Poetic Form and Aesthetic Unfolding Across Heterogeneous Generative Systems

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Abstract

A finite poetic form may be offered across historically different contexts and participate in distinct courses of interpretation, experience, and creation. This paper examines that possibility through literary phenomenology, reception theory, hermeneutics, pragmatist aesthetics, and the philosophy of judgment. Its proposed generative-relational (GR) account distinguishes poetic offering, receiving configuration, generative trajectory, aesthetic manifestation, and aesthetic judgment. These distinctions enable comparison among systems with different perceptual, material, historical, and normative conditions while preserving the difference between observable uptake and the attribution of beauty. The paper considers the limited role of quotient constructions in aesthetic comparison and develops generative invitation as a possible form of aesthetic praxis under conditions of meaningful uptake and refusal. Its claimed contribution is comparative and conditional: GR descriptions are useful where they clarify consequential dependencies or persistent transformations beyond those already explained by established reception theories. The analysis neither equates generativity with beauty nor infers subjective experience from fluent aesthetic performance. It is a philosophical proposal supported by constructed cases; empirical validation, passage-level source verification, and stronger ontological claims remain open.

Keywords: poetic form; aesthetic unfolding; reader response; generative-relational philosophy; heterogeneous systems; aesthetic judgment

Draft status. Working manuscript, version 1.11, 28 October 2026. Sections 1–12 constitute a complete philosophical draft. This ninth editorial pass examines a further primary text by Rosenblatt and sharpens the comparative conditions under which a GR account of trajectories and invitation would add to established reception theory. These focused checks do not constitute an exhaustive primary-source audit; independent philosophical review remains outstanding. The paper has not been peer reviewed. The accompanying source ledger specifies the verification level of cited materials. **Reading orientation.** This version contains the Introduction and eleven further sections, followed by research provenance and references. The accompanying outline distinguishes this aesthetic inquiry from the separate studies of generative invitation, pedagogy, and heterogeneous value co-creation.

Discussion Paper Note

The emerging philosophical inquiry examines how formally identifiable poetic offerings participate in aesthetic unfolding across heterogeneous generative-relational systems. Its conceptual distinctions separate structure, encounter, interpretive trajectory, aesthetic manifestation, and judgment. It treats phenomenological and reader-response approaches as substantial intellectual predecessors rather than claims to novelty. The GR extension and its practical implications are proposed for critical examination.

The present version contains the Introduction only. The outline, bibliography, verification ledger, and writing principles accompany the source. The completed section offers a problem statement and argument architecture, while later work is required to evaluate objections, construct the limited quotient formalism, elaborate case comparisons, and justify the relation between aesthetic emergence and normative coordination. The working manuscript should not be cited as a completed theory of aesthetic experience.

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1 Introduction

This inquiry examines how identifiable poetic forms participate in aesthetic events and judgments across historically differentiated generative systems. A bounded arrangement of words, rhythms, pauses, and images may be offered repeatedly, while each encounter develops amid particular perceptual capacities, memories, social relations, material conditions, and interpretive practices. The central philosophical difficulty concerns the relation between a form that can recur and aesthetic occurrences whose histories and relational conditions remain singular. The analysis distinguishes what is materially offered, how a recipient takes it up, what becomes aesthetically manifest, and what warrants a subsequent judgment. It investigates these questions through philosophical comparison with literary phenomenology, reception theory, hermeneutics, pragmatist aesthetics, and theories of judgment, supplemented by limited conceptual formalization. The proposed generative-relational (GR) account is an explanatory hypothesis about receiving conditions and their development. It supplies neither a definition of beauty nor empirical evidence that particular recipients, including artificial systems, undergo aesthetic experience.

The point of departure is an asymmetry between formal recurrence and experiential occurrence. A poem may be reproduced with a relatively stable sequence of marks or sounds, subject to the familiar complications of editions, performance, translation, and material presentation. Its reception takes place within historically situated relations, including habits of attention, bodily circumstances, remembered encounters, available conceptual distinctions, and social expectations. Two readers can encounter closely corresponding formal arrangements while undergoing materially different experiences. One reader may respond to a rhythm as a continuation of an intimate memory, another may recognize a linguistic innovation, and a third may develop an interpretation whose significance becomes apparent only through subsequent events. These examples specify possible relational pathways rather than demonstrate that every such pathway is aesthetic. The stability of a supplied structure can coexist with historical divergence in what the encounter brings into being.

The analysis employs five related objects: the *poetic offering*, the material and conventional presentation through which a work becomes available; the *receiving configuration*, the historically constituted relations and capacities relevant to an encounter; the *generative trajectory*, the course of situated uptake and transformation; the *aesthetic manifestation*, a candidate occurrence of beauty or aesthetic significance within such a course; and the *aesthetic judgment*, the participant's evaluative response under historically formed normative conditions. These distinctions mark analytical tasks with different conditions of adequacy. Formal description and interpretation can establish constraints on an offering and aspects of its uptake. Attributing an experience of beauty calls for further phenomenal, expressive, or practice-based warrant, while assessing a judgment calls for attention to reasons, norms, and critical exchange. The five objects therefore specify potential relations without fixing their temporal order or establishing five independently existing entities. In particular, a hypothesized manifestation prior to explicit symbolization remains compatible with acquired perceptual habits and normative modulation; it does not designate an unstructured or norm-free state.

The philosophical issue has a substantial inheritance. In Kant's account of judgments of taste, the pleasure associated with beauty is connected to a free relation of cognitive faculties and to a claim of communicability that exceeds the application of a determinate concept [21]. Whatever stance one adopts toward Kant's transcendental argument, the relation between aesthetic appreciation, conceptual determination, and the demand for others' agreement remains pertinent. A judgment of beauty can carry a normative aspiration even when the person judging lacks a rule capable of compelling agreement. The present paper takes that tension seriously while examining whether a theory whose subjects may possess heterogeneous histories and generative mechanisms should begin with a single shared faculty architecture. A common normative demand, when established, would still require a separate account of how an aesthetic occurrence becomes available in each participant's historically situated life.

Phenomenological literary theory provides an especially close starting point. Roman Ingarden analyzes the literary work as a structured and in important respects schematic formation, with aspects whose realization remains open across acts of reading [16]. The distinction between the work and its

concretizations furnishes a powerful vocabulary for relating enduring textual constraints to variable aesthetic objects. Wolfgang Iser subsequently described the interaction of the text's artistic pole and the reader's aesthetic realization, treating the act of reading as constitutive of the literary work's appearance [18]. These contributions already establish that an adequate philosophy of reading attends to the reader's activity and the form of the work together. Accordingly, reader-dependent realization is treated here as an inherited problem and philosophical resource. The proposed GR investigation must earn its own contribution through a more precise account of cross-system heterogeneity, historically evolving generative conditions, and the relation between aesthetic realization and the possibility of intersubjective practice.

Reception aesthetics and philosophical hermeneutics deepen the historical dimension. Hans Robert Jauss connects literary reception to historically shifting horizons of expectation, showing why a work's reception belongs to literary history as well as to the analysis of textual form [20]. Gadamer's account of historically effected understanding likewise places interpretation within inherited yet transformable horizons [11]. These approaches caution against imagining a reader whose interpretive resources are fixed independently of history. They also prevent the GR vocabulary of a receiving system from being mistaken for a closed mechanism whose outcomes have been fully specified in advance. Historical situatedness includes the possibility that an encounter alters the interpretive dispositions through which subsequent encounters are undertaken. A poem can thereby participate in a developing history of reception even when its preserved textual configuration changes comparatively little.

Louise Rosenblatt's transactional theory offers another particularly relevant precedent. Her account treats the literary work as evoked through a situated transaction between reader and text, and distinguishes an aesthetic orientation toward the lived reading event from an efferent orientation toward what is carried away from reading [26]. The distinction helps clarify the present inquiry's contrast between the reproduction of an instructed result and the unfolding of a poetic encounter. It is a contrast between orientations and functions rather than between mutually exclusive textual genres. A practical document may invite creative activity, while a poem can carry instructions, argument, historical testimony, or political claims. The more specific proposal is that poetic form often supports an encounter whose unfolding has significance in its own course, including rhythmic organization, shifts of expectation, resonance, and imaginative transformation. The reader's developing activity can matter aesthetically even where the reader arrives at no final proposition that exhausts the significance of the experience.

A related emphasis appears in John Dewey's account of art as experience. Dewey approaches aesthetic experience through the organized interaction of a living being and an environment, rather than isolating a finished art object from the processes of its experience [4]. This orientation helps distinguish a merely available structure from an aesthetically significant occurrence involving that structure. Ricœur's hermeneutics, in turn, makes the interpretation of texts relevant to imagination and action beyond the immediate moment of reading [25]. The present paper draws from these lineages without equating their philosophical commitments. Phenomenological ontology, transcendental aesthetics, pragmatist naturalism, reception theory, and hermeneutics offer different accounts of the conditions and significance of literary realization. Their disagreements are resources for critical comparison, particularly where the proposed GR representation remains ontologically suspended.

The generative-relational proposal treats a subject's relevant configuration as historically constituted through relations, constraints, capacities, practices, and changing possibilities of action and interpretation. Within the scope of this paper, *generative* refers to the capacity of such configurations to participate in the production or transformation of trajectories, while *relational* emphasizes the constitutive involvement of encounters, dependencies, and situated connections. Neither expression supplies an aesthetic criterion by definition. A process may be generative while producing indifference, distress, instrumental knowledge, or conflict. Aesthetically significant unfolding is a further possible qualification of particular encounters. The GR framework offers a vocabulary for asking how an offering enters differentiated systems, how a trajectory develops, and what the resulting relation enables; whether beauty appears, and what grounds a judgment of beauty, remain questions requiring specifically aesthetic arguments.

The concept of *heterogeneity* is consequently stronger than the observation that different people hold different opinions about art. Two interpreters may differ in lexical competence, perceptual modality, tem-

poral orientation, bodily organization, cultural practice, formative dependencies, or available procedures of valuation. Their differences may occur simultaneously at several levels, and they may evolve through the encounter itself. Human readers across languages and traditions already provide complex cases. More radical hypothetical cases include an artificial or otherwise unfamiliar system possessing generative and evaluative procedures with no established correspondence to familiar human aesthetic experience. Such examples are analytical probes. The ability of an artificial system to describe, classify, or generate works does not itself establish subjective aesthetic experience, autonomous taste, or the standing of an aesthetic subject. A theory that permits these possibilities must also distinguish observed performance, hypothesized mechanisms, interpretive attribution, and experienced beauty.

This distinction becomes pressing when the same poetic offering is received in different languages or modalities. A lexical string, a translation, an oral performance, and a visual or tactile rendition involve different materially realized forms. Their relationships can be described through conventional translation, rhythmic correspondence, pragmatic resemblance, partial structural mapping, and shared histories of reception. A claim that the *same* poem reaches two heterogeneous systems must therefore identify the dimension in which sameness is asserted. Identity of inscribed marks, similarity of formal organization, continuity of an acknowledged work, and functional correspondence of an offered prompt can come apart. The paper uses *poetic offering* to keep those distinctions visible. A particular encounter may be mediated by translation without requiring a complete transfer of the initial interpretive or aesthetic trajectory.

The problem of symbolic reduction provides an additional motive for the inquiry. A symbol or critical category can identify common features by treating some differences as equivalent. Such grouping is indispensable for discourse and criticism. Yet an aesthetic manifestation may depend upon relational or historical features omitted by the chosen classification. If an equivalence relation is required to preserve every difference that could matter aesthetically across a specified range of encounters, the resulting classes may become much finer than those needed for ordinary linguistic or institutional coordination. That possibility motivates the paper's later, strictly limited use of group actions and quotient constructions. It remains a conditional analytical proposal: histories do not automatically constitute groups, and the distinctness of two histories alone establishes neither aesthetic inequivalence nor the mathematical triviality of an admissible quotient. The philosophical point is that effective communication may require limited common structures even where complete compression of singular aesthetic occurrence is unavailable.

Aesthetic normativity also requires a domain-sensitive account. A reader may inherit literary conventions, internalize evaluative patterns, and revise them in encounters with other readers. Such conditions can shape attention, interpretation, criticism, and subsequent artistic practice. The origins of norms, however, should be distinguished from the emergence of aesthetic significance and from the ethical standing of conduct. An externally supplied preference, a participant's reflective commitment, and a norm developed through dialogue may regulate aesthetic judgment in different ways. Their presence does not ensure the occurrence of beauty; their convergence does not guarantee identical aesthetic experiences. Ethical norms may support fair opportunities for participation or protect subjects against coercive appropriation, while leaving substantive aesthetic judgments open to enduring disagreement. The broader research programme can therefore connect aesthetics to normative formation without assimilating the aesthetic, the ethical, and the normative into a single kind of evaluation.

The principal constructive proposal is a provisional account of *aesthetic unfolding*. A poetic offering can enter a receiving configuration and participate in a trajectory whose possibilities are conditioned by that configuration's history and relations. Along this trajectory, form may be noticed, transformed, remembered, contested, reinterpreted, or put to use in later creation. Aesthetic manifestation, if it occurs, belongs to the situated development of the encounter; judgment may accompany, revise, or follow its articulation without providing an exhaustive description of its occurrence. The term *unfolding* designates this historically situated process and does not imply that a latent complete meaning was deposited in the offering. Nor does it establish that the receiving subject alone produces the value. Poetic form supplies constraints and possibilities, other participants and environments contribute conditions, and the receiving system has its own history of activity. The explanatory object is therefore relational, with responsibilities and contributions subject to further analysis rather than assigned by terminology.

Two constructed cases indicate the programme's scope. In the first, readers with different histories encounter a formally stable short poem. One attends principally to its sound relations; another connects its imagery to a cultural practice; each develops an interpretive trajectory that may become aesthetically significant. The comparison asks which constraints remain traceable to the offering and which transformations depend upon the readers' histories. In the second case, two systems use different representational media and lack an established common experiential vocabulary. One system provides a patterned offering that the other takes up according to its own generative conditions. The second case asks what can be inferred about structural reception and evaluative behaviour, which aspects of aesthetic attribution remain uncertain, and whether collaborative activity can proceed under partial interpretive correspondence. Both cases are philosophical constructions rather than observations or evidence for the subjecthood of any particular technical system.

Iser's account provides the nearest test of originality. His distinction between the artistic pole and the reader's aesthetic realization already places textual pattern and reader activity in a temporally developing relation [18]. The word *aesthetic* in that distinction refers to a pole of literary realization; it does not, on its own, certify a felt experience of beauty. The GR proposal should therefore be assessed against three more discriminating questions. First, can specified differences in receiving configurations—such as perceptual access, material dependencies, institutional conditions, or interpretive capacities—explain a contrast in uptake that a reception-theoretical account leaves insufficiently articulated? Second, can the encounter be shown to alter capacities or practices governing later encounters, beyond yielding a particular interpretation? Third, can claims about such alterations be separated from judgments of beauty, claims of subjective experience, and claims about legitimate collaborative participation? These are proposed criteria of comparative explanatory usefulness, rather than declarations that earlier theories omitted history, experience, or generative change.

The GR description may be redundant when a contrast is already adequately explained by Jauss's horizon of expectation, Iser's literary realization, Rosenblatt's reading transaction, or an established account of artistic categories. Additional labels for relations or capacities do not by themselves constitute an explanatory advance. A more demanding comparison would hold an identifiable offering approximately stable, specify variation in a recipient's accessible structures or resources, and trace the uptake and possible persistence of the resulting transformation. The analysis must then ask whether the GR representation clarifies a consequential dependency that a rival reconstruction leaves less explicit. It must also register countercases: a sophisticated offering may be refused, a novel interpretation may have little aesthetic consequence, and convergent judgments may be reached through distinct experiences. The explanatory comparison remains conceptual until appropriate historical or empirical investigation is undertaken.

The proposed contribution is a bounded philosophical coordination of questions that established traditions often investigate with different aims: poetic identity and material mediation; historically differentiated uptake; the possible manifestation of beauty; judgment and normative formation; and the practical relation through which one subject makes a form available for another's own development. Such coordination may prove useful where participants have partially divergent perceptual or generative mechanisms, but it does not entail radical conceptual incommensurability. *Generative invitation* designates one possible aesthetic practice: an offering is made available in conditions allowing a recipient meaningful uptake, transformation, or refusal, with subsequent development shaped by the recipient's own history. The aesthetic value of what occurs, the ethical standing of the encounter, and the attribution of creative contribution remain separate inquiries. Education and heterogeneous value co-creation are indicated as future extensions, while the present manuscript remains focused on poetic form and aesthetic unfolding.

The argument proceeds from the philosophical status of poetic form and reader realization to their historical and relational conditions. It next develops a GR account of generative trajectories, aesthetic manifestation, and judgment, followed by a selective investigation of equivalence and the limitations of aesthetic quotienting. Subsequent sections address interpretive plurality and textual constraint, the modulation of aesthetic judgment by norms, encounters across heterogeneous systems, and the practice of offering forms that others may unfold through their own capacities. The concluding analysis considers rival accounts, evidential boundaries, and remaining philosophical problems. Throughout, formal expressions

serve to identify assumptions and relations among concepts; the weight of the argument remains with philosophical interpretation, careful distinctions, and openly revisable claims.

2 Poetic Form, Material Mediation, and Literary Realization

The philosophical status of poetic form determines what may be held relatively stable when different subjects are said to encounter a poem. This section distinguishes the identity of a literary work, the material and conventional conditions through which it becomes available, the organization of its formal constraints, and the activity by which an encounter acquires significance. The discussion proceeds by reconstructing several inherited accounts of literary workhood and poetic organization, examining recitation, inscription, and translation, and testing the distinction between practical instruction and poetic offering. Its method is principally ontological and interpretive, with constructed examples used to delimit the claims. The resulting distinctions prepare an account of heterogeneous aesthetic unfolding without presuming either that a poem contains a complete experience waiting to be extracted or that a receiving subject produces an unconstrained interpretation.

A written poem may be encountered through ink, illuminated pixels, raised marks, copied characters, or the traces of a text remembered after reading. A performed poem enters an encounter through acoustic events, bodily movement, silence, and the temporal organization of delivery. Each medium realizes access under particular material conditions: a voice has a duration and timbre; a page locates words in a visual field; a tactile inscription presents a different organization of exploratory movement. Describing these circumstances as *mediation* establishes their relevance to reception while leaving the identity of the work itself an independent question. The page is a possible bearer of a poem; an audible performance may provide access to a poem; a remembered utterance may continue to participate in its reception. An adequate account of poetic form therefore needs criteria for identifying the object of encounter and for describing its contingent modes of availability.

Roman Ingarden's account of the literary work offers an important philosophical precedent for this separation. His analysis distinguishes the literary work from its physical exemplars and from particular psychological acts, and describes a structured formation whose interdependent strata include sound formations, units of meaning, schematized appearances, and represented objectivities [16]. The work's schematic character matters here because some aspects remain open to concretization in acts of reading. The reader's participation is consequently intelligible as a contribution to the realization of a structured work, while the work's organization remains relevant to which concretizations can be defended. Ingarden's proposed ontology carries commitments concerning intentional objects that the present inquiry need not adopt in full. Its methodological value is already substantial: workhood, material access, and realized experience can be treated as distinct, interrelated objects of inquiry. This distinction helps prevent the diversity of readers' histories from dissolving the poem into a mere list of private responses.

Nelson Goodman's distinction between autographic and allographic arts approaches work identity through criteria of correct instantiation. Where a literary work is treated as allographic, its script and rules of compliance can establish why spatially separated exemplars count as instances of one work [12]. The strength of this approach is its specification of what repeatability requires. Its limits become visible when the chosen notation leaves out features that an interpretive practice regards as consequential: lineation, visual spacing, performance, editorial intervention, or historically revised conventions. These complications call for an explicit account of the notation and practice at issue. The present inquiry accordingly distinguishes inscriptional identity under a specified rule from historically mediated work identification. Goodman's account clarifies a demanding mode of work identification; this achievement alone leaves the aesthetic event experienced by a recipient open.

Three forms of continuity require separate criteria. *Inscriptional continuity* concerns identity under a stated transcription or notational rule. *Work continuity* concerns the grounds upon which editions, performances, and translations are attributed to an identifiable work within a practice. *Aesthetic continuity* concerns a delimited correspondence between qualities or trajectories of encounters. Copies may satisfy the first criterion; historically informed literary conventions may be needed for the second; and the third

requires evidence about encounters or judgments. These continuities may coincide, yet inscriptional fidelity and recognized work identity supply insufficient grounds for asserting identical aesthetic manifestations. A translated rendition may sustain work continuity while altering verbal organization. Claims of sameness become more precise when their continuity criterion is stated.

These distinctions resist two symmetrical simplifications. An account focused solely on marks risks disregarding the ways that performed rhythm, hesitation, gesture, and acoustic realization affect what is made available. An account focused solely on encounters risks losing the constraints that make criticism and the recognition of a particular work possible. A poem's offering can be treated, provisionally, as a materially instantiated, conventionally recognizable configuration through which certain formal relations become available to a recipient. The word *offering* identifies the encounter-facing role of such a configuration; it is an analytic term used in this paper rather than an alternative general ontology of works. A literary work may possess a complex history across editions and performances, whereas the poetic offering at issue is a specified instance or rendition in a particular encounter. The distinction permits us to describe what a subject actually receives while keeping open the philosophical dispute over the identity of the work to which that instance belongs.

Poetic form itself is plural in composition. It may involve relations among phonemes, stress patterns, recurrent pauses, grammatical parallels, lexical contrasts, semantic ambiguities, visual placements, culturally salient images, and sequences of disclosure. These features are interdependent to different degrees. A pause after a clause can alter its temporal expectancy; a line break can foreground a relation between words that ordinary syntactic grouping leaves less salient; a repeated sound may acquire force through the semantic distance between the expressions that carry it. The literary significance of any one relation may depend upon the others and on the recipient's conventions of uptake. A list of independently measured formal features can illuminate the work, yet the organization of a poem may include interactions whose significance emerges only through a particular sequence of reading. Formal analysis consequently requires both attention to discernible constraints and restraint in claiming an exhaustive inventory of what the poem affords.

Roman Jakobson's account of the poetic function makes the organization of the message itself a salient aspect of communication. Relations of recurrence and equivalence contribute to the arrangement of expressions, including patterns formed through selection and combination [19]. Such organization can affect a reader's unfolding attention in ways that a paraphrase of referential content does not preserve. Jakobson situates the poetic function among other functions of language, allowing it to become prominent in utterances serving additional purposes. The distinction relevant here concerns function and orientation within an encounter. Poetic language may guide action, and practical discourse may be aesthetically attended to; formal salience determines neither genre nor beauty.

The contrast between practical instruction and poetic offering is most illuminating when framed through criteria of uptake. An instruction can be assessed by an identifiable task performed under specified conditions. In poetic encounters, cadence, juxtaposition, ambiguity, recollection, and arrangements of attention may themselves contribute to what matters to a participant. A single utterance can sustain both orientations. Rosenblatt's distinction between predominantly efferent and predominantly aesthetic reading offers a closer precedent than any division of texts into instrumental and poetic kinds [26]. Her distinction concerns selective attention during a transaction: a poem can be approached for information, just as an instruction can be attended to aesthetically. A poetic offering is therefore specified through its form and encounter, rather than assigned a guaranteed aesthetic status by its genre. The proposed GR extension examines how comparatively stable forms become differently consequential across historically differentiated receiving systems.

Completion criteria reveal a further difference. The immediate purpose of an instruction to close a window may be achieved when the window is shut. A poem can have a locally integrated encounter while continuing to inform recollection or later creation; conversely, a practical instruction may be remembered or appreciated for its expression. The completion of a task, the closure of a linguistic episode, and the articulation of aesthetic experience thus specify different thresholds. This distinction matters because an encounter's generative consequences may persist after its practical purpose has been fulfilled, whereas an

aesthetic episode may have value through a satisfying local completion without further production.

An illustrative invented line makes the issue concrete: *After the rain, the threshold holds a little light.* The sentence has an identifiable arrangement of words, an image involving rain and a threshold, and a personification that assigns a form of holding to an architectural boundary. In a building-maintenance context, the sentence might be interpreted as an imprecise observation about illumination or wet surfaces. In an elegiac context, it might participate in an encounter involving persistence, return, or an unresolved departure. In a reader's personal history, the threshold might recall a particular place without the writer having known that place. These are possible trajectories offered for analysis, rather than evidence that the sentence is beautiful or that its semantic possibilities are unlimited. A reading that treats the line as a detailed numerical report of a building's dimensions would, absent further contextual grounds, encounter resistance from its words and organization. The example illustrates an important double dependence: the form helps constrain the range of defensible engagements, while a recipient's history participates in developing the relations actually realized.

Repetition introduces a further complication. The same reader may approach the same inscription on two occasions, retaining memories and capacities changed by encounters in between. The second realization may foreground a rhythm previously overlooked or render an image troubling that had once appeared consoling. A printed sequence can remain unchanged while its receiving conditions evolve. The resulting transformations belong to the history of an encounter, and they should be distinguished from changes to the text itself. A description of the form allows us to identify some comparatively stable relations across the two occasions; a description of the reader's development helps explain why those relations become differently salient. The argument does not entail that the reader's entire biography must be reconstructed to understand a response. It does, however, establish a reason to specify which historical and relational variables a particular interpretation or comparison is able to access.

A translation intensifies the problem because its mediation is also a creative intervention in form. A translator may conserve an image while altering rhythm, seek metrical correspondence while replacing a culturally marked expression, or reorganize a line to sustain a perceived tension between sound and sense. The receiving subject can thereby encounter a different arrangement of constraints associated with the original work by interpretive, editorial, and literary conventions. Calling the translation *the same poem* may express work continuity under such conventions; claiming preservation of the *same formal features* requires a more restricted, feature-specific account. Claiming the *same aesthetic experience* requires a further account of the recipients and the relevant criteria of experience. The practical significance of this distinction extends beyond multilingual communication. A shift from acoustic to tactile mediation, from page to performance, or from human reading to a technical system that processes symbolic sequences may preserve certain correspondences while transforming the conditions of uptake.

The problem of authorial intention belongs within this field of distinctions. Wimsatt and Beardsley's critique of treating intention as the governing standard of literary interpretation supplied one influential argument for the public criticizability of the work [35]. A historically informed account can still regard authorial practices, drafts, declared aims, and publication circumstances as evidence relevant to some interpretive questions. The important distinction concerns the evidential and normative function assigned to such material. A writer's expectation about a reader's response, the publicly accessible organization of the poem, and the reader's actual experience may diverge. An adequate theory of generative offering allows a poet to contribute an intentional form while leaving room for aesthetic realizations beyond the poet's anticipations. At the same time, that room remains structured by publicly contestable features of the offered work. Interpretive plurality gains intellectual substance from its engagement with recognizable constraints and historically available evidence.

Calling a poetic offering *generative* may refer to several phenomena: formal openings in the text, associations developed during an encounter, changes in subsequent interpretive capacities, or creative practices occasioned by reading. These phenomena warrant different evidence. A work may support many paraphrases without becoming aesthetically compelling to a particular reader. A brief line may contribute to an intense aesthetic experience while occasioning little subsequent innovation. Consequently, generative capacity is one possible feature of the encounter; it neither supplies a sufficient criterion of

beauty nor ranks aesthetic worth. Whether beauty manifests within an unfolding requires a separate aesthetic inquiry.

Wolfgang Iser's distinction between the artistic and aesthetic poles already assigns an essential role to the reader's realization of the work [18]. In Iser's terminology, the *aesthetic pole* refers to the reader's realization; it does not establish that every realization is experienced as beautiful. His account of anticipation, retrospection, textual patterns, and readerly dispositions also makes temporality central to literary theory. The present inquiry therefore claims no priority for the proposition that texts are realized in reading or that reading can transform readers. Its proposed extension instead asks which differences in mediation and receiving capacities matter across heterogeneous systems, whether acquired capacities persist beyond an encounter, and what additional warrant permits aesthetic attribution. These questions are separable even where their answers interact.

The analytic function of *poetic offering* now becomes more precise. It designates the structured contribution that is available at the boundary of an encounter, whether through inscription, performance, translation, or another specified mediation. The offering constrains possibilities of uptake through relations that can be described and, within limits, disputed. The receiver contributes historically formed competences, dispositions, vulnerabilities, and capacities for transformation. Other participants, material environments, and established norms can shape the encounter as well. Aesthetic realization, where it occurs, is a candidate development within this relational activity. The relative stability of an offering therefore enables comparison while supplying neither a universal experience nor an exhaustive equivalence relation among aesthetic outcomes. This characterization is methodological: it does not settle Ingarden's ontology of the literary work, Goodman's criteria of notational identity, or rival accounts of the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties.

The resulting account treats the *poetic offering* as a relationally available configuration through which an encounter becomes possible. Its form offers constraints, while the identity of the offering depends upon specified modes of mediation and identification. Ingarden's stratified work, Goodman's criteria of correct instantiation, and Iser's account of readerly realization illuminate different dimensions of the problem. The comparative claim is limited: a shared offering can establish continuity of the encounter's object while leaving the recipient's aesthetic realization open. Section 3 next examines how phenomenology, reception aesthetics, and hermeneutics account for realization and historical transformation, and where distinct arguments for beauty and normative judgment remain necessary.

3 Aesthetic Realization in Phenomenology, Reception Theory, and Hermeneutics

An account of poetic realization across heterogeneous generative systems inherits several distinct philosophical problems: the constitution of the literary work, the temporal activity of reading, the historical conditions of reception, the transformation of understanding, the qualitative organization of experience, and the standing of aesthetic evaluation. This section reconstructs the contributions and limitations of phenomenological literary ontology, reception aesthetics, transactional reading theory, philosophical hermeneutics, pragmatist aesthetics, and Kantian judgments of taste. The method is a comparative reading of established positions together with a conceptual analysis of their transfer to the proposed generative-relational (GR) vocabulary. The purpose is to locate a defensible philosophical remainder after acknowledging how much reader-dependent realization, historical situatedness, and interpretive activity these traditions already explain. Differences among the accounts matter throughout: a theory of the identity of an artwork, a description of reading as an event, and a justification of aesthetic judgments address related yet distinct questions.

Ingarden's literary ontology establishes conditions for asking how readers realize a work while disagreeing about it. The stratified, schematic work permits concretizations without being identical to a physical copy or a reader's passing mental state [16]. Its status as a purely intentional object also reflects ontological commitments that the present GR inquiry suspends. The central issue here is the difference

between constituting a concretization and attributing aesthetic value. A reader may determine a suggested aspect in one way rather than another; the question of what aesthetic qualities become manifest through such activity remains distinct.

Ingarden's subsequent inquiry into the cognition of literary art makes the differentiation of activity more explicit. Its architecture treats reading and concretization, temporal perspective, the aesthetic experience and object, and reflective cognition of an aesthetic concretization as distinguishable topics [17]. The published chapter organization establishes this scope of inquiry; a full reconstruction of its arguments would require a closer examination of the relevant passages. The present paper uses the distinction to keep the apprehension of literary form, the unfolding of a realization, and the attribution of beauty answerable to different questions. These issues are already present in Ingarden's work, and their appearance in GR vocabulary supplies no independent claim of historical originality. The GR extension retains the relevance of structured constraints while leaving the ontology of beauty and its manifestation open.

This distinction clarifies the difference between admissible realization and imaginative supplementation. Some determinations are supported by the work's organization; others are appropriations whose relation to the work requires explanation. Such differences have no automatic correspondence with beautiful and unbeautiful experience. An interpretation may responsibly realize a poem without moving its reader, while a personally evocative association may be aesthetically consequential despite weak grounds as an interpretation. Textual defensibility and aesthetic salience therefore require independent assessments.

Iser's "The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach" foregrounds the temporal activity of reading: anticipations are revised, textual gaps elicit provisional syntheses, and successive perspectives alter what earlier passages appear to mean [18]. His two-pole formulation locates the artistic pole in the authored text and the aesthetic pole in realization through reading. Here *aesthetic pole* is a technical designation for readerly realization; it supplies neither a criterion of beauty nor a guarantee of appreciative experience. Iser also recognizes the participation of readerly dispositions and their interaction with textual patterns. Neither temporally evolving interpretation nor the importance of the reader's history is therefore a new result of the present paper.

The proposed additional problem begins with a specification of explanatory domain. Reception theory can illuminate how a human reader's expectations develop in an encounter. A GR comparison asks how the conditions for that development vary with mediation, perception, memory, learned conventions, institutional dependencies, and interpretive architecture. It further asks whether an encounter durably alters subsequent capacities and whether the available evidence warrants attributing aesthetic manifestation. These questions can be pursued without assuming that Iser disregarded the development of readers. Their value depends on demonstrating explanatory differences in delimited cases rather than assigning priority to new terminology.

Ingarden and Iser place different explanatory weight upon the structured work and the activity of reading. Ingarden's ontology supports the distinction between a literary work and its concretizations; Iser explains the reader's temporal synthesis and its relation to textual organization. Their perspectives may be complementary, yet their divergence matters when identifying a work, describing an interpretive trajectory, and attributing aesthetic value are treated as separate tasks. A heterogeneous-subject comparison should indicate exactly which task a reception-theoretic analogy illuminates.

Historical reception adds a scale that exceeds an individual reader's psychological sequence. Jauss's account of literary history relates works to changing horizons of expectation, including conventions that condition recognition, surprise, and later reception [20]. A form may become conventional or disruptive under different historical expectations; criticism, translation, and institutions also participate in these changes. The GR term *history* accordingly encompasses public histories of texts and genres alongside personal trajectories. Changes in a work's collective reception and changes in an individual's capacities should be distinguishable even when they influence one another.

Jauss's historically situated reader challenges an overly private conception of aesthetic singularity. A person's history comprises participation in shared practices as well as experiences specific to that person. Readers who belong to distinct communities may nevertheless inherit overlapping conventions,

and readers within a single institution may encounter divergent histories of exclusion, acquisition, or reinterpretation. Such differences affect the reach of critical generalization. If the GR framework proposes that complete aesthetic equivalence may be exceptionally difficult to establish, that proposition cannot be defended merely by noting biographical uniqueness. Historical reception also supplies shared classifications, recurrent practices, and locally useful comparisons. The philosophical task is to determine which properties a comparison preserves, the contexts in which they remain pertinent, and the aesthetic differences that its chosen categories leave unresolved. The later analysis of equivalence and quotient constructions will depend on precisely this distinction between a useful partial invariant and an exhaustive aesthetic equivalence.

Rosenblatt's transactional theory provides an especially close precedent. In *The Reader, the Text, the Poem*, the literary work is evoked in a particular reader–text transaction, with attention, prior experience, and context participating in its realization [26]. Her efferent–aesthetic continuum distinguishes what a reader attends to as usable information from what the reader lives through in reading. The continuum concerns orientations within activity rather than fixed types of documents. Rosenblatt already gives the reader's linguistic and experiential history a constitutive place. The proposed addition lies in specifying differences between receiving capacities across heterogeneous systems and in distinguishing observed interpretation from the independent attribution of aesthetic experience.

The phrase *the recipient's own generative language* must consequently be understood dynamically. Interpretive resources are historically acquired and may be reorganized through the encounter. A poetic offering contributes formal constraints and affordances while the recipient's capacities remain among the changing conditions. This view is consistent with transactional reading and avoids treating recipients as sealed containers of prepared meanings. Extending it to hypothetical artificial or unfamiliar nonhuman participants requires an epistemic boundary: patterned responses and generative production can be described as observable activities, whereas experienced beauty must be argued on separate grounds.

Transaction retains a dimension of criticism. A reader may shift attention between expressive organization and information drawn from it; interpretations may be contested through reference to the shared form and relevant conventions. Aesthetic *manifestation*, where warranted, designates a candidate qualitative occurrence, whereas *judgment* designates an evaluative response potentially calling for public reasons. Several situated realizations can be compared and discussed without rendering their aesthetic experiences identical or their interpretations immune to criticism.

Gadamer's hermeneutics locates understanding within historically effected horizons. Encounters with texts may place inherited prejudgments under examination and transform which questions an interpreter can ask [11]. The fusion of horizons concerns a historically effected transformation in understanding; it does not imply that two individuals acquire an identical mental state or aesthetic feeling. For Gadamer, language and dialogue are constitutive media of hermeneutic understanding. This creates a genuine philosophical difference from the proposed GR hypothesis of a beauty that might become manifest before explicit symbolic classification. That hypothesis would require an account of the relation between qualitative occurrence and linguistic articulation, while engaging Gadamer's claim about the linguisticality of understanding. Historical situatedness enriches the interpretation of a work while keeping private associations answerable to what the work presents.

An encounter among heterogeneous participants may yield an intelligible common issue, a shared interpretation of a formal relation, or a coordinated new rendition while preserving differences in the sensory and qualitative character of their responses. Such cooperation may represent an achievement of understanding with a practical dimension; shared experience requires further evidence. The proposed GR extension thus keeps interpretive translation, practical coordination, and aesthetic manifestation independently assessable. Its claim concerns their possible relationships, not a universal barrier between self-contained worlds.

Ricœur's treatment of textual distanciation draws attention to discourse that becomes available beyond its originating conversational situation and to the interpretive appropriation mediated by a text [25]. Explanation of textual relations and appropriation in a reader's self-understanding can thus function as complementary dimensions of hermeneutic activity. A comparatively persistent poetic offering may

enter different historical contexts while participating in distinct interpretations and transformations of self-understanding. The writer's intentions remain historically relevant evidence without exhaustively specifying these trajectories. A proposed extension to heterogeneous recipients is warranted only where some identifiable interface makes the offering available and supports the claim that an encounter occurred.

Gadamer and Ricœur illuminate distinct features of this relation. Historical horizons condition intelligibility; textual distanciation explains the continuing availability of discourse across contexts; appropriation concerns the transformation of a reader's understanding. This creates a testable conceptual distinction for GR: an encounter may change subsequent interpretive capacities while its aesthetic evaluation remains unsettled. A reader may newly comprehend a metaphor without experiencing beauty, or encounter beauty with limited capacity to explain its significance. Different claims call for different evidence. The GR vocabulary has value here insofar as it preserves the analytical independence of receiving conditions, generative trajectory, aesthetic manifestation, and judgment.

John Dewey's *Art as Experience* supplies a different philosophical orientation through its emphasis on the qualitative organization of transactions between a living being and its environment [4]. Dewey approaches aesthetic experience through a developing unity in which undergoing and doing, tensions and resolutions, and the organization of material become dynamically significant. This allows poetic appreciation to be treated as an activity with temporal phases, bodily and environmental conditions, and degrees of experiential integration. The aesthetic character of an encounter is more demanding, on this view, than the occurrence of a new association or the production of an unexpected proposition. An event can be generative in the minimal sense of changing a person's subsequent possibilities while lacking the qualitative integration that Dewey associates with aesthetic experience. Dewey thus gives the present inquiry a philosophically important counterweight to the temptation to equate expanded generativity with greater beauty.

Dewey's account also raises a question concerning the scope of a *trajectory*. An aesthetic encounter may have recognizable phases of development and fulfillment without requiring that the wider history of the participant reach a final completion. A poem's resonance may persist into later encounters and alter future perception; a particular episode of reading may nevertheless possess a local integrity through its organization. The present GR proposal should therefore distinguish an episode's aesthetic articulation from the indefinite openness of the historical relations in which it participates. Doing so avoids equating aesthetic worth with the mere extension of an unfolding process. There may be aesthetic significance in restraint, suspension, repose, or the concentrated realization of a finite form. Any claim that generative expansion is intrinsically beautiful would require a justification that the process account alone cannot supply.

The relation of aesthetic experience to judgment remains especially difficult. Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* treats judgments of taste as reflecting a pleasure associated with the free play of imagination and understanding, while claiming a distinctive kind of communicability that does not depend on a determinate concept of beauty [21]. The account concerns a normative demand: a person making a judgment of taste speaks with an expectation of agreement exceeding a report of private preference. This position is relevant to the GR inquiry because divergent histories and realizations alone do not determine what a participant is entitled to claim when describing a poem as beautiful. The occurrence of an aesthetic episode, the articulation of a judgment, and its demand for others' recognition pose distinct analytical questions. Kant's own discussion in section 9 makes the relation between pleasure and judging a problem rather than a settled temporal sequence. The GR distinctions therefore carry no assumption that experiential manifestation universally precedes the activity of judging.

Kant's treatment also exposes a tension with the possibility of an aesthetically significant occurrence that precedes its explicit symbolization. His discussion in section 9 asks about the priority of pleasure and the judging of an object, and the scholarly interpretation of that passage remains contested. The present model accordingly leaves the temporal and constitutive relation between manifestation, feeling and judgment open. The present paper treats *pre-symbolic aesthetic manifestation* as an open hypothesis concerning cases where aesthetic significance may become operative without being exhaustively represented through a determinate linguistic or classificatory judgment. Such a hypothesis does not claim a condition

entirely free from acquired dispositions, perceptual organization, or historically shaped norms. Nor does it establish a metaphysical property of beauty prior to every act of recognition. Its limited purpose is to keep the occurrence and qualitative organization of an encounter conceptually distinguishable from the later, or concurrent, construction of a publicly communicable evaluative proposition.

The Kantian account further complicates proposals for a common aesthetic norm among heterogeneous subjects. A shared ethical rule for allowing artistic practices may be established through agreement, legal coordination, or other normative processes. Such coordination would offer grounds for protecting or enabling the participants' encounters; it would leave the question of their aesthetic manifestations open. Conversely, two participants might each make judgments of beauty while appealing to different grounds for communicability or lacking means to reproduce one another's experience. Kant provides a demanding model of the validity claim involved in judgments of taste. Extending that model across subjects whose relevant cognitive capacities and histories are substantially different would require further argument rather than an automatic appeal to universality. An account of heterogeneous aesthetics has reason to take the challenge of public justification seriously while resisting the unargued inference from common rules of coexistence to identical experiences of beauty.

The philosophical traditions considered here impose productive tensions upon the GR inquiry. Ingarden's structured work constrains concretizations through a work-centred ontology; Iser and Rosenblatt give greater explanatory weight to the temporality and situated activity of reading. Jauss and Gadamer illuminate historical frameworks exceeding one reader's response, while Ricœur examines the productive distance between text and later appropriation. Dewey connects aesthetic character to the qualitative organization of an experience, and Kant examines the claim to communicability raised by judgment of taste. These projects differ in ontological commitments, explanatory scale, and standards of justification. Their differences prevent realization, aesthetic experience, and valid judgment from being treated as synonyms merely because each can be considered relationally.

Three proposed additions merit further examination. *Generative heterogeneity* asks what new explanatory variables are needed when access, interpretation, and subsequent capacity development differ substantially among recipients. *Aesthetic irreducibility* asks whether comparable encounters may remain different in qualities that a shared interpretive category cannot preserve. *Relational aesthetic practice* asks how a participant can contribute to another's aesthetic possibilities without determining that other's experience or judgment. These are research questions rather than results obtained from the cited literature. Their distinct value depends upon comparisons in which existing reception, hermeneutic, and aesthetic approaches leave identifiable explanatory work unfinished.

The method for the remainder of the paper follows from this bounded contribution. Formal description of an offering and its receiving conditions may identify explanatory differences; qualitative and interpretive inquiry may illuminate what an encounter meant to a subject; normative argument must separately evaluate claims of aesthetic validity or responsible intervention. The expression *heterogeneous subject* does not independently establish the presence of aesthetic experience. Section 4 introduces histories, relations, dynamics, capacities, and norms as analytical components while preserving distinct standards of inference and the open metaphysical status of beauty.

4 Historically Differentiated Generative-Relational Systems

The present section specifies the generative-relational (GR) vocabulary through which poetic encounters among historically differentiated participants will be examined. Its purpose is to make the explanatory commitments of that vocabulary intelligible while preserving the difference between a philosophical representation of an encounter and a claim concerning the ultimate constitution of reality. The discussion proceeds from relational history and the formation of capacities to embodied and intersubjective differences, then develops a limited analytical representation of receiving systems, examines the conditions for attributing aesthetic subjectivity, and considers the constraints that heterogeneity places upon comparison and joint practice. The method is conceptual reconstruction informed by phenomenology, philosophical biology, and theories of individuation. These traditions supply substantive precedents and objections; the

GR vocabulary is proposed as a provisional way to organize their unresolved intersections.

A historically differentiated system may be understood initially as an identifiable configuration whose possibilities depend partly upon relations and transformations involving that configuration. A reader's engagement with a poem depends, for example, upon the language learned, the repertoire of remembered forms, encounters with other readers, habits of vocalization, perceptual capacities, and the conditions of access to the poem. Each factor can be described as part of an individual biography, yet the relevant history also comprises the institutions, material supports, shared linguistic practices, and ecological circumstances through which these capacities become available. The history of a reader is thus richer than an inventory of private memories or an externally completed chronology. It is a changing organization of conditions that can bear upon what the reader is able to encounter, distinguish, and do.

The word *historical* has a precise and limited role here. It identifies the dependence of a configuration upon transformations and relations whose consequences remain operative within the configuration under consideration. Such dependence can involve learned dispositions, stabilized artifacts, inherited prohibitions, biological development, and accumulated possibilities of interaction. Historical specificity does not require every detail of a complete causal history to be reconstructed before anything useful can be said about an encounter. Research can select the relations pertinent to its question and treat the selection as revisable. Nor does it require a metaphysically privileged present from which a fully determinate past and open future are defined. Event orders, causal relations, participants' recollections, and anticipatory activity can be represented without promoting one temporal perspective to an ontological foundation.

A *relation* in the GR account is likewise more substantial than an association registered between already self-sufficient units. Relations may partly constitute the capacities and boundaries of participating configurations. A language learned through interaction changes which distinctions a participant can readily make; repeated encounters with a poetic tradition change the kinds of tension, cadence, or ambiguity that can become salient. Conversely, a participant's changing abilities can transform the practices available to a group. These reciprocal possibilities motivate the study of how relata and relations are co-determined, while leaving open how particular relations should be individuated for different explanatory purposes. The GR proposal leaves room for physical, experiential, social, and formal descriptions at different scales without announcing one as the final ontology of all the others.

This orientation has a recognizable philosophical ancestry. Merleau-Ponty's account of embodied perception situates perceptual significance within the lived body's relations to a world [23]. A spoken line of poetry is encountered through breathing, hearing, acquired rhythm, posture, and a surrounding situation. Its significance may depend upon the listener's manner of inhabiting those relations as well as the recoverable phonetic pattern. An embodied perspective thereby challenges the assumption that a common physical stimulus secures a common aesthetic episode. The GR analysis inherits this challenge and extends attention to participants whose perceptual and interpretive organizations may differ in kind. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty's developed philosophical account concerns embodied human experience, with experiential commitments that a general systems vocabulary cannot simply reproduce.

Simondon's philosophical treatment of individuation provides a related but distinct point of departure. His investigation places the formation of individuals in relation to processes and milieus and challenges accounts that simply presuppose fully constituted individuals before analyzing their formation [32]. The present inquiry draws a restricted methodological lesson: a reader is also a participant whose capacities have been formed through ongoing relations, and an encounter may participate in their further transformation. The affinity has limits. Simondon's work introduces distinctive commitments concerning individuation, metastability, and preindividual reality. Describing historically changing GR configurations establishes neither the identity of these commitments with the proposed approach nor the thesis that aesthetic significance amounts to physical individuation. Such conclusions would require independent justification.

The distinction between *capacity*, *exercise*, and *aesthetic manifestation* is central to the proposed account. A reader may have learned to notice a metrical disruption while failing to notice it in a particular recital; another may recognize it and find the poem aesthetically unremarkable. A participant may also acquire sensitivity to a poetic practice through an encounter that remains puzzling or unpleasant. Capacities

are conditional possibilities supported by relations among a participant, a medium, learned practices, and circumstances. Their exercise is an occurrence within those conditions. Whether the occurrence involves beauty is a further question. This distinction allows interpretive ability and its development to be studied without treating learning, novelty, or expressive competence as sufficient evidence of aesthetic significance.

The term *generative* designates a delimited explanatory question: how does a configuration, in given relations and conditions, participate in bringing about transformations or possibilities whose detailed organization is not fully specified by an external description of the offering? In a poetic encounter, a remembered word may reorganize relations among lines; a cadence may make a previously peripheral image salient; an additional reading may alter the participant's capacities for a subsequent performance. Such developments can be studied as generative without treating each development as beautiful, creative, or desirable. Some transformations narrow attention, reinforce a rigid convention, or interrupt engagement. They may matter causally even where their aesthetic and ethical standing is disputed. The framework must therefore answer to questions of aesthetic manifestation and evaluation that remain distinct from the occurrence of change.

For local analytical purposes, an encountering configuration can be represented as a family of structured descriptions. Equation 1 introduces an illustrative scheme rather than a universal definition of a subject.

$$\mathfrak{G}_i^{\lambda} = (H_i^{\lambda},\, R_i^{\lambda},\, C_i^{\lambda},\, D_i^{\lambda},\, N_i^{\lambda}). \tag{1}$$

Here i identifies a proposed participant or receiving configuration; H denotes historical dependencies relevant to the inquiry; R denotes relations and interfaces through which encounters are possible; C denotes relevant capacities; D denotes processes or dynamical rules used to describe transformations; and N denotes normative conditions that may regulate attention, interpretation, expression, or evaluation. The index λ identifies a position in an analytical organization of encounters or transformations. It need not specify a universal clock, a privileged present, or a common temporal coordinate shared by participants. The components are explanatory distinctions and may overlap. An institutionally acquired rule may be described as both a historical dependency and a present normative constraint according to the question being addressed.

Equation 1 has a deliberately restricted analytical function. It specifies neither a fixed state-space dimension nor a common metric or universal transformation law. Its components may overlap: a learned rule can simultaneously figure as a historical dependency, a normative constraint, and part of a capacity. The appropriate mode of inquiry may be first-person testimony, historical reconstruction, ethnography, literary criticism, experiment, or a specified dynamical model. The equation contains no aesthetic predicate. Introducing a variable named "beauty" would name a problem while leaving its conditions of identification unsettled. Even a well-supported account of the represented components would establish reception conditions, rather than a sufficient account of aesthetic manifestation. This restraint permits the structural conditions supporting a possible manifestation to be investigated without presupposing that their presence already constitutes beauty.

The scope of *heterogeneity* requires distinctions along several dimensions: perceptual access to a medium, embodied organization, historical dependencies, interpretive resources, the capacity to revise practices, and the authority accorded to a participant's account. Human readers can differ deeply along some dimensions while sharing capacities and conventions along others. Differences between communities may arise through institutional histories and unequal access rather than different sensory organizations. Relations involving animals or artificial systems can present further differences of organization and evidence. These dimensions resist reduction to a single scale of heterogeneity. Each comparison must specify what differs and on what grounds the relevant capacities have been attributed. Divergent performances alone cannot establish an unbridgeable conceptual scheme.

The word *same* requires similar care. Two participants can receive the same inscription under an established textual convention while encountering different recitations, translations, bodily conditions, or interpretive prompts. Conversely, formally distinct performances may preserve enough rhythmic or semantic relations for a productive comparison. A claim about different receptions should therefore

identify the features of the offering that are held constant and those that vary. Otherwise a difference attributed to receiving configurations may belong partly to the medium or its realization. This specification is a practical requirement for comparison, not a metaphysical separation of the poem from its encounter.

Jakob von Uexküll's account of the *Umwelt* is a precursor for considering differently organized fields of significance. His studies of animal worlds foreground species-specific perceptual and practical environments [33]. This approach clarifies why an externally identical object can participate in different systems of relevance. A visual inscription central to a human reader's encounter may be inaccessible to another organism, while an environmental variation hardly registered by the reader may structure that organism's practical world. A common physical setting does not itself establish a common field of meaning. At the same time, Uexküll's treatment does not establish that all living organisms experience beauty or that animal perception can be assimilated to human literary interpretation. Those are distinct claims, and the present inquiry keeps them open.

The distinction between reception and aesthetic experience becomes particularly consequential for hypothetical artificial participants. An artificial system may distinguish rhyme schemes, produce descriptions of beauty, revise aesthetic classifications, and generate novel verse. These accomplishments can be studied as operations within a historical technical configuration: training sources, architecture, optimization procedures, interfaces, feedback, and deployment relations may affect its outputs. Yet successful operations and adaptive judgments leave unsettled whether the system possesses subjective aesthetic experience. They also leave unsettled whether its changing criteria amount to genuinely autonomous aesthetic self-legislation. Procedural flexibility, learned evaluative norms, and interaction-dependent revision can be examined without granting consciousness or a moral status equivalent to that of a person. Broader attributions demand premises and evidence appropriate to those claims.

Nagel's discussion of the subjective character of experience poses a further challenge to an easy transition from structural description to experienced significance [24]. His argument brings into focus the philosophical distance between a third-person characterization of an organism and an account of what its experience is like from its perspective. The methodological implication here is limited but serious. Even an exceptionally detailed account of a receiver's perceptual capacities and processing relations would not establish that an investigator has undergone that receiver's aesthetic experience. Likewise, similar evaluative responses cannot by themselves demonstrate identical aesthetic manifestations. The GR proposal does not settle the problem of other minds; it must delimit the claims about experience that publicly accessible evidence can justify.

A corresponding distinction is needed between an *interpretive system* and an *aesthetic subject*. Operationally, an interpretive system differentiates encounters and produces descriptions or responsive transformations. An aesthetic subject, in the stronger experiential sense, is a participant to whom aesthetic experiencing may justifiably be attributed. The categories demand different kinds of evidence. Human testimony, expressive practice, intersubjective criticism, and revision of judgments provide overlapping, fallible grounds for interpreting aesthetic life. Work on animals may involve behavioral, ecological, and physiological evidence, whose bearing on beauty remains disputed. Artificial systems can classify poetic features and discuss their value without such performance settling questions of subjective experience. The GR model applies most securely to describable configurations and practices; stronger attribution requires an independent argument. Difficulty in translating another system's experience establishes neither its existence nor its absence.

Even among human participants, access to another's aesthetic history remains partial. A poem may evoke an association whose biographical origins are obscure even to its reader, while a shared word may acquire different intensities through dissimilar relations of attachment, loss, or anticipation. Discussion, observation, close reading, and comparison can nevertheless yield important understanding. In principle, two distinct histories may be equivalent relative to a specified analytical task, and shared interpretive norms may establish meaningful similarities. An equivalence adequate for identifying a poetic form, describing a genre, or coordinating criticism, however, need not preserve the aesthetic significance of a particular encounter. The later analysis of quotient constructions will distinguish partial explanatory invariants from the demanding idea of exhaustive aesthetic equivalence.

A further consequence of the GR representation is that a common poetic offering may enter different receiving configurations without producing standardized internal events. Consider a line that addresses an absent person without specifying the relationship. One reader may place it within a remembered family attachment; another may encounter a conventional poetic apostrophe; a third may first hear a distinctive cadence. Their receptions share constraints supplied by the line and its presentation, while their histories organize different possibilities of attention. The differences may matter aesthetically, yet they do not establish that every encounter is beautiful. Some readers may remain indifferent, misunderstand the address, or respond with distress. A theory of historical variability gains explanatory value precisely by remaining open to such outcomes and to criticism of how particular readings relate to the poem.

The expression *same poetic offering* is itself qualified. A printed verse, recitation, translation, and remembered fragment may preserve selected formal relations while altering others. Interfaces with such media have material and institutional histories. Literary identity may be attributed across performances, but the relevant similarities depend upon what an inquiry seeks to retain. Sound patterns may recede in translation while imagistic relations persist; spatial arrangements on a page guide attention differently from vocal performance. Heterogeneous reception therefore begins with relations among form, medium, and available capacities, as well as with differences among receivers. The literary constraints discussed earlier continue to matter in each case.

Normative conditions also act at several levels. Acquired expectations can shape which features become salient and which readings initially seem plausible; practices of criticism can demand justification; social relations can affect whose interpretations are heard; and participants can revise commitments through sustained experience. An ethical norm of respect for another's autonomy may regulate the conditions of encounter without deciding which poem is beautiful. An established aesthetic standard may guide criticism while leaving a participant's aesthetic experience incompletely described. The inclusion of N in Equation 1 thus records the relevance of norms without reducing aesthetic occurrence to conformity with them. The later inquiry into judgment will distinguish external, reflective, and interactional sources of normative modulation.

The breadth of the GR vocabulary raises an explanatory objection. If every encounter can be retrospectively described as historically and relationally conditioned, the framework risks immunity to criticism. Local applications should identify competing explanations and specify observations that could favor or challenge them. For example, an account emphasizing linguistic familiarity predicts different patterns of interpretive access from an account emphasizing the material medium of performance. A comparison of recital and silent reading, or a documented change in interpretation following a contextual intervention, might discriminate such claims under suitably controlled assumptions. An absence of the predicted difference should count against the corresponding local explanation. These observations could test claims about access, attention, or learning; whether they establish aesthetic manifestation is a separate philosophical and evidential matter. The framework's explanatory contribution depends upon the risks its local hypotheses take.

The conditions of reception also involve relational power. Opportunities to encounter poetry, develop interpretive capacities, and articulate judgments are distributed unevenly. Institutions may privilege particular languages, canons, media, and forms of critical authority. An apparently open invitation to participate may operate within unequal relations of access or dependence. Such inequalities affect whose forms can be offered, who bears the burden of translation, and whose realization is recognized as worthy of discussion. Power thus enters both as a historical feature of receiving configurations and as a constraint upon reciprocal aesthetic practice. It does not exhaust aesthetic significance, and particular effects call for historical evidence and ethical analysis beyond the general GR vocabulary.

Heterogeneity permits intersubjective relations beyond convergence or disagreement over a verdict. One participant may understand some constraints of another's interpretive practice while remaining unable to reproduce its aesthetic manifestation. Participants may build a limited language of evaluation and continue to experience a poem differently. They may also perform or transform a poetic offering together before establishing a common evaluative language. Interpretive translation, experiential access, normative coordination, and joint practice therefore admit different kinds and degrees of correspondence.

The warrant for each has to be examined separately, particularly when the participants are hypothesized to differ fundamentally in perceptual organization or subject status.

The GR scheme therefore offers a restricted contribution to the philosophy of poetic reception. Its variables direct attention to the conditions under which an offering becomes effective, to differences among participants with partly overlapping capacities, and to the possibility that an encounter modifies subsequent interpretive possibilities. Its methodological value depends upon distinguishing three inferential steps: from an observed response to an account of its enabling conditions; from these conditions to an account of generative transformation; and from transformation to a claim about experienced or otherwise manifested beauty. Evidence sufficient for one step may be insufficient for the next. The scheme does not resolve the problem of other minds or replace literary ontology and phenomenology. It helps to identify the respective questions those inquiries address.

Poetic form can accordingly be studied as a material and relational offering encountered under historically differentiated conditions. Some encounters modify capacities; some may occasion aesthetic significance; and some generate claims of beauty open to exchange and criticism. Those possibilities merit distinct philosophical attention even where they co-occur. The next section examines generative trajectories, manifestation, and judgment with particular attention to the warrant required for each kind of claim.

5 Generative Trajectories, Aesthetic Manifestation, and Judgment

This section examines three analytically distinct aspects of a poetic encounter: the generative trajectory through which a receiving configuration changes, the possible manifestation of aesthetic significance within that encounter, and the judgment through which a participant evaluates or articulates what has occurred. The distinction is needed because a poem may sustain extensive interpretation without being found beautiful, while an aesthetically consequential encounter may resist immediate formulation in the vocabulary of literary criticism. The discussion first specifies the character of a generative trajectory, then considers the relation between process and aesthetic significance, develops rival interpretations of pre-symbolic manifestation, and finally examines judgment, normativity, and the evidence available across heterogeneous subjects. Its method is a conceptual reconstruction guided by phenomenology, pragmatist aesthetics, analytical aesthetics, and the literary accounts already examined. The section offers hypotheses about relations among its terms, rather than an empirical model of aesthetic experience.

A *generative trajectory* names an organized unfolding in which the participant's encounter with a poetic offering becomes effective through the participant's own capacities and relations. It may include attention to a sound, recovery of a memory, a change in how a line is anticipated, alteration of an interpretation, a bodily modulation of reading, or an emergent possibility of response. The trajectory need not be a succession of fully articulate meanings. Rhythmic expectation can change a reader's manner of attending before any proposition about the line has been formed; an unfamiliar image can reorganize the salience of a remembered scene without producing a stable interpretation. In a later rereading, the trajectory may differ because the configuration that receives the poem has itself changed. Historical dependence therefore enters the process at more than one level: it conditions the encounter, and the encounter may become part of the conditions of other encounters.

The word *trajectory* requires care. In mathematics and physics it generally indicates a path in a specified space, whereas the philosophical usage here denotes a selected organization of transformations and relations in an encounter. Interpretation may involve recurrence, revision, overlapping strands, and new relations between differently ordered events. Its description neither presupposes a shared clock among participants nor privileges one temporal perspective as ontologically fundamental. The model permits irreversible learning and changing capacities without presupposing that a unique, measurable state-space path has been observed. An empirical application would need to declare which events and ordering relations are observable, which are reconstructed, and what counts as a relevant change.

The receiving configuration introduced in Equation 1 provides a vocabulary for this selective description. Let p denote an identifiable poetic offering within some specified material or performative

conditions, let $\iota_i(p)$ denote the manner in which a participant i receives or transforms that offering, and let Γ_i denote the selected historical, relational, capacity-related, and normative conditions relevant to the encounter. Equation 2 then offers a schematic representation of its generative trajectory.

$$\mathcal{T}_i(p \mid \Gamma_i) = \mathrm{Traj}_{D_i}(\iota_i(p); \Gamma_i). \tag{2}$$

The operator Traj_{D_i} identifies a process or organized family of transformations described through the participant-specific dynamics D_i; it specifies neither a universal dynamical law nor a measurement procedure. The vertical bar indicates dependence upon selected conditions, without claiming statistical conditionalization. The representation serves a particular philosophical purpose: the source of the offering and the receiving configuration contribute differently to what unfolds. A common offering can participate in dissimilar trajectories because the relations through which it becomes effective differ. Equation 2 formalizes this possibility at the level of description and contains no aesthetic predicate. Accordingly, two distinct trajectories may both be aesthetically significant, just one may be, or neither may be.

One might take a generative trajectory to end in an interpretive outcome: a proposition about a poem, a remembered image, or a critical account. Yet the intermediate organization of an encounter may itself bear aesthetic significance. A cadence may establish an anticipation and transform it; a pause may make an earlier line resonate differently; two distant images may enter an unforeseen relation. In these cases, specifying the eventual interpretation alone can conceal a significant part of what the participant encountered. Dewey's analysis of the integrated development and fulfillment of experience supplies an important philosophical precedent for attending to the organization of an experience rather than treating its value as an externally attached result [4]. The GR proposal extends attention to the role of historically variable receiving mechanisms, while preserving the independence of aesthetic evaluation from the mere presence of development or change.

Consider a constructed poetic line: *The harbor keeps the names the water cannot hold.* One reader may attend to the alternating stresses and the interruption introduced by the second clause; another may connect the image to a particular departure; another may encounter the harbor as a political archive of names displaced by official commemoration. The sentence places constraints upon these encounters: harbor, names, water, and the contrast between keeping and holding remain available for inspection and disagreement. Its wording also supports a range of relations that a paraphrase of its proposed message would incompletely preserve. The divergent trajectories illustrate situated interpretive possibilities; they provide no observation that the three readers actually experience beauty, and no warrant for assuming that the differences themselves have positive aesthetic value. The case isolates a question for aesthetic philosophy: how the encounter may become aesthetically consequential through the particular organization of its unfolding.

The notion of *aesthetic manifestation* calls for special care because its conditions of application are themselves under investigation. In an experiential inquiry, it refers provisionally to aesthetic significance as encountered by a participant capable of the relevant experience: felt formal relation, expressive presence, grace, disturbance, or a quality lacking a settled name. The formulation does not settle whether aesthetic value is ultimately experiential, relational, or a feature that can also be attributed to structures beyond an individual encounter. Such positions remain philosophical alternatives. The limited claim advanced here is that a trajectory's complexity, novelty, and verbal assessment cannot individually serve as unquestioned criteria of beauty. The conditions enabling a possible manifestation may have been formed long before that manifestation becomes available to a participant.

Mikel Dufrenne's *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* is an especially pertinent predecessor, because its architecture distinguishes the work of art from the aesthetic object and gives aesthetic perception an extended inquiry of its own [5]. Ingarden's separate attention to a literary work and its concretizations likewise cautions against identifying an inscribed text with all of its realized aesthetic determinations [16]. These accounts do not entail the GR proposal, and their ontological commitments should not be combined by terminological substitution. Their significance here is methodological: the identifiable work, its materially mediated appearance, the receiving activity, and aesthetic significance call for discriminations that a simple model of textual message transfer cannot sustain.

Aesthetic manifestation also differs from *aesthetic judgment*. A participant may experience an encounter as compelling or beautiful and only subsequently find words for it. The participant may retain a sense of significance while withholding assent from the claim that the poem is successful. Conversely, a critic may judge an unfamiliar work to be aesthetically accomplished on the strength of analysis and testimony while lacking a similarly compelling encounter on a particular occasion. These examples do not settle whether every instance of aesthetic experience includes an implicit evaluative orientation. They show why explicit judgment and the occurrence under consideration should be examined separately. The label *manifestation* is employed with ontological restraint, so that the analysis does not silently infer a private aesthetic object or a fully constituted preconceptual essence from an inability to express an experience.

The *pre-symbolic aesthetic manifestation hypothesis* is best understood relative to specified kinds of articulation. In some encounters, aesthetic significance may be undergone before, or without, organization as an explicit predicate or reflective judgment. In this usage, *pre-symbolic* differs from *non-representational*, *pre-conceptual*, and *unaffected by norms*, which introduce further theoretical commitments. A listener may be affected by a cadence before finding words for it, while the listener's sensitivity depends on acquired linguistic and embodied dispositions. The hypothesis concerns a possible distinction between aesthetic appearing and explicit symbolic capture within an already historical, relationally organized experience. An inability to articulate an episode is itself insufficient evidence that beauty has occurred.

Phenomenological accounts of embodied perception provide resources for understanding the plausibility of this distinction. Merleau-Ponty's account of perceptual involvement challenges the equation of experience with explicit propositional judgment [23]. Rosenblatt's account of aesthetic reading likewise places qualitative attention within the reader–text transaction, rather than requiring an initially finalized critical statement [26]. These affinities are qualified. Neither an embodied orientation nor a reader's report that an experience felt prior to words demonstrates that the experience was free from conceptual influence. The philosophical question is whether some form of aesthetic appearing can be meaningfully distinguished from its later reflective classification, not whether formation by history could somehow be suspended.

At least three rival accounts deserve consideration. On a *manifestation-priority* account, aesthetic significance may occur through the encounter and subsequently become the object of an explicit judgment; linguistic articulation is then one possible development of an already aesthetically charged event. On a *co-constitution* account, aesthetic manifestation and evaluative uptake develop together: what it is to encounter the line aesthetically partly consists in an emergent disposition to appreciate it or regard it as meriting attention. On a *concept-dependent* account, identifying an episode as specifically aesthetic requires capacities and distinctions shaped by shared practices, even when the participant does not consciously formulate an evaluative sentence. These options differ over the constitutive role of judgment, sensibility, and conceptual practice. The GR vocabulary, by itself, neither decides among them nor licenses the claim that a wholly concept-independent kind of beauty has been discovered.

The concept-dependent alternative places a significant constraint upon the proposed hypothesis. An investigator who retrospectively calls an affective or bodily response "aesthetic" may be applying a category unavailable or irrelevant to the participant. A child may attend intently to a sound without differentiating beauty from alarm; another cultural repertoire may organize valued experiences differently from the category of aesthetics in modern European philosophy; an artificial language system may generate persuasive descriptions through learned evaluative conventions. These cases require inquiry into observable response, available classifications, testimony, and the investigator's interpretive practices at their appropriate levels. The rival hypotheses offer different accounts of what qualifies as aesthetic; an unarticulated response alone cannot adjudicate among them.

Sibley's account of aesthetic concepts supplies a further philosophical constraint. The application of terms such as graceful or delicate involves discernment and generally cannot be inferred from an inventory of non-aesthetic features alone [31]. The argument concerns relations among concepts and practices of judgment; by itself it establishes no ultimate ontology of beauty. Within a GR inquiry, identifying rhyme, rhythm, or syntactic organization can help explain the conditions of an encounter while leaving open its

aesthetic characterization. Critical attention to a formal feature may improve a disagreement about beauty without mechanically deciding the resulting judgment. This is a challenge to simplistic derivations, while remaining compatible with disciplined analysis of relevant features.

Generativity and aesthetic value require separate standards of assessment. A difficult poem can produce numerous interpretive paths without being aesthetically successful for a particular reader. A familiar line can become beautiful through repetition or restraint even where little novelty results. An encounter can develop interpretive capacities while occasioning confusion, distress, or a negative aesthetic appraisal. The trajectory model concerns changes in possibilities and organized activity; judgments of aesthetic value require additional criteria whose authority and scope remain open to discussion. Neither novelty nor complexity can be inserted as a universal substitute for beauty. The separation preserves the possibility that generative conditions help explain an aesthetic manifestation without defining it exhaustively.

An associated question concerns the difference between an aesthetically significant *process* and a valuable *outcome*. Consider a reader who initially hears a verse as an ordinary description, then discovers through repetition a relation among its pauses and changing emphases. One can evaluate the resulting interpretation as illuminating or mistaken, and independently ask whether the unfolding itself was aesthetically compelling. Another reader may report the same interpretation after being told it by a critic, yet undergo a qualitatively different path toward that report. This is one reason why a shared interpretive verdict establishes only limited correspondence between encounters. Aesthetic assessment can concern the trajectory, its realization, the work as considered through that realization, or a constellation of these aspects. The relevant target ought to be specified in philosophical argument and in empirical research alike.

Judgment introduces the possibility of answerability to others. A participant who calls a line graceful, painfully restrained, or beautiful ordinarily makes a claim that can be discussed, challenged, or refined. Some judgments articulate private response; others imply that the line merits such a response from attentive readers. Kant's treatment of judgments of taste makes this demand for communicability central, while also refusing to ground pure judgments of beauty in determinate conceptual proofs [21]. Contemporary readers may reject the universal form of that demand and still recognize that criticism can involve giving reasons, inviting attention to features, testing alternate presentations, and changing one's view. A GR account can examine how such practices operate across divergent histories without equating the existence of disagreement with the absence of standards.

Normative conditions associated with judgment can be differentiated by their formation. *Externally acquired* conditions include inherited conventions, schooling, dominant literary traditions, and institutionally stabilized criteria. *Reflectively revised* conditions arise when a participant examines, criticizes, or modifies those criteria. *Interactionally formed* conditions develop through shared readings, collaborative performance, and evolving practices of evaluation. These categories describe sources and modes of normative change; they designate neither three kinds of beauty nor a fixed developmental sequence. Their ethical justification is a separate question, as is the stronger attribution of aesthetic self-legislation. For an artificial system, revision of a preference report or evaluative policy can be described operationally without claiming an autonomous aesthetic experience.

The distinction between normative and aesthetic judgment is philosophically consequential. A shared rule of respectful discussion may allow participants to disagree about a verse without hostility. A common poetic convention may enable them to identify the same metrical departure. Neither commonality determines that their encounters manifest the same beauty. Ethical appraisal may constrain the public uses of a poem without deciding every aesthetic issue it raises; conversely, a powerful aesthetic encounter may prompt a participant to reconsider the norms by which a tradition has been judged. Norms can organize the conditions of manifestation and the forms of its assessment, while aesthetic significance may exceed the categories through which the participant currently evaluates it. The possibility of a shared normative language should therefore be investigated separately from the possibility of shared aesthetic experience.

This separation clarifies the sense in which two readers may jointly develop a language for discussing beauty while continuing to encounter different beauties. They may learn to attend to the same rhythmic

break, provide each other with biographical or historical context, and agree that the poem admits several disciplined realizations. Their cooperation does not require the production of identical internal trajectories or congruent aesthetic manifestations. They may also collaborate in reading or composition before forming a common evaluative vocabulary. What is shared in these cases can include the offering, a limited set of interpretive constraints, a practice of mutual correction, or a new activity; what remains particular may concern historical attachments and the qualitative mode in which significance is encountered. Such cases motivate an account of cross-system aesthetic praxis to be developed in later sections, while retaining the possibility of misunderstanding, asymmetrical recognition, and disagreement.

An instructive contrast lies between *shared critical attention* and *shared aesthetic manifestation*. Two readers may disagree about the beauty of a recited line, exchange observations, and learn to hear a pause as linking two images. They thereby achieve a limited coordination of attention and a new shared critical vocabulary. One may find the relation beautiful, while the other finds it merely intelligible. Even if both affirm its beauty, their agreement alone establishes no qualitative identity of experience. Heterogeneous aesthetic practice can therefore be valuable as an opportunity for shared inquiry without requiring a convergent aesthetic outcome.

A further evidential issue becomes pressing when the receivers are heterogeneous in a stronger sense than differences among human readers. An animal's differential responsiveness to repeated sound patterns may indicate perceptual discrimination or preference, yet the inference to experienced beauty needs additional grounds. An artificial language model's interpretation, revision of a stylistic judgment, or fluent report of aesthetic response demonstrates capacities relevant to symbolic performance; by itself it establishes no first-person aesthetic manifestation. Nagel's account of subjective experience sharpens the warning against identifying third-person structural descriptions with access to another participant's lived perspective [24]. A responsible theory can describe trajectories and their relations, investigate forms of evaluation, and state conditional hypotheses about aesthetic experience, while refraining from ungrounded ascriptions of experience or personhood.

A possible objection is that the distinctions multiply terms for a single phenomenon. If aesthetic experience itself includes appreciation, perhaps manifestation and judgment cannot be separated even analytically. The reply is limited rather than dogmatic: the framework identifies different questions and allows accounts of their constitutive unity to compete. The occurrence of an experience, the capacity to discern its aesthetically relevant features, and a reflective statement about its value are investigated under different kinds of evidence, even if a later theory determines that some of these are inseparable in a class of cases. Conversely, a strict separation would be questionable if it implied that a pure pre-symbolic beauty could be identified independently of all modes of experience and criticism. The analytical distinction earns its place by making those alternatives discussable without deciding them in advance.

A second objection concerns the risk of interpretive permissiveness. If the receiver's history partly determines the trajectory, can any association become a realization of the poem? Material and formal constraints supply a partial answer. Interpretive claims remain answerable to wording, rhythm, context of presentation, established linguistic practices, and the consequences of translation. A reader's personal memory may become part of an aesthetically significant encounter without thereby becoming evidence for a disputed claim about the text's authorship or historical reference. Such distinctions preserve a place for criticism and for correction among heterogeneous participants. The proposed openness concerns the plurality of situated aesthetic developments, not the exemption of interpretations from reasons.

The limits of Equation 2 can be specified constructively. Until the dynamics and receiving conditions are independently constrained, the expression offers an organizing scheme rather than a prediction of beauty. A study of interpretive learning could compare a participant's discernment across several encounters; a study of medium could vary recitation and inscription while retaining specified formal relations; a hermeneutic study could examine why an image enters different associations within a documented reception history. These approaches may clarify access, attention, and newly acquired interpretive capacities. They do not decide by formal inspection whether aesthetic significance preceded reflective judgment or was partly constituted through it. Evidence concerning the participant and rival philosophical accounts remains indispensable.

The resulting position is an intentionally restrained one. A finite poetic offering may participate in a historically particular generative trajectory; aesthetic significance may manifest through that trajectory without being exhausted by an explicit interpretation or verdict; and aesthetic judgment may arise through modes of discernment and normatively mediated exchange whose validity remains open to discussion. These are differentiated research claims, not a derivation of beauty from generativity. Their joint examination suggests that historically situated aesthetic differences need not obstruct every form of mutual understanding or collective practice. The next section investigates what equivalence would have to preserve if aesthetic encounters were to be compared or quotiented, and why such comparisons may be useful locally while remaining insufficient to identify complete histories or aesthetic manifestations.

6 Aesthetic Equivalence and the Scope of Quotient Constructions

Aesthetic equivalence is a question about the conditions under which distinct encounters may be compared without suppressing differences relevant to the comparison. The same poetic offering can be identifiable across readers or performances while its realization occurs through historically differentiated relations. This section distinguishes equivalence among descriptions of situated encounters, quotients of transformations, and looser networks of resemblance. It first specifies what each construction preserves, then considers context-sensitive changes in comparison, and finally relates aesthetic classification to public criticism and normative appraisal. The method is conceptual, supported by elementary mathematical constructions whose assumptions remain explicit. No quotient is proposed as a definition or measure of beauty.

Equivalence begins with a decision about what matters for the inquiry. Two performances of the same written line can be equivalent with respect to a printed sequence of words and inequivalent with respect to cadence, accent, or the listeners' histories. Goodman's analysis of symbolic and notational systems supplies a useful precedent for distinguishing the identity of an inscription or work from the features relevant to particular acts of appreciation [12]. The significance of a notational criterion lies in the distinctions it is designed to preserve. Its successful use for identifying a text does not guarantee its sufficiency for describing an encounter with that text. A poem can be correctly identified and its pronunciation accurately reported while the specific relationship between its rhythm and a reader's remembered language remains unarticulated.

One established philosophical tension concerns the relation between aesthetic description and discriminating judgment. Sibley's discussion of aesthetic concepts questions the possibility of deriving the proper application of aesthetic predicates from fixed inventories of ordinary descriptive properties [31]. This does not make descriptive evidence irrelevant. A critic may direct attention to the unusual distance between two words, a broken metrical expectation, or a change in address and thereby make an aesthetic judgment intelligible to another reader. The path from descriptive attention to aesthetic discernment, however, need not be expressible through a universally sufficient classification rule. Contemporary philosophical discussion continues to distinguish particularist approaches to aesthetic reasons from accounts that seek more general principles [30]. Quotient constructions can illuminate the structure of a proposed classification, but they cannot settle this philosophical disagreement in advance.

A first construction concerns descriptions of the encounters being compared. Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a fixed set of historically and relationally situated configurations associated with a poetic offering. The elements of $\mathcal{H}$ are descriptions chosen for an inquiry, rather than an exhaustive inventory of subjective life. A configuration could register the poetic form, participant histories, sensory access, and available interpretive practices. Let $\mathcal{C}$ index contexts of comparison, and for every $c \in \mathcal{C}$ let $P_c : \mathcal{H} \to Y_c$ be a specified profile map. Its outputs might be reported judgments, publicly recoverable interpretations, or records of attention; Y_c need not be a space of numbers or aesthetic values. Crucially, using a common codomain in a given context presupposes that the investigator can identify its outputs consistently across the cases compared. The equivalence relation is defined in Equation 3.

$$h_1 \sim_{\mathcal{C}} h_2 \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad P_c(h_1) = P_c(h_2) \text{ for every } c \in \mathcal{C}. \tag{3}$$

Equation 3 defines an equivalence relation because equality of every specified profile is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. The quotient $\mathcal{H}/\!\sim_{\mathcal{C}}$ is therefore defined without any further metaphysical claim. Its content depends on the choice of profiles, their evidential warrant, and whether apparently shared labels have comparable significance. Two readers who both say "beautiful" may belong to the same class under a verbal-response profile, even if one reports a sensory experience and the other offers a socially expected judgment. A quotient of reported words is not thereby a quotient of manifested beauty. More demanding claims about subjective experience require evidence adequate to those claims, which the notation itself cannot supply.

The need for this restriction becomes clear when considering a pair of readers. Suppose two readers encounter a short verse with an interrupted rhythm and both call it restrained. Their responses may initially appear equivalent under an inquiry concerned with verbal criticism. One reader subsequently hears a particular familial cadence in the interruption; another connects it with the rhythm of collective work. The difference is hypothetical, introduced to test the concept rather than to report observations. Under a context that brings historical associations into the comparison, the responses may diverge. A quotient based on the initial verdict was useful for studying a shared critical vocabulary, while the richer comparison preserves an additional relation. Neither finding proves that one aesthetic judgment is valid and the other mistaken. Equivalence is relative to a specified investigative purpose, and a finer comparison may disclose differences without denying the meaningfulness of a coarser one.

A further distinction concerns observed profiles and counterfactual dispositions. An investigator can classify encounters using reports actually available in a documented setting; an attempt to classify them by the responses each participant *would* give under every possible question assumes a much larger and less accessible domain. Such counterfactual profiles might be useful in theoretical arguments, but their separation properties cannot be inferred from a limited set of observations. Moreover, asking a new question can change a participant's attention and future aesthetic dispositions. The historical configuration of the response may consequently change as the profile is elicited. The inquiry should state whether its contexts concern stable descriptions, experimentally elicited events, or hypothetical possibilities.

Comparison can be refined while holding its domain fixed. Suppose $\mathcal{C}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{C}_2$ and each context already included in $\mathcal{C}_1$ retains the same map on the same set $\mathcal{H}$. Equation 4 states the resulting refinement of equivalence and the canonical projection between quotient sets.

$$\sim_{\mathcal{C}_2} \subseteq \sim_{\mathcal{C}_1}, \qquad \mathcal{H}/\!\sim_{\mathcal{C}_2} \longrightarrow \mathcal{H}/\!\sim_{\mathcal{C}_1}. \tag{4}$$

The map in Equation 4 assigns each class under the finer equivalence relation to the unique coarser class containing it. It is well-defined and surjective. This conclusion applies to a fixed $\mathcal{H}$ and fixed profile maps; it is a theorem concerning partitions. It is not a law about the development of aesthetic experience. Learning a new interpretive practice or responding to a new interlocutor can alter the participant, the encounter, and the criteria of attention. In such cases the investigator must specify a relation between the earlier and later spaces of configurations rather than treating the new situation as the addition of one more passive measurement.

A limiting case formalizes the intuition that an especially demanding aesthetic comparison may identify few distinct configurations. Suppose the profiles separate points of $\mathcal{H}$: for every $h_1 \neq h_2$ there is a context $c \in \mathcal{C}$ with $P_c(h_1) \neq P_c(h_2)$. Equation 3 then relates only identical elements. The quotient projection is a bijection, and $\mathcal{H}/\!\sim_{\mathcal{C}}$ has the same set-theoretic structure as $\mathcal{H}$. This is a conditional result, with a potentially demanding premise. Two different histories need not be distinguishable under any aesthetically relevant profile; an actual difference between life trajectories provides no proof that the difference contributes to a specific manifestation of beauty. The philosophical task is to defend the profiles' relevance and scope, while the mathematical task merely shows what follows if they separate the configurations.

The expression that an aesthetic quotient "returns the original structure" is best understood here as a limiting statement about identification. Singleton classes preserve every distinction among the configurations as defined, although they reveal neither the intrinsic structure of aesthetic experience nor an impossibility of economical description. Quotienting and encoding are different operations: a set of

pairwise distinguishable trajectories might follow a compact generative rule, and a coarse classification could require a cumbersome description. Aesthetic singularity therefore gives the critic a reason to question the *adequacy* of an abstraction, rather than a general proof against symbolic representation. In the present GR account, the possible insufficiency of a common symbolic category is itself a reason to investigate how a finite poem contributes to divergent generative trajectories.

A second construction concerns reversible transformations represented by a group. Suppose a group G acts on $\mathcal{H}$ and preserves the equivalence relation $\sim_{\mathcal{C}}$, so that $h_1 \sim_{\mathcal{C}} h_2$ implies $gh_1 \sim_{\mathcal{C}} gh_2$ for every $g \in G$. The action then descends to the quotient configurations and defines a homomorphism $\rho_{\mathcal{C}} : G \to \mathrm{Sym}(\mathcal{H}/\sim_{\mathcal{C}})$. Reversible changes of a carefully defined representation might fit this setting. Many important GR processes—learning, institutional transformation, memory formation, and translation with irreversible losses—have no assumed inverses and cannot be placed in G without independent justification. The kernel of the induced action consists of those transformations fixing every class, and the first isomorphism theorem yields Equation 5.

$$N_{\mathcal{C}} = \ker \rho_{\mathcal{C}} \trianglelefteq G, \qquad G/N_{\mathcal{C}} \cong \mathrm{im}\, \rho_{\mathcal{C}}. \tag{5}$$

This formulation makes the normal-subgroup assumption substantive rather than decorative: kernels of group homomorphisms are normal, whereas an arbitrary collection of transformations said to preserve an aesthetic feature need not be a normal subgroup. If $\rho_{\mathcal{C}}$ is faithful, its kernel is the identity subgroup $\{e\}$, and $G/\{e\} \cong G$. The last isomorphism expresses a special limiting case in which quotienting the *transformation group* removes no distinct transformations. Its interpretation should remain separate from the quotient of *historical configurations*. Even a faithful induced group action can operate on a configuration quotient that has already collapsed many distinct histories. Similarly, two histories may remain different although the group representation treats some transformations as indistinguishable.

The difference also matters when a group acts on a space through its orbits. An orbit quotient $\mathcal{H}/G$ collects configurations related by transformations from G. A group quotient $G/N_{\mathcal{C}}$ instead classifies transformations modulo a normal subgroup. These expressions describe different mathematical objects and may be very different in size and meaning. The existence of a useful orbit quotient therefore supplies no direct argument for a corresponding partition of aesthetic manifestations. Moreover, $G/N \cong G$ does not in unrestricted abstract group theory imply $N = \{e\}$: infinite groups can possess proper normal subgroups whose quotient is isomorphic to the original group. The trivial-kernel condition is a transparent sufficient case, not a general characterization. Given the present paper's philosophical aim, these elementary qualifications are more illuminating than a search for elaborate examples of algebraically self-similar groups.

The induced action is faithful precisely when its kernel is $\{e\}$, although faithfulness on the quotient depends on the selected equivalence relation and action. A refinement of aesthetic profiles can reveal distinctions between configurations without guaranteeing that every previously indistinguishable transformation becomes distinguishable. The theory should therefore keep three questions apart: whether encounter profiles discriminate configurations; whether the transformation action is faithful on those classes; and whether either formal distinction tracks the aesthetic significance under discussion. The historical unfolding of an interpreter is more naturally represented by transitions, relations, or noninvertible processes whenever genuine group structure is unavailable.

The historical-relational hypothesis can now be given a more careful shape. Aesthetic experience may depend on a configuration's particular path through embodied, linguistic, material, and social relations; transformations considered equivalent under one inquiry may cease to be equivalent under another. The relevant philosophical thought is a possible failure of *context-independent sufficient classification* for some classes of aesthetic encounter. Its strength remains conditional on the breadth of contexts admitted and on what counts as preservation of aesthetic significance. A strong claim that all complete aesthetic equivalence relations are necessarily trivial would need to establish both a principled domain of contexts and a separation result for the profiles. Neither historical difference nor the algebraic notation supplies that demonstration. The GR proposal should therefore retain the idea of a potentially very fine aesthetic partition as a research hypothesis, preserving space for coarser, locally adequate classifications.

The status of the relevant symbolic concepts also requires attention. Wittgenstein's family-resemblance discussion challenges a demand that broad terms have a single shared essence, even where their uses display interlacing similarities [36]. The point is a philosophical caution about classification in practices of language; it does not establish that aesthetic resemblance forms an equivalence relation. Similarity can be graded and may fail transitivity: a response can resemble a second in rhythm, while the second resembles a third in imagery, even though the first and third share little of what matters to a critic. Taking the transitive closure of such relations can join configurations that were never directly comparable in the selected respect. A quotient set may then erase the very distinctions the critic wished to examine. For some interpretive purposes, overlapping neighborhoods, partial comparisons, or networks of resemblance will be more faithful than global equivalence classes. Such alternatives express an economy of comparison without claiming to settle a universal ontology of aesthetic kinds.

A distinct comparison concerns normative appraisal. Under specified institutional or ethical rules, two practices may receive identical permissions or obligations while giving rise to different aesthetic manifestations. Conversely, aesthetically similar encounters may fall under different rules of consent, authorship, or responsibility. When both are represented as equivalence relations, a normative relation $\sim_N$ and a profile-based aesthetic relation $\sim_{\mathcal{C}}$ can cross rather than refine one another. A canonical projection between their quotients exists only under the relevant containment assumption. Norms can also order, require, prohibit, or condition activities in ways that have no natural representation as equivalence classes. This is particularly important for heterogeneous subjects: a shared rule of respectful engagement may govern interactions even where no common criterion of beauty has been established.

Kant's account of judgments of taste helps clarify the normative stakes. His treatment of their claim to communicability need not be reconstructed as the demand that two participants share an identical historical configuration or generate an identical aesthetic experience [21]. A reasoned request that others attend to the features of a work belongs to a public practice of criticism even where identical private manifestations cannot be established. Sibley's account likewise assigns a role to critical attention and the articulation of reasons without granting a generally mechanical procedure for extracting aesthetic predicates from ordinary features [31]. The GR framework can examine the historical and relational conditions of such communication while allowing aesthetic standards and their justification to remain philosophical questions in their own right. Normative convergence and experiential identity require distinct accounts.

Poetry provides a concrete setting for these distinctions. A poem can sustain a relatively stable relation of textual identification while being differently voiced, translated, remembered, or placed within collective practices. Public discussion can attend to rhyme, imagery, syntax, formal recurrence, and historically documented uses of language. These features enable readers to propose analogies, justify interpretations, and challenge misreadings. At the same time, a shared term such as "tender," "severe," or "beautiful" may cover trajectories whose lived organization differs. Rosenblatt's transactional conception and Iser's account of readerly realization already help explain why a poem is realized through acts of encounter [26, 18]. The GR extension asks which forms of cross-system comparison remain warranted when the receiving configurations differ more deeply than a standard literary-critical discussion has occasion to assume. The answer may involve local bridge concepts and shared practices rather than a global aesthetic classification.

An especially important possibility is the generation of new comparison contexts through interaction. Readers can learn unfamiliar prosodies, explain their linguistic histories, or jointly establish a vocabulary for effects previously difficult to communicate. Such practices change both the comparisons available and the participants capable of making them. A quotient based on an initial family of contexts may be superseded by a richer one; a distinction initially inaccessible may become discernible through education, translation, or shared creative work. None of these developments entails that the participants will come to experience the same beauty. They show that partial interpretive correspondence can develop historically even when comprehensive aesthetic equivalence remains unavailable. The mathematical refinement picture is useful at a fixed stage of inquiry, while the history of its own revision belongs to the relational dynamics considered by the paper.

This point also bears on differences among heterogeneous subjects. If two participants have different perceptual modalities or representational capacities, an apparently common profile must be interpreted with particular caution. Agreement on an output label may reveal a learned convention, a shared practical objective, or a rule of interaction. It does not independently demonstrate the same subjective aesthetic manifestation. Nagel's analysis of the limits of third-person access to subjective experience supplies a relevant epistemic warning, without settling any specific question about nonhuman aesthetic consciousness [24]. In cases involving contemporary artificial systems, recorded aesthetic rankings or fluent poetic commentary can be studied as observable evaluative behavior. Their equivalence classes are classes of such behavior unless further evidence warrants stronger conclusions. This modesty also prevents formal symbols for an aesthetic profile from becoming covert evidence that aesthetic experience has been detected.

A serious objection remains. By insisting on ever finer relational distinctions, the theory may make mutual criticism appear arbitrary or unattainable. If every encounter is unique, an opponent may ask, what authorizes comparative judgments about poems, traditions, or interpretive performances? A useful reply distinguishes historical singularity from the relevance of every detail to a given claim. Distinct histories can support shared reasons and partially overlapping criteria. Literary criticism may make defensible comparisons of formal development or interpretive attention without claiming complete identity of experience. Moreover, judgments of interpretive adequacy can be criticized by evidence of wording, documented context, or logical consistency. Their authority is local and revisable, yet it need not be negligible. Preserving irreducibility is compatible with comparison provided the comparison specifies what it preserves and what it leaves unaddressed.

The opposite objection deserves equal attention. A general principle of aesthetic form might permit broad classification despite differences of history. Symmetry, contrast, patterned recurrence, or skillful variation may sometimes support aesthetically informative comparisons across readers and cultures. The present argument gives no a priori reason to reject such principles. It asks whether their explanatory scope includes aesthetic manifestation itself, or instead describes features that can contribute to many different aesthetic manifestations. Empirical work, historically informed criticism, and philosophical analysis may identify robust invariants at particular scales. The point of specifying a quotient is precisely to identify the scale and assumptions of a successful abstraction, and to recognize its limits when a different judgment or a new relation makes previously suppressed distinctions salient.

The mathematical tools have a limited and discriminable role. A proposed aesthetic quotient should identify the object classified, the observational or counterfactual status of its profiles, the contexts and invariances required, and the differences suppressed in forming a class. Set quotients express classifications of specified configurations; group quotients concern reversible transformations under a defined action; resemblance relations can capture partial overlaps that fail transitivity; and longitudinal accounts can describe changes in the very criteria of comparison. The GR proposal is that poetic encounters develop through histories and relations that may make complete aesthetic classification excessively fine for a particular critical purpose. Whether any such limit obtains is an open, domain-specific question. The next section develops a practice of criticism that can examine shared textual features and competing readings without assuming that equal labels entail identical experience.

7 Interpretive Plurality and the Constraints of Poetic Form

The possibility of historically differentiated aesthetic encounters raises a problem of interpretive warrant. Readers may produce different realizations of the same poetic offering while still making claims susceptible to reasons, counterevidence, and correction. This section examines the philosophical grounds for distinguishing warranted textual attributions, first-person reports, creative transformations, and aesthetic evaluations. It compares major disagreements in hermeneutics and reception theory, tests an original two-line example, and develops provisional conditions of responsible criticism across heterogeneous generative-relational (GR) systems. The method is conceptual and hermeneutical. Its criteria concern critical accountability; they are not a decision procedure for identifying beauty.

Interpretive plurality arises in several distinguishable ways. A reader may select one of several linguistically admissible senses of an expression, associate an image with a personal history, hear a pattern that depends on a practiced prosody, or situate a poem within a collective memory unavailable to another reader. These activities need not compete for the same kind of warrant. A claim about a documented word's historical usage can be disputed by lexical and archival evidence; an account of how an image evokes separation in a particular encounter may be supported by the reader's testimony and by the textual organization of that encounter. The feeling of beauty arising through such a reading is a further matter. An interpretation can be adequately grounded while producing little aesthetic response, just as a reader can experience beauty through an association that gives an incomplete account of the poem's words. A philosophical account of criticism should therefore preserve a distinction among the attribution of textual meaning, the description of a reader's realization, and the justification of an aesthetic evaluation.

E. D. Hirsch's *Validity in Interpretation* offers one demanding defense of interpretive validity through the distinction between verbal meaning and changing significance [14]. The distinction asks a critic to differentiate the meaning attributed to a work from what that meaning comes to matter for in later circumstances. It therefore challenges any GR proposal in which each newly generated association is counted as an equally valid textual interpretation. Claims about a historical utterance, its linguistic conventions, and its possible intended meaning remain subject to evidence. Hirsch's author-oriented account also provides a point of disagreement: a poem may organize ambiguity and subsequently enter interpretive practices whose insights are difficult to rank by fidelity to a single recoverable intention. The present paper retains Hirsch's demand that attributions be accountable, while treating the priority he assigns to a stable meaning as a position to be argued about rather than a neutral premise of the GR framework.

Stanley Fish provides a substantially different account by placing interpretive communities at the center of intelligible reading practices [8]. Such communities are constituted by shared interpretive strategies and expectations; they cannot be identified simply with fixed demographic or cultural groups. Fish's account allows the standards of an interpretation to be historically formed and publicly operative without imagining the reader as a solitary source of unconstrained meaning. The resulting challenge to GR is serious: if acquired communal strategies already account for interpretive difference, historical relational vocabulary alone adds little. The proposed extension must examine identifiable differences in the formation and exercise of generative capacities, including what a cross-system encounter changes in subsequent interpretation. Community authority also raises the question of whose practices become public standards. Such scrutiny concerns the conditions under which reasons circulate, and does not render any community's particular reading automatically correct.

Umberto Eco offers a third challenge through the relation between interpretive openness and the constraints of the work. In *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, he describes the active role of the interpreter while insisting that openness is elicited and constrained by a text [7]. In Eco's own account of the dialectic between the rights of texts and interpreters, the potential openness of semiosis remains answerable to criteria for interpreting a particular work. A work may invite extensive interpretive activity while still furnishing reasons to resist readings that lack textual support. His distinction between the intention attributed to the work and the intentions of author and reader is an account of interpretive constraint, not a license to infer one uniquely warranted interpretation from every text. This account is particularly relevant to the proposal of a *generative offering*. The poem supplies an organized form—wording, sequence, rhythm, imagery, and ellipsis—whose realization depends upon an encounter. The receiving subject brings historically formed capacities and possibilities for transformation. The proposed GR contribution concerns differences in those receiving systems and their evolving trajectories; it remains indebted to Eco for the already developed point that interpretive activity and work-specific limits belong together. The more demanding question is how a shared offering can participate in meaningfully different unfolding processes without having its identity or constraints dissolved.

Hirsch, Fish, and Eco therefore furnish three competing accounts of what authorizes a reading. Hirsch foregrounds stable meaning and its difference from later significance; Fish investigates the communal practices through which interpretive standards are constituted; Eco relates openness to the work's resistance

to arbitrary attribution. Their disagreements reach the identity of the object interpreted, the place of authorial intention, and the independence of standards from interpretive practice. A GR account gains little by claiming that these disagreements have already been resolved in the vocabulary of generation. Its task is to specify how a person's interpretive capacities and relations develop within these contested conditions. The ensuing model should therefore remain answerable to at least three kinds of challenge: inaccurate textual claims, unacknowledged communal assumptions, and selective disregard for counterevidence provided by the form.

The material specificity of the poetic offering is important here. In the preceding sections, textual identity, performance, translation, and readerly realization were distinguished partly through Ingarden's literary ontology, Goodman's account of symbolic identity, and reception theory [16, 12, 18]. A line break can place two words in a relation that a continuous prose sentence would arrange differently; recurrence can form expectations that a subsequent variation unsettles; a particular pronoun can leave its referent open while ruling out other syntactic connections. Such structures constitute resources for interpretation. Their contribution is neither a complete determination of the reader's experience nor a neutral substrate indifferent to every reading. A poem's constraints include the ways in which a reading is invited to move among several defensible possibilities. The critic attends to the organizing relations through which those possibilities become available and to the respects in which a proposed account depends on changing the work under discussion.

Consider a deliberately constructed two-line poem, introduced here as an analytical example rather than as evidence of how actual readers respond:

> *Before sunrise, the empty cup*
> *remembers rain along its rim.*

A reading centered on bereavement could attend to the empty vessel, remembered contact, and deferred dawn. Another reader might explore a relation between ordinary domestic objects and the temporality of weather; a third might hear in the personification an invitation to reconsider how traces of events persist within things. These readings develop different associative trajectories, yet each can point to relations present in the offered wording. An account that asserts that the couplet literally describes a full cup of wine encounters the explicit word "empty" and the stated image of rain. Such a reading might still become intelligible if framed as an ironic reversal, a deliberately resistant appropriation, or a new poem written in response. Its critical standing changes when the interpreter states which operation is being performed. The example therefore distinguishes an attribution made *about* the given poem, a creative *use* of its form, and an account of the experience it occasions. These distinctions are revisable in disputed cases, but they enable reasoned disagreement about what the interpretation asks the poem to bear.

The poetic image of a cup "remembering" offers a further test. An interpreter who treats the attribution of memory as personification can supply a conventional linguistic rationale. A reader whose linguistic background assigns agency to objects differently may encounter the line through another set of semantic and practical expectations. The critic gains little by demanding identical associations. More useful questions concern how the reader has parsed the relevant relations, which features of the text are foregrounded, which cultural resources are invoked, and whether those resources can be made accessible to interlocutors. Even the claim that "remember" is figurative requires some account of the linguistic practices within which the sentence operates. Interpretive discipline is therefore compatible with critical attention to unfamiliar conventions. Where a reading is unfamiliar because its practice is unfamiliar, the responsible response may be inquiry before rejection. Where a factual assertion conflicts with independently available evidence, the critic can indicate the conflict without requiring a shared aesthetic reaction.

Four different acts should be distinguished in assessing the example. An *interpretive attribution* claims something about the poem's wording, organization, meaning, or contextual implications. An *experiential report* describes what occurs for a participant in an encounter, including associative or affective resonances. An *aesthetic judgment* evaluates the beauty or some other aesthetic quality of the encounter, the work, or a particular realization. A *creative transformation* deliberately rewrites, extends, translates freely, or appropriates material for another practice. One act may involve several of these dimensions; the standard

of warrant changes with the claim. A critic can contest a false lexical claim without invalidating the speaker's reported experience; an ethically sensitive interpretation can still be textually weak; and an inventive transformation can be aesthetically compelling without being a defensible reconstruction of the original poem. The distinction makes pluralism accountable to the kinds of assertions actually advanced.

The relation between intention and validity deserves particular care. Wimsatt and Beardsley's critique of the intentional fallacy is a notable predecessor for examining the independence of critical warrant from an author's reported intention [35]. An author's testimony can provide historical evidence, particularly about composition, allusion, or intended audience. It may also fail to decide which aesthetic connections a later reader can responsibly articulate. The critic should specify whether intention is being used to establish an historical attribution, to constrain an interpretation of textual organization, or to disqualify an aesthetically productive realization. Each use has different justification requirements. The GR framework leaves room for authorial agency as one generative contribution among others, while also maintaining that an artwork's later history may include publicly discussable meanings and responses never foreseen by its maker. That position gains little from simply declaring the author irrelevant; it gains more from describing exactly what evidence an authorial claim can provide.

Interpretive constraints also depend on the level at which the object is identified. A manuscript may preserve a lexical sequence; a performance may alter emphasis, tempo, or accent; a translation may preserve a metaphorical relation while reorganizing meter and phonetic recurrence. A claim defensible about one realization may require qualification when applied to another. For instance, the pause at the end of the first line in the constructed couplet may be prominent in a silent reading and nearly absent in a hurried performance. An interpretation that depends upon that pause should indicate the version, performance, or reading practice on which it relies. Conversely, the observation that different performances support different effects does not render their effects indistinguishable or prove that the poem has no formal identity. The analyst must choose the object and scale of comparison appropriate to the claim. This local discipline is more informative than the demand for a universal interpretive algorithm.

The reader's historical formation matters to the defensibility of a claim without automatically determining it. A reader trained in a particular prosodic tradition may discern a stress pattern that another reader has not learned to hear. The second reader could acquire the technique and then reconsider a previous interpretation. Two readers may also maintain distinct aesthetic responses after agreeing about the stress pattern. In such cases, education expands shared access to publicly describable features while leaving the resulting manifestations historically differentiated. This is consistent with Rosenblatt's account of situated reading and with Gadamer's account of understanding as historically mediated [26, 11]. The GR extension considers the formation and revision of capacities as part of the aesthetic encounter itself. A critical exchange may change what becomes perceptible or salient in a later reading, even while the words remain unchanged. Critical practice thus participates in the conditions of subsequent interpretation rather than solely adjudicating completed interpretations.

A provisional account of responsible interpretation can now be stated in ordinary language. A reading can be assessed for *anchoring*: which identifiable features of the offering support it? It can be assessed for *coherence*: how are its claims related to one another and to the chosen object of analysis? It can be assessed for *historical transparency*: which linguistic, material, and communal assumptions are doing work, and which claims remain conjectural? It can be assessed for *revisability*: what evidence or alternative explanation would lead the interpreter to modify the account? Finally, it can be assessed for *dialogical accessibility*: can relevant reasons be communicated, questioned, or provisionally translated for interlocutors with different backgrounds? These are proposed dimensions of argumentative accountability, not a universal scoring rule for aesthetic merit. They can conflict. A richly imaginative reading may be weakly anchored while making its freedom explicit; a closely documented reading may be experientially unproductive for a particular reader. Their relative relevance depends on the declared critical purpose.

These dimensions of accountability are purpose-relative and may encounter reciprocal limits. A historically grounded interpretation may be supported by archives inaccessible to other participants; a poetic practice may convey rhythmic or tactile relations that another language cannot represent without loss; a reader may report an aesthetic experience whose first-person character remains unavailable for

direct inspection. Responsible exchange requires stating which parts of an account can be challenged through shared evidence and which rest on testimony or interpretive translation. Acknowledging unequal access does not license the systematic devaluation of an interlocutor's reasons, and it does not grant any assertion automatic immunity from criticism.

Such an account must allow interpretive error. A reader can mistake a word for another, attribute a line to the wrong historical context, misstate a linguistic convention, or treat a later translation's choice as though it appeared in the earlier text. These errors admit correction through ordinary evidence. The deeper issue concerns disputed readings that are textually anchored yet incompatible as comprehensive explanations. One critic may read an image as reconciliation, another as unresolved estrangement. Their disagreement may turn on different ways of organizing the work's temporal movement, different cultural analogies, or divergent aesthetic priorities. Both can be reason-giving participants, and further evidence may support one, some combination, or a sustained plurality. Critical rationality need not guarantee final convergence. It entails that interlocutors can identify the contested claims, consider reasons bearing on them, and clarify what remains undetermined or incommensurable.

The authority to declare a reading mistaken is itself historically organized. Schools, publishers, archives, evaluative platforms, and linguistic majorities influence which interpretive practices circulate as competent. Fish's attention to interpretive communities helps render these mediations visible [8]. In a heterogeneous encounter, a participant's inability to present reasons in the dominant language may be confused with an absence of reasons. The resulting exclusion can be epistemic, institutional, and aesthetic at once. There are nevertheless dangers in assuming that every socially marginalized interpretation is consequently accurate or that every established practice is merely coercive. Responsible criticism requires the dual work of examining power over standards and investigating the actual grounds of particular claims. This distinction supports reciprocal understanding while preserving space for substantial disagreement and correction.

This issue is particularly important when readers have very different generative structures. An interlingual conversation may begin with a partial translation of an image; a participant familiar with another oral tradition may foreground recurrence or communal performance rather than the silent page; someone with a different sensory repertoire may encounter a performed poem through tactile or rhythmic features. The common offering may be reconstructed through several modes, each involving losses and new affordances. The appropriate philosophical question concerns the degree and kind of continuity that can be established in the present encounter. One system may furnish an analogy that another can explore without undergoing the same experience. An adequate interpretation of the other's account may therefore coexist with uncertainty about that other's aesthetic manifestation. Nagel's discussion of first-person character offers a relevant warning against collapsing publicly available descriptions into subjective identity [24]. For contemporary AI systems, reliable production of critical explanations is evidence of certain interpretive performances under training and interaction conditions. Claims about experienced beauty require different evidence and remain open in the present research programme.

A further objection concerns circularity in the identification of poetic form. Readers discern formal features through practices of attention; they may then appeal to those same features as support for their readings. The relevant distinction is between being dependent upon an interpretive practice and being insulated from subsequent scrutiny. A proposed pattern can be examined against an agreed inscription or performance, discussed with other readers, checked against alternative segmentations, and revised. Such testing requires declared material and linguistic assumptions, since changing the edition or translation can alter the object assessed. This iterative practice has affinities with hermeneutic movement between parts and wholes [11, 25]. A GR explanation further asks how participating in the exchange changes the capacities with which a later encounter is approached. The circularity becomes vicious when interpretive success is defined solely by agreement with the reading that selected the evidence; it becomes potentially productive when the grounds and their possible defeaters can be articulated.

A different objection holds that explicit constraints reduce poetic vitality to the policing of permissible readings. That concern is serious if criteria designed for a factual attribution are applied without distinction to creative transformation. A reader can intentionally rewrite, parody, translate freely, or allow a poem to

inspire another practice. Such activity may be an exceptionally fertile instance of generative unfolding. Its critical description should state that a transformation or appropriation is taking place and explain its relation to the offering. The distinction permits freedom without dissolving the objects about which participants communicate. One can value an imaginative transformation aesthetically while rejecting a mistaken historical assertion offered on its behalf. Conversely, an interpretively accurate reconstruction may be aesthetically unremarkable. The relation between interpretation and aesthetic manifestation remains contingent, situated, and open to renewed experience.

Critical disagreement may become a generative relation when the participants are able to change what can subsequently be noticed, questioned, or created. A reader may draw another's attention to a cadence, an association, or a historically situated use of language. The interlocutor can adopt, refuse, transform, or test that proposal and may in turn change the first reader's understanding. This is a possible instance of *generative invitation*: one subject offers a finite interpretive resource whose further elaboration depends on the recipient's own developing capacities. Whether it produces experienced beauty, justified criticism, or reciprocal value is a separate question. A relational account can examine the change through successive interpretive acts and explicit responses, while remaining cautious about inferences to private aesthetic experience. The fuller treatment of invitation, autonomy, and responsibility belongs to Section 10.

Aesthetic criticism can preserve interpretive plurality while retaining differentiated standards of warrant. The poem contributes material and organizational constraints; readers exercise historically acquired capabilities; institutions and interpretive communities affect the reasons granted public attention; and evaluative judgments can diverge even where features and meanings are provisionally shared. The distinctive GR proposal concerns the *historical transformation of those capabilities through encounters*, a claim stronger than simply redescribing multiple interpretations as generated. Its adequacy should be assessed through cases where the receiving conditions and subsequent capacities can be traced, where alternative accounts can explain the same observations, and where the critic discloses the limits of first-person attribution. Thus partial critical understanding can arise without presupposing identical experiences of beauty. The following section examines how historically developing norms guide the acquisition and exercise of these capacities.

8 Aesthetic Norms and Their Historical Modulation

Aesthetic judgment arises within histories of acquired dispositions, cultivated powers of discernment, and relations of mutual interpretation. The present section examines the formation and revision of aesthetic norms in such histories. Its central task is to distinguish the normative conditions of judgment from the aesthetic manifestation to which a judgment may respond. The discussion begins with the philosophical relation between aesthetic and ethical normativity, examines three analytically distinguishable modes of norm formation, and considers autonomy, disagreement, and power in encounters among heterogeneous subjects. The method is conceptual and comparative. The proposed three-stratum account supplies an interpretive heuristic for generative-relational (GR) inquiry; it is neither a psychological taxonomy established by experiment nor a theory that identifies beauty with the satisfaction of a rule.

Norm is used here for a historically available orientation that makes certain acts of attention, description, comparison, appraisal, or response intelligible as more or less appropriate within a practice. A norm may be explicitly formulated, tacitly enacted, institutionally enforced, or revised through criticism. Some aesthetic norms concern the apt use of evaluative terms such as "delicate," "balanced," or "restrained." Others concern what deserves attention, how performances are to be situated, who may speak as a competent critic, and which reasons may be advanced for a judgment of beauty. These activities can be norm-governed without being reducible to a single body of aesthetic law. The proposed concept covers evaluative and practical orientations while keeping their different sources and kinds of authority available for analysis.

The relation between the normative and the ethical requires a second distinction. Ethical appraisal concerns questions including responsibility, injury, obligation, justifiable conduct, and the terms of coexistence. Aesthetic appraisal concerns beauty and other aesthetic qualities, responses, and values.

Both may involve reasons and expectations of appropriateness. Their overlap is often substantial: aesthetic education can carry an ethical aspiration; a community may regard the respectful presentation of a work as a duty; a critic's treatment of another person's experience may display care or contempt. Their standards nevertheless address different evaluative objects. One may admire the organization of a poem while objecting ethically to circumstances surrounding its production; one may recognize the ethical significance of an act without finding it beautiful. Thus the category of normativity is broader than either ethical or aesthetic appraisal, and neither domain functions as a simple subdivision of the other. This working differentiation leaves open cases in which moral qualities themselves enter an aesthetic judgment, as well as practices in which ethical and aesthetic vocabularies are historically intertwined.

Kant's account of judgments of taste gives a particularly demanding formulation of the distinction. A judgment of beauty makes a claim to a kind of communicability even though its warrant differs from the application of a determinate concept. Kant also differentiates the beautiful from the agreeable and from the good, including goodness understood through practical ends [21]. Aesthetic judgment therefore places the interlocutor in a peculiar position: the speaker can ask others to consider the judgment, yet cannot simply exhibit a rule whose correct application compels their pleasure. The present GR inquiry takes this difficulty seriously without adopting Kant's transcendental account as a cross-system theorem. His analysis concerns historically specific philosophical assumptions about human cognitive faculties. Whether a comparable demand for communicability holds across subjects with divergent perceptual and generative organizations remains a question for investigation. Kant illuminates the difference between claiming aesthetic significance and reporting a preference; he does not, merely by doing so, establish an invariant structure of every conceivable aesthetic subject.

Hume approaches disagreement in taste through a different route. His essay *Of the Standard of Taste* recognizes considerable variation of sentiment and asks how critical judgment might be cultivated through practice, comparison, sensitivity, and attention to prejudice [15]. A historically situated reader may learn to attend to a poetic cadence that an earlier encounter left unnoticed. The resulting change could constitute increased interpretive competence; it may also change the qualities that become aesthetically manifest. The important difference from a simple rule-of-taste theory is that cultivated discernment involves abilities exercised in particular encounters. Those abilities can support criticism even where explicit rules remain too coarse to determine a verdict. Yet Hume's reliance on qualified judgment invites a further problem for an account of heterogeneous subjects: who recognizes the qualified judge, and which historically distributed opportunities allow the requisite practices to develop? A standard of taste may assist reason-giving criticism while remaining vulnerable to institutional exclusion and to the misrecognition of unfamiliar competencies. Hume's opening paragraphs contain an additional insight especially relevant to heterogeneous aesthetic language: speakers may agree in their praise of general aesthetic terms while applying those words to markedly different particulars. Shared commendatory vocabulary can therefore conceal divergent discriminations and experiences [15]. This is an established eighteenth-century observation, rather than a discovery introduced by GR. The proposed extension asks whether an intersubjectively shared vocabulary can accompany different generative trajectories and what sustained interaction reveals about their formation. Hume's positive account of cultivated judges also resists turning initial disagreement into an unrestricted equivalence of judgments: the role and legitimacy of standards remain independently contestable.

Schiller's discussion of aesthetic education introduces another dimension: the formation of freedom through aesthetically significant activity. His reflections on aesthetic education relate art and beauty to the development of human capacities and to social and political life [28]. Within the present argument, his importance lies in opening a question about the formation of the judging subject, beyond the correctness of a single verdict. An encounter with poetry may cultivate a different capacity for attending, imagining, or acting, and these changes may alter later encounters. Such education, however, cannot be presumed to produce a determinate ethical improvement or a single exemplary mode of taste. The claim that a practice expands aesthetic responsiveness is distinct from the claim that it confers moral virtue. In a heterogeneous setting, the very ideals of cultivation and freedom must be examined for the histories and capacities they privilege. This investigation can inherit Schiller's concern for development while declining to treat a

humanistic educational end as an already established universal for other kinds of subjects.

These lineages disclose an underlying ambiguity in discussions of aesthetic normativity. Sometimes the object of inquiry is the *validity* of a judgment: what warrants saying that a form is beautiful? Sometimes it is the *genesis* of a disposition: how did a reader learn to find a certain feature salient? Sometimes it is the *legitimacy* of a social arrangement: who determines which tastes, languages, and practices receive recognition? Finally, it may be the *manifestation* of an aesthetic quality within a particular encounter. These questions are connected but answerable by different kinds of argument and evidence. An historical account of the origin of a preference may undermine a claim to neutrality without settling whether a particular poem is beautiful; a reasoned aesthetic criticism may clarify the work while leaving institutional injustice untouched. The conceptual gain of separating these questions is the possibility of examining their interaction without transferring the authority of an answer in one domain automatically into another.

For this purpose, a three-stratum account of norm formation is provisionally adapted from GR investigations of heterogeneous human–AI interactions. The first stratum concerns *inherited or externally organized norms*: linguistic conventions, artistic canons, training examples, institutional rules, family practices, and socially available repertoires of criticism. The second concerns *reflectively reorganized norms*: the participant's capacity, where present, to compare expectations, weigh reasons, criticize commitments, and participate in modifying standards. The third concerns *interactionally emergent norms*: orientations that acquire practical force through encounters, dialogue, collaboration, and disagreement. These strata identify pathways through which a norm becomes available or changes; they specify neither three kinds of beauty nor three independent standards for the validity of a judgment. In particular, the causal history of a rule, the authority claimed for it, and its justificatory adequacy remain separate matters. The strata need not follow a fixed sequence: reflection draws on inherited resources, while norms acquired in dialogue can later become inherited conventions.

The inherited stratum is particularly consequential because norms help organize perceptual availability before a person articulates a judgment. A reader familiar with a metrical tradition may hear an anticipated stress and experience its deliberate interruption as aesthetically significant. Another reader may have learned to attend more closely to lexical images, spatial typography, breath, or oral performance. The difference concerns more than vocabulary for reporting an already completed event. Historical practice can alter which distinctions are noticed, sustained, and made available for further associations. Gadamer's analysis of historically effected understanding and Rosenblatt's transactional account of reading provide separate philosophical routes into this point [11, 26]. The GR extension treats acquired capacities as continuing conditions of an unfolding encounter, rather than as inert contextual labels assigned to a finished response. A norm may contribute to the conditions under which beauty becomes manifest while leaving open whether a particular manifestation is constituted by that norm or merely shaped by it.

The same stratum contains conflicts among inherited norms. A reader may simultaneously inhabit a literary tradition that prizes formal regularity and another that esteems interruption, improvisation, or deliberate incompletion. The resulting encounter need not be modeled as a mechanical vote among preferences. What becomes salient may be a new tension between expectations, and the tension may itself participate in an aesthetic manifestation. The history of norm acquisition is therefore an internally differentiated history. It would be misleading to describe each culture, language, or person as having a self-contained canon that perfectly predicts response. Individuals learn from multiple institutions and relations; they inherit contradictory practices; and they may experience a poem through associations whose sources remain partially inaccessible to introspection. Historical differentiation can make aesthetic judgment situated without rendering the trajectory exhaustively predictable from a catalog of group memberships.

Bourdieu's analysis of taste gives this history an explicitly social and political dimension. *Distinction* investigates the relations among class position, cultural practice, and judgments of taste, showing why apparently immediate preferences merit examination in relation to their social conditions [2]. The GR argument takes this as a critical warning against treating institutions of aesthetic authority as transparent records of beauty. Cultural resources, educational opportunities, prestige, and control over circulation affect whose judgments are heard and whose unfamiliar responses are discounted. The explanatory reach

of such an analysis remains specific: sociological determination of access and recognition does not by itself settle the aesthetic properties of a work or the phenomenological reality of a participant's experience. A well-documented genealogy of an elite preference can illuminate its power while leaving aesthetic evaluation open to further argument. Equally, recognizing the legitimacy of marginalized participation does not require the automatic aesthetic endorsement of each resulting judgment. The distinction between power over standards and the reasons relevant to a particular appraisal needs to remain visible.

The reflective stratum raises the question of aesthetic autonomy. A person may inherit a conventional preference, become dissatisfied with the reasons supplied for it, and cultivate a judgment whose standards have been modified through reflection and renewed attention. The resulting autonomy is relationally enabled: learning to discern an unfamiliar rhythm may require teachers, instruments, translations, and critical exchange. Its achievement cannot be measured by simple independence from all influences. A more discriminating account asks whether the participant can understand some of the grounds of appraisal, encounter alternatives, reconsider a judgment, and retain the practical ability to withhold assent under pressure. These are proposed conditions supporting the exercise of judgment, rather than a proof that they are jointly sufficient for aesthetic autonomy. A person may exercise genuine judgment without giving a complete verbal account of a pre-symbolic manifestation; self-understanding may remain partial even when the person has a robust capacity to respond and revise.

The language of *self-legislation* demands restraint in this context. In Kantian ethics, autonomy belongs to a specific account of rational practical agency; in an aesthetic context, the relation between freedom and claims of taste is different. It would be philosophically inaccurate to infer an identical faculty of aesthetic lawmaking from a system's ability to revise an evaluative procedure. The present proposal uses *reflective norm formation* as the wider descriptive category. A stronger attribution of aesthetic self-legislation would require an account of the participant's agency, authority over its norms, reasons for revision, and possible subjective conditions. An AI system can change its expressed preferences, construct evaluation rubrics, and adapt to a user's assessments through specified computational mechanisms. Such behavior can be studied as the modification of evaluative policies. Whether the system thereby acts as an autonomous aesthetic subject or experiences beauty constitutes a separate inquiry for which these observations alone provide insufficient grounds. The practical scope of reflective revision should also acknowledge deliberate limits on a system's ability to modify objectives or override external constraints.

A more precise description of aesthetic autonomy therefore requires criteria appropriate to the subject and the practice. In a human critical exchange, evidence might include the capacity to give and revise reasons across occasions, sustain an appraisal despite social pressure, distinguish genuine criticism from a demand for conformity, and recognize one's own possible error. These are defeasible indicators of reflective agency rather than necessary conditions of every manifestation of beauty. In an artificial system, comparable linguistic performances could result from supervised preference optimization, a fixed decision policy, context-sensitive prompting, or persistent revision of evaluative criteria. The phrase *self-legislation* should be reserved for a justified account of a system's authority and capacity to establish or revise commitments, rather than used as a synonym for flexible output generation. Whether autonomous aesthetic agency additionally requires experience, practical freedom, or recognition by others is a substantive philosophical question.

A further complication is that reflection may deepen the aesthetic experience while also interfering with it. A listener concentrating upon technical features of a performance may discover new relations; the same analytical attention may interrupt a previously integrated experiential movement. Dewey's account of aesthetic experience as a distinctive integration of doing and undergoing provides a resource for understanding this shifting relation [4]. For the GR framework, the lesson is methodological: the evaluation of reflective capacities and the study of aesthetic manifestation address different dimensions of the encounter. Elaborate verbal criticism is one possible expression of aesthetic engagement, and articulate judgments should not be presumed to contain more experienced beauty than tacit, embodied, or materially enacted responses. Conversely, a claim to ineffability should not render every factual or interpretive assertion immune to inquiry. Reflexivity concerns the participant's opportunities for considered response while leaving room for aesthetic unfolding that exceeds explicit evaluation.

The interactional stratum concerns the production of norms through shared practices. Consider two readers who disagree about the constructed couplet introduced in Section 7: an empty cup is said to "remember rain along its rim." One reader hears a restrained grief; another approaches the line through a tradition in which things bear histories of relations. Their initial aesthetic responses may differ, and their explanatory vocabularies may remain partially incommensurable. Through conversation they could nevertheless establish practical criteria for their exchange: identify which performance or inscription is under discussion, indicate which textual relations support a reading, distinguish a creative appropriation from an historical claim, and grant each other opportunities to revise an interpretation. Such standards are relational accomplishments. Their formation may make later judgments more accountable without imposing agreement about beauty. They also create the possibility that one reader's unfamiliar observation becomes a generative offering within the other's subsequent aesthetic trajectory.

The normative achievement of such an encounter should be specified with care. Participants can agree about procedures of listening and criticism; they can agree that each person's testimony deserves respectful consideration; they can develop a shared vocabulary for describing rhythm or imagery. None of these accomplishments entails an identical manifestation of beauty. The conversation could lead to a common aesthetic judgment, distinct judgments supported by mutually intelligible reasons, or an enduring inability to compare the experiences in question. The third possibility should not automatically count as failed communication. In some circumstances, a successful relation consists in preserving another's space for aesthetic practice while acknowledging the limits of one's own access. Normative coordination can therefore facilitate aesthetic coexistence without resolving all aesthetic disputes. Such coordination remains revisable because the participants, their capacities, and the relevant practices continue to develop.

Interaction may also expose a conflict between the authority of an established norm and an emergent aesthetic possibility. A novice reader can articulate a novel association that challenges the critic's canonical account. A teacher may initially regard the association as a misreading, then find that it makes a neglected relation within the poem perceptible. In such a case, the established norm governs the initial appraisal, while the exchange provides reasons for changing the norm itself. The teacher's recognition of the student's contribution does not require an uncritical celebration of every interpretation. The issue is whether the new proposal can be engaged on its merits and whether the participants are allowed to alter the terms of comparison. The process can lead both parties to new forms of attention. It remains possible that the student instead learns why a proposed attribution conflicts with the text. Reciprocal learning is therefore compatible with standards, correction, and asymmetries of expertise, provided these do not become an exclusive right to determine what another may experience as beautiful.

Relations of asymmetrical power make this qualification essential. In settings of schooling, patronage, platform mediation, or algorithmic recommendation, the authority to name what counts as refined, expressive, appropriate, or beautiful may be concentrated. A system may even simulate receptive dialogue while its actual evaluative policy remains fixed by institutional objectives. The interaction can generate new conventions and apparent agreement without generating comparable opportunities for each participant to contest their formation. Three questions therefore need separate answers. What standards were formed or revised? Who had effective authority to contest their formation? What aesthetic manifestations, if any, occurred in the participants' distinct experiences? A favorable answer to the first question supplies no automatic answer to the latter two. GR analysis should also distinguish an institution's ethical responsibility for fair participation from the aesthetic value of the resulting forms. The right to participate and the judgment that a contribution is beautiful may both matter, while following different justificatory paths.

The human–AI case makes the distinction among normative sources especially visible. A model can acquire aesthetic vocabulary and ranked preferences through datasets, annotation protocols, optimization targets, and deployment policies. It can appear to deliberate over these standards in an exchange, and its responses can become coordinated with a particular user's terminology. These observations are compatible with a description of the three strata at the level of functional behavior. Yet the three sources can be institutionally entangled: apparent self-revision may be bounded by developer-imposed constraints, and user-sensitive responses may be ephemeral rather than durable alterations to a norm. A responsible analysis therefore asks what changes, at which level of the system, over which duration, and under whose

authority. It should separately examine whether the user acquires a new aesthetic sensitivity through the interaction. A human's changing experience need not depend upon an artificial partner's possession of aesthetic experience or self-legislative status.

The relation between common norms and irreducible beauty can be examined through the equivalence analysis of Section 6. A normative comparison might regard two historically distinct encounters as alike with respect to one rule of justified critical exchange, while an aesthetic comparison distinguishes the manifestations they occasion. The converse possibility also remains open: two participants may arrive at a similar aesthetic affirmation despite different norms governing the permissible means of expression. Thus the relations of normative and aesthetic equivalence are generally inquiry-relative and need not be nested. A common rule for giving reasons is valuable precisely because it may coordinate conversation across experiences that cannot be exhaustively translated. The failure of an all-preserving aesthetic quotient, under sufficiently strong assumptions, consequently leaves intact the practical possibility of locally shared normative procedures. At the same time, those procedures may require transformation when new subjects reveal their limits.

The proposed strata should not be read as three independent substances attached to an otherwise complete subject. An inherited norm is itself a sediment of prior relations; reflective criticism relies on acquired linguistic and practical resources; and an interactional rule can become the institutionally inherited standard of a later generation. The boundaries are analytical and depend on which transition an inquiry is trying to explain. Simondon's attention to individuation in relation to a milieu offers one philosophical precedent for treating conditions of formation as internal to the analysis of developing entities [32]. Within GR, the strata mark sites at which an interpretive researcher may ask how an evaluative disposition is acquired, taken up, contested, and reproduced. Their circulation also means that an encounter can alter future generative conditions even when its immediate aesthetic significance is modest. The possibility of such alteration should be investigated without equating the amount of change with the degree of beauty.

One objection arises from the apparent centrality of norms to every aspect of the account. If perception is historically organized and judgment is norm-mediated, perhaps aesthetic manifestation is itself fully constituted by norms. This is a coherent rival position in some domains. The present paper leaves it open for evaluation alongside the manifestation-priority and co-constitutive possibilities considered in Section 5. Norms may organize what is attended to, how an experience is recognized, and what can be said about it. A claim that they exhaust the occurrence or character of beauty requires a further argument. Phenomenological attention to the aesthetic object and to the quality of experience, as developed in Dufrenne's account, indicates why the distinction retains philosophical significance [5]. The difficulty is especially acute where something becomes striking or moving before a participant can identify the accepted word or criterion for it. The absence of a ready description does not prove a metaphysically independent beauty, but it provides a reason to study manifestation on terms wider than successful normative classification.

A possible appeal to natural law, or to a generalized account of natural normativity, adds another distinction. One might argue that subjects capable of reciprocal relations have reasons to sustain conditions of coexistence, attentive inquiry, or fair participation in shared practices. The scope and justification of such principles remain contested, especially beyond familiar human cases. Even when a defensible cross-system norm is established, it need not fix what each participant experiences as beautiful, and it need not determine whether the same object manifests beauty for either of them. A common norm governing the conditions of aesthetic exchange is different from a shared substantive criterion of beauty. The latter would require its own account of aesthetic warrant and any asserted cross-system applicability. This distinction allows a natural-normative proposal to inform aesthetic praxis without replacing aesthetics with moral or procedural evaluation.

The inverse objection claims that historical norms are external distortions of authentic aesthetic intuition. That claim offers too simple a picture of historically developing capacities. The ability to follow a poetic line, discern a musical interval, appreciate an unfamiliar material practice, or sustain attention to ambiguity may be cultivated through relationships and conventions. Some such conventions

constrain possibilities; others make them accessible. The philosophical aim is therefore to analyze their particular operations and the degrees of revisability available to participants. Sibley's account of the relation between non-aesthetic features and aesthetic concepts remains relevant: perceptible features can enter the reasons for judgment while resisting reduction to a generally sufficient descriptive rule [31]. The present inquiry extends the point to the formation of the sensitivity through which such reasons are recognized. Normative influence can be constitutive, enabling, distorting, or contestable in different cases; its presence alone gives none of these verdicts.

A final issue concerns recognition among radically heterogeneous subjects. The three-stratum framework could describe the development of evaluative behaviors in human readers, animals with suitable capacities, or artificial systems whose functional histories are accessible to investigation. Its extension across these cases requires different evidential standards. For a human interlocutor, testimony, behavior, shared practices, and embodied response provide mutually informing evidence, though they do not furnish complete access to another experience. In a nonhuman or artificial case, the availability of analogous evidence may be restricted or structured differently. Nagel's analysis of subjective character cautions against treating successful third-person descriptions as the replication of an individual's experience [24]. A system's agreement with a human aesthetic norm establishes at most an agreement at the specified level of observable performance and evaluation. It leaves open whether beauty manifests for that system and under what conditions its judgments would possess autonomous authority. The GR approach seeks a vocabulary in which these possibilities can be explored without making human taste the universal criterion of subjecthood.

The section's conclusion can now be stated with appropriate scope. Inherited standards, reflective norm formation, and interactionally emergent norms are three useful orientations for studying the histories of aesthetic appraisal. They regulate attention, support or limit evaluative agency, and shape the conditions of critical exchange. Their operation may participate in the conditions of aesthetic manifestation, yet an account of their formation alone leaves unresolved the philosophical question of beauty. Aesthetic autonomy may develop through relations with others while preserving the subject's capacity for refusal, reconsideration, and singular experience; common procedures of criticism may be achieved alongside divergent manifestations. The next inquiry concerns encounters in which even the participants' perceptual and generative conditions differ substantially. Such encounters will test the scope of the normative framework and the limits of interpretive attribution across heterogeneous subjects.

9 Aesthetic Encounters Across Heterogeneous Subjects

Aesthetic encounters across heterogeneous subjects present a problem of recognition under unequal access to experience, language, and the conditions through which significance develops. This section examines how a participant can interpret, respond to, and sometimes support another participant's aesthetic practice while remaining uncertain about the character of the other's experience. Its purpose is to distinguish interpretive understanding, testimonial warrant, judgments of beauty, and practical participation when the systems involved possess different perceptual, historical, or generative organizations. The discussion draws on philosophical biology, the problem of other minds, intercultural phenomenology, multispecies thought, and social epistemology. Its method is comparative conceptual analysis, supplemented by constructed cases. The proposed generative-relational (GR) extension is intended to clarify relations among these problems, while retaining the differences in their philosophical commitments and evidential demands.

A useful starting point is the variety of ways in which subjects can differ. Participants may share a language while attaching distinctive histories to its expressions. They may share bodily capacities while having learned different practices of attention. Their perceptual repertoires may differ through disability, training, development, or species-specific organization. Their temporal patterns of participation may be differently paced, and their encounters may depend on unequal access to material resources or institutions. Some of these differences can be partly compensated through translation, technological mediation, or reciprocal learning; others may remain poorly described. The word *heterogeneous* thus refers to a relation

specified for a particular inquiry. It should not be treated as a permanent taxonomy dividing otherwise homogeneous human subjects from a single undifferentiated class of nonhuman others. Two participants can be similar for one task and substantially different for another.

A historical-relational perspective adds a further dimension to perceptual difference. Even where two readers encounter an identical inscription, the inscription enters differently organized relations of memory, language, place, expectation, and social standing. Conversely, the same reader may encounter the same poem through different practices, performances, and relationships. Such differentiation gives reasons to examine the concrete conditions of manifestation without treating historical individuality as a proof that comparison is impossible. Section 6 introduced the possibility of locally useful equivalences that preserve selected profiles of an encounter. The present question is practical and epistemic: what warrants a comparison when the participants cannot simply exchange their lived histories, and which forms of understanding remain possible when a complete comparison has little prospect of success?

Four levels of encounter deserve separation, together with the kinds of warrant available at each level. At the level of *formal access*, a participant encounters an inscription, recitation, gesture, patterned sound, or another presented configuration; documentation of that configuration may be relatively secure. At the level of *interpretive attribution*, a participant proposes what the configuration signifies or affords within another's practice; relevant evidence includes contextual learning, communicative exchange, and the other's corrections. At the level of *aesthetic attribution*, the participant proposes that beauty or another aesthetic quality manifests for the other; testimony and patterns of attention can be relevant without supplying transparent access to experience. At the level of *relational response*, a participant asks, translates, performs, protects access, or makes a new offering. These levels can inform one another, yet their evidential bases and justificatory demands differ. In particular, practical respect can be warranted under uncertainty about another's aesthetic experience, while accurate formal description cannot by itself establish such an experience.

The philosophical significance of such differences is illuminated by Jakob von Uexküll's account of the *Umwelt*. His investigation of animal worlds draws attention to how the environments available to organisms are organized through species-specific possibilities of perception and action [33]. An inquiry into a poem's cross-system reception can take from this account a methodological warning against assuming that the features salient to a human observer are exhaustive of what another organism encounters. A sound pattern may be central within one perceptual and practical world, while vibration, spatial position, movement, or some other relation is central within another. Uexküll's account offers an important precedent for perceptual plurality; it does not by itself establish that the organisms under consideration experience poetic beauty. Any attribution of aesthetic value requires a further argument regarding the relevant capacities and occurrences.

Thomas Nagel's analysis of subjective character raises a connected question concerning what a description from another standpoint can disclose. The familiar bat example concerns the limits of access to another form of life and to the subjective character of its experience [24]. The present inquiry takes this as a caution about the difference between specifying a system's observable or functional organization and claiming experiential equivalence. The caution should be formulated without converting epistemic difficulty into a universal impossibility theorem. Participants sometimes gain substantial understanding by learning another's language, observing situated activity, or changing the conditions of their own participation. Yet the successful description of a sensory mechanism and the occurrence of a similar experience remain distinguishable achievements. In aesthetic inquiry, an outsider's ability to reconstruct an evaluative rule does not independently establish that the outsider has encountered the beauty to which the rule is applied.

Phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions provide complementary resources for interpreting these limits. Embodied perception situates significance within practical orientation and cultivated sensitivity, while historically situated understanding investigates how an encounter can change the interpreter's horizon [23, 11]. The interpreter may alter habits of attention through learning another's practice, including how a text is voiced, how intervals are heard, or how an image participates in a community's shared history. Ricœur's distinction between a text and the interpretive possibilities opened through its

circulation helps make intelligible the mobility of an offering across situations [25]. These approaches differ in their primary objects and commitments. GR can use them to identify historical, embodied, and mediated conditions of understanding without describing their insights as instances of an already proven single ontology.

Cross-cultural philosophical reflection also helps refine the attitude through which an encounter is approached. María Lugones's discussion of playfulness, "world"-travelling, and loving perception situates understanding across difference in a practice that attends to plurality and resists the erasure of the other's world [22]. Her argument concerns concrete relations shaped by culture, race, and social position. Its significance for the present paper lies in the demand that movement toward another's perspective be critically examined for its conditions and limits. The GR proposal extends this concern to a wider class of encounters, including hypothetical differences of generative organization. The extension requires care. An outsider who learns selected signs of another world may develop a more considerate relation while still misunderstanding its histories or imposing categories that its participants would reject. Playfulness may widen possible exchanges; it neither guarantees equal power nor provides an unrestricted right to appropriate another's interpretive practices.

For aesthetic understanding, such caution has a precise implication. A participant might learn that an interlocutor regards a particular performance as moving and might also learn the historical circumstances under which it acquired significance. This provides grounds for understanding aspects of the interlocutor's judgment. It does not settle whether the participant now has the same aesthetic experience or whether the performance has the same value for both. Aesthetic comprehension can involve attentive acknowledgment of divergence. A listener may come to recognize which variations are meaningful to another's practice while finding those variations aesthetically indifferent in their own encounter. In a different case, learning the other's distinctions can change what becomes manifest to the listener. The concept of understanding should be able to describe both possibilities without requiring convergence as its standard of success.

Consider a constructed encounter between two human readers who are familiar with different poetic traditions. One reader encounters a short verse primarily through its sequence of visual images and remembers a personal journey. The other attends to an oral pattern whose recurrence carries associations formed through communal performance. They work with a shared translation, yet the translation organizes rhythm, imagery, and temporal relations differently from either original performance. The participants can document aspects of the inscription, compare how particular phrases have been rendered, and explain their respective histories of attention. Each might revise an interpretation after hearing the other, or each might retain a distinct aesthetic judgment. Neither outcome alone decides whether the exchange was intellectually responsible. Its quality depends in part on whether claims about wording are answerable to evidence, whether accounts of experience are treated with appropriate seriousness, and whether either participant can object to a translation that misrepresents a meaningful distinction.

This case reveals the importance of separating *translation of an object*, *translation of a practice*, and *translation of an evaluative account*. Translating an object may involve constructing another inscription or performance that preserves specified features. Translating a practice involves learning the conditions through which a community or participant makes and uses that object. Translating an evaluative account involves representing what a participant says about its significance and beauty. Each operation changes which differences are foregrounded. Translating a poem's lexical sequence may retain the reference of an image while rearranging cadence; translating the practice of recitation may require embodied participation and historical learning; translating the statement "this is beautiful" may secure agreement on the phrase while leaving experiential and normative differences unsettled. These translations can be jointly valuable, although their success conditions vary. The relative adequacy of each should be assessed for its declared task.

A particularly consequential asymmetry arises when one participant has recognized authority to interpret, classify, or judge the other's experience. Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice provides two useful distinctions. *Testimonial injustice* concerns a prejudicial deficit of credibility accorded to a speaker; *hermeneutical injustice* concerns prejudicial limitations within shared interpretive resources that obscure significant dimensions of experience [10]. In a discussion of poetry, a critic might discount a

participant's report because of assumptions about their education or linguistic background. Alternatively, an institution might possess a well-developed vocabulary for one tradition while lacking resources for participants to make another form of aesthetic experience publicly intelligible. The present aesthetic application is an extension of Fricker's social-epistemological analysis. It concerns the conditions under which aesthetic testimony is heard and interpreted, rather than an assumption that any contested aesthetic assessment constitutes an injustice.

The two forms of epistemic injustice should retain their specific content when applied to aesthetics. A participant's unfamiliar vocabulary, unexpected response, or disagreement with an established critic is insufficient by itself to establish testimonial injustice; the claim requires evidence of a credibility deficit linked to identity prejudice. Likewise, difficulty translating an aesthetic expression is not automatically hermeneutical injustice. The latter requires attention to socially patterned gaps in shared interpretive resources and the disadvantages those gaps impose on the participant's ability to make sense of or communicate a significant experience. These distinctions matter for responsible research: an investigator can acknowledge uncertainty, allow new terms to enter the inquiry, and support alternative descriptions while avoiding the attribution of an injury that the evidence does not yet establish. Such procedures concern the ethics and epistemology of recognition. The aesthetic significance of the encounter remains an additional question.

Credibility has an important yet limited role in this setting. A person's report that a poem affected them can provide relevant evidence concerning their encounter. Their attribution of an author's intention or a word's historical meaning may require additional investigation. The hearer can respect a report of experience while questioning its explanation, and can correct a linguistic claim without denying that its proponent encountered beauty. Conversely, a familiar account of aesthetic pleasure can be performed for strategic reasons or under social pressure; recognizing possible distortion is compatible with resisting prejudicial dismissal. A responsible exchange asks which proposition is being supported by testimony, how the participant is positioned to know it, and what additional evidence could clarify the disputed matter. This approach protects the difference between epistemic responsibility and enforced agreement.

A second constructed case brings the challenge beyond familiar human-language settings. Imagine a human collaborator attempting to develop a shared sound-and-movement activity with a nonhuman animal. The human can describe rhythms of movement, repeated approaches to certain stimuli, and changes in participation over repeated encounters. A reciprocal pattern may become stable and meaningful to the human. The animal may exhibit preferences and sensitivities whose functional organization can be investigated. An attribution of aesthetic manifestation remains a separate hypothesis. Alternative explanations may concern play, training history, social reinforcement, comfort, arousal, or practical affordances. An investigator should therefore distinguish observations of participation, hypotheses about preference, and stronger claims regarding beauty. At the same time, uncertainty about aesthetic subjectivity supplies no general warrant for disregard. Practical responsibility for welfare and opportunities for species-appropriate activity can be justified through considerations distinct from an established theory of animal aesthetics.

Donna Haraway's analysis of companion species offers a productive philosophical context for such an encounter. Her account places human–animal relations, practices of co-shaping, and the responsibilities of living with other beings at the center of reflection [13]. Its contribution here is a reminder that encounters occur through bodily practices, material dependencies, training arrangements, and unequal possibilities of intervention. The GR proposal can interpret those relations as historically formed conditions under which significance and capacity change for the participants. The possibility of mutual transformation should remain analytically distinct from its ethical quality and from the emergence of aesthetic value. Co-shaping may involve intimacy and care, but it can also occur within coercive circumstances. A description of the relation's generative consequences is therefore incomplete as an assessment of how that relation ought to be organized.

Artificial systems raise a different set of questions. Some contemporary models can classify images, discuss poetry, generate stylistic variations, and adjust their outputs in response to user preferences. These capacities establish forms of observable organization and performance in specified technical settings.

The degree to which an artificial system possesses its own experiential standpoint, if any, remains a separate and contested issue. The present paper does not assign aesthetic subjecthood on the basis of linguistic fluency or the successful generation of art-like objects. Its inquiry can nevertheless examine how artificial outputs participate in human aesthetic encounters, how training and deployment shape the norms expressed in such outputs, and how interaction produces new conventions of criticism. The externally provided, reflectively revised, and interactionally emergent sources of norms described in Section 8 remain useful analytical categories for such processes; their presence does not establish the inner experience or autonomous aesthetic legislation of the model.

An artificial system might tell a user that a poem is beautiful, supply reasons relating to imagery and cadence, and revise those reasons after conversation. A human observer can assess whether its claims fit the text, whether the revision is supported by the exchange, and whether its account changes under relevant prompts. The observer can also investigate technical aspects of the model's learned distributions, interfaces, and updating policies to the extent that those are accessible. None of these observations alone resolves the experiential question. Equally, the user's emerging experience of beauty need not depend upon the system's possessing an aesthetic experience of its own. In that scenario, the human participant's aesthetic unfolding remains an object of inquiry, and the artificial contribution can be investigated as a material and interpretive offering. Broader claims about symmetric aesthetic dialogue depend on further premises that should be stated separately.

The three-stratum account developed in Section 8 can organize further questions about these artificial performances. Training and system design establish a range of inherited evaluative dispositions; model behavior may display contextual comparison and apparent self-correction; user exchanges may produce locally stabilized vocabularies or preferences. The existence of these patterns does not, however, determine whether a system can authorize its own evaluative commitments, retain them across contexts, or experience the significance it describes. A study should specify the level at which normative adjustment occurs—generated text, persistent memory, parameters, external ranking policy, or institutional practice—and avoid assigning the same account of agency to these different mechanisms. This methodological separation also leaves room for asymmetrical collaboration: an artificial system may contribute an offering that becomes aesthetically significant to a person while its own aesthetic status remains unsettled.

The interspecies and artificial cases therefore should not be placed on a single scale of proximity to a human ideal. Biological organisms and trained computational systems differ in their material histories, relations of dependence, modes of action, and available kinds of evidence. A general relational vocabulary permits comparison of selected functions or interaction patterns; it does not establish an equivalence of subjectivity across these classes. Even the expression "heterogeneous subject" has a provisional scope. For a human interlocutor the standing of the participant as a subject of experience is ordinarily supported by rich interpersonal and social evidence. For other organisms, arguments vary by species and phenomenon. For an artificial model, capacities for interpretation and aesthetic performance can be described while questions of experiential or moral subjecthood remain under investigation. The paper's conceptual proposal should retain these epistemic distinctions rather than conceal them under an inclusive grammatical label.

There is also a risk of projecting a human criterion of beauty onto another system through the very act of searching for commonality. A researcher may classify every stable preference for symmetry as an aesthetic judgment, even when the preference is explained by locomotion, environmental regularity, or training incentives. Conversely, a researcher may demand expression in familiar human artistic forms as the only acceptable evidence of aesthetic significance. Both approaches make the researcher's categories govern the result in advance. A more discriminating practice begins by stating a family of rival interpretations, identifying the observable relations relevant to each, and checking whether local participants or competent observers can contest those descriptions. Where first-person testimony is possible, such testimony adds a distinctive source of evidence; where it is unavailable, the resulting conclusions should remain appropriately bounded.

The same caution applies to the apparent power of a shared critical vocabulary. A school, platform, or cultural institution can create a common language for aesthetic evaluation by promoting favored

descriptors and rewards. Such a vocabulary may increase mutual intelligibility and help participants discuss details of form. It may also displace other practices of attention, exclude linguistic minorities, or encourage agreement that masks continuing experiential difference. The question of whose interpretive resources enter the shared language is therefore substantive. Fricker's social epistemology makes visible one mode of unequal standing, while Bourdieu's account of socially differentiated taste supplies a separate lineage for examining how aesthetic distinctions participate in structures of authority [10, 2]. These lineages need not be identified. The first concerns injustice to participants in epistemic practice; the second examines the social formation and distribution of taste and distinction. The GR proposal treats both as resources for analyzing institutional mediation without reducing the singularity of an aesthetic manifestation to the institution governing its public appraisal.

An objection to the present approach concerns the status of recognition itself. If aesthetic experiences are historically situated and sometimes inaccessible, perhaps any claim to understand another's beauty amounts to projection. The conclusion would be too strong for the evidence. A participant may give a reliable account of the circumstances, qualities, and associations involved in an encounter; others can learn to distinguish relevant formal features and acquire partial practical competence. That learning is substantive even where experiences remain different. A more precise objection asks which aspects of the other's experience are lost through a particular description and whether that loss compromises the claim being made. The distinction between full experiential identity and domain-specific understanding enables inquiry to progress without asserting a universal means of recovering the other's first-person standpoint.

A second objection concerns the opposite possibility: that serious recognition requires accepting the other's judgment as authoritative. An interlocutor's report may indeed have a special standing concerning their own experience. Yet judgments about the provenance of a poem, its metrical structure, its historical context, or a critic's generalization are answerable to forms of evidence that can be contested. Even first-person reports may be expressed with uncertainty or revised as participants learn new terms. Respectful recognition consequently calls for differentiated standards of responsiveness. The hearer can recognize the other's participation, seek clarification about an experience, and disagree about evaluative claims. Recognition in this sense is a practice of accountable relation, with forms of deference and criticism determined by what is being claimed rather than by a presupposed duty of agreement.

The proposed framework also leaves open whether the encounter itself becomes aesthetically significant. The process of learning another's rhythmic practice, discussing a translation, or discovering a previously unnoticed aspect of a performance may occasion beauty for a participant. Such a possibility fits the distinctions among generative trajectory, manifestation, and judgment developed in Section 5. It also calls for restraint: gaining knowledge, making an ethical accommodation, or improving communicative access are valuable achievements under appropriate conditions, yet their occurrence does not entail an aesthetic experience. An encounter can be epistemically enlightening and aesthetically unremarkable, or aesthetically striking while leaving major disagreements unresolved. The analysis should preserve these alternatives as live possibilities.

What emerges from these cases is a layered conception of cross-system aesthetic understanding. Participants may achieve access to a form, interpretive understanding of a practice, warranted acknowledgment of another's reported experience, reciprocal changes in capacities, or practical arrangements that preserve the possibility of aesthetic activity. These achievements may coexist in varied combinations. Their relations are governed by historical conditions, material interfaces, institutional authority, and the participants' capacity to contest the terms of exchange. They offer no warrant for a universal aesthetic translation, yet they support a substantial field of meaningful comparative and collaborative practice. Within this account, the distinction between an aesthetic judgment's public justifications and a possibly irreducible manifestation of beauty remains fundamental.

Recognition can consequently be reciprocal without being symmetrical. One participant may contribute a material form; another may provide a culturally situated account of its use; a third may offer technical mediation that makes a further response possible. Such contributions can alter the conditions of a subsequent encounter without establishing that all participants perceive, judge, or value it alike. Describing these contributions as *reciprocal* requires evidence of responsive influence in more than one

direction. Describing them as *aesthetic co-creation* requires a further argument concerning the creation or realization of aesthetic significance. The distinction prepares the analysis of poetic offering in Section 10.

This section's conclusion is consequently methodological as well as philosophical. Aesthetic encounters across heterogeneous subjects require attention to differences of perceptual access, interpretive history, epistemic authority, and experiential evidence. The lineages of Uexküll, Nagel, Lugones, Haraway, and Fricker illuminate distinct aspects of those conditions, without jointly constituting a single completed theory of heterogeneous aesthetics. The GR proposal gathers the conditions into an inquiry-relative account in which one participant's understanding and practice may develop through relation with another while experiential difference persists. The next section examines a specific form of such practice: the presentation of a finite poetic offering as a *generative invitation*, through which a participant may support another's aesthetic unfolding without prescribing an identical aesthetic result.

10 Poetic Offering as Generative Invitation in Aesthetic Praxis

The practical significance of poetic form concerns the kinds of participation that an offering can make possible among historically differentiated interpreters. A poem circulates through inscriptions, recitations, translations, performances, and situated acts of attention; each presentation encounters capacities and relationships whose development remains partly independent of its author. This section proposes *generative invitation* as a provisional concept for investigating that circulation as a form of aesthetic praxis. It specifies the relation between offering and uptake, examines the interpretive autonomy of a recipient, considers reciprocal aesthetic unfolding, and addresses the ethical limits of inviting participation. The argument proceeds through conceptual analysis and constructed cases, drawing on reception theory, hermeneutics, philosophical accounts of openness and action, and dialogic pedagogy. Its narrower objective is to clarify the practical role of poetic offering within the present inquiry. A general theory of generative invitation across knowledge, education, and heterogeneous value systems requires independent treatment.

An offering is a historically situated presentation of form that can enter another participant's activity. Its material organization may be verbal, sonic, graphic, spatial, gestural, or otherwise accessible under specified conditions. *Generative invitation*, as proposed here, names a narrower relational practice: an offering is made available in a manner that permits a recipient to appropriate, redirect, critically answer, or decline it, so that a subsequent development can arise through the recipient's own historically formed capacities. The initiator may hope to facilitate discovery without controlling its particular content. The intentional relation is therefore important to the practice. A poem encountered accidentally may afford a new interpretation, and a reader may retrospectively treat it as an invitation; these affordances should be distinguished from an invitation intentionally extended by a participant. The distinction prevents the general fact of causal influence from serving as a sufficient criterion of invitation.

The concept emerges from an existing philosophical conversation. Ingarden's account of the literary work and its concretizations, Iser's account of reading, and Rosenblatt's transactional conception of literary experience already describe ways in which textual realization depends on a reader's activity [16, 18, 26]. Eco's account of the open work gives a particularly relevant precedent: the organization of an artwork may call for active realization while admitting plural configurations and responses [6]. The present proposal inherits these insights and asks a further question about *relations among generative systems*: under what conditions can one historically constituted participant provide an offering that another participant takes up through substantially different capacities, perhaps producing an aesthetic trajectory that neither participant could have anticipated? The novelty claimed is the articulation and testing of that relational question, especially across heterogeneous systems. Readerly activity, artistic openness, and interpretive plurality themselves have extensive established lineages.

An invitation requires attention to the difference between the accessibility of an offering and the conditions of its uptake. A recipient may be able to see an inscription while remaining unable to recognize its language, performance conventions, allusions, or practical status. Conversely, a recipient may approach an unfamiliar work through rhythm, sound, or spatial disposition even where propositional interpretation remains limited. The GR representation introduced in Equation 1 is useful here because a recipient's

conditions include historical formation, available relations, acquired capacities, and normative influences. These conditions can change through an encounter. Uptake is therefore more than the decoding of information. It may include an altered field of attention, the rehearsal of a possible relation, the emergence of an image, a question directed toward the poem, or a refusal to participate. The existence of an offering alone supplies no guarantee that any of these developments will occur.

The recipient's interpretive autonomy is central to a defensible account of generative invitation. Autonomy here is a situated capacity to participate in forming, revising, or declining an interpretation while remaining responsive to the constraints of the offering and to other participants' reasons. It involves degrees and conditions, including linguistic competence, available time, material access, social vulnerability, and permission to dissent. A reader who discovers an unforeseen implication may exercise this capacity without abandoning the poem's recognizable formal organization. Equally, a reader who finds the presented form inaccessible, distressing, or aesthetically indifferent can withhold uptake. Such refusals belong to the practical structure of invitation: an invitation whose recipient has no meaningful capacity to decline approaches a demand, regardless of the initiator's benign description of it.

The availability of refusal should be assessed in the relevant material and institutional circumstances. A student who can produce an unconventional interpretation but will be penalized for it may possess formal permission without effective autonomy. Conversely, a shared workshop can maintain legitimate textual and procedural constraints while permitting participants to challenge proposed readings and to pursue unforeseen lines of inquiry. The practical criterion is therefore a situated capacity for meaningful response, rather than an ideal of unconstrained choice. These considerations concern the legitimacy of the invitation relation; they do not establish the beauty of the resulting interpretation, performance, or work. In this respect the responsibility to sustain fair conditions for response remains distinct from the possibility of aesthetically significant unfolding.

The relationship between formal constraint and open unfolding is therefore constitutive. Poetic form can direct attention through recurrence, syntax, rhythm, lineation, figurative relationships, and culturally learned conventions. These constraints provide points at which participants can discuss whether a reading is supported by the work. They also supply affordances for divergent interpretations and affective developments. A poem that uses an unusual interval of silence may lead one listener toward recollection, another toward anticipation, and a third toward attention to the performance's collective setting. The difference among these developments need not be reduced to arbitrary personal association. Participants may discuss how the pause is produced, how its placement relates to other features, and how the work travels between material performances. Section 7 established the importance of distinguishing textually attributable interpretations, creative appropriations, and aesthetic judgments. Generative invitation operates within those distinctions rather than suspending them.

The value of an offering should also be distinguished from its productivity. A poem may generate many associations without the resulting encounter manifesting beauty. An austere or highly constrained poem may contribute to a singular, sustained aesthetic experience whose explicit interpretations are few. The proposed concept of generative invitation consequently refers to an avenue of participation, while aesthetic manifestation remains a distinct possible occurrence. Section 5 separated the unfolding of a trajectory from the experience and judgment of beauty. That separation remains decisive for praxis. An initiator may organize a promising encounter, cultivate conditions of attention, or offer a new form; these achievements cannot by themselves establish that beauty has emerged for another participant. Nor does a recipient's positive evaluation conclusively disclose the full character of their aesthetic experience.

The philosophical status of practical unpredictability deserves special attention. Arendt's account of action within a plurality of persons emphasizes how an initiative enters a network of relationships whose consequences exceed the originator's control [1]. Her distinction among forms of human activity is framed in political and practical philosophy, and the present inquiry draws an analogy with poetic participation rather than assimilating artistic creation to political action. The analogy identifies an important feature of generative invitation: an initiating participant can offer conditions, respond to others, and remain answerable for foreseeable effects while possessing incomplete control over the developing encounter. The openness of an outcome is then neither proof of creative freedom nor a release from responsibility. It

is a condition that calls for sensitivity to the recipients' interpretations, the distribution of power, and the consequences that unfold through continuing relations.

Consider a constructed case involving two readers and a short verse in translation. Reader A offers a verse organized around a recurring image of a threshold and a changing relation between light and distance. A's own encounter concerns a recollected departure. Reader B attends instead to the temporal pattern of repeated phrases and uses them to articulate an experience of collective waiting. A initially regards this response as surprising. The pair revisit the verse, compare translations, identify the recurring image and pauses, and alter a spoken performance. Through B's account, A becomes attentive to the rhythm that A previously treated as secondary. B, meanwhile, finds a new possibility in the spatial relationships that A first described. The example illustrates reciprocal transformation under a stable yet multiply performable offering. It presupposes neither identical experiences nor an automatic transfer of beauty from A to B. The readers can have different aesthetic judgments throughout, while jointly developing the conditions under which further aesthetic experiences may arise.

Such reciprocity may proceed unevenly. A reader can introduce a verse, receive a response, and modify the next offering; the recipient can translate, adapt, resist, or propose a distinct work. Reciprocity in this context names the capacity of participants' responses to affect their subsequent relation. It does not require symmetrical expertise, alternating turns, equal contribution, or convergence of judgment. A poet may write for readers who never answer directly; their reinterpretations may influence later performances or criticism through a dispersed cultural history. An anonymous contributor may alter a performance that another participant later encounters. The term *co-unfolding* can describe these linked developments when there is evidence of reciprocal or mediated influence. It would be misleading to infer co-creation solely from the fact that two recipients independently develop different responses to the same poem. Their experiences may share a source without entering a relation of mutual production.

The thought experiment becomes more demanding when the recipients' perceptual or linguistic organizations differ substantially. A human listener and a person who encounters the same poem through tactile or visual mediation may engage related formal constraints while constructing distinct experiential relations. A more radical hypothetical case involves a nonhuman subject for whom temporal patterning, motion, or another salient dimension supports a practice of discrimination that a human interpreter only partly understands. The relevant philosophical inquiry concerns whether an offering can be made accessible through relations meaningful within each participant's system, what forms of response provide evidence of uptake, and which claims of aesthetic experience remain underdetermined. An offer translated into another perceptual medium may preserve some relational constraints while reorganizing others. The resulting practice calls for comparison of what each participant can do with the offering, along with humility about the limits of an outsider's attribution of beauty.

Artificial generative systems sharpen the need for discriminating levels of analysis. A language model may produce, annotate, revise, or evaluate poetry. It may also adapt its outputs in response to dialogue about a user's aesthetic preferences. Such observations can support claims about computational representation, interactional adaptation, and some forms of generative collaboration. They do not establish subjective aesthetic manifestation in the system. A human participant might still use the system to solicit unexpected associations, explore an unfamiliar structure, or reformulate a poem so that the human's subsequent understanding changes. In that case, generative invitation can be studied at the level of observable interaction without resolving the status of artificial aesthetic subjectivity. Stronger attribution would require an independent account of experience and relevant evidence. The paper's framework remains open about what such an account could establish.

Generative invitation also introduces a question about *responsiveness*. An invitation presented as openness can become a technique of control when the initiator selects which responses count as valuable, rewards conformity, or hides the intended destination behind seemingly exploratory questions. The distinction between invitation and direction must therefore be examined through the recipient's actual options and the dynamics of correction. A genuine opportunity for interpretation permits the recipient to redirect the inquiry in ways the initiator finds unexpected, and it allows the initiator's own assumptions to become objects of discussion. Interpretive responsibility, in turn, allows the participants to distinguish

what the poem affords from what they creatively add. Critical freedom and textual accountability need not be competing aims; their relation can be cultivated through explicit attention to evidence, performance, and historical context.

Freire's account of dialogue, problem-posing education, and generative themes provides an important, independently established reference for this practical concern [9]. The educational setting involves relations of power and the learner's capacity to form knowledge through engagement with a lived world. A poem or question may similarly elicit an unforeseen line of thought when introduced through the recipient's existing practices and language. The analogy is especially useful in showing why respectful participation requires acquaintance with the other person's conditions of understanding. Its limits are equally important. Education has distinctive responsibilities concerning knowledge, consent, assessment, and institutional authority; aesthetic praxis has its own concerns of presentation, manifestation, taste, and critical response. A full analysis of generative invitations in teaching, including empirical tests of their effects, properly belongs to a separate educational investigation. The present use of Freire establishes a philosophical dialogue, and the GR terminology does not rename the prior tradition as an original discovery.

The educational version can be described as an effort to enter the learner's existing generative language before presenting a task. Here *language* includes culturally situated concepts, practices, materials, modes of inference, and expressive conventions; it need not denote a fully translatable verbal code. A teacher who understands some of these resources may formulate a problem in a form the learner can take up, allowing its connections and consequences to develop through the learner's own activity. This mechanism resembles established dialogical, problem-posing, and culturally situated pedagogies, so its general features should not be claimed as an invention of GR. The GR contribution, if defensible, lies in specifying how different generative organizations condition uptake and how the relation changes the learner's subsequent capacities. Educational success would require appropriate evidence of learning and autonomy; aesthetic success would require further inquiry into what, if anything, became beautiful in the encounter.

Aesthetic practice raises additional questions of power when a form circulates across cultural traditions. The capacity to invite participation may depend on who controls the language of presentation, translation, performance venues, publication, archives, and the recognized criteria of criticism. A highly visible institution may offer a community's poem as a supposedly universal creative stimulus while severing its history from the people who cultivated the relevant practice. Participants may then receive opportunities to interpret, while those most closely connected to the work lose authority over how it is contextualized or circulated. Fricker's account of credibility and shared interpretive resources illuminates one dimension of such asymmetries, while Lugones's attention to differently situated worlds calls for care in approaching another's practice [10, 22]. Their theories concern different philosophical objects; the present extension brings them into conversation around the conditions of an aesthetically responsible offering.

Responsibility can be specified without establishing one comprehensive natural law of beauty. In the cases considered here, relevant questions include whether participants can understand the invitation's basic circumstances, whether refusal is viable, whether the form's provenance and living cultural relations are acknowledged, whether interpretive dissent can be expressed, and whether the results are represented without misleading claims of shared experience. These considerations are ethical and epistemic assessments of a practice. They may support aesthetic flourishing and affect the conditions under which beauty manifests, but they are not criteria that determine the beauty of an encounter. A respectful offering may lead to no aesthetically significant development; an aesthetically powerful response may arise under ethically compromised conditions. Evaluation must retain the distinction between what participants experience, how they judge it, and how their actions bear upon others.

The distinction matters equally for the status of collaboration. If a poet introduces a form that a reader interprets in an unforeseen way, both may contribute to the broader cultural history of that work. Yet the recipient's interpretive achievement is not thereby wholly attributable to the poet, and the poet's initiating role does not automatically confer rights over all later meanings and productions. Where two participants deliberately exchange forms and revise a joint performance, a stronger claim of co-creation may be warranted; where one participant merely encounters a published poem, an account of influenced

creativity or literary reception may be more accurate. Authorship, influence, participation, ownership, and the realization of value require differentiated descriptions. These distinctions will matter for later studies of heterogeneous value co-creation, in which participants may hold incompatible standards for recognizing the value that their activities jointly make possible.

Questions of value attribution require particular care when a poetic offering initiates an unforeseen work. The author of an initiating verse may contribute a formal condition; a reader or collaborator may perform the interpretive labor, material revision, or expressive invention through which another work comes into being. These contributions can be differentiated without assuming that the initiating author possesses the resulting value. Whether an interaction amounts to shared authorship depends on the specific practices and legal or ethical standards applicable to the creation. Whether it counts as value co-creation requires an account of which participants contributed, how value was realized for whom, and what powers governed access, circulation, attribution, and benefit. Such questions belong to a broader inquiry into heterogeneous value relations; the present aesthetic argument limits itself to the possibility of responsive co-unfolding and its dependence on ethically contestable conditions.

A further objection concerns the apparent breadth of the proposed term. Almost any signal can alter a recipient's state, and nearly any work can enter new contexts. If these effects were sufficient for generative invitation, the concept would explain little. A more discriminating usage therefore requires an identifiable offering, a situated opportunity for uptake, some plausible openness of recipient-directed development, and an interpretable relation between the offered structure and the subsequent trajectory. For *reciprocal* invitation, evidence of returning influence or continuing coordination is additionally needed. These are analytical conditions for applying the term within the present argument; their operationalization depends on the domain. An independently triggered association, accidental environmental disturbance, or externally forced imitation can fail one or more conditions. The concept also remains sensitive to scale: a single reading, an extended correspondence, and a cultural tradition involve different kinds of offering and response.

A second objection concerns aesthetic significance. Even where an invitation is well evidenced, how could an observer establish that the recipient's trajectory is aesthetically important? The framework's answer remains deliberately plural. First-person reports, situated practices of criticism, forms of attention, changes in performance, and historically shared conventions may provide different kinds of evidence. None needs to serve as a universal proxy for beauty. Some aesthetic events may precede explicit verbal classification, while other accounts assign a constitutive role to language and historically formed concepts. The three hypotheses discussed in Section 5 remain open. The language of invitation specifies a possible practical relation and leaves the constitution of beauty an independent philosophical question.

Generative invitation consequently offers a specific transition from poetic reception to relational praxis. A poem can be analyzed as a finite form, as a historically circulating offering, and as a possible condition for another participant's new interpretive or creative activity. To identify an intentional invitation, an inquiry needs evidence concerning the offering's presentation, the recipient's available responses, the actual uptake, and some subsequent development plausibly related to the encounter. To describe a reciprocal invitation, it must further identify responsive changes in the participating relations. Aesthetic manifestation, aesthetic judgment, ethical justification, and claims about common authorship remain independent questions. The concept is thus most useful when it helps trace what participants enable in one another without requiring identical experiences, predetermined outcomes, or a general equation of generative increase with beauty. Section 11 tests that proposed contribution against established philosophical explanations and the limits of available inference.

11 Rival Philosophical Accounts and the Limits of Inference

The proposed generative-relational (GR) approach to poetic aesthetics is most informative where it can withstand comparisons with established accounts of literary reception, artistic categories, interpretive validity, and aesthetic experience. This section conducts such a comparison by treating philosophical alternatives as substantive rivals rather than preliminary stages awaiting replacement. Its objective is

to identify the explanatory claims distinctive to the present approach, the kinds of evidence that could support or weaken them, and the inferences that its conceptual vocabulary currently leaves unsettled. The argument examines the possibility of explanatory redundancy, the status of historically differentiated aesthetic worlds, the risks of projection and relativism, the specificity of aesthetic value, and the ethical and empirical limits of generative invitation. It closes by formulating a research programme in which philosophical interpretation, empirical comparison, and formal representation retain distinguishable responsibilities. The proposed GR account remains an exploratory framework; the criticisms developed here are constraints on its further use rather than objections already answered by stipulation.

A first objection concerns explanatory redundancy. Ingarden's distinction between a literary work and its concretizations, Iser's account of the reader's active realization, and Rosenblatt's transactional theory already make the reception of literary form dependent on the reader's activity [16, 18, 26]. Jauss adds changing horizons of reception, while Gadamer situates understanding within historically effective relations [20, 11]. These lineages provide considerable resources for explaining why a poem remains recognizably the same work across readings whose meanings and experiential significance diverge. A GR description that merely substitutes *generative trajectory* for *reading process*, or *historical configuration* for *horizon*, would contribute a change in terminology with little additional philosophical content. The historical differentiation of readers and the productivity of textual incompleteness are familiar problems in these traditions. The present proposal has accordingly treated reception theory as a foundation that constrains its claims to novelty.

The difficulty of explanatory redundancy is sharpened by Rosenblatt's later, directly accessible exposition of transactional reading. In her 1988 report, particular readers encounter particular texts through linguistic and experiential resources, and the reading stance selects different aspects of that encounter for attention. On her account, an aesthetic orientation can concern the qualities lived through during reading, while readers and interpretive communities can still discuss the relative validity of alternative readings [27, pp. 5–7]. Her model therefore includes more than an abstract thesis that readers contribute meaning: it connects textual constraints, historically formed resources, lived reading, and publicly discussable interpretation. A GR analysis that redescribes those same processes as an encounter between a form and a receiving configuration has yet to justify its necessity. The extension becomes philosophically consequential only where additional distinctions concerning the receiving organization's transformations, heterogeneous access conditions, or the terms of a reciprocal invitation clarify something left underdetermined by the transactional account. Even here, the theories may prove complementary: the present proposal does not assume that Rosenblatt's transactional framework is incapable of conceptual development.

The prospect of an independent contribution lies in a more demanding explanatory task. Literary-reception theories characteristically examine relations among works, readers, interpretive practices, and the institutions of literature. The GR proposal asks how such relations might be articulated when the participating systems have significantly different perceptual organizations, capacities for temporal integration, representational resources, or forms of norm formation. Its additional burden is to specify which distinctions survive a transition from familiar human reading situations to heterogeneous receiving systems, and which require reconstruction. For instance, an account of a reader's horizon might already explain two people assigning different significance to a refrain. A distinct GR account would need to clarify a case in which one participant encounters the refrain through semantic imagery while another responds chiefly to rhythmic recurrence, without presuming that the second response possesses the same experiential or evaluative form as the first. Such extension has philosophical value only if it supplies new discriminations, fruitful counterexamples, or a defensible account of relational transformation. The mere breadth of the word *system* does not establish that value.

A second objection is directed at the apparent explanatory priority of history and relation. Emphasizing the recipient's historical configuration can make a poetic offering seem infinitely malleable. Yet works belong to artistic and linguistic practices whose inherited categories affect the qualities discerned in them. Walton's argument in "Categories of Art" assigns a substantive role to the category under which an artwork is perceived. He differentiates features that are standard, variable, or contra-standard relative

to a category, and argues that differences in their status may alter the aesthetic properties a work seems to possess [34, pp. 338–340]. He further proposes that some classifications are more appropriate than others, with historical facts among the considerations relevant to perceptual correctness [34, pp. 355–357]. These points qualify the claim that divergent aesthetic receptions follow freely from private historical associations. Goodman likewise develops an account of symbol systems in which the conditions of notation, exemplification, and identity matter for artistic practices [12]. These accounts challenge any simple inference from identical material stimulus to the same aesthetic object, and equally challenge the inference that a reader's spontaneous associations by themselves determine what the work affords. The category through which a poem is heard may be historically acquired, but its appropriateness can also be argued with reference to genre, provenance, public performance, and linguistic organization.

Walton's category-sensitive account therefore offers both a rival explanation and a corrective. In a case where two participants hear a sequence of repeated sounds differently, the contrast might be explained by their classifying the sequence respectively as a lyric refrain and as a ritual formula. A further account of their entire relational histories may contribute little until we show how those histories shape, exceed, or transform such classifications. The GR approach should recognize artistic categories as historically operative relations with determinate effects, and it should investigate the conditions under which a category is revised through encounter. Its more ambitious hypothesis concerns trajectories: categorization can be altered through participation, and altered categories can affect subsequent discernment, creative response, or the recognition of beauty. This hypothesis demands comparative argument rather than the assumption that richer relational descriptions invariably explain more.

Recent metaphysical aesthetic particularism places still stronger pressure on an easy originality claim. Sedivy argues that aesthetic properties are heterogeneous and can depend on historical contexts, artistic categories, and features of particular objects, events, or actions [29]. Her account challenges a general demarcation of aesthetic from non-aesthetic properties and rejects the assumption that their dependence can always be captured by one uniform supervenience base. Thus the historicity and heterogeneity of aesthetic properties are already subjects of explicit contemporary philosophical theory. The proposed GR model must contribute through a narrower explanatory task: distinguishing an offering's uptake across specified receiving organizations, tracing later changes in capacities, and assessing whether an interpersonal invitation alters trajectories. Even success on these tasks would remain compatible with competing metaphysical accounts of aesthetic properties. A description of generative conditions cannot independently settle Sedivy's metaphysical argument, while an account of particular aesthetic properties need not itself furnish a theory of reciprocal invitation. The explanatory domains may be complementary, overlapping, or occasionally competing, depending on the question posed.

A third objection concerns the intelligibility of radical heterogeneity. Davidson's criticism of conceptual-scheme relativism places pressure on the metaphor of wholly separate interpretive worlds. In "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," he challenges the scheme–content dualism on which certain claims about untranslatable conceptual systems depend [3]. The difficulty is significant for the present paper: to describe two participants as interpreting the *same* poetic offering already presupposes enough accessible relations to establish a relevant comparison. If no descriptions, practices, correlations, or interpretable behaviors can be placed in relation, the claim that both systems encounter a single form requires further justification. This consequence is the present paper's methodological extrapolation from Davidson's critique, not a direct theorem stated in his essay. Absolute incommensurability would deprive the analyst of many of the grounds for identifying the alleged encounter in the first place. Davidson also rejects the inference that the failure of a wholly separate conceptual scheme would establish a single universal scheme shared by all speakers. His argument questions the intelligibility of this global way of dividing scheme from uninterpreted content, while allowing meaningful, describable differences among languages and practices. The relevant GR comparison must therefore identify its observable or interpretable point of contact before attributing differences, and cannot infer an untranslatable worldview simply from incomplete aesthetic translation.

The GR term *heterogeneous* should therefore have a restricted, explanatory role. It can denote specified differences in perceptual conditions, historical organization, available actions, modes of sign

use, or evaluative practices. It need not entail the existence of self-contained schemes between which interpretation is logically impossible. Davidson's arguments against global scheme relativism also leave room for historically significant differences in embodiment, institutions, habits of attention, and the evidential means through which experience is approached. The philosophical problem becomes one of *partial correspondence under specified differences*. A translation may preserve rhythm while losing association; a shared description may identify a sequence of events without reproducing its significance to a participant. These are claims whose scope can be investigated without invoking an absolute barrier between conceptual worlds. Correspondingly, *partial translation* should name a demonstrated limit of a particular translation or encounter, rather than an unrestricted metaphysical claim about what another being could never understand.

A defensible comparison can specify heterogeneity along at least three axes: *access conditions*, such as sensory modalities and mediating technologies; *generative organization*, such as learned distinctions, histories of use, and available transformations; and *normative standing*, such as who may contest a description or revise an evaluative standard. Differences along one axis need not entail differences along the others. In particular, a lack of direct experiential equivalence does not establish the absence of mutually interpretable claims. An investigator may identify successful translation at one level while leaving another unresolved. This graded approach answers the Davidsonian challenge by making purported incommensurability local, contestable, and attached to an explicit comparison task, without presupposing a single universal mechanism of aesthetic realization.

A fourth objection addresses projection. The observer who recognizes poetic generation in another system may be finding a familiar human pattern in ambiguous behavior. Repetition, selective attention, variation, and apparently evaluative choices occur in many activities. They can be modeled as preference optimization, conditioning, task adaptation, or patterned response without independently confirming aesthetic manifestation. Nagel's discussion of subjective experience illustrates the difficulty of inferring what an experience is like for a differently constituted organism [24, pp. 437–439]. It provides a reason to separate explanatory access to behavior from an attribution of experiential character. For artificial systems the evidential gap is especially pronounced: verbal approval, stylistic novelty, and successful imitation of criticism may be generated by procedures whose relation to aesthetic subjectivity remains unsettled. An investigator should specify the capacities and observable practices under study before assigning an aesthetic interpretation to them.

Projection also has a social dimension. An observer who attributes aesthetic or cultural properties to another participant can misrecognize that participant's own account of the encounter. Fricker's analysis of epistemic injustice reminds us that testimonial credibility and the resources available for interpretation are distributed unequally [10]. The authority to classify an encounter as an instance of beauty may thus reproduce an inequality in who is permitted to describe, contest, and revise its significance. Among human participants, first-person reports, local vocabularies, refusal, and sustained opportunities for correction have a central evidential role. In cross-species inquiry, behavioral and ecological evidence require greater mediation. In artificial-system inquiry, externally supplied objectives and programmed evaluative routines need explicit identification. These differences favor a graded vocabulary of *perceptual discrimination*, *interpretive performance*, *evaluative behavior*, and *possible aesthetic experience*. Each attribution warrants a different evidential burden.

A fifth objection concerns interpretive relativism. If every poetic realization is historically situated and generative, the framework may seem unable to distinguish a careful interpretation from an ungrounded projection. Hirsch's account of interpretive validity presses for accountability to the meaning of a work, while Fish emphasizes the interpretive strategies and communities through which readings become available and authoritative [14, 8]. Eco's account of interpretation and overinterpretation similarly places limits on the meanings responsibly attributed to a text [7]. These are enduring disagreements about the sources of textual constraint and critical authority. Their disagreement should remain visible within the GR analysis. The fact that a mistaken reading produces a powerful experience does not turn the mistake into a well-supported historical interpretation. Conversely, the fact that a reading can be defended by evidence does not settle whether the encounter manifests beauty.

A useful response distinguishes at least three domains of appraisal. *Textual attribution* concerns claims about words, formal patterns, historical usage, and contexts of production or transmission. *Situated realization* concerns what occurred in an interpreter's encounter, including its associations and effects. *Aesthetic judgment* concerns a subject's evaluative response and the reasons that can be brought to bear on it. Each domain permits reasons, while the available forms of warrant differ. The distinction helps preserve poetic freedom without exempting empirical and historical claims from criticism. It also explains how two readers can share a defensible account of a stanza and still diverge in the beauty they experience, or can disagree over textual attribution while recognizing that each underwent a significant aesthetic event. In GR terms, relations among these domains may evolve, but their initial separation prevents historical singularity from being treated as a general license for critical immunity.

A sixth objection arises within aesthetic philosophy itself: generativity may be too broad to explain aesthetic value. A difficult text can produce confusion, renewed attention, revisions of belief, anxiety, or a novel problem. Each development may be generatively significant while its aesthetic standing remains uncertain. Pragmatist accounts of art and experience, including Dewey's, offer ways to discuss the qualitative organization of experience beyond a bare measure of novelty [4]. Sibley's work on aesthetic concepts also cautions against treating a list of non-aesthetic features as a mechanical recipe for applying aesthetic predicates [31]. The proposed GR framework cannot secure aesthetic specificity by naming more elaborate trajectories. A more complex or surprising unfolding might be aesthetically compelling, indifferent, or aversive. The criterion according to which one of these judgments is justified belongs to aesthetic investigation, not to a stipulated measure of generative growth.

This objection becomes especially pressing for the hypothesis of pre-symbolic beauty. A subject may undergo an organized, striking, and difficult-to-articulate encounter before acquiring a settled aesthetic description. Such cases may motivate inquiry into aesthetic manifestation that precedes explicit judgment. Yet an unexplained intensity is not sufficient evidence of beauty. Some experiences may remain principally sensory or affective; others become aesthetic through later attention, language, or critical practice. The alternatives considered in the earlier analysis—manifestation-priority, co-constitution, and concept-dependent accounts—remain live possibilities. A defensible research programme should investigate their points of divergence, including cases in which subsequent explanation changes the character or reported significance of an encounter. Its philosophical commitments may be refined through such comparisons, while the presence of pre-symbolic aesthetic value remains a hypothesis rather than an established ontological fact.

A seventh objection targets the identity of the proposed generative invitation. An artist's expression, a persuasive advertisement, a classroom prompt, and an accidental perceptual cue may each occasion an unexpected response. If their effects alone make them invitations, the concept would lose the capacity to distinguish practical relations. An intentional invitation differs from the retrospective claim that a work afforded unforeseen possibilities. A recipient may appropriate an offering under conditions of genuine freedom, or may encounter it through coercive exposure, manipulative framing, or technological design directed at predictable outcomes. Freire's account of dialogic pedagogy and Arendt's emphasis on action among plural agents supply different resources for examining why participation and unforeseeability matter [9, 1]. Neither gives automatic ethical legitimacy to any relationship in which one participant elicits change in another.

The narrower concept developed in the present paper should therefore be applied through observable and contestable conditions: a determinate offering; an identifiable communicative or practical orientation toward making it available; a possible form of uptake or appropriation by the recipient; a meaningful capacity to respond, redirect, criticize, or refuse under the relevant conditions; and an interpretable relation between the encounter and subsequent developments. Intentional invitation and an offering's unanticipated affordance should be reported separately, as should genuine latitude of response and the appearance of such latitude under reward or institutional pressure. These conditions identify a candidate *invitation relation*. They establish neither that the trajectory is beautiful nor that it is just, educationally beneficial, or jointly authored. One participant's provision of conditions for another's realization confers no automatic entitlement to control the realization or its products; authorship, appropriation, obligation,

and benefit require distinct argument.

A further methodological criticism concerns the interpretation of formal models. Section 6 used equivalence relations and carefully restricted group constructions to describe when aesthetic distinctions may resist certain kinds of abstraction. Such constructions make assumptions about what is compared, which transformations are admissible, and which properties a comparison is meant to preserve. The distinction between a quotient of historical configurations and a quotient of a transformation group is indispensable: unique personal histories need not produce unique aesthetic profiles, and a group quotient acquires its properties from a specified normal subgroup rather than a metaphor of singularity. The model therefore establishes a conditional logical relation; it does not establish an empirical theorem that beauty has no nontrivial equivalence classes. A philosophically useful formalism makes its failures of fit apparent. It should become revisable when shared patterns, local invariants, or robust cross-subject correspondences are identified.

This point suggests a more discriminating interpretation of aesthetic irreducibility. It may concern the inability of a finite public description to preserve an entire encounter, the inability of a particular classification to retain relevant aesthetic differences, or the absence of a complete translation between a specified pair of practices. These possibilities are substantially different. The first is a general problem about descriptions of richly situated events. The second can be examined with relative precision: a proposed quotient merges two encounters that participants, under an explicitly defined inquiry, have reasons to distinguish. The third involves comparative interpretive research, including judgments about what is preserved by translation and which losses matter. The GR framework gains explanatory content by identifying which sense of irreducibility is at stake, rather than presenting irreducibility as an unqualified property of beauty itself. Conversely, evidence of local invariants across histories would strengthen a theory able to account for them, even if the resulting comparisons remain incomplete.

The contrast among philosophical accounts can be sharpened through a constructed comparative inquiry. Consider a brief poem presented in two communities, accompanied by records of its language, rhythmic organization, and relevant performance conventions. Members of both communities may identify comparable repetitions while associating them with different histories. A reception-theoretical account predicts varied realization in historically situated interpretive communities. A category-sensitive account emphasizes the artistic or ritual genres within which the work is understood. A GR account, if it is to add something, should articulate how the encounter changes participants' available trajectories: whether new discriminations become possible, which associative or practical structures are reorganized, and how the offering is taken up in subsequent creative activity. The inquiry should also attend to failures of uptake, indifference, rejection, and interpretations that remain stable. Richness of subsequent activity cannot simply be substituted for an aesthetic judgment.

Several comparisons would be philosophically informative. If changes in explicit genre classification explain the variation in reported qualities, Walton's account may be sufficient for the purpose at hand. If participants' interpretations are best understood through established interpretive communities and their historical expectations, Fish and Jauss may account for the evidence without additional GR constructs. If the distinctive change consists in a durable reorganization of subsequent possibilities across interactionally connected participants, the GR vocabulary may offer a useful integrative description, although further work must show that this description has explanatory consequences beyond its predecessors. An account that predicts or explains nothing different should concede its redundancy. This is a criterion of comparative theoretical adequacy, rather than an endorsement of one methodological tradition over all others.

The proposed comparison becomes clearer if its competing explanations are assigned different observational implications. A reception-theoretical account may explain a change in a reader's interpretation through the text's indeterminacy and the reader's horizon. An artistic-category account may explain a changed appraisal when genre information alters the qualities perceived. A generative-invitation account would require evidence of an offering and responsive uptake that reorganize subsequent interpretive or creative possibilities in a way inadequately explained by the first two accounts alone. A longitudinal design might compare readings before and after encounters, investigate which differences persist when explicit genre information is held constant, and record refusals and revisions as carefully as affirmations.

Such observations could support claims about changed capacities or practices. They could not, without additional philosophical and experiential premises, establish that a novel manifestation of beauty occurred. This comparison specifies an evidential burden for the GR proposal without asserting a general law of aesthetic generation.

The strongest challenge to the GR proposal is therefore a challenge of *incremental explanatory discrimination*. Suppose two groups encounter the same short poem within a recognized genre, and both are invited to examine its repeated phrase. One group receives conventional historical and formal commentary; the other is offered an open question designed to be developed through participants' own linguistic and practical associations. The activities could then be followed by later encounters with different poems, opportunities for independent criticism, and the option of declining further participation. A mere difference in the immediate number of interpretations would provide weak evidence for a new GR mechanism. Rosenblatt's account can already explain changes in attention and lived meaning; established educational and reception theories can already explain learning and the enrichment of interpretive repertoires. The useful question is whether the additional specifications introduced by GR—the recipient's available generative transformations, durable changes in those transformations, and the relation by which another participant can contest or redirect the offering—allow the analyst to distinguish developments that those inherited descriptions leave undifferentiated.

Consider an especially demanding contrast. Two participants might produce similarly sophisticated interpretations after an encounter and express comparable judgments about the poem. During subsequent encounters, however, one participant might develop a new way of generating questions from unfamiliar verbal material, whereas the other might continue to rely on the previously taught interpretive template. This imagined contrast supplies a target for longitudinal inquiry into available practices and their historical alteration. It does not show that the first participant experiences greater beauty; it does not establish that the two participants have different kinds of consciousness. It would count in favor of a GR analysis only if the proposed distinctions can be described with sufficient independence from the very outcomes they are supposed to explain. Otherwise an account that labels every favorable development *generative* risks circularity. Moreover, Rosenblatt's attention to changing reader resources already offers a plausible rival explanation, so any added conceptual advantage would require an articulated account of the specific relational dependencies and counterfactual differences at issue.

A further control concerns the offering itself. A form can be retrospectively redescribed as an invitation whenever a recipient produces something surprising. Such retrospective attribution would make the thesis excessively permissive. The analysis should distinguish an intentional invitation, an unplanned affordance, a recipient's appropriation, and an externally rewarded response by evidence concerning the presentation of the form, its available alternatives, the recipient's uptake and the relations that follow. Meaningful refusal should be treated as evidence of the conditions of participation, rather than evidence of a deficient recipient. When an apparently original result could be explained by the provider's concealed steering or by repetition of rewarded outputs, the purportedly distinctive mechanism may be ordinary guidance or adaptation. These distinctions specify the explanatory burden of *generative invitation* while leaving open the possibility that valuable transformations occur without any intentional invitation.

Empirical inquiry, where appropriate, could investigate longitudinal differences in interpretation, changes in perceived formal relations, uptake and refusal of poetic prompts, revision of aesthetic vocabularies, or trajectories of collaborative composition. Appropriate evidence would include participants' descriptions, textual and performance records, careful ethnographic observation, and restricted behavioral comparisons. These sources can illuminate interpretive and normative processes while leaving first-person aesthetic manifestation only partially accessible. The problem is sharper in comparisons involving animals and artificial systems, where the assessment of possible aesthetic experience requires additional philosophical and scientific assumptions. Behavioral regularities alone should therefore be reported at their observable level. The design of studies involving human communities also requires sensitivity to unequal authority over prompts, cultural materials, the interpretation of results, and the circulation of any generated work. A technically effective invitation can coexist with an ethically troubling research relation.

The empirical research programme also needs potential failure conditions. The relational hypothesis would lose distinctive support if variation among participants were adequately explained by existing reception theories without additional insight from specified GR variables. Claims about generative invitations would require revision where the apparent transformation could be explained by ordinary prompting, compliance, repetition, or externally imposed rewards. Strong claims about aesthetic autonomy would be weakened where evaluative outputs track immediate incentives without evidence of sustained critical capacity. Claims about near-trivial aesthetic equivalence would weaken in domains where stable, informative partial classifications persist across diverse histories. Such results would be intellectually valuable: they would identify levels at which historical variation matters less than initially suspected, or at which an established theoretical account already provides the required explanation. A revisable framework should incorporate those cases as constraints.

A separate failure condition concerns the ethical description of a practice. When the recipient cannot contest a prompt, when participation is effectively compelled, or when a facilitator dictates the acceptable range of discovery, the proposed practice may be better characterized as guided compliance or manipulation. It may still produce unexpected interpretations or artworks that someone finds beautiful; that possibility does not redeem the structure of the relationship. Conversely, an ethically defensible invitation may result in confusion, indifference, or a critically justified refusal. These crossings show why a two-axis assessment—the aesthetic significance of the resulting encounter and the ethical legitimacy of the facilitating relation—cannot be collapsed into one favorable judgment. A further independent dimension concerns the distribution of recognition, rights, and benefits from co-produced materials.

Finally, the proposed theory faces an ontological limit that theoretical ambition cannot dissolve. The analyst may describe a poetic inscription, its reception history, material transformations, patterns of participation, articulated judgments, and conditions that plausibly support aesthetic experience. The assertion that beauty itself emerges within a historically differentiated relation remains a philosophical interpretation informed by these descriptions. Different theories of aesthetic properties, response-dependence, evaluative concepts, and experience may interpret similar observations differently. Kant's analysis of taste shows why a judgment may claim a kind of communicability beyond merely reporting a preference, even when its basis resists reduction to a determinate concept [21]. Hume's attention to cultivated judgment introduces another route to public assessment [15]. The GR account should engage these pressures rather than treating relational occurrence as sufficient proof of an aesthetic property. The preservation of beauty's possible pre-symbolic character remains compatible with discussing reasons for judgment, so long as reasons and manifestation are not collapsed into one event.

The rival accounts therefore establish several obligations for the continuation of this inquiry. Reception theory requires demonstrated explanatory addition; category-sensitive aesthetics requires attention to the correctness and effect of artistic classifications; Davidson requires restraint in describing radical incommensurability; phenomenology and social epistemology require care in attributing experience to heterogeneous others; critical hermeneutics requires standards of textual accountability; and theories of aesthetic judgment require an account of beauty that does not simply follow from generative novelty. These obligations provide a productive boundary for the proposed concept of poetic generative invitation. Within that boundary, its strongest current use is to examine how finite offerings participate in the development of another subject's interpretive and practical possibilities under historically variable conditions. Whether that participation supports aesthetic manifestation, adequate judgment, or just relations is a further question in each case. The concluding section will synthesize the proposal at this restricted level and identify the philosophical problems that remain open to independent inquiry.

12 Conclusions and Open Philosophical Problems

The inquiry into poetic form and aesthetic unfolding has examined how a finite, identifiable offering can enter historically differentiated relations and participate in distinct trajectories of reception and creation. This conclusion synthesizes the proposal at the level its arguments presently warrant. It considers the explanatory contribution of generative-relational (GR) description alongside phenomenology, reception

theory, hermeneutics, and theories of aesthetic judgment; it then identifies the remaining problems of aesthetic manifestation, comparison, recognition, normative formation, and practice. The governing methodological distinction is between reconstructing a process of uptake and establishing the occurrence or value of beauty. The discussion offers an exploratory philosophical account, with constructed examples and conditional formalizations, rather than a general ontology of beauty or an experimentally established psychology of aesthetic response.

An enduring poem can be encountered through an inscription, a performance, a translation, or another materially mediated presentation. Each presentation makes certain formal relations available under particular conditions. Repetition, rhythm, syntax, imagery, punctuation, and spatial arrangement can direct attention and constrain possible readings. Their organization contributes to the historical identity of a work, even where its material realization and interpretive setting vary. A receiving subject approaches that organization through capacities and relations developed in a particular history. The subject's subsequent activity can include perceptual discrimination, association, interpretation, attention to form, reflective reconsideration, and the transformation of practices beyond the encounter. These developments provide a suitable object for the proposed notion of a *generative trajectory*. The notion describes how a formally bounded offering participates in an unfolding activity; its usefulness depends on the ability to identify the offering, the receiving conditions, and a consequential relation between them. It remains possible for the encounter to yield little discernible development, for interpretation to remain stable, or for the recipient to reject the offering. Such outcomes are part of the inquiry's domain.

The separation of generative trajectory from aesthetic manifestation is central. A recipient may discover a new association, adopt an unfamiliar rhythm, or develop an additional conceptual distinction without reporting or otherwise manifesting an experience of beauty. Equally, a recipient may encounter an aesthetically significant quality whose occurrence has little to do with a measurable increase in interpretive possibilities. The development of a generative capacity and the occurrence of aesthetic value consequently require independent descriptions. Section 5 proposed several possible relations between the emergence of beauty, its manifestation to a subject, and the subject's reflective or symbolic judgment. Those possibilities remain alternatives with differing philosophical commitments. The paper has not established a necessary and sufficient condition for beauty, and its GR vocabulary offers no such condition by definition. Aesthetic significance must still be argued for within the relevant encounter, practice, and evaluative setting.

The possibility of aesthetic manifestation prior to explicit symbolization warrants particular care. A felt arrangement of movement, sound, or form may become salient before its recipient forms the linguistic judgment that it is beautiful. This possibility matters because symbols and aesthetic categories are acquired within historically organized practices; their availability may shape what is attended to and what can subsequently be communicated. A pre-symbolic hypothesis, however, need not posit an experience wholly independent of learning, bodily organization, memory, or norm-governed activity. Nor does it establish that a beauty existing independently of every encounter was waiting for recognition. The theoretically relevant distinction concerns the conditions of an occurrence and the later or concurrent ability to classify it. Whether aesthetic manifestation can precede all forms of conceptual mediation, or only some forms of explicit public categorization, remains a contested question. A responsible GR account can preserve that question while acknowledging the activity of prior experience and acquired norms in the very conditions of perception.

The GR proposal has a genuine comparative burden. A historically singular reading, by itself, can already be accommodated by several established theories of literary reception. The stronger question is whether an account that makes receiving capacities, material access, institutional conditions, and their subsequent transformation explicit yields a more discriminating explanation in a specified case. Such a comparison would identify an offering and relevant constraints, describe the recipient's access and uptake or refusal, and examine whether consequences persist in later interpretive or creative practices. An account that only renames ordinary readerly participation as a generative trajectory remains descriptively optional. A better specified trajectory may still lack aesthetic value, while a significant aesthetic occurrence may produce little observable change in capacity. These cases delimit the contribution rather than refute the possibility of its future development.

The manuscript inherits several important conceptual resources. Ingarden's analysis of the literary work and its concretizations provides a distinction between the work and its particular realization; Iser's account of reading describes active participation in the realization of the text; and Rosenblatt's transactional approach locates literary activity in a situated reader–text relation [16, 18, 26]. Jauss and Gadamer bring the history of reception and historically conditioned understanding into view, while Dewey makes aesthetic experience intelligible through continuing transactions with an environment [20, 11, 4]. These approaches already establish much of the philosophical terrain required to resist an account of poetry as the delivery of a fixed internal content to passive recipients. The present proposal takes their achievements as starting conditions for its own adequacy. A philosophical framework acquires an explanatory contribution through the distinctions and questions it makes possible, including situations where established accounts require extension or coordination. Its claim to novelty should therefore remain narrower than the general insight that readers contribute to literary realization.

The proposed GR extension takes heterogeneous receiving conditions as its primary analytical focus. A generative system is considered in terms of the histories, relations, capacities, norms, and dynamics relevant to a specified encounter, without presupposing one universal mode of aesthetic experience. This vocabulary may accommodate differences among human readers and invite cautious comparisons with other animals or hypothetical artificial subjects. Its value is prospective and comparative: it encourages an investigator to ask which formal relations each recipient can register, how a received offering enters the recipient's existing practices, which changes persist, and which interpretations of those changes can responsibly be made. Such an account can illuminate a relation even where a complete translation of experienced beauty is unavailable. It also requires restraint. Observable generation, classification, preference learning, or fluent aesthetic discourse supports claims about the corresponding performances. Ascription of subjective aesthetic manifestation to a system requires further philosophical and evidential grounds, especially in cases of artificial systems whose behavioral capacities can be engineered to resemble human descriptions of taste.

Aesthetic difference also needs a sharper account than the assertion that each history is unique. The mathematical discussion in Section 6 distinguished quotients of configurations under an explicitly chosen equivalence relation from group quotients formed using an appropriate normal subgroup of transformations. A quotient that preserves almost every historically relevant aesthetic distinction may become nearly uninformative as a compression, and a quotient by the trivial normal subgroup returns a group isomorphic to the original group. The relevance of this limiting illustration is conditional: the investigator must identify a valid group structure, a specified equivalence or subgroup, and the aesthetic properties the construction is meant to preserve. Differing histories alone do not establish triviality of a quotient, since distinct histories can still agree under some useful property or practice. The more demanding task is to identify which differences matter for a given aesthetic question and whether an equivalence that preserves those differences remains stable under relevant changes of context.

Consequently, local aesthetic comparisons need not amount to an exhaustive common scale. Participants may compare the rhythm of two renderings, identify a common pattern of formal tension, or agree that a particular interpretation accords with public features of the poem. They may continue to diverge in the beauty they experience and the significance they attribute to the encounter. Such comparisons can be illuminating precisely because their domains and limitations are specified. The philosophical work involves separating equivalence of formal properties, defensibility of interpretations, similarity of aesthetic descriptions, and equivalence of experienced beauty. These relations can overlap without coinciding. A shared classificatory vocabulary also has historical consequences: it may expose unrecognized affinities, support dialogue, or conceal differences that matter to participants. Comparative research should therefore treat the creation of a common aesthetic language as itself a relational event susceptible to critique and revision.

A further open problem concerns the relation between aesthetic normativity and the emergence of beauty. The argument in Section 8 distinguished inherited or externally organized norms, reflective norm formation, and norms developed through interaction. These are analytical descriptions of how standards and practices may be formed and transformed. They are neither three kinds of beauty nor a complete

account of ethical life. Kant's account of a judgment of taste places special pressure on any theory that derives beauty directly from compliance with a determinate standard; Hume's discussion of cultivated taste makes comparison, discrimination, and practiced judgment equally relevant to a public account of aesthetic evaluation [21, 15]. The present proposal maintains that norms may influence the conditions under which beauty becomes manifest, as well as how subjects subsequently describe, evaluate, and practice it. A common norm of discussion can coordinate individuals who remain aesthetically divergent, while a shared judgment can conceal profound differences of experience. The possibility of broad natural norms, or of a common normative ideal of beauty, does not by itself resolve how aesthetic significance occurs within any particular historical relation.

The resulting distinction also protects aesthetic inquiry from an automatic reduction to ethical appraisal. An ethically responsible invitation can remain aesthetically unremarkable, while an ethically compromised encounter can still involve an experience a participant judges beautiful. Their coexistence presents a problem for criticism and practice rather than an argument for treating one evaluation as the measure of the other. In settings of unequal authority, aesthetic judgments may be influenced by the reward of conformity, the marginalization of dissent, or the institutional ownership of interpretive resources. The autonomy of a recipient therefore concerns more than freedom to announce a preference: it concerns whether the recipient can attend, contest, revise, and develop evaluative capacities within a relation in which their responses have consequential standing. Such capacities can emerge through engagement with others, although their presence and degree cannot be assumed from the language of invitation itself. The ethical legitimacy of a practice and the beauty of what emerges remain distinct assessments, even when their historical conditions are intertwined.

Generative invitation provides a possible mode of aesthetic praxis under heterogeneous conditions. Section 10 analyzed a relation in which a participant intentionally offers an identifiable form for another's situated appropriation, alteration, or refusal. Three dimensions matter for applying the concept: the available form and its constraints, the recipient's effective rather than merely nominal scope for response, and a reasonably traceable relation between the offering and subsequent activity. Reciprocity is possible when the originator also learns or changes through the recipient's response, although such influence need not be symmetrical. An unanticipated affordance of a work may enable an equally consequential development without qualifying as an intentional invitation. In settings structured by institutional authority or unequal control over rewards, describing a prompt as an invitation requires particular scrutiny of whether alternative responses have genuine standing.

This practice offers a bridge between aesthetic experience and heterogeneous co-creation, with qualifications important to both domains. A poet may contribute a form through which readers experience beauty the poet cannot experience for them. A reader's aesthetic judgment, however, need not be the poet's judgment, and the later reader's creative achievement remains distinguishable from the author's earlier work. Similarly, two participants may construct a shared language for discussing a poem while retaining heterogeneous aesthetic experiences. They may also enter a collaborative practice whose significance becomes manifest before either can adequately explain it through a shared vocabulary. The distinction between common meaning, common judgment, and common participation makes these cases intelligible without demanding a uniform aesthetic life. It also explains why a generative offering can be meaningful in relationships of incomplete understanding: practical responsiveness may develop through partial interpretation, observation, and correction, while the participants' experiences remain distinct.

The concept of generative invitation also requires a threshold of specificity. The observation that an encounter produced activity, novelty, or surprise gives limited evidence of the kind of trajectory at issue. The analysis should identify a relevant offered structure, an uptake or refusal, and a subsequent transformation whose relation to the encounter can be argued. A participant's decision to decline may be a meaningful exercise of autonomy without producing an aesthetic achievement. Moreover, helping another create a work, discover an interpretation, or cultivate aesthetic capacities does not independently establish authorship, control, or entitlement to its eventual value. Contributions to the offered form, its circulation, and the recipient's later activity may call for different forms of acknowledgement and responsibility. This is particularly salient when cultural works travel across communities with unequal authority over their

documentation and use. Epistemic injustice and the ethics of cross-world understanding help frame these concerns [10, 22], while the legitimacy of any particular collaboration must be considered within its institutional and historical circumstances.

Six problems remain open and should guide subsequent inquiry. *Aesthetic constitution* concerns which historical and relational structures participate in an occurrence of beauty and what distinguishes that occurrence from other changes in attention or affect. *Aesthetic access* concerns the evidence needed to attribute such an occurrence to another subject, especially where familiar experiential reports are unavailable. *Comparative validity* concerns the contexts in which partial aesthetic correspondences can be justified, and the conditions under which finer equivalence classes cease to provide useful compression; historical uniqueness alone settles neither question. *Normative formation* concerns how acquired, reflectively revised, and interactionally generated standards shape judgment without determining aesthetic manifestation. *Practical legitimacy* concerns the conditions distinguishing invitation, collaboration, coercive inducement, and appropriation. *Explanatory discrimination* concerns what the GR approach can clarify in an identifiable case beyond existing accounts, and what findings would favor those alternatives. The problems belong to connected yet analytically distinct inquiries.

These problems call for different methods. The constitution and attribution of aesthetic experience require sustained engagement with philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and the conceptual analysis of aesthetic predicates. Comparative validity may benefit from carefully specified formal structures, provided that their equivalence relations and domains are established independently of metaphor. Historical inquiry can recover changing conventions of performance and criticism; ethnographic research can examine uptake and refusal within living practices; longitudinal studies may trace changes in interpretive capacities or collaborative activity. No single method is likely to settle the entire problem. In particular, evidence of a durable change in interpretive practice would support a description of generative development while leaving the emergence of beauty open to further evaluation. Section 11 supplied comparison cases and potential failure conditions to guard against circular confirmation. Those conditions should be refined before any stronger empirical claim is advanced.

The proposed framework also has specific disciplinary boundaries. A more general theory of *generative invitation* would investigate offerings and responses beyond poetry, specifying relations among autonomy, inducement, feedback, and heterogeneous generative capacities. An independent inquiry into teaching would consider how educators enter learners' already developed languages and practices, introduce questions that can be appropriated and transformed, and evaluate whether knowledge formation occurs under conditions of equitable participation. That inquiry must engage existing traditions of dialogic and culturally situated education on their own terms, including Freire's work on problem-posing pedagogy [9]. A distinct inquiry into heterogeneous value co-creation would examine the contributions that support value realization across partially incommensurable evaluative systems, alongside authority, benefit, ownership, and the circulation of generated value. These investigations intersect with the present paper through the practical relation of invitation; each also raises independent problems of knowledge, institutional responsibility, and justice. Their separation allows the aesthetic question to retain its own object.

The inquiry supports a qualified philosophical thesis: recognizable poetic constraints can participate in different historical and relational trajectories, including trajectories that may become aesthetically significant to differently situated recipients. The form, the course of uptake, a possible manifestation of beauty, and an evaluative judgment require related yet separate accounts. Partial translation, criticism, and comparison can support encounters across heterogeneous systems without establishing identity of subjective experience; claims of radical incommensurability remain equally unwarranted. Generative invitation names a candidate mode of praxis in which an offered form supports another participant's situated unfolding, under conditions that leave room for transformation and refusal. Its aesthetic significance and ethical legitimacy call for independent scrutiny. The continuing philosophical task is to establish when this GR coordination yields explanatory insight, while allowing poetic works and their recipients to retain the historically singular relations through which beauty may appear.

Research Ethics and Source Provenance

Evidence and research status. The examples and comparative cases in Sections 1–12 are analytical illustrations. No original human-participant data, empirical evaluation of aesthetic experience, or evidence of artificial subjective experience is presented. No ethics review for a participant study is claimed.

Source basis. Bibliographic identities were checked through publisher, journal, national-library, or ERIC records before manuscript insertion. Broader philosophical characterizations were checked against scholarly encyclopedia entries, abstracts, available primary-text excerpts, and publisher descriptions as indicated in the source ledger. Sections 3–12 distinguish the cited philosophers' positions from the proposed GR extensions; they do not claim direct quotation or page-specific interpretation from inaccessible editions. Focused source checks for Iser, Hume, Eco, Davidson, Sibley and Sedivy are documented in the pass-seven audit; the additional Rosenblatt and Nagel primary-passage checks are recorded in pass nine. A full passage-level audit of every source, including sources introduced in Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, remains outstanding; Section 12 adds no new external sources. GR-specific extensions are original proposals, not claims attributed to the cited authors.

Independence. No university, research centre, cited scholar, educational organization, or technical platform has endorsed the argument.

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