

Philosophy of Intimacy and Theory of Justice Series

Generative Relations

in Parenting and
Early Childhood Education

THEORY AND PRACTICE

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道生之，德畜之，物形之，势成之。

是以万物莫不尊道而贵德。

*The way gives them life, its power nurtures them,
things give them form, circumstance completes them.
Thus among the ten thousand things there is none
that does not honour the way and value its power.*

— Laozi, *Daodejing*, ch. 51

*Nemo enim est quisquam, qui sic amet,
ut non plus se quam alterum diligat.*

*There is no one who loves in such a way
as to hold himself dearer than the other.*

— after Cicero, *Laelius de Amicitia*

ἀρχὴ γὰρ λέγεται τὸ ἥμισυ εἶναι παντός.

The beginning is said to be half of the whole.

— Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1098b

致她——山林之女，
For her—The Girl of Forests and Mountains,

也致那些尚未到来的，
and for those who have not yet come,
他们将在我们不知道的关系中长成，
who will grow within relations we do not know,
而我们能给的，只是那个使生成成为可能的场。
and to whom we can give only the field
in which their becoming remains possible.

Abstract

This book treats childrearing and education as the domain in which the propositions of generative relational being become simultaneously visible, testable, and unavoidable. The child occupies a position the framework has so far addressed only obliquely. Where the framework's account of the subject presumes a party who has already been seen, who holds other relations elsewhere, and who therefore retains reserves against which any present relation can be measured, the child holds none of these, and the gaze now organising him is the same gaze that is constituting him. Every proposition the framework has established about degradation, symbolic closure, absorption, and revisability was formulated for a subject with reserves, and this book undertakes their re-derivation for a subject without them.

The argument proceeds through four movements. The ontological movement establishes what the framework commits itself to concerning what a child is: relational primacy in its transcendental rather than genetic sense, generativity as structural evolution within a relationally constituted space of possibility, and the subject as continuous formation within relational generation. It reads the major theories of development for their ontological presuppositions and locates in each the point at which the relation ceases to constitute and begins merely to transmit. The diagnostic movement examines asymmetry as a constitutive rather than remediable feature of the rearing relation, the absorption of the power that asymmetry continuously generates, and the forms degradation takes when absorption ceases: the symbol that governs both the mode of contact and the rules by which evidence about itself will be read; the gaze whose singularity renders recognition zero-sum irrespective of material abundance; and the projection of a childhood onto a unified optimisable space. The explanatory movement develops the co-generation of knowledge, the relational form of authority and the conditions of its maintenance, and the intergenerational transmission of grammar within families and educational traditions.

The fourth movement carries the framework into practice along two distinct lines. The generative development of human capacities treats perception, movement, language, concrete and formal operation, relational capacity, self-regulation, normativity, and aesthetic sensibility, each through a common architecture: what the developmental literature establishes, what that account presupposes, what relational conditions constitute the capacity's space of possibility, what closes it, and what follows for practice. The practice of relation treats the acts by which a relation itself is conducted, including the restoration of response, the shared third, the maintenance of channels of revision, rupture and repair, and the operative forms of household governance. A closing movement states the questions the book frames without resolving, submits the account to a projection test against existing theories, and sets out the research programme that follows.

Throughout, the book declines the form of advice. Its practical weight is earned by describing what certain acts do, and the wall between dynamical description and normative justification is held with particular care in this domain, where the sentence that a measure serves a child's future arrives with unusual sincerity and occasional truth.

Keywords: generative relational being; childrearing; the immature subject; relational asymmetry; the absorption of power; symbolic closure; revisability; the generation of capacities; educational practice.

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Preface

A book about raising children, written at this length and in this register, invites a question before it invites a reader. The subject is among the most thoroughly written about in any language, most of what is written about it is practical, and a work that declines to be practical while running to the length of a treatise owes an account of itself.

The account is that childrearing is where a certain set of philosophical propositions becomes at once visible, testable, and impossible to set aside.

The propositions concern how a subject comes to be. They have been developed in a series of studies conducted over some years, addressed to questions of justice, intimacy, recognition, and the conditions under which a relation continues to generate rather than settling into repetition. Those studies took their cases from politics, from economics, from the analysis of conflict, and from the long literature on what human beings owe one another. In every case the subject under discussion was an adult, and the adult was assumed to arrive at the relation already formed. What such a subject does when a relation degrades, what resources it draws on, what it can refuse and what it must endure, all rest on that assumption without stating it.

A child is the case where the assumption fails. The child arrives at the relation unformed, and the relation is what forms the child. Whatever the framework has established about degradation, about the symbol, about recognition and its withdrawal, was established for a party who had somewhere else to stand. A child has no elsewhere. Every proposition therefore has to be derived again under conditions the original derivations did not contemplate, and the results are not the same.

That is the reason for the book, and it should be said plainly that the reason runs in one direction rather than the other. This is not the application of a framework to a domain. It is the domain in which the framework either survives or is found wanting, and a reader who concludes at the end that it has been found wanting will have read the book correctly.

A second matter needs stating at the outset, because it governs how everything after is to be read.

Practices of rearing differ across places, across periods, and across the material circumstances of the households that conduct them. Any book that surveys such differences faces a temptation, and the temptation is nearly irresistible: to take the arrangement its author knows best as the neutral case and to describe the others as departures from it. The temptation operates whether the author's own arrangement is treated as the standard of health or as the object of self-criticism, since both moves grant it the central position from which the others are measured.

This book proceeds from a different commitment. A practice of rearing is a response to conditions. The conditions include what work the adults of a household do and where they do it, what the household must secure and what threatens it, how a society allocates the positions its young people may occupy and by what procedure, what the state provides and withholds, and what the accumulated history of a place has made available to be thought. Practices that

appear from outside to be excessive, or indulgent, or harsh, or negligent are, in the ordinary case, intelligible responses to arrangements the observer has not troubled to reconstruct. Reconstructing them is prior to assessing them, and the reconstruction is difficult enough that this book will frequently decline the assessment.

Two consequences follow and both are restrictions the book accepts.

The first is that evaluative vocabulary is withheld from national and cultural practices throughout. Where a practice is described, it is described together with the conditions in which it stands. Where the framework's own criterion is applied, the application is stated as conditional on that criterion, which is a philosophical commitment this book argues for and which a reader may decline. What will not be found here is the claim that some society raises its children wrongly.

The second consequence is more uncomfortable and is worth facing directly. A book written from inside a moment cannot see that moment's slow variable. This is not modesty; it is a proposition the book itself argues for at length, and it applies to the book. The arrangements now current, in every country, are of unknown historical standing. Which of them are transitional responses to a passing configuration, which are stable, and which are the early form of something not yet recognisable are questions that cannot be settled from within. An author who claimed otherwise would be claiming an observation point that the argument of this book denies to anyone.

This book is addressed to two readers, and they will use it differently.

The first is a reader who works on these questions professionally: a philosopher, a developmental researcher, a scholar of education or of the family. For that reader the book's weight sits in its earlier parts. The survey of theoretical traditions and the taxonomy that organises it, the treatment of what the two available research methods can and cannot establish, the historical formation of the developmental theories and their circulation between cultures, and the analysis of rearing practice as a response to material conditions are all conducted at length and with the apparatus such a reader will expect. The ontological chapters that follow state the position the whole book rests on. A reader of this kind may find the later parts of the volume the least interesting, and is entitled to.

The second is a reader who raises children or works with them: a parent, a teacher, someone responsible for an early-childhood setting. For that reader the weight sits in the later parts. The generation of the individual capacities, taken one at a time and each treated at length, is the longest single part of the book. The chapters on practice that follow it address what particular acts do rather than what should be done, which is a distinction that will matter to such a reader more than it might appear. The part on method and empirical programme, which proposes ways a relation might be observed and assessed, is written so that someone conducting the observation can use it. A reader of this kind may find the earlier parts heavy going, and is entitled to skip forward and return.

Both routes are legitimate and the book is arranged so that either can be taken. The later parts carry enough of what precedes them to be intelligible on their own, and the reader who begins there will find the reasons behind what is claimed at the cross-references rather than in a summary. What such a reader loses is a matter of warrant: the practical material will be usable and the grounds on which any of it should be believed will be somewhere else in the

volume.

One thing should be said plainly, since addressing two readers can be a way of serving neither. The chapters do not adjust themselves to whoever might be reading. Nothing in the later parts is simplified on the assumption that a practitioner is there, and nothing in the earlier parts is elaborated to satisfy a specialist. The difference between the two halves of this book is a difference of subject matter, and the argument is conducted at the same level throughout.

One further note. This book stands within a larger body of work and does not require it. That work is organised around a single proposal, which may be stated here in the form it takes in the foundational study: Generative Relational Being is a theory of how subject, meaning, value, creation, and normativity co-emerge through generative relational processes. The five named terms co-emerge, and none is prior to the others. Extensions of the proposal into particular domains have been developed separately, among them an epistemology, an economics, a theory of governance, and an account of historical change, and the present volume draws on several of these at the points where its argument requires them.

The propositions this book uses are stated where they are used, in the form the argument here needs, and a reader who has read nothing else will find nothing missing. Readers who wish to see them developed in their own right, with the cases and objections that shaped them, will find the relevant studies cited at the points where they bear. The relation between this volume and that corpus is that the corpus supplied the questions and this volume tests them where the testing is hardest.

A word about the standing of all of it. The framework is historically dialectical, and this is a commitment about its own status rather than only about its subject matter. What can be known and what can be done are both finite within the historical frame in which they occur. An account produced in such a frame is answerable to conditions its author did not choose and could not fully survey, and revision is therefore expected rather than conceded under pressure. The propositions in this book are numbered so that they can be located, disputed, and amended. A reader who amends one has done what the framework asks.

Part I

The Position of the Question

Chapter 1

The Ontological Premises of Theories of Development

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what the major accounts of childhood presuppose about what a child is, prior to and beneath what they claim about how children develop.

It contributes the ground on which the rest of the book stands. The survey establishes that accounts differing on nearly everything converge on one commitment, that the commitment is substantive, and that it is not refutable by evidence. [Chapter 6](#) constructs the alternative; the whole of Parts II through X depends on that construction, and the construction is intelligible only against what is established here. The chapter also fixes the book's method and states the sense in which philosophical, historical, cultural, and empirical work belong together in one volume.

It does not assess the empirical adequacy of any theory surveyed. Those assessments exist, they have been conducted by people better placed to conduct them, and this book adds nothing to them. Nor does it trace how each account arose in its own historical and cultural conditions, which is the work of [ch. 2](#), or how accounts travel between cultures, which is the work of [ch. 3](#).

The chapter closes by stating why a further framework is required, in the form of the tensions the surveyed literature runs into and cannot resolve from its own resources, together with the limitations of what is offered in their place.

The reader should carry forward four things: the four objects a theory of childhood may take, the two methodological traditions available for studying them, the location question, which asks of any account what it takes the bearer of a developing property to be, and the proposal that what develops in rearing is a relational system rather than a child.

1.1 The Location of the Premise

1.1.1 The Order of Commitment

Every account of how a child develops carries, beneath its findings and prior to them, a commitment concerning what a child is. The commitment is rarely argued. It is more often inherited, absorbed from the discipline in which the account was formed, and it does its work by determining in advance what will count as a phenomenon requiring explanation. A theory that takes the child to be a solitary constructor of knowledge will find, in a room containing a child and an adult, a child who is constructing and an adult who is supplying material. A

theory that takes the child to be a node in a system of transmission will find, in the same room, a transfer proceeding at some rate. Neither theory is looking away from anything. Each is seeing what its commitment has equipped it to see, and the commitment was settled before the room was entered.

This ordering has a consequence that governs the present chapter. Disagreements between theories of development are ordinarily conducted at the level of findings, and at that level they are frequently resolvable. Whether infants track intentions at nine months or at fourteen is a question that admits of evidence, and evidence has narrowed it. Whether a child's vocabulary growth is better modelled by a threshold or by a continuous accumulation is likewise a question with an answer that data can approach. Disagreements of this kind are the ordinary business of a productive science, and the productivity is real. What such disagreements leave untouched is the layer at which the theories agree without having noticed that they agree, and the agreements at that layer are what this chapter takes as its object.

Consider the difficulty in its concrete form. A researcher who holds that development is the maturation of individual capacities and a researcher who holds that development is the internalisation of social forms will design different studies, code different variables, and reach different conclusions. They will also, in the ordinary case, share the assumption that there exists a child whose capacities are being matured or whose internalisation is proceeding, and that this child is the thing about which the theory is a theory. The assumption is so nearly universal in the field that stating it can seem pedantic. The claim this book will develop is that the assumption is substantive, that a serious alternative to it exists, and that a great deal follows from the choice between them.

An objection presents itself immediately, and it deserves an answer before the survey begins. One might hold that ontological commitments of this kind are idle, that they float above the empirical work without touching it, and that a researcher may hold any view whatever about what a child ultimately is while conducting perfectly sound investigations into what children do. There is something to this. A well-designed study of visual attention will produce the same numbers whether its author is a realist or an instrumentalist about the child, and the numbers will be worth having in either case.

The objection loses force at the point where the numbers must be interpreted, and it loses force entirely at the point where an instrument must be designed. An instrument is a decision about where a property resides. To measure vocabulary is to have decided that the vocabulary is the child's, held by the child, and countable in the child. To classify an attachment pattern is to have decided that the pattern characterises a dyad, that the dyad has a type, and that the type persists across the occasions on which it is assessed. These decisions precede the measurement and are not tested by it. A finding that a child's vocabulary has grown does nothing to confirm that vocabulary is the sort of thing a child has, because the finding was generated by an instrument that presupposed as much. The ontological commitment enters the empirical work at the moment the instrument is built, and it enters in a form that the instrument's own output cannot reach.

Chapter 69 returns to this in detail, and the question of what existing instruments locate their measured properties in becomes the organising question of the empirical part of the book. For the present it establishes the reason the survey that follows is conducted as it is. The theories examined in this chapter are examined for what they presuppose rather than for what

they claim. Their claims have been assessed extensively by others, and this book has nothing to add to those assessments. Their presuppositions have received less attention, and it is at the level of presupposition that the book's own commitment differs from theirs.

One further point of method. The theories surveyed here are, without exception, serious achievements. Each identified a real structure, each generated research that has produced knowledge, and each remains in use because it continues to be useful. A survey conducted in order to clear the ground for a new proposal is under a temptation to find its predecessors wanting, and the temptation is worth naming so that it can be resisted. The finding this chapter reports is narrower and, if correct, more interesting than a general inadequacy. It is that each of these theories arrives at a particular boundary and stops there, that the boundary is in approximately the same place in every case, and that the location of the boundary is intelligible in terms of the ontological commitment each theory began from. What lies past the boundary is the subject of this book.

1.1.2 The Silence of the Premise

A commitment that is never stated is difficult to examine, and the difficulty is structural rather than accidental. The premises this chapter is after are silent in a specific sense. They are not hidden, in the manner of an assumption a theorist prefers to keep from view. They are not tacit in the manner of a background belief the theorist would acknowledge if asked. They are silent because the vocabulary in which the theory is conducted has already absorbed them, so that stating them would produce a sentence the theory's own practitioners would find either obviously true or barely meaningful.

An illustration makes the point better than a definition. Within the developmental literature it is ordinary to write that a child *has* a vocabulary of some size, *possesses* a theory of mind, *shows* secure attachment, or *lacks* inhibitory control. The verbs are unremarkable and no one attends to them. Each of them locates something. To have, to possess, to show, and to lack are all relations between a bearer and a property, and the bearer in every case is the child. A reader who paused over these verbs and asked whether the property might be located elsewhere would be asking a question the vocabulary is not built to receive. The question sounds, within that vocabulary, like a confusion about where things are.

The silence is therefore maintained by the language of the field rather than by any decision of its practitioners, and this has two consequences worth separating.

The first concerns how such a premise changes. A commitment held in the vocabulary of a discipline is not revised by argument directed at it, because the argument must be conducted in some vocabulary, and the available one already contains what the argument would question. Revision of this kind occurs when a new vocabulary becomes available and turns out to do work the old one could not, and it occurs slowly, and it is usually visible only afterward. This is a familiar pattern in the history of the sciences and there is nothing peculiar about developmental psychology in this respect.

The second consequence bears directly on this book's position. If the premises are held in the vocabulary, then a book proposing a different premise must supply a different vocabulary, and it must do so without the new terms collapsing into the old ones on first contact. The risk is concrete. Words like *relation*, *relationship*, and *relational* are already in use throughout

the developmental literature, and in that use they name a connection between parties who exist prior to the connection. A mother and an infant have a relationship; the relationship is a property of the pair; the pair consists of two individuals each with properties of their own. When this book says that a capacity is a stabilised relational structure, the sentence will be read, by default, as the claim that a capacity held by a child is influenced by the child's relationships. That reading is not the claim. It is the claim the existing vocabulary permits, and it is a claim the existing literature has already established at length and with better evidence than this book will offer.

Chapter 6 therefore does more work than an ordinary statement of premises. Its task is to make available a sense of *relation* in which the relation is prior to its terms, and to make that sense stable enough that the later chapters can use it without sliding back. Whether it succeeds is a question the reader is better placed to answer than the author, and the book's later arguments are hostage to the answer.

For the survey that follows, the silence has a practical implication. Each theory examined in the remaining sections of this chapter will be read for what its verbs locate. This is a narrow instrument and it will not settle any large question. What it does is bring into view the layer at which the theories agree, and that layer is where this book's disagreement lies.

1.2 The Taxonomy of the Field

1.2.1 The Objects of the Framework

The accounts examined in this chapter are ordinarily discussed together, and discussing them together invites the assumption that they are answering one question in competing ways. They are not. Piaget's subject is the development of knowledge. Bowlby's is a bond and its disruption. Montessori's is the design of an environment in which teaching occurs. A comparison that places these three in a row and asks which is correct has already made an error, and the error is common enough in the applied literature to be worth naming before the survey begins.

Four distinct objects can be discerned, and most accounts address one of them.

The first is *what changes*. An account of development proper asks what is different about a child at one age and another, describes the trajectory, and proposes a mechanism for the movement along it. Piaget's stages, Vygotsky's general law, the growth curves of contemporary quantitative work, and the sequence descriptions that fill developmental textbooks all belong here. The object is a course of change and the question is what governs it.

The second is *what a mind is*. An account of child psychology asks about the organisation of a child's mental life, and it can do so without any commitment about how that organisation came to be. Core knowledge research describes what an infant represents. Theory-of-mind research describes when a child attributes belief. Psychoanalytic accounts describe a structure of wishes, defences, and objects. The object is a mental organisation and the question is what it consists of.

The third is *what an adult does*. An account of rearing addresses the conduct of the person raising a child. It may be derived from a developmental theory, and often is, but its object is different: the adult's action, its warrant, and its consequences. Attachment-derived sensitivity guidance, behaviourist contingency management, and the whole of the popular parenting

literature belong here. The object is a practice and the question is how to conduct it.

The fourth is *what an institution does*. An account of early education addresses arrangements that are collective, professionalised, and organised around a curriculum however loosely specified. It faces questions the other three do not: what a group of children makes possible and forecloses, how a practitioner's attention is divided, what a public system owes and to whom. Montessori's method, the Reggio Emilia approach, and national early-years frameworks belong here. The object is an institutional arrangement and the question is how to design it.

The distinctions matter because the borrowing between them is constant and mostly unmarked. A finding about what changes is taken to license a claim about what an adult should do. A description of what a mind consists of is taken to settle a question about institutional design. Each borrowing may be legitimate and each requires an argument, and the argument is ordinarily not supplied.

An instance makes the difficulty concrete. Attachment research establishes an association between caregiver sensitivity and a classification of infant behaviour, which is a finding about what changes and under what conditions. Considerable rearing advice has been derived from it. The derivation requires at least three further premises: that the classification names something worth having, that sensitivity as operationalised in research corresponds to what an adult can deliberately do, and that a practice aimed at producing the classification produces the same thing the research measured. None of these is obviously true, the third is doubtful for reasons this book takes up at length, and the advice is nonetheless issued as though the research had established it.

Proposition 1.1. *A theory addressing one of the four objects supplies no claim about the others without a further argument. The transfers are ordinarily made without one, and much of what circulates as evidence-based rearing advice consists of such transfers.*

The taxonomy also locates this book. Its primary object is the third, which is the conduct of rearing, and it treats the first as the ground that conduct operates on. It says a great deal about the fourth and offers no institutional design. On the second it takes a position, which is that a mind's organisation is not the sort of thing that can be described without describing the relations in which it stands, and the position is argued in [Chapter 6](#) rather than assumed here.

1.2.2 The Methodological Divide

A second axis cuts across the first, and it divides the field more deeply than any disagreement about content. The question is what would count as knowing something about a child.

Two traditions supply answers.

The first holds that a claim earns its standing by contact with controlled observation. A construct is defined so that it can be measured, a measurement procedure is specified so that others can repeat it, variation is examined against variation, and inference is disciplined by what the design permits. This is the tradition that produced the Strange Situation, the false-belief task, the longitudinal cohort, and the randomised trial of an early-years intervention. Its achievements are not in question anywhere in this book. It has settled matters that speculation had left open for centuries and it continues to settle them.

The second holds that a claim earns its standing by illuminating what is already before us. It proceeds through the analysis of concepts, the reading of texts and traditions, the his-

torical reconstruction of how a practice came to take its form, and the careful description of experience. This is the tradition of the philosophical treatment of education, the ethnographic account of a household, the historian's account of how childhood came to be conceived as it is, and the practitioner's articulate description of what happens in a room. It supplies most of the categories the first tradition then measures.

Each carries a defect, and the defects are worth stating precisely because a great deal turns on their being different in kind.

The empirical tradition cannot cross from what is to what ought to be. No accumulation of findings about what produces a given outcome establishes that the outcome should be produced, and the gap is not a temporary limitation to be closed by better studies. It also estranges its object, and this is the more insidious difficulty. A construct is measurable to the extent that it has been narrowed, the narrowed construct then stands in for what was originally of interest, and the substitution is invisible from inside the practice. What began as a question about whether a child is flourishing becomes a question about a score, and the score is what gets reported, compared, and optimised.

The traditionalist tradition cannot establish which of its accounts is correct. Two careful descriptions of the same household may differ, both may illuminate, and there is no procedure that decides between them. Its claims are therefore difficult to falsify, and a tradition whose claims cannot fail has no mechanism for discovering that it has gone wrong.

The two defects do not repair one another, and it is important to see why. Empirical work cannot cure unfalsifiability, because the is-ought gap means that data never adjudicates a claim about what matters. Traditionalist work cannot defeat Hume's problem, because it has no more access to necessary connection than measurement does. A book that presented the two as complementary halves of a complete method would be claiming something false.

What the pairing does in its place is constrain each other's overreach. Empirical discipline keeps conceptual analysis tied to phenomena it must account for. Conceptual and historical work keeps empirical practice from mistaking its proxies for the thing, which is precisely the estrangement named above. Neither closes, and the honest form of inquiry into a subject of this kind is a dialectic between two methods that each remain open. §1.26.4 returns to this and states the position the book adopts.

1.2.3 The Coordinates of the Survey

The remaining sections of this chapter examine nineteen bodies of work. Table 1.1 places each on the two axes established above, and the table is given before the survey rather than after it so that the reader knows at each point what kind of thing is being examined.

Three features of the table are worth remarking before the survey proceeds.

The accounts that address what an adult should do are, without exception, extensions of accounts that originated elsewhere. Attachment theory was a theory of a behavioural system before it was a source of advice about sensitivity. Behaviourism was a theory of learning before it was a method of managing behaviour. The formation traditions are the exception that confirms the pattern, since they began as pedagogy and have never produced a developmental theory of their own. No body of work in this survey began by asking what a rearing adult should do and built its account from there.

1. The Ontological Premises of Theories of Development

Account	Primary object	Method	Section
Constructivism	The course of change	Traditionalist, then empirical	§1.3
Sociocultural	The course of change	Traditionalist	§1.4
Shared intentionality	The course of change	Empirical	§1.5
Core knowledge	A mind's organisation	Empirical	§1.6
Dynamic systems	The course of change	Empirical, formal	§1.7
Ecological systems	The surround of change	Empirical	§1.8
Attachment	The course of change; adult conduct	Empirical	§1.9
Psychoanalysis	A mind's organisation	Traditionalist	§1.10
Behaviourism	The course of change; adult conduct	Empirical	§1.11
Social learning	The course of change	Empirical	§1.12
Transactional	The course of change	Empirical	§1.13
Neural	The physical substrate	Empirical	§1.14
Social reproduction	The distribution of position	Both	§1.15
Warranted practice	Adult conduct; intervention	Empirical	§1.21
Educational philosophy	Adult conduct; institutional design	Traditionalist	§1.19
Disciplinary analysis	The apparatus of knowledge	Traditionalist	§1.20
Parenting styles	Adult conduct	Empirical	§1.17
Stage accounts	The course of change	Both	§1.18
Formation traditions	Adult conduct; institutional design	Traditionalist	§1.22

Table 1.1: The coordinates of the survey. Where two objects are listed, the account originated with the first and was extended to the second, and the extension is examined in the relevant section.

The two methodological traditions are not evenly distributed across the objects. Accounts of what changes are predominantly empirical; accounts of what an adult or an institution should do are predominantly traditionalist. This is not accidental and it is not a criticism of either. It reflects that trajectories admit measurement and that conduct requires categories measurement does not supply.

The single account that spans both methods is the one that founded the modern field. Piaget's early work is conceptual analysis conducted through clinical interviews of his own children, and the research programme that followed it was quantitative and international. [ch. 2](#) returns to what that transition cost.

1.3 The Constructing Solitary

Piaget's achievement (Piaget, 1952, 1954) was to establish that a child's errors are systematic. Before him it was possible to treat what children say about the world as an incomplete version of what adults say, deficient in the way a partial copy is deficient. After him this became difficult to maintain. The child who judges that the taller glass holds more water is not failing to perform an operation an adult performs. The child is performing a different operation, and performing it consistently, and the consistency is the finding. A structure was there to be described, and Piaget described a great deal of it.

The description rests on a mechanism, and the mechanism is where the premise sits. Knowledge, on this account, is built by a subject acting on objects. The subject assimilates what it encounters to the schemes it already has; where assimilation meets resistance, the schemes accommodate; and the alternation of these two, driven by the disequilibrium that resistance produces, carries the subject from one stage of organisation to the next. Equilibration names the process by which the whole thing keeps moving.

Two features of this mechanism deserve attention. The first is that it is genuinely a mechanism, specified well enough to generate predictions about what a child at a given stage will and will not do, and this specification is why the theory produced fifty years of productive research. The second is that everything in it happens on one side. The schemes are the subject's. The assimilation is performed by the subject. The disequilibrium is a state of the subject. The accommodation is a change in the subject's structures. The object contributes resistance, and resistance is a limit rather than a contribution. Nothing in the mechanism requires a second subject to be present at all.

This is not an oversight, and reading it as one would miss what is interesting. Piaget was explicit that the child constructs knowledge through activity, and the explicitness was a real advance over the alternatives available to him, which located knowledge either in innate endowment or in impressed experience. Locating it in the child's own operation on the world was the move that made development into a process with an internal logic. The cost of the move is that the logic is internal to one party.

Where, then, do other people enter? They enter as a special class of object. Another child is an object that resists in complicated ways, and the resistance is instructive: peer disagreement produces disequilibrium, disequilibrium drives accommodation, and this is the standard Piagetian account of how egocentrism declines. Social interaction is thereby granted a real role. The role it is granted is the role of a particularly effective supplier of resistance.

Consider what this account can and cannot state. It can state that a child who argues with peers will decentre sooner than a child who does not, and this is a substantive claim with empirical support. It cannot state that the child's capacity to hold a position at all is generated in the arguing, because the capacity is a scheme, schemes belong to the child, and the arguing supplies the occasion for their reorganisation. The child who enters the argument and the child who leaves it are the same child with differently organised schemes. Something has happened to the child. Nothing has happened to a relation, because on this account there is no relation in the relevant sense, only two constructing subjects each undergoing its own equilibration in the presence of the other.

The verbs confirm the reading. The child *has* schemes, *acquires* conservation, *attains* con-

crete operations, *lacks* reversibility. Each verb locates the property in the child. The account is coherent, well specified, and locates everything it describes in one place.

Proposition 1.2. *On the constructivist account, another person functions as an occasion for the reorganisation of structures that belong to the child. The account has resources to describe what such an occasion produces in the child and no resources to describe what it produces between them.*

The boundary this reaches is worth stating precisely, because it recurs in every theory examined in this chapter. Piaget's mechanism explains how a structure held by a subject changes under encounter. It does not address the question of how there comes to be a subject holding structures, and it does not need to, because the constructing subject is the premise from which the mechanism starts. Development, on this account, is something that happens to a subject who is already there. The question this book takes as its own is the question of that subject's own generation, and it lies on the far side of the boundary Piaget's account establishes.

1.4 The Scaffolded Agent

Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986) arrives at the question from the opposite direction and reaches a position that resembles this book's more closely than any other in the chapter. The resemblance is what makes the section difficult, and the difficulty is worth taking slowly.

His central proposition is that the higher functions appear twice. They appear first between people, as an interpsychological event, and afterward within the child, as an intrapsychological one. Attention is directed by another before it is directed by the self. Memory is prompted by another before it is prompted by the self. What will become the child's own operation begins as an operation distributed across two people, and the child's acquisition of it consists in that distributed operation being taken inward. The general law of cultural development states this, and the statement is a departure from everything Piaget's account permits. On Piaget's account the social supplies occasions. On Vygotsky's it supplies the form.

The zone of proximal development follows from the proposition and is its practical face. What a child can do with assistance stands in a determinate relation to what the child will shortly do alone, and the gap between them is where instruction operates. A child assessed only on independent performance is assessed on what development has already completed. A child assessed on assisted performance is assessed on what development is currently producing. The distinction reorganised educational measurement wherever it was taken seriously, and it remains among the most productive ideas the field has generated.

Note what has been granted. Vygotsky has located the origin of a psychological function outside the individual, in an exchange between individuals, and has made the individual's possession of that function a derivative fact. Function is prior in the interaction and posterior in the person. If a theory of relational generation is going to be constructed, this looks like the place it would begin.

The question is what the between-people event consists of, and this is where the account settles into a shape the present book cannot adopt.

Consider the standard scene. A child cannot solve a problem; an adult provides prompts, breaks the task into components, holds part of the structure while the child manages the rest;

over repetition the adult's contributions withdraw; the child performs the whole. The scene is real and the description is accurate. Ask now where the function was, at each moment. Before the episode it was in the adult, who could solve the problem. During the episode it was distributed, with the adult holding a portion. After the episode it is in the child. What the episode accomplished was a transfer of location, conducted in stages, with the intermediate stages managed so that the child could take up successively more of what the adult was holding.

This is a description of transport rather than of production. What moved was something that already existed in complete form on one side of the exchange. The adult did not come to possess anything through the episode. The adult was the source. The exchange was asymmetric in a specific way: one party had it, the other did not, and afterward both do.

Two consequences follow, and neither is a defect within Vygotsky's own project.

The first is that the account cannot describe generation of what neither party held. A conversation in which a parent and a child arrive at something the parent did not previously possess is, on this account, difficult to place. It can be redescribed as the parent also having learned, which is true and which relocates the phenomenon back into two separate acquisitions. What it cannot be described as is a single event in which something came into being between them and was afterward available to both. The vocabulary of internalisation requires an original location.

The second consequence concerns what happens to the adult. Internalisation is a one-way operation, and a theory built on it has no term for the adult's transformation by the same episode that transforms the child. A parent who is changed by a child, and who is changed precisely through the exchange that is teaching the child, is doing something the account has no name for. This will matter a great deal later in the book, where the reversal of direction becomes the criterion distinguishing two kinds of stable asymmetry ([ch. ?? ch:stability]). For the present it identifies the boundary: internalisation runs from the competent to the developing, and a mechanism that runs in one direction cannot describe a relation in which the direction reverses.

Proposition 1.3. *Internalisation requires that what is internalised have a prior location. An account built upon it can describe the movement of a function from one party to another and cannot describe the generation of a function that neither party held.*

The verbs here are less uniform than Piaget's and the difference is instructive. Alongside the child who *acquires* and *internalises*, one finds a function that *appears* between people, and appearing is not a verb of possession. The vocabulary is reaching for something the mechanism does not supply. Vygotsky died at thirty-seven with the work in an early state, and it is entirely possible that the mechanism would have been developed further. What was left is a theory in which the social is prior in origin and the individual is where everything ends up.

One further observation, since it bears on how the remainder of this book should be read. It is common to treat any relational account of development as a variant of Vygotsky's, and the treatment is understandable given how much territory he claimed. The difference this book requires can be stated in one line. On the Vygotskian account the relation is the channel through which a function passes. On the account developed here the relation is what the function consists of, so that the function does not arrive anywhere and does not need to, and

what stabilises is a structure rather than a possession. Whether that formulation can be made to do work is the question [Chapter 6](#) takes up.

1.5 The Shared Intention

The sociocultural line did not end with Vygotsky, and its contemporary form differs from his in ways that bear directly on the question this chapter is pursuing. Two developments matter. Rogoff ([Rogoff, 1990, 2003](#)) reconceived learning as participation in the activity of a community rather than as the acquisition of what a community holds. Tomasello ([Tomasello, 1999, 2019](#)) proposed that the human capacity for culture rests on a specific and identifiable ability to share intentions with another, and assembled comparative evidence for the proposal that Vygotsky had no means of gathering.

Tomasello's line of argument runs through a comparison. A chimpanzee and a human infant are set the same instrumental problems and perform comparably on many of them. The divergence appears where a problem requires reading another's intention and joining it. An infant of twelve months points to inform, which is to say points in order to supply another with something the other wants and does not have. An infant follows a gaze to an object and then looks back at the adult, establishing that both are attending to the same thing and that both know this. An infant offers help unprompted to an adult who has visibly failed at something. These are not more sophisticated versions of what other primates do. They constitute a different organisation of the social, and Tomasello's proposal ([Tomasello, 1999, 2019](#)) is that this organisation is the precondition of everything cumulative in human culture.

Joint attention is its elementary form and deserves attention here because of how it is described. Two parties attend to a third thing, and each attends to the other's attending, and this mutual registration is what makes the situation joint rather than parallel. Tomasello's term for what emerges is a shared intentional state, and the term carries a real commitment: what is shared is a state whose subject is a plural rather than two matching individual states. He writes of a joint goal that neither party holds alone.

This is a substantial move and it is worth marking how far it goes. A theory that admits states whose subject is plural has admitted something the accounts examined earlier cannot state. Piaget's disequilibrium belongs to one child. Behaviourist reinforcement history belongs to one organism. A shared intentional state, if the notion holds, belongs to a pair and to neither of its members.

Rogoff's ([Rogoff, 2003](#)) contribution proceeds from a different direction and arrives nearby. Her observation, developed through work in Mayan communities and elsewhere, is that a great deal of what children learn is learned by being present at and gradually assuming a place within activities conducted for their own sake. A child grows into the practice of a household by doing progressively more of what the household does. Nothing is transmitted in any straightforward sense, because there is no episode in which one party holds a competence and conveys it. There is an activity, the child's participation in it deepens, and competence is the name for the deepened participation. Her rejection of the transmission model is explicit and it is one of the strongest such rejections in the developmental literature.

Both lines are closer to this book's concerns than anything examined so far. The question is what remains once the closeness has been granted.

Consider the shared intentional state first. Its status within the theory is that of a capacity, and the capacity is possessed. Tomasello's central empirical claim is that human infants have this ability and other primates do not, that it emerges on a schedule, and that its absence or delay characterises certain developmental conditions. The state is shared; the ability to enter such states is individual, is species-typical, and is the property of an organism. The theory's explanatory work is done by the second of these. When it explains why human culture is cumulative, the explanation runs through what humans can do, and what humans can do is a fact about human individuals.

The consequence can be stated exactly. Shared intentionality names a relation and grounds it in a disposition. Two parties enter a joint state because each is the kind of creature that can enter joint states. The relation is real, is genuinely irreducible to its members' separate states while it obtains, and obtains because of what its members are.

This is a different position from the ones surveyed earlier and it is not the position this book will take. The difference is worth stating carefully, since it is fine and much depends on it. On Tomasello's account the capacity for the relation is prior and the relation follows. On the account developed here the relation is prior and what appears as a capacity is the relation's having stabilised. The two accounts will frequently describe the same episode in nearly the same words and will disagree about which term is doing the explaining.

Rogoff's participation model raises a different difficulty and it is a difficulty about description rather than about mechanism. Participation is a term for what a newcomer does in an activity that already exists. The activity has a form, the form is maintained by the community, and the newcomer's trajectory runs from the periphery toward the centre of something already constituted. What the model describes well is a child entering a practice. What it has less to say about is a practice altered by the entry, and the household case makes this pressing. A first child does not join a family in the sense in which an apprentice joins a workshop. The family that exists after the birth was not there before it, and the parents' own competence at being parents is generated in the same process by which the child is generated as a member.

Proposition 1.4. *An account grounding relational phenomena in a capacity for relation explains why a relation can occur and treats the relation's occurrence as the exercise of something prior. What it does not describe is a relation that generates the capacity by which it is subsequently explained.*

The verbs make the location visible in the usual way, though they are more mixed here than elsewhere. Alongside the child who *has* shared intentionality, *develops* the ability to read intentions, and *acquires* a capacity for cooperation, one finds states that are *shared*, attention that is *joint*, and goals that are *held together*. The second set has no bearer, and its presence in the vocabulary marks how far the tradition has moved. The first set is where the explanations are.

A final observation, since it will matter when the projection test is conducted in [ch. 90](#). Of the accounts in this survey, shared intentionality is the one whose empirical findings map most directly onto the propositions this book will defend. The disagreement is about what those findings show rather than about what they are. A reader persuaded by Tomasello's evidence and unpersuaded by this book's ontology will still find the two accounts describing the same infants doing the same things, and the choice between them will turn on which term is treated

as basic.

1.6 The Endowed Mind

The accounts examined so far differ about what builds a mind and agree that something builds it. The tradition considered here disputes the agreement. Its proposal is that a substantial part of what a mind contains is present at the outset, that this part is structured rather than diffuse, and that development consists in a good deal less construction than the constructivist supposed.

The argument arrived first in linguistics. Chomsky (Chomsky, 1965, 1980) observed that a child acquires a grammar on the basis of what the child hears, that what the child hears is finite and contains errors, and that the grammar the child arrives at licenses judgements about sentences never encountered. The gap between the input and the attainment is the poverty of the stimulus, and the proposal that closed it was that the child brings constraints to the task, so that only a restricted class of grammars is entertained at all. Whatever is concluded about the specific form of the proposal, the argument identified a genuine difficulty for any account on which a mind is assembled from what reaches it.

The developmental version of the argument came later and rests on a different kind of evidence. Infants cannot be asked what they think, and the methods that made the field possible are indirect: an infant looks longer at an event that violates an expectation, and the differential looking is read as evidence that the expectation was there. On this basis Spelke and Kinzler (2007) and others have proposed a small number of systems present in the first months of life. One represents objects as cohesive bodies that persist through occlusion and move on continuous paths. Another represents agents as directed toward goals and as responding to the environment at a distance. A third represents approximate number, discriminating quantities by ratio. A fourth represents spatial layout in a way that supports reorientation. These are the core systems, and the claim about them is specific: they are early, they are domain-particular, they operate on a restricted range of inputs, and they persist into adulthood alongside whatever is later constructed.

Carey's development of the position (Carey, 2009) addresses what the constructivist account was for. If a mind begins with a small number of narrow systems, the question of how it arrives at concepts none of those systems contain becomes pressing. Her answer is that conceptual change occurs, that it is discontinuous, and that a specifiable mechanism carries it out. A placeholder structure is acquired from the surrounding culture, most often through language, and is then filled in by a bootstrapping process in which the initially uninterpreted structure comes to be understood through modelling relations to what is already represented. The account of how a child comes to represent exact large numbers is the worked case and it is detailed.

Two features of this tradition should be recorded before the ontological question is put to it.

The first is that it has been unusually productive of findings that other accounts did not anticipate and cannot easily accommodate. That infants track object permanence far earlier than the classical account allowed is now well established, and the establishment came from these methods. Whatever the interpretation, the phenomena are there.

The second is that the tradition is internally contested in ways that matter. Whether the looking-time measures license the representational interpretation placed on them is disputed. Whether core knowledge is best described as knowledge or as a set of perceptual sensitivities is disputed. Whether the number system represents number or magnitude is disputed. The section that follows examines the tradition's ontological commitment rather than adjudicating these.

The commitment is the plainest in the survey. What develops is located in the child, and the location is now doubly secured: the property is the child's, and it is the child's before any relation has occurred. Where the constructivist made the child the builder and the sociocultural theorist made the community the source, the nativist makes the endowment prior to both. An infant in the first weeks, before any history of interaction, already represents.

The relation's office follows and it is the narrowest yet encountered. Experience triggers, selects among, or fills in what the endowment supplies. Chomsky's parameter-setting is the explicit version: the environment supplies a small number of decisions among options already enumerated. Carey's bootstrapping grants the environment more, since the placeholder structure comes from the culture and the child does not invent it. Even there, the culture supplies a symbol sequence and the child's own modelling operations do the interpretive work.

Proposition 1.5. *An account on which structure is endowed prior to interaction assigns the relation the office of selecting among options already present. The relation determines which of the available structures is realised and contributes nothing to what is available.*

There is a further consideration, and it concerns what this tradition would say about the propositions this book will defend. A nativist has a ready response to any claim that a capacity is generated relationally: the capacity was there, the relation revealed it, and an observer who sees generation is seeing the removal of an obstacle to expression. The response is always available and it cannot be refuted by an observation, since any developmental sequence is compatible with a sufficiently structured endowment expressing itself on a schedule.

This is worth noting because it is the mirror image of the difficulty identified in §1.25. There it was observed that the bearer commitment can redescribe any relational phenomenon and is therefore not refutable by counterexample. The nativist position has the same property, and so does this book's. Three accounts each capable of accommodating any observation are not distinguished by observation, and the question of what distinguishes them is taken up in §1.26.4.

The verbs, finally. An infant *has* core knowledge, *represents* objects, *is endowed with* a system, *comes equipped*. The last two are the tradition's own and they say the whole of it: the child arrives at the world already carrying what will develop, and what happens afterward is the unpacking.

1.7 The Self-Organising System

The tradition considered here proposes that developmental change is the behaviour of a system with many interacting components, that stable forms arise from the interaction without being specified anywhere in advance, and that the vocabulary of nonlinear dynamics is the right vocabulary for describing what happens. It is the most recent of the accounts surveyed, and

among them it stands closest to this book in method while diverging on a question that turns out to be decisive.

Thelen's work on infant stepping (Thelen and Fisher, 1982) is the case that established the position, and it is worth following because the argument runs through it rather than around it. Newborns produce alternating stepping movements when held upright. The movements disappear at around two months and return near the end of the first year. The received explanation was maturational: a reflex is present, cortical development inhibits it, later development releases a voluntary version. Thelen submerged the infants' legs in water and the stepping returned. The legs had gained fat faster than muscle, and the disappearance was a matter of mass relative to strength. Nothing had been inhibited and nothing was later released.

The general moral is larger than the case. A developmental change that appeared to require a controller, an inhibitor, and a schedule turned out to require none of them. What produced the observed pattern was the assembly of components at a moment, and the components included the infant's body, its immediate physical circumstances, and the task. Thelen and Smith (1994) generalised this into a position: behaviour is softly assembled from whatever is available, stable patterns are attractors in the space of possible assemblies, and development is change in the layout of that space.

Van Geert's contribution (van Geert, 1991) is formal and addresses growth. Developmental curves, he showed, can be generated by simple coupled equations in which growers compete for limited resources and support one another. The models produce features the data show and that linear accounts do not predict: sudden transitions, temporary regressions, variability that increases before a change rather than after it. Fischer's dynamic skill theory (Fischer, 1980) applies related reasoning to cognitive development and yields the proposition that a skill has no single level, only a range whose upper bound depends on the support present.

Three things this tradition established deserve recording before the divergence is stated.

The first is that variability carries information. The received practice treated fluctuation as measurement error to be averaged away. On the dynamic account fluctuation is a property of the system near a transition, and its increase is evidence that a reorganisation is approaching. This has been confirmed often enough to be relied upon.

The second is that stages are results rather than causes. If a stable pattern is an attractor, then observing a stage explains nothing, since the question is what makes that region of the space attracting. This is a real reversal of the explanatory direction and the tradition is entitled to it.

The third is that the context of an assembly is a constituent of what is assembled. Thelen's water is not an influence on stepping; it is part of what the stepping consists of. The tradition is genuinely committed to this and has resisted the pressure to relocate the explanation inside the infant.

The divergence lies elsewhere, and stating it requires care, because on a quick reading this book and this tradition are saying the same thing.

Ask what the components of the system are. Across the literature the answer is consistent: the infant's neural state, its muscles and their mass, its posture, its arousal, the surface it stands on, the object within reach, the caregiver's hand. These are components of a system whose behaviour is emergent, and the emergence is real. Every component is a physical particular, and the caregiver appears in the list as a source of support, a supplier of a task constraint, or a

physical circumstance.

What follows is that the system in question is a system of things standing in causal relations. The relations are dense, reciprocal, and non-decomposable, and this is exactly what distinguishes the account from a linear one. They remain relations between components that exist independently of them and that could in principle be listed before the relations are described. A system in this sense is an arrangement of parts.

This book's commitment is a different one and the difference is not a matter of degree. It holds that the terms of a relation are constituted in the relating, so that a list of components made prior to the relation would already have decided the question. Where the dynamic account says that a caregiver and an infant form a coupled system, this book says that what is coupled is not a caregiver and an infant, since neither is available as an independent term before the coupling.

The distinction is fine and its practical consequences are visible in what each account can describe. A dynamic account describes with precision how two components' interaction produces a pattern neither would produce alone. It has no vocabulary for a component that comes into existence through the interaction, because a component is what interacts. The parent who becomes a parent in the course of raising a child is, on the dynamic account, a component whose parameters changed.

Proposition 1.6. *An account treating development as the behaviour of a system of interacting components describes emergent pattern with precision and requires that the components be specifiable prior to the interaction from which the pattern emerges.*

Two further observations, both bearing on later parts of this book.

The dynamic tradition is where the formal apparatus of this field currently resides, and any formal proposal made in [ch. 70](#) will be measured against it. That measurement is appropriate. A proposal that reproduces what coupled growth equations already deliver, in a different notation, will have contributed a notation. The question those chapters must answer is what a relational formalism represents that a component formalism cannot, and the answer will have to be more specific than a preference about vocabulary.

The second observation concerns the verbs, which in this tradition are the most interesting in the survey. Alongside the child who *has* a skill level, one finds patterns that *emerge*, systems that *self-organise*, behaviour that is *softly assembled*, and states that *settle* into attractors. None of the second group has a bearer, and the tradition has gone furthest of any surveyed here toward a vocabulary in which what develops is not held by anyone. What it has not done is remove the components from the description, and the components are where the bearers went.

1.8 The Ecological Surround

The accounts examined so far locate a child and then ask what acts upon it. The tradition considered here asks a prior question: what is the structure of the surrounding within which a child develops, and how far out does it extend before it stops mattering?

Bronfenbrenner's answer ([Bronfenbrenner, 1979](#)) was a set of nested systems. The microsystem contains the settings in which a child directly participates, the household, the classroom, the group of children on a particular street. The mesosystem is the relation between two

such settings, and the proposal that this constitutes a distinct level was his first substantial contribution: what happens between a household and a school is not reducible to what happens in either. The exosystem contains settings in which a child does not participate and which nonetheless reach the child, a parent's workplace being the standing example. The macrosystem contains the arrangements of law, custom, and economy within which all of these sit. He added the chronosystem later to hold change over time.

Two features of the model deserve statement before the ontological question is put.

The first is that the mesosystem was a genuine discovery of a level. A child whose household and school describe the child in incompatible terms is in a situation that neither setting contains, and before Bronfenbrenner there was no vocabulary for it. Whatever is concluded below, this remains a contribution.

The second is that Bronfenbrenner revised the model substantially in his later work, and the revision is instructive. He came to hold that the early formulation had been read as a taxonomy of contexts and that the reading had cost the theory its explanatory content. The bioecological model that replaced it (Bronfenbrenner and Morris, 2006) made proximal processes central: the recurring, progressively more complex reciprocal interactions between a developing person and the persons, objects, and symbols in the immediate environment. These processes were declared the engines of development, with context, person, and time as the parameters conditioning their operation. He was explicit that a study which measured contexts and outcomes without observing proximal processes had not tested his theory.

The revision moves the tradition closer to this book and it is worth marking how far. Proximal processes are reciprocal by definition. They are described as occurring over extended periods and as requiring increasing complexity to remain developmentally effective. This is an account in which the interaction, rather than either party, is the unit of analysis.

What remains is the question the chapter has been putting.

A proximal process, in Bronfenbrenner's formulation, is the engine of development, and development is what happens to the developing person. The process is specified as an interaction between a person and an environment, and the person is one of the four parameters. Person characteristics, in the mature model, are of three kinds: dispositions that set processes in motion, resources of ability and experience, and demand characteristics that invite or discourage response from others. All three are properties of an individual, and the third is a property of an individual defined by its effect on others.

The environment, correspondingly, is a structure of settings within which the person is located. The nesting figure makes this vivid and the vividness is the difficulty: a set of concentric circles has a centre, and the centre is where the child is placed.

Proposition 1.7. *An account organised around a developing person situated in nested environments requires that the person and the environments be distinguishable in order to be nested. The developing person occupies the centre of the figure, and what surrounds is what acts upon what is surrounded.*

The cross-cultural tradition arrived at a related structure from a different direction and with more attention to the content of the surround. Whiting and Whiting (1975) established that variation in what children do all day is enormous, that it tracks the household's productive arrangements, and that a great deal of what developmental psychology had taken as sequence

was a description of one arrangement. Super and Harkness (1986) proposed the developmental niche as an analytical unit, with three components: the physical and social settings a child occupies, the customary practices of care, and the psychology of the caretakers, which includes their beliefs about what children are and what they need. LeVine's work on parental goals (LeVine et al., 1994) argued that rearing practices are organised around a hierarchy of concerns beginning with survival and that the ordering is a response to conditions rather than a preference.

This tradition supplies something no other account in this survey does, and this book is directly indebted to it. The proposal that a caretaker's beliefs about what a child is form a component of the developmental environment, and that those beliefs vary systematically with material arrangements, is the empirical counterpart of the argument §1.1.2 conducted about the vocabulary of theories. What a household takes a child to be conditions what the household does, and what the household takes a child to be is not freely chosen.

ch. 5 takes up this literature at length, since the comparative survey is its proper home. What matters here is narrower. The developmental niche is described as an environment surrounding a child, its three components are components of the surround, and the child is what the niche is a niche for. The tradition's radicalism concerns the content of the environment and the variability of what had been taken as universal, and it leaves the figure of a child within a surround intact.

The verbs are consistent across both branches. A child *is embedded in* a context, *is exposed to* a setting, *develops within* a niche, *is affected by* an exosystem. Every one is locative and every one places the child at the centre of what is described.

1.9 The Naturalised Bond

Attachment theory presents the chapter with its sharpest case, because the relation is not a peripheral consideration within it. The relation is its subject. Bowlby's proposition (Bowlby, 1969) was that an infant's tie to a caregiver is a primary system in its own right, organised around proximity and available protection, and that the distress of separation is the operation of that system rather than a symptom of some other need being obstructed. The proposition was directed against accounts on which the tie derived from feeding, and it displaced them. Whatever else the present chapter concludes, it should record that attachment theory established the caregiving relation as an object of serious study and that the establishment has held.

The apparatus that made this possible was ethological. A behavioural system, in the sense Bowlby borrowed, is an organised set of responses with a set point, activated under specifiable conditions and terminated when the set point is reached. Proximity-seeking activates under threat, fatigue, or unfamiliarity, and terminates on achieved proximity. The system has a function in the evolutionary sense, which is protection, and the function accounts for why it should exist at all. The apparatus was rigorous, it generated predictions, and Ainsworth's procedure (Ainsworth et al., 1978) turned the predictions into an observational method that has been used for six decades across many populations.

Attend now to what the apparatus does with the relation.

A behavioural system is a property of an organism. It is located in the infant, it has a set point the infant carries, and it is activated by conditions the infant registers. The caregiver

enters as the object toward which the system is directed and as the environmental variable determining whether the system's aim is achieved. Sensitive responsiveness is a property of the caregiver; the infant's system is a property of the infant; and the pairing of the two produces an outcome that is then classified. The relation is thoroughly present in the theory and thoroughly composed of two parties who arrive with their properties already constituted.

The classification is where the consequence becomes visible. A dyad assessed in the Strange Situation receives a category, and the category is understood to characterise the relationship rather than the infant alone. This is a real advance over an instrument that would return a trait score, and it is often cited as evidence that attachment theory measures relations. Consider what the category does. It assigns a type. A type persists, is expected to show stability across assessments, and is predictive precisely to the extent that it does persist. The instrument returns, for a relation, something with the logical form of a property: a value on a classification, borne by an entity, stable enough to be measured again.

This is what it is for a relation to be naturalised. The relation becomes a thing with characteristics. Once it has characteristics, the question of how it is generated becomes the question of what caused it to have the characteristics it has, and the causal story runs backward through caregiver sensitivity to the caregiver's own history, which is itself classified. The internal working model completes the arrangement by relocating the whole matter inside the infant, as a representation the infant carries forward and applies to later relationships. The relation, having been described as a system with an object, is then stored as a model in a head.

None of these moves is unmotivated. Each was required for the theory to make contact with evidence, and the evidence it made contact with is substantial. The observation to be recorded is narrower. An apparatus that classifies relations by type will find what persists in them, and what persists is precisely what a relation has in common with a property. Whatever in a relation is not of that kind falls outside the instrument's reach, and it falls outside by the construction of the instrument rather than through neglect.

Proposition 1.8. *An instrument that assigns a persisting type to a relation returns, for that relation, something with the logical form of a property. What the instrument cannot register is any respect in which the relation is generative rather than characteristic.*

Two matters deserve separate notice, since both are places where attachment research has moved further than its founding apparatus.

The first is that security is a description of a functioning relation and carries no account of how such a relation produces anything new. A securely attached infant explores more readily, and exploration is treated as the behavioural correlate of a secure base. Exploration in this framework is what the infant does when the attachment system is quiescent. The framework has a term for the condition under which the infant is free to explore and no term for what the exploring generates in the relation itself. The parent is a base from which the child departs and to which the child returns. The base does not change through being departed from.

The second is the direction of the account. Attachment runs from caregiver sensitivity to infant security, and where the reverse direction is studied it is generally studied as a moderator, with infant temperament affecting how readily sensitivity produces security. What the framework does not contain is a term for the caregiver being generated by the caregiving. The parent whose own capacities are formed through raising a child is doing something the theory

has room to acknowledge and no apparatus to describe. This will become one of the central matters of [ch. 10](#).

The verbs, once more. An infant *has* an attachment style, *develops* a working model, *shows* secure behaviour, *is* securely attached. The last of these is the most revealing, because it predicates of the child a condition that the theory itself holds to be a property of a dyad. The vocabulary settles the location even where the theory resists it.

1.10 The Held Infant

The psychoanalytic tradition entered this territory before any of the others and has remained in it longest. Its evidence is of a kind the empirical accounts do not admit, drawn from the consulting room and from a method whose reliability has been contested since its founding. Its influence on how childhood is conceived, in and beyond the clinic, exceeds that of anything else surveyed here. And it contains, in Winnicott, a formulation closer to this book's position than any other in the chapter, which is the reason the section runs at length.

Freud's account ([Freud, 1923](#)) placed the family at the centre of what a person becomes. Development proceeds through a sequence in which drive attaches successively to different bodily zones and different objects, and the residues of that sequence organise adult life. The specific stage theory has not survived. What has survived is the structural proposal underneath it: that a person is formed in a small number of early relations, that the formation is largely inaccessible to the person, and that what was formed continues to operate. Every subsequent account in this section works within that proposal.

Klein ([Klein, 1975](#)) moved the emphasis from drive to object. An infant, on her account, is from the beginning in relation to objects, initially partial ones, and its inner life consists in what happens to those objects under the pressure of love and destructiveness. The paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions name two organisations of that inner world, the second achieved when the infant becomes able to recognise that what it loves and what it attacks are the same object. Whatever is thought of the specific developmental timetable, Klein established that a mind's contents are relational in form. What a person carries is objects and relations to them rather than sensation and disposition.

Bion's contribution ([Bion, 1962](#)) addresses what the caregiver does with what the infant cannot manage. An infant experiences states it has no means of processing, and it projects them; a caregiver receives them, is affected by them, holds them, and returns them in a form that can be borne. Containment is his term for this, and the account is of a capacity built in the infant out of an operation initially performed by another. The parallel to internalisation is close and the difference is that what is internalised here is a function rather than a content.

Lacan's rereading ([Lacan, 2006](#)) returns the tradition to the question of how a subject comes to be at all. The mirror stage describes an infant's recognition of its own image as an anticipation rather than a report: what is recognised is a coherence the infant does not yet possess, and the identification with it founds the ego on something the infant is not. Beyond this lies the symbolic order and the position Lacan calls the big Other, the locus from which a subject is addressed, recognised, and given a place. His claim is that a subject is constituted in submission to that order, that its desire is organised by what the Other is taken to want, and that no subject stands outside this arrangement. What matters here is the structure of the claim:

the subject is an effect of a relation to something it does not author.

Winnicott is where the tradition approaches this book most closely, and his formulations require quoting exactly, since their force lies in their precision.

His central statement (Winnicott, 1965) is that there is no such thing as an infant, and the sentence continues: wherever one finds an infant one finds maternal care, and without maternal care there would be no infant. This is offered as an ontological remark rather than a claim about dependency. An infant is not a small person who happens to require assistance. The unit that exists is the nursing couple, and the infant as a separate being is a later achievement rather than a starting condition.

From this several of his other formulations follow. The holding environment is what the caregiver provides, and the provision is a condition within which the infant comes to be rather than an action performed on the infant. The good-enough mother fails the infant progressively and in graduated amounts, and the failures are what permit the infant to develop its own capacities, so that the caregiving that succeeded perfectly would prevent what it aimed at. Transitional phenomena occupy a space that belongs neither to the infant nor to the world, and Winnicott insisted that the question of whether the object was found or created is one that must never be asked of a child, since the space depends on the question remaining unposed. The true self and the false self distinguish a spontaneity that arises from the infant's own gesture from a compliance organised around what the environment requires.

The proximity of this to what this book will develop is considerable and should be stated plainly. A reader who took Winnicott's (Winnicott, 1965, 1971) ontological remark seriously, worked out its consequences, and stated them in a general form would arrive somewhere near the position of Chapter 6.

What remains, then, is a question about what the tradition does with the insight, and it can be stated as three observations.

The first concerns the direction of the account. In Winnicott and in Bion alike, the caregiver's provision is what the infant develops out of, and the caregiver is described as the one who provides, holds, contains, survives, and fails in graduated amounts. What the caregiver becomes through the caregiving is not part of the account. The mother's primary maternal preoccupation is described as a state she enters in order to be able to provide, which is a state of the caregiver in the service of the infant's development rather than a development of her own.

The second concerns where the achievement is finally located. The infant's development, on these accounts, moves toward a capacity it comes to hold. Bion's containment produces an apparatus for thinking that becomes the infant's own. Winnicott's holding produces a self capable of being alone in the presence of another. The relation is where the capacity comes from and the capacity ends up in a person. The vocabulary is developmental in the ordinary sense: what begins between finishes within.

The third concerns evidence and is a different kind of point. The tradition's claims about infancy are largely reconstructions from adult clinical material, and the reconstruction is inferential in a way that permits the inference to be shaped by the theory guiding it. This has been the standing objection since Freud and it has not been answered. The observation is recorded here because the tradition's proximity to this book's position could otherwise be mistaken for support, and it is not support. Winnicott's formulation is available to be built upon; the evi-

dence for it is of a kind that settles nothing.

Proposition 1.9. *The psychoanalytic tradition supplies the closest available statement of a relational constitution of the subject and treats what is so constituted as arriving, in the end, within the person constituted. What is described as beginning between two parties is described as finishing in one of them.*

A final note on Bowlby, since his break from this tradition was examined in §1.9 without being placed. Bowlby was trained within psychoanalysis and left it over evidence. He held that claims about infancy should be answerable to observation of infants, and the ethological apparatus was what allowed him to construct such claims. The gain was a research programme that has produced six decades of findings. The cost was the vocabulary. Holding, containment, the transitional space, and the true self have no counterpart in attachment theory, and the concepts that replaced them are those that survived operationalisation. Both the gain and the cost should be held in view, since the book will draw on both traditions and for different purposes.

The verbs, finally, and they are the most divided in the chapter. The infant *introjects, internalises, develops* a capacity, *achieves* the depressive position. Alongside these stand formulations with no bearer at all: there is no such thing as an infant, the transitional object is neither found nor created, the subject is an effect of the signifier. The tradition contains both vocabularies and has never resolved which is doing the work.

1.11 The Response Surface

The behaviourist account differs from the others in this chapter by holding its premise openly. Where Piaget's constructing subject and Bowlby's behavioural system are assumptions the theories operate with, the behaviourist commitment was announced as a methodological principle and defended in print. Explanation should proceed by relations between observable conditions and observable behaviour, and terms referring to inner states should earn their place or be dispensed with. Whatever is thought of the position, it was arrived at deliberately, and this section is correspondingly brief. A premise that has been stated requires less excavation than one held in the verbs.

The account of development that follows is straightforward. A child's behaviour is shaped by its consequences. Responses followed by reinforcement become more probable, responses followed by no consequence or by aversive consequence become less so, and the accumulated history of such contingencies constitutes what a child has become. Language is acquired this way, as is social behaviour, and what appears from outside as the emergence of a capacity is the sedimented result of a schedule.

The apparatus was successful in a manner worth acknowledging plainly, since it is now conventional to treat behaviourism as a superseded episode. It is not superseded in practice. Contingency management remains among the most reliably effective interventions available for a range of childhood difficulties, and applied behaviour analysis continues to produce outcomes that competing approaches do not match. A theory whose techniques work is a theory that has identified something real, whatever is said about its interpretation of what it identified.

What it identified is worth naming precisely, because the naming locates the premise. Behaviour is sensitive to consequence. This is true, it is demonstrable, and no account of development can afford to deny it. The premise enters with the further claim that this sensitivity is the whole of the matter, so that a child is exhaustively describable as a surface on which contingencies operate.

A surface has no interior and requires none. It has a history, which is the record of what has been impressed upon it, and it has a current disposition, which is the summed effect of that history. The parent, in this account, is an arranger of contingencies. The relation between them is a schedule.

Two features of this arrangement bear on the book's concerns.

The first is that the account is entirely one-directional and makes no attempt to be otherwise. Contingencies are arranged by one party and undergone by the other. That the child also arranges contingencies for the parent is true, is occasionally noted, and has no structural place in the theory, since a theory of shaping requires a shaper. The reciprocal case is describable only as two shaping operations running simultaneously in opposite directions, which is not the same as a relation and does not become one by being doubled.

The second is that the account contains no term whose loss would constitute degradation. A schedule can be effective or ineffective, well designed or badly designed, and these are assessments of its efficiency in producing specified behaviour. A relation on this account cannot deteriorate, because there is nothing in it besides the contingencies, and a change in contingencies is a change of schedule rather than a loss. The vocabulary that this book will require in [ch. 30](#), in which a household loses a distinction it once could make, has no counterpart here. What would be lost, on the behaviourist account, is a discriminative stimulus, and discriminative stimuli are established and extinguished as a matter of course.

Proposition 1.10. *An account in which a child is a surface on which contingencies operate has resources to describe the efficiency of an arrangement and no resources to describe its degradation, since degradation requires that something have been present which is now absent, and the account admits nothing that could be absent besides a contingency.*

The verbs in this literature are the most consistent in the chapter and the most revealing for being so. A child *emits* responses, *is reinforced*, *acquires* a repertoire, *extinguishes* a behaviour. The child is grammatically an object throughout, and this is a fair report of the theory's commitment. The behaviourist would not regard the observation as a criticism. Nor is it offered as one. It records that the location question has been answered here with a completeness the other accounts do not attempt: nothing is located in the child except a history of what was done to the child.

1.12 The Modelled Act

Bandura's work ([Bandura, 1977, 1986](#)) began as an extension of the behaviourist programme and ended somewhere the programme could not have reached. The extension is worth following, since it is the clearest case in this survey of an account moving under the pressure of its own findings.

The initial observation was that children acquire behaviour they have never performed

and for which they have therefore never been reinforced. A child who watches an adult treat a doll in a particular manner will treat it that way afterward, without instruction and without consequence having been arranged. This is not explicable within an account on which the shaping of emitted responses is the whole of learning, and Bandura's conclusion was that observation is itself a mode of acquisition.

The apparatus he built around this is more elaborate than it is usually given credit for. Observational learning was analysed into attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation, each a separable process with its own conditions. Vicarious reinforcement was proposed as a mechanism: the consequences of another's action are informative about the consequences of one's own. Reciprocal determinism, his term for the relation among person, behaviour, and environment, held that each of the three influences the others, and this was directed against unidirectional formulations in both the behaviourist and the trait traditions.

The later work moved to self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), which is a person's judgement of what they can accomplish, and to the proposition that such judgements govern what a person attempts, how long they persist, and how they interpret failure. This became one of the most heavily investigated constructs in psychology and remains so.

Three of these deserve to be marked as gains for any account of rearing.

Observation without arranged consequence is a real mode of transmission and it is the mode by which most of what passes between a parent and a child passes. Nothing in a household is arranged as a contingency, and a great deal is watched.

Reciprocal determinism was an early and explicit rejection of one-way causation. Bandura insisted that a person's behaviour alters the environment that subsequently acts on the person, and he insisted on it before this was common.

Vicarious reinforcement locates a source of learning outside the learner's own history, which the operant account could not do.

Ask now where the theory places what is acquired.

An observer acquires a representation of the modelled act, retains it, and reproduces it under conditions of adequate motivation. The representation is the observer's. Self-efficacy is a belief held by a person about that person's own capacities, and the entire research literature on it measures it as an individual difference. Reciprocal determinism specifies three influencing terms, of which two are properties of a person and the third is the surroundings.

This is behaviourism's bearer commitment with an interior added. Where the operant account admitted nothing in the child besides a history of consequences, Bandura admitted representations, expectations, and self-judgements. Each is located in the same place the response repertoire had been.

Proposition 1.11. *An account in which acquisition proceeds by observation locates in the observer a representation of what was observed. The reciprocity such an account admits is reciprocity of influence between a person and an environment, which leaves both terms in place.*

The verbs, briefly. A child *acquires* a behaviour by observation, *retains* a representation, *holds* a sense of efficacy, *models* another's act. The last is transitive and its object is a person, which is as close as this vocabulary comes to naming a relation.

1.13 The Transactional Pair

The account examined here is the closest in mainstream developmental psychology to the proposition this book will defend, and it should be handled with corresponding care.

Sameroff's transactional model (Sameroff and Chandler, 1975; Sameroff, 2009) began from a finding that the literature of the period could not accommodate. Perinatal complications predict later developmental difficulty weakly and inconsistently, and the strength of the prediction varies with the family the child is born into. Neither a constitutional account nor an environmental account explains this pattern, since each predicts a stable effect of its own variable.

The proposal was that outcomes are produced by continuous mutual influence over time. An infant who is difficult to soothe alters what a caregiver does; the altered caregiving alters the infant; the altered infant alters the caregiving again. What is observed at any later moment is the accumulated product of this exchange and is not attributable to either party's initial state. Sameroff stated the consequence directly: neither the child nor the environment at time one predicts the outcome, because both have been transformed by their interaction in the interval.

Several things follow that distinguish this from everything examined earlier.

Bidirectionality is constitutive rather than added. The model does not say that children influence parents in addition to parents influencing children. It says that the developmental outcome is a property of the exchange, and that a measurement of either party in isolation is a measurement of something the exchange has already altered.

The account has a term for what this book calls direction. Bell's earlier argument (Bell, 1968) on the direction of effects (Bell, 1968), which Sameroff's model absorbed, established that a correlation between parental behaviour and child behaviour is uninformative about which produced which, and that the developmental literature had been reading such correlations in one direction by assumption.

The account also predicts that interventions on either party alone will produce smaller effects than expected, which is a testable claim that has been repeatedly borne out.

Related work extends the structure. Tronick's still-face procedure (Tronick et al., 1978) demonstrated that an infant of a few months responds to the cessation of a caregiver's responsiveness with a rapid and organised change of state, and his mutual regulation model treats the ordinary condition as one of continuous repair of small mismatches. Trevarthen's primary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979) proposed that infants engage in the coordination of affect and timing with a partner from the first months, and that this coordination is not the exercise of a solitary capacity on a social object.

The proximity to this book's position is real. The remaining distance can be stated in one observation.

The transactional model is a model of two parties in continuous mutual influence, and the two parties are its primitives. Sameroff's formal statements are written as a chain of states, in which the child's state at each time and the environment's state at each time each depend on both states at the previous time. Something must occupy those positions at time one for the chain to be defined. The model abolishes the priority of either party's contribution and retains the parties.

What this book proposes is a step past that. It holds that what stands at each end of the

exchange is itself produced in the exchange, so that a state of the child at time one is already a relational fact rather than an initial condition. The transactional model can describe a child transformed by an exchange and requires a child to enter it. The difference is not visible in most of the phenomena either account describes, and it becomes visible at the beginning, where the transactional model must posit initial states that the account developed here declines to posit.

Proposition 1.12. *A model of continuous mutual influence between two parties requires initial states for both parties in order to be specified. The mutuality it describes is complete and it begins with terms it did not generate.*

Two further remarks, both bearing on how this book uses the tradition.

The first is that the transactional literature supplies the strongest existing empirical warrant for the propositions of [ch. 10](#), which concerns the reversal of direction within a relation. Where this book claims that a household in which the direction of contribution reverses differs structurally from one in which it does not, the transactional literature has established that such reversals occur, can be measured, and predict outcomes. The claim in [ch. 70](#) that directional reversal is an observable rests on that literature having shown it observable.

The second is that Tronick's still-face procedure is the closest thing developmental psychology possesses to an experimental study of what [ch. 32](#) examines under a different description. The procedure withdraws a caregiver's responsiveness for a short interval and records what an infant does. That this produces a rapid and specific disorganisation in a healthy infant of a few months is among the most robust findings in the field, and its relation to the argument of that chapter is taken up there.

The verbs in this tradition are unlike those elsewhere in the survey and the difference is instructive. A dyad *co-regulates*, a pair *repairs* a mismatch, states *are coordinated*, effects *are bidirectional*. Several have no single bearer. What retains the bearer is the formal apparatus rather than the prose, and this is the reverse of the situation found in [§1.7](#), where the prose spoke of emergence and the components did the work.

1.14 The Neural Account

Developmental neuroscience occupies a position in this survey unlike the others. It is not a theory of development in the sense the preceding sections have used. It is a body of findings about the physical substrate, produced by methods that have improved rapidly, and it is compatible in principle with several of the accounts already examined. A nativist and a dynamic systems theorist can both point to neural evidence, and both do.

This section therefore does something narrower than the preceding ones. The substance of what neuroscience has established about the developing brain, and the methods by which it establishes it, are the subject of [[ch. ?? ch:neural-part](#)], which treats each function in turn and examines the instruments at length. What is at issue here is a single question, and it is the question this chapter has been putting to every account: what does a neural measure locate?

The answer is unusually clear, which is why the section is worth having.

A measurement of cortical thickness locates a quantity in a region of tissue. A measurement of white matter integrity locates a property in a tract. A measurement of activation locates a signal in a volume. A measurement of connectivity locates a statistical relation between two

volumes. In every case the thing measured is a property of matter belonging to one organism, and the organism is bounded by its skin.

This is the bearer commitment in its most literal available form. Where the constructivist located schemes in a child by a theoretical decision that could in principle be revised, the neural account locates its properties in a child because the tissue is in the child. There is no interpretive step to contest. A brain is where it is.

Two consequences follow, and they pull in opposite directions.

The first is that a neural finding cannot by itself settle a question posed at the relational level. Consider a finding that children raised under conditions of severe deprivation show reduced volume in some structure. The finding is real and its practical importance is considerable. What it establishes is that a relational circumstance leaves a physical trace, which nobody doubted. What it does not establish is what the relational circumstance consisted of, since the measure was taken in one organism and the circumstance obtained between several. A trace is evidence that something happened and is not a description of what happened.

The second consequence cuts the other way and this book is bound by it. If a relational claim is not confirmed by a neural correlate, then a relational claim cannot be supported by one either. A finding that parent-child interaction of a certain kind is accompanied by some pattern of neural activity in the child adds no weight to a proposition about what the interaction generates. The temptation to cite such findings is considerable, since they carry an authority that philosophical argument does not, and the citation would be illegitimate. [[ch. ?? ch:neural-part](#)] states this restriction at its opening and observes it throughout.

Proposition 1.13. *A neural measure locates a property in tissue belonging to a single organism. It therefore registers the trace of a relational circumstance and does not describe the circumstance, and this holds symmetrically for accounts that would be confirmed by such traces and accounts that would be embarrassed by them.*

A third matter deserves separate statement because it is frequently confused with the first two. Nothing above is an argument against reduction, and this book takes no position on whether mental phenomena are ultimately physical. The claim is about what a measurement locates rather than about what exists. Two organisms in a relation are, on any materialist account, two physical systems in causal interaction, and there is no further substance required. What follows from this is that the relation is physically realised, which is not the same as saying that it is measurable in either organism taken alone. A property realised in an arrangement of two systems is not thereby a property of either.

There is one development within the neural literature that bears directly on this and it should be flagged here even though its treatment belongs later. Over the past two decades methods have appeared that record from two brains simultaneously during interaction, and the measures they yield concern the relation between the two recordings rather than the state of either. This is neuroscience approaching, with its own instruments, the question this chapter has been pursuing. Whether such a measure registers a relation or registers two organisms whose separate states happen to covary is a question the field has not settled and this book does not settle. It is examined in [[ch. ?? ch:two-brain](#)].

The verbs, briefly, since they are the plainest in the chapter and need no analysis. A brain *develops*, a region *matures*, a network *becomes* more efficient, a child's cortex *shows* a trajectory.

The location is in the noun rather than in the verb, and no one has ever supposed otherwise.

1.15 The Reproduced Position

The tradition examined here asks a question none of the preceding accounts ask. Where they ask how a child develops, it asks why children of some households arrive at positions resembling their parents' with a regularity that no account of individual development predicts. Its answer is that rearing and schooling are among the mechanisms by which a structure of positions reproduces itself, and that this occurs without anyone intending it and largely without anyone perceiving it.

The question is a real one and the regularity is not in dispute. Across societies with markedly different institutions, the correlation between a household's position and its children's eventual position is substantial and has proved resistant to interventions designed to reduce it. Any account of childhood that cannot address this is incomplete, and most of the accounts surveyed above do not attempt it.

Bourdieu's apparatus (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bourdieu, 1990) is the most developed. Cultural capital names the competences, dispositions, and familiarities that a household transmits and that institutions reward: a manner of speaking, a relation to written language, an ease in the presence of officials, a knowledge of what is done. These are acquired at home, are unevenly distributed, and are treated by schools as evidence of ability. Habitus names the durable dispositions laid down by early conditions, generating practices that reproduce those conditions without calculation and without rules. The school's role is decisive and is misdescribed by its own account of itself: it selects on cultural capital while presenting itself as selecting on merit, and the misdescription is what makes the selection legitimate.

Bernstein's contribution (Bernstein, 1971) concerns language and is more specific. He distinguished codes of speech differing in their dependence on shared context, and observed that schools operate in one of them. A child whose household speech assumes shared context arrives at an institution conducting itself in a register that assumes none, and the resulting difficulty is read as limited capacity. The proposal is not about vocabulary or correctness. It concerns the relation between a form of speech and the social arrangements that make it functional.

Bowles and Gintis (1976) proposed a correspondence between the social relations of schooling and those of work: the timekeeping, the subordination to external evaluation, the fragmentation of tasks, the deferral of gratification. What schooling transmits, on this account, is a disposition suited to a place in production, and it transmits this more reliably than it transmits any curriculum.

Althusser's formulation (Althusser, 1971) is the most abstract and the most consequential for what follows. Ideology, on his account, does not operate through beliefs a person holds. It operates by constituting individuals as subjects of a certain kind, through the everyday operations of institutions that address them. Interpellation is his term for the address, and the point of the term is that the one addressed is produced in the addressing. A subject called upon by an institution comes to be the subject that institution calls for.

Willis (Willis, 1977) supplied the corrective that keeps the tradition honest. His study of working-class boys found that they were not passively receiving a disposition. They actively

rejected the school's account of the world, and the rejection was intelligent, penetrating the school's promises accurately. The rejection nonetheless delivered them into the positions the school would have assigned. Resistance conducted with clear sight produced the reproductive outcome, and this is a finding the reproduction theorists had not predicted.

Social reproduction feminism made visible what the male-authored versions had assumed: that the labour of producing the next generation is labour, that it is performed disproportionately by women, that it is unwaged, and that its availability is presupposed by every institution examined above. This changes what the object of study is. Rearing is work, its conditions are material, and the household is a site of production.

The tradition is thus the only one in this survey that treats rearing as located in material arrangements rather than in a dyad. This book's own commitment, stated in the preface, is closer to that than to anything else surveyed. The remainder of this section concerns where the two nonetheless diverge, and the divergence is more difficult to locate than in any previous case.

Begin with what the tradition explains. It explains the transmission of position. Its explanandum is a distribution: why the children of some households arrive where they do at a rate exceeding chance. Its mechanisms are accordingly mechanisms of transmission, and a mechanism of transmission requires something transmitted, a source, and a destination. Cultural capital is held by a household, acquired by a child, and converted at an institution. Habitus is laid down by conditions and carried forward. A code is spoken at home and encountered at school.

The destination in every case is the child, and what arrives there is a property the child thereafter has. This is the observation the section is for. The reproduction traditions relocate the cause of what a child comes to be, moving it from the child's constitution or the parent's technique to a structure neither party controls. They leave the child in place as the bearer of what results. A child possessing little cultural capital is described in exactly the grammatical form as a child possessing little inhibitory control, and the difference between the accounts is where the possession came from.

Proposition 1.14. *An account explaining the transmission of position relocates the cause of a child's trajectory outside both the child and the household and leaves the child as the bearer of what is transmitted. Relocating a cause is not the same as changing what is taken to bear the effect.*

Two further observations follow from this and both bear on later parts of the book.

The first concerns what a transmission model of this kind cannot describe. If what passes between generations is capital, disposition, or code, then it is a substance with a location at each moment, and the relation is the channel. This is structurally the difficulty identified in Vygotsky at §1.4, arriving now at a different scale. What a household transmits, on the account this book will develop in ch. 37, is neither a possession nor a disposition but a grammar: the terms in which a situation can be described, the distinctions available for making sense of a child, the moves a family can recognise as moves. A grammar has no location in the way capital does. It is not held by the parents and conveyed to the child, since the parents are also inside it, and this is why it changes without anyone deciding to change it.

The second concerns Althusser and is a genuine debt rather than a divergence. His proposi-

tion that a subject is produced in being addressed is close to what this book means, and closer than anything in Bourdieu. What separates them is that interpellation, in his account, runs from an apparatus to an individual and admits no reverse direction: the state addresses, the subject is constituted, and nothing in the apparatus is constituted by the address. The chapters on the household will require a term for the address that constitutes the one who issues it, and Althusser does not supply one.

The verbs, finally. A child *possesses* cultural capital, *acquires* a habitus, *internalises* a code, *is interpellated*. The last is passive and the tradition means it to be, which is its distinctive contribution. The others locate exactly as the developmental literature locates, and the tradition's radicalism about causes has left its grammar of possession untouched.

1.16 The Marxist Traditions

The account examined in §1.15 belongs to a tradition that has developed, since its classical statements, into a number of lines that disagree with one another substantially. They differ on whether the decisive matters are economic or cultural, on the standing of the state, on reform and rupture, on technology, on ecology, and on what a political practice should now consist of. Treating them as one doctrine would misdescribe the tradition and would also lose what is useful in it, since the lines that bear on rearing are not the same as those that bear on other subjects.

Each subsection below takes one line, states what it contributes to the questions of this book, and passes over the remainder of what it has said. The restriction follows from the taxonomy of §1.2.1: a great deal of this tradition addresses matters other than children, households, and schooling, and that material has no place in a chapter about developmental premises.

1.16.1 The Western Marxist Line

Gramsci, Lukács, Marcuse, and Bloch moved the analysis toward culture, ideology, and subjectivity, on the ground that a settlement is maintained less by force than by the general acceptance of an account of the world.

Gramsci's hegemony (Gramsci, 1971) is the operative concept and the institutions that circulate the account include the school. His position on schooling is not the one usually attributed to writers of his politics: he argued for a demanding common curriculum on the ground that the children of subordinate groups require disciplined command of the dominant culture in order to contest it, and he was sharply critical of pedagogies that offered them something easier. Whatever is concluded about the argument, it is a serious position on early education and it is rarely represented accurately.

Lukács (1971) supplied reification, which names the process by which a relation between people comes to present itself as a property of a thing. The proximity to this chapter's finding should be marked plainly. What §1.25 identifies across the developmental literature is a relational fact appearing in the logical form of a property, and reification is the name an earlier tradition gave to that operation. This book's argument about the bearer commitment can be read as a claim that the developmental literature has reified the relations it studies, and a reader who finds that formulation useful is welcome to it, with one qualification: reification

in Lukács is a consequence of a specific commodity form, and the argument here does not depend on that derivation.

Marcuse and Bloch contribute less directly. Marcuse's account of one-dimensional thought (Marcuse, 1964), in which alternatives cease to be thinkable rather than being defeated, is structurally the degradation of ch. 30 at the scale of a society. Bloch's concern with the not-yet (Bloch, 1986), with what a situation contains as possibility rather than as fact, is the closest thing in the tradition to a vocabulary for generation, and §1.16.9 returns to it.

1.16.2 The Frankfurt School

Critical theory combined this material with psychology and sociology and produced several things this book uses.

Adorno's work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950) attempted to connect household relations to political character. The instrument has not survived scrutiny and the attempt is the point: a research programme asking how a family's manner of conducting itself contributes to what its children become politically is asking this book's question in a form the developmental literature does not.

Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) on instrumental reason describes the reduction of questions about ends to questions about efficient means. ch. 28 examines a household form of that reduction, in which the question of what an evening with a child is for becomes the question of what it produces.

Habermas (Habermas, 1984, 1987) supplies two things. The distinction between communicative and strategic action separates an exchange conducted toward understanding from one conducted toward an outcome, and a household in which every exchange with a child has become the second kind is describable in his terms. The colonisation of the lifeworld by system imperatives is the general form of what Part V examines locally. His own account of how validity claims are redeemed in discourse also bears on ch. 39, since a question that cannot be answered against the questioner is not a question in his sense either.

1.16.3 The Analytical Line

Cohen (1978), Roemer (1982), and Elster (1985) applied formal treatment to claims the tradition had argued in other ways, using game theory, mathematical modelling, and causal analysis.

Its bearing here is methodological rather than substantive, and it is a bearing this book cannot avoid. ch. 70 proposes to submit claims about relational structure to formal treatment, and the analytical line is the nearest precedent for performing that operation on a tradition of this kind. Its difficulties are correspondingly instructive. What survived formalisation was not always what the tradition had taken to be central, several concepts turned out to be doing less work than their prominence suggested, and the exercise produced a body of results whose relation to the original tradition remains disputed. A programme that formalises a set of claims should expect to discover that some of them were doing less than they appeared to.

1.16.4 The Autonomist Line

Tronti (2019) and Hardt and Negri (2000) inverted the direction of explanation, treating the initiatives of workers as prior and the arrangements of capital as responses to them.

Two of its concepts bear directly on rearing. Immaterial and affective labour names work whose product is a relation, a state of feeling, or an attentive presence, and whose performance resists measurement by time. Rearing is affective labour by this description, it does not stop at the end of a working day, and the difficulty of measuring it is not a defect in the measuring. The commons names a form of holding that is neither private property nor state property, in which a resource is used and maintained without being owned. A household's shared understandings are held in this manner, and ch. 79 draws on the concept.

The inversion of explanatory direction is itself worth noting. A tradition that had explained workers by reference to capital's requirements found that it could explain more by reversing the order. §1.13 recorded a structurally similar reversal within developmental psychology, where the direction of effects between parent and child had been assumed rather than established.

1.16.5 The Ecological Line

Foster (2000) and O'Connor (1998) developed the analysis of metabolic rift, the disruption of the exchanges between a society and the natural conditions on which it depends.

The bearing on childhood is direct and is likely to grow. Children now being reared will live through a climate trajectory their households did not choose and cannot alter, and this is a condition of rearing in the material sense this book's preface commits it to taking seriously. The developmental literature has barely addressed what it is to be reared under such a condition, and the framework of ch. 50 suggests why: the variable in question moves on a timescale that makes it invisible within any single childhood, which is the structural blindness that chapter describes.

1.16.6 The Feminist Line

This line has been treated in its social-reproduction form in §1.15, and two further contributions belong here.

Federici's historical argument (Federici, 2004) is that the separation of reproductive from productive labour was accomplished rather than given, through a specific and violent history, and that the household's present form is the residue of that accomplishment. This matters for the neutrality commitment of this book: an arrangement that appears natural is frequently the settled outcome of a contest whose losing side has been forgotten.

Fraser's crisis-of-care thesis (Fraser, 2022) holds that accumulation depends on care work while eroding the conditions under which care work can be performed. Applied to the present, it is a hypothesis about why rearing has intensified across a number of societies simultaneously, and it is better formed than most of the alternatives in circulation, which appeal to fashion, to anxiety, or to a collective error of judgement. ch. 5 examines it against the comparative evidence.

1.16.7 The Postcolonial Line

Fanon (1967) and Amin (1976) address formation under colonial and post-colonial conditions, and Fanon's contribution is a developmental claim of a kind no other tradition in this survey makes.

The claim is that a person formed under a relation of subordination internalises a description of himself supplied by the party that subordinates him, that the description operates beneath what the person believes about himself, and that it is not corrected by information to the contrary. ch. 15 examines the household form of exactly this structure, in which a judgement about a child governs the conditions under which evidence about the judgement is produced. That the same structure appears at the scale of a colonial relation and at the scale of a kitchen table is a point ch. 90 takes up.

Amin's world-systems argument bears on the comparative chapters. If regions occupy positions in a single system rather than developing independently, then rearing arrangements in different places are not independent samples, and a comparison that treats them as such has misdescribed its own data. ch. 4 examines this as one of the difficulties facing any comparative instrument.

1.16.8 The Recent Directions

Work of the present century extends in several directions at once and the following bear on this book.

Digital capitalism addresses platform economies (Zuboff, 2019; Srnicek, 2017), algorithmic governance, and the extraction of value from recorded behaviour. Applied to childhood its object is a subject whose activity is recorded before that subject can consent, whose attention is a commodity in a market, and whose educational provision may pass into the hands of a party with a commercial interest in the record. Data labour treats ordinary activity as unwaged production and asks what is owed for it.

Work on the commons addresses knowledge, open-source practice, and forms of governance in which a resource is held and maintained without being owned. Platform cooperativism, participatory budgeting, and community education are practical experiments in the same direction, and ch. 45 draws on the governance literature they have produced.

Several researchers have begun combining this material with complex-systems theory, network science, and institutional and evolutionary economics, addressing self-organisation, non-linear change, and the emergence of cooperative arrangements. This is the point at which the tradition comes nearest the formal apparatus of ch. 70, and the convergence is worth marking: a tradition that began by analysing the reproduction of structures has arrived, by its own route, at the study of how structures come into being.

1.16.9 The Generative Limit of Reproduction

The lines above differ in what they emphasise and share a structure at the point this chapter examines. The observation made in §1.15 holds across all of them and can now be stated in a stronger form.

Reproduction is the tradition's organising concept, and a theory of reproduction is a theory of how an existing arrangement persists. Its mechanisms are accordingly mechanisms of persistence: capital converted at an institution, a code encountered and acquired, a subject interpellated into a position that awaited him, care work restoring labour power for another day. Each explains why the arrangement at the end resembles the arrangement at the beginning.

What such an account cannot describe is a household that produces something the surrounding structure did not supply.

The gap is worth stating concretely. A family may arrive at a way of valuing that its position does not underwrite and that its members did not encounter elsewhere. A household may develop a manner of settling disagreement for which the surrounding society has no name. Parents and children may jointly construct an understanding of some part of the world that neither brought to the exchange and that is not a diluted version of anything available outside it. These occur, they are not rare, and the reproduction traditions treat them as noise, as incomplete transmission, or as the resistance Willis described, which delivers the reproductive outcome anyway.

Proposition 1.15. *An account whose organising concept is reproduction explains the persistence of an arrangement and has no term for the generation of an arrangement that did not previously exist. Within such an account a household is a site at which a structure is transmitted and cannot be a site at which one is produced.*

This book proposes that a family is both. The proposal is not that reproduction theory is mistaken about what it describes, since the correlations it identifies are real and the mechanisms it proposes are largely correct. The proposal is that reproduction is one of two things a household does, that the other has not been given an account, and that supplying one is possible with the resources developed here.

The extension can be stated in a sentence. A household transmits a grammar, in the sense [ch. 37](#) makes precise, and a household may also generate one. What is transmitted is the terms in which a situation can be described and the moves that can be recognised as moves; what may be generated is a term, a distinction, or a move that was not previously available anywhere. The conditions under which the second occurs are the subject of that chapter, and they are the conditions this book identifies throughout as the conditions of generation.

Three consequences deserve statement.

The first is that this locates the disagreement precisely, and it is not a disagreement about politics. A theory of reproduction and a theory of generation answer different questions, and the tradition has answered one of them. Its radicalism about causes, noted in [§1.15](#), is unaccompanied by any account of how a cause could come to be other than it was.

The second is that Bloch is the exception within the tradition and deserves the credit. His concern with the not-yet, with what a situation holds as possibility rather than as fact, is an attempt at the vocabulary this section finds missing. What he did not supply is a mechanism, and the difference between a possibility that is latent and one that is generated is exactly what a mechanism would settle.

The third is that this is where the strongest connection to educational philosophy lies. Freire's proposal that a child is a co-namer of the world rather than a container for knowledge about it is the same claim arriving from another direction: what happens between a teacher

and a student is the production of a name that neither held, and a pedagogy conducted as deposit forecloses it. §1.19 noted that Freire located the resulting consciousness in the student. The present point is that what he described as occurring between them is generation, and that a tradition organised around reproduction has nowhere to put it.

1.17 The Measured Style

Of all the literatures surveyed in this chapter, the one examined here is the only one whose primary object is what a rearing adult does. By the taxonomy of §1.2.1 it is therefore the closest to this book's own subject, and it is the account a reader of a book on childrearing is most likely to arrive already holding.

Baumrind's programme (Baumrind, 1967, 1971) began with observation. She watched children in nursery settings, identified groups differing in self-reliance, self-control, and approach to novelty, and then observed their households. The classification that emerged was organised on two dimensions that later work made explicit: the degree to which a household makes demands of a child, and the degree to which it responds to the child. The four combinations yield the familiar types. Authoritative households are demanding and responsive. Authoritarian households are demanding and unresponsive. Permissive households are responsive and undemanding. The fourth cell, added by Maccoby and Martin (1983), is neglectful.

The finding attached to this classification is that children of authoritative households do better on a wide range of measured outcomes, and the finding has replicated for half a century.

Three things about the programme deserve statement, and the second and third are more important than the first.

The classification is bidimensional rather than a single scale of strictness. This was Baumrind's own emphasis and it is regularly lost in transmission. Authoritative and authoritarian households are alike in what they demand and differ in whether the demands are explained, negotiable, and accompanied by response to what the child brings. The dimension that separates them is not severity.

The programme took the household's own conduct as the object of measurement rather than inferring it from outcomes. This was methodologically unusual at the time and remains uncommon.

And the finding has been tested against the objection that most threatens it, which is that the association reflects the child's effect on the parent rather than the reverse. The transactional considerations of §1.13 apply here with full force, and the literature has confronted them with longitudinal and genetically informative designs. The association survives in attenuated form.

The ontological question can now be put, and it has two parts, because this literature commits itself twice.

The first commitment concerns the parent. A style is a property of a parent. It is measured by questionnaire administered to parents or to children about parents, it is treated as stable across situations and across siblings, and it is reported as a type the parent belongs to. The parent, in this literature, is a bearer.

That may seem unremarkable and it is the point at which this book's difference from the literature is sharpest. A style so measured is a disposition the parent brings to the relation. The literature's own findings press against this: styles vary by child within a household, shift

under economic pressure, and differ between a parent's conduct at six and at sixteen. Each of these is accommodated as moderation of a style rather than as evidence that what is being measured is a feature of a particular relation rather than a property of a person.

The second commitment concerns the child, and here the literature is entirely conventional. What the styles predict are outcomes located in the child: academic attainment, measured self-esteem, externalising behaviour, substance use. The dependent variables are properties of individuals throughout.

Proposition 1.16. *An account that classifies rearing by style locates a disposition in the parent and an outcome in the child, and describes the relation between them as a relation between two individuals each characterised independently. What such an account cannot represent is a manner of conduct that exists only within a particular relation and would not be found in the same parent with a different child.*

A further matter requires attention here and it is the point at which the neutrality commitment of this book does concrete work.

The style classification has been applied comparatively, and the comparative application has produced a recurring pattern: the association between authoritative rearing and measured outcomes is weaker, and sometimes absent, in samples outside the population where the classification was developed. Chao's work on Chinese-American households (Chao, 1994) proposed that the authoritarian category does not capture what those households are doing, that a distinct construct better describes it, and that the outcome pattern differs accordingly. Similar arguments have been made for African-American households, for households under conditions of material threat, and for several East and South Asian populations.

Two readings of this pattern are available. On the first, the classification is approximately correct and its association with outcomes is moderated by culture. On the second, the classification is a description of one arrangement, articulated in the terms that arrangement makes available, and its application elsewhere measures distance from that arrangement rather than any property of the households measured.

This book withholds adjudicating between them here. ch. 4 takes up the question, since it is the general problem of comparative instruments rather than a local difficulty with this one. What should be recorded now is that the two readings are not empirically equivalent and that the literature has not consistently distinguished them.

One final observation about this literature's position in the wider culture. Of everything surveyed in this chapter, the style classification is the account that has travelled furthest from its origin, and it now circulates in forms Baumrind explicitly disowned, most often as a scale from strict to lenient with a recommended midpoint. ch. 3 examines that journey. The relevant point here is that a reader who arrives at this book holding a view about parenting styles is likely to hold a version of it that its author rejected.

The verbs. A parent *is* authoritative, *has* a style, *exhibits* warmth, *provides* structure. A child *shows* competence, *develops* self-regulation, *has* higher attainment. Both parties are bearers and the relation is the correlation between their properties.

1.18 The Staged Life

Two accounts remain that organise development as a sequence of tasks or positions, and they are treated together because their ontological structure is the same and because each is the standard reference in its area.

Erikson's psychosocial stages (Erikson, 1950) proposed that a life proceeds through a series of crises, each posing a tension whose resolution shapes what follows. Basic trust against mistrust in the first year, autonomy against shame, initiative against guilt, industry against inferiority, and beyond childhood the identity crisis for which he is most often cited. Two features of the account distinguish it from the psychoanalytic material of §1.10 from which it descends. The stages continue through adulthood, which was a departure. And each crisis is posed by an encounter between a developing person and a social institution: the caregiving arrangement, the household's demands, the school, the peer group, the occupational order.

The second feature is what earns Erikson a place in this survey. His stages are not maturational unfoldings, and the tension at each stage is generated by something outside the person. The account is more social than the tradition it came from and it says so.

Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981) proposed a sequence in which the grounds a person offers for a moral judgement change in a fixed order, from consequences to the self, through conformity to expectations and to law, toward reasoning from principles taken as general. The evidence was the reasoning people gave when presented with dilemmas, and the ordering was held to be invariant even where the rate of movement varies.

Gilligan's response (Gilligan, 1982) is part of the record and must be included. She argued that the scoring system registered one form of moral reasoning and read a different form as a lower stage, that the difference tracked how the person conceived their relation to others, and that an ethics organised around responsibility within relationships was being scored as a failure to reach an ethics organised around abstract rights. The empirical claims about sex differences that accompanied the argument have not fared well. The methodological claim has, and it is the one that matters here: a stage instrument scores what its designer took development to be moving toward.

The ontological structure of both accounts is the same and it is visible in the same place.

A stage is occupied by a person. The sequence is a sequence of positions through which a person passes, the person is what persists across the passage, and an assessment of stage assigns a person to a position. In Erikson the social is where the crisis comes from; the resolution is a quality the person carries forward, and his own vocabulary of virtues acquired at each stage makes this explicit. In Kohlberg the reasoning is the person's, elicited from the person, and scored as the person's level.

Proposition 1.17. *A stage account requires a subject who occupies successive positions, since without such a subject there is nothing that has moved from one stage to the next. What is generated at each stage is described as a quality the subject thereafter carries.*

Gilligan's methodological point deserves one further remark, since it anticipates something this book will need. Her argument was that an instrument scoring moral development had encoded an answer to a question about what moral development is. That is the argument of §1.1.1 arriving from within the empirical literature, and it arrived there two decades before the

comparative critique of attachment instruments made the same move. The book's treatment of instruments in [ch. 69](#) is indebted to it.

1.19 The Educative Experience

Philosophy of education is a discipline of its own, with a literature that predates developmental psychology by a considerable margin and that has continued alongside it with surprisingly little traffic between them. Its central question is what education is for, and its answers rest on accounts of what a person is that are argued rather than assumed. This makes it unusually relevant to a chapter concerned with premises.

Dewey ([Dewey, 1916, 1938](#)) is the figure who matters most here, and the reason is that his position is relational in a sense close to this book's own.

His starting proposition is that experience is not something that happens inside a person. Experience, on his account, is a transaction between a living creature and its surroundings, and the two terms are specified by the transaction rather than prior to it. He was explicit that the word had been used to name a private mental episode and that this usage was the source of a long confusion. What a person undergoes and what a person does are the two phases of one process, and an experience in the full sense occurs when they are connected so that the doing is informed by the undergoing.

Education follows from this. It is the continuous reconstruction of experience, which means the reorganisation of the connections through which subsequent experience will be had. It has no end outside itself, a proposition Dewey defended at length against accounts on which education prepares for a later condition. Growth is his term for the process, and its criterion is whether it produces further capacity for growth: an education that produced a person with narrowed capacity for further education would have failed by the only standard available.

Two features of this deserve to be marked as close to the present book.

The transactional specification of experience does what the accounts examined in [§1.13](#) do not quite manage. Dewey does not describe an organism and an environment influencing each other; he describes a single process of which each is an aspect. The formulation is philosophical rather than operational and the difference from the mutual-influence models is real.

And the criterion of growth is a criterion of the same form as the one this book will propose. Whether an arrangement produces further capacity for the process it belongs to is what [\[ch. ?? ch:stability \]](#) will use to distinguish two kinds of stable relation. Dewey arrived at the form of that criterion and applied it to a different object.

The remainder of the tradition can be treated more briefly. Herbart ([Herbart, 1904](#)), writing a century earlier, proposed that instruction should build on an apperceptive mass, the organised body of prior ideas through which new material is assimilated, and his followers turned this into a formal method that Dewey spent considerable effort dismantling. [Peters \(1966\)](#) and the analytic philosophy of education asked what conditions a process must satisfy to be called education at all, and proposed that it must transmit something worthwhile, in a manner involving the learner's understanding, and with breadth of cognitive perspective. Freire ([Freire, 1970](#)) proposed that education conducted as deposit into a passive recipient is a political arrangement rather than a pedagogical error, and that the alternative is a practice in which teacher and student jointly investigate a shared object. The capabilities approach, in [Sen](#)

(1999) and Nussbaum (2011), proposed that what should be equalised is neither resources nor satisfaction but what a person is actually able to do and to be, and that education is among the conversion factors determining this.

The ontological question can now be put to the tradition, and the answer differs between its members in a way that is worth setting out rather than averaging.

Herbart and Peters locate straightforwardly. An apperceptive mass belongs to a learner; a cognitive perspective is possessed by an educated person; the conditions Peters specifies are conditions on what a person comes to have.

The capabilities approach is more interesting. A capability is what a person is able to do, and Sen's formulation makes it depend on conversion factors that include social arrangements. This is a property that is not fully in the person, and the approach is often read as relational for that reason. What remains is that a capability is predicated of a person: it is this person's ability, assessed by asking what this person could do. The account distributes the determinants of the property across the person and the arrangements, and does not distribute the property.

Freire is closest to the position this book will take, and closer than the reading his slogans suggest. His proposal is not that students should be active rather than passive. It is that the teacher and the student are both transformed in the joint investigation, that a teacher who is not so transformed has not taught, and that the relation between them is what produces the knowledge rather than what conveys it.

The formulation that matters most for this book concerns naming. On Freire's account a person is not a container into which an account of the world is placed, and the alternative he proposes is not that the person constructs the account alone. It is that the world is named jointly, that naming is what education consists of, and that a pedagogy conducted as deposit removes the possibility of it. A child, on this account, is a co-namer of the world rather than a recipient of names for it.

The proximity to what this book will argue is close enough that the difference requires stating. What Freire describes as occurring between a teacher and a student is the production of something neither party held, which is generation in the sense ch. 6 will make precise. Where the account stops short is in what it says the production yields: a critical consciousness, which is described as the student's own, and an awakening located in the person awakened. The relation produces, and what it produces is deposited after all, in the party the pedagogy was for.

Dewey is the hardest case in this section and requires the same care that §1.13 required.

The transactional account of experience genuinely refuses to locate experience inside a person, and any reading that attributes such a location to him is a misreading. What can be observed is different and narrower. Growth, in Dewey's account, is growth of the creature. Habits are the organised dispositions through which subsequent transactions are conducted, and habits are the creature's; he says so directly and builds much of his ethics on it. The transaction is not located in the organism, and what the transaction leaves behind is.

Proposition 1.18. *An account on which experience is a transaction between creature and surroundings may decline to locate the experience in either term and still locate what the transaction produces. Where the product is a habit, a capability, or a consciousness, it is predicated of the creature, and the relational specification of the process has not carried through to its result.*

One further observation about this tradition's position in the survey. Of everything examined in this chapter it is the least read by developmental researchers, and the neglect is mutual: philosophy of education cites developmental psychology sparingly and usually at second hand. The separation is a fact about disciplinary history rather than about the subjects, and [ch. 2](#) takes up how it came about. This book draws on both and treats the separation as an accident to be repaired rather than a boundary to be respected.

1.20 The Disciplined Subject

The account examined here is the most direct challenge in this survey to what this book proposes to do, and it is set out at length for that reason. A survey that omitted the strongest objection to its own author's programme would be worth less than one that included it.

Foucault's argument ([Foucault, 1977](#)) concerns how power operates in modern institutions, and its relevance here is that the institutions he analysed include the school and that his central mechanism is one that produces subjects.

Discipline, in his account, is a technique ([Foucault, 1977](#)) rather than a prohibition. It works by distributing bodies in space, by partitioning time into segments with prescribed activities, by arranging individuals in ranked series, and by subjecting them to continuous observation. The school appears in his analysis alongside the barracks, the workshop, and the hospital, and he treats their convergence of form as the finding: institutions with quite different purposes arrived at the same techniques within a few decades of one another.

The examination is where the argument becomes specific to this book's concerns. An examination combines observation with normalising judgement. It renders each individual visible in a way that permits comparison, it produces a record, and the accumulated records constitute individuals as describable cases. Foucault's claim about this is precise and radical: the examination does not measure a pre-existing individuality but is among the procedures by which individuality is constituted as an object of knowledge. Before the apparatus, there is no fact of the matter about where a child stands in a distribution, because there is no distribution.

Normalisation follows. A norm is established by the distribution of measured cases, deviation from it is made visible and correctable, and the correction is administered as care rather than as punishment. The subject produced is one who monitors their own position relative to the norm.

Governmentality, in the later work ([Foucault, 2007](#)), extends this beyond enclosed institutions. Government in this sense is the conduct of conduct: the shaping of the field of possible action of others, exercised through their freedom rather than against it. A parent who is supplied with developmental milestones, screening schedules, and guidance about what a child of a given age should be doing is being governed in this sense, and the government operates by making certain courses of action appear as the obvious ones to a parent who wants what is best.

Three observations about this account before its difficulty for this book is stated.

It is not a theory of development and does not claim to be. Foucault has nothing to say about how a two-year-old comes to speak. What he supplies is an account of the institutional apparatus within which such questions came to be asked and answered, and of what the apparatus does to those it examines.

It applies to the entire survey conducted in this chapter. Every account examined above generated instruments, the instruments generated records, and the records constituted populations of comparable cases. The developmental norm, the percentile, and the screening threshold are all products of the machinery Foucault describes, and none of the traditions that produced them treats this as part of its subject matter.

And it is not a claim that the measures are false. The child at the third percentile is at the third percentile. What is at issue is what kind of fact that is and what it becomes when a parent, a teacher, and a clinician all orient to it.

The difficulty for this book can now be stated, and it should be stated in its strongest form rather than deflected.

ch. 70 proposes a set of relational observables and argues that a household's generative condition can be assessed. If Foucault is right about examination, then such an apparatus would not measure a pre-existing property of households. It would constitute households as cases in a distribution, produce a norm of relational health, and render deviation from that norm visible and correctable. The parents so measured would come to monitor their own position relative to the norm, and the monitoring would be experienced as concern for their children rather than as subjection. The apparatus would produce exactly the phenomenon it was designed to detect, and it would do so while remaining, at every point, accurate.

This is not a general objection to measurement that a methodological remark could answer. It is the specific prediction that a relational measure would relationally deform what it measures, and the prediction follows from the argument this book itself makes about symbols and indices in Parts III and V.

Two things are worth saying about how the book responds, and neither is a refutation.

The first is that the objection is registered rather than answered. ch. 76 is given to it, and the chapter concludes without resolving it. Any reader who finds the response inadequate has located a real weakness rather than a presentational one.

The second is that Foucault's account, applied consistently, presents a difficulty for itself in this domain. If every apparatus of knowledge about children constitutes what it examines, then the absence of such apparatus does not leave a household unconstituted. It leaves it constituted by whatever else operates there, which in the case of a family is the grammar examined in ch. 37. The choice is not between an examined household and an unexamined one.

Proposition 1.19. *An apparatus that renders a relation visible, comparable, and correctable participates in producing what it renders. This holds for relational instruments as fully as for individual ones, and it does not distinguish between accurate and inaccurate apparatus.*

The verbs in this tradition are the only ones in the survey that take the child as a product rather than a bearer. A subject *is constituted*, an individual *is produced* as a case, a body *is rendered* docile, conduct *is conducted*. Nothing is possessed. What replaces possession is production, and the producer is an apparatus rather than a relation, which is where this book's account differs.

1.21 The Warranted Practice

A body of work remains that is not a theory of development and that governs more contemporary practice than any theory surveyed above. It presents itself under the description of evidence-based parenting, and its claim is procedural rather than substantive: that recommendations to parents should rest on findings from controlled studies, and that recommendations resting on anything else should be discounted.

The programme has produced a considerable literature. Parenting interventions with manualised content have been tested in randomised trials, several have shown effects on measured child behaviour that persist beyond the intervention, and meta-analytic summaries have identified components that recur across the effective ones. Home-visiting programmes for households under material strain have been evaluated at scale. Guidance issued by paediatric bodies and by health ministries increasingly cites this literature and identifies itself as resting on it.

Two features of the programme deserve statement before its premises are examined, and the first is a real achievement.

The programme supplies a mechanism by which a recommendation can be withdrawn. Advice to parents has historically circulated on the authority of whoever issued it, has reversed repeatedly, and has reversed without acknowledgement. The requirement that a recommendation cite something answerable to observation makes the reversal traceable, and a field that can be shown to have been wrong is in better condition than one that cannot.

The second is that the programme is not a theory and does not claim to be. Its practitioners are frequently explicit that they are agnostic about mechanism and interested in whether something works.

The ontological question therefore has to be put differently here than elsewhere in this chapter. The programme carries no commitment of its own about what a child is. What it carries is a commitment about what counts as a warrant, and that commitment has consequences for what can be recommended.

An intervention is evaluated against an outcome, and an outcome must be measured. What is measurable in a randomised trial of a parenting programme is a behaviour of a child, a score on an instrument administered to a parent, or an observer's coding of a recorded interaction. Each is a property of an individual or a coded event, and each is selected for measurability. The programme therefore inherits, without adopting, the ontology of whatever instrument supplied its outcome, and the instruments were built by the traditions surveyed above.

This is the point at which §1.1.1 bites. A programme that is agnostic about mechanism is not thereby agnostic about ontology, because its outcome measures are not agnostic. An intervention that improved a relation without improving any measured property of either party would register as ineffective. Whether such interventions exist is a question the programme's design cannot ask.

Proposition 1.20. *A methodology that evaluates practices against measured outcomes takes on the ontological commitments of its outcome measures. Agnosticism about mechanism is compatible with a determinate commitment about what is to be measured, and the second is not neutral.*

Three further difficulties belong to the record and are acknowledged within the literature itself.

The programme evaluates what can be manualised. An intervention must be specifiable in advance to be tested, which selects for practices that can be described as procedures, and a great deal of what passes between a parent and a child is not of that kind. The result is that the evidence base is denser for what is proceduralisable, and its density is read as though it reflected importance.

Effects attenuate with distance from the trial. Programmes that perform well under supervision perform less well when disseminated, and the gap is a subject of study in its own right. What this book takes from the finding is stated in [ch. 77](#): a practice that requires supervision to survive may be a practice whose operation depends on a relation that supervision supplied.

The programme's authority in public discourse exceeds its warrant. A recommendation may be described as evidence-based when the evidence bears on a narrower claim, on a different population, or on a shorter horizon than the recommendation implies. This is not a defect of the programme, which generally states its own limits with care. It is a fact about how the description travels, and [ch. 3](#) takes it up.

One further observation completes the section. The programme and the traditions of [§1.22](#) present themselves as opposed, and the opposition is the shape most contemporary argument about rearing takes: warranted findings against inherited practice. Each side describes the other as its deficiency, one as unwarranted custom and the other as thin technique. [§1.27](#) argues that the opposition is real, that neither side can be dissolved into the other, and that the relation between them is where this book locates its own method.

1.22 The Formation Traditions

The accounts surveyed to this point explain. They propose what a child is and what governs the changes a child undergoes, and their claims are answerable, at least in principle, to evidence about children. The traditions examined in this section do something else. They specify what a rearing adult or an educating institution should aim at, and they proceed from an account of what a well-formed person is rather than toward one.

This makes them a different kind of object and they are treated together for that reason. Grouping the Confucian formation tradition with the European child-centred tradition would be unwarranted if the criterion were content, since their contents are opposed on nearly every point at which they can be compared. The criterion is structural. Each specifies an ideal, each treats the work of rearing as the approach to that ideal, and each therefore contains a picture of what a child is that is derived from what the child is to become.

1.22.1 The Status of an Ideal

A remark on method is required before either tradition is described, and it is the point at which the commitment stated in the preface does concrete work.

A formation tradition is a response to conditions. It arises in a society with a particular structure of positions, a particular distribution of the means of securing them, and a particular arrangement of who may compete for what. It specifies a person suited to those conditions, and the suitability is not a defect in it. An account of formation that specified a person unfitted to any available way of living would not have been adopted by anyone.

Two consequences follow for how such traditions can be treated here.

The first is that a tradition's own description of what it does is evidence about the tradition and is not a finding about what the tradition accomplishes. Every formation tradition describes itself as cultivating what is best in a person. The self-descriptions are sincere, they are frequently eloquent, and they cannot be used to settle what the practices they name actually produce. This applies symmetrically. A tradition's most attractive self-account and its critics' least attractive characterisation stand in the same evidential relation to the practice, which is to say a weak one.

The second is that a tradition cannot be assessed against another tradition's ideal without the assessment being decided in advance. To ask whether a formation tradition produces autonomous individuals is to have chosen an ideal from one tradition and applied it to another. To ask whether a child-centred arrangement produces persons capable of sustaining obligation is the same operation conducted in the other direction. Both questions are answerable and neither is neutral, and this book asks neither.

What can be asked is narrower and it is the chapter's own question. Each tradition presupposes something about what a child is. That presupposition can be brought into view, and bringing it into view requires no judgement about whether the tradition's aims are worth having.

1.22.2 The Cultivated Person

The Confucian tradition of formation, in its classical statements and in the long institutional history that followed, holds that a person becomes fully a person through cultivation, that cultivation proceeds through practice rather than through instruction alone, and that its content is supplied by relations already structured: to parents, to siblings, to teachers, to rulers, to those who came before. Learning is not the acquisition of information about how to conduct oneself. It is the repeated conduct of oneself, in specific relations, until the conduct is one's own.

Several features distinguish this from the accounts surveyed earlier and they deserve to be stated precisely.

Relations are not the setting of formation on this account. They are its content. What one becomes is constituted by the positions one occupies and by the manner of occupying them, and there is no residual person underneath who occupies them well or badly. The tradition possesses a rich vocabulary for the qualities of a relation and comparatively little for a self apart from relations, and this is a feature of its ontology rather than a gap in its psychology.

Formation is understood to be lifelong and to have no terminal state. An adult is not formed and thereafter finished. The teacher is also cultivating, the parent is also cultivating, and the asymmetry between them and the child is an asymmetry of position within a shared process rather than a difference between one party who has arrived and another who has not.

The tradition also holds, in its dominant statements, that what cultivation develops is present in some form beforehand. The classical debate on whether that beforehand is favourable or unfavourable ran for centuries and was never settled, and the disagreement matters less here than what both sides assumed: that there is something in the person that cultivation works upon.

That assumption is where the chapter's question lands. Cultivation, on this account, requires a material to cultivate. The tradition's own metaphors are agricultural and horticultural, and a plant is a thing with a nature that conditions can serve or fail. What the tradition locates in the child is not a scheme or a capacity, and the difference from the developmental accounts is real. What it locates is a person-in-form who is the subject of the cultivating, and who therefore precedes it.

Proposition 1.21. *An account on which a person is formed through cultivation requires a subject who undergoes the cultivation. The relational content of that account does not by itself displace the subject, since the relations are described as those in which the subject stands.*

A second observation concerns the institutional history and is included because the chapter's method requires it. The tradition became, over a long period, the content of an examination system, and the examination system became the principal route to position. This is not a corruption of the tradition to be set aside before examining it. It is a fact about the conditions under which the tradition was transmitted, and the transmission shaped what was transmitted. [ch. 2](#) takes this up, together with the parallel question about the European traditions, whose institutional histories are equally consequential and equally seldom examined by their adherents.

1.22.3 The Released Nature

The last position in this survey differs from the others in kind. Piaget, Vygotsky, Bowlby, and the behaviourists each produced a research programme with a specifiable mechanism. What is examined here is a family of commitments held across several traditions that share no common apparatus and frequently disagree with one another. Rousseau stands behind all of them without belonging to any. Montessori built an institution and a method. Steiner built a different one on different metaphysics. The progressive tradition in its various national forms shares the family resemblance without the metaphysics. Contemporary discourse carries the commitment in a diluted form that no longer names its ancestors, in phrases about following the child, honouring the child's nature, and refraining from interference with a process that would otherwise unfold well.

The commitment they share can be stated in a sentence. There is something in the child that is complete, and the work of education is to protect the conditions under which it can emerge.

The sentence has two parts and they are separable. The second part is a claim about pedagogy and much of it is defensible. Environments can be arranged so that a child's own activity is the engine of what happens; instruction can be withheld at moments when withholding produces more than supplying would; a prepared environment can accomplish what direct teaching cannot. Montessori demonstrated a great deal of this and the demonstration has held up. Whatever is concluded about the metaphysics, the pedagogical findings are findings.

The first part is a claim about what a child is, and it is the reason this position appears in a chapter on ontological premises. Something complete is present, and it is prior to any relation the child enters. Development is its emergence. Interference is what obstructs the emergence. On this account the fundamental risk in rearing a child is doing too much, and the fundamental virtue is restraint.

Consider what follows for the status of the relation. If what develops is already there in the child, then the adult's role is custodial. The adult supplies conditions, removes obstacles, and stands back. The relation is an environment surrounding a process rather than a participant in it. This is stated explicitly in some of the traditions and implied in the rest, and it produces a characteristic silence: these accounts have a great deal to say about what an adult should refrain from and comparatively little about what an adult contributes, because on their own premises the contribution is negative.

The position is generous in intention and its intention is worth honouring. It arose against practices that were coercive and often cruel, it has consistently defended children against instrumentalisation, and its instinct that a child is owed something prior to what the child produces is an instinct this book shares and will argue for at length in [ch. 24](#). The disagreement is about what grounds the instinct.

Two difficulties are worth stating.

The first concerns the completeness itself. A nature that unfolds must be specified before the unfolding, since otherwise there is no fact about what would have emerged had conditions been right. Yet the specification is never available. When a child develops in an unexpected direction, the tradition can describe this as the nature having been obstructed or as the nature having been other than assumed, and there is no procedure for deciding between these. The claim thereby loses contact with anything that could bear on it. This is a familiar difficulty with accounts of a hidden nature and it is not peculiar to education.

The second is closer to this book's concerns. An account built on protection has no way to distinguish two conditions that present identically. A child left alone in a prepared environment and a child left alone in a household that has ceased to respond are both, from the standpoint of non-interference, unobstructed. The tradition's vocabulary contains a term for excessive intervention and no term for withdrawn response, since withdrawn response registers as the absence of interference. The situation examined in [ch. 32](#), in which what injures a child is precisely that nothing is being done, cannot be stated in this vocabulary at all.

Proposition 1.22. *An account on which development is the emergence of what is already present has a term for interference and no term for the withdrawal of relation, since the withdrawal of relation satisfies the account's own condition for development proceeding well.*

The verbs are the gentlest in the chapter and locate as firmly as any. A child *unfolds*, *blossoms*, *realises* a potential, *becomes* what the child was. The last construction is worth pausing over. To become what one was requires that one was it, and the tense carries the whole ontology: what appears at the end was present at the beginning, and the interval added nothing that was not already there.

This is the position the present book departs from most sharply, and the departure is not in the direction one might expect. The disagreement is not that children require more intervention than the tradition allows. It is that the alternative to intervention is a relation rather than an absence, and that a child left unobstructed in a field where nothing responds is not thereby left free.

1.22.4 The Shared Premise

The two traditions examined above specify opposed ideals. One holds that a person is completed through the assumption of relational positions and that this is the work of a lifetime. The other holds that a person is present at the outset and that the work is to avoid obstructing what would emerge. Set beside each other the disagreement appears total.

They agree on the point this chapter is asking about.

Both require a subject who is there before the formation begins. The cultivating tradition requires it because cultivation must have something to work on, and the tradition's own agricultural figures make this explicit. The releasing tradition requires it because what is released must have been present to be released. The two disagree about what should be done with the subject and about how much should be done, and they do not disagree about whether there is one.

This is worth stating because the two traditions are frequently taken to exhaust the available positions on rearing, and a great deal of contemporary argument consists of choosing between them or seeking a balance. A balance between an account requiring a prior subject and another account requiring a prior subject settles nothing about whether there is one.

Proposition 1.23. *The formation traditions divide on how much should be done to a child and share the premise that there is a child to whom it is done. A position between them inherits the premise entire.*

One further note, and it concerns what these traditions have that the explanatory accounts lack. Each possesses a developed vocabulary for the conduct of an adult in the presence of a child, and each treats that conduct as a subject worth centuries of attention. Nothing comparable exists in the developmental literature, which describes what happens to children and grows terse when asked what a person should do on a particular evening. [ch. 77](#) returns to this, since the book's own practical chapters face the same difficulty and will draw on these traditions for the form of the problem while declining their answers.

1.23 The Excluded Literatures

A survey that named nine traditions has passed over others, and some of the omissions would be noticed. Each is stated below with its reason. An omission with a reason attached is a boundary of the argument; an omission without one is a gap, and the difference matters to what the chapter can claim.

Behaviour genetics is the largest of the exclusions. Twin and adoption designs have established that measured variation in nearly every psychological characteristic is partly associated with genetic variation, that shared family environment accounts for less of the variance in many outcomes than had been assumed, and that these findings replicate. The literature is substantial and the exclusion is not a judgement about its quality.

It is excluded because its object is different in a way that makes it unavailable for the chapter's question. A heritability estimate is a statement about the sources of variance in a population under a particular range of conditions. It is not a statement about how any characteristic came to be in any individual, and it does not become one when the population is described. The chapter has been asking what an account takes to bear a developing property. A vari-

ance decomposition takes nothing to bear anything; it partitions a distribution. The exclusion therefore reflects a difference of object rather than a disagreement. [ch. 70](#) returns to the relation between population-level and individual-level statements, since the empirical programme proposed there is exposed to the same distinction.

Comparative and evolutionary work is excluded for a related reason. Studies of rearing in other species, and of what human childhood may be for in evolutionary terms, address the question of why a developmental arrangement exists at all. The extended human juvenile period, the involvement of parties other than the mother in provisioning, and the comparative rarity of both are real findings and bear on any complete account. What such work explains is the presence of an arrangement across a species. What this chapter asks is what happens within one instance of it. The two questions are compatible and the answers to one do not constrain the answers to the other as directly as is sometimes supposed.

Educational effectiveness research is excluded on different grounds. This literature asks which arrangements produce which measured outcomes, and it has produced findings that bear on decisions institutions have to make. Its exclusion here follows from the taxonomy of [§1.2.1](#). Effectiveness research takes an outcome as given and asks what produces it. The present chapter asks what a theory takes a child to be, and an effectiveness study need take no position on that in order to be conducted well. Where such research does carry an ontological commitment, it carries the commitment of whatever theory supplied its outcome measure, and those theories have been examined above.

Four further bodies of work are passed over and each would be noticed by a specialist.

The neo-Piagetian accounts of Case, Pascual-Leone, and Halford retained the stage structure while proposing a processing constraint as its mechanism, most often a limit on how many elements can be held in relation at once. The proposal is serious and the exclusion is on grounds of redundancy for this chapter's purpose: the constraint is located in the child, and the ontological commitment is that of [§1.3](#) with a different mechanism supplied.

Connectionist and neuroconstructivist work, in Elman, Karmiloff-Smith, and Johnson, proposed that structure emerges from architecture and input rather than being specified in advance, and constitutes the most substantial challenge to the nativist account examined in [§1.6](#). It is excluded here because its dispute with nativism concerns how much must be built in, and both parties to that dispute locate what develops in the same place.

The literature on temperament, from Thomas and Chess through Kagan and Rothbart, established that infants differ from the first weeks in reactivity and regulation, and that some of this is stable. It is excluded because a temperament is by construction a property of an individual, and the literature makes no claim to the contrary.

Developmental psychopathology, in Rutter, Cicchetti, and the resilience literature, established that the same condition produces divergent outcomes, that adaptation under adversity is common rather than exceptional, and that developmental pathways branch. This is close to several of this book's concerns and is excluded here because its unit is a pathway through a life, which is a different object from the one this chapter examines. [ch. 64](#) draws on it.

Three smaller exclusions can be stated more briefly. The clinical literature on developmental conditions is not surveyed, since its concepts are organised around difference from a typical course and the question of what that course consists of is prior. Media and technology effects research is not surveyed, since it is a literature about a class of inputs rather than an account of

development. The history of childhood as a social category, which includes work of the first importance, is not surveyed here because it belongs to [ch. 2](#) and is treated there at length.

Proposition 1.24. *An account may be omitted from a survey because its object differs from the survey's question. Such an omission constrains what the survey can claim and does not weaken the claim it makes within its stated range.*

One exclusion of a different kind should be recorded. The chapter has not surveyed the popular literature of rearing advice, which is by volume the largest body of writing on this subject and by influence probably the most consequential. It is not examined here because it does not, in general, contain accounts of the kind this chapter examines. Where it rests on a theory, the theory is one of those surveyed above, usually at some remove and often with the qualifications removed in transit. That process of removal is itself a subject, and [ch. 3](#) takes it up.

1.24 The Ledger of the Survey

Before the synthesis, an accounting. Each tradition examined above has established something that a reader of this book should continue to believe, and each reaches a limit that is a limit of its apparatus rather than a failure of its practitioners. This section sets both out together, since a survey that recorded only the limits would have misrepresented what it surveyed.

The accounting has a further purpose. Several of these traditions will be drawn on later in this book, and drawn on for their findings while their framing is declined. A reader is entitled to know in advance which is which.

1.24.1 The Achievements

The constructivist account established that children's errors are systematic, that a child's reasoning has a form of its own rather than being an incomplete version of an adult's, and that this form can be described. It also established that a child's own activity on the world is a condition of understanding it, which no subsequent account has withdrawn.

The sociocultural account established that a psychological function can originate outside the individual, that assisted performance and independent performance are different measures with different uses, and that instruction operates on the difference between them. The general law of cultural development remains the strongest single statement in the literature that the social is prior in the order of formation.

The shared-intentionality account established that human infants enter joint states with others in a manner that comparative evidence does not find elsewhere, that this appears early, and that the elementary forms of it can be observed and measured. It supplied the field's most careful description of what two parties attending to a third thing are doing.

The core knowledge account ([Spelke and Kinzler, 2007](#); [Carey, 2009](#)) established that a newborn mind is not undifferentiated, that specific representational competences are present far earlier than had been supposed, and that a poverty-of-stimulus ([Chomsky, 1965](#)) argument constrains any account on which a mind is assembled from what reaches it. Its methods made the study of preverbal infants possible.

The dynamic systems account established that developmental change can arise from the interaction of components without a controller, that variability carries information rather than being error, that stages are results requiring explanation rather than explanations, and that context is a constituent of behaviour rather than an influence on it. It also supplied the field's formal apparatus.

The ecological tradition established that a setting a child never enters can shape what the child becomes, that the relation between two settings is a level of its own, and that the recurring reciprocal interactions of daily life are where development is transacted. Its cross-cultural branch established that what children do all day varies enormously with productive arrangements, and that a caretaker's beliefs about what a child is form part of the developmental environment.

The attachment account established the caregiving relation as an object of systematic study, produced an observational method that has held for six decades across many populations, and demonstrated that the quality of early care has consequences that are measurable and durable. It displaced the accounts on which the tie derived from feeding.

The psychoanalytic tradition established that early relations form a person in ways inaccessible to that person, that what a mind contains has a relational structure, and that a caregiver performs functions the infant later performs alone. In Winnicott it produced the closest existing statement of a relational constitution of the subject.

The behaviourist account established that behaviour is sensitive to its consequences, that this sensitivity is powerful enough to support interventions that work, and that a great deal of what appears to require explanation in terms of inner states can be produced without invoking them.

The social learning account established that behaviour is acquired by observation without arranged consequence, that this is the mode by which most of what passes between a parent and a child passes, and that a person's judgement of their own capacity governs what they attempt and how they read failure.

The transactional tradition established that developmental outcomes are produced by continuous mutual influence, that a correlation between parental and child behaviour is uninformative about direction, that interventions on one party alone underperform, and that the withdrawal of a caregiver's responsiveness produces rapid and specific disorganisation in an infant of a few months.

The neural account established that early experience leaves physical traces, that the developing brain is organised by identifiable processes on identifiable schedules, and that severe deprivation has consequences at the level of tissue. It supplies the substrate constraint any developmental account must respect.

The reproduction traditions established that the correlation between a household's position and its children's is substantial and resistant to intervention, that schooling participates in producing this rather than merely failing to prevent it, that what is transmitted includes competences institutions read as ability, and that the labour of rearing is labour with material conditions.

The parenting-styles literature established that adult conduct in rearing can be classified on two dimensions rather than one, that demand and response are separable, that the resulting classification predicts a wide range of outcomes, and that the prediction survives when the

child's own effect on the parent is controlled.

The stage accounts established that developmental tasks can be posed by encounters with institutions rather than by maturation alone, that the grounds a person offers for a moral judgement change in a describable order, and, through Gilligan's response to Kohlberg, that an instrument scoring development encodes an answer to the question of what development moves toward.

The evidence-based programme established that a recommendation to parents can be made answerable to observation, that a reversal of advice can thereby be made traceable, that several manualised interventions produce effects surviving the intervention, and that effects attenuate on dissemination in a manner that is itself informative.

Philosophy of education established that experience admits a transactional specification in which creature and surroundings are aspects of one process, that education has a criterion internal to itself in whether it produces further capacity for education, and that a pedagogy conducted as deposit into a passive recipient is a political arrangement rather than a technical error.

The contemporary lines of the reproduction tradition established that reification renders a relation between people as a property of a thing, that a household's political formation is a subject admitting study, that instrumental reason reduces questions of ends to questions of means, that affective labour does not stop at a working day's end, that the separation of reproductive from productive labour was historically accomplished rather than given, and that a person raised under subordination internalises a description supplied by the party that subordinates.

The disciplinary analysis established that the school converged in form with other institutions of the same period, that examination combines observation with normalising judgement, that the accumulated records of examination constitute individuals as comparable cases, and that government in the modern sense operates through the freedom of the governed rather than against it.

The formation traditions established, over far longer periods than any of the above, that the conduct of an adult in the presence of a child is a subject admitting sustained and disciplined attention. They possess vocabularies for that conduct which the explanatory literatures lack entirely.

1.24.2 The Limits

Each limit below is stated as a limit of what the apparatus can express. None is offered as a mistake, and in most cases the limit is the price of a strength named above.

The third column of Table 1.2 is the one that matters most for how this book proceeds. A limit that is the price of a strength cannot be removed by adjusting the account, since removing it would remove what the account was built to deliver. Attachment theory could describe a relation as something other than a type only by giving up the instrument that made it a research programme. The dynamic tradition could dispense with prior components only by giving up the formalism. These are not defects awaiting repair by a more careful practitioner.

Proposition 1.25. *Where an account's limit is the price of the strength that defines it, the limit cannot be removed within that account. An alternative must be constructed rather than an ad-*

justment proposed.

1.24.3 The Retained Commitments

Three of these traditions supply material this book uses directly, and the use should be declared now rather than discovered later.

The dynamic systems tradition supplies the vocabulary of stability, attractors, transitions, and the informational value of variability. [ch. 70](#) works within that vocabulary and disputes what the state space is a space of.

The psychoanalytic tradition, in Winnicott and in Lacan, supplies formulations this book builds on directly: that the unit which exists is not the infant, and that a subject is constituted under an address it does not author. The framing of both as accounts of what a person comes to contain is declined.

The transactional tradition supplies the empirical warrant for the propositions of [ch. 10](#) concerning the reversal of direction within a relation, and its still-face procedure is the closest existing experimental study of what [ch. 32](#) examines. Its requirement of initial states is declined.

The reproduction traditions supply the commitment that rearing has material conditions and that a household is not sealed from the structure it stands in. Their transmission model is declined and [ch. 37](#) states the alternative. The extension proposed in [§1.16.9](#), on which a household both reproduces a structure and may generate one, is the book's principal debt to this tradition and its principal departure from it.

The disciplinary analysis supplies an objection rather than a resource, and the objection is retained at full strength. [ch. 76](#) is given to it and does not dispose of it. A reader who concludes that the empirical programme of [ch. 70](#) cannot survive that objection has reached a conclusion this book regards as open.

From the remaining traditions this book takes findings and declines apparatus. It has no quarrel with any of the findings named in [§1.24.1](#), and a reader who accepts all of them can still find the argument of the following chapters open.

1.25 The Common Boundary

Nineteen bodies of work have been examined and they disagree with one another about nearly everything that can be disagreed about. They differ on whether development has stages, on whether its engine is internal or supplied, on whether structure is endowed or assembled, on whether the child is active or acted upon, on where the causes of a trajectory are located, on what an adult should do, and on what would count as evidence for any of it. The disagreements are substantive and have been prosecuted for a century.

What this section proposes is that they arrive at approximately the same boundary, and that the boundary is intelligible in terms of a commitment they hold in common while disagreeing about everything built upon it.

1.25.1 The Common Location

The commitment is that there is a child, that the child is the bearer of whatever develops, and that a relation is a condition under which the bearing proceeds.

Everything else varies. What is borne may be a scheme, an internalised function, a capacity for shared intention, an endowed system of representation, a position in a state space, a classified security, an internal object, a repertoire, a quantity of neural tissue, a stock of transmitted capital, or a cultivated character. How the relation conditions the bearing may be by supplying resistance, by supplying form, by supplying an occasion for joint attention, by selecting among options already enumerated, by entering as one component among others, by supplying protection, by holding what cannot yet be borne, by supplying contingency, by leaving a physical trace, by transmitting a position, or by refraining from interference. The bearer does not vary, and the relation's standing as a condition rather than a constituent does not vary.

The boundary each account reaches follows from the commitment and can be stated in a single form. Each has resources to describe what happens to a bearer under conditions. None has resources to describe the generation of the bearer.

The instances are worth recalling in compressed form, since the compression is what makes the pattern visible. The constructivist account explains how a structure held by a subject reorganises under encounter, and begins from the subject holding structures. The sociocultural account explains how a function moves from one party to another, and requires that the function have had a prior location. The shared-intentionality account explains why joint states are available to human infants, and grounds their availability in a capacity those infants have. The core knowledge account explains what a mind begins with, and locates the beginning before any relation. The dynamic account explains how pattern emerges from interacting components, and requires the components to be specifiable in advance. The ecological account explains how a surround reaches a child, and places the child at the centre of the figure. The social learning account explains acquisition without arranged consequence, and locates the acquired representation in the observer. The transactional account explains outcomes as products of mutual influence, and requires two parties to begin. The style literature explains which adult conduct predicts which outcomes, and characterises both parties independently. The stage accounts explain an ordered sequence, and require someone to occupy the positions. The evidence-based programme establishes which practices predict which measured outcomes, and takes its outcomes from instruments built elsewhere. The educational philosophies explain what education is for, and predicate its product of the person educated. The disciplinary analysis explains how an apparatus produces the cases it examines, and offers no account of what develops. The attachment account explains what characteristics a relation exhibits, and returns them in the logical form of a property. The psychoanalytic account explains how a self is constituted in early care, and describes what begins between two parties as finishing in one. The behaviourist account explains how a surface is shaped, and admits nothing besides the shaping's record. The neural account measures a trace, and measures it in tissue belonging to one organism. The reproduction account explains how position is transmitted, and leaves the child as the destination. The formation traditions specify what a person should become, and require someone already there to become it.

Each is a real explanation and each stops at the same place.

1.25.2 The Difficult Cases

Three of the eleven strain this reading and are worth handling separately, since a survey that absorbed them without difficulty would have proved less than it claimed.

The psychoanalytic tradition contains, in Winnicott's ontological remark, a statement of the position this book will defend. If the reading offered above is right, the tradition possessed the insight and did not build on it, and what it built in its place was an account of how the products of early care come to reside in a person. The evidence for this is the tradition's own vocabulary of achievement: a capacity to be alone, an apparatus for thinking, a depressive position attained. Whether Winnicott himself is best read this way is a question a specialist may reasonably contest, and the contest would not affect the chapter's finding about the tradition as it developed.

The dynamic systems tradition is the closest in method and its components are the difficulty. A reader may object that a component-based account is not a bearer-based account, since no single component bears the emergent pattern. The objection is well taken and the reply is that the components are themselves specified as bearers of the properties that enter the interaction: a mass, an arousal level, a neural state. What the tradition abolished was a single privileged bearer. What it retained was a description of the world as populated by things with properties, standing in relations to one another.

The reproduction traditions are the hardest case and the one that most repays attention. They locate the cause of a child's trajectory entirely outside both the child and the household, in a structure of positions no participant controls. This is a genuine departure from every other account surveyed, and a reader might reasonably conclude that a tradition so radical about causes cannot be holding the commitment this section attributes to it.

The reply is that a cause and a bearer are different things, and that an account may relocate the first while leaving the second untouched. Cultural capital originates in a structure and arrives in a child, who thereafter has more or less of it. Habitus is laid down by conditions and is carried by the person in whom it was laid down. A code is spoken in a household and is acquired by a child who then speaks it. In each case the explanatory work is done by the structure and the resulting property is predicated of an individual. The tradition's radicalism is real and it operates at the level of causes.

Althusser is the partial exception and deserves the credit. Interpellation is a production of subjects rather than a transmission to them, and the difference is exactly the one this chapter has been tracking. What his account lacks is any reverse direction, so that an apparatus produces subjects and is not itself produced in the producing. The account is one-directional in the way §1.4 found internalisation to be, and for a structurally similar reason.

1.25.3 The Redescription and Its Availability

Two clarifications are needed before the chapter closes, because the claim is easily overstated in either direction.

The first is that reaching a boundary is not a defect. A theory that explains what happens to a bearer under conditions has explained a great deal, and the phenomena so explained are the majority of what a developmental science is asked about. A parent who wants to know whether a two-year-old's vocabulary is within the expected range, a clinician deciding whether

an intervention is indicated, a ministry choosing between two curricula, and a researcher asking whether an effect replicates are all asking questions these accounts answer and this book does not. Nothing in what follows is offered as a replacement for that work.

The second is that the boundary is not a border between what is known and what is unknown. It is a border between what a vocabulary can state and what it cannot. The material on the far side is not mysterious and is not inaccessible to observation. Parents encounter it continually. A parent who reports that a child has become someone the parent did not expect, and that the becoming happened in the exchanges between them and belongs to neither of them, is reporting something ordinary.

Each account surveyed can redescribe such a report in its own terms, and the redescrptions are available: the child's schemes reorganised, a function was internalised, a capacity for shared intention matured, an endowment expressed itself, the system settled into a new attractor, sensitivity produced security, the holding environment permitted a self to consolidate, contingencies accumulated, a network became more efficient, a disposition was transmitted, a nature emerged. Every one of these is coherent. What each does is relocate the phenomenon into a bearer, and the parent's report was about something that happened between.

Proposition 1.26. *Accounts that treat a relation as a condition under which a bearer develops can redescribe any relational phenomenon by relocating it into a bearer. The redescription is always available, and its availability is what makes the underlying commitment difficult to bring into view.*

This last point identifies why the commitment is stable and why it will not be dislodged by counterexamples. There is no observation the accounts cannot accommodate, because accommodation requires only that the observed be attributed to one or another bearer, and every observation involves bearers.

A commitment with this property is not refuted by evidence. Neither, it should be said plainly, is the alternative this book will propose. §1.6 noted that the nativist can always answer a claim of relational generation by saying the capacity was there and the relation revealed it, and that the answer is unfalsifiable. The same holds in the other direction: a relational account can always answer a claim of prior endowment by saying that the endowment was itself constituted in a prior relation. Three positions each capable of accommodating any observation are not distinguished by observation.

What distinguishes them is what they permit to be described, what they make it possible to ask, and what they render invisible. That is an argument of a different kind, conducted by different means, and §1.26.4 states how this book proposes to conduct it.

Constructing the alternative is the business of Chapter 6. What this chapter has established is narrower and is the ground the construction stands on. There is a question about children that the available accounts do not answer, the question concerns how a child comes to be a bearer at all, and the reason it goes unanswered is that each account begins where the question ends.

1.26 The Method of This Book

This chapter has left a debt. It observed that the bearer commitment cannot be refuted by evidence, that the nativist position has the same property, and that the alternative this book proposes has it too. Three accounts each able to accommodate any observation are not separated by observation, and a book that noticed this and proceeded as though it had not would be relying on the reader's forbearance.

The debt is discharged here, and discharging it requires stating what kind of book this is.

1.26.1 The Available Methods

§1.2.2 distinguished two traditions of inquiry and named the defect of each. The distinction is taken up again here in the form the rest of the book will use.

The empirical method proceeds by controlled observation. Its power is that it can be wrong in ways its practitioners discover, and this is not a small thing. A field with a mechanism for finding its own errors will, over time, hold fewer of them. Its two defects were named earlier: it cannot cross from what is to what ought to be, and it estranges its object by substituting a narrowed construct for what was originally of interest. The second defect is the one that matters for a book about children, because the substitution is invisible from inside the practice and its accumulation is the subject of [ch. 28](#).

The traditionalist method proceeds by analysis, by historical reconstruction, and by the disciplined description of what is before us. Its power is that it supplies the categories the other method then measures, and that it can describe what has no operational definition. Its defect is that it cannot establish which of two illuminating accounts is correct, and a tradition whose claims cannot fail has no mechanism for discovering that it has gone wrong.

The temptation is to present these as complementary halves of a complete method, each supplying what the other lacks. The presentation would be false, and the falsity is worth stating exactly. Empirical work cannot cure unfalsifiability, since no accumulation of findings adjudicates a claim about what matters. Traditionalist work cannot defeat the problem of induction, since it has no better access to necessary connection than measurement does. The defects are not complementary. They are simply different, and both remain after the two methods have been combined.

1.26.2 The Dialectic

What the pairing accomplishes is narrower and is worth having.

Each method constrains the other's overreach. Conceptual work left alone drifts toward accounts that explain everything and forbid nothing; the requirement to say what would be observed if it were true is a discipline on that drift, even where the observation is not conducted. Empirical work left alone drifts toward the measurable, and the measurable displaces what was of interest; the requirement to say what the measure is a measure of is a discipline on that drift, even where no philosopher is present to impose it.

Neither discipline closes. A concept forced to state its observational consequences is still not thereby confirmed, and a measure forced to state its object is still a narrowing. What the

pairing produces is a pair of standing demands rather than certainty, each answerable and neither satisfiable once and for all.

This is why the book has the shape it has. The chapters that follow contain conceptual analysis, historical reconstruction, cultural description, formal modelling, and proposals for measurement, and the mixture is not eclecticism. Each Part is exposed to a demand it cannot meet from its own resources. The ontological chapters are required to state what would be observed; the empirical chapters are required to state what they are measuring and to face the objection that the measuring changes it.

There is a further point, and it is the one that makes this a method belonging to a particular framework rather than a general recommendation of methodological pluralism. The relation between the two methods is itself an instance of what this book describes. Two positions, each with its own logic, neither reducible to the other, each generating something the other cannot: this is the structure the framework calls generative. A method that used only one would have the property the book identifies as degradation, which is the loss of the distinction that made a correction possible. That the argument applies to the book's own procedure is not an ornament. A framework claiming to describe the conditions of generation and exempting its own inquiry from them would have made an exception it cannot justify.

The framework in question is set out in **Chapter 6** and its formal statement is given there. Its governing commitment for present purposes can be stated now, since it bears on how the rest of this book should be read. The framework is historically dialectical. It holds that what can be known and what can be done are both finite within the historical frame in which they occur, that an account produced in one such frame is answerable to conditions it did not choose, and that revision is therefore expected rather than conceded. Nothing in the chapters that follow is offered as a completed statement. The propositions are numbered so that they can be located, disputed, and amended, and a reader who amends one has done what the framework asks rather than what it resists.

Proposition 1.27. *The two methods constrain each other's overreach and do not repair each other's defect. Their pairing yields a standing demand rather than a closure, and the relation between them instantiates the structure this book describes.*

1.26.3 The Discharge of the Debt

The question can now be put in its sharp form. If the bearer commitment accommodates any observation, and this book's alternative accommodates any observation, on what grounds is one preferable?

Three grounds are available and the first two are weaker than they appear.

The first is fertility. A framework may be preferred if it generates questions the alternative does not, and this book will generate a number of them. The ground is real and it is weak, because a framework can be fertile in questions and wrong, and the questions can be interesting and unanswerable. It is offered here as a reason to continue reading rather than as a reason to believe.

The second is the accommodation of recalcitrant cases. A framework may be preferred if the alternative accommodates certain phenomena only by strain. This book will argue that several phenomena are accommodated by the bearer commitment only with difficulty: the

parent transformed by the raising, the household that loses a distinction without anyone deciding, the capacity that appears in one relation and is absent in another. The ground is real and it is weak, because strain is a matter of judgement and a determined theorist can absorb a great deal.

The third ground is the one this book rests on and it is of a different kind. A framework may be preferred if it makes describable what the alternative renders invisible, and if what it makes describable turns out to matter.

The claim is not that the bearer commitment is false. It is that a vocabulary in which every developing property belongs to someone has no way to say certain things, that those things happen, and that a household unable to say them is thereby unable to notice them. [ch. 30](#) makes this precise by distinguishing a difficulty that is felt from a difficulty whose vocabulary has been lost, and [ch. 31](#) argues that the second is undetectable by asking. If those chapters are right, then the choice between vocabularies is not a choice between two equally serviceable descriptions of the same facts. One of them removes a distinction the other retains, and the removal is consequential.

This is an argument about what a vocabulary permits rather than about what is the case, and it is answerable in kind. A reader who holds that nothing is lost, that every phenomenon this book claims is invisible can be stated in the received vocabulary without strain, has understood the argument and rejected it. That is the form a refutation would take, and the book is written so as to make it possible.

The chapters that follow develop a number of claims, and a small set of them govern the rest in the sense that the others are worked out under their constraint. One can be stated at this point, since its form is a methodological matter as much as a substantive one.

Keynote Claim I. *Development consists in a child becoming, within relations that can support, revise, and create jointly, someone able to continue generating relations and meanings.*

Four features of the statement require comment, and the fourth is the reason it appears in this section rather than in the ontological chapter.

The claim names three conditions on the relations within which development occurs. They must be able to support, which is to say that what a child ventures within them is held rather than left to fail alone. They must be able to revise, which is to say that an account given of a child within them can be altered by what the child does. And they must be able to create jointly, which is to say that something can arise between the parties that neither brought. Each of these is developed at length later, and each is stated in the negative in [ch. 30](#), where the loss of one of them is what degradation consists in.

The claim specifies a terminus that is not a terminus. What a child becomes able to do is to continue, and continuation has no completed state. This is what distinguishes the claim from an account of development as the acquisition of a competence, and it is why the assessment proposals of [ch. 70](#) cannot take the form of a threshold passed.

The claim concerns relations and meanings jointly. A child able to generate relations without generating meanings, or the reverse, is not what the claim describes, and [ch. 62](#) argues that the two are not separable in the way the phrasing might suggest.

The fourth feature is the methodological one. The claim defines development by what a child becomes able to continue doing, and not by what a child comes to have. The bearer

commitment identified in §1.25 is refused here in its positive form rather than merely criticised, and the refusal has consequences for every instrument this book proposes. An instrument built on this claim cannot measure a stock. It must measure whether generation continues, which is a property of a relation over time rather than of a person at a moment. That constraint is what ch. 70 inherits, and much of the difficulty of those chapters follows from it.

The claim did not arise from one tradition. Its ancestry includes the contemporary Marxist work examined in §1.16, particularly the social-reproduction line and its limit; the philosophical accounts of relational being; the literature on generative justice; the dynamical treatment of stability and transition surveyed in §1.7; and the psychoanalytic material of §1.10, in Winnicott's formulation above all. What the claim attempts is a statement compatible with what each of these established and reducible to none of them.

One qualification is required and it matters. This is one keynote claim among several. The book does not proceed from a single organising proposition, and a reader who treats this one as the thesis will misread what follows, since several later chapters develop claims that stand beside it rather than beneath it. ch. 6 states the others, and ch. 89 records which of them the book regards as most exposed.

1.26.4 The Materialist Commitment in Its Methodological Form

One further element of method requires statement here, since it governs the four chapters that follow this one and recurs throughout the book.

The preface stated that a practice of rearing is a response to conditions. In methodological form this becomes a constraint on the order of investigation: the conditions are reconstructed before the practice is assessed, and where the reconstruction cannot be completed the assessment is withheld.

Three consequences follow for the chapters ahead.

Theories are examined for the conditions of their formation and not only for their content. ch. 2 asks what each account surveyed above could see from where it stood, and the asking is not a debunking. An account formed in a particular arrangement is an account of something, and knowing the arrangement is part of knowing what it is an account of.

Practices are described together with what they respond to. ch. 5 surveys contemporary arrangements across a number of societies, and the survey withholds the evaluative vocabulary that such surveys ordinarily employ. This is a restriction the book accepts and it costs something: a reader who wants to know which arrangement is better will not be told.

The book applies the constraint to itself. Its own position was formed under conditions it cannot fully reconstruct, and its blindness to its own moment's slow variable is the specific case of a proposition it will argue in general at ch. 50. Nothing in the method allows the author an observation point the argument denies to everyone else, and passages in this book that appear to claim one should be read as errors rather than as exceptions.

1.27 The Case for the Framework

A survey of this length invites a question it has not yet answered. The traditions examined above are serious, several are more developed than anything this book proposes, and a reader

who has followed the survey is owed an account of why a further framework is required at all. The account given here is not a list of the framework's merits. It is a statement of eight tensions that the surveyed literature runs into and cannot resolve from its own resources, followed in each case by what this book proposes to do about them. A reader who judges that the tensions are not real, or that the existing traditions handle them adequately, has grounds for setting this book aside, and those grounds are stated below as clearly as the responses are.

1.27.1 The Tension of Historical Standing

Every account surveyed presents itself as a description of children. None presents itself as a participant in the history it describes.

The difficulty is not that the accounts are historically situated, which is unremarkable, but that their form gives them no way to say so. A stage sequence, a classification of attachment, a set of parenting styles: each is stated as a finding about how children are, and a finding about how children are does not have a date. Yet [ch. 2](#) will show that each arose under conditions that made certain questions askable and others invisible, and [ch. 3](#) that each changed in transit between societies while retaining its claim to describe children as such.

This book's response is to hold that a theory of development is itself a historical formation, that it is answerable to conditions it did not choose, and that revision is expected rather than conceded. The commitment was stated in [§1.26.2](#) and it applies to the present volume without exception. What follows from it practically is that the propositions here are numbered so that they can be located and amended, that the framework is presented as open rather than complete, and that the conditions under which each claim was formed are stated where they are known.

The cost of this position should be stated too. A framework that expects its own revision is harder to refute than one that does not, and [§1.25.3](#) has already conceded that this book's position is not refutable by counterexample. Historical openness is a virtue that shades into unfalsifiability, and the two are difficult to separate.

1.27.2 The Tension Between Warrant and Inheritance

[§1.21](#) and [§1.22](#) described two bodies of practice that reject each other. One holds that a recommendation is worth having when a controlled study supports it. The other holds that practices refined across generations carry knowledge that no trial has captured. Each describes the other as its own deficiency.

The rejection is mutual and neither party can win it on the other's terms. A tradition cannot be validated by trial without being first reduced to what a trial can measure, and the reduction discards what its practitioners take to be essential. A trial cannot be answered by appeal to inherited practice, since the appeal supplies no mechanism by which the practice could be found mistaken.

This book holds that both are sources of knowledge and that both require the same treatment: interpretation, revision, and testing in practice. The position is not a compromise between them, and it is worth being precise about why. A compromise would take some recommendations from one source and some from the other. What is proposed in its place is that a claim from either source enters the same process, in which it is stated in a form that could be

wrong, examined against what is known, and revised by what happens when it is acted on. §1.26.1 set out why this constrains overreach without curing either defect.

1.27.3 The Tension of the Hume Problem and Its Companion

The empirical programme carries two difficulties that are usually treated as one and are better separated.

The first is the familiar one. No accumulation of findings about what is the case entails a conclusion about what ought to be done, and a literature that reports which practices predict which outcomes has not thereby established that those outcomes should be sought. The gap is not closed by adding further findings. Every recommendation issued on empirical grounds has passed through a premise about what is worth wanting, and that premise was not measured.

The second difficulty is less often stated and this book takes it to be the sharper of the two. A methodology that proceeds by measurement must render its object measurable, and rendering a person measurable is an operation performed on the person. A child becomes a profile of scores; a parent becomes a style with a level of responsiveness; a relation becomes a set of coded events. Each of these is a real gain in tractability and each is a loss of the thing that prompted the inquiry. The estrangement is not a side effect that better instruments would remove, since it is what instruments do.

§1.20 put this argument in its strongest form and this book does not claim to have answered it. What is claimed is narrower. A framework that states in advance what it takes a person to be, and that requires its instruments to answer to that statement rather than the reverse, is in a position to notice the estrangement when it occurs. A framework with no such statement measures what is measurable and calls the residue noise. Noticing is not preventing, and ch. 76 is where the difference between them is examined.

1.27.4 The Tension Between Ontology and Practice

Two failure modes recur across the literature surveyed and they are mirror images.

An account may be rich in practice and silent about why the practice works. Much of the intervention literature is in this condition, and its silence becomes consequential at the boundary of the tested range: a practitioner facing a case the manual does not cover has nothing to reason from. An account may equally be rich in ontology and unable to say what anyone should do on a particular evening. Several of the philosophical traditions are in this condition, and the practical vacancy is not remedied by further conceptual refinement.

The response proposed here is a circuit rather than a bridge. An ontology states what is taken to exist; an epistemology states how it could be known; a practice acts on what is known; and what happens in practice, over historical time, returns as pressure on the ontology. Each stage is answerable to the next and the last is answerable to the first. ch. 70 and the practice Parts are the second and third stages, and ch. 89 records what the fourth has so far returned.

Whether this book completes the circuit is a fair question and the honest answer is that it does not. The historical feedback stage requires a duration no single volume has.

1.27.5 The Tension Between Classification and Change

A striking number of the accounts surveyed answer the question of development by supplying a set of categories. Piaget supplies stages, Erikson supplies stages, Kohlberg supplies stages, attachment research supplies types, the style literature supplies four cells, temperament research supplies profiles.

A classification tells us which category an instance belongs to. The question of how an instance comes to belong to a different one is a separate question, and a classification does not answer it by being refined. The transition between two stages is not itself a stage. What the literature has in its place is a set of proposed mechanisms for movement, and §1.7 noted that the dynamic tradition treats the absence of such mechanisms in stage accounts as its founding complaint.

This book's object is the mechanism rather than the category. Its question is under what conditions a child comes to be able to do what the child previously could not, and it takes the answer to concern the conditions of the relation rather than the child's position in a taxonomy. [ch. ?? ch:stability] states the criterion this replaces classification with, and it is a criterion about whether generation continues rather than about which type obtains.

The debt to the dynamic tradition here is substantial and was recorded in §1.24.3. What this book adds is a claim about what the state space is a space of, and that claim is where it can be wrong.

1.27.6 The Tension of the Located Property

§1.25 established the finding this subsection turns into a reason. Every account surveyed locates what develops in a child and treats the relation as a condition. The practical form of the commitment is a question: how does one raise a capable child?

The alternative question is what relations are being generated, and the difference is not rhetorical. A parent asking the first question and a parent asking the second will attend to different things, will read the same evening differently, and will notice different failures. The first question makes the child's properties the object of attention and the relation the means. The second makes the relation the object.

This book holds that the second question is prior, and the holding is what most distinguishes it from the traditions surveyed. ch. 6 states the ontology this requires and ch. 10 states the first substantive proposition that follows from it.

1.27.7 The Tension of Transmitted Knowledge

The dominant picture of what happens when a child learns is a picture of transfer. Something possessed by an adult, or contained in a curriculum, comes to be possessed by the child. §1.4 found this in internalisation, §1.15 in cultural capital, §1.12 in the acquired representation.

The picture has a consequence that is rarely noticed: it makes the adult's development unintelligible. If knowledge moves from a party that has it to a party that lacks it, then the transaction leaves the first party unchanged, and every parent's experience of being altered by raising a child becomes an epiphenomenon.

The alternative developed here holds that what occurs between a parent and a child produces something in the relation that neither held beforehand, that both parties are altered, and that a family's shared understanding is a third thing rather than the intersection of two private ones. §1.16.9 located this claim against the reproduction traditions, and [[ch. ?? ch:knowledge-generation](#)] develops it as an epistemology.

1.27.8 The Tension of Imposed Norms

A book about rearing must say something about what ought to be done, and the literature offers two ways of doing so. A tradition may specify an ideal and derive conduct from it, as §1.22 described. An empirical programme may identify practices associated with valued outcomes, as §1.21 described, with the difficulty noted in §1.27.3.

Both supply norms from outside the relation the norms govern. The first supplies them from a picture of the completed person; the second from a distribution of measured results.

This book takes normativity to emerge within relations rather than to be imposed upon them, and this is one of the five terms the framework holds to co-emerge. A household arrives at what may be asked of whom, what counts as a reason, and what constitutes a wrong, through a history of exchanges in which those things were settled and could have been settled otherwise.

The obvious objection is that this is relativism, and it should be met directly rather than deflected. It is not, for the following reason: that a norm emerged historically does not entail that any norm would have done. The conditions under which a household's normative order remains open to revision are themselves specifiable, and [ch. 42](#) specifies them. A household in which the norm cannot be questioned by the party it binds is in a describable condition, and describing it does not require an external standard to which its norms should have conformed. What this book denies is that norms are given prior to relations. It does not hold that all normative orders are equivalent.

1.27.9 The Tension of Disciplinary Multiplicity

This book draws on developmental psychology, education, neuroscience, sociology, philosophy, the Marxist traditions, dynamical systems, and psychoanalysis. Each has its own vocabulary, and a work that moved between them without a common language would be a collection of chapters written in different registers with no argument passing between them.

The framework is offered as that common language, and the offer is a substantive claim rather than a convenience. If subject, meaning, value, creation, and normativity co-emerge through relational processes, then a neural finding, an ethnographic observation, and a philosophical argument can bear on one another because they concern aspects of one process. [[ch. ?? ch:neural-part](#)] is the hardest test of this, since a neural measure and a relational claim are separated by more than vocabulary.

The risk is equally real. A vocabulary general enough to accommodate every discipline may be doing no work in any of them, and a framework that can restate any finding has not thereby explained one. [ch. 90](#) is given to this and states the test the book proposes to submit to.

1.27.10 The Unit of Development

The eight tensions above converge on a single proposition, and it is the second of this book's keynote claims.

Keynote Claim II. *Rearing consists in the generation of relations rather than the production of a child. What a child becomes is one result among several, alongside the relation between the parties, the culture of the household, and the knowledge, values, and practices held in common. Rearing is the history by which a relational system generates itself, and not the process by which one subject forms another.*

The claim identifies the unit of development. Where the surveyed literature takes a child to be what develops and the relation to be the condition, this book takes the relational system to be what develops and the child's development to be one of its products.

The second sentence names five things that undergo development, and the naming is not a list of by-products. Each is set out below, since they recur throughout the book and the practice Parts address them separately.

1. **The relation between the parties.** What may be said within it, what has been settled, what would count as a breach, and how a rupture in it is repaired. [ch. 81](#) treats this directly.
2. **The culture of the household.** What its members can take for granted with one another, including what needs no explanation and what would be strange to state aloud.
3. **The knowledge held in common.** A body of understanding that includes a great deal neither party could state alone, and which [[ch. ?? ch:knowledge-generation](#)] treats as generated between rather than transmitted from one to the other.
4. **The values held in common.** The terms in which the household's members can make a case to one another, and by which a claim is recognised as a claim rather than a demand.
5. **The practices held in common.** What the household does without deciding to, including the arrangements that persist because no one has had occasion to question them.

Each of these has a trajectory over years, each may develop or fail to, and none is a property of any member. A household in which the child has advanced on every measured index while the relation, the culture, and the common knowledge have each contracted is a household in which development has occurred on one of five counts, and the book's later chapters give that condition a name.

The third sentence is the one that carries the ontological weight. The picture it displaces is a picture of formation: one subject, already constituted, acting upon another who is not yet. Nearly every account surveyed in this chapter is a version of that picture, and the versions differ in what the forming party is taken to supply. What replaces it is a system that produces itself over time, in which the parties are internal to what is being produced and neither stands outside it. A parent who forms a child is outside the process. A parent within a relational system that is generating itself is not.

Three consequences follow and they will recur throughout.

The parent develops, and this is a claim about the ordinary case rather than about parents who happen to be reflective. A relation that generates cannot leave one party unaltered, and an

account on which the adult is a stable instrument acting on a developing child has described something other than what occurs.

A household has a history that is not reducible to the histories of its members. What has been settled between the parties, what can be said and what cannot, what counts as a reason: these belong to the household and persist across changes in what any member believes. [ch. 37](#) treats this history as the object that passes between generations.

An assessment addressed to a child's properties measures a product and omits what produced it. This is the constraint [ch. 70](#) inherits, and the difficulty of that Part follows from it.

The relation of this claim to Keynote Claim I should be stated, since the two are close and are not the same. The first concerns what a child becomes able to do. The second concerns what it is that develops. A reader may accept the first while holding that the child remains the unit, and the second is the stronger commitment.

One further remark concerns what the claim does for the rest of the book, and it bears on a hazard this chapter has been exposed to throughout. A survey of nineteen traditions can accumulate without integrating, and a book that continued in that manner would produce a sequence of chapters each summarising a literature, with the framework named at intervals and doing no work. The claim is what prevents that outcome, if it holds. A Marxist account of reproduction, a sociocultural account of internalisation, an attachment classification, a neural measure of early adversity, and a proposal about instruction conducted with machine assistance all concern the same object under this description: a relational system generating itself over time. They can therefore bear on one another, and [[ch. ?? ch:neural-part](#)] and the practice Parts are where that bearing is required to become specific rather than asserted. Whether the claim holds is the question; that a great deal depends on it is not in doubt.

1.27.11 The Limitations of the Framework

A section arguing for a framework is obliged to state where it is weak, and four admissions are made here rather than left for a reviewer to supply.

The framework is under development and several of its formal components are immature. [ch. 70](#) proposes observables and models that have not been implemented at scale, and a reader who works in a modelling tradition will find the apparatus preliminary by the standards of that tradition. This is a statement about the present condition of the work rather than about what is achievable in principle, and the distinction is one the book cannot make on its own behalf.

Many propositions here lack longitudinal empirical support. The claims that matter most concern what happens to a relation over years, and the studies that would bear on them have not been conducted. What this book offers in its place is a specification of what such studies would have to measure, which is a contribution of a different and lesser kind. Whether the propositions survive contact with that evidence is not settled by anything in this volume.

The vocabulary of generation is abstract and abstraction is a hazard here more than in most subjects, since a framework about rearing that cannot be acted on has failed at its own task. The book's response is structural: the practice Parts are the site where the theory is required to become specific rather than an appendix to the theory, and a chapter of theory that generates no practical difference is a chapter this book regards as unfinished. Whether that discipline

has been maintained is for a reader to judge.

The framework does not replace any discipline it draws on. It supplies no developmental neuroscience, no paediatrics, no clinical psychology, and a reader who requires an answer within one of those fields should seek it there. What is offered is an account of how their findings bear on one another, and an account of that kind can be useful while being useless for every question the individual disciplines answer well.

1.27.12 The Grounds Restated

§1.26.3 identified three grounds on which a framework may be preferred and rested this book's case on the third: that a framework may be preferred if it makes describable what the alternative renders invisible, and if what it makes describable turns out to matter.

The eight tensions specify what that ground amounts to concretely. What the surveyed literature renders difficult to describe is a theory's own historical standing, the relation between warranted and inherited knowledge, the estrangement its instruments produce, the passage between ontology and practice, the mechanism of transition as against the classification of states, the relation as the object of attention, the alteration of both parties in an exchange, the emergence of a normative order, and the bearing of one discipline's findings on another's.

Whether these matter is the question a reader should hold open. This book argues that they do and the argument is conducted by showing what becomes sayable, not by demonstrating that the alternative is false.

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Account	The limit of its apparatus	The price of
Constructivist	No term for what an encounter produces between the parties	An internal logic of development
Sociocultural	Internalisation requires a prior location; no term for the adult's transformation	A mechanism with a direction
Shared intentionality	Grounds the relation in a capacity for relation	Comparative testability
Core knowledge	Endowment prior to relation is unfalsifiable by developmental evidence	Explaining early competence
Dynamic systems	Components must be specifiable before the interaction	Formal tractability
Ecological systems	A nested figure requires a centre, and the child occupies it	Locating the surround
Attachment	Returns a relation in the logical form of a property	An operational instrument
Psychoanalytic	What begins between finishes within; evidence settles little	Access to what cannot be observed
Behaviourist	No term whose loss constitutes degradation	Exhaustive observability
Social learning	An interior added in the same location as the repertoire	Explaining unreinforced acquisition
Transactional	Requires initial states for both parties	Formal specifiability
Neural	Locates in tissue of one organism; registers trace, not circumstance	Physical determinacy
Social reproduction	Relocates the cause, retains the bearer; no term for generation	Explaining a distribution
Warranted practice	Inherits the ontology of its outcome measures	Traceable revision
Educational philosophy	The transaction is not located; its product is	Refusing a private experience
Disciplinary analysis	Supplies no account of development; leaves no alternative standing	Seeing the apparatus whole
Parenting styles	A style is a property of a parent, not of a relation	An instrument that travels
Stage accounts	A subject must occupy the successive positions	An ordered sequence
Formation traditions	Requires a subject present before formation	Specifying an ideal

Table 1.2: The limits, each paired with the strength that produces it.

Account	The borne property	Office of the relation
Constructivist	Schemes, operations	Occasion of disequilibrium
Sociocultural	Higher functions	Prior site, then channel
Shared intentionality	A capacity for joint states	Exercise of that capacity
Ecological systems	Dispositions, resources, demands	Nested surround
Core knowledge	Endowed representational systems	Trigger and selector
Dynamic systems	A position in a state space	Component among components
Attachment	Security; a working model	Object of a system; classified type
Psychoanalytic	Objects; a self; a capacity to think	Holding, containment, address
Behaviourist	A repertoire	Arranger of contingency
Social learning	Representations, self-efficacy	Model to be observed
Transactional	A state at each moment	Continuous mutual influence
Neural	Properties of tissue	Source of a physical trace
Social reproduction	Capital, habitus, a code	Channel of transmission
Warranted practice	An outcome, as measured	Manipulable input
Educational philosophy	A habit; a capability	Transaction, or joint investigation
Disciplinary analysis	Nothing borne; a case produced	Apparatus that constitutes
Parenting styles	A style; an outcome	Correlation of two properties
Stage accounts	A position in a sequence	Poser of the crisis
Formation traditions	A character; a nature	Cultivating or non-interfering

Table 1.3: The common location. The borne property varies and the office of the relation varies; that a bearer is named does not.

Chapter 2

The Historical Formation of Developmental Theory

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what conditions made each account surveyed in [Chapter 1](#) possible, and what those conditions permitted its authors to see.

It contributes the reflexive application of the preceding chapter's own thesis. [Chapter 1](#) argued that a theory carries a commitment it does not state; this chapter argues that the commitment was available to be taken up because of where and when the theory was formed. Together the two establish that the convergence identified in [§1.25](#) is a historical fact about a period rather than a discovery about children. [ch. 3](#) depends on this, since a theory can only be traced in transit once its point of origin has been located.

It does not evaluate any theory by the standards of its period, which would substitute one anachronism for another. Nor does it claim that a theory's origins determine its truth. The relation between the conditions of a claim's formation and the claim's standing is the subject of [§2.1](#), and the position taken there governs the whole chapter.

The reader should carry forward two things: that each account arose in answer to a question its moment was asking, and that what a moment does not ask is not thereby absent from the world.

2.1 The Genetic Question

A chapter that reconstructs the conditions under which theories were formed invites an objection before it begins, and the objection has to be met first because everything after it depends on the answer.

2.1.1 The Form of the Objection

The objection is that the origins of a belief are irrelevant to whether the belief is true. A proposition advanced for poor reasons, by a person with interests, in a society whose arrangements made the proposition convenient, may nonetheless be correct, and the way to find out is to examine the proposition rather than its author. To reason from the conditions of a claim's production to a verdict on the claim is to commit the genetic fallacy, and the fallacy is a fallacy in the strict sense: the inference does not go through.

Stated that way the objection is sound and this chapter accepts it without reservation. Nothing in what follows argues that Piaget was mistaken because Geneva was a particular kind of

city, or that attachment theory is false because Britain in the nineteen-fifties had a view about mothers and employment. Such arguments would be bad arguments and their conclusions would be unwarranted even where the conclusions happened to be true.

The objection has a second and stronger form which is worth stating, since a reader who raises only the first has raised the easier one. The stronger version holds that historical reconstruction of this kind is invalid as inference, and beyond that corrosive in practice: that it supplies a technique for setting aside any claim whatever, that the technique requires no engagement with the claim's content, and that a field which acquires the habit stops arguing. The concern is legitimate. The habit exists and its effects are visible.

2.1.2 The Distinction the Chapter Rests On

What separates this chapter from the fallacy is a distinction between two questions that the objection runs together.

The first question is whether a proposition is true. Its origins bear on this not at all, and this chapter asks it nowhere.

The second question is why a proposition was available to be asserted, and why the alternatives to it were not. This is a question about a field's range of options rather than about the merits of the option taken, and it has an answer that historical reconstruction can supply. A theory is a selection from what could be thought at a given moment. Reconstructing what the moment made thinkable does not adjudicate the selection. It describes the set from which the selection was made.

The difference matters most where a field has converged. When several accounts that disagree about nearly everything turn out to agree about one thing, two explanations are available. The agreement may record a discovery, in which case the accounts converged because the thing agreed on is so. Or the agreement may record a shared inheritance, in which case the accounts converged because no alternative was available to any of them.

These are different explanations and they are distinguishable, though not by examining the propositions. What distinguishes them is whether the alternative was ever formulated and rejected, or was never formulated at all. A commitment that was considered and retained has been tested. A commitment that no one thought to state has not, and its survival is not evidence of anything.

Proposition 2.1. *Where accounts differing on most points converge on one, the convergence may record a finding or a shared inheritance. The two are distinguished by whether the alternative was available to be considered, which is a historical question rather than a conceptual one.*

This is the chapter's warrant and it is narrower than a history of ideas would require. The concern is not with the biography of the theorists, and where biographical material appears it appears because it bears on what was available to be thought rather than because it explains what its subject believed. §1.25 established that nineteen traditions share a commitment. The question here is whether any of them was in a position to consider dropping it.

2.2 The Reach of This Reconstruction

The preceding section established what kind of question this chapter asks. This one states what it takes as its object, which is a narrower thing than the title of the chapter might suggest, and gives the reason for the narrowing.

2.2.1 The Single Lineage

This chapter reconstructs the formation of one body of theory. That body is the Euro-American tradition of developmental thought, running from the child-study movement through the accounts surveyed in [Chapter 1](#), and the reconstruction does not treat the intellectual histories of other societies as parallel cases running alongside it.

The restriction is deliberate and it should be understood as a restriction of object rather than a gap in coverage. A history of quantum mechanics is not deficient for omitting the physics of other traditions; its object is a particular body of theory and the object is what the title names. The same holds here. The object of this chapter is not childhood, which has been thought about everywhere and always. The object is a specific formation of knowledge that arose in a specific setting, acquired institutional backing, and now circulates internationally as the standard account.

That last clause is the reason the restriction is defensible rather than merely convenient. The tradition reconstructed here is the one that travelled. Its concepts appear in the training of teachers in societies that had nothing to do with its formation, in the guidance issued by health ministries across the world, and in the instruments used to assess children in settings its authors never visited. A reconstruction of how it formed is therefore not a parochial exercise. It is an account of the origins of what has become, in practice, the international default.

Two things follow that a reader should hold onto.

The first is that nothing in this chapter licenses a claim about what other traditions of thought about children contain. [§2.5](#) takes up one such tradition, and takes it up for a specific and limited purpose that is stated there.

The second is that the absence of comparison here is not the absence of comparison from the book. [§2.2.3](#) sets out where the comparative work is done and why it is done there rather than here. A reader who reaches the end of this chapter with the impression that the book takes the Euro-American formation to be the only one has read the chapter correctly and the book incorrectly.

Proposition 2.2. *A diachronic reconstruction may take a single lineage as its object without thereby claiming that the lineage is the only one or the most important. What such a reconstruction cannot do is establish anything about the lineages it does not treat.*

A third thing should be said, since it concerns the standing of what follows. This chapter is not the first attempt at the reconstruction it undertakes. There is an established critical literature on the historical formation of developmental psychology, and its principal findings are not in dispute here: that the discipline arose alongside institutions of assessment and classification ([Rose, 1985](#)), that its developmental norms carry assumptions their statistical form conceals ([Burman, 2016](#)), and that its adoption of a biological idiom was a historical event with consequences ([Morss, 1990](#)). The reconstruction offered below draws on that literature

throughout and departs from it in one respect. Those accounts are addressed, in the main, to what the discipline did to children and to the categories it imposed. The question here is narrower and prior: what the discipline's conditions permitted it to formulate about what develops, and what they placed beyond formulation. A reader who wants the fuller critical history should go to the works cited.

2.2.2 The Available Methods

A reconstruction of this kind has several established forms available to it, and they are not interchangeable. Each was developed to answer a different question and each would produce a different chapter from the same materials. Setting them out makes the choice made here visible as a choice.

Contextualist intellectual history, associated with Skinner (Skinner, 1969) and Pocock, holds that a text is understood by recovering what its author was doing in writing it: which question was being answered, which position was being opposed, and which vocabulary was available for the purpose. Its characteristic finding is that a work read as addressing a perennial problem was in fact intervening in a local dispute now forgotten. Applied here it yields what §2.4.1 attempts, which is an account of Piaget as answering a question posed by his philosophical inheritance rather than as founding a psychology.

Historical epistemology takes a different object. In Canguilhem (Canguilhem, 1989), in Foucault's archaeological work, and in the later studies of Daston and Galison (Daston and Galison, 2007) and of Hacking (Hacking, 2002), what is reconstructed is a matter of the conditions under which any doctrine of a certain kind became statable. Hacking's styles of reasoning and Daston's history of objectivity are the models: they treat as historical what a period took to be simply the correct way of proceeding. Applied here this yields §2.3, where the object is the instruments and arrangements that made children describable rather than any theory of what children are.

Comparative historical sociology, in Weber's comparisons of religious formations and in the case-based work of Barrington Moore (Moore, 1966), Skocpol (Skocpol, 1979), and Tilly, selects several settings on theoretical grounds, traces the process within each, and compares the trajectories. Space becomes a variable. Applied here it would produce a chapter comparing the developmental sciences of several societies and asking why they differ.

Histoire croisée, in Werner and Zimmermann (Werner and Zimmermann, 2006), was formulated against exactly that procedure. Its objection is that comparison treats its units as independent when they were in contact and partly constituted one another, so that a comparison of two national traditions misdescribes a situation in which each had already absorbed the other. The recommendation is to study the crossings rather than the units.

World-systems analysis, in Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 1974) and in the work of Amin cited in §1.16.7, presses the objection further. If societies occupy positions in a single system, then comparing them as cases is comparing effects of one structure while treating them as independent instances. What should be compared, on this account, is position rather than nation.

These are not five ways of doing one thing. The last two are objections to the third, and the first two answer questions the third does not ask.

Proposition 2.3. *A method of historical reconstruction determines what can appear as a finding.*

A method that takes societies as units will produce differences between societies; a method that takes conditions of stability as its object will produce an account of what a period could think.

This chapter uses the first two and declines the third. §2.2.3 gives the reason, and the reason is not that comparison is uninformative.

2.2.3 The Division of Labour

The comparative method is declined in this chapter for two reasons, and the reasons are specific to this book rather than general objections to comparison.

The first is that ch. 4 will argue that a comparative instrument carries the categories of the setting in which it was built, and that applying it elsewhere measures distance from that setting rather than any property of what is measured. A chapter that had already compared national traditions of developmental science, treating them as commensurable units placed side by side, would have performed the operation that a later chapter examines and finds wanting. The book would then be inconsistent, and the inconsistency would sit in the two chapters a critical reader is most likely to read together.

The second is Amin's point, recorded in §1.16.7. If societies occupy positions in a single system, national traditions of thought about children are not independent samples. They developed in contact, under conditions of unequal exchange, with concepts moving predominantly in one direction. A comparison that set them side by side as separate cases would misdescribe the relation between them at exactly the point where the relation is what matters.

What follows is a division of labour across four chapters, stated here so that no part of the work appears to have been forgotten.

The present chapter reconstructs how one tradition formed and what its conditions supplied it. ch. 3 follows that tradition in transit: what happened to Piagetian stages when they entered normal-school curricula elsewhere, what happened to attachment theory when it entered policy in societies with different arrangements of care, what was dropped and what the receiving setting supplied. This is where the crossings of §2.2.2 are treated, and it is where the transmission is examined rather than the endpoints. ch. 4 takes up the methodological problem of comparison itself. ch. 5 then describes contemporary arrangements across a range of societies, with the instruments already examined.

The sequence has a rationale beyond tidiness. A comparison conducted before the instruments of comparison have been examined produces findings whose status is unclear. A comparison conducted after produces findings a reader can evaluate. The cost is that a reader who wants the comparative material must wait three chapters for it.

Proposition 2.4. *Where a later chapter will criticise a method, an earlier chapter may not employ that method without the book contradicting itself. The ordering of an argument constrains which operations are available at which point.*

One further remark completes this section. The division set out here treats time and space as separate dimensions, handling formation in one chapter and distribution in another, and the treatment is a convenience rather than a commitment. §2.8 returns to this at the end of the chapter and states what the framework would say about it, which is that the separation is an artefact of how historical work is customarily organised rather than a feature of what is being

studied.

2.3 The Emergence of the Object

Before any theory of development could be formed, childhood had to become the kind of thing about which theories are formed. This section reconstructs how that happened, and the reconstruction bears on the survey because a field's founding conditions constrain what its founders could take their object to be.

2.3.1 The Conditions of Visibility

Three changes in the arrangements of European and North American societies, occurring across roughly the same century, brought children into view as a population that could be described.

The first was demographic. Where a large proportion of children die before their fifth year, a household's relation to any particular child is conditioned by that fact, and the decline in infant and child mortality across the nineteenth century altered the conditions under which a child could be attended to. This is not a claim about the depth of parental feeling, which is not recoverable from mortality statistics and about which the historical literature has argued to no settled conclusion (Ariès, 1962; Cunningham, 2005). It is a claim about what a society could organise around. A population of children expected to survive is a population that can be planned for, schooled in cohorts, and measured against expectations.

The second was the removal of children from production. Legislation restricting child labour, extended across the second half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, changed where children spent their days (Zelizer, 1985; Hendrick, 1997). A child in a mill is an economic participant whose capacities are assessed by what the work requires. A child removed from the mill and placed in a schoolroom becomes something else: an occupant of a category defined by age, doing work whose only purpose is the child's own formation. The category of childhood as a protected non-productive period is a product of this legislation rather than a discovery that preceded it.

The third was compulsory schooling (Rose, 1985), and this is the one that matters most for what follows. Schooling assembled children of the same age in one place, at the same time, doing the same thing. It thereby produced, for the first time, the conditions under which children could be compared to one another systematically. A schoolmaster confronting thirty seven-year-olds is confronting a distribution, and a distribution invites the questions that produce a science: what is typical, what is delayed, what is the range.

Proposition 2.5. *A population becomes available for systematic description when institutional arrangements assemble its members under comparable conditions. The category available for description is shaped by the arrangement that assembled it.*

The consequence for this book's argument is direct and it is the reason the section exists. The child that developmental psychology took as its object was a child already produced by these arrangements: individuated, age-graded, removed from productive relations, and situated in an institution that compared him with others of his year. A discipline whose object

arrives in that form is unlikely to ask whether the individuation is an artefact of the arrangement, since the arrangement is what made the object visible in the first place.

The point can be put more sharply. §1.25 found that nineteen traditions treat the child as the bearer of what develops. The schoolroom is a machine for producing exactly that description: it isolates a child from the relations he stands in, places him beside others isolated in the same way, and asks what each one can do. A field formed in the presence of that machine did not need to argue for the bearer commitment. It was supplied with it.

2.3.2 The First Instruments

The arrangements described above made children comparable. What turned comparability into a research programme was a set of techniques for recording the comparison, and those techniques were built between roughly 1880 and 1920 by people who were not, for the most part, attempting to found a science of development.

The child-study movement in the United States, organised around Hall (Hall, 1904), distributed questionnaires to teachers and parents asking what children of given ages knew, feared, and could do. The method was loose by any later standard and Hall's own theoretical apparatus, which held that a child's development recapitulates the history of the species, was abandoned within a generation. What survived was the practice of collecting observations on many children at once and reporting them by age.

The mental testing movement supplied the decisive instrument. Binet and Simon were commissioned by a French ministry to identify children who would not profit from ordinary instruction, and the scale they produced in 1905 (Binet and Simon, 1905) was designed for that administrative purpose. Its innovation was to order tasks by the age at which most children could perform them, so that a child's performance could be reported as the age whose tasks he could complete. The mental age was thus a comparative quantity from the outset. It had no meaning except relative to a distribution of other children.

Gesell's programme at Yale added the third technique (Gesell, 1925). Working with film and one-way observation, he recorded what infants and young children did at successive ages and published normative schedules stating what could be expected when. His theoretical position was maturationist, holding that development unfolds on a biological schedule that rearing can support or disturb but not fundamentally alter, and that position has not survived. The schedules have. They passed into paediatric practice, into the well-baby visit, and eventually into the developmental milestone charts that parents now consult.

Three features these instruments share deserve statement, since they were inherited by everything that came after.

Each renders a child as a position in a distribution of children. This is what the instruments were built to do and they do it well. What follows from it is that a child's development is expressed as a relation to other children rather than as a relation to anything the child is involved in.

Each requires the unit of measurement to be an individual. A questionnaire is answered about one child, a scale is administered to one child, a schedule reports what one child does at a given age. Nothing in the apparatus can take a pair as its unit, and no one at the time proposed that it should.

Each was built for an administrative purpose before it was used for a scientific one (Gould, 1996; Rose, 1985). Binet's scale was for allocating instruction. Gesell's schedules were for identifying children who needed attention. The child-study questionnaires were for informing teachers. The scientific programmes were built on instruments already shaped by a decision about what someone needed to know.

Proposition 2.6. *An instrument built to allocate an individual to a category or a position will produce individuals allocated to categories and positions. A research programme conducted with such instruments inherits their unit of analysis, and inherits it as a fact about its object rather than as a feature of its method.*

The last point returns to §1.1.1. That section argued that an ontological commitment bites at instrument design rather than at interpretation. The present section supplies the historical case. By 1920 a field that wished to study children empirically had available to it a set of instruments each of which located what it measured in a single child, and had available to it no instrument that did otherwise. A commitment does not need to be argued for when the apparatus for investigating anything else does not exist.

2.4 The Historical Generation of the Questions

The preceding section described conditions common to the field. This section follows what was built on them, and the organisation requires a word of explanation before it begins.

An account of a field's history may be organised by its theories, in which case it reports what was proposed and by whom. The organisation adopted here is different. Each section below takes a question, asks what made the question available to be posed, describes the answer that was given, and identifies the question the answer generated in turn. The sequence is thus a sequence of problems rather than of persons, and the theories appear as answers rather than as episodes.

Two qualifications are required and the first is important enough that its omission would misrepresent the chapter.

The chain reconstructed here is a reconstruction. The claim is that each question became askable once a previous answer was in place, and it is emphatically not the claim that each theorist was replying to the last. Vygotsky did not read Piaget's later work and could not have. Bowlby was not answering Vygotsky, whose work was unavailable to him. What the sequence describes is a field's problem situation changing over time, which is a property of the field rather than of any participant's intentions, and a participant may contribute to a change he neither observed nor intended.

The order is also not strictly chronological. Two of the questions below were live simultaneously in different countries, and one of them was posed, abandoned, and posed again. The sequence is logical in the sense that each question presupposes an answer to the one before it, and the presupposition is what orders them.

2.4.1 The Epistemological Child

The first question this field asked, in the form that produced a research programme rather than a philosophy, was whether the development of understanding has a describable order.

The question was available because of what §2.3 described. Children assembled in age-graded classrooms and measured against normative schedules present an obvious regularity: what a seven-year-old can do differs from what a five-year-old can do, and differs in ways that recur across children. A regularity of that kind invites the question whether the order is necessary or merely typical, and the answer given by the person who pursued it hardest was that the order is necessary and that its necessity is the interesting thing about it.

Piaget is misread when he is read as a psychologist who happened to study children, and the misreading obscures why his account has the shape it has.

His training was in natural history and his doctorate concerned molluscs (Vidal, 1994). The question that occupied him from early on was epistemological: how knowledge that is valid comes to exist at all, and how the categories by which we organise experience acquire their necessity. This is a question inherited from Kant, and the philosophical situation Piaget entered was one in which Kant's answer, that the categories are conditions of any possible experience and therefore not derived from experience, was under pressure from several directions.

Piaget's proposal was to answer the question empirically. If the categories cannot be derived from experience and are not simply given, then their acquisition might be observable in the one population that does not yet possess them. A child becomes the site of an epistemological investigation, and the investigation is into how necessity arises where it was not present before. He gave the programme a name, genetic epistemology (Piaget, 1970), and the name states its purpose plainly.

Three consequences follow for the shape of the resulting theory, and each explains a feature that appears arbitrary if the origin is forgotten.

The child in Piaget's account is an epistemic subject rather than a social one, because the question was about knowledge rather than about socialisation. What a child comes to know about number, space, causality, and conservation is what the programme was designed to track. What a child comes to know about his mother's moods is not a defect of coverage. It is outside the question.

The mechanism is internal because an externally supplied answer would not have addressed the difficulty. A category acquired by being told is a category whose necessity is borrowed, and Piaget's problem was precisely the origin of necessity. Equilibration, the process by which a structure reorganises under the pressure of what it cannot assimilate, is an answer that keeps the necessity internal to the developing structure. Had he proposed that children acquire the categories from adults, he would have relocated the question rather than answered it.

The stages are stages of structure rather than of behaviour, and they are ordered by logical containment rather than by empirical succession alone. This follows from the same source. A structure that can perform reversible operations contains one that cannot, and the containment relation is what makes the sequence necessary rather than merely typical.

Proposition 2.7. *An account formed to answer how valid knowledge originates will locate development in the individual, since knowledge acquired from another party has an origin the account was formed to explain and cannot presuppose.*

The Geneva setting bears on this in a specific way that is worth stating without overstating. Piaget worked in a small city with a strong tradition of natural-scientific observation, in

a French-speaking intellectual world where the philosophical question he was pursuing was live, and in an institutional position that gave him access to a school and to his own children over long periods. These conditions made the programme possible. They do not explain its content, and a reconstruction that treated them as explaining it would commit the error §2.1.1 refused.

What can be said is narrower and it is what this chapter needs. The question Piaget was answering was available to be asked in his setting and was being asked by his contemporaries. The alternative question, whether the categories might arise between people rather than within one, was not a question his philosophical inheritance posed. Kant's problem is a problem about a subject. A programme that inherits the problem inherits the subject with it.

The answer generated a question it could not itself address, and the question is what the next section takes up. If the order of development is necessary, arising from the logic of the structures themselves, then the order should be the same wherever children are found. Piaget's own cross-cultural interests were real and his collaborators pursued them. What the studies produced was a pattern of results in which the sequence held approximately while the ages at which children passed through it varied considerably, and in which performance on the tasks proved sensitive to whether the task resembled anything the child had occasion to do. A necessity that arrives on a schedule set by circumstance is a necessity requiring explanation, and the explanation was not available within an account whose mechanism was internal.

2.4.2 The Social Child

The question the previous answer generated was why an order held to be necessary should vary with circumstance. An answer was formulated in a setting where the question had a different urgency, and where the philosophical resources for addressing it were of a different kind.

The setting was the Soviet Union in the decade after the revolution, and three of its features bear on what could be proposed there.

The first is the philosophical inheritance. A tradition in which consciousness is understood as socially produced, and in which the human being is taken to be the ensemble of social relations, poses the question of development differently from one that inherits Kant. Where Piaget's problem was how necessity arises in a subject, the problem available in Moscow was how a form of consciousness characteristic of a society comes to be present in the individuals who compose it. The second problem does not have to be argued into existence. It follows from the position.

The second is the institutional situation. The new state had committed itself to mass literacy across a territory containing populations with no tradition of schooling and, in many cases, no written language. This produced both an urgent practical problem and an unusual research opportunity. The question of what instruction does to thought was not academic in that setting. It was the question on which a programme of national transformation depended, and it was funded accordingly.

The third is the expeditionary work that followed. The studies conducted in Central Asia in the early nineteen thirties (Luria, 1976), comparing populations with and without schooling, produced findings on classification, inference, and self-description that differed by more

than the investigators anticipated. Whatever is now thought of their methods, and there is a substantial literature on their difficulties, the results were taken at the time as demonstrating that forms of thought held to be general were consequences of particular arrangements.

Vygotsky's proposal, formed in this setting, was that a psychological function appears twice, first between people and then within the person, and that the second appearance is derived from the first. The general law of cultural development states this in a single sentence and it is the strongest claim in the literature surveyed in [Chapter 1](#) for the priority of the social.

Three observations belong here rather than in the survey chapter.

The proposal answers the question the previous section left standing. If higher functions originate in social interaction, then their variation across societies is expected rather than anomalous, because societies differ in what interactions they arrange. The account thereby absorbs the cross-cultural findings that had embarrassed the alternative.

The proposal was formed under conditions that made the social available as a starting point without argument. This is the point at which [§2.1.2](#) applies. Piaget had to be argued out of the individual, and no one in his setting was positioned to conduct the argument. Vygotsky did not have to be argued into the social, since the social was where his tradition began. Neither position was reached by considering and rejecting the other.

And the account nonetheless retains the structure this book has been tracking. What appears first between people is a function, and a function is the kind of thing that has a location. The general law describes a movement from one location to another, and [§1.4](#) showed that a movement of that kind requires the function to have existed at the origin. The social priority is real and it is a priority of location rather than a dissolution of the located.

Proposition 2.8. *A tradition in which consciousness is taken to be socially produced makes the social origin of psychological functions available without argument. What such a tradition does not thereby supply is an account in which a function has no prior location.*

The question this answer generated was not pursued in the setting that produced it. Vygotsky died in 1934, the expeditionary work was suppressed, pedology was abolished by decree in 1936, and the texts were unavailable outside a narrow circle for a generation ([van der Veer and Valsiner, 2012](#)). The question that would have followed, concerning what in a relation makes it capable of producing a function, waited for other conditions and was taken up by a tradition with different concerns.

What arose in its place, in a different setting and from a different starting point, was a question about what a child requires rather than about what a child acquires.

2.4.3 The Emotional Child

This is the clearest case in the chapter, and it is clearest because the conditions that produced the question are documented, dated, and were experienced as an emergency by the people who posed it.

The question was what a child requires from the people who care for him, and what follows when the requirement is not met. It had not been a research question. Institutional care for children without families was longstanding across Europe and North America, its standards were understood as matters of hygiene and provision, and the outcomes of children raised in

it were not systematically studied. What made the question urgent was a sequence of events across roughly fifteen years.

The evacuation of British children from cities during the Second World War separated large numbers of them from their parents under conditions that were recorded. Observations of the evacuated, and of children in wartime residential nurseries, produced accounts of distress that could not be explained by material deprivation, since the children were fed and housed. The post-war situation across Europe left institutions holding children whose families had been destroyed, in numbers that made the question of what such care does unavoidable. And a study of children raised in institutions from infancy (Spitz, 1945) reported developmental consequences of a severity that was disputed at the time and has been qualified since, without the central observation being overturned.

The World Health Organization commissioned a report on the mental health of homeless children in 1950 and Bowlby wrote it (Bowlby, 1951). This is the institutional fact that matters most for the shape of what followed. The document was addressed to policy, its conclusions were framed for administrators deciding how children without families should be housed, and its argument had to be statable in terms an administrator could act on. What an administrator can act on is an arrangement: whether children are placed in institutions or in families, whether a mother is present, whether care is continuous.

The theory that developed from this had three features that follow from its origin.

Its object is the presence and continuity of a caregiver rather than the character of an exchange. This is what the practical question required. A recommendation that institutions be replaced by family placement is answerable to evidence about presence and continuity, and would not have been strengthened by an account of what passes between a caregiver and a child moment to moment.

Its explanatory frame is biological, and the choice was deliberate. Bowlby's break from the psychoanalytic tradition, described in §1.10, was in part a search for a language in which claims could be tested (van der Horst, 2011) and in which a policy recommendation would not rest on contested interpretation. Ethology supplied it. A behavioural system with a biological function is the kind of thing about which evidence can be gathered, and the kind of thing whose disruption can be described as damage.

Its unit of assessment became a classification of the child. The procedure that made attachment a research programme rather than a policy argument was developed by Ainsworth two decades later, and it assigns a child to a category on the basis of behaviour in a standardised episode. §1.9 examined what this does to a relational claim. What belongs here is the observation that a programme formed to answer an administrative question about arrangements produced, as its central instrument, a device for sorting individual children.

Proposition 2.9. *A question posed for administrative purposes selects for answers stated in terms of arrangements that an administration can alter. What passes within a relation is not such a term, and an account formed under that constraint will describe the relation by its external conditions.*

One further feature of the setting deserves recording, since the neutrality commitment of this book requires it to be stated without editorial. The report and the literature that followed appeared during a period in which the employment of mothers was a contested question in

the societies where the work was conducted, and the theory's conclusions were taken up in that argument (Riley, 1983). Bowlby's own later positions on the matter were more qualified than the uses made of him, and the qualifications travelled less well than the conclusions. ch. 3 takes up this pattern, which is not peculiar to this case.

The question this answer generated concerns what the tie consists of. If a child requires a caregiver, and the requirement is not for food or shelter, then the requirement is for something the caregiver supplies through interaction. Naming that something proved difficult. The candidates offered over the following decades included responsiveness, sensitivity, contingency, and attunement, and §1.13 described the tradition that took the naming of it as its central problem.

A different question arose at the same time from an unrelated direction, and it concerned neither what a child acquires nor what a child requires, but what a child must already have.

2.4.4 The Cognitive Child

The question was how a competence that no one teaches and that no amount of correction produces can nonetheless appear in every normal child on approximately the same schedule. It was asked about language first and generalised afterwards, and it was asked in a setting that had spent two decades committed to an answer it now appeared to rule out.

Three conditions made the question available.

The first was the exhaustion of the behaviourist programme as an account of language. That programme had proposed that verbal behaviour is acquired as other behaviour is acquired, through the shaping of emitted responses by their consequences. The proposal was stated at length in 1957 (Skinner, 1957) and reviewed by Chomsky in 1959 (Chomsky, 1959), and the review's argument was that the mechanisms proposed could not in principle produce what children in fact produce. A child says sentences never heard and never reinforced, applies a regularity to cases outside any corpus he has encountered, and produces errors of a kind that presuppose a rule rather than a habit. Whether the review was fair to its target has been argued since. Its effect was not in doubt.

The second was the availability of a formal apparatus. Work in mathematical logic and in the theory of computation had produced, by the nineteen fifties, a precise notion of a generative system: a finite set of rules capable of producing an unbounded set of well-formed structures. This supplied a way of describing what a speaker knows that was neither a list of behaviours nor a disposition, and it made the poverty of the stimulus into a technical argument rather than an intuition. If the data available to a child underdetermines the grammar the child converges on, and if the space of possible grammars is large, then something must constrain the search.

The third was the computer, and its contribution was an analogy that structured the field for forty years (Gardner, 1985). A machine that manipulates representations according to rules, whose program can be described independently of the hardware running it, supplied a picture of what a mind might be. The picture made certain questions natural: what representations does the system contain, what operations does it perform on them, what is specified in advance and what is supplied by input. It made other questions difficult to formulate, and §1.20 has already indicated the general form of that difficulty.

What followed was a research programme with an unusual property. It proposed that

a great deal is present before experience, and it made the proposal empirically tractable by developing methods for asking what preverbal infants distinguish. The core knowledge literature described in §1.6 is the mature form of this, and its findings on object permanence, numerosity, and the discrimination of agents from objects are among the most robust in the field.

The ontological consequence was noted in the survey and belongs here as a historical observation. An account formed to explain how a competence can appear without instruction will locate whatever explains it in the organism, since instruction is what has been ruled out. The endowment is not a conclusion the programme reached. It is the shape of the only answer the question permits.

Proposition 2.10. *A question about how a competence appears in the absence of teaching admits answers that locate the competence's source in the organism. The question forecloses answers locating it in what passes between the organism and others, since such passage is what the question stipulates to be insufficient.*

This is the point at which the sequence of this section is least linear, and the departure should be marked. The programme just described did not arise from the questions of the two preceding sections and was not addressed to them. It arose from a dispute about verbal behaviour, in a different discipline, with a formal apparatus the developmental literature did not possess. Its entry into developmental psychology was a migration rather than a succession.

The migration nonetheless changed what the field's other questions meant. Once it had become respectable to propose that infants arrive with substantial structure, the question of what a caregiver supplies acquired a competitor. What had looked like a relation producing a capacity could be redescribed as a relation triggering a capacity already present, and §1.6 showed that the redescription is always available. The question generated here is therefore not a further question about children. It is a question about how the field could tell the two descriptions apart, and it has not been answered.

A different challenge arrived at the same period, and it did not concern what children have or acquire at all. It concerned who benefits from the way the question had been posed.

2.4.5 The Political Child

The question was who benefits from an arrangement in which children are described, sorted, and allocated by their measured properties. It was not a question about children and it was not addressed to developmental psychologists, most of whom took some years to notice that it had been asked about them.

The conditions were those of the nineteen sixties and early seventies in Western Europe and North America, and three of them bear on what could be proposed.

The first was the expansion of schooling and the disappointment that followed it. Systems that had extended secondary and then tertiary education to populations previously excluded found that the extension did not produce the redistribution of positions it had been expected to produce. The children of households already advantaged continued to arrive at the advantaged destinations, through a system that had been opened. This is the finding the reproduction traditions were formed to explain, and it is a finding about an institution rather than about children.

The second was the political situation of the period, in which institutions of many kinds were being asked to account for what they did rather than for what they said they did. The events of 1968 in France are the conventional marker, and the intellectual formations that followed took as their common object the operations of power in settings that had presented themselves as neutral. A school is such a setting. So is a clinic, and so is an examination.

The third was the availability of the sociological and philosophical apparatus described in §1.15 and §1.16. Bourdieu's work on cultural capital, Bernstein's on codes, Althusser's on ideological apparatuses, and Foucault's on discipline were formed in this period and addressed to this situation. Their targets were institutions and their method was to describe what an institution accomplishes independently of what it intends.

The consequence for the developmental literature was of a kind it had not previously faced. The earlier questions in this section were internal: a finding did not fit, a mechanism was inadequate, a competence required explanation. This question was external. It did not dispute any developmental finding. It asked what the findings were for, and it proposed that a description of a child as possessing more or less of a measured quantity is an operation performed within an institution that allocates positions.

Foucault's version is the sharpest and §1.20 has stated it. The examination does not merely record a distribution of children; it constitutes children as comparable cases, and the constitution is a condition of the allocation. Applied to developmental psychology, the argument holds that the norm tables of §2.3.2 are not a neutral background against which children are measured. They are the apparatus by which a child becomes the kind of thing that can be measured against others.

Proposition 2.11. *A description of a person by measured properties is available for administrative use, and is produced within institutions that have such uses. An account of what such a description accomplishes is not answerable by defending the accuracy of the measurement.*

Two things follow that bear on the rest of this book.

The first is that the developmental literature's response to this challenge was, in the main, not to answer it. The programmes described in the preceding sections continued, the instruments continued to be used and refined, and the critique was absorbed as a topic within educational sociology rather than as a question about the psychology. This is a fact about disciplinary organisation rather than about the merits of either side, and ch. 3 examines the mechanism by which a critique can be contained in this way.

The second is the reflexive point that this chapter has been building toward. The reproduction traditions relocated the causes of a child's trajectory outside the child, and §1.15 showed that they nonetheless left the child as the bearer of what was transmitted. The reason is visible historically. A tradition formed to explain the distribution of positions requires a unit to which positions are distributed, and the available unit was the individual the instruments already produced. A critique of an apparatus may be conducted in the categories the apparatus supplies, and this one was.

The question generated here was not taken up for two decades and it is the question this book takes as its own. If the description of a child by his properties is an operation rather than an observation, then what would a description that was not that operation look like, and what would it be a description of.

One further question arose in the same period from an entirely different quarter, and it concerned neither what a child has nor what an institution does, but a difficulty in the notion of a stage that had been present since the beginning.

2.4.6 The Dynamical Child

The question was how a transition occurs. It had been available since the first stage account was proposed, since a sequence of stable states does not explain the passage between them, and it went unpursued for as long as the description of the states was itself the achievement.

Three conditions made it pursuable in the nineteen eighties.

The first was accumulated dissatisfaction with the stage construct itself. Findings had built up across two decades in which a competence appeared earlier under simplified conditions, later under complicated ones, in one task and not in a structurally similar one, and inconsistently within the same child across a single week. Each finding was accommodated as a matter of task demands or of horizontal *décalage*. Their accumulation made the accommodation look like the theory's principal activity.

The second was methodological (Siegler and Crowley, 1991). Studying transition requires observing the same child densely over the period in which the change occurs, and this is expensive in a way that cross-sectional comparison is not. The microgenetic designs that became feasible in this period made variability visible, and what they made visible was that a child in transition does not move from one stable performance to another. The child oscillates, produces several forms of the behaviour within a single session, and settles unpredictably.

The third was the availability of a mathematics for exactly this, and since the vocabulary recurs throughout this book it is set out here rather than assumed.

A dynamical system is any system whose state changes over time according to a rule. The rule states how fast the state is changing as a function of where the state currently is. Written in the most compact form,

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = f(x, c), \quad (2.1)$$

where x is the state of the system, dx/dt is the rate at which it is changing, f is the rule, and c is a parameter that the rule depends on but that is not itself part of the state.

Four terms follow from this and they are the ones used throughout.

A *state* is whatever the system is doing at a moment, described by whatever quantities the description requires. For an infant learning to reach, the state might include the position of the hand, its velocity, and the posture of the trunk.

An *attractor* is a state the system returns to after small disturbances. It is where dx/dt is zero and where the rule pushes the state back if it is displaced. A settled pattern of reaching is an attractor in this sense: perturb it and the child returns to it.

A *control parameter* is the quantity c , which the system's rule depends on and which may change for reasons outside the system. Leg mass, muscle strength, and the buoyancy of the surrounding medium are control parameters for stepping. A parameter is not a cause in the ordinary sense; it is a condition under which the rule operates.

A *transition* occurs when a control parameter passes a value at which the existing attractor loses stability. The system then moves to a different attractor, and near the boundary its behaviour becomes variable, since the old pattern no longer holds it and the new one does not

2. The Historical Formation of Developmental Theory




Figure 2.1: A transition as the loss of stability of an attractor. The curve is a stability landscape: the ball rests where the surface is lowest, and the depth of a well is how strongly the pattern resists disturbance. As the control parameter c changes, the well flattens, behaviour becomes variable, and the system settles into a different pattern. Nothing was added to the system; a condition changed.

yet.

Figure 2.1 gives the picture that accompanies the equation. The landscape is not a physical surface; it is a way of drawing how strongly the system resists being moved from a state.

Two features of this description do work in what follows.

A stage, in this vocabulary, is an attractor rather than a programme. It is stable because the rule holds it there, and not because a schedule has assigned it to an age. The stability requires explanation, and so does its loss.

Instability is informative. A system near a transition produces variable behaviour, so variability is the signal that a change is under way. This inverts the treatment of variability as measurement error, and [ch. 70](#) depends on the inversion.

One further clarification is required, since the equation above is the simplest member of a large family and a reader who takes it for the whole will misunderstand what is being claimed later.

Equation (2.1) describes change of a continuous quantity in continuous time on a space with a metric, and its familiarity should not be mistaken for necessity. The same structure appears in systems of quite different kinds. A discrete map advances a state in steps rather than continuously. A quantum system evolves a state vector under a unitary operator, and an open quantum system, coupled to surroundings it exchanges with, evolves a density matrix under a rule that no longer preserves the purity of the state. A graph rewriting system changes a structure by replacing subgraphs according to rules, so that what evolves is a pattern of connection rather than a quantity. A generative grammar produces structures by rule application, and the space it moves through is a space of derivations. Each of these is a system with states and a rule for their change, and none of them is a point moving on a line.

What such systems have in common may be stated as four elements, and this book takes the statement as its working position rather than as an established result.

1. **Constraint.** What the system may not do. The rule is a restriction on possible successions before it is a prescription of actual ones.
2. **Difference.** States must be distinguishable, since a system whose states cannot be told apart has no change to describe.
3. **Change.** Some ordering along which the differences are traversed. Time in the familiar case, and not necessarily time.
4. **Structure.** The organisation of the space in which the change occurs, and the organisation of the changes themselves.

The generality this buys is worth stating plainly. Once the four elements are separated, the space on which change occurs becomes a variable of the description rather than a presupposition of it. Change may occur on a discrete set, on a continuum, on a space with a metric, on a space with only a topology, or on a structure with neither. It may occur across objects of different kinds rather than within one kind, and the transformation of a quantity of money into a value of another sort is the standard example of a change whose difficulty is that its terms belong to different categories. The structures of change may themselves be composed, which is what a category of such structures describes.

Proposition 2.12. *Constraint, difference, change, and structure are the elements common to descriptions of systems that evolve. Fixing them does not fix the space on which the evolution occurs, and accounts differing in that space may nonetheless share the four elements.*

The reason for stating this here, in a historical chapter, is that it bears on what the tradition of §2.4.6 accomplished and on what it did not. That tradition established that developmental change admits a systems description, and it did so with the continuous, metric, quantity-valued instrument that was available. Whether relational change is well described by that particular instrument is a separate question from whether it is a systems phenomenon, and the two have not been kept apart in the literature.

The practical situation should be stated with equal plainness, since a claim of generality at this altitude invites a reasonable suspicion. Most of the systems named above cannot at present be brought into contact with evidence about children. The instruments do not exist, the observations required have not been made, and in several cases it is not known what an observation would consist of. This is a limitation of what can now be done rather than of what may in principle be attempted, and the distinction is not a consolation: an untestable model is untestable whatever its prospects. ch. 70 confines itself accordingly, and ch. 89 records which of these directions the book regards as most likely to become tractable.

How dynamical description is to be used within the framework of this book is therefore an open problem rather than a solved one. What follows in the present section is the simplest classical case, and it is presented because it is the case the historical tradition actually used.

A concrete case makes the vocabulary less abstract, and the stepping reflex is the one on which the tradition was built.

Thelen's programme applied this to motor development and produced the field's clearest demonstration of the general point. The disappearance and reappearance of the stepping reflex (Thelen and Fisher, 1982), which had been explained by cortical maturation inhibiting a subcortical pattern, was shown to depend on the relation between an infant's leg mass and leg strength, and could be restored by supporting the infant in water. A phenomenon that had been read as evidence of a maturational schedule turned out to be a consequence of the relation between a body and its immediate circumstances.

Figure 2.2 sets the two readings beside each other, since the contrast is the tradition's founding argument and it is easier to see than to state.

The figure states the difference the tradition rests on. Both readings account for the same observation, and they differ in where they locate what changed. On the first, something in the child switches. On the second, nothing switches, and a relation crosses a value. The water experiment discriminates between them, which is why it mattered.




Figure 2.2: Two readings of the same observation. On the left, stepping is a behaviour switched off and on by a maturing structure inside the child, and the age of each switch is what requires explanation. On the right, stepping persists throughout as a capacity, and what changes is the relation between two quantities neither of which is the behaviour. Submerging the infant alters that relation directly, and the behaviour returns without anything inside the child having changed.

The transactional programme described in §1.13 arose in the same period from a different direction, and its question was structurally similar. Sameroff's finding was that perinatal complications predict later difficulty inconsistently, and that the inconsistency tracks the family the child is born into. The explanation proposed was that neither the child's initial state nor the environment's determines the outcome, because each has been transformed by the other in the interval.

What these programmes share is the object rather than the method. Both take as their explanandum the process by which a state changes, and both find that the process cannot be described by properties of the entities at the start.

Proposition 2.13. *An account of transition requires terms for what occurs between stable states. Such terms are unavailable to a description that reports which state obtains, and the unavailability is a feature of the description rather than a gap in the evidence.*

The question generated here is the one this book takes up in its formal chapters, and it is worth stating exactly because §1.24.3 declared a debt to this tradition.

If a developmental change is a transition in a system, then the question is what the system is. Thelen's answer is that it is an organism in an environment, and the components entering the description are a leg mass, a muscle strength, a support surface. Sameroff's answer is that it is a pair, and the components are a child's state and an environment's state at each moment. Both answers specify components that are properties of one party or the other, and §1.25.2 examined why this is not incidental to the formalism. A dynamical description requires variables, and a variable must be a quantity of something.

The question of what else could stand in those positions is where this chapter's reconstruction ends and the rest of the book begins.

2.5 The Alternative Conditions of Visibility

This section takes up a tradition that did not produce the questions of §2.4, and takes it up for one purpose. The purpose is not comparison and the section is not a second history running alongside the first.

The argument of this chapter has been that the Euro-American formation was conditioned, and a reader may grant every particular of the reconstruction while continuing to hold that the questions asked were the questions any serious inquiry into children would arrive at. Condi-

tions, on that view, explain the timing and the personnel and leave the content where it was. The way to test this is to find a tradition that thought about children seriously, over a long period, with institutional support, under different conditions, and to ask what it produced.

The Confucian formation tradition satisfies those requirements. It sustained systematic reflection on the formation of persons for longer than the discipline surveyed in [Chapter 1](#) has existed ([Tu, 1985](#)), it was institutionally supported at the highest level, and it generated an enormous literature. What it did not generate is a question about the stages of cognitive development, an instrument for measuring a child against a distribution of other children, or a theory of what a child possesses at a given age.

The absence requires explanation and the explanation is the section's point.

2.5.1 The Question That Was Asked Instead

The organising question of the Confucian tradition concerns how a person becomes fully a person, and the becoming is understood as the assumption of relational positions rather than the acquisition of capacities.

Several features of the tradition follow from this and each has a counterpart in what the tradition did not produce.

The object of formation is conduct within specified relations. A person is a son, a younger brother, a subject, a friend, and the tradition's vocabulary for what is being formed is a vocabulary of how one occupies such positions. What is assessed is whether the occupation is fitting. There is no equivalent question about what the person contains that makes the conduct possible, because the conduct is what was at issue.

The process has no terminus and no age-graded schedule. Cultivation continues through a life, an adult is not a finished product, and the teacher is also cultivating. A tradition holding this does not require a description of what a seven-year-old can do that a five-year-old cannot, since the interesting comparison is between a person and the conduct the position calls for rather than between ages.

The unit of assessment is a relation rather than an individual, and this is the feature that bears most directly on this book. To ask whether a person is filial is to ask about a relation between two parties and about a manner of conducting it. The question cannot be answered by examining one party in isolation, and no procedure for doing so was developed because the question that would require such a procedure was not asked.

Proposition 2.14. *A tradition that takes conduct within relations as the object of formation will not develop instruments for measuring properties of individuals, since its question does not have the form to which such instruments are answers.*

The contrast with [§2.3.2](#) is exact and it is worth drawing out. The instruments described there were built to allocate individual children to positions in a distribution. They were built because an administrative question required them, and the administrative question arose from an institutional arrangement that assembled children by age. The examination system of imperial China was also an administrative apparatus of immense consequence, and it also sorted persons. What it sorted them on was the command of a textual and ethical tradition, assessed by composition, and the assessment was of a performance rather than of a capacity the per-

formance revealed. A candidate who failed had not demonstrated a deficit in an underlying quantity. He had written an inadequate essay.

Two qualifications are required and the neutrality commitment of this book makes both of them mandatory.

Nothing here is a claim that the Confucian tradition was correct about formation, or that its arrangements were preferable, or that its institutions were benign. The examination system was a machine for allocating position that consumed the lives of those subject to it, and the tradition's account of relational positions was also an account of a hierarchy of obligation from which exit was not contemplated. [ch. 5](#) takes up the contemporary descendants of these arrangements and [ch. 42](#) the general question of when a normative order is closed. Neither treatment is flattering.

Nor is this a claim that the tradition anticipated the position of this book. It did not. [§1.22.2](#) established that a tradition of cultivation requires a subject to be cultivated, and that the requirement is as real there as the bearer commitment is in the developmental literature. The two traditions locate differently and both locate.

What the contrast establishes is narrower and it is exactly what this chapter needs. Two traditions of comparable seriousness and duration, formed under different conditions, took different things as the object of study. One took what a person can do and asked how it arrived. The other took how a person conducts himself in a relation and asked how it is cultivated. Neither object is more natural than the other, and a field that arrived at the first did not do so by considering and rejecting the second.

The developmental question is therefore a historical formation, in the sense this chapter has been using, and not a discovery about what children are. That is all the section claims and it is enough.

2.5.2 The Unarisen Conditions

The preceding subsection described a tradition asking a different question. This one asks why the conditions that produced the developmental question in Europe did not produce it here, and the answer is instructive because several of those conditions were present.

[§2.3.1](#) named three: a decline in child mortality, the removal of children from production, and the assembly of children by age in institutions that compared them. The third is the one that did the decisive work, and imperial China possessed something that resembles it closely.

The examination system ([Elman, 2000; Miyazaki, 1976](#)) assembled candidates, subjected them to a standardised assessment, ranked them, and allocated position on the result. It operated for over a millennium, it reached into households at every level that could afford preparation, and it organised the ambitions of an enormous population around a graded sequence of hurdles. If an apparatus that sorts persons by measured performance is what produces a science of individual differences, this apparatus should have produced one.

It did not, and three features of its operation explain why.

The unit assessed was a composition rather than a capacity. A candidate submitted work, the work was judged, and the judgement was of the work. Nothing in the procedure required a construct standing behind the performance and explaining it, and none was developed. A modern examination reports a score understood as an estimate of an underlying quantity, and

the estimate can be wrong about the quantity. In the imperial procedure there was nothing for the assessment to be wrong about in that way.

The candidates were not age-graded. Men sat the examinations at whatever age they were prepared, and repeated attempt across decades was ordinary rather than remarkable. A population assembled without regard to age presents no age-related regularity to be noticed. The question of what a person of a given age can typically do does not arise where the assembling is done on another principle, and it was this question that §2.3.1 identified as the one a schoolroom poses.

The apparatus was directed at adults. Preparation began in childhood and was extensive, but what was assessed was the finished performance of a candidate, not the progress of a child. Childhood appears in the system as a period of preparation whose internal structure the system had no occasion to describe.

Proposition 2.15. *An apparatus that sorts persons by performance produces a science of individual differences only where it assesses a construct behind the performance and assembles those assessed on a principle that makes a regularity visible. An apparatus lacking either feature may sort with great consequence and generate no such science.*

This sharpens what §2.5.1 established. The difference between the two traditions is not that one had an institution of assessment and the other did not. Both had one, both were consequential, and both shaped what households did with children over centuries. What differed was the form of the assessment, and the form determined what became visible.

Two further remarks belong here.

The first concerns what this establishes about the European case. §2.3.2 was careful to say that the instruments were built for administrative purposes and that scientific programmes inherited them. The Chinese case shows that administrative purpose is not sufficient. What was required was an administrative purpose of a particular kind: one that assembled by age, and one that treated performance as evidence of something else. Binet's commission had both. The imperial examiners had neither.

The second concerns the limits of the contrast. Nothing here explains why the European apparatus took the form it did, and this chapter has not attempted that explanation. §2.3.1 described the arrangements without accounting for their emergence, which is a question in economic and social history that a book on childrearing has no business settling. What the contrast establishes is that the arrangements were contingent, which is the claim §2.5 was introduced to support.

2.6 The Blindness of the Present Moment

A chapter arguing that every account of children was conditioned by what its moment made visible has an obligation it cannot discharge and must nonetheless attempt. The present moment is also a moment. If the argument holds, this book is being written under conditions that determine what its author can formulate, and the determination is not visible from inside.

2.6.1 The Form of the Difficulty

The difficulty is not that the present is hard to see clearly. That would be a matter of effort and could be answered by more of it. The difficulty is structural and has three components, each of which is visible in the reconstructions above.

The first is that a condition does its work by supplying what does not need to be argued for. §2.3.2 found that a field with only individual-level instruments did not have to defend the individual as its unit. What a moment supplies without argument is precisely what its participants do not experience as a choice, and one does not notice having declined an alternative one never formulated.

The second is that the relevant conditions frequently move on timescales longer than the inquiry. The Euro-American formation took its shape over roughly seventy years, and no participant observed the whole of it. A variable that changes appreciably over a century is, from inside any single career, a constant. It appears in the description as background rather than as a factor, and background is what one does not think to vary.

The third is that a moment's blindness is not a list of topics it fails to mention. Several of the conditions reconstructed in this chapter were mentioned constantly by the people they conditioned. Piaget knew he worked in Geneva. Bowlby knew he was writing for the World Health Organization. What was invisible was a question of its bearing: that the administrative form of the commission would select for an account stated in terms of arrangements, and thereby foreclose an account stated in terms of what passes between two parties. A condition can be perfectly well known and its consequences entirely unnoticed.

Proposition 2.16. *A condition of inquiry operates by supplying premises that do not require defence, and such premises are not experienced by those who hold them as positions taken. Awareness of the condition as a fact does not entail awareness of it as a condition.*

Three consequences follow for how this section proceeds.

Naming candidates is worth doing and is not the same as seeing. What can be attempted is a list of variables that are currently treated as background and that a later reader may find were doing work. Such a list will be wrong in both directions: it will include things that turn out not to matter, and it will omit whatever matters most. A list with those properties is still better than the alternative, which is a general acknowledgement that every age has blind spots. The general acknowledgement is unfalsifiable and costs nothing. A list can be checked.

The candidates must be things this book itself relies on or leaves aside, rather than errors attributed to other people. A section identifying the blindnesses of one's opponents would be an exercise of a different kind, and §2.1.1 has already ruled out the version of that exercise which treats conditions as refutations.

And the attempt cannot succeed on its own terms. If the argument of this chapter is right, the most consequential of the present conditions is not on any list a present author could compose. §2.6.2 states what can be stated, and it should be read as an attempt whose value lies in being specific enough to fail rather than in being correct.

2.6.2 The Candidates

Six variables are named below. Each is currently treated, in this book and in the literature it draws on, as a setting within which rearing occurs rather than as a factor in what rearing is. Each may turn out to have been doing work that a later reader can see and the present author cannot.

The imaging instrument. §1.14 recorded that a neural measure locates a property in the tissue of one organism, and [ch. ?? ch:neural-part] treats the neuroscience at length. What is not examined anywhere in this book is the possibility that the availability of imaging has reorganised which developmental questions appear worth asking. A technique that answers questions of one form supplies a standing reason to pose questions of that form. The literature on early adversity is now largely a literature about what adversity does to a brain, and the reorganisation happened within three decades without being decided. A later reader may find that this book, while stating that no neural finding settles a relational question, nonetheless took the neural evidence as the evidence that most required accommodating.

The digital environment. Children now grow up in the presence of systems that respond to them, that record what they do, and that are designed to hold attention. The literature treats this as a class of inputs with effects to be measured, and §1.23 excluded the media-effects literature on that ground. The excluded framing may be the wrong one. If what a child interacts with has become partly a party that adapts to him, the question is a question of whether the relational field a child develops in now contains participants of a kind no prior account contemplated. This book withholds treating that question and its omission is a choice made without argument.

The platform as an institution of rearing. Related and distinct. §1.16.8 noted the platformisation of educational provision. What is not examined is that a substantial part of what parents now know about children reaches them through systems that select what they see according to what holds engagement. ch. 3 examines how theories travel and takes its models from an era of books, curricula, and professional training. The mechanism may have changed in a way that chapter does not register.

The ecological trajectory. §1.16.5 recorded that children are being reared under a climate trajectory their households did not choose. This book states the fact and does not build on it. A later reader may find the omission remarkable, in the way that a present reader finds it remarkable that accounts of childhood written in the nineteen fifties treated the arrangement of the household as a natural fact rather than as a recent settlement.

Movement and displacement. A substantial and growing proportion of children are reared in societies other than the ones their households came from, in households where more than one language and more than one account of what a child owes are present simultaneously. The literature treats this as a specialised topic. If ch. 37 is right that what passes between generations is a grammar, then a household containing two grammars is the case in which the mechanism is most visible rather than a special case of transmission, and this book treats it as neither.

The generative machine. Systems that produce language are now present in the settings where children learn language, and in the settings where adults seek advice about children. What this does is not known, and the honest position is that nobody currently knows. What can

be said is that every account surveyed in [Chapter 1](#) presupposes that the parties to a child's linguistic environment are human, and that the presupposition was never stated because it never required stating. A presupposition of that kind is exactly what [§2.6.1](#) described.

Proposition 2.17. *A variable treated as the setting of a phenomenon is not thereby absent from the phenomenon. Where the variable changes on a timescale exceeding the inquiry, its treatment as a setting is a methodological convenience that the inquiry has no means of testing.*

Two remarks close the section.

The list has an evident bias and it should be named rather than left for a reader to notice. Five of the six candidates are things that have changed recently and that are widely discussed. A condition of the kind this chapter has been reconstructing is more often something stable and unremarked than something new and prominent. The most consequential present condition may therefore be something this list does not resemble: an assumption about households, or about what a person is for, or about the relation between a life and the work it contains, so settled that it has not occurred to the author to state it.

And the section should not be read as a hedge. Nothing in it withdraws a claim made elsewhere in this book. A claim advanced under conditions the author cannot fully survey is still a claim, and [§1.26.2](#) stated the position: revision is expected, the propositions are numbered so that they can be located, and a later reader who identifies what this moment could not see will have done what the framework asks.

2.7 The Ledger of Conditions

The reconstruction can now be set out in one place. [Table 2.1](#) pairs each question examined in [§2.4](#) with the conditions that made it available and with what those conditions placed beyond reach.

The third column is the one that carries the argument. A condition that makes a question available makes other questions unavailable at the same time, and the second effect is not a defect in anyone's reasoning. It is what a condition is.

Three observations complete the chapter.

The foreclosures are not errors and they were not noticed. In no case did a research programme consider the possibility named in the third column and reject it on evidence. [§2.1.2](#) distinguished a commitment that was considered and retained from one that was never formulated, and the table records six instances of the second kind.

The foreclosures agree with one another. Six questions arising in different countries, in different decades, from different disciplines, and answering to different institutional demands, each placed beyond reach a description in which what develops is not borne by an individual. This agreement is the finding of [§1.25](#) restated as a historical fact. A convergence produced by six independent conditions is not thereby correct, and it is also not an accident: what the conditions had in common was the apparatus described in [§2.3](#), which every one of them inherited.

And the sequence has not ended. [§2.6.2](#) named six variables currently treated as settings, and a later reader will be able to complete a seventh row of this table that the present author cannot. The table is offered as a description of a period from inside it, which is the only vantage

The question	What made it available	What it placed beyond reach
The order of understanding	A philosophical problem about the origin of necessity; age-graded classrooms presenting a regularity	An origin of the categories lying between persons, since borrowed necessity was what the problem excluded
The source of variation	A tradition holding consciousness to be socially produced; a state programme of mass literacy; expeditionary evidence	A relation without a prior location for what it carries, since the general law describes a movement between locations
The requirement of care	Wartime separation; institutional populations; a commission addressed to policy	The character of an exchange, since the recommendation had to be stated in arrangements an administration could alter
The possibility of competence	The collapse of the behaviourist account of language; a formal notion of generative systems; the computer as analogy	A competence produced between parties, since instruction was what the question stipulated to be insufficient
The beneficiary of the arrangement	An expansion of schooling that failed to redistribute; a period of institutional critique; a sociological apparatus	A unit other than the individual, since the critique was conducted in the categories the criticised apparatus supplied
The mechanism of transition	Accumulated anomalies in the stage construct; micro-genetic method; a mathematics of stability	A variable that is not a quantity borne by one party, since a dynamical description requires quantities

Table 2.1: Each question with its conditions and its foreclosures. The third column states what the condition placed beyond reach, and in every case the foreclosure follows from the same feature that made the question productive.

available and the one this chapter has argued is insufficient.

2.8 From Historical to Generative Reconstruction

This chapter has reconstructed a formation. What it has not done is explain how a formation travels, and the omission is the reason the next chapter exists.

The account given here has a shape that should be made explicit before it is left behind. A question became askable under certain conditions, an answer was given, the answer generated a further question, and the sequence continued. Presented that way the history is a succession of problems within one setting, and the setting appears as a container in which the succession occurred.

Three features of what actually happened do not fit that shape.

The first is that the answers did not stay where they were formed. Piagetian stages entered teacher training in societies whose schools were organised on other principles. Attachment classifications entered policy in states whose arrangements for care had nothing to do with post-war Britain. A programme formed to answer one question was taken up elsewhere to answer another, and the taking up was not a transmission of a finished object.

The second is that what travelled was altered in transit, and altered in ways that were not errors. §1.17 recorded that the style classification now circulates in a form its author disowned. §2.4.3 recorded that Bowlby's qualifications travelled less well than his conclusions. A theory arriving in a new setting is interpreted with the resources available there, and the interpretation is what then operates. Calling this misreading assumes an original meaning that the receiving setting failed to preserve, which is a description from the point of view of the origin.

The third is that the alterations returned. A concept reworked elsewhere re-enters the literature of its origin bearing the marks of the rework, and the literature does not always notice. What is treated as a single tradition developing over time is frequently a set of local versions in intermittent contact.

Proposition 2.18. *A history organised as a succession of questions within one setting cannot represent what happens when an answer is taken up elsewhere. The taking up alters what was taken, and the alteration is a generative event rather than a loss.*

This bears on the division of labour set out in §2.2.3, and it is worth stating what the division costs. That section separated formation from distribution, assigning the first to this chapter and the second to the next, and defended the separation on the ground that comparison requires instruments that have not yet been examined. The defence holds. What it does not establish is that formation and distribution are two things.

They are more plausibly one thing described twice. A tradition forms by taking up what reached it and reworking it, which is the same operation that occurs when what it produces reaches somewhere else. Geneva was a site of reception before it was a site of origin: Kant reached it, Darwin reached it, and what Piaget produced was made from what arrived. The distinction between forming and travelling marks a difference in vantage rather than a difference in the process.

A framework organised around generation would take the trajectory as its unit rather than the period or the place. What would be reconstructed is a path along which something is repeatedly received, reworked, and passed on, with each rework a generative event and each site both a destination and an origin. Time and space would then be aspects of how such a path is laid out rather than two dimensions specified in advance.

This book withholds developing that methodology. Doing so would require an account of what a trajectory's unit is, of when two reworkings count as the same tradition, and of how a path is individuated, and none of these is a question about childrearing. The framework's own historical writings are where such an account belongs, and §2.2.3 noted that the separation of time from space adopted here is a convenience rather than a commitment. This section discharges that note.

What can be said is that the next three chapters proceed as though the distinction held, and that a reader should hold the arrangement lightly. ch. 3 follows the tradition reconstructed here

as it moved, and asks what the moving did to it.

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Chapter 3

The Circulation of Theories

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what happens to an account of children when it is taken up in a setting other than the one that produced it.

It contributes the connection between the two chapters that surround it. [Chapter 2](#) reconstructed a formation and [ch. 5](#) describes contemporary arrangements across a number of societies. Without an account of movement those two chapters state a beginning and an end with nothing between them, and the arrangements described in the later chapter would appear as independent developments rather than as what they largely are, which is local settlements reached with materials that arrived from elsewhere. The chapter also supplies the mechanism that [ch. 37](#) generalises, since what happens to a theory in transit and what happens to a description of a child within a household have the same form.

It does not evaluate any local version against its original, which would require the assumption this chapter is written to examine. Nor does it survey the arrangements themselves, which is the work of [ch. 5](#).

The reader should carry forward one thing: that what arrives in a new setting is not what left the old one, and that the difference is produced by the receiving setting rather than lost in transmission.

3.1 The Standing of a Local Version

A chapter about theories in transit has to decide, before it begins, how to describe what it finds. The available vocabulary is not neutral and the most natural terms carry a conclusion.

3.1.1 The Language of Loss

The customary way of describing what happens to a theory abroad is a vocabulary of damage ([Said, 1983](#)). A concept is diluted, an argument is oversimplified, a qualification is dropped, a finding is popularised, a doctrine is misapplied. Each of these terms describes a difference between an original and a later version, and each attributes the difference to a failure on the receiving end.

The vocabulary is sometimes apt. [§1.17](#) recorded that the style classification now circulates in a form its author disowned, and [§2.4.3](#) that Bowlby's qualifications travelled less well than his conclusions. In both cases something specific was dropped, the dropping is documented, and the resulting version supports claims the original was careful not to make. A description of these as losses is accurate.

What the vocabulary cannot describe is the case where the receiving setting adds something. When a concept arrives in a society whose institutions and practices differ from those of its origin, the concept must be attached to whatever is there, and the attaching is work. Someone has to decide what in the local arrangement the concept refers to, what follows from it for practices already in place, and what to do when it conflicts with something established (Callon, 1984; Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). The result is a version that says things the original did not say, and some of those things are not in the original even implicitly.

Calling that result a distortion presupposes an answer to the question this chapter is asking. It treats the original as containing a fixed content that the receiving setting either preserved or damaged, and it takes the point of view of the origin as the point of view from which the transaction is to be assessed.

Proposition 3.1. *A description of a local version as a distortion of an original attributes a fixed content to the original and evaluates the local version by its fidelity to that content. Both the attribution and the evaluation are made from the standpoint of the origin.*

Two considerations tell against adopting that standpoint here.

The first is that originals are themselves local versions (Latour, 1987). §2.8 observed that Geneva was a site of reception before it was a site of origin, and the observation generalises. Every account surveyed in Chapter 1 was assembled from materials that reached its author from elsewhere, and in each case the assembly involved the same operations that this chapter examines: selection, attachment to local conditions, and the production of consequences the sources did not contain. A distinction between origination and reception that is drawn on the basis of where an author happened to work will not survive examination.

The second is that fidelity is not what determines a version's consequences. What operates in a society is the version that is present there, and it operates through whatever it has become. A local version that departs substantially from its source may be the more consequential of the two, may generate a research programme of its own, and may in due course be exported (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004). Assessing it by its distance from a source describes what it is not, and this chapter is concerned with what it is.

The vocabulary adopted here is accordingly one of transformation rather than of loss (Liu, 1995; Venuti, 1995). What arrives somewhere is reworked, the rework has a direction that can be described, and the description does not require an original against which to measure. Where something is dropped this will be said, since dropping is one of the things that happens. What will not be said is that the dropping constitutes a failure, unless there is a specific reason within the case for saying so.

3.1.2 The Objects That Travel

A theory is not one thing and its parts do not move together (Star and Griesemer, 1989). Separating them is the first analytical step, since what a receiving setting takes up is rarely the whole and the selection is not random.

Four kinds of thing move, and they move under different conditions and at different rates.

A *proposition* is a claim that something is the case. That development proceeds through an invariant sequence of stages, that early separation has durable consequences, that respon-

sive care produces security. Propositions travel through texts, through training, and through summary, and they are the part of a theory most often reported as its content.

An *instrument* is a procedure for producing a measurement or a classification. The Strange Situation, an inventory of parenting style, a schedule of developmental milestones. Instruments travel as protocols, they require training to administer, and they carry with them a commitment about what is being measured that the protocol itself does not state.

A *vocabulary* is a set of terms with their distinctions. Attachment, sensitivity, scaffolding, stimulation, readiness. Vocabularies travel most easily of all (Liu, 1995), since a word may be adopted without any of the apparatus that gave it its sense, and they travel furthest from professional settings into ordinary speech.

An *authority* is the standing that permits a claim to be made without further defence. That a recommendation rests on developmental science, that a practice is evidence-based, that an arrangement accords with what is now known about the brain. Authority travels attached to whatever it is invoked for, and it may be invoked for a proposition its source would not endorse.

These four separate in transit, and the separation is what most needs describing.

An instrument may arrive without the propositions that motivated it. A ministry may adopt a developmental screening schedule because it requires a procedure for allocating early intervention (Meyer et al., 1997), and the schedule will then operate as an administrative device in a setting where the theory behind it is unknown to those administering it. What arrived was a protocol.

A vocabulary may arrive without either. Terms enter a language through translation, through professional training, through the market in advice, and once present they are available for uses their source never contemplated. A term so adopted acquires its sense from the uses it is put to locally, which is why a vocabulary is the part of a theory that changes most and is noticed least.

An authority may arrive with almost nothing attached. That developmental science supports a practice is a claim about the standing of a recommendation rather than about its content, and the claim can be made by anyone in a position to make it.

Proposition 3.2. *The propositions, instruments, vocabulary, and authority of a theory separate when the theory moves. What operates in a receiving setting is frequently one of these without the others, and which one arrived determines what the theory does there.*

Two consequences shape the rest of this chapter.

The first is that a question about whether a theory has been correctly understood in a given society is usually the wrong question. Where an instrument arrived without its propositions, there is nothing that was understood or misunderstood. There is a procedure being used, and the question is what the procedure does.

The second is that the four kinds move in a characteristic order, and the order matters. Vocabulary moves first and fastest, because it requires no institutional accommodation. Authority moves next, since a claim to standing can be made as soon as the vocabulary is available to name what is being claimed for. Instruments move more slowly, because they require training, funding, and a use. Propositions move last and least completely, since they are the part that has to be argued for rather than adopted. A setting may therefore have a fully developed local vocabulary, a widely invoked authority, an established instrument, and no substantial

engagement with the claims that produced any of them, and this configuration is common rather than exceptional.

3.2 The Passages

Four cases follow. They are selected because the material is documented and because each shows a different one of the four objects of §3.1.2 arriving in advance of the others. No case is offered as representative of its society, and §3.2.5 states what the four together do and do not establish.

3.2.1 The Stage Sequence in Teacher Training

The constructivist account of §1.3 entered teacher preparation in a large number of countries between roughly 1960 and 1990 (Schriewer, 2000), and what entered was not the epistemological programme described in §2.4.1.

What entered was a sequence of named periods with ages attached. Sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, formal operational, with approximate age ranges, and a set of associated propositions: that instruction should be matched to the period a child occupies, that a child cannot profit from material requiring operations he has not attained, and that readiness is a condition of teaching rather than an effect of it.

Three features of this version are worth stating precisely, since each departs from the source in a direction the source did not indicate.

The ages became the content. In the original the sequence is necessary and the ages are incidental, since what makes a stage a stage is the logical structure of the operations available within it. §2.4.1 showed why the necessity mattered: it was the answer to a question about the origin of necessity. A version organised around ages retains the part that was incidental and drops the part that motivated the account.

Readiness became a constraint on instruction. The proposition that a child cannot profit from material beyond his period does not follow from an account of how structures reorganise under encounter with what they cannot assimilate, and something close to its converse does. The version that entered training treated the sequence as a schedule to be waited for, and the treatment had consequences for what was offered to whom.

The account acquired an application it did not have. The original is an account of how knowledge originates and contains no pedagogy. The version in teacher training is a pedagogy, and the pedagogical content was supplied by the receiving institutions, which required from an incoming theory a specification of what a teacher should do.

Proposition 3.3. *A theory that supplies no practical direction acquires one when it enters an institution that requires practical direction. The direction is produced by the institution and attributed to the theory.*

The receiving conditions varied and the variation is instructive.

Where teacher preparation was organised around a national curriculum with age-graded expectations already in place, the stage sequence was absorbed as a scientific warrant for arrangements that existed. What the theory supplied was authority, in the sense of §3.1.2, and the arrangements did not change.

Where preparation was organised around a doctrine of child-centred practice, the same sequence was absorbed as a warrant for that doctrine, and the resulting version emphasised discovery, activity, and the inadvisability of direct instruction. This is the version that entered English-language primary education and that subsequent critics attacked (Burman, 2016), and the criticism was frequently addressed to Piaget for positions he did not hold.

Where preparation was organised around a tradition holding that instruction leads development rather than following it, the sequence was received as a competitor and was taught alongside an alternative. In settings where Vygotsky's work was available first, or was institutionally established, the constructivist account entered as one position in a dispute rather than as the account of how children develop.

The last case is the one that bears most directly on this chapter's argument. What a receiving setting already contains determines what an arriving theory becomes, and it determines this more strongly than anything in the theory. The same sequence of four periods served as a warrant for age-graded instruction, as a warrant for child-centred practice, and as a foil for a rival account, in three settings differing in what was there when it arrived.

3.2.2 The Classification in Policy

Attachment theory presents the clearest case of an instrument arriving in advance of the propositions that produced it, and the case is instructive because the instrument is unusually demanding and the propositions are unusually qualified.

What §2.4.3 described was a body of claims addressed to policy: that a child requires continuity of care, that institutional rearing of a certain kind produces durable difficulty, that the requirement is not met by adequate feeding and housing. What was later built on those claims was the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978), a laboratory procedure of about twenty minutes in which an infant's response to separation and reunion is coded, and from which the infant is assigned to one of a small number of categories.

The procedure travelled and the propositions travelled less well. Three features of its movement bear on the argument.

The procedure travels as a protocol and the protocol contains no theory. What is transmitted is a sequence of episodes, a coding scheme, and a training requirement. Nothing in the materials states what the categories are categories of, and the question does not arise for someone administering the procedure correctly. §3.1.2 predicted this configuration. An instrument that arrives without its propositions operates as a procedure, and the question of whether it was understood does not have an application.

The categories acquired an evaluative sense the procedure does not supply. The classification distinguishes a pattern in which an infant seeks proximity on reunion and is comforted from patterns in which he does not. The names given to these are ordinary evaluative words, and once the vocabulary travelled the evaluation travelled with it. A version in which one category is the good outcome and the others are deficits was available to any reader of the terms alone, and it is the version that reached practice in a number of settings.

The distributions differed across societies and the difference was read as a finding about children. Samples in several countries produced proportions departing from those reported in the original American work, and the departures were substantial enough to require comment

(van IJzendoorn and Kroonenberg, 1988; Rothbaum et al., 2000). Two readings were available. On the first, the societies differ in the security of the ties children form. On the second, the procedure measures a response to a specific situation whose meaning depends on arrangements that differ across societies, so that the same coded behaviour indicates different things. The literature contains both readings and ch. 4 takes up the general problem they instance.

Proposition 3.4. *An instrument transmitted as a protocol carries its ontological commitment without stating it. Where the commitment is not stated it is not available to be questioned, and a finding produced by the instrument will be read as a finding about what the instrument was built to be about.*

What happened in policy settings followed from these features together.

A classification is administratively useful in a way that a body of qualified propositions is not. It sorts, it produces a record, and it supports a decision about a particular child. Where a system required grounds for decisions about placement, contact, or intervention, an available classification with a training pathway and a research literature behind it was taken up, and taken up for decisions the research had not addressed.

The qualifications did not travel. That a classification describes a relationship rather than a child, that the procedure was validated on a narrow population, that stability across time is moderate rather than high, and that the categories predict group differences rather than individual outcomes, are all stated in the specialist literature. None of them is contained in the protocol, and a setting that received the protocol received none of them.

This is the pattern §2.4.3 identified in the theory's formation, appearing a second time. An account formed to answer an administrative question, in terms an administration could act on, produced an instrument that administrations could use, which was then used administratively in settings the account had not considered. The circulation did not distort the theory. It extended a feature the theory had from the beginning.

3.2.3 The Method in the Market

The third case differs from the two before it. What travelled was neither a proposition nor an instrument but a name, and the name travelled into a market rather than into a profession or a ministry.

The pedagogy described in §1.22 was developed for a specific population under specific conditions: children of working families in a district of Rome, in a facility provided so that they would be supervised while their parents worked. The materials were designed for that setting, the training was extensive, and the method as its author specified it (Montessori, 1912) makes demands on the preparation of an adult that are considerable.

What circulated internationally over the following century included the method, and included a great deal else.

The name is not restricted in most jurisdictions. A setting may describe itself by the name without training, without the materials, and without any relation to the organisations that maintain the method's standards. Two settings using the name may therefore have almost nothing in common, and a parent selecting between them has no way to tell from the name what is being offered.

The market position inverted. A provision developed for children whose parents could not otherwise supervise them became, in a large number of countries, a provision purchased at a premium by households with means. The inversion was not an intention of anyone in particular. A method with a distinctive name, a philosophy that can be stated attractively, and a shortage of accredited providers has the properties of a positional good (Bourdieu, 1984), and the market treated it accordingly.

The materials became the identifying feature. What is most visible to a purchaser is the apparatus: the specific objects, their arrangement, the appearance of the room. What is least visible is the preparation of the adult and the structure of the day, which is where the method's substance lies. A version identified by its equipment is available, it is cheaper to supply, and it is what a competitive market will tend to produce.

Proposition 3.5. *Where a method's name is unprotected and its visible features are separable from its substance, circulation through a market selects for the visible features. The selection is a property of the transmission channel rather than of the method or of anyone's intention.*

Two observations complete the case, and the neutrality commitment of this book requires the first.

Nothing here is an assessment of the pedagogy. Whether the method as specified produces the outcomes claimed for it is a question the present chapter does not address, and a version identified by its equipment may nonetheless be a good provision judged on its own terms. The claim is about what a channel of circulation selects for, and it would hold equally if the method were the best available or the worst.

The second is that this case exhibits the configuration §3.1.2 named as common. A vocabulary is present and widely used. An authority is invoked, in the form of a founder's name and a philosophy of the child. Instruments in the form of materials are widely distributed. The propositions, which concern what a prepared environment does and why an adult's restraint matters, travelled least of all. A setting may have three of the four and be, in the respect that matters to its author, unrelated to what she specified.

This is also the only case of the four in which the receiving setting is neither a profession nor a state institution. §3.2.1 concerned teacher preparation and §3.2.2 concerned ministries and courts. Here the receiving setting is a market of households purchasing provision, and the difference in channel produced a different transformation. §3.2.5 returns to this, since it bears on how far the four cases can be generalised.

3.2.4 The Guidance of an International Body

The fourth case concerns a channel the three preceding ones do not use. An international organisation issues guidance, ministries adopt it, and what reaches practice in a given country has passed through a body that is not the theory's origin and not its destination.

The channel has features that distinguish it from the others.

Guidance must be statable for every member (Meyer et al., 1997). A recommendation issued to a hundred and more states cannot presuppose an institutional arrangement that many of them lack, and it cannot rest on evidence gathered in one setting unless the claim is put in a form that does not depend on the setting. The drafting therefore selects for propositions of a particular kind: general, expressed in outcomes rather than in procedures, and stated

at a level of abstraction at which disagreement about implementation does not arise. What survives drafting is what could be agreed to.

Guidance arrives with an authority the underlying research does not carry. §3.1.2 distinguished authority from proposition, and this channel produces the sharpest instance of the distinction. A ministry adopting an international recommendation is not adopting a finding; it is adopting a standard, and the standard's force in a national debate derives from its provenance rather than from the evidence behind it. A claim that was contested in the literature may become, once it has passed through this channel, the settled position from which departures require justification (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004).

Guidance carries indicators, and the indicators are what actually travel. A recommendation that children should receive adequate early stimulation is not administrable. A recommendation accompanied by an indicator, a target, and a reporting requirement is administrable, and what a ministry does with the guidance is determined by the indicator rather than by the recommendation. ch. 28 takes up what happens to a practice organised around an index, and the general finding there applies here.

Proposition 3.6. *Guidance issued to many states selects for propositions statable independently of institutional arrangement, and reaches practice through indicators rather than through the propositions themselves. What operates in a receiving country is the indicator.*

The consequences for what circulates are direct.

A finding formed in one setting acquires, by passing through this channel, a generality its evidence does not support. The research on early adversity was conducted predominantly in a small number of countries (Henrich et al., 2010), and the guidance derived from it is addressed to all of them. This is not a criticism of anyone's drafting. A body issuing guidance must issue it to its members, and the alternative to a general recommendation is no recommendation.

The receiving country's version is shaped by what it must report. Where the reporting requirement concerns enrolment in early provision, provision expands and its character is determined by whatever is cheapest to expand. Where the requirement concerns a developmental screening rate, screening expands. The indicator selects the practice, and the selection operates whatever the guidance says.

And a contested claim can become settled by transit. A proposition that the specialist literature treats as qualified may appear in guidance without its qualifications, since the qualifications are the part that does not survive drafting for a general audience. It then returns to national debates carrying international authority, and a domestic researcher who states the qualification is in the position of contradicting a standard rather than of reporting the literature.

This last is the feature that connects the case to §2.8. What returns to a national debate is not what left it. The channel has produced something with a standing that neither the original research nor the receiving country's own literature possessed, and the something is now a fact in the debate that both must accommodate.

3.2.5 The Limits of the Cases

Four cases do not establish a general account of circulation, and the reasons they do not should be stated before the chapter draws its conclusions.

The cases were selected because they are documented, and documentation is not independent of what is being described. A transformation that produced controversy generated a literature; one that proceeded without objection did not. The four cases are therefore drawn from the visible end of a distribution whose other end is unavailable by the same procedure that made these available. Whether the quiet cases resemble the noisy ones is not something this chapter can determine.

The cases share a destination. All four concern material moving from Western European or North American origins outward, and none concerns movement in the other direction or between settings neither of which is an origin in this sense. This reflects the pattern of the period, and §2.2.1 gave the reason the pattern exists. It nonetheless means that the mechanisms described have been observed operating in one direction, and a mechanism observed in one direction may be asymmetric.

The cases were selected to display the separation of §3.1.2, each showing a different object arriving first. A selection made to display a distinction will display it. What the cases establish is that the separation occurs and has consequences, and not that it occurs in any particular proportion of transmissions.

And the unit of each case is coarse. A case treats a country or a market as a receiving setting, and a country is not a setting in any sense that would satisfy the argument of this book. Within any of them the reception differed by region, by institution, by profession, and by the position of the individuals involved. The cases are stated at the level at which the documentation exists, and the level is not the one at which the transformations actually occurred.

Proposition 3.7. *Cases selected because they are documented are drawn from transmissions that produced comment. What such cases establish about mechanisms is not thereby established about frequencies.*

What the four do establish is narrower than a general account and is enough for the chapter's purpose.

They establish that the four objects separate in transit, since each case exhibits a different one arriving in advance of the others. They establish that the receiving setting supplies what the arriving material lacks, and that what it supplies comes from what was already there. They establish that the channel of transmission selects: a profession selects for what can be taught, an administration for what can be recorded, a market for what can be seen, and an international body for what can be agreed. And they establish that transformation is not confined to the receiving end, since §3.2.4 showed material returning to its origin altered.

What they do not establish is any claim about how often, about which societies transform more or less, or about whether transformation improves or damages what is transmitted. The last of these was ruled out in §3.1.1 on other grounds, and the ruling holds independently of the evidence.

One further limit deserves its own statement because it concerns the book rather than the chapter. This chapter has described theories moving between institutional settings, and ch. 37 will describe grammars moving between generations within a household. The structural similarity is real and the chapter's title indicates that the book intends to use it. Whether a mechanism observed at the scale of professions and ministries operates at the scale of a household is not established by anything here, and the later chapter must argue it rather than inherit it.

3.3 The Installation of a Commitment

The four cases were presented as instances of transformation, and a chapter that stopped there would have described a process the sociology of knowledge has described already. What the cases show, taken with what [Chapter 1](#) established, is something narrower and more consequential for this book.

3.3.1 The Passage from Premise to Procedure

[§1.1.1](#) argued that an ontological commitment does its work at the point where an instrument is designed, and that this is why such commitments are not idle. An instrument is built to detect something, the something must be the kind of thing that can be located somewhere, and the decision about where is taken before any measurement occurs. The argument was made about the formation of instruments. The cases of this chapter show what happens to a commitment afterwards.

Consider what the Strange Situation carries. The procedure assigns an infant to a category on the basis of behaviour in a standardised episode, and the assignment presupposes that there is something stable enough to be assigned, present in the infant during the episode, and detectable through what he does. That presupposition is not stated in the protocol and does not need to be, since the protocol is a set of instructions for conducting a procedure. [§3.2.2](#) recorded that the procedure travelled where the propositions did not.

What travelled with it was the presupposition, in a form that could not be examined.

This is the passage the chapter exists to describe. A commitment enters an instrument at the point of design, where it is at least in principle open to argument, since the designer could have designed otherwise and someone could have objected. It then travels inside the instrument as an unstated condition of the instrument's use. It arrives in a setting where the instrument is adopted for an administrative purpose. And at that point it has become a feature of a procedure, embedded in training, in forms, in the categories a record permits, and in the decisions the record supports.

A commitment in that position is no longer the kind of thing that can be disputed. There is nothing to dispute with. A practitioner administering the procedure correctly is not asserting anything about where developmental properties are located, and a ministry requiring the procedure is not asserting it either. The assertion was made once, elsewhere, by someone who is not present, and what remains is a form to be completed.

Proposition 3.8. *An ontological commitment enters an instrument at design, travels inside it as an unstated condition of its use, and becomes on arrival a feature of an administrative procedure. In that position the commitment governs practice while being unavailable for dispute, since no one in the receiving setting is asserting it.*

The other three cases exhibit the same passage through different channels, and the differences are informative.

In teacher training the commitment travelled inside a sequence. What a trainee received was a description of what children of given ages can do, and to receive it is to receive the assumption that what a child can do is a property he has at an age. [§3.2.1](#) showed that the ages were the part that survived, and the ages are precisely the part in which the assumption

is carried. A version organised around what a child possesses at seven is a version in which the bearer commitment is doing all the work.

In the market the commitment travelled inside the materials. An apparatus designed for a child to work with alone, in a prepared environment, at his own pace, embodies a view about where development occurs before any parent chooses it. What §3.2.3 described as the selection of visible features is also the selection of the features in which the commitment is most concretely present.

In international guidance the commitment travelled inside indicators. §3.2.4 observed that what reaches a ministry is the indicator rather than the recommendation. An indicator counts something, what it counts must be countable, and a child is countable in a way a relation is not. A reporting requirement expressed in children screened, children enrolled, or children meeting a milestone installs the unit of measurement as the unit of the phenomenon, and installs it in the one place where it will not be questioned, which is the place where the numbers are compiled.

Three consequences follow, and the third is the one this chapter was written to reach.

The first is that the invisibility is not a failure of anyone's attention. §1.1.2 argued that premises live in verbs and are not noticed because they are not asserted. The cases add that a premise travelling inside a procedure is not even present as a verb. It is present as a form field, a training requirement, a piece of apparatus, a column in a report.

The second is that the receiving setting's own tradition does not protect against this. A society whose account of formation locates it elsewhere, in the manner of §2.5, will nonetheless install the commitment along with the instrument, because installing an instrument does not require agreeing with anything. The instrument is adopted for what it does administratively. What it presupposes arrives as freight.

The third concerns what can be observed. §1.25 established the convergence of nineteen traditions on a shared commitment, and §2.7 showed the convergence was historically produced. Neither established that the commitment is now materially entrenched, and neither could, since both were arguments about literatures. This chapter supplies what those could not. The commitment is not merely held by theorists. It is built into the procedures by which children are assessed, the categories in which they are recorded, the indicators by which provision is planned, and the training of those who do all three. It is a fact about institutions and not only about ideas.

That is what the chapter contributes, and it is why the chapter stands between Chapter 2 and ch. 4 rather than being an excursion between them. The historical chapter showed how a commitment came to be held. This one shows how it came to be installed. ch. 4 asks what follows for anyone who now proposes to compare societies using instruments in which it is installed, and the answer is already visible: an instrument carrying an unstated commitment will find, in any society where it is used, the thing it was built to locate.

3.4 The Bearing on What Follows

The chapter's goal statement declared two obligations. This section discharges them and states what the chapter leaves open.

3.4.1 The Standing of a National Arrangement

The first obligation was to [ch. 5](#), which describes contemporary arrangements across a number of societies. Without the present chapter those arrangements would appear as what a reader would naturally take them for, which is what each society has arrived at. The cases show that this description is available only in a qualified form.

Three qualifications follow from the four passages, and they should be stated as constraints on how the later chapter may be read.

An arrangement is a settlement reached with materials, and the materials were mostly not local. Where a society's early-childhood provision is organised around developmental screening, the screening instrument arrived, the reporting requirement arrived, and the categories in which children are recorded arrived. What the society supplied was the decision to adopt them and the institutional form the adoption took. The arrangement is genuinely its own and it is not made of its own materials.

The differences between arrangements are therefore not, in general, differences between traditions of thought about children. They are differences in what was already present when the same materials arrived, in which of the four objects arrived first, and through which channel. [§3.2.1](#) showed one sequence of stages producing three incompatible pedagogies in three settings. A reader encountering those three pedagogies in [ch. 5](#) would have no way, from the arrangements alone, to recover that they have a common source.

And the convergence between arrangements is at least partly an artefact of shared supply. Where two societies use the same instruments, report on the same indicators, and train practitioners in the same categories, their arrangements will resemble one another in respects that follow from the instruments rather than from any agreement about children. [§3.2.4](#) described the channel through which this occurs. A finding that societies are converging on a common model of early childhood is compatible with their having converged on nothing except a common apparatus.

Proposition 3.9. *Similarity between national arrangements may record agreement about children or common supply of instruments. The two are distinguishable by whether the similarity extends to what the instruments do not measure.*

That proposition states a test, and the test is not one this book conducts. It is recorded here because it is the form a research question takes once circulation is taken seriously, and [ch. 89](#) collects such questions.

The second obligation was to [ch. 37](#), and it must be discharged by withdrawal rather than by delivery. [§3.2.5](#) conceded that a mechanism observed at the scale of professions and ministries is not thereby established at the scale of a household. The concession stands and the goal statement of this chapter overstated what the chapter delivers. What this chapter supplies to the later one is a description of a mechanism and a demonstration that the mechanism operates somewhere. Whether a household transmits a grammar in the way a ministry installs a commitment is a question the later chapter inherits without an answer.

There is nonetheless one structural resemblance worth recording, since it is what makes the later argument worth attempting.

In both cases what passes is a way of describing rather than a description. A ministry that adopts a screening schedule does not adopt a claim about children; it adopts a set of categories

in which children will henceforth be recorded, and the categories then generate claims. A household in which a child is described in certain terms does not transmit those descriptions to him as propositions; it transmits the terms, and the terms generate descriptions. In both cases the recipient acquires a capacity to produce statements rather than a set of statements, and in both cases what was acquired is difficult to notice because it is what the noticing would have to be done with.

Proposition 3.10. *What passes in the cases of this chapter is a vocabulary and its associated procedures, which together generate statements the recipient did not receive. A recipient of this kind acquires the means of description before acquiring any description.*

Whether that resemblance is a shared mechanism or an analogy is undetermined here.

What the chapter leaves open should be stated plainly, since three questions have been raised and answered nowhere.

The first is what happens when a receiving setting refuses. Every case in §3.2 concerns material that was adopted, and adoption is what the documentation records. Instruments are also declined, guidance is also ignored, and vocabularies also fail to establish themselves. Nothing in this chapter accounts for the difference, and an account of circulation that describes only successful transmission has described half of its subject.

The second is what a receiving setting exports. §3.2.5 noted the directional bias of the cases. A local version may travel outward, and the international bodies of §3.2.4 draw on evidence from more places than they once did. Whether the mechanism runs the same way in that direction is not known here.

The third is the one ch. 4 takes up immediately. If an instrument installs what it presupposes, then a comparative study using such instruments is not in a position to discover whether the presupposition holds in the societies compared. The instrument will report what it was built to report. Whether comparison is possible at all under that constraint, and in what form, is the question the next chapter must answer, and the present chapter has made the question harder rather than easier.

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Chapter 4

The Problem of Comparison

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what a comparison of rearing across societies can establish, given what [ch. 3](#) showed about the instruments such comparisons use.

It contributes the methodological warrant that [ch. 5](#) requires and that [§2.2.3](#) promised. [Chapter 2](#) declined to compare national traditions on the ground that a later chapter would show why comparative instruments cannot be treated as neutral. This is that chapter, and if its argument fails the refusal recorded there was unwarranted. The chapter also states the form of comparison the book will use, which later Parts inherit.

It does not conduct the comparison, which is the work of [ch. 5](#), and it does not build the instrument its argument calls for, which is the work of [ch. 70](#).

The reader should carry forward the distinction between comparing what societies produce and comparing the conditions under which they produce it, and the reason the second is available where the first is not.

4.1 The Standard Difficulty and Its Depth

The problem of cross-cultural comparison has an established literature and a standard formulation. The formulation is correct as far as it goes, and the distance it does not go is what this chapter is about.

4.1.1 The Sampling Objection

The standard objection concerns the population on which the discipline's findings rest. A substantial proportion of published developmental research has been conducted on samples drawn from a small number of industrialised societies, and a large share of that on university populations within them ([Henrich et al., 2010](#); [Nielsen et al., 2017](#)). The samples are unrepresentative of the species on almost any dimension one might name, and they are unrepresentative in ways that bear directly on rearing: household composition, the number of adults involved in care, the age at which children are separated from a primary carer, the presence of siblings as carers, the relation between the household and the wider kin group ([Keller, 2018](#); [Lancy, 2015](#)).

The objection has been stated forcefully and its empirical support is substantial ([Henrich et al., 2010](#)). Findings taken as descriptions of human development have been shown, on examination, to hold in the populations studied and to vary elsewhere. The variation is sometimes large enough that the original finding inverts.

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The remedies proposed follow from the diagnosis. Sample more widely. Replicate in other populations. Report the population on which a claim rests. Validate an instrument locally before using it. Include researchers from the societies studied in the design of studies about them (Nielsen et al., 2017). Each of these is an improvement, each has been adopted to some degree, and the discipline's evidence base is better for them.

Proposition 4.1. *An unrepresentative sample supports a claim about the population sampled. Where a claim about a wider population is wanted, wider sampling is the remedy, and the remedy is available.*

What the objection in this form does not reach is the instrument.

The sampling objection treats the instrument as a measuring device that was applied to the wrong people. On that description the device is sound and the error lies in the inference from a narrow sample to a general claim, so that applying the same device to a broader sample corrects the error. This description is available whenever the instrument measures something whose existence is not in question, and for a great many purposes it is the right description.

It is not available for the instruments at issue here, and §3.3.1 gave the reason. An instrument in this field is built to detect a property whose location was decided at design. Applying it to a wider sample yields more measurements of a property so located. It does not yield any information about whether the property is so located, since the instrument has no way of reporting that it has failed to find something it was not built to look for.

The difference can be put in terms of what a null result means. A thermometer applied in a new place either registers a temperature or fails to function, and a failure to function is visible. An instrument that assigns a child to one of a fixed set of categories always assigns him to one of them. It cannot return the result that the categories do not apply here, and a practitioner administering it correctly will produce a distribution regardless of whether the distribution means anything.

This is why the sampling objection, while correct, understates the problem. Its remedy is more measurement, and more measurement with an instrument that installs what it presupposes produces more instances of the presupposition. §3.2.4 described a channel through which exactly this occurs at scale, and the resulting body of comparative data is larger, better distributed across societies, and no more capable of testing the commitment on which every instrument in it rests.

4.1.2 The Equivalence Problem

The methodological literature on cross-cultural measurement has confronted a version of this difficulty and has developed an apparatus for it. The apparatus is more sophisticated than the sampling objection and reaches closer to the problem, which is why the point at which it stops is informative.

The apparatus distinguishes several kinds of equivalence that a comparison requires (van de Vijver and Leung, 1997). Whether a construct means the same thing in two settings is one question. Whether an instrument's items function the same way is a second. Whether scores can be placed on a common scale is a third. These are separable, they can fail independently, and procedures exist for testing each. A comparison that has not established equivalence at the relevant level is reporting differences that may be artefacts of the instrument.

The tests are genuine and their results are sometimes decisive. An item that behaves differently across groups can be identified statistically and removed. A factor structure that fails to replicate is evidence that a construct is not assembled the same way in the two populations. A scale that lacks common metric properties cannot support the comparison of means, and the literature says so.

Proposition 4.2. *Equivalence testing establishes whether an instrument functions comparably across settings. Its finding concerns the instrument's behaviour and is silent on whether the construct the instrument was built to measure is present in either setting.*

Three features of the apparatus limit what it can settle, and the third is the one that matters here.

The tests are internal to the instrument. What they examine is the pattern of responses: whether items relate to one another consistently, whether a model fits, whether parameters are invariant. All of this concerns the instrument's operation, and an instrument may operate with perfect consistency while measuring something that has no significance in one of the settings compared. Consistency is a property of a procedure. It is not evidence that the procedure has found anything.

The tests presuppose the construct. Establishing that a measure of parental sensitivity functions equivalently in two societies establishes that the measure behaves the same way in both. Whether sensitivity, as the measure defines it, is a property that organises rearing in either society is not among the things the test examines, and the test would return the same result if it were a property of neither.

And a failure of equivalence is treated as a problem to be repaired. This is the feature that reveals what the apparatus assumes. When an instrument fails to function equivalently, the standard responses are to modify items, to establish partial invariance, to re-specify the model, or to develop a local version of the measure. Each response preserves the comparison by adjusting the instrument. The response of concluding that the two settings do not contain a common object to be measured is available in principle and is rarely taken, because a research programme organised around comparison requires something to compare.

The situation may be put as follows. The equivalence literature asks whether an instrument travels well, and it has developed good methods for answering that question. §3.3.1 argued that what travels inside an instrument is a commitment about where a property is located. An equivalence test cannot detect that commitment, since the commitment is a condition of the instrument's operation and the test examines the operation. A perfectly invariant instrument is one that installs the same commitment in every setting it is used, and invariance is what the apparatus is designed to certify.

This is not an argument against equivalence testing, which does what it claims. It is an argument that a comparison certified as equivalent has been certified in one respect and not in another, and that the respect it has not been certified in is the one this chapter is concerned with.

Two remarks close the section.

The cultural psychology tradition made a version of this objection some decades ago and drew a stronger conclusion from it (Shweder, 1990; Cole, 1996). If psychological processes are constituted within cultural practices, then a measure developed in one setting does not

measure a thing that also exists elsewhere in a different amount. It measures a thing that exists there, and the question of its amount elsewhere is malformed. That position is close to the one this chapter reaches, and it reached it from a different direction, by way of an argument about the constitution of mind rather than about the design of instruments.

The difference in route matters for what follows. An argument from the constitution of mind supports the conclusion that comparison of constructs is unavailable and leaves open what should replace it. The argument of this chapter, running through what an instrument installs, supports the same conclusion and additionally identifies what any replacement would have to avoid. §4.3 takes up the replacement, and the specification derived here is what constrains it.

4.2 The Units of Comparison

The preceding section concerned what an instrument can establish. This one concerns what is being compared, and the difficulty it identifies would remain even if every instrument behaved perfectly.

A comparison requires units. To say that rearing in one society differs from rearing in another is to treat two societies as items that can be set beside one another and described independently, and the treatment carries assumptions about what a society is and how it came to be as it is. Chapter 3 has already unsettled these assumptions. This section states what remains of them.

The first assumption is independence. A comparison of two cases treats each as having arrived at its condition by its own path, so that a difference between them is evidence about what different paths produce. Where the cases developed in contact, the assumption fails, and it fails in a specific way: the difference between them may be a product of the contact rather than of anything internal to either.

The material of §3.2 bears on this directly. Four passages were described, and in each the receiving setting's arrangement was shaped by what arrived. A comparison of two such settings compares two receptions of overlapping material. The differences between them are real and they are not differences between independently developed traditions. They are differences in what each setting already contained when the same material reached it, in which of the four objects arrived first, and through which channel.

The point is Amin's, recorded in §1.16.7 and now with a mechanism attached (Wallerstein, 1974). Societies occupying positions in a single system are not independent instances of anything. What distinguishes them includes their position, and position is a relational property that a description of either one alone cannot state.

Proposition 4.3. *Cases that developed in contact are not independent instances. A difference between them may record different paths or different positions within one process, and a comparison of their properties cannot distinguish these.*

The second assumption is that a society is the right unit. This assumption is more damaging to the standard procedure and it is less often examined.

A comparative study reports that rearing practices differ between one country and another. The unit is national, the data are aggregated to the national level, and the finding is a difference

between two means. What the aggregation conceals is that variation within any of these units is generally larger than variation between them (Lancy, 2015). Households in a single country differ by class position, by region, by whether they are urban or rural, by the composition of the household, by whether the adults are in work and what kind, and by whether the household is where it originated. A national mean is a summary of that variation, and two national means may differ while the distributions they summarise overlap almost entirely.

This is not merely a matter of statistical care. The national unit is itself a product of the arrangements described in §2.3 and §3.2.4. Data are collected nationally because states collect data, indicators are reported nationally because international bodies require it of states, and a research literature organised around national comparison inherits the unit from the administrative apparatus that supplies its data. The unit is not chosen on theoretical grounds. It is the unit in which the numbers arrive.

A second consideration compounds this. Where the national unit is used, the differences it reports are readily attributed to culture, since a nation is the kind of thing that is thought to have one. A difference between two national means may reflect differences in household income distribution, in the availability of care outside the household, in the length of the working day, or in whether a second adult is present, and each of these is a material condition rather than a cultural preference. The unit invites an explanation in terms of what a society values, and the invitation is frequently accepted where an explanation in terms of what a society's households can afford would serve.

Proposition 4.4. *The national unit in comparative research is inherited from the apparatus that supplies the data. Differences reported at that level are compatible with explanations in terms of material conditions and are commonly given explanations in terms of cultural values.*

This is where the neutrality commitment stated in the preface acquires a methodological form. That commitment was expressed as a refusal of evaluative vocabulary for national and cultural practices. The present argument gives it a second ground. A practice described as characteristic of a society, and evaluated as such, has usually been described at a unit that conceals the conditions under which the practice occurs. The refusal is not only a matter of courtesy toward societies one is not a member of. It is a consequence of the observation that the unit conceals what would explain the practice.

The third assumption concerns what a comparison is for, and stating it makes the previous two easier to place.

A comparison may be conducted in order to find what varies, or in order to find what does not. The first purpose treats differences as the finding, and it is the purpose most comparative developmental research serves. The second treats differences as noise around an invariant, and it is the purpose served by research seeking universals. Both purposes are legitimate and both require the units to be independent instances, since a universal established across cases in contact may be a shared inheritance and a difference between cases in contact may be a division of labour between them.

There is a third purpose, less often pursued, which the argument of this book requires. A comparison may be conducted in order to identify the conditions under which something occurs. On this purpose the differences between cases are neither findings nor noise. They are the variation in conditions, and what is sought is the relation between a condition and what

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occurs under it. Cases in contact are not disqualifying for this purpose, since what is compared is the relation rather than the case, and cases that share a history may differ in exactly the conditions one wishes to examine.

Proposition 4.5. *A comparison seeking the conditions under which something occurs does not require its cases to be independent instances, since what is compared is a relation between condition and occurrence rather than a property of a case.*

The third purpose is what §4.3 develops. Two things should be noted about it before that section states the position.

It changes what a case is. Under the first two purposes a case is a society, and the society must be characterised. Under the third a case is a configuration of conditions, and the same society may supply several cases while two societies may supply one between them.

ch. 5 is organised accordingly. Its sections take conditions rather than places, and the societies appear inside them as the settings in which a condition is found or absent. A reader expecting a country-by-country survey will therefore find something else, and the difference is not a reduction in what is covered. Under a country-by-country organisation each society is described once, in its own section, and comparison is left to the reader. Under the present organisation each society appears in every section that bears on it, and the differences between societies appear within a condition rather than as the boundaries between chapters. The comparative contact is greater and it occurs where the argument can use it.

One consequence of this should be stated in advance, since it will be visible throughout that chapter. A section organised around a condition will place beside one another societies that are conventionally treated as remote from each other, and will separate societies conventionally grouped together. Where the condition is the number of adults available to a child, an urban household in one continent may belong with an urban household in another and not with a rural household in its own country. This is the finding of §4.2 appearing as an organisational fact.

And it relocates the difficulty rather than dissolving it. Identifying a condition requires describing it, describing it requires a vocabulary, and a vocabulary developed in one setting carries what §3.3.1 showed it carries. The third purpose is available where the first two are not, and it is not available for free. What it costs is stated in §4.3.1.

4.3 The Residue of Comparability

The preceding sections established two constraints. An instrument built to detect a located property will report that property wherever it is used, and a comparison of societies as units compares cases that are neither independent nor internally uniform. This section states what can be compared under those constraints, and it is the first place in this book where the framework is asked to do methodological work rather than being described.

The constraints can be stated as a specification. What is wanted is something that varies across settings, that is describable without presupposing where a developmental property is located, and that does not require the settings compared to be independent instances. Anything satisfying all three is available for comparison. Anything failing one of them is not.

The first two sections showed that constructs fail the specification. A construct is a property

of an individual, its measurement presupposes a location, and its comparison across settings requires the settings to be instances of something.

What satisfies the specification is a process rather than a property, and §1.26.3 supplies the process. Keynote Claim I defines development as a child becoming, within relations that can support, revise, and create jointly, someone able to continue generating relations and meanings. The claim was proposed as an ontological position. Its methodological consequence is what concerns this section.

Three features of the claim bear on comparison.

What it names is not a stock. A capacity to continue generating is not a quantity a child has at a moment, and there is no procedure that could report how much of it is present. §1.26.3 recorded that Part XII inherits this as a constraint on any instrument built on the claim. The constraint is also what makes the claim usable here, since a property that is not a stock is not the kind of thing an instrument installs by locating it.

What it names is observable over time or not at all. Whether generation continues in a relation is a question about a sequence: whether what could be said last month can still be said, whether a disagreement that arose was worked through or closed off, whether the terms in which the parties describe each other have changed. Any of these requires a history, and none is answerable from a single observation.

And what it names admits of conditions. The three the claim states, that relations can support, can revise, and can create jointly, are conditions rather than measurements. Whether a household is one in which a child's account of a situation can revise an adult's is a question about what is possible there, and the answer is available from what happens when the possibility is exercised.

Proposition 4.6. *A condition under which generation continues is describable without locating a property in a party, is observable in a sequence rather than at a moment, and varies across settings. It therefore satisfies the specification that constructs fail.*

What follows for comparison is a change in what is set beside what.

Under the standard procedure two societies are compared on a measured property, and the comparison asks which has more of it. Under the position taken here two configurations are compared on whether a condition obtains, and the comparison asks what makes the difference. A household in which disagreement is worked through and one in which it is closed off are two configurations, they may occur in one society or in two, and what distinguishes them is a proper object of inquiry in either case.

Three consequences deserve statement.

The comparison becomes internal as readily as external. If what is compared is a configuration of conditions, then two households in one society are as comparable as two societies, and the same question may be asked of both. This dissolves the difficulty of §4.2 rather than answering it, since the difficulty arose from the requirement that the units be societies.

The material conditions become part of the comparison rather than a confound. Whether an adult can attend to a child's account of a situation depends on whether the adult has time, and whether the adult has time depends on the working day, the presence of other adults, and what the household must do to subsist. Under the standard procedure these are covariates to be adjusted for. Under the present one they are among the conditions being compared, and

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§1.26.4 stated the general form of this position.

And a society may contain configurations that differ more from one another than either differs from a configuration elsewhere. This follows from what §4.2 observed about within-unit variation, and under the present position it is expected rather than awkward. Two households of different class position within one city may share less than either shares with a household of comparable position in another country, and the finding would be reported as such.

4.3.1 The Cost of the Position

The position is not available without cost, and three costs should be stated plainly.

The first is that the vocabulary problem is relocated rather than solved. §4.2 noted this and it must now be met directly. Describing a condition requires terms, the terms used here were developed by the author of this book, and a term developed in one setting carries what §3.3.1 showed terms carry. Whether disagreement was worked through or closed off is a description, and someone must apply it. That the description concerns a relation rather than a child does not make it neutral, and a household in which a child does not contradict an adult may be described as one where revision is unavailable by an observer for whom contradiction is what revision looks like.

The book's answer to this is partial and should not be presented as more. The conditions are stated as questions about what is possible in a setting rather than as behaviours to be coded, and a question of that form can be answered by the parties themselves in their own terms. ch. 70 takes up whether an instrument can be built on this basis, and ch. 76 takes up the objection that such an instrument would deform what it measures. Neither is answered here, and a reader should record that the vocabulary problem is met by displacement onto later chapters rather than by argument in this one.

The second cost is evidential. A comparison of conditions over time requires observation over time, and the developmental literature's comparative material is overwhelmingly cross-sectional. The position taken here therefore has less existing evidence available to it than the position it declines, and ch. 5 operates under that limitation. What that chapter can do is describe arrangements and identify the conditions they establish. What it cannot do is report findings about whether generation continued under them, since the studies that would support such findings have not been conducted.

The third cost is that the position is harder to falsify. A claim that a society scores lower on a measured construct can be checked by anyone with the instrument. A claim that a configuration of conditions makes revision unavailable is a claim about what is possible, and claims about possibility resist direct test. §1.25.3 conceded that this book's position shares with its rivals the property of being able to accommodate any observation, and the present section adds a methodological instance of the concession. The position is preferred here for the reason given in §1.26.4, that it makes describable what the alternative renders invisible, and that reason does not become stronger by being applied to comparison.

Proposition 4.7. *A position that compares conditions rather than measured properties trades the checkability of the measurement for the describability of what the measurement omits. The trade is a trade and not an improvement in every respect.*

What the chapter has established can now be stated. The refusal of comparison in §2.2.3

was warranted, since the instruments a comparison would have used install the commitment that **Chapter 1** identified and **Chapter 2** traced. Comparison of societies as units is unavailable for that reason and for the further reason that the units are neither independent nor uniform. Comparison of the conditions under which generation continues is available, at the cost of a vocabulary problem displaced onto later chapters, an evidence base that does not yet exist, and a reduction in falsifiability. **ch. 5** proceeds on that basis.

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Chapter 5

The Contemporary Variety of Rearing

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter describes the conditions under which children are currently reared, across the range of arrangements for which evidence exists.

It contributes the material that later Parts draw on when they claim that a relational condition matters. A framework asserting that generation depends on whether a relation can support, revise, and create jointly is asserting something about arrangements, and the arrangements vary. This chapter establishes the variation, and [ch. 6](#) onward may cite it rather than restating it.

It is organised by condition rather than by country, for the reason given in [§4.2](#). Societies appear inside the sections as the settings in which a condition is found. A reader looking for a description of rearing in a particular country will find the material distributed across the chapter rather than collected.

The chapter describes arrangements and identifies the conditions they establish. It does not report whether generation continued under them, and [§4.3.1](#) gave the reason: the comparative evidence is overwhelmingly cross-sectional, and the studies that would support such a finding have not been conducted. The reader should carry forward the conditions and their distribution, and should not expect the chapter to evaluate them.

5.1 The Adults Available to a Child

The first condition is the simplest to state and the most consequential for everything the framework claims. It concerns how many adults are present in a child's daily life, in what relation to him, and with what continuity.

5.1.1 The Range of Arrangements

The arrangement most represented in the developmental literature is a household containing one or two adults in a parental role, with other adults appearing intermittently. It is the arrangement in which attachment research was conducted, in which the transactional studies of [§1.13](#) were carried out, and from which the vocabulary of primary caregiver and secondary caregiver derives. It is not the most common arrangement historically and it is not the most common arrangement now.

At the other end of the range are arrangements in which a young child's daily care is distributed across a substantial number of adults. The anthropological literature on West African societies ([Alber et al., 2013](#)) describes households in which a child is cared for by a shifting

set of women related through kin ties, in which fostering to another household is ordinary rather than exceptional, and in which the identity of the person primarily responsible for a child changes across his early years without this being experienced as disruption. Similar distributions are documented in parts of Oceania (LeVine and New, 2007), where a child may be raised for extended periods by grandparents or by an aunt, and where the arrangement is a normal expression of kin obligation rather than a response to difficulty.

Between these lie a wide range of intermediate configurations, and three deserve separate statement because they are frequently collapsed together.

There are arrangements in which several adults are present and one is responsible. Multi-generational households in East Asia, in Southern and Eastern Europe, and in Latin America commonly contain grandparents who are involved in daily care, but the involvement is understood as assistance to a parent rather than as shared responsibility. The number of adults available to the child is high; the number who may make a decision about him is low.

There are arrangements in which one adult is present and responsible, and the remainder of the care is institutional. This is the configuration produced by the combination of high employment among mothers and extensive public provision (Esping-Andersen, 2009), and it is characteristic of the Nordic societies and, in a different form, of France. The child's day contains many adults, most of whom are professionals, and the household contains few.

And there are arrangements in which one adult is present and responsible and no substitute exists. Single-parent households without extended kin nearby, and households in which one adult works hours that prevent daily involvement, produce this configuration. It occurs across every society in the coverage of this chapter and it is not a cultural characteristic. It is a consequence of household composition, employment, and migration, and it is increasing where those change.

Proposition 5.1. *The number of adults available to a child and the number responsible for him vary independently. An arrangement may contain many of the first and one of the second, or the reverse, and the two have different consequences.*

Two observations about this range are required before the chapter proceeds.

The first concerns what the literature has taken as its baseline. §4.1.1 recorded that developmental research has been conducted predominantly on a narrow range of populations. The consequence here is specific and it is not merely that the samples were unrepresentative. The vocabulary in which the field describes this condition was developed within one of the arrangements above. Terms such as primary caregiver, maternal availability, and separation presuppose a configuration in which one adult is centrally responsible and the child's relation to her is the relation whose interruption requires explanation. Applied to a distributed arrangement, the vocabulary does not describe a different quantity of the same thing. It fails to have an application, since the question of which adult is primary has no answer where responsibility is genuinely shared.

The second concerns what varies with what. The distribution of adults across a child's day is not independent of the conditions treated in the sections that follow. Where the working day is long and provision is scarce, care falls to whoever is available, which is frequently an older sibling or an elderly relative (Weisner and Gallimore, 1977). Where employment is high and provision is extensive, care falls to institutions. Where a household has migrated, the kin who

would have been available are elsewhere. The condition described in this section is therefore an outcome of others as much as a condition in its own right, and §5.6 takes up what follows from that.

5.1.2 The Continuity of Presence

The number of adults available to a child is one question. Whether the same adults remain available over time is another, and the two vary independently.

Three patterns of discontinuity occur across the range of arrangements, and they differ in what produces them and in what a child encounters.

Discontinuity by circulation occurs where a child moves between households as a normal feature of kin arrangement. West African fostering is the documented case, and the anthropological literature is careful about what it involves. A child sent to a relative's household is not being relinquished; the sending household retains a relation, the arrangement may be reciprocal, and the child's position in the receiving household is defined by kinship rather than by charity. The discontinuity is real and it occurs within a structure that persists across it.

Discontinuity by labour migration occurs where an adult is absent for extended periods because work is elsewhere. This is documented at scale in the Philippines, in parts of Mexico and Central America, in rural China where adults work in coastal cities, in South Asia with movement to the Gulf states, and in Eastern Europe with movement westward (Parreñas, 2005). The configuration produced is specific: a child remains in a household containing kin, most often grandparents, while one or both parents are present through remittance and intermittent contact. The relation is maintained at a distance and by means that have changed considerably with the availability of communication technology.

Discontinuity by household dissolution occurs where the composition of a household changes through separation, and it is the pattern most studied because it is most common in the societies where research is concentrated. What a child encounters here differs from the two above in one respect that matters. Circulation and labour migration are arrangements a household enters as a strategy, and the child's position within kinship is not in question. Dissolution alters the relations themselves.

Proposition 5.2. *Discontinuity in the adults available to a child may leave the structure of relations intact or alter it. The two are behaviourally similar in that an adult is no longer daily present, and they differ in whether the child's position is still defined by the same arrangement.*

That proposition is the section's contribution to the framework's material, and it should be stated carefully because it is the kind of claim this book is most likely to be wrong about.

The developmental literature on separation, formed in the conditions described in §2.4.3, treats the absence of a primary caregiver as the event requiring explanation. Under that description all three patterns above are instances of one thing occurring in different amounts. The framework's vocabulary suggests a different reading, in which what matters is whether the arrangement that positions the child remains in force, and the reading implies that the three patterns should have different consequences.

The evidence does not currently settle this. Studies of children in labour-migration arrangements report a range of findings that vary by which parent is absent, for how long, at what age, with what remittance, and with what quality of care from the remaining adults (Graham and

Jordan, 2011). Studies of fostering report that outcomes depend heavily on the child's position in the receiving household, which is what the framework's reading would predict, though the studies were not designed to test it. What can be said is that the literature does not support treating the three as one phenomenon, and that a research programme organised around the distinction has not been conducted.

Two further observations complete the section.

The first concerns what the societies in question say about these arrangements. Where circulation is ordinary it is described in the vocabulary of kin obligation and of a child's advantage, and the description is not a rationalisation offered to an outside observer. Where labour migration is common the arrangement is frequently described by the adults involved as a sacrifice made for the child, which is also not a rationalisation. §2.2.3 and the neutrality commitment of this book require that these self-descriptions be recorded as part of what the arrangement is. They are not evidence about outcomes and they are evidence about what the arrangement means to its participants, which is a different thing and is not nothing.

The second concerns the institutional cases. In arrangements where a substantial share of daily care is professional, continuity has an additional determinant that does not arise elsewhere, which is staff turnover. A child in a setting with high turnover encounters a sequence of adults whose relation to him is defined by their role, and the sequence is produced by employment conditions rather than by anything in the child's household. This is a condition of the same kind as those above, it is measurable, it varies substantially across systems, and it is generally treated in the policy literature as a question of provision quality rather than as a question about the adults available to a child. §5.2 returns to it.

5.2 The Care Provided Outside the Household

The second condition concerns whether a young child's day is spent partly in a setting the household does not constitute, on what terms that setting is available, and what it is understood to be for.

5.2.1 The Terms of Provision

Provision for children below school age varies across the societies in this chapter's coverage on four dimensions (OECD, 2006) that are separable and are frequently treated as one.

Availability is the first. Whether a place exists for a child of a given age is determined by public commitment, by the market, and by the two in combination. The Nordic societies established near-universal entitlement from the end of parental leave, France established a widely used provision at a different age with a different institutional history, and a number of societies in this chapter's coverage have provision that reaches a minority of children of the relevant age, whether because it has not been built, because it is unaffordable, or because demand for it is low.

Cost to the household is the second, and it is independent of availability. A place that exists and costs a substantial share of a household's income is available in a sense that does not include many households. Systems differ sharply here: some fund provision from general taxation, some subsidise the household, some subsidise the provider, some leave the cost with

the household entirely. The consequence is that in two societies with comparable coverage rates the composition of the children attending may be quite different.

The age at which provision begins is the third. This is determined jointly by the length of paid leave and by the age at which places are available, and the interaction produces gaps. Where leave is short and provision begins at a later age, households must arrange the interval privately, and the arrangement falls to kin, to informal paid care, or to a parent leaving employment. Where leave is long and provision is available at its end, no gap exists. Where leave is long and provision is scarce, the leave functions as a substitute for provision rather than as a complement to it.

What the provision is understood to be for is the fourth, and it is the dimension least visible in comparative statistics and most consequential for what happens in the setting.

Three understandings can be distinguished across the coverage of this chapter, and each has an institutional history.

Provision understood as care for children while adults work. On this understanding the setting's purpose is that the child is safe and attended to, the staffing requirement follows from that, and the curriculum question does not arise with urgency. This understanding is historically the origin of much provision, including the facility described in §3.2.3, and it remains the operative understanding in a substantial share of provision worldwide.

Provision understood as a stage of education. On this understanding the setting is the first part of a system whose later parts are schools, its purpose is described in terms of what children acquire, and the staffing requirement includes pedagogical qualification. Systems that place early provision under an education ministry rather than a welfare ministry have generally adopted this understanding, and the placement is a reliable indicator of it.

Provision understood as a social good in its own right, in which children are members of a collective and the setting is where they participate in one. The Nordic tradition is the clearest instance, the vocabulary of its own literature is explicit about this (Einarsdóttir et al., 2015), and the practical consequences include a lower ratio of directed activity and a higher tolerance for unstructured time than the second understanding produces.

Proposition 5.3. *Provision for young children varies in availability, in cost, in the age at which it begins, and in what it is understood to be for. The four vary independently, and two systems alike on the first three may differ on the fourth in ways the first three do not reveal.*

Two matters require statement here, and the neutrality commitment governs the first.

Nothing in the above ranks the three understandings. Each is a response to what a society required of provision when it was built, and §2.3.1 showed how such requirements arise. A society that built provision so that women could enter industrial employment built it for the first understanding, and a society that built it after establishing universal schooling built it for the second. The understandings are legible as histories, and evaluating them against one another would require a standard this chapter does not have and ch. 77 declines to supply in that form.

The second matter concerns what the framework can say here without exceeding its evidence.

An arrangement in which a child spends a substantial part of his day among adults whose relation to him is professional, and among a stable group of children, establishes conditions of

a specific kind. There are more adults available, they are available on terms defined by a role, and the relation between the child and any one of them is bounded by the setting. Whether the conditions of §1.26.3 obtain in such a setting is a question about the setting rather than about provision in general, and §4.3.1 recorded that the longitudinal evidence which would answer it has not been gathered.

What can be said is narrower. The literature on provision quality, which is extensive, measures features that are separable from the conditions this book takes to matter. Ratios, group size, staff qualification, and the observed quality of interaction are the standard instruments (Sylva et al., 2004), and each is a property of the setting or of an adult in it. Whether a child's account of a situation can revise an adult's account, which is the second of the three conditions in §1.26.3, is not among the things any widely used instrument records. This is not a criticism of the instruments, which measure what they were built to measure and do it well. It is an instance of the general finding of §4.3, appearing in the one setting where systematic observational data on early childhood is most plentiful.

5.2.2 The Hours of the Adults

Provision and employment determine one another, and neither is intelligible without the other. This subsection takes the employment side, since it is the condition that most directly governs how much of an adult's attention is available to a child and it is the one most often treated as background.

Four features of adult working arrangements vary across the coverage of this chapter and bear on rearing.

Total hours vary, and they vary in ways that do not follow economic development. Annual hours worked per employed person differ substantially among societies of comparable income (OECD, 2021), with the shorter figures in parts of Northern and Western Europe and the longer in East Asia, in parts of Latin America, and in the Anglophone societies. A household in which two adults each work long hours contains a quantity of adult attention that is an arithmetic consequence of its labour arrangements rather than a cultural characteristic of the society.

The predictability of hours varies independently of their number. Employment in which a schedule is known in advance permits a household to arrange care; employment in which hours are assigned at short notice does not, and the difficulty is not resolved by the hours being few. This distinction cuts across national lines and follows sector and contractual form. It has grown more consequential where scheduling is managed algorithmically (Schneider and Harknett, 2019), and the literature on this is recent enough that its findings should be treated as provisional.

The distribution of hours between adults varies. Where one adult is in full-time employment and another is not in employment or is in part-time employment, the household contains a configuration in which one adult's attention is largely available and the other's largely is not. Where both adults are in full-time employment, neither is. Where a single adult is in full-time employment, the household has no adult attention available during working hours and must obtain it elsewhere. These are three different conditions, and comparative statistics reporting maternal employment rates report only part of what distinguishes them.

And the relation between working hours and the household's location varies. Where employment is near the residence the commute is short and the day's remainder is longer. Where it is distant, hours not counted as work are nonetheless unavailable to a child. This is a substantial quantity in the large metropolitan areas of several societies in this chapter's coverage, and it is invisible in every statistic that reports hours worked.

Proposition 5.4. *The adult attention available to a child is determined by the number of working hours, their predictability, their distribution between adults, and the time required to reach employment. These vary independently and no one of them alone determines the quantity.*

Two consequences follow, and the first connects this section to the argument of [ch. 4](#).

A difference between societies in what adults do with children is frequently reported as a difference in what adults value. The material above supplies an alternative account of many such differences. Where adults in one society spend more time in a certain kind of interaction with children than adults in another, the difference is compatible with a difference in values and it is equally compatible with a difference in hours, in predictability, in how the hours are distributed, and in commuting time. [§4.2](#) recorded that the national unit invites the cultural explanation. This section supplies the material conditions the cultural explanation is competing against, and the competition is not usually adjudicated.

The second consequence concerns what the framework requires and cannot presently obtain.

The conditions of [§1.26.3](#) are conditions on a relation. Whether a relation can support, can revise, and can create jointly is not a matter of hours in any direct way, since a relation with little time available to it may satisfy all three and a relation with a great deal may satisfy none. This must be stated plainly because the alternative reading is available and would be wrong: the framework does not hold that more adult time produces better development, and [§1.27.6](#) explains why it cannot hold anything of that form.

What time bears on is whether the conditions have occasion to be exercised. A child's account of a situation can revise an adult's only where the account is given and heard, and giving and hearing take place in time. An arrangement that leaves no interval in which a child's account might be given has not made revision impossible in principle, and it has removed the occasions on which the possibility would be tested. The distinction between a condition being absent and a condition being untested is one this book must maintain, and [ch. 30](#) depends on it.

5.3 The Subsistence of the Household

The third condition is what a household must do to secure its own continuation, and it stands behind the two preceding sections. Adults work the hours they work, and provision is or is not purchased, under a prior constraint concerning what the household requires and how it obtains it.

5.3.1 The Work a Household Must Do

Households across the coverage of this chapter differ in what proportion of their subsistence is obtained through wages, what proportion through their own production, and what proportion

through transfers from a state or from kin. The differences are large and they bear on rearing in ways that are not captured by household income.

Where subsistence is obtained substantially through the household's own production, children participate in it. The anthropological record on this is extensive and consistent (Lancy, 2015; Levine and New, 2007): in agricultural and pastoral households children are assigned tasks from an early age, the tasks are graded to capability, and the assignment is not understood as labour in the sense the term carries in industrialised societies. A child herding, carrying water, minding a younger sibling, or working alongside adults is doing something the household requires and is doing it in the company of those who require it. §2.3.1 recorded that the removal of children from production was one of the conditions under which the developmental question became askable. In households where the removal has not occurred, the condition described there does not obtain.

Where subsistence is obtained through wages and the household purchases what it consumes, children do not participate in subsistence and their activity is separated from it. What a child does is schooling, and schooling's relation to the household's continuation is deferred and indirect. This is the arrangement in which nearly all developmental research has been conducted, and §4.1.1 recorded the consequence.

Between these are arrangements in which both hold. A household with a small holding and one adult in wage employment requires both kinds of activity, and its children may do schoolwork and household production in the same day. This configuration is common across South and Southeast Asia, across much of sub-Saharan Africa, in rural Latin America, and in rural areas of societies whose urban arrangements are entirely wage-based. It is under-described in the developmental literature relative to how many children live in it.

Proposition 5.5. *Where a household's subsistence requires the participation of children, the child's activity and the household's continuation are directly related. Where it does not, the relation is deferred through an institution. These are different conditions and neither is a deficient form of the other.*

Three observations follow, and the second is the one this book's argument requires.

The first concerns what the vocabulary of the field permits to be said about the first arrangement. Terms such as child labour, educational participation, and opportunity cost of schooling are the standard instruments for describing it, and each carries a comparison with the second arrangement built into it. This is not an argument that the terms are useless, and where children are working in conditions that damage them the term child labour is doing necessary work. It is an observation that the vocabulary makes one arrangement the norm from which the other departs, and §3.3.1 described the mechanism by which such a norm becomes administrative.

The second concerns what a child does with an adult. In an arrangement where subsistence requires participation, a child and an adult are frequently engaged in the same activity, with the adult more capable and the child learning by doing what is being done. The literature that has described this most carefully calls it participation in ongoing activity (Rogoff, 2003) and distinguishes it from instruction, and it is worth noting what the distinction consists in. In instruction an adult arranges an activity for the purpose of a child's learning. In participation the activity has its own purpose and the child's learning is a consequence of joining it.

This bears directly on §1.26.3. The third condition named there is that a relation can create jointly, and joint creation is easier to identify where two parties are making something whose existence does not depend on either alone. A household producing what it consumes offers many occasions of this kind. A household in which a child's activity is schooling and an adult's is wage employment offers fewer, and the occasions it offers must be arranged rather than arising from what the household is doing anyway.

The framework's reading of this must be stated with care, since the obvious reading would be wrong and would also be sentimental. Nothing here holds that subsistence production is a superior condition for development. It is frequently arduous, it is undertaken because there is no alternative, and the households in question would in many cases prefer the wage arrangement and are seeking it. What the framework holds is that the two arrangements differ in the occasions they supply for a condition to be exercised, that the second supplies fewer of them incidentally, and that a society in the second arrangement must therefore arrange deliberately what the first produced as a by-product. ch. 77 takes up what follows from that, and ch. 77 states why deliberate arrangement of this kind is difficult in a way that is not merely practical.

The third observation concerns transfers. Where a substantial share of subsistence arrives through a state, the household's relation to its own continuation is altered again, and the alteration has been treated in the literature chiefly through its effects on income. A household whose subsistence is conditional on demonstrating something to an administering body stands in a relation to that body which enters the household's own arrangements. Conditional transfer programmes requiring school attendance or health-service contact are widespread across Latin America and increasingly elsewhere, and their evaluations report effects on the conditioned behaviour (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). What they do not report, and what would bear on this book's argument, is what the condition does to the household's account of what it is doing and why.

5.3.2 The Position of the Household

Households differ in how they obtain subsistence, and equally in in where they stand relative to other households obtaining it the same way. The difference is generally reported as class position or as socioeconomic status, and the reporting conceals more than it discloses for the purposes of this chapter.

Three separable things travel under those terms.

The first is the household's command over resources: what it can purchase, what it can decline to do, and what it can withstand without the arrangement collapsing. This is what income and wealth measures report and it is genuinely important, since a household unable to purchase care has fewer configurations available to it than one that can.

The second is the household's relation to the institutions its children pass through. §1.15 recorded Bourdieu's account of this, and the observation that has survived subsequent testing is that households differ in their familiarity with what a school expects, in their willingness to intervene when it does not go well, and in whether they treat institutional judgements as authoritative or as negotiable. These differences are correlated with resources and are not identical to them. A household with modest resources and extensive familiarity with schooling behaves differently from a household with the same resources and none.

The third is the household's expectation of its own future. Whether a household anticipates that its position will improve, remain, or deteriorate bears on what it does with children, and the anticipation is not determined by present position. Migrant households whose present position is poor and whose expectation is of improvement have been documented behaving quite differently from long-settled households in the same present position (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001), and the difference appears in what is asked of children.

Proposition 5.6. *Command over resources, familiarity with institutions, and expectation of the household's future vary partially independently. A description of a household by its position on one of these does not determine its position on the others.*

Two matters bear on how this chapter uses the material.

The first is that within-society variation on these dimensions frequently exceeds between-society variation, and this is the empirical content of the claim made in §4.2. Households at the upper end of the distribution in one society resemble one another across societies in a number of respects that have been documented (Lareau, 2011): in the intensity of adult involvement in children's activities, in the extent of purchased enrichment, in the treatment of a child's schedule as something to be managed, and in the disposition to negotiate with institutions rather than defer to them. The convergence is not complete and it is substantial enough that a comparative claim about societies which does not condition on position within them is reporting something other than what it appears to report.

The second concerns what the framework can and cannot say about this.

The temptation available here is to hold that one position produces conditions favourable to generation and another does not, and the temptation runs in both directions. An account holding that resource-rich households provide better conditions would be the standard one and would reproduce exactly what §1.27.6 identifies as the error. An account holding that resource-rich households are subject to intensive optimisation and therefore generate less would be the inverted version of the same error, arrived at by a different route and equally unsupported.

What the material supports is narrower. Position determines which configurations are available to a household and which require effort to sustain. A household with resources can purchase care and thereby obtain adult attention it does not itself supply; it can also purchase activities that fill a child's time completely. A household without resources may have an adult present because employment is unavailable, or may have no adult present because employment is precarious and hours are long. Each position makes some conditions easy to establish and others difficult, and the mapping from position to condition is not monotonic in either direction.

This is where the concern raised in §1.27.3 becomes concrete rather than methodological. A framework that supplies criteria for what makes a relation generative can be used to grade households, and grading households by position would be the most available application of it. ch. 76 takes this up as a problem about instruments. The present chapter notes only that the material of this section does not support such a grading and that a reader who extracts one from it has extracted something the evidence does not contain.

One further observation belongs here because it will recur.

The conditions described in this chapter are, for the most part, not chosen by the households subject to them. Working hours are set by employment, provision is available or not, sub-

sistence requires what it requires, and position is inherited more often than achieved. §1.26.4 stated the book's materialist commitment in methodological form, and this is its substantive form. A description of rearing that treats arrangements as expressions of what adults value, without first establishing what was available to them, has described a choice where there may have been none. The remaining sections of this chapter proceed on that basis, and §5.6 states what follows from taking it seriously.

5.4 The Languages of a Child's Day

The fourth condition concerns how many languages a child encounters, in which relations, and on what terms. It is treated here at greater length than the preceding conditions for three reasons: the arrangements vary more sharply than in any other condition in this chapter, the institutional responses to them are explicitly theorised in a way that other responses are not, and the condition bears directly on a capacity this book takes to be central.

5.4.1 The Range of Arrangements

A description of this condition must begin by setting aside the arrangement that the developmental literature has treated as standard, since it is not standard anywhere except in the societies where the literature was produced, and it is not standard in all of those.

The arrangement in question is one in which a child is reared in one language, is schooled in that language, and encounters other languages as subjects of instruction. Most of the world's children are not in it.

Four other arrangements are widespread and they differ in ways that matter.

There are societies in which several languages are in ordinary daily use and a child acquires more than one without any institution arranging it. This is the situation across much of sub-Saharan Africa (Lüpke and Storch, 2013), where a child may use one language with a grandmother, another in the market, and a third at school, and where the number of languages an adult uses competently is frequently three or more. It is also the situation in much of South and Southeast Asia. In such settings multilingualism is not a policy outcome and not an achievement; it is what the linguistic environment produces.

There are societies with a formal multilingual settlement, in which two or more languages have official standing and the arrangement is constitutional. Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada are the most examined cases, and the arrangements differ substantially among them. What they share is that the languages are territorially or institutionally allocated, so that a child in a given place is schooled in a given language, and the multilingualism is a property of the polity rather than necessarily of the individual.

There are societies with a dominant national language and substantial populations using others, where the others are home languages of migrant or minority communities. This is the situation across most of Western Europe, in North America, in Australia, and in the Gulf states. Here the arrangement a child encounters is determined by what the school does about a language the child brings and the institution does not use.

And there are societies in which an indigenous language exists in a state of contested maintenance alongside a colonial or settler language. New Zealand, the Nordic countries in re-

spect of Sámi, several Latin American states in respect of Quechua, Aymara, and Guaraní, and Canada and Australia in respect of indigenous languages are cases of this kind (May, 2012). The arrangements here are the outcome of policy reversals: suppression, followed in most of these cases by revitalisation programmes conducted under conditions the suppression created.

Proposition 5.7. *The number of languages a child encounters is determined by the linguistic environment, by constitutional settlement, by what an institution does about a language a child brings, and by the history of policy toward a language. These produce different arrangements and are not degrees of one thing.*

Two features of the comparative literature deserve statement before the institutional question is taken up.

The first concerns what has been studied. Research on childhood multilingualism has been conducted disproportionately in the third arrangement, on children of migrant background in societies with a dominant language, and the research question has typically been framed as one about the acquisition of the dominant language and the consequences of the home language for it. That framing is intelligible given who commissions such research. It also means that the arrangement in which multilingualism is ordinary and unremarkable, which is the arrangement most of the world's multilingual children are in, is the least studied of the four.

The second concerns a finding that has moved considerably. A literature reporting general cognitive advantages associated with bilingualism was influential for some decades, and subsequent work has substantially qualified it. Effects reported in early studies have been difficult to replicate (Paap and Greenberg, 2013), publication bias in this area has been documented (de Bruin et al., 2015), and the current position in the specialist literature is more cautious than the position that reached public discussion and educational policy. This chapter takes no position on the remaining dispute. It notes the case as an instance of §3.2.4: a qualified finding travelled as an unqualified one, arrived in settings that made policy on it, and the qualification has travelled far less well and far more slowly.

What can be said without entering that dispute is that a child in a multilingual arrangement is doing something a child in a monolingual one is not, and that what he is doing is relational as much as linguistic. §5.4.3 takes this up, and it is where this chapter's material bears most directly on the framework.

5.4.2 The Institutional Response

What an institution does when the languages a child brings differ from the language it uses is a decision, it varies widely, and the variation is not explained by the linguistic situation alone. Societies with similar language distributions have adopted quite different arrangements, and the differences follow from what each institution took the situation to be a problem about.

Five responses can be distinguished across the coverage of this chapter.

Submersion places a child in instruction conducted entirely in the institution's language, with no provision for the language he brings and frequently with its use discouraged or forbidden. This was the standard response across most of Western Europe and North America for much of the twentieth century, and it was the instrument of the suppression referred to in §5.4.1. It persists in settings where no alternative has been resourced.

Transitional provision uses a child's home language as a temporary support while instruction shifts to the institution's language, with the shift completed within a stated period. The arrangement's purpose is the acquisition of the dominant language, and the home language is instrumental to it. This is the most common formal provision in the third arrangement described above.

Maintenance provision continues instruction in both languages beyond the point at which a child could manage in the dominant one, on the ground that the home language has value that does not depend on its usefulness for acquiring the other. Bilingual education programmes of this kind exist across a number of societies and are politically contested in most of them.

Immersion places children whose home language is the dominant one into instruction conducted in another, and it is worth noting that this arrangement is generally uncontested where the previous one is contested. The Canadian French immersion programmes are the examined case (Genesee, 2004), and their populations differ in a way that bears on how findings from them travel: an immersion programme serves children whose home language is secure and whose families chose the programme.

Content-integrated instruction teaches subject matter through a second language without the language itself being the subject of the lesson. Variants of this operate across the European Union under an institutional label, in international schools worldwide, and in a number of the formal-settlement societies.

Proposition 5.8. *An institution's response to a child's home language is determined by what it takes the home language to be: an obstacle to be removed, an instrument for acquiring another, or a thing with standing of its own. The three yield different provision from identical linguistic circumstances.*

Three observations follow.

The first concerns evidence. The comparative literature on these arrangements is substantial and its findings are more consistent than the political contestation would suggest. Instruction in a language a child does not yet command produces poorer learning of the subject matter than instruction in one he does, and provision that develops the home language does not impede acquisition of the dominant one. These findings have held across a range of settings (Baker and Wright, 2017). What they do not settle is the political question, which concerns what a society owes to a language and whether provision should be made where it is costly, and no finding about learning outcomes answers that question.

The second concerns what the responses treat as the unit. Every arrangement above is a decision about what happens to a child in an institution, and the child's languages are treated as properties he brings. A recent line of work has proposed a different description (García and Wei, 2014), under which a multilingual speaker has a single repertoire rather than several languages, and draws on it according to what a situation calls for. The proposal has practical consequences: an institution operating on it does not partition the day between languages and does not treat the use of one language during instruction in another as an error to be corrected. Whether the description is correct is disputed. What is relevant here is that it locates the phenomenon differently, in a repertoire deployed in situations rather than in a set of languages possessed, and §3.3.1 explains why the relocation has consequences for instruments.

The third concerns what the arrangements do to relations, which is the aspect this chapter's

organisation requires and which the comparative literature addresses least.

Each arrangement above establishes a relation between a child's household and the institution his day is spent in. Under submersion the household's language has no standing in the institution, and a child who acquires the institution's language and loses fluency in his household's has been placed in a relation to his own household that the institution produced. This outcome is documented and it is not rare (Wong Fillmore, 1991). Under maintenance provision the household's language has standing, and the child's relation to both is maintained by an arrangement that costs something to sustain.

The consequences of this for what passes between a child and the adults in his household are substantial and they are under-studied. A grandmother who cannot speak to a grandchild is a common outcome of the first arrangement, and it is a relational fact rather than a linguistic one. §1.26.3 names support, revision, and joint creation as conditions on relations. A relation in which the parties lack a common language in which to conduct them is a relation in which the conditions cannot be met, whatever else is present. This chapter can record that the arrangements differ in whether they produce such relations. It cannot report what follows, for the reason stated in the chapter's opening.

5.4.3 Plurilingual Competence and Its Political Form

The European institutions have produced a body of doctrine on multilingualism that is unusual in two respects. It defines the capacity at issue in a form that does not treat languages as possessions, and it attaches a political argument to that definition. Both deserve examination, and the second requires the neutrality commitment of this book to be applied carefully.

The definitional point comes first because the political argument rests on it.

The Council of Europe's framework (Council of Europe, 2001) distinguishes multilingualism, which it treats as the coexistence of several languages in a society or in an individual's knowledge, from plurilingual competence, which it defines as a capacity to draw on a repertoire in which the languages are not held separately. On this definition a speaker does not have three languages in the way he might have three qualifications. He has one repertoire, unevenly developed, in which what he can do in each language differs by domain and by situation, and competence consists in deploying the repertoire according to what an interaction requires. Partial competence is therefore not a deficient version of full competence. It is what plurilingual competence normally looks like.

Three features of this definition bear on the argument of this book, and the first is why the definition is treated at length here rather than mentioned.

The definition does not name a stock. What a plurilingual speaker has is stated as a capacity to draw on something in a situation, which is a disposition exercised in relations rather than a quantity held. §1.26.3 defined development as a child becoming able to continue generating relations and meanings, and stated that its form is what distinguishes it: it names what a person becomes able to continue doing. The Council of Europe's definition has the same form. This is the only instrument-bearing definition encountered in this book's survey that does, and §1.25 makes clear how unusual that is.

The definition makes uneven development the normal case. A repertoire in which a speaker can conduct household matters in one language, technical work in another, and neither in a

third is not a partial achievement of a complete state. It is a repertoire shaped by the relations the speaker has been in. What a person can do in a language is a record of where he has done it.

And the definition is relational at the point of exercise. Which part of a repertoire is drawn on is determined by who is being addressed and what the situation is. A child who uses one language with a grandmother and another with a teacher is not switching between two possessions. He is responding to two relations, and the response is the competence.

Proposition 5.9. *A capacity defined as the deployment of a repertoire in a situation is defined without locating a stock in the person. Uneven development is then the expected condition rather than an incomplete approach to a complete one.*

The political argument attached to this definition should now be stated, and stated as its proponents make it.

The argument holds that a polity conducting its affairs in several languages requires something other than a common language to make democratic participation possible, and that plurilingual competence among citizens is what makes it possible. On this view a multilingual democracy is not a defective approximation to a monolingual one that has failed to unify. It is a form of political organisation with its own requirements, one of which is that citizens can operate across linguistic boundaries rather than all operating within one. The educational consequence drawn is that provision should develop plurilingual repertoires from an early age, and the European institutions have promoted this consequence in policy.

The argument has critics and the criticism should be recorded with equal care. One line holds that the doctrine's practical effect is the promotion of a small number of high-status languages (May, 2012), since a repertoire is developed in the languages available to be developed in, and that the languages of migrant communities benefit little from a doctrine framed in these terms. A second holds that democratic deliberation requires a common public sphere, that a common sphere requires a shared medium (Kraus and Kazlauskaitė-Gürbüz, 2014), and that plurilingual competence distributed unevenly across a population produces a stratification in political participation rather than removing one. A third observes that the doctrine originated in institutions with an interest in the legitimacy of a multilingual polity, and that its academic development has been substantially funded by them.

This book takes no position on the dispute. It is a question about political organisation, the arguments on each side turn on empirical matters about deliberation that are not settled, and §1.26.4 would apply even if the arguments were settled.

What can be said, and what the chapter records, is narrower and concerns the definition rather than the politics.

A definition of a capacity that names a disposition exercised in relations, rather than a stock held by a person, is available and has been institutionally adopted at scale. This is evidence that such definitions are usable, that assessment frameworks can be built on them, and that the objection that a relational definition cannot be operationalised is not correct in general. ch. 70 inherits this observation, and it inherits with it the difficulty that the European frameworks have been criticised precisely on the ground that their assessment instruments do not measure what their definition names, which is an instance of the general problem §3.3.1 described.

One further matter belongs here because it is what the framework can contribute rather

than borrow.

A child moving between languages by interlocutor is doing something that the literature describes linguistically and that has a relational description available to it. He is reading which register a relation calls for, and adjusting. That is a relational operation performed with linguistic means, and whether the child's facility at it constitutes a developed relational capacity or a developed linguistic one is a question the standard instruments cannot pose, since they measure proficiency in an individual and the operation is a property of what passes between two parties. [ch. 30](#) takes up the general question of how a relational capacity develops. What the material of this section supplies is the observation that a widespread condition of childhood, in most of the world, consists in the daily exercise of exactly the operation that chapter is about, and that the exercise has been studied almost entirely as a matter of language.

5.5 The Standing of a Child's Account

The fifth condition is the one this book's framework makes central and the one for which comparative evidence is thinnest. It concerns whether what a child says about a situation can alter what an adult holds about it.

5.5.1 The Arrangements of Address

Societies differ in what a child is expected to say to an adult, when, and with what consequence. The differences are documented, though mostly as a by-product of research directed at other questions, and they are frequently reported in a vocabulary that obscures what varies.

The vocabulary in question is that of parenting styles, recorded in [§1.17](#). It distinguishes arrangements by the combination of warmth and control an adult exercises, and it treats the extent to which a child's view is solicited as an aspect of one of these. The classification has been applied across many societies and the applications have produced a familiar difficulty ([Chao, 1994; Keller, 2018](#)): arrangements that the instrument codes as high in control are found in societies where the adults involved describe what they are doing in terms the instrument does not contain, and where the outcomes associated with high control in the originating population are not observed.

What varies, described without that vocabulary, can be stated as three separable things.

Whether a child is expected to give an account at all. In some arrangements a child is routinely asked what he thinks about matters concerning him, and the asking is understood as part of what rearing is. In others a child is not asked, and the omission is not an oversight; the arrangement holds that a child's view on the matter is not yet the kind of thing that bears on it. These are different expectations and they are held with equal sincerity.

Whether the account, once given, is answerable. A child may be asked what he thinks and the asking may be a formality, in which case the account is received and nothing follows from it. A child may not be routinely asked and yet, in a particular matter, what he says may change what an adult does. The first arrangement has the form of consultation without the substance; the second has the substance without the form. An instrument recording whether children are consulted will rank these in the wrong order.

Whether the matters on which an account counts are bounded. Arrangements differ in

which questions a child's view bears on. In many the domain is real and small: what he eats, what he wears, how he spends an afternoon. In others it extends to matters with consequences, including his schooling and the household's arrangements. The boundary's location is a feature of the arrangement, it is generally unstated, and it moves with the child's age on a schedule that also varies.

Proposition 5.10. *Whether a child is asked for an account, whether the account can alter an adult's, and which matters it bears on are separable features of an arrangement. An arrangement may have the first without the second, and the second without the first.*

That proposition identifies what this book's framework requires and what the comparative literature does not supply.

The second of the three is the condition named in §1.26.3 as revisability. It is not the same as consultation, it is not the same as warmth, and it is not the same as permissiveness. It concerns whether a child's account of a situation is capable of altering an adult's account of it, and the alteration is the thing at issue rather than the hearing.

No widely used instrument measures this. The parenting-style instruments measure reported practices and attitudes. Observational instruments measure the quality of interaction, which is closer and is not the same, since an interaction may be warm and responsive throughout while nothing the child says alters anything the adult holds. Instruments used in the provision literature measure adult behaviour toward children. What would be required is a record of occasions on which a child's account was given, together with whether an adult's subsequent conduct or stated view differed from what it had been, and such records are not routinely collected in any research programme this book has surveyed.

Two consequences follow, and the first is a limitation on this chapter.

This section cannot report how the condition is distributed across the societies in the chapter's coverage. What it can report is that the arrangements differ in the three respects above, that the differences are documented incidentally in ethnographic work (Lancy, 2015; Rogoff, 2003), and that the condition the framework takes to matter has not been the object of comparative study. §4.3.1 anticipated this and the present section is where the cost is actually paid.

The second consequence concerns what may be inferred from the arrangements that are documented.

An arrangement in which a child is not routinely asked for his view is not thereby an arrangement in which revision is unavailable. §5.2.2 distinguished a condition being absent from a condition being untested, and the distinction applies here with particular force, since the occasions on which a child's account alters an adult's may be rare in any arrangement and may be exactly the occasions that matter. A household in which a child is consulted daily on small matters and never on consequential ones may be less revisable, in the sense at issue, than one in which he is seldom consulted and is heeded when he objects to something serious.

This is why the chapter's organisation places this condition beside the others rather than treating it as the important one. What the framework requires is a property of particular relations over time, the arrangements described in this chapter are the conditions under which such relations are conducted, and the relation between the two is what the book has yet to establish. ch. 30 takes up the first half of it, and ch. 70 takes up whether the second half can be observed at all.

5.6 The Conditions Taken Together

The preceding sections treated five conditions separately. This section states what follows from the fact that they occur together, and it is where the chapter's organisation is either vindicated or shown to have been an inconvenience.

5.6.1 The Configurations

The conditions are not independent. §5.1.1 noted that the adults available to a child follow from employment and provision; §5.2.1 that provision and employment determine one another; §5.3.1 that both stand on what a household must do to subsist. A description that varied one condition while holding the others constant would describe an arrangement that does not occur.

What occurs are configurations, and a small number recur across the coverage of this chapter. Four are set out below. They are offered as recurring combinations rather than as a taxonomy, no society consists of one of them, and the fourth is increasing everywhere.

There is the configuration of distributed kin. Subsistence is obtained substantially through the household's own production or through local trade, several adults are available and several are responsible, children participate in subsistence from an early age, provision outside the household is scarce or absent, and more than one language is ordinarily in use. Occasions of joint activity between adults and children are abundant and arise from what the household is doing. Whether a child's account can alter an adult's is not routinely documented in these settings and there is no reason to assume a common answer across them.

There is the configuration of institutional provision. Subsistence is obtained through wages, employment among adults of both sexes is high, provision outside the household is extensive and publicly supported, working hours are moderate and predictable, the household contains one or two adults, and a child's day contains many professional adults and few household ones. Occasions of joint activity with household adults are fewer and are arranged rather than incidental. The Nordic societies are the clearest instance and the configuration is not confined to them.

There is the configuration of the long day. Subsistence is obtained through wages, working hours are long, provision is available at cost, and the household contains one or two adults of whom one or both are absent for most of a child's waking hours. Care falls to whoever is available, which may be a grandparent, a paid carer, an older sibling, or an institution. This configuration occurs in urban areas across East Asia, across much of Latin America, in the Anglophone societies, and increasingly in the large cities of every society in this chapter's coverage. It is not a cultural characteristic of any of them and it follows from the arrangement of employment.

There is the configuration of dispersal. A household's members are in more than one place, subsistence is obtained partly through remittance, kin who would be available are elsewhere, more than one language is in use and the languages have unequal standing, and the household's relation to the institutions its children pass through is one of unfamiliarity. This configuration is produced by migration, it is documented across every region in this chapter's coverage, and §2.6.2 named it as something this book may be failing to treat with the weight it will turn out to have had.

Proposition 5.11. *Conditions occur in configurations and the configurations recur across societies that differ in other respects. A configuration is not a property of a society, since one society contains several and several societies contain one.*

Three observations complete the chapter.

The first vindicates or fails to vindicate the organisation. If the configurations above are real, then a country-by-country chapter would have described each society as a mixture of them without the mixture being visible, since each society's section would have reported averages over configurations rather than the configurations. The organisation adopted here makes the configurations visible and makes national description harder. A reader who wants to know what rearing is like in a given society will find the answer distributed and will find that the answer is several answers. That is the finding of §4.2 in its most concrete form, and it is the chapter's principal result.

The second concerns convergence. Comparative work frequently reports that arrangements are converging internationally, and the material above supports a qualified version of this. What is converging is the distribution of configurations rather than the practices within them. The configuration of the long day is increasing in societies whose earlier arrangements differed considerably, and it is increasing for the same reason in each: urban employment, the cost of provision, and the dispersal of kin. Two societies becoming more alike in this respect are not adopting one another's practices. They are arriving at the same configuration from different starting points because the conditions that produce it are becoming general. §3.2.4 described a channel through which a further and different kind of convergence occurs, and the two should not be conflated.

The third concerns what this chapter has not established and what the next chapters must therefore not assume.

The chapter has described conditions and it has not shown that any of them bears on what the framework says it bears on. That a configuration supplies fewer occasions for joint activity does not establish that generation is impaired in it, and §4.3.1 gave the reason such a finding is not currently available. ch. 6 states the framework's commitments, and it must state them as commitments rather than as conclusions drawn from this chapter. What this chapter supplies to the remainder of the book is a description of the conditions under which the relations it discusses are actually conducted, so that when a later chapter describes a household it is describing something that exists and is not describing the household of the literature's imagination.

That is a modest contribution and it is the one the chapter can support. A reader who reaches the end of Part I expecting to have been shown that relational conditions determine development has expected something Part I did not undertake. What Part I has undertaken is to establish what the field's accounts presuppose, how the presupposition was formed, how it was installed, what comparison can establish under it, and what arrangements children are actually in. The framework's own claims begin in the chapter that follows.

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Chapter 6

The Commitments of Generative Relational Being

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter states what the framework of this book holds, in a form precise enough that later chapters can be checked against it.

It contributes the positive position that the preceding five chapters withheld. Those chapters established what the field's accounts presuppose, how the presupposition was formed and installed, what comparison can establish under it, and what arrangements children are actually reared in. None of them argued for an alternative. This chapter supplies one, and everything after it depends on the supply. Its most specific obligation is the one §1.1.2 imposed: to make available a sense of relation that is prior to its terms, stable enough that the later chapters do not slide back into the ordinary sense in which a relation connects things that were already there.

It does not argue that the framework is correct, and §1.25.3 explained why no such argument is available. It does not derive practical consequences, which begin in ch. 77. And it does not present the framework as finished.

The reader should carry forward the five co-emergents, the sense of relation established in the first section, and the distinction between what the framework asserts and what it merely permits to be described.

6.1 The Sense of Relation

The word this book depends on is already in use, and the sense in which it is in use is the one the book must displace. This section does the displacing, and it is the chapter's first section because nothing later in the chapter can be stated without it.

6.1.1 The Ordinary Sense and Its Difficulty

In ordinary use a relation holds between things. Two people stand in a relation, a parent and a child are related, an item is related to another. The grammar of the word requires terms: something is related to something, and the relation is what obtains between them. On this construction the terms are prior. They exist, they have properties, and the relation is a further fact about how they stand to one another.

The construction is not a mistake and it serves most purposes. Where the things related are independently identifiable, and where their identity does not depend on the relation, the

ordinary sense describes the situation correctly. Two cities are a certain distance apart; the distance is a relation, the cities are prior to it, and neither is constituted by it.

The difficulty appears where the relation is what makes the terms the terms they are.

§1.25 found that nineteen traditions treat a relation as a condition under which a child develops. Each of them uses the ordinary sense, and using it is what produces the finding. If a relation holds between a child and an adult, then the child is a term, the child has properties, and the relation is a circumstance affecting what happens to those properties. The bearer commitment follows from the grammar of the word before any theoretical claim is made.

This is why §1.1.2 concluded that the book must supply a vocabulary. Announcing that this book is relational would communicate nothing (Gergen, 2009), since every account surveyed is relational in the ordinary sense and several are emphatically so. The disagreement is not about whether relations matter. It is about whether the terms are prior to them.

Three constructions are available and it is worth setting them out, since the third is the one this book takes and the second is frequently mistaken for it.

On the first construction the terms are prior and the relation is external to them. Two individuals with properties enter into a relation, the relation may affect what they subsequently do, and each remains identifiable independently of it. This is the ordinary sense and it is the construction the survey found.

On the second the terms are prior and the relation is internal to them (Emirbayer, 1997), in the sense that a term could not be what it is without standing in the relation. A parent is not a parent except in relation to a child. This construction is familiar in philosophy, it is stronger than the first, and it does not do what this book requires. It makes the relation necessary for the term's being of a certain kind, and it leaves the term's existence untouched. The person who is a parent existed before the relation and would exist without it; what the relation supplies is a description under which he falls.

On the third construction there is a process, and terms are what the process stabilises (Whitehead, 1929; Simondon, 2020). A relation on this construction is not something obtaining between two things. It is a going-on, and the parties to it are the aspects of it that have become stable enough to be picked out and named. The parties are real and they are not prior. What is prior is the process in which they are constituted, and it is prior in the order of explanation rather than in time.

Proposition 6.1. *An account may treat a relation as external to its terms, as internal to them, or as prior to them. The third is not a stronger version of the second, since the second leaves the existence of the terms untouched and the third does not.*

The third construction requires two immediate defences, since it invites two objections that would end the discussion if they held.

The first objection is that the construction is incoherent, because a process must be a process of something and a going-on must be a going-on among things. If there is nothing there, nothing can go on.

The reply is that the construction does not deny that there is something there. It denies that what is there is exhaustively described as a collection of individuals with properties. A conversation is a case: it is going on, it has participants, and the participants are not prior to it in the relevant sense, since what each is doing at any moment is determined by what

the conversation has become and could not be specified independently of it. To describe a conversation as two people each producing utterances is to describe something, and it is not to describe the conversation.

The second objection is that the construction collapses the individual, and that a framework in which persons are aspects of processes cannot say the things about persons that need saying. This objection is serious, it recurs throughout the book, and [ch. 7](#) is where it is answered rather than deflected. The short form of the reply is that stabilisation is real. An aspect of a process that has stabilised is a thing, it has properties, it can be harmed, and it is owed what persons are owed. What the construction denies is that the stabilisation is prior to the process or independent of it.

One further remark completes the section, and it concerns what this construction costs.

A sense of relation prior to its terms cannot be stated in a vocabulary whose grammar requires terms, and English requires them. Every sentence in this book that names a parent and a child has already conceded the point at the level of syntax. [§1.27.9](#) recorded the risk that a vocabulary general enough to describe everything describes nothing; the present difficulty is its inverse. A vocabulary specific enough to name the parties has already individuated them. The book proceeds in the available language, states the construction as clearly as the language permits, and asks the reader to hold the construction against the grammar rather than to expect the grammar to express it.

6.1.2 Stabilisation and What It Yields

The preceding subsection stated that terms are what a process stabilises. The statement is unhelpful until stabilisation is said to be something, and this subsection says what.

A process stabilises where a pattern within it becomes self-maintaining, so that a disturbance is followed by a return to the pattern rather than by its dissolution. This is the notion of an attractor introduced in [§2.4.6](#), and the vocabulary is used here in the same sense. What stabilises is not a substance and not a thing added to the process. It is a regularity in how the process proceeds, and its stability consists in the process's returning to it.

Three features of stabilisation bear on everything that follows.

Stability is a matter of degree and of range. A pattern may be maintained under small disturbances and lost under larger ones, and the range over which it is maintained is a property of the pattern rather than a fixed quantity. Two stabilisations may be equally stable under ordinary conditions and differ entirely in what it takes to end them. This is why a household may appear settled for years and reorganise abruptly, and [§2.4.6](#) recorded that the abruptness is what a dynamical description predicts rather than what it finds anomalous.

Stability is maintained rather than possessed. A pattern that is not being maintained is not thereby stable and quietly persisting; it is being lost at a rate that may be slow. This has a consequence for how the framework describes what look like static arrangements. A relation that has not changed in ten years has been maintained for ten years, and the maintenance is something that was done, by whatever was doing it, whether or not anyone intended it. [ch. 10](#) is where this becomes the book's central diagnostic.

And a stabilisation supports description. Once a pattern is stable it can be named, and the naming picks out something real. This is what licenses the ordinary vocabulary. A child,

a parent, a household are stabilisations, they are correctly named, and sentences about them are true or false in the ordinary way. The framework does not hold that such sentences are confused. It holds that they describe stabilisations without describing what stabilised them, and that certain questions cannot be asked in a vocabulary that only describes the stable.

Proposition 6.2. *A stabilisation is a self-maintaining pattern within a process, its stability is a matter of degree and range, and it is maintained rather than possessed. It supports true description of itself and does not thereby describe the process that maintains it.*

What this yields for the subject matter of this book can now be stated.

A child is a stabilisation. So is an adult, and so is the relation between them, which is a stabilisation of a different kind and not a lesser one. The three are not three things of which two are solid and one is a circumstance connecting them. They are three patterns of different scale and different stability within one going-on, and the framework's substantive claims concern how they condition one another.

Two of these claims are stated here and developed later.

The first is that the stabilisation of a child is conducted within the stabilisation of a relation, and that this is an asymmetry rather than a symmetry. Both parties are stabilised in the relation, both are altered by it, and §1.27.10 holds that what develops includes the relation itself. The asymmetry lies in the ranges. An adult's stabilisation is maintained by many relations, of which this is one; a young child's is maintained by few, and by these almost exclusively. A disturbance that an adult's pattern absorbs may exceed the range over which a child's is maintained. ch. 7 is where this is treated at length, and it is the book's founding asymmetry.

The second is that the description a relation supports is itself part of what maintains it. A household in which a child is described in certain terms conducts itself according to those terms, the conduct produces occasions that the terms describe, and the terms are thereby maintained. This is a stabilisation with a specific structure, in which the naming and the named support one another, and ch. 15 is where its consequences are traced. The structure is not in itself a defect. It is how any stable description of a person is maintained, including the accurate ones.

One clarification prevents a misreading that would otherwise be natural.

Nothing in this construction holds that stabilisation is undesirable or that generation consists in avoiding it. A process with no stabilisations is not generative; it is noise. What a child comes to be able to do, in the sense of §1.26.3, requires that a great deal about him has stabilised, and the same holds for the relations he stands in. The framework's interest is in the difference between a stabilisation that continues to admit alteration and one that does not, and [ch. ?? ch:stability] states the criterion. A pattern that returns to itself after disturbance is stable. A pattern that has come to exclude the disturbances that would alter it has a different property, and the two are easily confused because both look like a household that is doing well.

6.1.3 The Working Definition

The three constructions of §6.1.1 say how a relation stands to its terms. They leave open what a relation is, and the omission has a cost this book can no longer postpone.

Huang (2026) supplies the definition adopted here.

Definition 6.3. *A relation is the constraint through which generation unfolds in history.*

Four terms carry the sentence and each bears on what follows in this book.

Constraint means a restriction on succession. It concerns how the states of what is related may follow one another, and it leaves untouched which states exist. The narrowing is essential: a constraint on configurations holds that certain states are unavailable, and a constraint on succession holds that certain states, being available, may be reached only from certain others. The first impoverishes a system and the second gives it a shape in time.

Generation is the appearance, within a system, of what was not specifiable in the system's own prior terms. The formulation is thin deliberately, since the framework treats generative tendency as a postulate and declines to explain it. To answer why systems unfold their own dynamics would be to name a further good that generation serves, and generation would become the means to it.

Unfolding marks a course that is shaped without being fixed. A predetermined course would make the constraint the whole story, and an arbitrary course would make it idle.

History is the clause that carries the weight. The constraint through which generation unfolds is itself borne by the process it constrains. Without the clause the definition would state structuralism, since the constraint would condition generation and be given from outside. With it, a relation is at once condition and product: it constrains the succession of states, and the succession it constrains revises it.

Proposition 6.4. *A relation is a constraint on succession, borne by the process it constrains and revised by it. Relations are accordingly made of what has passed through them, which Marx (1979) states at the scale of circumstances and this definition states at the scale of the concept.*

6.1.4 The Supply of the Definition to This Book

Three of the book's recurring formulations become sayable under the definition, and stating them here prevents the later chapters from appearing to introduce apparatus without warrant.

§6.1.2 holds that a pattern is maintained rather than possessed. Under the definition this is the second clause: what maintains a pattern is the succession it constrains, and a pattern separated from that succession has nothing to be maintained by.

§10.2.2 characterises a relation by a rate against a rate, and §62.1.3 holds that every capacity Part X treats is a rate over a period. Both follow from a definition stated over succession, since a constraint on succession is assessed across a sequence and by nothing shorter.

§30.1.2 defines a condition in which a description ceases to be alterable by what it describes. Under the definition this is a constraint that has ceased to be revised by the succession it governs, which is the second clause failing while the first holds. The two levels of ch. 30 are accordingly two conditions of one object, and the distinction §30.1.3 argued three ways is a distinction between a constraint on occasions and a constraint on the rules by which occasions are read.

One consequence constrains how this book may argue. Because generation appears in the definiens, no proposition of the form that relations are generative may be presented here as a result. The substantive claims are existential: that constraints of the defined kind obtain in households, and that in those households the constraint is borne and revised by the succession

it governs. Those claims can be false, and §8.3.1 states what would count against them.

Proposition 6.5. *The definition supplies the warrant for maintenance rather than possession, for characterising a relation by rates over periods, and for the condition of §30.1.2, which is a constraint that has ceased to be revised by what it governs. Since generation appears in the definiens, the generativity of relations is a postulate here and no result.*

6.1.5 The Delimitations Adopted

Huang (2026) enters four refusals with the definition, and this book inherits each.

The definition is no ontology. It says nothing about whether relations are more fundamental than their relata, and §6.1.1 took a position on that question separately and on other grounds.

The definition is no epistemology. That relations of the defined kind are frequently invisible to the parties standing within them is a claim of this book and a separate one, and §50.1.2 and §43.4.2 argue it.

The definition is no theory of interaction. Interaction is one mode in which a constraint on succession is realised, and §32.1.1 describes occasions in which a party is present and no interaction of the relevant kind occurs.

And the definition makes no claim about the word. Other disciplines use relation in their own senses correctly, and what is adopted here is a term of art.

Two further delimitations bear directly on this book's vocabulary.

The first concerns scale. The word is used at two levels: for the constraint holding between particular parties, and for the constraint a historical situation imposes on everything within it. The definition is stated at the first. ch. 47 treats the second under the name of a field, and §47.2.1 states its relation to the first as a matter left open. The vocabulary keeps them apart deliberately, since a definition of relation as constraint applied at both levels at once would collapse a distinction the framework requires.

The second concerns teleology. A definition tying relation to generation invites the reading that relations exist for the sake of generation, and that reading would be a serious error. The definition says how relation and generation stand to one another and assigns no purpose to either. §24.2.1 and §24.1.2 guard the corresponding point about recognition, and the guard is needed here for the same reason: a framework treating the free unfolding of its own dynamics as an end can justify the destruction of whatever impedes it, and that justification is available in this framework's vocabulary unless the vocabulary is guarded.

Proposition 6.6. *The definition is no ontology, no epistemology, no theory of interaction, and no claim about the word. It is stated at the scale of particular parties, and ch. 47 treats the historical scale under a separate name. It assigns generation no normative standing, and the refusal is what prevents the framework from justifying the removal of whatever impedes generation.*

6.2 The Co-Emergent Terms

The framework's central statement can now be given. It is stated first in its formal form, which is compact and unhelpful on its own, and the remainder of the section says what each of its

terms means and what the statement's structure commits the framework to.

Generative Relational Being (GRB): A theory of how subject, meaning, value, creation, and normativity co-emerge through generative relational processes.

6.2.1 The Structure of the Claim

Three features of the statement carry its content, and each of them rules out a reading that would otherwise be available.

The five items are named together and none is given priority. This is what *co-emerge* states, and it rules out the most natural reading of a framework of this kind, which would take one of the five as basic and derive the others. An account beginning with the subject and asking how a subject comes to have meanings, values, and norms is a theory of the subject with consequences for the rest. An account beginning with meaning and treating subjects as positions within a system of meanings is a theory of meaning with consequences for the rest. Both are available and coherent, and neither is what is stated here.

What is stated is that the five arise together, in the sense that none is available to be described independently of the others. A subject without meanings is not a subject with an empty inventory; it is not a subject. A value that no one holds and that bears on nothing is not an unvalued value; it is not a value. The framework holds that these are five aspects of one emergence rather than five things that happen to appear at the same time, distinguishable in description and not separable in fact.

The second feature is the word *through*. The five co-emerge through generative relational processes, and the preposition states that the processes are what the emergence consists in rather than a mechanism producing it. §6.1.2 supplied the sense: the five are stabilisations, and the process is what stabilises them. There is no further question about how a process gives rise to a subject, in the way there would be a further question about how a mechanism produces an output, because the subject is not an output of the process. It is a pattern within it that has become self-maintaining.

The third feature is *generative*, and it is the term that does the most work and is most likely to be read loosely. It does not mean productive, in the sense of yielding a great deal. It does not mean creative in the ordinary evaluative sense. It names a property of a process: that the process produces states that were not available in it before, so that the space of what can occur within it is itself altered by what occurs. A process that cycles among a fixed set of states is not generative in this sense however active it is. A process in which a new state becomes available, and in which the availability of that state makes further states available, is.

Proposition 6.7. *The framework asserts that subject, meaning, value, creation, and normativity are aspects of one emergence rather than five phenomena in causal relation. An account deriving any of them from another has departed from it, whichever is taken as basic.*

What the five terms mean in this statement should be said, since each is a word with other uses.

Subject names a stabilisation that is a locus of experience and of address. It is what can be spoken to and what can answer, what a situation is a situation for. §6.1.1 committed the

framework to treating this as constituted rather than prior, and [ch. 7](#) takes up what that means where the subject is a young child.

Meaning names what a sign, an act, or a situation amounts to for the parties to it. The framework treats this as neither in a head nor in a system of signs but as what is settled between parties, provisionally and revisably, in the course of their dealing with one another.

Value names what counts as mattering. The framework's position is that this arises within relations rather than being brought to them, and [§1.27.8](#) recorded the relativism objection this invites and the form of the answer.

Creation names the appearance of what was not available before. It is the term in which the generativity of the process shows up as a fact about outcomes, and it covers the trivial and the momentous alike: a joke a household repeats, a practice it settles into, a way of speaking that did not exist last year and is now how things are said.

Normativity names the standing of a claim about how things should go. The framework distinguishes this from value, since a value may be held without anything following from holding it, and normativity concerns what follows: what may be demanded, what counts as a breach, what a party may be held to.

Two remarks close this subsection.

The first concerns what the framework is a theory of. It is a theory of how these five co-emerge, and it is not itself a theory of the subject, of meaning, of value, of creation, or of normativity. There are such theories, several are better developed than anything here, and [§1.27.11](#) recorded that this framework replaces none of the disciplines it draws on. What it offers is an account of the emergence as one thing, and the offer is worth something only if the unification does work that separate theories cannot.

The second concerns the reader's position. The statement above is compact enough to be memorised and general enough to be applied loosely, and both are hazards. [§1.27.9](#) recorded the risk that a vocabulary general enough for every discipline does no work in any. The remedy adopted in this book is that every use of the framework's vocabulary in later chapters is required to do something a more specific vocabulary could not, and a reader is entitled to check each use against that requirement. [ch. 90](#) states the test formally.

6.2.2 The Corpus and This Book's Draw on It

The statement of [§6.2.1](#) is the foundational one, and a body of work develops it in particular directions. A reader of this book does not need that work and should know what exists, since several of this book's Parts draw on it and would otherwise appear to invent what they are applying.

Five components may be distinguished, and the distinctions are among directions of development rather than among separate theories.

Generative Relational Being is the ontological component and is what [§6.2.1](#) states. It concerns what there is and how it comes to be, and everything else presupposes it.

Generative Relational Epistemology concerns how knowledge is generated within relations rather than transmitted between parties who hold it. Its central refusal is of the picture in which knowledge is a substance possessed by one party and moved to another, and its positive account concerns what is generated in common. [[ch. ?? ch:knowledge-generation](#)] is

where this book takes it up, and the childrearing case is unusually demanding for it, since the asymmetry between an adult who knows a great deal and a child who does not is real and the transmission picture is at its most plausible there.

Generative Relational Economics concerns the generation of value and its conversion, and this book draws on it in one place. [ch. 28](#) treats what happens to a household organised around measured indices, and the question of what is lost when one kind of value is converted into another is that component's central problem.

Generative Relational Governance concerns authority and its exercise within relations that are asymmetric by constitution. [ch. 42](#) and [ch. 45](#) draw on it. The household is a demanding case for the same reason it is a demanding case for the epistemology: the asymmetry is real, it cannot be abolished, and the question is what distinguishes its exercise in a way that keeps a relation open from its exercise in a way that closes one.

Generative Relational History concerns how relational structures form, persist, and transform across time, and [ch. 37](#) and the Part containing it draw on it. [§2.8](#) gestured at what a historical method built on this component would look like and declined to develop it, on the ground that developing it is not a question about childrearing.

Proposition 6.8. *The framework's components are directions of development from one ontological statement. A claim made in one component and not derivable from that statement is a claim of the component rather than of the framework.*

That proposition is a discipline this book imposes on itself, and it is worth saying why.

A framework with several components can absorb any objection by relocating a claim from a component that cannot defend it to one that can. The discipline stated above prevents this. Where a later chapter of this book makes a claim, the claim belongs either to the ontological statement, in which case it must be shown to follow from it, or to a component, in which case its standing is that of the component and not of the framework as a whole. [§1.26.3](#) recorded that this book's position can accommodate any observation; the present discipline does not remove that property and it limits how the property may be exploited.

Two further matters belong in this subsection.

The first concerns the relation between this book and the corpus. This book is not an application of a finished framework to a domain. [§1.27.1](#) stated the framework's own commitment to revision, and the childrearing case has already required the framework to say things it had not said. [ch. 7](#) is the clearest instance: the framework's account of a subject was formulated for subjects with reserves, and a young child has none, so the account must be re-derived rather than applied. Where this book departs from what the corpus states, the departure is marked and the reason given.

The second concerns what a reader may hold this book to. The corpus is available and this book does not presuppose it. Every claim made here is either argued here or marked as belonging elsewhere with a statement of what it does. A reader who finds a claim that is neither has found a defect, and the defect is this book's rather than the corpus's.

One clarification about the components' names, since the vocabulary is unusual and invites a suspicion.

A framework that generates a component for each domain it encounters is exhibiting the risk [§1.27.9](#) named: the appearance of scope purchased by the absence of content. The reply

available here is that the five components are a statement of a set of questions that the ontological statement makes askable, and that they were not generated by encountering domains. Whether the reply is adequate is a fair question, and [ch. 90](#) states the test by which a reader may decide it: whether the vocabulary of a component permits something to be described that could not be described without it, or merely renames what was already available.

6.3 The Standing of the Framework

A framework may be presented as established, as provisional, or as a proposal. Which of these is intended determines what a reader is entitled to expect and what would count as an objection. This section states the standing this book claims, and it is a chapter of Part I rather than a remark in a preface because the standing conditions every claim the book makes afterward.

6.3.1 The Historical-Dialectical Commitment

The framework holds that revision is expected, that both knowledge and practice are finite within a historical frame, and that a framework presented as complete has misdescribed its own position.

This is not modesty and it is not a disclaimer. It is a substantive commitment with three consequences, each of which constrains what the book may do.

The first concerns the framework's own status as a stabilisation. [§6.1.2](#) held that patterns are maintained rather than possessed and that maintenance is something done. A framework is such a pattern. It is maintained by those who use it, it stabilises under some conditions and not others, and it may be lost. A framework that exempted itself from its own account of stabilisation would be asserting that it stands outside what it describes, and nothing in the account licenses the exemption. [§1.26.2](#) recorded that the method of this book instances what the book describes, and this is the general form of that observation.

The second concerns what counts as a correct use of the framework. If revision is expected, then a later worker who finds that a proposition here is wrong, and who states what should replace it, has done what the framework asks. This is why the propositions in this book are numbered. A numbered proposition can be cited, disputed, and superseded, and the numbering is an invitation rather than a display of formality. [§2.6.2](#) named six conditions this book may be failing to see; the numbering is what allows a later reader who identifies a seventh to say precisely which propositions it bears on.

The third concerns the finitude of practice, which is the harder half and the one more often omitted.

A commitment to the finitude of knowledge is common and costs little. What it usually means is that present accounts are incomplete and will be improved. The commitment stated here is stronger and less comfortable. It holds that practice is finite in the same way: that what can be done under present arrangements is limited by those arrangements, that the limits are not visible from inside, and that a practice which is the best available now may be unavailable to justification later. [§2.5.2](#) supplied a case. The imperial examination was administered by people who were doing what could be done, competently, within an apparatus whose alternatives

were not formulated. A book that describes conditions and offers practical consequences is in the same position with respect to its own moment.

Proposition 6.9. *A framework that holds knowledge and practice to be historically finite is committed to the same finitude in its own propositions and in whatever practice it recommends. The commitment is not discharged by acknowledging it.*

The last clause requires expansion, since acknowledging the finitude is exactly what this subsection is doing.

An acknowledgement of fallibility that changes nothing about what is claimed or how it is claimed has cost nothing and has purchased the appearance of rigour. §2.6.1 made this point about historical blindness and it applies here with equal force. The question is what the commitment requires beyond its statement, and three requirements can be named.

It requires that claims be made in a form that can be superseded. A claim stated so generally that no observation bears on it cannot be superseded and has therefore been placed outside the commitment. This is the discipline §6.2.2 imposed, in a different form.

It requires that the framework's own conditions of formation be examined. Chapter 2 performed this examination on other frameworks. Nothing in that chapter's argument exempts this one, and §2.6.2 began the examination. It is not complete and cannot be completed by its author.

And it requires that a practical recommendation be stated as what it is, which is a description of what an act does under conditions that hold now. ch. 77 states this as the governing constraint on the practical Parts of this book, and the constraint is inherited from the present subsection rather than adopted there for local reasons.

One matter is worth stating plainly, since a reader may reasonably suspect otherwise.

A commitment to revisability can function as a defence against criticism. An objection to a proposition may be met by saying that the framework expects revision, which converts a defect into a confirmation of the framework's own account of itself. This is available and this book must not use it. An objection that a proposition is false is an objection to that proposition, and the correct response is to establish whether it is false and to say so. The revisability commitment concerns what happens after that determination, and it supplies no reason for declining to make it. §1.26.3 conceded that this book's central position cannot be refuted by counterexample; the concession was specific to that position and does not extend to the book's ordinary claims, most of which can be wrong in the ordinary way.

6.3.2 The Assertions and the Permissions

A framework of this kind does two different things and the difference is not always marked. It asserts that certain things are the case, and it makes certain descriptions available. The two have different standings, they are supported by different considerations, and confusing them is the most likely way for a reader to attribute to this book a claim it has not made.

The assertions are few. They are the statement of §6.2.1, the construction of relation given in §6.1.1, the account of stabilisation in §6.1.2, and the two keynote claims of Chapter 1. Each of these says that something is so. Each may be false. Each is the kind of thing an argument could bear on, though §1.26.3 recorded that the arguments available are not decisive.

The permissions are numerous and their standing is different. A permission is a description the framework makes available: a way of putting something that the framework's vocabulary supports and that other vocabularies do not. That a household has lost a distinction is a permission. That a symbol is maintaining itself through the conduct it produces is a permission. That an adult has stopped absorbing is a permission. None of these asserts that any particular household is in the state described. Each says that the state is describable and states what would make the description apply.

The distinction matters for three reasons.

A permission cannot be refuted by finding a case it does not fit. If the framework permits a household to be described as having lost a distinction, the existence of households that have not lost it is not an objection. A permission is refuted by showing either that the description is incoherent, or that it applies to nothing, or that whatever it picks out was already available in a vocabulary that does not require the framework. [ch. 90](#) states this last test and it is the one that matters most.

An assertion cannot be defended by pointing to a permission's usefulness. That the framework's vocabulary permits an illuminating description of some household is not evidence that subject, meaning, value, creation, and normativity co-emerge. [§1.27.9](#) recorded the risk of a vocabulary that describes everything and establishes nothing, and the present distinction is what keeps that risk visible. A book that accumulated illuminating descriptions and presented the accumulation as support for its ontology would have committed exactly the error it warns against.

And the practical Parts of this book trade almost entirely in permissions. [ch. 77](#) states that the framework yields description rather than prescription, and the present distinction is why. A description of what an act does, under conditions that hold, is a permission being exercised. It does not become a prescription by being useful, and a reader who extracts prescriptions from the practical Parts has converted a permission into an assertion the book did not make.

Proposition 6.10. *A framework asserts propositions and makes descriptions available. An assertion is refuted by showing it false; a description is displaced by showing that what it picks out was already available without it. Support for the second is not support for the first.*

One consequence for how this book should be read follows, and it is worth stating because it bears on what a fair objection looks like.

A reader who holds that the framework's ontology is wrong may nonetheless find the descriptions useful, and there is no inconsistency in this. The descriptions would then be doing work for reasons the framework misdescribes, which is a common situation in the history of inquiry and not a scandal. [§2.3.1](#) recorded that Gesell's schedules survived the maturationism that produced them. The same may happen here, and if it does the book will have contributed something while being wrong about what it contributed.

A reader who holds that the ontology is right is not thereby committed to any particular description this book offers. The descriptions are exercises of the permission and each may be badly executed. Where a later chapter describes a household in the framework's terms and the description does not fit, the fault may lie with the chapter rather than with the framework, and distinguishing these is what [ch. 90](#) is for.

Two final remarks close the section and the chapter's statement of standing.

The framework is under development and the development is not this book's. §1.27.11 listed four limitations and the first was that the framework's formal components are immature. ch. 70 is where the immaturity is most exposed, since a formal component that cannot yet be brought into contact with evidence is a component whose adequacy is not yet testable. The book proceeds because the alternative is to wait, and waiting has its own costs, and neither consideration establishes that proceeding was correct.

And the childrearing case is not an illustration. §6.2.2 recorded that this book has already required the framework to say things it had not said. A domain that only illustrated a framework would be a domain the framework had nothing to learn from, and a framework with no such domains is not being tested anywhere. ch. 7 is where the testing begins in earnest, since it takes up the case the framework's existing account was not formulated for.

6.4 The Bearing on Rearing

The preceding sections stated an ontology, its components, and its standing. None of them concerned children. This section states what the ontology implies for the subject of this book, and it is where the framework earns its place here or fails to.

6.4.1 The Ontological Requirements on a Description of Rearing

Four requirements follow from what has been stated, and each rules out a description that the field currently uses.

The first is that a description of rearing must have a unit that is not a person. §6.1.1 held that terms are stabilisations within a process and that the process is prior in the order of explanation. A description taking a child as its unit and asking what happens to him has taken a stabilisation as its unit and has thereby placed the process outside the description. §1.27.10 stated this as Keynote Claim II and enumerated what develops. The present section supplies the ontological ground of that claim rather than restating it: the five items enumerated there are five stabilisations within one going-on, and the reason they develop together is that they are aspects of the same thing.

The second is that a description must be able to represent what a relation makes possible, not only what it contains. §6.2.1 defined generativity as the alteration of what can occur, so a description that reports only what did occur has not described the generativity. This is a demanding requirement and the field's instruments do not meet it. §5.5.1 recorded that no widely used instrument measures whether a child's account can alter an adult's, and the reason is now storable: measuring what a relation permits requires observing the permission being exercised or established that it would be, and neither is a measurement of a state at a moment.

The third is that a description must treat maintenance as an activity. §6.1.2 held that patterns are maintained rather than possessed. Applied to rearing, this means that a settled household is not a household in which nothing is happening. It is one in which what is happening reproduces what is there, and the reproduction is being done. ch. 10 takes this up as the book's central diagnostic, and the diagnostic has force only because of the present ontological point: an arrangement that appears static is being actively maintained, so the question of what maintains it is always a real question.

The fourth is that a description must locate normativity inside the relation. §6.2.1 named normativity as one of the five and held that it co-emerges with the others. A description that brings a standard to a household from outside, whether the standard is a developmental norm, a cultural ideal, or a framework's own criterion, has treated normativity as prior to the relation it is applied to. §1.27.8 recorded that this invites the relativism objection and that ch. 42 is where the objection is met.

Proposition 6.11. *An ontology in which terms are stabilised within a process requires that a description of rearing take a unit other than a person, represent what is made possible rather than only what occurs, treat maintenance as activity, and locate normativity within the relation described.*

What these requirements exclude should be stated, since a reader is entitled to know what the framework rules out and not only what it recommends.

They exclude a description of rearing as an adult acting on a child. This is the form of nearly all practical writing on the subject and of a substantial part of the research literature. Under the requirements above it misdescribes at the first step, since it takes two stabilised terms and a causal relation between them as its whole apparatus.

They exclude an assessment of a household by properties of its child. §1.26.3 established that development names what a child becomes able to continue doing, and the present section adds that the child is one of five things developing. An assessment reporting the child's state has reported on one stabilisation and has said nothing about the process. This is the constraint ch. 70 inherits and it is severe.

And they exclude a description in which a relation is good or bad simpliciter. The framework's criterion concerns whether generation continues, which is a property of a process over time and admits of the distinctions [ch. ?? ch:stability] draws. A relation that is warm and closed and a relation that is difficult and open are not ranked by warmth, and any reading of this book that ranks them so has imported a standard the framework does not supply.

Two matters remain and both concern what the framework does not settle.

The ontology does not determine which relations matter for a given child. It holds that a subject is stabilised within relations and it does not say which. That a child's household is the primary site is an empirical claim about most children under most arrangements, and Chapter 5 showed how much the arrangements vary. Where a child is reared in the distributed configuration of §5.6.1, the household is not the unit, and a framework that assumed it were would have imported the arrangement of one setting as an ontological fact. This is the error Chapter 4 diagnosed, and the framework must not commit it in its own vocabulary.

And the ontology does not by itself say anything about children. Everything stated in this chapter applies to any relational process whatever, and the specific features of the childrearing case, that one party is being stabilised for the first time and has no other relations to be stabilised in, do not follow from it. They are additional and they are what ch. 7 supplies. That chapter is therefore not an application of this one. It is where the framework acquires the content that makes it a theory of rearing rather than a general ontology with a childrearing example attached.

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Chapter 7

The Problem of the Immature Subject

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what changes in the framework's account when the subject being stabilised has not been stabilised before.

It contributes the book's founding asymmetry, and every later Part depends on it. [Chapter 6](#) stated an ontology that applies to relational processes generally and said nothing about children. The corpus that ontology belongs to was developed with adult cases in view, and its central propositions concerning degradation, refusal, and repair were formulated for subjects who have other relations to fall back on. A young child does not. This chapter establishes what follows, and later chapters treating symbol, gaze, degradation, and authority are re-derivations rather than applications because of it.

It does not describe what happens to children under any particular arrangement, which is the work of the diagnostic Parts. It does not settle at what age the asymmetry ceases to hold, and [§7.1.2](#) states why no such age is available.

The reader should carry forward the notion of a reserve, the four respects in which a child lacks one, and the consequence that the framework's existing propositions cannot be transferred to this case without re-derivation.

7.1 The Subject Without Reserves

The framework holds that a subject is stabilised within relations. Where a subject stands in many relations, the stabilisation is distributed across them. Where it stands in few, it is not.

7.1.1 The Notion of a Reserve

An adult whose account of himself is contradicted in one relation has other relations in which it is not ([Gergen, 2009](#)). This is so ordinary that it is easy to miss what it supplies.

Consider what is available to an adult when a relation goes badly. There are people who have known him longer, and their knowledge of him was formed under other conditions. There is a history in which he was described differently, and the history is available to be recalled. There are settings he can enter in which the description that operates here does not operate. There is the possibility of leaving, which need not be exercised to be effective, since a relation one could leave is a relation one remains in for reasons. Each of these is a resource, and what each supplies is the same thing: a standpoint from which the description operating in this relation can be seen as a description rather than as how things are.

This is what the term reserve names in what follows. A reserve is a relation, a history, or a

setting that supplies a subject with a stabilisation not maintained by the relation currently in question. It is not a psychological property, it is not resilience, and it is not a matter of character. It is a structural fact about how many independent processes are maintaining a given subject.

A young child has few and in the limiting case has none.

Four respects in which this holds should be separated, since they are frequently run together and they have different consequences.

The child has no prior description. An adult who is told he is difficult has been told other things before, by others, and the new description enters a field of existing ones. A young child being described has nothing the description competes with. §6.1.2 held that a description a relation supports is part of what maintains the relation; where the child has no other description, the one the relation supplies is not one account among several. It is the account.

The child has no alternative setting. An adult's day contains settings in which different descriptions operate, and the multiplicity is itself informative, since a subject who is regarded differently in different places has evidence that regard is a variable. A young child's settings are few and are frequently continuous with one another (Bronfenbrenner, 1977), since the adults in them communicate and the descriptions travel. Where a child's household and his early provision hold the same account of him, the account is confirmed everywhere he goes.

The child has no exit. §5.6.1 described arrangements varying in how many adults are available, and in none of them may a young child leave. This is not a contingent feature of any arrangement. It follows from what a young child is: a subject who cannot subsist independently, whose leaving would be a catastrophe he would not survive, and for whom the relations in question are therefore not relations he remains in for reasons.

And the child has no history to appeal to. An adult can recall having been otherwise, and the recollection is a standpoint. A child in the early years is being constituted, so there is no earlier state of himself to which the present description can be compared. ch. 15 takes up what follows when a description cannot be compared with anything.

Proposition 7.1. *A reserve is a stabilisation of a subject maintained by a process other than the one currently in question. A young child lacks reserves in four respects: no prior description, no alternative setting, no exit, and no history. The lack is structural rather than psychological.*

Two clarifications prevent the notion from being taken for something it is not.

A reserve is not support. An adult with a reserve may be entirely unsupported in the relation that is going badly, and the reserve is doing its work anyway, since what it supplies is the possibility of regarding the description as one description. Someone who has been treated badly for years by one party, and who has a friend elsewhere who thinks well of him, may take no comfort from the friend and may still be able to see that the treatment is a treatment. That is the reserve operating.

And a reserve is not a solution. ch. 32 will show that an adult with reserves may nonetheless be destroyed by a relation, and that the reserves may be precisely what the relation works on. The claim here is narrower: that a subject with reserves has something a subject without them does not, and that propositions formulated for the first do not transfer to the second.

This is the chapter's founding observation and it is worth stating in the form the rest of the book will use. Where the corpus says that a subject may refuse a description, may withdraw from a relation, may hold to an account of himself against pressure, it is describing operations

that require a standpoint outside the relation in question. A young child has no such standpoint. The operations are therefore unavailable to him, and a framework that recommended them would be recommending what cannot be done. §7.2 states what this requires of the chapters that follow.

7.1.2 The Degrees of Reserve

The preceding subsection stated the case in its limiting form. The limiting form is rare, most children have something, and a chapter that treated the absence of reserves as a fixed property of childhood would have replaced one static description with another.

Reserves accumulate, and the accumulation is uneven in three respects that matter.

It is uneven across the four kinds. A child may acquire an alternative setting long before he acquires a history to appeal to, since entering provision supplies the first and nothing supplies the second except time. A child in the distributed configuration of §5.6.1 has several settings and several adults from an early age, and may nonetheless have no exit and no prior description. The four are not a sequence and a child does not pass through them in order.

It is uneven across children in the same arrangement. Two children in one household differ in what reserves they have, because a second child arrives into a household that already contains a description of what children are and an older sibling who is a relation of a kind the first did not have at that age. This is an ordinary observation and it is generally reported as birth order. What the framework's vocabulary adds is that the difference is a difference in the structure of what stabilises each child, and not a difference in what each child is like.

And it is uneven with respect to what is at issue. A child may have substantial reserves concerning one description of himself and none concerning another. A child regarded as capable at school and as difficult at home has an alternative setting with respect to the second description and no alternative with respect to a description both settings share. This is why the question of whether a child has reserves has no general answer. Reserves are reserves against something, and what a child has must be assessed against the description in question.

Proposition 7.2. *Reserves accumulate unevenly across their kinds, across children in one arrangement, and across the descriptions a child is subject to. Whether a subject has a reserve is a question about a particular description rather than about the subject.*

That proposition is why this chapter states no age at which its argument ceases to apply, and the reason should be given plainly since a reader will look for one.

An age would be available if reserves accumulated uniformly. They do not, and the material of Chapter 5 is what establishes this. A child in the configuration of institutional provision has multiple settings and many adults by his third year. A child in the configuration of the long day may have one adult and one setting well past that age. A child in the dispersal configuration may have settings whose descriptions of him conflict, which is a reserve of a particular kind, and may simultaneously lack any adult who has known him continuously. The arrangements vary and the reserves vary with them.

A second consideration weighs against stating an age even as an approximation. §3.3.1 described what happens to a claim about children when it enters an administrative apparatus. A stated age would travel, would be attached to a threshold, and would arrive somewhere as

the age at which a child may be regarded as having reserves. Nothing in this chapter would license that use and the use would be made.

What can be said in place of an age is a condition, and the condition is what later chapters will use.

A subject has a reserve with respect to a description when there exists, for that subject, a process maintaining an account of him that the description does not govern. The condition is stated so that it can be checked in a particular case rather than assumed from an age, and [ch. 30](#) is where the checking becomes a diagnostic. Whether the condition is checkable in practice is a further question and [ch. 70](#) takes it up.

Two remarks close the section.

The first concerns adults, and it prevents the chapter from being read as a claim about children alone. An adult may lack reserves. Someone whose relations are few, whose settings are continuous, who cannot leave, and whose history is not available to be recalled is in the structural position this chapter describes, and the position is produced by circumstances rather than by age. [§5.6.1](#) noted arrangements in which adults are isolated, and confinement, certain institutional settings, and some circumstances of migration produce the position in its fuller form. The framework's account of what happens to a subject without reserves therefore applies to adults in that position, and the chapter's title names the case rather than the population.

The second concerns what accumulating reserves is. It is not a process that happens to a child while relations proceed around him. Each reserve is a relation, a setting, or a history, and each was generated. [§1.26.3](#) defines development as becoming able to continue generating relations and meanings; a child who has generated relations has thereby acquired reserves, and the reserves are what make further generation possible under conditions that would otherwise foreclose it. The two are the same process described from two sides, and [[ch. ?? ch:stability](#)] states what follows for how stability should be assessed.

7.2 The Re-derivation Requirement

The framework's propositions were formulated with a subject who has reserves in view. This section states what follows for the chapters that use them, and the requirement it states governs the remainder of the book.

7.2.1 The Operations That Become Unavailable

Four operations recur in the corpus, each is available to a subject with reserves, and each requires re-derivation here. Setting them out shows what the requirement amounts to in practice.

Refusal is the first. A subject may decline a description offered of him, and the declining is an act with a standpoint behind it. What makes refusal possible is that the subject has an account of himself that the description contradicts, so that the description arrives as a claim to be assessed rather than as information. A young child has no such account. A description offered to him does not meet a competing account and is not assessed; it is the material from which an account is being made. [ch. 15](#) traces the consequence, and the consequence is that advice to a child to refuse a description misdescribes what is happening to him.

Withdrawal is the second. A subject may reduce what he invests in a relation that is going

badly, and the reduction is protective because something else is available to invest in. Where nothing else is available, withdrawal is not protective. It reduces the relation without supplying an alternative, and the subject remains stabilised by a relation he has withdrawn from. [ch. 32](#) takes up what this produces, and it is one of the places where the adult case and the child case come apart most sharply.

Appeal is the third. A subject may bring the conduct of one relation before another, and the bringing does two things: it obtains a second account, and it establishes that the first relation is a relation rather than the world. Both require a second party who is not governed by the first relation's description. [§7.1.2](#) stated the condition. Where a child's settings are continuous, there is no such party, and an appeal made within a continuous set of settings returns the description it appealed against.

Departure is the fourth and it has been stated already. It requires no further treatment except to note that its unavailability is not merely practical. A subject who could not survive leaving is not a subject who is choosing to stay, and [§7.1.1](#) recorded that this alters what remaining means.

Proposition 7.3. *Refusal, withdrawal, appeal, and departure each require a stabilisation of the subject that the relation in question does not maintain. Where no such stabilisation exists, the operations are unavailable, and an account that recommends them has recommended what cannot be done.*

What the requirement asks of later chapters can now be stated precisely.

Where a proposition of the corpus concerns what a subject may do, the chapter using it must establish that the doing is available in this case. Where it is not, the chapter must state what takes its place, and the statement is a new proposition rather than an application of an old one. This is why the diagnostic Parts of this book are long. A chapter that could apply an existing account would be short.

Three consequences follow and each shapes a later Part.

The first concerns where remedy can be located. If the operations above are unavailable to the child, then a remedy addressed to the child is addressed to a party who cannot execute it. This holds however gently the remedy is phrased and however true its content. Telling a child that a description of him is unfair supplies him with a second description, which is something, and it does not supply him with a standpoint, since the second description comes from within the same field. [ch. 77](#) takes up where remedy can be located in its place, and the answer concerns what adults do rather than what children are told.

The second concerns what counts as harm here. [§6.1.2](#) held that stabilisation is real and that a stabilised thing can be harmed. The present section adds that harm to a subject without reserves has a form the adult case does not exhibit. An adult harmed in a relation is harmed in one of the processes maintaining him. A child harmed in the relation that is maintaining him is harmed in the maintenance itself, and there is no separate self that undergoes the harm and remains to be repaired. [ch. 30](#) makes this a distinction between two levels of degradation, and the distinction is the book's principal diagnostic instrument.

The third concerns what the framework may claim about repair. Where an adult's relation is repaired, an account exists of what it was before and what it should return to, and the account is held by parties who can state it. Where a child's constitutive relation is repaired, there may

be no prior state to return to, since the relation is what has been forming him and its earlier form is not available as a standard. [ch. 81](#) states what repair consists in under that constraint, and it is not restoration.

One remark completes the section, and it concerns the honesty of the whole undertaking.

The re-derivation requirement is easy to state and difficult to satisfy, and a book may state it in Part I and quietly fail to meet it thereafter. The failure would look like a chapter that used a corpus proposition, noted the asymmetry in a sentence, and proceeded as before. A reader who wishes to check whether this book has met its own requirement should look for whether the later chapters state new propositions where old ones do not transfer, or whether they state old ones with a qualification attached. The first is re-derivation and the second is not. [ch. 89](#) records where the requirement has been met least well.

7.3 The Standing of the Constituted Subject

[§6.1.1](#) raised an objection and deferred it here. The objection is that a framework treating persons as stabilisations within processes cannot say the things about persons that need saying, and that a child in particular is owed something the framework's vocabulary cannot express. This section answers it, and the answer requires the material of the preceding two sections.

7.3.1 The Objection from Standing

The objection has a strong form and it should be given in that form rather than a weaker one.

A child is wronged when he is treated in certain ways. The wrong is done to him, it is not merely a disturbance in a process, and the parties who did it are answerable to him. A vocabulary in which the child is an aspect of a going-on appears to have no place for this. If what there is, fundamentally, is a process, then the child is a pattern within it, patterns are not the sort of thing that is wronged, and the framework has dissolved the very thing whose treatment is at issue. The objection concludes that a relational ontology of this kind is hostile to it rather than merely inadequate to moral description.

Three replies are available and the third is the one this book relies on.

The first reply is that the framework does not deny the child's existence. [§6.1.2](#) held that a stabilisation is real, that it can be named, and that sentences about it are true or false in the ordinary way. A child is a stabilisation and so is an adult, and neither is less real for being one. This reply is correct and it is insufficient, since the objection is not that the framework denies the child exists. It is that the framework makes his existence derivative, and a derivative existence appears to be a poor foundation for a claim that someone is answerable to him.

The second reply is that the objection proves too much. Every account of persons makes personhood depend on something: on continuity of memory, on the persistence of an organism, on the exercise of certain capacities. Each of these is a condition, each admits of degree, and each therefore faces a version of the same difficulty. This reply is also correct and also insufficient, since establishing that other accounts share a difficulty does not resolve it.

The third reply is that the framework locates the standing in the right place, and this requires the notion of a reserve to state.

What the objection assumes is that standing must rest on something the subject possesses

independently of his relations, on the ground that a standing derived from relations could be withdrawn by them. The assumption is intelligible and this book denies it. Standing on the framework's account is not possessed by the subject and is not conferred by the relation either. It is a feature of what the relation is: a process in which a subject is being constituted is a process that is answerable for the constituting, and the answerability is not something added to the description.

This is where §7.1.1 does work the general ontology could not. The reason a child's treatment is a serious matter, on this account, is precisely what §7.2.1 established: that he cannot refuse, cannot appeal, cannot withdraw, and cannot leave. An adult in a bad relation has a standing that the relation cannot reach, because other processes maintain him. A child does not, and the absence is what makes the parties to the relation answerable rather than what makes them free of answerability. The framework does not derive a weaker standing for the child from his dependence. It derives a stronger obligation on the other parties from the same fact.

Proposition 7.4. *On a relational account, what a subject is owed follows from the position he occupies in the process constituting him rather than from a property he possesses. A subject without reserves is owed more rather than less, since the parties to the relation are the only parties who could be answerable.*

That proposition should be examined rather than accepted, since it is the point at which this book's ontology and its practical Parts are joined, and a defect here would propagate through everything that follows.

Two difficulties with it should be recorded.

The first is that the proposition states an obligation and §1.27.3 recorded that the framework's normative claims stand in need of a derivation the book has not supplied. Nothing here closes that gap. What the proposition establishes is narrower: that the relational account is not disabled from stating obligations, which is what the objection alleged. Whether the obligation it states is correct, and what grounds it, is the question ch. 42 takes up.

The second is that a standing derived from position is a standing that changes as the position changes. As a child accumulates reserves the obligation described above alters, and it alters continuously rather than at a threshold. §7.1.2 refused to state an age, and the refusal has this consequence: the framework cannot say when the obligation takes its adult form. This is a real cost, it is not resolved by anything in this book, and a reader who wants a determinate answer will not find one here.

One remark closes the section.

The objection was that a relational ontology is hostile to moral description of the child. The reply given here is that the ontology relocates the description rather than removing it, and that the relocation puts the weight on the parties who can bear it. Whether this is an improvement depends on what one wanted from the moral vocabulary. A reader who wanted a property of the child that grounds his claims independently of anyone will find that this framework does not supply one and holds that nothing supplies one. A reader who wanted an account of why the parties to a constitutive relation are answerable will find that this framework supplies it directly, and that the supply is a consequence of it rather than an addition to the ontology.

7.4 The Bearing on What Follows

7.4.1 The Inheritance of the Diagnostic Parts

This chapter completes the framework's statement, and the Parts that follow use it rather than argue for it. Setting out what they inherit serves two purposes: it tells a reader what to hold the later chapters to, and it records the debts in a form that can be checked.

Four things pass forward.

The asymmetry itself passes forward as a standing condition rather than a topic. Every later chapter treating a child and an adult is treating parties who differ in the respect §7.1.1 identified, and no later chapter may describe their relation as though the parties were symmetrically placed. ch. 10 is where this has the most immediate consequence, since what an adult absorbs and what a child absorbs are not the same operation performed by two parties.

The re-derivation requirement passes forward as a constraint on method. §7.2.1 stated it and stated how a reader may check whether it has been met. The chapters most exposed to it are those drawing most heavily on the corpus: ch. 15, ch. 32, and ch. 81. Each concerns an operation that presupposes a standpoint, and each must supply what takes its place.

The condition replacing an age passes forward as a diagnostic. §7.1.2 stated it: a subject has a reserve with respect to a description when some process maintains an account of him that the description does not govern. ch. 30 uses this to distinguish its two levels, and ch. 70 must say whether the condition can be observed.

And the account of standing passes forward as the joint between the ontology and the practical Parts. §7.3.1 located what a subject is owed in the position he occupies. ch. 42 must ground this and ch. 77 must state what follows from it for what adults do.

Proposition 7.5. *The framework's application to rearing rests on four inheritances: the asymmetry as a standing condition, re-derivation as a constraint on method, the reserve condition as a diagnostic, and position as the location of standing.*

What Part I has established should now be stated, since the Part ends with the chapter that follows and a reader is entitled to a reckoning.

Part I has established what the field's accounts presuppose and where the presupposition lives; how it was historically formed and why the alternative was never formulated and rejected; how it became an administrative fact by travelling inside instruments; what comparison can and cannot establish under it; what arrangements children are actually reared in; what this book's framework holds; and what changes in that framework when the subject is a child. It has established none of the book's substantive claims about rearing. Those begin in Part II.

Two matters are worth stating plainly at this point, since Part I's argument has been long and its limits are easy to lose sight of.

The first is that the case for the framework rests on one ground and has not been strengthened by anything in the six chapters since. §1.26.1 stated the ground: that the framework makes describable what the alternatives render invisible. §1.26.3 conceded that the bearer commitment cannot be refuted by counterexample and that this book's position has the same property. Nothing in Chapter 6 or in the present chapter alters this. The framework has been stated more precisely, its components have been distinguished, and its application to the child case has been derived. None of that is evidence. ch. 30 and ch. 31 are where the ground is

either made good or is not, and if they fail there is no second argument in reserve.

The second is that this chapter has made the book's task harder rather than easier. A framework that could be applied would now be ready to apply. The re-derivation requirement means that the corpus supplies a starting point and not a result, and that each diagnostic chapter must do work the corpus has not done. §6.2.2 recorded that this book is not an application of a finished framework, and the present chapter is where that ceases to be a methodological remark and becomes a description of the labour remaining.

One further observation belongs here because it will not fit anywhere else.

The asymmetry this chapter describes is not a defect in childhood to be corrected. A subject who is being constituted for the first time is in a position no arrangement can abolish, and a household that could supply a young child with reserves against itself would be a household that was not constituting him. §1.27.10 holds that what develops includes the relation; the asymmetry is a feature of what the relation is at the outset and it diminishes as the relation does its work. What this book examines is what is done within it rather than whether the asymmetry obtains, and [ch. ?? ch:stability] supplies the criterion by which the doing is assessed.

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Chapter 8

The Shape of the Argument

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter states what the rest of the book does, in what order, and on what terms. It contributes the map. Part I has been long and its chapters have made commitments that later Parts inherit; a reader who has followed them is entitled to know where each is discharged and what the whole is meant to establish. The chapter also states what this book does not undertake, which is more than a reader might expect and includes several things a book with this title would ordinarily supply.

It does not summarise Part I, since §7.4.1 has done that. It does not argue for anything. A reader in a hurry may skip it and consult it when a later Part seems to be doing something the book has not accounted for.

The reader should carry forward the division of labour among the Parts, the four non-deliverables, and the standard by which the book asks to be judged.

8.1 The Division of Labour Among the Parts

8.1.1 The Diagnostic Parts and What They Must Show

The Parts following this one fall into three groups, and the groups differ in what they are attempting rather than only in subject matter.

The first group is diagnostic. It runs from Chapter 10 through the Part containing ch. 32, and its business is to establish that the framework makes describable something the alternatives render invisible. §1.26.1 rested the case for the framework on this single ground and §7.4.1 recorded that nothing since has strengthened it. The diagnostic Parts are therefore not applications of a framework already established. They are where the establishing is attempted, and a reader assessing this book should weight them accordingly.

Four things must be shown in that group and it is worth stating them as tests.

It must be shown that something is lost. ch. 30 and ch. 31 carry this and the requirement is severe: not that a household can be described in the framework's vocabulary, which is trivially true of any household, but that the description picks out a difference between households that the available instruments do not record. §6.3.2 stated the form such a demonstration must take, and it is the form in which a permission is defended rather than an assertion proved.

It must be shown that the loss is not merely renamed. §1.27.9 recorded the risk and ch. 90 states the test. A diagnostic chapter that describes a familiar phenomenon in unfamiliar words has done nothing, and the appearance of insight that such redescription produces is the most likely way for this book to be wrong while seeming right.

It must be shown that the child case requires its own derivation. §7.2.1 stated the requirement and stated how to check whether it has been met. Each diagnostic chapter draws on a corpus proposition formulated for subjects with reserves, and each must supply what replaces it.

And it must be shown that the diagnosis does not license grading. §5.3.2 recorded that the framework can be used to rank households by position and that the material of Chapter 5 does not support such a ranking. A diagnostic chapter that yields a scale on which households can be placed has produced exactly what ch. 76 warns against, and the warning is worth little if the chapters preceding it have already done the thing.

Proposition 8.1. *The diagnostic Parts must establish that the framework's vocabulary picks out a difference the available instruments do not record, that the difference is not a renaming, that the child case has been derived rather than assumed, and that the result does not constitute a scale for ranking households.*

The second group is constructive and it runs through the Parts on knowledge, authority, and generational transmission. Its business is to state what the framework's components hold about matters the diagnostic Parts raise but cannot settle: how knowledge is generated in an asymmetric relation, what distinguishes an exercise of authority that keeps a relation open, and how a relational grammar passes and is remade across generations. These Parts assert more than the diagnostic ones and their assertions are correspondingly more exposed.

The third group is empirical and methodological, and it contains the two Parts a reader is most entitled to be sceptical about. [Chapter ?? ch:neural-part] treats what neuroscience can and cannot supply to an account of this kind. ch. 70 treats whether anything in this book can be brought into contact with evidence. §1.27.11 recorded that the framework's formal components are immature, and ch. 70 is where the immaturity is most exposed rather than least.

One remark on the order.

The diagnostic Parts precede the constructive ones because the constructive Parts presuppose that there is something to construct an account of. If ch. 30 and ch. 31 fail, the Parts after them are elaborations of a distinction that does not obtain, and their elaborateness would not repair the failure. §7.4.1 recorded that there is no second argument in reserve, and the ordering of the Parts is what that fact looks like in the structure of the book.

8.2 The Non-Deliverables

8.2.1 The Undertakings Declined

A book with this title creates expectations, and four of them will not be met. Stating this now costs a reader less than discovering it in Part XI.

The book does not supply instructions. §6.3.2 explained why: the practical Parts trade in permissions, a permission is a description made available, and a description of what an act does under conditions that hold is not an instruction to perform it. A reader who wants to be told what to do with a child on Tuesday will find, in the practical Parts, an account of what several courses would amount to and no ranking of them. This is a limitation and it should be

called one. It is not a superior form of advice and it does not spare anyone a decision.

The book does not supply norms of development. It states no ages, no sequences, and no expected accomplishments, and §7.1.2 gave the general reason: a stated age would travel and would arrive somewhere as a threshold. The more particular reason is that a norm of development is a statement about what a child should have, which is a stock, and §1.26.3 defines development as something that is not one. A reader looking for what a child of a given age should be doing will not find it here and will find it in the literature this book surveys, where it is stated more carefully than a book of this kind could state it.

The book does not diagnose. Nothing in it identifies a household as damaging or a relation as failing, and no chapter supplies criteria by which a reader could make such an identification about a household he knows. §5.3.2 recorded that the framework can be used to grade households and §8.1.1 made the refusal of grading a test the diagnostic Parts must pass. The vocabulary is for describing what happens in relations, and a reader who turns it on a particular household, including his own, is doing something the book has not equipped him to do well.

And the book does not adjudicate between the arrangements of Chapter 5. It holds that arrangements differ in the occasions they supply and that the differences follow from material conditions rather than from what adults value. It does not hold that any configuration is better, and §5.3.2 refused both directions of that judgement in the case where the temptation is strongest. A reader who wants to know whether the long day is worse than institutional provision will find the question refused rather than answered.

Proposition 8.2. *This book supplies neither instructions, nor developmental norms, nor diagnostic criteria, nor a ranking of arrangements. Each refusal follows from a commitment made in Part I rather than from caution.*

That proposition invites a fair objection and the objection should be stated.

If a book on rearing supplies none of these, it may be asked what it supplies that anyone could use. The answer is a description, and the claim made for a description is that it alters what can be seen. §3.3.1 traced how a way of describing installs itself in procedures and comes to seem like the world; a competing way of describing does not install itself and does not have that force, and what it can do is make a second description available where there had been one. Whether that is worth having is a judgement a reader is entitled to make against this book, and ch. 90 states the test by which the judgement can be made rather than merely felt.

Two further limitations belong here, and they differ from the four above in being defects rather than refusals.

The evidence this book would need does not exist. §4.3.1 recorded that the longitudinal evidence bearing on whether generation continues has not been collected, §5.5.1 recorded that no widely used instrument measures the condition the framework takes to matter, and ch. 70 must state whether such evidence could be collected at all. The book proceeds on argument and on evidence collected for other purposes. This is not a position from which strong claims can be made and the book attempts none.

And the framework's formal side is not developed here. §1.27.11 recorded the immaturity, §2.4.6 recorded that most of the formalisms that would suit an account of this kind cannot presently be brought into contact with evidence about children, and ch. 70 treats the gap with-

out closing it. A reader who wants the formal statement will find gestures toward one and should not mistake the gestures for the thing.

One matter is worth stating in closing, since it concerns how the four refusals should be read.

A refusal to supply instructions, norms, diagnoses, or rankings can function as a defence, since a book that claims nothing specific cannot be shown to be wrong about anything specific. §6.3.1 blocked the analogous move for revisability and the block applies here. The refusals above are not a shelter. Each of them has a cost that falls on the reader, each was incurred to keep a commitment made earlier, and a reader who concludes that the commitments were not worth their costs has made a judgement this book cannot answer by pointing to the commitments again.

8.3 The Standard of Assessment

8.3.1 The Conditions of Refutation

A book that states what would refute it has made a commitment a reader can hold it to. This one cannot state a refutation in the strict sense, for reasons §1.26.3 gave and did not disguise. It can state what would count against it, which is weaker and is not nothing.

Five things would count, and they are ordered from the most damaging to the least.

The first is a demonstration that the framework's descriptions are available without it. §6.3.2 held that a permission is displaced by showing that what it picks out was already sayable in a vocabulary that does not require the framework. If the phenomena ch. 30 and ch. 31 describe can be described in the vocabulary of, for example, the transactional tradition of §1.13 (Sameroff, 2009) or the psychoanalytic tradition of §1.10 (Winnicott, 1965), with no loss, then this book has produced a synonym for what was already available. This would be the most damaging finding because it would leave every proposition here true and the book pointless.

The second is a demonstration that the difference the book describes makes none. If households distinguished by the framework's criteria do not differ in anything that can be independently established, over any span for which evidence exists, then the criteria have picked out a distinction without a difference. §4.3.1 conceded that the evidence to run this test does not currently exist. It may come to exist, and the book should be assessed against it when it does rather than protected from it.

The third is the discovery that the historical argument is wrong. Chapter 2 holds that the field's bearer commitment was inherited from an apparatus rather than established by inquiry, and that in no case was the alternative formulated and rejected on evidence. A historian who produces the case where it was formulated and rejected has damaged the argument of that chapter substantially, and the damage would propagate, since §1.26.1 uses the historical point to license a re-opening the book then conducts.

The fourth is a failure of the re-derivation requirement. §7.2.1 stated the requirement and stated the check. If the diagnostic chapters are found to have applied corpus propositions with qualifications attached rather than re-derived them, then Chapter 7 announced a standard the book did not meet, and the chapters in question are about adults with a child-shaped qualification.

The fifth is the accumulation of cases the framework describes badly. This is the weakest of the five because §1.25.3 established that redescription is always available, so a poorly fitting case can generally be accommodated. What would count is a pattern in which the accommodations are strained rather than any single case, and a reader is better placed to notice such a pattern than an author.

Proposition 8.3. *This book would be damaged by a demonstration that its descriptions are available without it, that the differences it names make none, that its historical argument is wrong, that its re-derivation requirement went unmet, or that its accommodations of difficult cases are systematically strained.*

One thing that would not count against the book should also be stated, since it is the objection most likely to be raised.

That the framework is unfamiliar, that its vocabulary is difficult, or that a reader who has understood it finds it does not change what he does are not objections to its truth. The last of these deserves a word, since it will occur to anyone who reaches Part XIII expecting practical consequence. §8.2.1 stated that this book supplies descriptions rather than instructions. A description that changes nothing about what a reader does may still be correct (Hacking, 1995), and the framework's value on its own account lies in what becomes visible rather than in what follows practically. Whether a description that changes nothing is worth having is a fair question and it is a different question from whether the description is true.

Two final remarks close Part I.

The first concerns the reader's position with respect to the whole. Part I has surveyed nineteen traditions, reconstructed a history, traced a circulation, criticised a comparative method, described contemporary arrangements, stated an ontology, and derived a founding asymmetry. A reader may accept some of this and reject the rest. The parts are not tightly coupled: the historical argument of Chapter 2 stands or falls independently of the ontology of Chapter 6, and the descriptive material of Chapter 5 is available to a reader who rejects both. Only the diagnostic Parts require the whole, and they require it because they use the framework rather than argue about it.

The second concerns what the book is for. §7.4.1 recorded that the case rests on making describable what is otherwise invisible. If the book succeeds, what it will have supplied is a second way of describing what happens between an adult and a child, available alongside the ways already in use and displacing none of them. That is a modest object for a book of this length. It is the object the argument of Part I supports, and a reader who finds a larger claim in the Parts that follow has found something the foundation does not carry.

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Part II

Asymmetry and Absorption

Chapter 9

The Constitution of Asymmetry

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what asymmetry between an adult and a child is, and what follows for how an arrangement containing it should be assessed.

It contributes the first step of the diagnostic argument. [Chapter 7](#) established that the asymmetry obtains and that no arrangement abolishes it. The present chapter establishes that its magnitude is the wrong variable to attend to, and that a description evaluating households by how much asymmetry they contain will misdescribe both the ones that have reduced it and the ones that have not. [ch. 10](#) supplies the variable that replaces it. It does not treat what an adult does with the asymmetry, which is the following chapter's subject. It does not settle whether any distribution of authority is defensible, which [ch. 42](#) takes up and which [§9.3.2](#) records as a cost of the position taken here.

The reader should carry forward the distinction among kinds of asymmetry, the reason the egalitarian ideal locates the variable where it does, and the two households the ideal cannot tell apart.

9.1 The Asymmetry as a Condition

9.1.1 The Content of a Relation

A relation between parties who are alike in every respect has nothing in it. This is worth establishing before anything is claimed about households, since it is the ground on which the chapter's argument stands and it can be established without reference to children at all.

[§6.2.1](#) held that a process is generative where it produces states that were not available in it before. Consider what this requires of the parties to a relation. If two parties are identical in what they can do, know the same things, want the same things, and stand in the same position with respect to everything the relation concerns, then nothing one party can supply is unavailable to the other. Exchange between them alters nothing, since each already has what the other has. Such a relation may be pleasant and it is not generative ([Simondon, 2020](#)), because generation requires that something be produced, and production requires a difference for it to be produced from.

The point is not that difference is desirable. It is that difference is what a relation is made of. [§6.1.1](#) held that terms are stabilisations within a process; two stabilisations that are indistinguishable are one stabilisation described twice, and there is no relation between them to speak of.

Three consequences follow and the third is the one this chapter needs.

Asymmetry is not a defect in a relation. It is a condition of there being a relation with content. Where a relation is described as marred by asymmetry, what is being objected to is something else that the asymmetry is being used to name, and identifying what that something is is the work of §9.3.1.

Asymmetry is not a quantity of one thing. Two parties may differ in many respects at once and the respects do not aggregate. §9.1.2 separates the kinds and shows that they vary independently.

And asymmetry does not by itself indicate direction. That two parties differ says nothing about which way anything moves between them, and the assumption that difference in capability determines direction of flow is an assumption rather than an observation. ch. 10 is where this becomes the Part's central question.

Proposition 9.1. *A relation between parties alike in every respect relevant to it contains nothing that can be generated. Asymmetry is therefore a condition of a relation having content rather than a defect in it.*

Two qualifications keep the proposition from being read as more than it is.

The first is that nothing here holds that greater asymmetry yields more content. The proposition states a condition and not a monotonic relation, and §9.3.1 argues that the size of an asymmetry bears on generation much less than is generally assumed. A relation may contain a vast asymmetry and generate nothing, which is the case this Part exists to describe.

The second is that this argument establishes nothing about households in particular. It applies to any relation whatever, including relations between adults, between institutions, and between a person and a text. The founding asymmetry of §7.1.1 is a further and different matter: it concerns a claim of that one of them is being constituted by the relation while the other is not, and that consequence does not follow from the present argument. This chapter needs both and they should not be confused, since running them together would license the inference that because asymmetry is constitutive, the child's position is unproblematic. §7.3.1 established the opposite.

9.1.2 The Kinds of Asymmetry

Asymmetry between an adult and a child is generally treated as one thing admitting of degrees. It is several things, they vary independently, and a household may stand at opposite ends of two of them at once.

Five may be separated, and the separation is not exhaustive.

There is asymmetry of capability. One party can do what the other cannot: lift, reach, read, drive, earn, wait. This is the asymmetry most visible and the one that diminishes most reliably with time. It is also the one least connected to the others, since a party may acquire capabilities without anything else in the relation altering.

There is asymmetry of knowledge. One party knows what the other does not, and the knowledge includes both what is generally known and what is known about the relation itself. The second kind matters more here. An adult knows things about the household's circumstances, its history, and its arrangements that a child does not, and §7.1.1 recorded that a child has no history to appeal to. Knowledge of a relation is not distributed the way knowledge of the world is, and it does not diminish on the same schedule.

There is asymmetry of dependence. One party requires the other for subsistence, and §7.1.1 established that this is what makes exit unavailable. This asymmetry is the sharpest, it is not a matter of degree in the early years, and it diminishes abruptly rather than gradually in most arrangements.

There is asymmetry of authority. One party's account of a situation settles what will be done. ch. 42 treats what authority is and how it is exercised; what matters here is that it is separable from the preceding three. A party may have authority without superior capability, may lack it while possessing knowledge, and may hold it over someone not dependent on him.

And there is asymmetry in what each party is for the other. A child is, for an adult, one relation among the several that maintain him. An adult is, for a young child, most of what maintains him. §6.1.2 gave this its ontological form as a difference in ranges, and it is the asymmetry this book takes to be founding. It is also the one least often named, since it concerns neither what either party can do nor what either may decide.

Proposition 9.2. *Asymmetries of capability, knowledge, dependence, authority, and constitutive weight vary independently. A relation may be nearly symmetric in one and extremely asymmetric in another, and no aggregate of them describes the relation.*

Three observations follow, and they set up the chapter's remaining sections.

The first concerns what varies with time. Capability asymmetry diminishes continuously and is largely gone by early adulthood. Dependence diminishes abruptly at whatever point subsistence becomes available elsewhere. Authority may diminish, may persist, and may in some arrangements reverse. Knowledge of the world redistributes and knowledge of the relation may never redistribute at all, since a party may retain permanently what the other was never told. And constitutive weight diminishes as reserves accumulate, on the uneven schedule §7.1.2 described. Five schedules, and no reason for them to align.

The second concerns arrangements that reduce one asymmetry while leaving others. A household may reduce its authority asymmetry considerably, so that decisions are taken jointly and a child's objection carries weight, while the constitutive asymmetry is untouched, since the child still has no other relation maintaining him. §9.2.3 argues that this combination is invisible to the vocabulary most often used to describe such households.

The third concerns which asymmetries the framework's criterion attends to. §1.26.3 names three conditions on a relation, and none of them mentions capability, knowledge, or authority. Whether a relation can support, can revise, and can create jointly is compatible with large asymmetries in all three, and is not guaranteed by their absence. What the conditions bear on is what passes between the parties, and §9.3.1 argues that this is the respect in which the size of an asymmetry turns out not to be the question.

One remark closes the subsection and concerns a case the separation makes visible.

An arrangement may reduce asymmetry of capability and knowledge deliberately, by explaining, including, and equipping, while increasing the constitutive asymmetry, by drawing a child's relations inward so that the household becomes more nearly the whole of what maintains him. Nothing in the ordinary vocabulary marks this as a combination worth noticing, since each component is separately described as good practice. ch. 10 and [ch. ?? ch:stability] between them supply what is needed to say what such an arrangement amounts to, and this book's claim to be doing work rests substantially on cases of this shape.

9.2 The Egalitarian Family Ideal

9.2.1 The Achievement

An account has become widely held according to which a household should be as equal as its circumstances permit, that children should be consulted, that parental authority requires justification, and that the arrangements of the past were defective in proportion to their hierarchy. This section treats that account in the form §1.25 used for the traditions of Chapter 1: the achievement is granted first and at its strongest, and the premise is located afterward.

The achievement is substantial and it should not be understated by a book that goes on to disagree with part of it.

The ideal made certain arrangements sayable that had not been. That a child's objection to a decision might bear on the decision, that an adult might owe a child a reason, that a household's arrangements might be discussed by everyone in it: each of these is now ordinary across a large part of the coverage of Chapter 5 and each was unusual in the same societies within living memory (Gillis, 1996). §5.5.1 separated whether a child is asked from whether the asking has consequence, and the ideal is what made the first widespread. Whatever is said below, the availability of the question is an achievement of this account.

The ideal made certain arrangements unavailable that had been ordinary. Corporal punishment in households is now prohibited in a substantial and growing number of jurisdictions (Gershoff and Grogan-Kaylor, 2016), and the prohibition followed a change in what households were held to owe children rather than preceding it. Arrangements in which a child's labour was disposed of by an adult, in which a child's education was terminated by an adult's decision without consultation, and in which a child's marriage was arranged without consent have been curtailed by legal instruments that presuppose the ideal's central claim (Archard, 2015). These are not small matters and no framework that could not endorse the curtailment would be worth much.

The ideal identified something real about hierarchical arrangements. Where authority requires no justification, the giving of reasons atrophies, and a party who need not explain himself tends over time to lose the practice of explaining. This is an observation about what maintained hierarchy does rather than an assertion that hierarchy is wrong, and ch. 42 treats it at length. The egalitarian account noticed it first and stated it clearly.

And the ideal has empirical support of a specific kind. Households in which children are consulted and reasons are given are associated, across a substantial literature, with outcomes on the measures that literature employs. §1.17 recorded the instrument and §4.1.1 recorded its limits, and neither of those observations shows the association to be spurious. It is what it is: a consistent finding produced by instruments with known commitments.

Proposition 9.3. *The egalitarian family ideal made the child's account askable, supported the curtailment of arrangements that disposed of children without consultation, and identified the atrophy of justification under unquestioned authority. These are achievements and nothing in this chapter disputes them.*

Two further matters belong to the account of the achievement, since a reader may suspect the concessions above of being preliminary to a dismissal.

The first is that the ideal is not a theory and does not present itself as one. It is a settlement,

held in law, in professional practice, in advice literature, and in ordinary expectation, and it is held by people who would not recognise the description of it given here. Locating its premise, which the next subsection does, is not an accusation against anyone holding it. §1.1.2 established that a premise is generally not asserted by those who hold it, and this case is the book's clearest instance.

The second is that this chapter's disagreement is narrow. It does not hold that households should be more hierarchical, that consultation is a mistake, or that the curtailments listed above went too far. It holds that the ideal identifies the variable incorrectly, that the misidentification is invisible while arrangements are improving on the ideal's own terms, and that it becomes visible in two kinds of household the ideal cannot distinguish. §9.2.2 locates the misidentification and §9.2.3 describes the two households.

9.2.2 The Location of Its Premise

§1.1.1 held that a premise is located by attending to what an account's verbs require. The egalitarian ideal's verbs are those of reduction, and reduction is the operation that discloses what the ideal takes itself to be operating on.

The characteristic formulations are these. Authority is to be minimised, or exercised sparingly, or justified where it must be exercised at all. Hierarchy is to be flattened. Power is to be shared, or distributed, or held lightly. A relation is to be made more equal. Each of these verbs takes an object that admits of more and less, and a household that has done more of the operation stands somewhere the household that has done less does not.

What the verbs require is that the thing operated on be a magnitude. One cannot minimise what has no size, cannot flatten what has no height, and cannot make more equal what is not a quantity distributed between parties. The ideal's practical vocabulary presupposes throughout that asymmetry is a scalar, that households can be ordered by how much of it they contain, and that movement along that ordering in one direction is improvement.

This is the premise, and §9.1.2 has already established that it does not hold. Asymmetries of capability, knowledge, dependence, authority, and constitutive weight vary independently and do not aggregate. There is no quantity of which a household has more or less, so there is no ordering to move along, and a household that has reduced two of the five while increasing a third has not moved in any direction the ideal's vocabulary can name.

Proposition 9.4. *The egalitarian ideal's characteristic operations require that asymmetry be a magnitude admitting of more and less. Asymmetry is not a magnitude, so the ideal's vocabulary presupposes an ordering of households that does not exist.*

Three observations locate the premise more precisely and forestall a misreading.

The first is that the premise is not an error about a matter of fact. §1.25.3 established that a commitment of this kind is not refuted by counterexample, and the present one has the same property. A household in which asymmetries move in opposite directions can be described by the ideal as having reduced asymmetry in some respects and not others, which is true, and which leaves the ordering intact by treating the household as a mixed case rather than as evidence against ordering. The premise absorbs the observation. What can be shown is that it makes certain households indistinguishable rather than that it is false, and §9.2.3 shows which.

The second is that the premise entered the ideal from outside it. The vocabulary of quantity applied to relations between persons has a long history in political thought, where its objects are votes, rights, holdings, and offices, all of which are genuinely countable and genuinely distributable. Extending it to households required only that the household be treated as a small polity. §3.3.1 described the general mechanism by which a way of describing arrives somewhere and becomes the way things are seen, and the migration of distributive vocabulary from the polity to the household is an instance with a well-documented route. What the household received was a means of description, and it received it before receiving any particular description.

The third concerns what the premise makes invisible, stated generally here and concretely in the next subsection. If asymmetry is a magnitude and reduction is improvement, then the question of what an asymmetry does cannot arise, since a quantity does not do anything. §9.1.1 held that asymmetry is what a relation is made of and §9.1.2 held that it does not by itself indicate direction. Both observations concern what passes between the parties. A vocabulary that reports only how much difference there is has no place to record what the difference is used for, and the two households of §9.2.3 differ in exactly that respect.

One matter should be conceded before the boundary is described, since it bears on how much the finding is worth.

Nothing above shows that reduction is the wrong practical policy. If reducing authority asymmetry is associated with households in which more passes between the parties, then the operation may be well advised even though the account of why is wrong. §6.3.2 recorded that a description may do work for reasons that misdescribe it, and this may be such a case. What the argument establishes is that the ideal cannot say why the operation helps where it helps, and therefore cannot say where it will not. ch. 10 supplies the account that can, and the test of whether it does is whether it identifies cases the ideal gets wrong rather than merely restating the cases it gets right.

9.2.3 The Boundary Reached

The premise of §9.2.2 has a boundary, and the boundary is reached at two households that stand at the same point on the ideal's ordering and differ in what the framework takes to matter.

The first household has reduced its asymmetries considerably. Decisions are discussed, reasons are given, a child's objection is heard, and the vocabulary of the household is one of fairness and explanation. The reduction is real and no one is dissembling. What has also happened, over the same period and by the same means, is that the household has become more nearly the whole of what maintains the child. The discussions are conducted in the household's terms, the reasons offered are the household's reasons, and a child who has been included in the household's account of things at every point has no account of things that is not the household's. §9.1.2 named this combination: capability and knowledge and authority asymmetries reduced, constitutive asymmetry increased.

Whether this household is generative is not settled by anything said so far, and the point is not that inclusion is harmful. The point is narrower and it concerns description. On the ideal's ordering this household has moved a long way in the right direction, and the ideal's

vocabulary contains no term for the movement in the other respect, since that respect is not one of the things it measures.

The second household has reduced its asymmetries much less. An adult decides a good deal, explains sometimes, and the arrangements are recognisably hierarchical by the standards of the societies where the ideal is held. What is also the case is that the child stands in relations this household does not govern. There is a grandmother with her own account of him, a setting whose adults describe him differently, a domain in which he is competent and the adult is not, and an occasion on the record when his account of a situation altered an adult's. §7.1.1 named these: they are reserves.

On the ideal's ordering this household stands well below the first. On the framework's criterion the comparison does not go that way, and it does not go the other way either. What the framework holds is that the two households differ in a respect the ordering does not register, that the respect is whether a description operating in the household can be seen from anywhere as a description, and that this bears on the conditions of §1.26.3 directly, since revision requires that there be something to revise against.

Proposition 9.5. *Two households may stand at opposite ends of the ideal's ordering and differ in the opposite direction in whether the child has any account of himself the household does not supply. The ordering does not register this difference, and neither household is thereby shown to be better than the other.*

That last clause is not a hedge and it should be read strictly. §8.2.1 recorded that this book does not rank households, and the present proposition is an instance rather than an exception. What is claimed is that a difference exists which the ideal's vocabulary cannot state. What is not claimed is that the second household is preferable, that inclusion is a danger, or that hierarchy supplies reserves. A hierarchical household may be as continuous with itself as any other and frequently is, and the second household above was specified as having reserves because the case requires it, not because hierarchy produces them.

Three remarks complete the section.

The first concerns how the two households would appear to any instrument now in use. §5.5.1 recorded that no widely used instrument measures whether a child's account can alter an adult's, and §1.17 recorded what the standard instruments do measure. The first household would score well on those instruments and the second would not. This is not a criticism of the instruments, which measure what they were built to measure. It is the concrete form of §3.3.1: the ideal's premise is installed in the instruments, so an arrangement that the premise cannot describe is an arrangement the instruments cannot detect.

The second concerns what has been shown and what has not. This subsection has produced two descriptions and a claim that a vocabulary cannot distinguish them. It has not shown that the distinction makes a difference to anything, and §8.1.1 listed that as the second of the five things that would count against this book. The demonstration is owed by ch. 30 and ch. 31, and the present chapter's contribution is to state precisely which distinction they must vindicate.

The third concerns the ideal's own resources. An advocate of the egalitarian account may reply that nothing prevents it from attending to a child's relations outside the household, and that the account has no commitment to the household being the whole of a child's world. This is correct and it is the reply this book expects. What it concedes is the point at issue: attending

to that would require a term for the respect in which the first household is worse off than the second, and the ordering supplies no such term because the respect is not a quantity of asymmetry. An account that added one would have adopted the framework's variable, and [ch. 10](#) is where that variable is stated.

9.3 The Wrong Variable

9.3.1 The Size and the Direction

What the preceding section established negatively can now be stated positively, and the statement is this chapter's result.

[§9.1.1](#) held that asymmetry is what a relation is made of and that it does not by itself indicate direction. [§9.1.2](#) held that the kinds vary independently. [§9.2.3](#) exhibited two households indistinguishable on magnitude and different in something else. What the something else is can now be named.

An asymmetry is a difference between parties. What bears on generation is a question of whether what the difference produces moves in more than one direction.

Consider what an asymmetry produces. Where one party knows what the other does not, something passes: an explanation, an instruction, a correction, an account of how things are. Where one party decides what the other cannot, something passes: a decision, and with it a description of the situation the decision responds to. In each case the asymmetry is the condition of the passing and the passing is what the relation consists in.

The question this book puts is whether anything comes back. Not whether the parties are equal, and not whether they take turns, but whether what passes from the child alters what the adult holds. [§1.26.3](#) named revision as one of three conditions and the present subsection states what revision requires structurally: that the direction of the flow is not fixed by the asymmetry that occasions it.

Proposition 9.6. *What bears on whether a relation generates is whether what passes across an asymmetry moves in more than one direction. The magnitude of the asymmetry constrains what can pass and does not determine which way it moves.*

Four consequences follow and they are what [ch. 10](#) develops.

A large asymmetry is compatible with return. An adult who knows a great deal more than a child may nonetheless be altered by what the child supplies, and the alteration need not be a matter of the child teaching the adult facts. [§5.3.1](#) described arrangements in which adults and children are engaged in one activity with the adult more capable; such arrangements produce occasions of return continuously and the asymmetry within them is not small.

A small asymmetry is compatible with its absence. A household that has reduced its asymmetries may have arranged matters so that nothing the child supplies alters anything, and the reduction may itself be the means: where every decision is explained until the child agrees, the explaining occupies the occasions on which something might have come back. [§9.2.3](#) described such a household and the present proposition states why the description was not perverse.

Return is not reciprocity. The parties are not doing the same thing, and nothing here requires that a child supply what an adult supplies. What is at issue is whether the adult's ac-

count is answerable to the child's, which is a different matter from whether the two accounts are of comparable standing. [ch. 42](#) treats the difference.

And the direction can be fixed without anyone fixing it. [§6.1.2](#) held that a pattern is maintained by what happens rather than by anyone's intention. A relation in which return has ceased may contain no party who decided that it should, and [ch. 10](#) takes this as its central case, since a description requiring a villain would fail to describe most of what this book is about.

One clarification prevents a misreading that the proposition invites.

Nothing here holds that an adult should defer to a child's account, or that an account which alters nothing is thereby illegitimate. [§7.3.1](#) established that the parties to a constitutive relation are answerable, and answerability is not deference. An adult who hears a child's account, considers it, and maintains his own has done what the condition requires, since the condition concerns whether the account can bear on the adult's and not whether it prevails. [§5.5.1](#) separated consultation from consequence and the present distinction is a third thing: an account may have consequence in a case where it does not prevail, and the framework's interest is in whether the possibility is live rather than in the outcome of any instance.

9.3.2 The Costs of This Position

The position of [§9.3.1](#) gives up several things that a reader may have wanted, and the objection it invites is serious. This subsection states both, and it states them at greater length than the position's defence, since the position's exposure is where a reader's judgement should be exercised.

Three things are given up.

The book cannot condemn an arrangement by its shape. If the variable is what passes and in which directions, then no description of how a household is organised settles anything about it. A household with a single adult who decides everything, and a household in which every matter is put to a vote, are alike unassessed until something is known about what moves between the parties. [§8.2.1](#) recorded that the book supplies no diagnostic criteria, and the present subsection is where that refusal costs the most, since arrangements are visible and what passes between parties is not.

The book cannot say that any distribution of authority is wrong in itself. [§1.27.3](#) recorded that the framework's normative claims stand in need of a derivation not supplied here, and the consequence is concrete: this chapter has no resources with which to hold that an arrangement in which a child is never consulted is wrong, as distinct from holding that it is likely to foreclose return. The likelihood is an empirical matter and the wrongness would be a normative one. [ch. 42](#) must supply what is missing and until it does the gap is open.

And the book cannot supply an ordering to replace the one it has criticised. [§9.2.2](#) argued that asymmetry does not admit of more and less. Nothing in [§9.3.1](#) supplies a magnitude in its place. Whether what passes moves in more than one direction is not a quantity either, and a reader who expected the chapter to substitute a better scale has been given a distinction and no scale at all. [ch. 70](#) must say whether anything here can be measured, and [§8.1.1](#) recorded that a diagnostic Part yielding a scale would have produced what [ch. 76](#) warns against.

Proposition 9.7. *The position of this chapter cannot assess an arrangement by its form, cannot*

establish that any distribution of authority is wrong in itself, and supplies no ordering in place of the one it criticises.

The objection these costs invite should now be stated in its strongest form, since it is the most serious objection this Part faces.

An account holding that the magnitude of an asymmetry is not the variable, that arrangements cannot be assessed by their shape, and that a hierarchical household may be generative while an egalitarian one may not, is an account whose practical effect is to relieve the party holding the power of the presumption against him. Whoever benefits from an existing distribution has been supplied with a reason to say that the distribution is not what matters. The objection concludes that this is what such accounts are for, whatever their authors intend, and that a framework arriving at this conclusion in a book about children and adults should be read accordingly.

Four things can be said in reply and none of them dissolves the objection.

The first is that the objection applies with equal force to the account it defends. An ideal holding that reduction is improvement supplies whoever has reduced an asymmetry with a warrant for saying that his household is in order. §9.2.3 described a household that would hold such a warrant. That an account can be used by an interested party is a property of accounts and not a criterion for choosing between them.

The second is that the position is not neutral about power. §7.3.1 held that the parties to a constitutive relation are answerable, and that a subject without reserves is owed more rather than less. That is a burden on the party with the power and it is heavier than the one the egalitarian account imposes, since it cannot be discharged by adopting a form. A household may reduce its asymmetries and remain in breach of it.

The third is that the position is testable in a way that would embarrass it. If arrangements do not bear on what passes between parties, then the framework's variable and the ideal's ordering are independent, and if they are strongly correlated in fact then the ideal's ordering was a good proxy and this chapter's argument was pedantic. §8.1.1 recorded that a demonstration of this kind would count against the book. The position is not protected from it.

And the fourth is a concession rather than a reply. A framework's practical effect is not determined by its author's intentions, and a book that supplies the powerful with a serviceable argument has supplied it whatever else it also supplies. §6.3.1 committed the book to the finitude of practice and ch. 76 is charged with turning the critique on the framework's own instruments. Neither of those discharges the present objection, which concerns the argument of this chapter rather than an instrument, and ch. 89 must record it as one the book has not answered.

One remark closes the chapter's argument.

The objection above has force in proportion to how the position is used. Stated as a description of what bears on generation, it is a claim that may be right or wrong. Deployed as a defence of a particular household's arrangements by a party to that household, it is doing something else, and §8.2.1 recorded that a reader who turns this book's vocabulary on a household he knows is doing something the book has not equipped him to do well. That warning was general. Here it is specific: this chapter's argument is the one most readily convertible into a justification, and a reader who finds himself reaching for it in that form should treat the reaching as evidence about the situation rather than as an argument about it.

9.4 The Bearing on What Follows

9.4.1 The Inheritance of the Remaining Chapters

This chapter has produced a distinction and no account of what maintains either side of it. The chapters following supply the account, and setting out the division tells a reader what each is answerable for.

Four things pass forward.

The variable itself passes to [ch. 10](#), which must say what the return consists in. [§9.3.1](#) established that what bears on generation is whether what passes across an asymmetry moves in more than one direction, and left the operation unnamed. The following chapter names it and must do so in a form that distinguishes it from courtesy, from indulgence, and from an adult's simply changing his mind.

The case of the fixed direction passes to [ch. 11](#). [§9.3.1](#) recorded that a direction may become fixed without any party fixing it, and this is the Part's hardest descriptive problem. A chapter treating it must account for degradation without a perpetrator, and [§9.2.3](#) supplies its first case, since the household described there contains no one who has done anything.

The two households pass to [\[ch. ?? ch:stability \]](#), which must supply the criterion by which they are told apart over time. [§6.1.2](#) held that a pattern which has come to exclude the disturbances that would alter it differs from one that returns after disturbance, and that both look like a household doing well. The present chapter has now produced a pair of households to which that criterion must apply, and a criterion that did not distinguish them would have failed at its first case.

And the position's exposure passes to [ch. 13](#), in a specific form. [§9.3.2](#) conceded that this chapter's argument is readily convertible into a justification. The chapter on the fixed position of the giver treats what happens when a party comes to occupy the giving end permanently, and it is the chapter in which the convertibility is most likely to be exercised by the parties described.

Proposition 9.8. *This chapter establishes a distinction and supplies no account of what maintains it. The account is owed by the chapters on absorption, on the ceasing of absorption, on stability, and on the fixed position.*

Two matters close the chapter.

The first concerns what has been established about the egalitarian ideal, since the treatment was long and its conclusion is narrow. The ideal was granted four achievements, none of which has been withdrawn. Its premise was located in the verbs of reduction and shown to require that asymmetry be a magnitude. Its boundary was reached at two households it cannot distinguish. What has not been shown is that the ideal's practical recommendations are mistaken, and [§9.2.2](#) conceded that they may be well advised for reasons the ideal misdescribes. A reader who takes this chapter as licensing a return to arrangements the ideal displaced has taken from it something it does not contain and [§9.2.1](#) states why.

The second concerns what this Part is attempting. [§8.1.1](#) held that the diagnostic Parts are where the case for the framework is made rather than applied, and that the case rests on making describable what the alternatives render invisible. This chapter has exhibited a candidate: a difference between two households that the ideal's vocabulary and the standard

instruments both fail to record. Exhibiting a candidate is not establishing one. Whether the difference makes a difference is the question [ch. 30](#) and [ch. 31](#) must answer, and the chapters between here and there are the account of what the difference consists in, which those chapters will need before they can show that anything turns on it.

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Chapter 10

The Mechanism of Absorption

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what becomes of the power an asymmetry generates, and names the operation by which a relation remains generative under it.

It contributes the account §9.4.1 left owing. Chapter 9 established that what bears on generation is whether what passes across an asymmetry moves in more than one direction, and supplied no account of what the movement consists in. The present chapter supplies it, and the account is what ch. 11 then describes the failure of.

It does not hold that an adult should absorb, which would convert a description into a prescription and breach the commitment of §6.3.2. It does not treat what happens when absorption ceases, which is the following chapter's subject. And it settles nothing about authority, which ch. 42 takes up.

The reader should carry forward the passage from asymmetry to power, the failure of the resource account, the operation of absorption and what distinguishes it from three things it resembles, and what it costs the party who performs it.

10.1 The Generation of Power

10.1.1 The Passage from Asymmetry to Power

§9.1.1 held that asymmetry is a condition of a relation having content. Something follows from this that the preceding chapter did not state, and it should be stated as a claim rather than assumed, since a good deal rests on it.

Consider again what an asymmetry produces. Where the parties differ in some respect the relation concerns, something passes between them, and what passes settles something. An explanation settles what the situation is. An instruction settles what will be done. A correction settles that an account was wrong. In each case a matter that was open is now closed, and it is closed in the terms of the party the asymmetry favours.

This settling is what the word power names in this book (Foucault, 1977). It is not a possession, not a quantity held in reserve, and not in itself an exercise of will. It is the fact that in a relation with an asymmetry, some matters are settled in one party's terms rather than the other's, and that this happens continuously and mostly without anyone attending to it.

Two features of this account should be marked, since they distinguish it from what the word ordinarily conveys.

Power on this account is generated rather than held. It is produced by the asymmetry at every occasion on which something passes, and it does not accumulate anywhere unless

something in the relation causes it to. §6.1.2 held that a pattern is maintained by what happens rather than by anyone's intention, and the same holds here: a party may end up with a great deal settled in his terms without having sought any of it.

And power on this account is not yet a moral matter. That a matter is settled in one party's terms is a description of what has occurred. Whether it should have been, whether the party is answerable for it, and whether the settling was of a kind that ought to have been open are further questions, and ch. 42 is where they are taken up. A book that made power a moral term at this point would have foreclosed the description it needs.

Proposition 10.1. *An asymmetry generates power continuously, in the sense that matters passing across it are settled in the terms of the party the asymmetry favours. The generation is a consequence of the asymmetry rather than of any party's intention.*

Three consequences follow and the third sets up the chapter's problem.

The generation cannot be stopped. §9.1.1 established that a relation without asymmetry has no content, and the present proposition establishes that asymmetry generates power. A relation that generated no power would be a relation in which nothing passed. This is why §9.2.2 found the reduction vocabulary misdirected: what it proposes to minimise is a by-product of the relation existing.

The generation is continuous rather than episodic. It is easy to attend to the occasions on which a matter is settled conspicuously, over an objection or in a dispute. Most settling is not of that kind. It occurs in the ordinary course of a day, in what is explained and what is not, in which questions are answered and which are treated as not requiring an answer, and in whose account of what happened becomes the account of what happened. ch. 15 treats the last of these at length.

And the generation raises a question the preceding chapter did not answer. If power is produced continuously and cannot be stopped, then something becomes of it. It may be returned to the relation, or it may accumulate, and §10.2.1 argues that these are the two cases and that the difference between them is what Chapter 9 was pointing at. The chapter's remaining sections are an account of the first, and ch. 11 is an account of the second.

One clarification is owed before the account proceeds.

Nothing in this section holds that settling is regrettable. A young child requires that a great many matters be settled for him, and §7.1.1 established that his position is one in which he cannot settle them himself. An adult who declined to settle anything would not have removed a burden from a child; he would have failed to supply what the child's position requires, and ch. 42 treats that failure as a distinct one. The question is what becomes of the power the settling generates rather than whether matters are settled.

10.1.2 The Resource Account and Its Limit

An account is widely held according to which power in a relation tracks what the parties hold. The party with more of what the relation depends on can settle more, and the distribution of holdings therefore explains the distribution of settling. This subsection grants the account and then locates where it stops, since what it cannot explain is what the remainder of the chapter is about.

The account is strong and its strength should be stated first.

It explains a great deal about households. A household's arrangements follow from what it can command, and §5.3.2 recorded that command over resources determines which configurations are available. An adult who can purchase provision can settle matters that an adult who cannot must leave to circumstance. The material of Chapter 5 is largely an account of how holdings determine what is open to be settled at all.

It explains the direction of settling in the adult case. Where two adults differ in what they hold, and where one requires what the other has, matters between them are settled predominantly in the terms of the party who is required. This is documented across employment, tenancy, and marriage (Emerson, 1962; Molm, 1997), and the documentation is extensive enough that a framework denying it would be denying something well established.

And it explains change. Where holdings shift, settling shifts with them, frequently without any renegotiation. A party who acquires an alternative source of what he required ceases to be settled for, and the ceasing does not wait on anyone's consent. §7.1.1 described the general form of this and the resource account describes its most common instance.

Proposition 10.2. *Where a party requires what another holds, matters between them are settled predominantly in the terms of the party who is required. The distribution of holdings therefore accounts for a substantial part of the distribution of settling.*

The account's limit is reached at a case it predicts wrongly, and the case is central to this book.

Holdings in the adult-child relation are extremely asymmetric and they are asymmetric in nearly all households, across the entire coverage of Chapter 5. A young child holds essentially nothing the household requires. On the resource account the settling should therefore be near total, and it should be near total in the same degree everywhere, since the holdings asymmetry is near total everywhere.

It is not. Households differ enormously in how much is settled unilaterally and in whether a child's account bears on anything, and they differ while the holdings asymmetry is held constant. §9.2.3 described two households of this kind. The resource account has no variable to which the difference can be assigned, since the variable it offers takes the same value in both.

Two replies are available to the account and neither succeeds.

The first holds that the relevant holdings are not material. Affection, attention, and the child's compliance are things a household requires, and a child holds these. This is correct and it does not rescue the account, since these holdings do not vary in the way the observed differences do. A child's affection is available in the household where nothing he says bears on anything, and its availability there is precisely what the account would need to explain and does not.

The second holds that the difference is one of the adults' dispositions rather than of the relation. Some adults are inclined to consult and others are not, and the resource account was never a theory of dispositions. This reply concedes the point. If what explains the difference is not the distribution of holdings, then the distribution of holdings is not what explains the difference, and locating the residue in a disposition names the gap rather than filling it. §1.1.1 recorded that an account's premise is found where its explanation stops, and here it stops.

What varies, when holdings do not, is what this book calls the relational grammar of the household. The term is used in the sense §6.1.2 supplies: a set of patterns, maintained by what

happens rather than by anyone's decision, governing what may be said, what counts as an answer, which questions arise, and what a party's account is treated as. Two households with identical holdings may differ in all of these, and the difference is neither in the holdings nor in anyone's head. It is in what the relation does.

Proposition 10.3. *The distribution of holdings does not account for variation in settling among households whose holdings are alike. What varies is the relational grammar, which is maintained by the relation and is not a property of either party.*

Two remarks close the subsection.

The first is that this displaces the resource account rather than refuting it. §6.3.2 distinguished refuting an assertion from displacing a description, and what has been shown is that the resource account describes correctly where holdings vary and has nothing to say where they do not. The adult-child relation is the case where they do not, which is why the limit shows here and not elsewhere.

The second is that grammar is an unpromising thing to attend to, and this should be conceded. Holdings can be counted. A grammar cannot, it is not visible to a party operating inside it, and ch. 70 must say whether anything about it can be established empirically. §9.3.2 recorded that this Part supplies a distinction and no scale, and the present subsection is where the absence begins to be felt rather than merely stated.

10.2 Absorption

10.2.1 The Operation

Power is generated continuously and something becomes of it. This subsection names the case in which it is returned to the relation, and the naming must be precise enough to distinguish the operation from three things it resembles closely.

An adult settles a matter in his own terms. This is the ordinary case and it is what §10.1.1 described. Absorption is what occurs when the settling is subsequently opened by what the other party supplies: when a child's account, conduct, question, or objection alters what the adult holds about the matter, and the alteration is retained.

Three features of this belong to the definition rather than to its illustration.

Absorption operates on the adult's account rather than on his conduct. An adult may do what a child asks while holding exactly what he held before, and nothing has been absorbed. What is at issue is whether the adult's own description of the situation is different afterward, and whether it remains different. §9.3.1 held that the framework's interest is in whether the account can bear on the adult's, and absorption is what the bearing consists in when it occurs.

Absorption requires that something be given up. What is settled in a party's terms is settled advantageously, in the minimal sense that the party's own account of the matter prevails. To absorb is to surrender that, and the surrender is real even where the adult is glad of it. This is why the operation is not a gift: a gift is a transfer of something held, and absorption is a relinquishing of the position from which transfers are made.

And absorption is retained rather than performed. An adult who is altered by what a child supplies, and who reverts, has not absorbed; he has been momentarily interrupted. §6.1.2 held

that a pattern is maintained by what happens, and absorption alters the pattern. Whether it has occurred is therefore not visible in an occasion and is visible in a sequence.

The operation belongs to the party the asymmetry favours, and this is a consequence of the definition rather than a further condition on it. A child cannot absorb the power an asymmetry generates in an adult's favour, since he holds none of it to relinquish. §7.2.1 established that the operations of the corpus require a standpoint the child lacks, and absorption belongs to that list in the specific sense that it is something a child is not positioned to do. This is why the account of this chapter is asymmetric where an account of relations between adults would not be.

Proposition 10.4. *Absorption is the alteration of what the party favoured by an asymmetry holds, by what the other party supplies, retained afterward. It operates on the account rather than on conduct, it consists in a surrender rather than a transfer, and it is identifiable only across a sequence.*

Three things resemble absorption and are not it, and the distinctions are the ones §9.4.1 required.

Courtesy is not absorption. An adult may hear a child out fully, acknowledge the account, thank him for it, and hold precisely what he held. The hearing may be sincere and the acknowledgement may be warm. §5.5.1 distinguished consultation from consequence and this is that distinction appearing as an operation: what makes courtesy courtesy is that the adult's account is not exposed to what he is hearing. A household may be scrupulously courteous and absorb nothing, and the courtesy is not thereby dishonest, since nothing in courtesy purports otherwise.

Indulgence is not absorption. An adult may let a child have his way, and letting him have his way is a settling like any other: it settles that the matter will be conducted as the child wishes, and it settles it in the adult's terms, since the adult is the one deciding to let it be so. §9.3.1 held that return concerns what alters the adult's account. Indulgence alters the outcome and leaves the account untouched, and an adult who indulges a child about whom he holds a fixed and unfavourable view has done nothing this chapter is describing.

And an adult's changing his mind is not absorption where the change did not come from the child. Adults revise their views constantly, on reflection, on advice, on new information from elsewhere. What distinguishes absorption is the source: the alteration is produced by what the other party to the relation supplied. An adult who arrives independently at the conclusion the child had been urging has changed his mind, and the child's account has still not borne on anything, which is a difference the child is generally in a position to detect.

Two further observations complete the account of the operation.

The first concerns what may be absorbed. It is not only objections and not primarily objections. What a child supplies includes his conduct, his questions, what he attends to, what he finds difficult, what he makes, and what he is unable to say. An adult may be altered by any of these, and §5.3.1 noted that arrangements in which parties are engaged in one activity supply such occasions continuously. The verbal case is the most conspicuous and it is not the most common.

The second concerns who else absorbs. Nothing in the definition restricts the operation to adults, and a child absorbs a great deal of what an adult supplies. §1.27.10 held that what

develops includes the relation, and absorption in both directions is what that development consists in. The chapter attends to the adult side because the asymmetry runs that way: the child's absorbing is not in question, and §7.1.1 established that he is not positioned to decline it.

10.2.2 The Friction Model

The operation of §10.2.1 occurs on occasions. What matters for a relation is the rate at which it occurs against the rate at which power is generated, and this subsection states the relation between the two.

§10.1.1 held that power is generated continuously by the asymmetry. §10.2.1 held that absorption returns it to the relation. Neither is an event: both are rates, and what characterises a relation over time is how they stand to one another.

Where power is absorbed at the rate it is generated, nothing accumulates. Matters are settled in the adult's terms continuously, and continuously the settling is opened by what the child supplies. The relation contains a great deal of power at every moment and holds none of it. This is what a generative relation under asymmetry looks like, and it is worth noting how little it resembles equality: the asymmetry is undiminished, the settling is constant, and what distinguishes the case is entirely a matter of what happens afterward.

Where power is generated faster than it is absorbed, it accumulates. What accumulates is not a substance and not an entitlement. It is a growing set of matters settled in one party's terms which have not been opened, and the set has a property that makes it more than an inventory: each settled matter is a premise available for settling the next. ch. 15 describes the mechanism by which this occurs and ch. 12 describes the state it produces.

Proposition 10.5. *A relation under asymmetry is characterised by the rate at which power is absorbed against the rate at which it is generated. Where the rates are comparable nothing accumulates; where generation exceeds absorption, settled matters accumulate as premises for further settling.*

Two consequences follow immediately and both correct a natural reading.

The first is that the party with power is not the problem to be solved. §9.2.2 located the ideal's premise in the vocabulary of reduction, and the present model states the alternative concretely: an adult in a generative relation has as much power as an adult in a degraded one, and the power is being generated at a comparable rate in both. What differs is what happens to it. The adult who absorbs is not an adult who has less power; he is an adult who does not retain what is continuously produced.

The second is that absorption is not an achievement completed. It is a rate, so it can fall, and it falls for reasons that need not include anything anyone would recognise as a decision. §5.2.2 recorded that arrangements differ in whether occasions exist. An adult who absorbed readily under one arrangement and absorbs little under another has not become a different sort of person, and ch. 11 takes this as its subject.

What absorption looks like in the ordinary course can now be described, and three forms recur.

There is the alteration produced by a child's growth. A child becomes capable of what he was not, and an adult's account of what may be asked of him, told to him, or left to him is

altered by the fact. This form is nearly universal and it is the one adults find easiest, since the alteration is in the direction of the child's increasing competence and costs the adult's account very little. It is also the form most likely to be mistaken for the whole operation.

There is the alteration produced by being taught. A child knows something the adult does not, and the adult's account is altered by it. §9.1.2 noted that a party may be competent in a domain where the other is not, and §5.4.1 described arrangements in which a child's facility exceeds an adult's in a respect that matters daily. This form is more demanding than the first, since it operates against the knowledge asymmetry rather than along it.

And there is the reversal of the direction on a matter the adult had settled. A child's account of a situation displaces the adult's account of the same situation, and the adult afterward describes what happened as the child described it. This is the form that costs most, it is the least frequent, and it is the one whose presence or absence §9.2.3 was pointing at when it distinguished two households by whether anything on record had altered an adult's account.

One clarification prevents the model from being read as recommending a rate.

Nothing here holds that a higher rate of absorption is better without limit. §10.1.1 recorded that a young child requires that matters be settled for him, and an adult whose account is altered by everything a child supplies has not absorbed a great deal; he has failed to hold an account at all, and ch. 42 treats what that failure does to a child who requires something to be settled. The model states a relation between two rates and does not state that one of them should be maximised. §10.2.3 takes up why the question of a rate's sustainability is a real one rather than a hedge.

10.2.3 The Costs of Absorption

Absorption is expensive. A chapter that named the operation and left the expense unstated would have written a recommendation while claiming to write a description, and §6.3.2 committed this book against that. This subsection states what the operation takes from the party who performs it.

Four costs can be separated.

Absorption costs the adult his account of the matter. §10.2.1 held that the operation consists in a surrender of the position from which settling is done, and the surrender is not notional. An adult who has held that a child is careless, and whose account is altered by what the child supplies, has lost something he was using: a description that organised his conduct, made his decisions intelligible to him, and told him what to expect. What replaces it is less settled than what it replaced, and the interval during which nothing has replaced it is not comfortable.

Absorption costs time, and the time is of a particular kind. What a child supplies arrives in the ordinary course, frequently at length, frequently at the least convenient moment, and its bearing is generally not apparent until after it has been attended to. An adult cannot know in advance which of a day's occasions is the one that would alter his account. §5.2.2 established that arrangements differ in whether such time exists at all, and the present point is sharper: absorption requires time that is not committed in advance rather than merely time, which is the scarcest kind in the configurations §5.6.1 described.

Absorption costs the coherence an adult's account supplies to others. A household's arrangements rest on adults holding stable accounts of what is going on, and an adult whose

account is continually open is harder to coordinate with. Where two adults share responsibility, one absorbing readily and the other less so, the difference between them is itself a matter to be settled, and [ch. 45](#) takes up what a household does with it. An adult may decline to absorb for the sake of a coherence that is genuinely required.

And absorption costs the adult his standing in his own eyes, in a way the preceding three do not capture. To be altered by a child is to have been wrong about something in a relation where one's not being wrong is part of what the other party relies on. [ch. 42](#) treats what authority is and holds that its exercise is not the same as its assertion, and the observation belongs here in a narrower form: an adult who absorbs is doing something that feels like a loss of position and sometimes is one.

Proposition 10.6. *Absorption costs the adult the account he was using, time that is not committed in advance, coherence with those who coordinate with him, and standing in a relation where his not being wrong is relied upon. The operation is expensive and its rate is constrained by what the adult can afford.*

Three consequences follow and the first is the one this Part most needs.

An adult who absorbs little may be an adult who cannot afford to. [§10.2.2](#) recorded that a rate can fall without a decision, and the present subsection supplies the mechanism: where the costs above are high and the adult's own reserves are few, absorption is what gets dropped. [§7.1.2](#) noted that adults may lack reserves, and an adult without them is an adult for whom being wrong about something is not a small matter. This is why [ch. 11](#) can describe degradation without a perpetrator, and it is why this book's account of a household that has stopped absorbing is not an account of anyone's failure of character.

The costs fall unequally across the arrangements of [Chapter 5](#), and they fall most heavily where they can least be borne. The configuration of the long day supplies few occasions of uncommitted time. The configuration of dispersal supplies an adult with few reserves of his own. [§5.3.2](#) recorded that a framework of this kind can be used to grade households and that the material does not support it; the present observation is where the temptation is strongest and where the refusal matters most. What the material supports is that absorption is costlier under some conditions than others. It does not support the inference that adults under those conditions absorb less, which is an empirical claim for which [§5.5.1](#) recorded that no evidence exists.

And the costs bear on what any practical chapter of this book may say. [§8.2.1](#) recorded that the book supplies descriptions rather than instructions. A description of absorption that omitted its price would function as an instruction whatever it claimed, since a reader told that a thing is generative and not told what it costs has been told to do it. [ch. 77](#) inherits this, and the constraint is specific: what an act does under conditions that hold includes what it takes from the party performing it.

One remark closes the subsection.

Nothing here holds that the costs are always worth paying, and the framework has no resources with which to hold it. [§1.27.3](#) recorded the gap and [§9.3.2](#) recorded that this Part cannot establish that any arrangement is wrong in itself. What can be said is that a relation in which the costs are never paid is one in which power accumulates, that accumulation has consequences [ch. 12](#) describes, and that an adult deciding whether to pay them on a given

occasion is not in a position to know which occasion he is in. §2.6.2 established the general form of that limitation. Here it is domestic and daily.

10.3 The Bearing on What Follows

10.3.1 The Residue Left by the Account

This chapter has named an operation and described its rate, its forms, and its price. What it has not done should be stated, since the remaining chapters of this Part are what the omissions require.

Four things are left open.

The chapter has not described what happens when the rate falls. §10.2.2 established that absorption is a rate and that a rate can fall without a decision, and §10.2.3 supplied the mechanism by which it falls. What accumulation then produces is not described here. ch. 11 takes it up, and it inherits a specific requirement from §10.2.3: the account must work without a perpetrator, since the mechanism supplied is one in which nobody has done anything.

The chapter has not distinguished two households in which the rate is low. A household in which absorption is infrequent because the occasions are few, and a household in which the occasions exist and nothing is absorbed, are alike on the model of §10.2.2 and are not alike. ch. 12 must draw the distinction, and §6.1.2 supplies the form it takes: a pattern that returns after disturbance differs from one that has come to exclude the disturbances that would alter it.

The chapter has not treated the party who occupies the settling position permanently. §10.2.3 held that absorption costs standing, and said nothing about what becomes of a party for whom the giving position has become what he is. ch. 13 takes this up, and §9.3.2 recorded that it is the chapter in which this Part's argument is most likely to be turned to use by the parties it describes.

And the chapter has not established that any of this bears on a child. It has described an operation in a relation and named the conditions of §1.26.3 as what the operation serves. Whether a child in a household where absorption has ceased is thereby worse off in any respect that can be established is the question ch. 30 and ch. 31 must answer, and §8.1.1 recorded that the book stands or falls there.

Proposition 10.7. *This chapter describes an operation and its conditions. It does not describe the failure of the operation, does not distinguish absence of occasions from refusal of them, does not treat the party fixed in the settling position, and does not establish that anything follows for a child.*

Two matters close the chapter.

The first concerns the re-derivation requirement. §7.2.1 held that where a corpus proposition concerns what a subject may do, a chapter using it must establish that the doing is available in this case and must supply what replaces it where it is not. Absorption is such a proposition. In the corpus it is an operation available to either party, and a relation between adults is one in which each may absorb what the other supplies and each may decline. Here it is not symmetric, and the asymmetry is not a matter of degree: the child absorbs what the adult supplies

without the option of declining, since §7.1.1 established that he has no standpoint from which to decline. What replaces the corpus proposition is therefore this: in the adult-child relation, absorption is an operation whose performance falls to one party and whose necessity falls on the other. That is a new proposition and it is stated here as one.

The second concerns what the chapter has supplied to the Part's argument. §9.2.3 exhibited two households that the available vocabulary cannot distinguish, and §9.4.1 recorded that the distinction wanted an account of what maintains it. The account is now given: the households differ in whether power generated by their asymmetries is returned to the relation or accumulates. Whether the difference is real is not settled by having named it, and §10.1.2 conceded that a grammar cannot be counted while holdings can. What has been gained is that the difference is now stated in terms of an operation that occurs on identifiable occasions, which is what ch. 70 would need if it is to say anything about observing it.

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Chapter 11

The Ceasing of Absorption

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks how absorption ceases, and answers that it ceases without anyone deciding it should.

It contributes the account of degradation this Part requires and §10.3.1 left owing. Chapter 10 established that absorption is a rate and that a rate can fall; the present chapter describes the routes by which it falls, why the fall stabilises rather than fluctuating, and what follows for accounts of family harm that require someone to have done something. It does not describe the state the fall produces, which is ch. 12. It does not treat what a child in such a household loses, which Part VI must establish and which nothing here presumes.

The reader should carry forward the three routes, the self-reinforcing character of the fall, and the formulation that an adult who has stopped absorbing has acquired nothing and has stopped surrendering.

11.1 The Fall Without a Decision

11.1.1 The Routes to Cessation

§10.2.2 held that absorption is a rate standing against the rate at which power is generated. A rate may fall, and this subsection sets out three ways it does. None of them requires that anyone decide anything, and the third is the one this book's apparatus is needed to state.

The first route is the disappearance of occasions.

Absorption occurs when what a child supplies alters what an adult holds, and the supplying happens on occasions. §10.2.3 established that the time it requires is time not committed in advance. Where such time contracts, the occasions contract with it, and the rate falls without anything about either party changing. §5.2.2 described the conditions under which this happens: hours lengthen, a commute is added, a second employment is taken, an adult who was available becomes unavailable. The adult in such a household absorbs less than he did and has not become less willing to. §5.6.1 recorded that the configuration of the long day is increasing across every society in this book's coverage, and this route is what that increase means for the present argument.

The second route is the rise of costs past what the adult can bear.

§10.2.3 listed four costs and noted that they fall most heavily where they can least be borne. An adult whose own account of himself is under pressure, who has few relations maintaining him, or whose circumstances require that a great deal be settled quickly, is an adult for whom

being wrong about something is expensive. §7.1.2 established that adults may lack reserves. Where they do, the surrender that absorption consists in is a surrender they cannot afford, and the rate falls for that reason rather than for any reason concerning the child.

The third route is the one the friction model is required to state, and it operates where neither of the first two obtains.

§10.2.2 held that where power is generated faster than absorbed, settled matters accumulate, and that each settled matter is a premise available for settling the next. Consider what this does to the cost of the next settling. An adult who holds that a child is careless has a description in hand (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968), and the description settles the next ambiguous occasion at no cost: what happened is what the description says happens. Absorbing on that occasion would require the description to be opened, which is expensive, and settling requires nothing at all. The accumulated settlings have made the cheap course cheaper and the expensive course more expensive, and an adult who takes the cheap course on each occasion has not chosen a policy. He has done, on each occasion, what cost less.

Proposition 11.1. *The rate of absorption falls when occasions disappear, when the adult's costs rise past what he can bear, or when accumulated settlings make further settling cheaper than the alternative. The third route requires no change in conditions and no change in the adult.*

Two features of the third route deserve statement, since it does the chapter's work.

It is self-reinforcing rather than merely persistent. Each occasion settled in the adult's terms adds to what the description covers, and a description covering more settles more occasions at no cost. §6.1.2 held that a pattern is maintained by what happens rather than by anyone's intention, and here what happens maintains the pattern by making the alternative to it progressively more costly. §11.1.2 takes this up.

And it is invisible from inside. An adult taking the cheaper course on each occasion is doing on each occasion what any adult would recognise as reasonable, and there is no occasion on which the cumulative matter presents itself. §2.6.2 established the general form of this: what decides an outcome may be invisible at the timescale on which the parties are operating. ch. 50 treats it at length and ch. 12 describes the state it produces.

One clarification prevents an inference the three routes invite.

Nothing here holds that the routes are exhaustive or that they operate separately. A household may be in all three at once, and the configurations of §5.6.1 make this common: an arrangement that contracts occasions is frequently one that also raises what an adult must settle quickly, and both make the third route's cheap course cheaper still. What the separation supplies is a statement of three mechanisms that must be distinguished if the question of what could be done is to be asked at all, since what would answer one of them answers neither of the others. ch. 77 inherits the distinction and §8.2.1 recorded what it may and may not do with it.

11.1.2 The Self-Maintaining Character of the Fall

A rate that falls might be expected to fluctuate. Occasions vary, an adult's circumstances vary, and a rate driven by cost should rise when costs fall. This subsection argues that it does not, or does so much less than the variation in conditions would suggest, and the reason is the third route of §11.1.1.

§6.1.2 held that a pattern is self-maintaining where a disturbance is followed by a return to the pattern rather than by its dissolution. A rate of absorption that has fallen exhibits this property, and three mechanisms produce it.

The first is that the accumulated description does not decay. What was settled remains settled, since nothing in a settling expires. An adult who held six months ago that a child is careless holds it still unless something has opened it, and the six months of occasions settled by it have made the description better supported rather than staler. §10.1.1 held that power is generated continuously; the corollary is that where it is not returned, what accumulates accumulates monotonically.

The second is that the description alters what there is to absorb. This is the mechanism ch. 15 treats at length and it is stated here only in the form the present argument requires. An adult who holds a description approaches occasions in its terms, and his approach is part of what produces the occasion. A child approached as careless is a child in a situation that differs from the one he would be in otherwise, and what he supplies in that situation is not what he would have supplied. The description therefore receives confirmation that is real rather than imagined, and §7.1.1 established that the child has no standpoint from which to observe that the confirmation was produced.

The third is that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field. Suppose the conditions that removed the occasions reverse: hours shorten, an adult becomes available, the pressures of §10.2.3 relax. The occasions return, and they return to a relation in which a good deal is now settled. What a child supplies on such an occasion must contend with a description that has been accumulating, and the contending is harder than it would have been before, since the description now has months of confirmation behind it. An adult who becomes available again does not thereby resume absorbing at the rate he absorbed before.

Proposition 11.2. *A fallen rate of absorption is self-maintaining, because settled matters do not decay, because the description they constitute alters what the child supplies, and because occasions restored later arrive into a relation where more is settled than when they were lost.*

Three consequences follow and the second is the one this Part has been building toward.

The first concerns the relation between conditions and states. Chapter 5 described conditions and §5.6 declined to claim that they determine anything. The present proposition supplies a specific and limited connection: a period under a configuration that contracts occasions leaves a residue that outlasts the configuration. This is not a claim that conditions determine outcomes, and it is a claim that the effect of a condition is not co-extensive with the condition's duration. ch. 70 inherits the difficulty this creates for any design that measures conditions and outcomes contemporaneously.

The second concerns what the household looks like while this is occurring. It looks settled. §6.1.2 recorded that a stabilisation supports true description of itself, and a household in which little is absorbed is a household in which little is in dispute, accounts are stable, expectations are met, and the parties know where they stand. §9.2.3 exhibited a household of this kind that would score well on any instrument now in use. ch. 12 is where the two kinds of settledness are distinguished, and the distinction is this Part's principal result.

And the third concerns what would reverse it. Nothing in the mechanisms above suggests that a fallen rate cannot rise. What they suggest is that it does not rise by the removal of

what lowered it, since what lowered it is no longer what maintains it. **ch. 81** inherits this and **§7.2.1** constrains what it may say: the operation that would open an accumulated description is one the child cannot perform, so whatever reverses the fall is something the adult does or something that happens to the relation from outside it.

One remark closes the section.

The account above describes a process with no author. Each mechanism is a consequence of the preceding state, no mechanism requires an intention, and the whole proceeds while both parties conduct themselves in ways that are locally unremarkable. **§10.3.1** recorded that **ch. 11** must work without a perpetrator, and the requirement is now met at the level of mechanism. What remains is to say what this does to the accounts of family harm that require one, and **§11.2.1** takes that up.

11.2 Degradation Without a Perpetrator

11.2.1 The Requirement of an Agent

A body of accounts holds that what is wrong in a person's adult life is traceable to a household, that the household did something, and that identifying what it did is the beginning of being able to live otherwise. These accounts circulate widely in professional practice and more widely still outside it, and this subsection treats them in the form **§1.25** used for the traditions of **Chapter 1**. The achievement is granted first and the premise located afterward.

The achievement is substantial and it is not primarily theoretical.

These accounts made intergenerational harm sayable. Before them a person whose household had damaged him had, in most of the settings where the accounts now circulate, no vocabulary in which to say so that would be received as a description rather than as a complaint or a disloyalty. **§1.1.2** held that what cannot be said is not thereby absent, and the availability of the saying is the achievement here. It is not a small one.

They located harm in relations rather than in the person harmed. An account holding that a person's difficulty originates in what was done to him is an account that declines to locate it in a defect he brought. This is a relational move and it is the correct one; a framework of this book's kind should recognise its own commitment in it rather than treating it as a rival.

And they are frequently accurate. Households do things to children, some households do them deliberately, and in those cases the account describes what happened and identifies who did it. **ch. 32** treats a class of such cases and does not treat them as rare. Nothing in what follows suggests that accounts requiring an agent are wrong where an agent acted.

Proposition 11.3. *Accounts locating adult difficulty in a household's conduct made intergenerational harm sayable, located it in relations rather than in the person harmed, and describe correctly the cases in which someone acted.*

The premise is found where the accounts' explanations stop, and **§1.1.1** supplies the method: attend to the verbs.

The characteristic verbs are transitive and they take an agent. A household withheld, criticised, controlled, neglected, invalidated, or failed to provide. Each requires someone who did it, and each locates the harm in an act. Where the act is identified the account explains; where

no act can be identified the account has nothing to offer, and the person seeking it is left either without an explanation or in search of an act that will serve.

This is the premise: that harm in a household implies conduct that produced it. It is not stated because it does not need to be, and §1.1.2 recorded that this is the normal condition of a premise.

The account of §11.1.1 and §11.1.2 describes a case the premise cannot accommodate. An adult whose occasions contracted, whose costs rose, and around whom accumulated settlements made each further settling cheaper has not withheld, criticised, controlled, or neglected. He has, on each occasion, done what was locally reasonable. There is no act to identify, and the state the household arrives at is nonetheless the state this Part has been describing.

Proposition 11.4. *Accounts requiring an agent cannot describe a household in which absorption ceased through the routes of this chapter, since no party performed an act and the resulting state is a consequence of a sequence of locally unremarkable ones. Such an account must either treat an absence as an act, which misdescribes the adult, or report that nothing occurred, which returns the person to the position the account was formed to remedy.*

Three observations follow, and the second is where this book's disagreement is narrowest and most important.

The first concerns what the premise costs the person using it. A person whose household is in the state this chapter describes, and who has an account requiring an act, is in a difficult position. Either he concludes that nothing happened, which contradicts what he has to go on, or he searches for an act, and the search is likely to succeed, since any household supplies candidates and §1.25.3 established that a description can accommodate what it encounters. The account then attributes to an act what a process produced, and the attribution is not corrected by anything, since the act attributed to is generally real and the question of whether it bears the weight is not one the account raises.

The second is that this book is not holding that no one is responsible. §7.3.1 established that the parties to a constitutive relation are answerable for the constituting, and answerability does not require an act. An adult in whose household absorption ceased is answerable for the relation whether or not he did anything, and the absence of an act removes neither the answerability nor the state. What this chapter denies is that the state requires an act, not that anyone is off the hook. §11.2.2 states this at greater length because it is the point most easily lost.

And the third concerns what the two accounts are for. An account requiring an agent supplies a person with a description of his history. The account offered here supplies a description of a mechanism. These are different objects and the second does not replace the first, since a person seeking to understand his own life is not primarily seeking a mechanism. §6.3.2 held that a permission is displaced only by showing that what it picks out was available otherwise. The present claim is narrower than displacement: that there are households the agent-requiring account cannot describe, and that a person in one of them is not helped by an account that will nonetheless produce an answer if pressed.

A fourth observation records what this book's alternative does not supply. §10.2.1 named an operation and §11.1.1 described its failure, and neither furnishes a party to hold responsible. A person who learns that what happened to him was a process with no author has been given

an accurate description and has been left without an address for his complaint. **ch. 89** must record this, since a framework whose descriptions are accurate and useless to the people they describe has a defect that its accuracy leaves unrepaired.

11.2.2 The Absence of an Act

The formulation this chapter has been working toward can now be given, and it is short.

An adult in whose household absorption has ceased has acquired nothing. He has stopped surrendering.

The distinction is between two descriptions of the same state. On the first, an adult has taken something: authority he did not have, deference he did not earn, a position of command over a party who cannot resist. On the second, an adult has ceased to give something up. What he holds is what an asymmetry generates continuously and by itself, as **§10.1.1** established, and what has changed is that it is no longer being returned.

The second description is the correct one and three things follow from it.

Nothing was taken from the child. There is no transfer, no moment of appropriation, and no occasion on which the adult came into possession of what the child had. The power the adult holds was never the child's, since **§10.1.1** held that power is generated by the asymmetry rather than distributed between the parties. A description in which the child has been deprived of something he had misdescribes the case, and it misdescribes it in a way that matters, since it directs attention to a taking that did not occur.

The change is a cessation rather than an act. **§10.2.1** held that absorption is a surrender performed on occasions. To stop performing it is not to perform something else. **§11.1.1** established that the stopping happens through routes none of which requires a decision, and the present formulation states what the routes produce: the absence of a conduct rather than a new conduct, and the absence is invisible in a way conduct is not.

And what results is nonetheless a state, and the state is not nothing. **§11.1.2** established that the accumulated settlements constitute a description, that the description alters what the child supplies, and that the arrangement is self-maintaining. An adult who has merely stopped doing something is an adult in a household that has become something. **§6.1.2** held that a pattern not being maintained is being lost at a rate that may be slow; the corollary here is that a relation in which return has stopped is not a relation that has stayed as it was.

Proposition 11.5. *An adult in whose household absorption has ceased holds what the asymmetry generates and has stopped returning it. Nothing was transferred from the child, no act was performed, and the resulting state is nonetheless a state of the relation rather than an absence of one.*

This is not exculpation and the reasons should be stated at length, since the formulation invites the reading and a reader who takes it as a defence has taken the chapter to be doing the opposite of what it does.

The first reason is that answerability does not track acts. **§7.3.1** located what a subject is owed in the position he occupies within the process constituting him, and held that a subject without reserves is owed more rather than less because the parties to the relation are the only parties who could be answerable. That argument makes no reference to what anyone did.

11. The Ceasing of Absorption

An adult is answerable for a relation that is constituting a child, and the answerability is not discharged by his having performed no act, since it was never contingent on an act.

The second is that a cessation is a thing one can be answerable for. Ordinary moral thought is not embarrassed by this. A person who stops paying attention to a road has done nothing, and what follows is his. The absence of an act does not remove answerability where the thing not done was the thing required, and §7.3.1 established what is required here.

The third is that this chapter's account makes the adult's position harder rather than easier in one respect. An account requiring an act supplies a defence: the adult may say truthfully that he did not do the thing named. The account offered here supplies none, since it does not name a thing done. What it describes is a state of a relation for which the adult is answerable, and there is nothing he can truthfully deny his way out of. §9.3.2 recorded that this Part's argument is convertible into a justification; the present subsection is where the conversion is hardest to perform.

And the fourth is that nothing here holds that the adult could have done otherwise on any given occasion. §10.2.3 established that absorption is expensive and that the costs fall most heavily where they can least be borne. §11.1.1 established that the routes operate without decisions. A reader may conclude from this that the adult is not blameworthy, and the framework does not dispute the conclusion, because it does not trade in that vocabulary. §1.27.3 recorded the gap and ch. 42 must close it. What the framework holds meanwhile is that a state obtains, that a child is in it, and that the question of blame is a different question from the question of what is the case.

One remark closes the section.

The formulation of this subsection is the point at which this Part's account is most likely to be quoted and least likely to be quoted whole. Read as a description of a mechanism it is what the preceding chapters establish. Read as a verdict on any actual household it is an overreach that §8.2.1 forbids, and read as consolation it is a use the framework cannot license, since §7.3.1 holds that the answerability survives the mechanism entirely.

11.3 The Bearing on What Follows

11.3.1 The Products of Cessation

This chapter has described a fall and the mechanisms that maintain it. What the maintained state amounts to is not described here, and the remaining chapters of this Part are what the omission requires.

Three things pass forward.

The state itself passes to ch. 12. §11.1.2 established that a household in which little is absorbed is a household in which little is in dispute, and that such a household looks settled. §9.2.3 exhibited two households that stand differently on the framework's criterion and alike on every available instrument. The chapter that follows must supply what distinguishes them over time, and §6.1.2 states the form: a pattern that returns after disturbance differs from one that has come to exclude the disturbances that would alter it. A criterion that did not separate settledness of the first kind from settledness of the second would leave this Part with a mechanism and no diagnosis.

The fixed position passes to [ch. 13](#). [§11.2.2](#) held that an adult who has stopped absorbing holds what the asymmetry generates and has performed no act. Nothing in that formulation treats what becomes of a party for whom the settling position has become permanent, and [§10.2.3](#) noted that absorption costs standing in a relation where one's not being wrong is relied upon. An adult who has not surrendered for a long period is an adult whose position and whose account of himself have grown together, and the chapter treating this must say what that does to the possibility of the position being opened.

And the question of what a child in such a household loses passes to Part VI. [§8.1.1](#) listed the demonstration among the five things that would count against this book and [§10.3.1](#) recorded that nothing in this Part establishes it. The present chapter has described a household in which a child's account bears on nothing and in which the description of him accumulates confirmation. That is a description of a state and not yet a claim that anything is lost in it, and [ch. 30](#) and [ch. 31](#) carry the whole of the difference.

Proposition 11.6. *This chapter describes how absorption ceases and what maintains the cessation. It does not describe the state as a condition to be distinguished from others, does not treat the party fixed in the settling position, and does not establish that a child in such a household is worse off in any respect.*

Two matters close the chapter, and the first is the re-derivation this chapter owed.

[§7.2.1](#) requires that where a corpus proposition concerns what a subject may do, a chapter using it must establish that the doing is available and supply what replaces it where it is not. The proposition at issue here concerns what a party does when the other stops absorbing. In the corpus the answer is that he may name it: a party to a relation between adults who finds that nothing he supplies alters anything can say so, and the saying is itself an occasion on which the other party's account is exposed. That operation is a refusal in the sense of [§7.2.1](#), and it is unavailable here for the reason given there.

What replaces it must be stated as a new proposition rather than as a qualification, and it is this. Where a child is party to a relation in which absorption has ceased, the cessation cannot be named by him, because naming it requires a standpoint from which the relation's current terms are seen as terms. [§11.1.2](#) supplies the aggravating condition: the accumulated description is producing the confirmation that would be cited against any such naming were it attempted. The consequence is that a household in this state contains no party positioned to report it. The adult does not experience a cessation, since [§11.2.2](#) established that nothing was done and the state is one of local reasonableness. The child cannot describe one. [ch. 31](#) inherits this and it is the sharpest form of the difficulty that chapter faces.

The second matter concerns what this chapter has contributed to the Part's case. [§9.2.3](#) exhibited a difference the available vocabulary cannot state. [Chapter 10](#) named the operation whose presence or absence constitutes it. The present chapter has shown that the absence arises without an author, maintains itself, and is not reported by anyone inside it. Each step makes the difference harder to detect and none of them makes it more likely to be real. [§8.1.1](#) recorded the standard: that the framework picks out a difference the instruments do not record. This Part has now specified the difference precisely enough that Part VI can be held to showing that something turns on it, and [§8.3.1](#) recorded what follows if it cannot.

References

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Chapter 12

Hierarchical Stability and Generative Stability

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what distinguishes two households that are both stable, both asymmetric, and both settled.

It contributes this Part's principal result. Chapter 9 exhibited a pair of households the available vocabulary cannot separate; ch. 10 named the operation whose presence or absence constitutes the difference; ch. 11 showed that the absence arises without an author and maintains itself. What remains is the criterion by which the two states are told apart, and §6.1.2 stated its form without applying it.

It does not establish that a child in either household fares differently, which Part VI must show. It does not supply a means of determining which state a particular household is in, and §12.1.2 states why the criterion resists that use.

The reader should carry forward the criterion, the distinction between ossification and stability, and the account of how a position occupied continuously becomes a property of the person occupying it.

12.1 The Forms of Settledness

12.1.1 The Problem of the Indistinguishable Households

The pair should be stated sharply before the criterion is offered, since the criterion is worth only as much as the difficulty it resolves.

Two households. In each, an adult holds a stable account of a child and the account is largely accurate. In each, matters are settled promptly and the parties know where they stand. In each, disputes are rare, expectations are met, and the arrangements have held for years. In each, the asymmetries of §9.1.2 are substantial and no one in either household experiences them as oppressive.

By every measure available, these households are alike. §1.17 recorded what the standard instruments measure and §5.5.1 recorded that none of them measures whether a child's account can alter an adult's. An observer with the instruments in hand would report two settled households, and the report would be accurate as far as the instruments reach.

§10.2.2 holds that they differ. In the first, power generated by the asymmetry is returned continuously and the settledness is a settledness of a relation that keeps being remade. In the second, power has accumulated and the settledness is a settledness of a relation in which the

terms have stopped moving. §11.1.2 established that the second maintains itself and that the household in it experiences nothing.

Three difficulties make this hard to establish and they should be stated rather than managed.

The first is that both households produce the same observations on most occasions. An adult holding a stable and accurate account of a child will, on the great majority of occasions, do exactly what an adult in the other household does, because the account is accurate and the occasions are ordinary. §10.2.1 held that absorption is visible in a sequence rather than an occasion, and the present difficulty is the consequence: the occasions that discriminate are rare, and an observer present for a week may see none of them.

The second is that the difference is counterfactual. What distinguishes the households is what would happen to a disturbance, and §12.1.2 treats the consequences of this for anything that hopes to observe it. A household in which nothing has recently disturbed the account gives no evidence either way, and §5.2.2 established that arrangements differ in whether such occasions arise at all.

And the third is that the second household is not doing badly by its own lights or by anyone's. §11.2.2 established that no act has been performed. A description in which the second household is the deficient one has smuggled in a judgement that §8.2.1 forbids and that nothing in this Part supports. What is claimed is that the two are in different states, and that a vocabulary which cannot say so is missing something.

Proposition 12.1. *Two households may be alike on every available measure, alike in the accuracy of the accounts they hold, and alike in their settledness, and differ in whether the settledness is maintained by continuous return or by the accumulation of what was never returned.*

One observation completes the statement of the problem and it concerns why this pair matters more than the pairs a critical account usually offers.

An account of family harm can always find its cases at the extremes. A household in which a child is beaten, or one in which he is ignored, differs from a household in which he is not, and no framework is needed to say so. §8.1.1 held that a diagnostic chapter which describes a familiar phenomenon in unfamiliar words has done nothing. The pair above is not of that kind. Both households are ones that any observer would call good, both would be so described by the people in them, and the claim that they differ is a claim that cannot be reached from the extremes. This is the case on which the framework's utility turns, and §8.3.1 recorded that if the difference proves empty the book has produced a synonym.

12.1.2 The Criterion

§6.1.2 supplied the form of the criterion and left it unapplied. A pattern that returns to itself after disturbance is stable. A pattern that has come to exclude the disturbances that would alter it has a different property. The present subsection applies this to the pair of §12.1.1 and states what the application costs.

The distinguishing question is not whether the household is disturbed. It is what becomes of a disturbance when one occurs.

In the first household a disturbance is an occasion. A child supplies something that does not fit the account, the account is exposed to it, and one of two things follows: the account is

altered, or it is maintained for reasons the adult could give and that bear on what was supplied. Either outcome is a return in the sense of §9.3.1, since in both the account was answerable to what arrived. The household is stable because the pattern re-forms after each such occasion, and it re-forms slightly differently each time.

In the second household a disturbance is not an occasion. A child supplies something that does not fit, and the account absorbs it in the other sense of that word: what does not fit is received as an instance of something the account already covers. §11.1.2 described the mechanism. The exception becomes evidence of the rule, the unusual conduct becomes a further instance of the disposition, and there is no moment at which the account stands exposed. The household is stable because nothing reaches the pattern, and the pattern is therefore identical after each occasion to what it was before.

Proposition 12.2. *The criterion is what becomes of a disturbance. Where a disturbance reaches the account and the account is answerable to it, the stability is generative. Where a disturbance is received as a further instance of what the account already holds, the stability is hierarchical.*

Three features of this criterion should be marked, and the third is a difficulty rather than a feature.

The criterion does not require that the account change. An adult who considers what a child supplies and maintains his account has met the criterion, provided the maintaining was answerable to what arrived. §9.3.1 distinguished consequence from prevailing and the same distinction operates here. A criterion requiring change would be a criterion requiring an adult to be wrong, which §10.2.2 already rejected.

The criterion is about a capacity of the account rather than a frequency of events. A household in which no disturbance has arisen for a year is not thereby hierarchical, and a household in which several have arisen is not thereby generative. What the criterion picks out is what would happen, and §5.6 recorded the general form of this problem: the framework's conditions concern what a relation makes possible rather than what it contains.

And the criterion is counterfactual, which is a serious difficulty and the reason this subsection is not the end of the matter.

A counterfactual criterion cannot be checked by observing what occurs. To determine which household one is in requires knowing what would happen if the account were disturbed, and the only reliable way to know is for the account to be disturbed. Three consequences follow and none of them is comfortable.

The first is that a household cannot determine its own state by introspection. An adult asking himself whether he would be answerable to a challenge is asking himself a question about a situation he is not in, and §2.6.2 established that what decides an outcome may be invisible at the timescale on which the parties operate. An adult in the second household will generally answer that he would be answerable, and will answer sincerely, since nothing in his experience contradicts it.

The second is that the criterion resists instrumentation. ch. 70 must say whether a counterfactual property of a relation can be measured, and the difficulty is not merely technical: an instrument that disturbed an account in order to observe what became of the disturbance would be an intervention rather than a measurement, and ch. 76 treats what follows. §9.3.2 recorded that this Part supplies no scale, and the present subsection is where the reason be-

comes specific rather than general.

And the third is that the criterion is asymmetrically evidenced. A single occasion on which an account was exposed and answerable establishes the capacity. No number of occasions on which no disturbance arose establishes its absence. The evidence available therefore bears on one of the two states and not on the other, and a household about which nothing can be said is not thereby a household in the second state. §5.5.1 distinguished a condition being absent from a condition being untested, and this is where that distinction does its heaviest work in the book so far.

One remark closes the subsection.

The difficulties above are not reasons to abandon the criterion, and they are reasons to be clear about what it is for. It is a distinction between two states, offered as a description that the available vocabulary does not contain. §6.3.2 held that a permission is not refuted by the difficulty of applying it, and is displaced by showing that what it picks out was already sayable. Whether the distinction can be brought into contact with evidence is a further question and ch. 70 carries it. What this chapter establishes is what would have to be observed, which is more than the vocabulary it displaces has offered.

12.2 Ossification

12.2.1 Ossification as the Variable

The criterion of §12.1.2 can be stated in a second way, and the second statement makes clear what the ordinary vocabulary of family life has been conflating.

A household is called stable when its arrangements persist. §6.1.2 held that persistence is not a single property: a pattern may persist because it re-forms after each disturbance, or because disturbances do not reach it. These are different mechanisms of persistence and the word stable does not distinguish them.

What the second requires, and the first does not, is that something have hardened. The account of the child is not merely held; it has become the frame within which occasions are read, so that occasions cannot bear against it. §11.1.2 described the process by which this occurs and the term for the resulting condition is ossification.

The variable this Part has been circling is therefore not stability and not asymmetry. It is whether what stabilises retains the capacity to be altered by what it stabilises against.

Proposition 12.3. *Persistence has two mechanisms: re-formation after disturbance and imperviousness to disturbance. The ordinary vocabulary of stability names both, and what distinguishes them is whether the pattern retains the capacity to be altered.*

Three consequences follow and the second bears on how the whole Part should be read.

The first is that ossification is not rigidity of conduct. An adult may be flexible in everything he does and ossified in what he holds. He may vary the household's arrangements freely, accommodate a child's preferences readily, and change plans without difficulty, while the account of who the child is remains untouched by any of it. §10.2.1 distinguished absorption from indulgence and the present distinction is its structural form: conduct and account come apart, and the vocabulary of flexibility tracks the first.

The second is that ossification admits of scope. §7.1.2 held that reserves are reserves against particular descriptions, and the same holds here. A household may be ossified with respect to one account of a child and open with respect to others. An adult may be entirely answerable about what a child is capable of and entirely closed about what he intends, or open about his abilities and closed about his character. There is no general state of a household, and a chapter that spoke as though there were would have committed the error §9.2.2 located in the ideal it criticised: treating as a single magnitude what varies independently across respects.

And the third is that ossification is not confined to unflattering accounts. §7.1.2 noted that reserves are against something; an account may be favourable and ossified. A child held to be gifted, in a household where nothing he supplies can disturb the holding, is in the structural position this section describes. What he supplies that does not fit is received as an instance: a poor performance becomes evidence of insufficient effort rather than of the account being wrong, and the account is confirmed by what would otherwise have unsettled it. ch. 18 treats this case at length and it is the harder one, since nothing in it looks like harm.

Two remarks close the subsection.

The first concerns why ossification is difficult to notice from inside. An ossified account is not experienced as a commitment held despite evidence. It is experienced as knowing the child. §11.1.2 established that the account accumulates real confirmation, so an adult who reports that he knows his child well is reporting something the evidence supports. §2.6.2 recorded that a slow variable is invisible at the timescale on which the parties operate, and the present case is the domestic form: what has hardened has hardened over years, and no interval within those years contained the hardening.

The second concerns what ossification is not being claimed to cause. Nothing in this section holds that a child in an ossified household is harmed, that his development is impaired, or that anything follows for him at all. §10.3.1 recorded that this Part establishes no such thing and §8.1.1 recorded that Part VI carries it. What has been established is that two households which the vocabulary calls alike are in different states, that the difference is in whether an account can be reached, and that the state which cannot be reached is produced by ordinary conduct and maintains itself. Whether being in it costs a child anything is the question the book has yet to answer.

12.2.2 The Sedimentation of Position

The preceding subsection treated what ossifies in an adult's account of a child. Something ossifies on the other side of the same process, and it concerns the adult's account of himself.

§10.1.1 held that an asymmetry settles matters in one party's terms continuously. Consider what a party experiences under this arrangement across years. He is, on occasion after occasion, the one whose account prevails. He is not asserting anything; the position is supplied by the relation, and §11.2.2 established that nothing was taken. What he experiences is simply that things are as he says they are, repeatedly and without contest.

Three stages can be distinguished in what this becomes, and they are stages of a single process rather than separate events.

At the first, the position is occupied. The adult is the party whose account settles matters, and this is a fact about the relation. Were the relation to change, the position would change

with it, and the adult would be someone whose account did not settle matters. Nothing about him is at stake in it.

At the second, the position is identified with. Occupying it continuously, the adult comes to describe himself in its terms: he is the one who knows how things are, who decides, who is relied upon. This is a description of a person rather than of a position, and it is arrived at by generalising over occasions. §6.1.2 held that a stabilisation supports true description of itself, and the description here is true, since the adult has in fact settled these matters.

At the third, the identification becomes an essence. What began as a position and became a description of a person becomes a property he brings to relations rather than one they supply. The adult is not the one who knows how things are in this relation; he is one who knows how things are, and the relation is where this is exercised. The order of explanation has reversed. §6.1.1 distinguished a relation prior to its terms from terms prior to their relation, and sedimentation is that reversal occurring within a life.

Proposition 12.4. *A position occupied continuously is first identified with and then taken as a property of the party occupying it. The relational fact becomes a personal one, and the party thereafter brings to the relation what the relation had supplied.*

What distinguishes this from the ordinary confidence of an adult who is competent should be stated, since the two are easily conflated and only one is at issue.

The criterion is whether the value loop is closed. In an open loop, what the adult supplies to the relation is answerable to what returns: he settles matters, what he settles is exposed to what the other party supplies, and his standing as the one who settles is renewed or revised by the exposure. §12.1.2 stated the same criterion for accounts and the present one is its reflexive form. In a closed loop, the standing is maintained by the settling itself. Each occasion on which the adult's account prevails confirms that his account is the one that prevails, and the confirmation requires nothing from the other party but the position he already occupies.

Three consequences follow.

A closed loop is self-supporting and therefore requires no maintenance that anyone would notice performing. §11.1.2 established the general mechanism and this is its reflexive case: the adult's account of himself is confirmed by the same occasions that confirm his account of the child, and the two accounts hold one another up.

A closed loop makes the surrender of §10.2.1 more expensive over time. §10.2.3 listed standing among what absorption costs. Where standing has sedimented into a property of the person, absorbing is no longer the surrender of a position on a matter; it is a disturbance to what the adult takes himself to be. ch. 13 treats the case where this has gone furthest, and the present subsection supplies its mechanism.

And a closed loop is compatible with warmth, generosity, and sincere devotion. Nothing in the mechanism requires that the adult be harsh, self-satisfied, or indifferent, and §9.2.3 exhibited a household in which the parties are none of these. An adult may give a great deal and be entirely closed in the sense described here, since what closes the loop is that nothing returning can reach his position rather than what he withholds. ch. 13 takes this as its subject.

One remark closes the section.

The account above is available in this book because Chapter 6 committed it to a particular ontology. §6.1.1 held that terms are stabilisations within a process, and sedimentation is de-

scribable as an error only against that commitment: it consists in a stabilisation coming to be treated as prior to what stabilised it. On an account in which persons are prior to their relations, nothing has gone wrong at the third stage, since an adult who takes his competence to be his own has taken it to be what it is. §6.3.2 held that a permission is displaced by showing what it picks out was available otherwise, and this is a case where the description depends on the framework rather than restating what other vocabularies supply. ch. 90 must test whether that dependence is doing work or merely showing.

12.3 The Bearing on What Follows

12.3.1 The Reach of the Criterion

This chapter has produced the distinction the Part was assembled to produce. What it supplies and what it withholds should be set out together, since the two are easily confused and the withholding is the larger part.

Three things are supplied.

A statement of what would have to be observed. §12.1.2 held that the criterion concerns what becomes of a disturbance, and that a single occasion on which an account was exposed and answerable establishes the capacity. This is more determinate than the vocabulary it displaces, which offers no observation at all bearing on the difference. ch. 70 inherits it and §12.1.2 recorded the three difficulties it inherits with it.

A reflexive form of the same criterion. §12.2.2 held that the adult's standing may be maintained by the settling itself, and that this closes a loop which absorbing would have opened. The criterion therefore applies twice in the same household, to the account of the child and to the account of the adult, and §12.2.2 established that the two accounts hold one another up. Any later chapter treating one must treat the other.

And a correction to the vocabulary of stability. §12.2.1 held that persistence has two mechanisms and that the ordinary word names both. This is the Part's contribution to what can be said about a household, and §8.1.1 recorded the test it must pass: whether the correction permits something to be described that could not be described without it, or renames what was already available.

Four things are withheld.

The chapter withholds any means of determining which state a given household is in. §12.1.2 established that introspection fails, that instrumentation is obstructed by the intervention problem, and that the evidence is asymmetric between the two states. A reader who wants to know about a household he is in will find that the chapter has explained why he is poorly placed to know.

It withholds any claim that one state is better. §12.2.1 recorded this and it should be repeated here, since a chapter naming one state ossification and the other generative has supplied a reader with everything he needs to draw the conclusion the book declines to draw. §8.2.1 forbids it and nothing in this Part supports it.

It withholds the consequences for the child. §10.3.1 recorded this and §12.2.1 repeated it. The Part has described a state of a relation. Whether a child in it is worse off in any respect that can be established is what ch. 30 and ch. 31 must show, and §8.3.1 recorded that the book

is damaged if they cannot.

And it withholds any account of how the state is left. §11.1.2 established that removing what lowered the rate does not restore it, since what lowered it is no longer what maintains it. ch. 81 carries this and §7.2.1 constrains what it may say.

Proposition 12.5. *This chapter supplies a criterion, its reflexive form, and a correction to the vocabulary of stability. It supplies no means of applying the criterion to a particular household, no ranking of the two states, no consequence for the child, and no account of how the second state is left.*

Two matters close the chapter, and the first is the re-derivation it owes.

§7.2.1 requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available or replaced. The proposition at issue is the one by which a party detects that a relation has closed. In the corpus, a party detects it by attempting to disturb the account and observing what becomes of the attempt, and §12.1.2 held that this is the only reliable route. An adult with reserves can make the attempt at manageable cost, since §7.1.1 established that his stabilisation does not depend on the relation's response.

The replacement proposition is this. A child cannot perform the test that would determine which household he is in, because performing it requires supplying something the account does not cover and observing whether it is received as an exception or as an instance, and §7.1.1 established that he has no standpoint from which the reception could be observed as a reception. What he encounters in its place is a household in which what he supplies is met, consistently and without hostility, by an account that already covers it. ch. 31 inherits this, and §11.3.1 recorded the aggravating condition: the adult in such a household experiences nothing either, so the state has no witness.

12.3.2 The Residue Left by the Criterion

This chapter has supplied a distinction and a criterion for it. What the criterion cannot do, and what the remaining chapters must therefore supply, should be set out.

Three things pass forward.

The reflexive case passes to ch. 13. §12.2.2 described how a position occupied continuously becomes a property of the party occupying it, and treated the process without treating the state it arrives at. An adult for whom the giving position has become what he is stands in a relation that cannot easily be opened, and §12.2.2 established why: opening it is no longer a matter of revising an account of a child but of disturbing an account of himself. The chapter that follows takes this as its subject and inherits with it §9.3.2's warning about who is likely to reach for the Part's argument.

The counterfactual difficulty passes to ch. 70. §12.1.2 established that the criterion concerns what would happen to a disturbance, that a household cannot determine its own state by introspection, that an instrument disturbing an account in order to observe it would be intervening rather than measuring, and that the evidence available bears asymmetrically on the two states. Part XII must say whether anything survives these difficulties, and ch. 76 must say what an instrument that did survive them would be doing to the households it was applied to.

And the whole question of consequence passes to Part VI. §12.2.1 stated plainly that nothing in this Part establishes that a child in an ossified household is worse off. ch. 30 and ch. 31 carry the demonstration, and this chapter has now given them their target: not a household that mistreats a child, but a household in which an account of him has become unreachable while everything else about the arrangement remains in order.

Proposition 12.6. *This chapter distinguishes two states and supplies a criterion that is counterfactual, scope-relative, and asymmetrically evidenced. It does not establish that the states differ in consequence, does not treat the position that has become a person, and does not show that the criterion can be applied.*

Two matters close the chapter, and the first is the re-derivation it owes.

§7.2.1 requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available in this case or replaced. The proposition here concerns what a party does when an account of him has become unreachable. In the corpus the answer is that he may hold to his own account against it, and §7.1.1 named this among the operations a reserve supplies: a standpoint from which the description operating in a relation can be seen as a description. A party with reserves subject to an ossified account of himself knows that he is subject to one, which is the minimal condition of the account's being merely an account.

The replacement proposition is this. Where an account of a child has ossified, the child does not hold a competing account against it, because the ossified account is among the materials from which his account of himself is being made. §11.1.2 supplies the aggravating term: the account generates real confirmation, so what the child would have to hold out against is an accumulating record rather than a claim. The consequence is that ossification in the adult-child case does not produce a subject who disagrees with how he is described. It produces one for whom the description is not the kind of thing that admits of disagreement, and ch. 15 carries this as its central problem.

The second matter concerns what Part II has established and what it has not.

It has established that asymmetry is constitutive and that its magnitude is the wrong variable; that power is generated continuously by asymmetry and returned by an operation with identifiable occasions and a real price; that the operation ceases through routes requiring no decision and that the cessation maintains itself; and that two households alike on every available measure may differ in whether an account can be reached. §8.1.1 required of the diagnostic Parts that they show something is lost, that the loss is not a renaming, that the child case is derived rather than assumed, and that nothing yields a scale for grading households. The third has been done at each chapter's close. The fourth has been observed, and §12.1.2 established that the criterion resists conversion into a scale for reasons internal to it rather than by the book's forbearance. The first two are not this Part's to discharge, and Part VI has them. ch. 13 completes the present Part by treating the party for whom the position has become permanent.

References

Chapter 13

The Fixed Position of the Giver

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what becomes of a party whom a relation places permanently at the giving end.

It contributes the closing case of this Part and it completes the account §12.2.2 began. That subsection described how a position occupied continuously becomes a property of the party occupying it; the present chapter treats the position that is hardest to leave, because the role supplies a description of it that is admirable and because what would return to it arrives in a form that cannot reach it.

It does not treat what a child in such a household loses, which Part VI carries. It does not hold that giving is a defect, and §13.2.1 states plainly that the sentence this chapter examines is generally true and sincerely meant.

The reader should carry forward the identification of giving with settling, the mechanism by which a return to a giver is erased, and the reason a child cannot answer the sentence that states the position.

13.1 The Position That Has Become a Person

13.1.1 The Grammar of the Giving Role

Certain roles place a party at the giving end and keep him there. The parent is the case this book concerns; the physician, the teacher, the carer, and the several professions organised around rescue are cases of the same structure (Hochschild, 1983), and §7.1.2 noted that the framework's account of a position applies to whoever occupies it rather than to a population.

What makes these positions distinctive is not that a great deal passes from one party to the other. That is true of many relations and it is true of every relation with an asymmetry, as §10.1.1 established. What is distinctive is that the direction is stipulated by the role. A parent is not someone who happens to be supplying more than he receives; he is someone whose relation is constituted as one in which he supplies. The role tells both parties in advance which way things go.

The identification this chapter requires can now be stated, and it follows from §10.1.1 rather than being added to it.

To give, in a relation with an asymmetry, is to settle. What a parent supplies is not only material: it is an account of what the situation is, what is needed, what will help, and what the other party requires. Supplying these settles them. §10.1.1 held that power is the fact that some matters are settled in one party's terms, and the giving role is a role in which the supplying

and the settling are one act. The parent who provides is thereby the parent who determines what provision consists in.

Proposition 13.1. *In a relation with an asymmetry, giving and settling are one operation described twice. A role that fixes a party at the giving end thereby fixes him at the settling end, and the fixing is a feature of the role rather than of anyone's conduct.*

Three consequences follow and they distinguish this position from the general case of §12.2.2.

The role supplies a description that resists examination. §12.2.2 described a position becoming a property of a person through the accumulation of occasions, and the description arrived at is of someone who knows how things are. Here the description arrived at is of someone who gives, and that description is admirable. An adult examining his own position finds a self-account that is both accurate and creditable, and there is nothing in it to prompt the examination further. §12.1.2 established that a household cannot determine its own state by introspection; the present case supplies an additional reason, which is that the introspection terminates in something the adult has no motive to look past.

The role converts costs into confirmations. §10.2.3 established that absorption is expensive and that the expense falls on the adult. In the giving role, expense is what the role consists in. An adult who finds the position costly is not thereby prompted to question it, since the cost is evidence that he is doing what the role requires. What would otherwise register as a strain registers as fidelity, and §10.2.2 recorded that a rate can fall without anyone noticing; here the noticing is actively displaced.

And the role makes the position difficult to vacate even temporarily. §10.2.1 held that absorption consists in surrendering the position from which settling is done. Where that position is what the role is, the surrender is not a local concession on a matter; it is a departure from what the adult is for. §12.2.2 established that sedimented standing makes absorption more expensive over time, and the giving role is the case in which the expense is highest, because the position and the person have been identified by the role itself rather than only by accumulation.

One clarification prevents the section from being read as a criticism of giving.

Nothing here holds that a parent should supply less, that the role is a mistake, or that a party who occupies it is thereby closed. §10.1.1 recorded that a young child requires that a great many matters be settled for him, and the giving role is how they are settled. What the section establishes is that the role has a structural property: it fixes a direction, it supplies a creditable self-description, and it makes what would open the position expensive in a way the occupant has no ordinary occasion to notice. Whether a given household's giver is closed is a separate question, and §12.1.2 established that it is not answerable by asking him.

13.1.2 The Erasure of the Return

§9.3.1 held that what bears on generation is whether what passes across an asymmetry moves in more than one direction. The giving role has a property that bears directly on this: what returns to a giver is systematically received in a form that cannot open his position.

Consider what a child supplies to a parent who occupies the position of §13.1.1. He supplies a great deal: attention, conduct, questions, difficulty, delight, an account of how things

seem to him. On the framework's terms each of these is a candidate for absorption, and §10.2.1 established that what may be absorbed is not primarily objections.

What the giving role does is supply a reading under which all of it becomes something else.

What returns to a giver is read as gratitude. A child who is pleased is a child who has received well. A child who does what was asked has responded to what was given. A child who says something that would otherwise alter an adult's account is a child expressing appreciation, or failing to, and either reading places what he supplied on the ledger of the giving rather than in the position of something that bears on it. §10.2.1 distinguished absorption from courtesy by whether the adult's account is exposed to what he is hearing; here what he is hearing has been pre-classified as a response to what he supplied, and a response to a gift is not a challenge to the account of the giver.

Proposition 13.2. *In a relation organised by a giving role, what the other party supplies is received as a response to what was given. So received, it is placed on the ledger of the giving and cannot expose the account of the giver, whatever its content.*

This is §12.2.2's closed loop with its specific mechanism supplied, and three features of the mechanism deserve statement.

The erasure is not selective. It operates on favourable and unfavourable returns alike. A child's gratitude confirms that the giving was right; a child's ingratitude confirms that the giving was necessary, since a party who does not appreciate what he has been given is a party who has not yet understood what he requires. §12.1.2 held that in the second household a disturbance is received as a further instance of what the account already covers, and the present case is that structure operating on the adult's account of himself rather than on his account of the child.

The erasure requires no interpretive effort. The reading is supplied by the role and not constructed on occasions. An adult is not deciding to treat what a child offers as gratitude; the role has already established what the relation consists in, and a return within that frame is legible only in the frame's terms. §11.1.1 described a cheap course that costs nothing to take and an expensive one; here the cheap course is the only one with a name.

And the erasure is compatible with the return being genuine and being noticed. An adult may be moved by what a child supplies, may say so, and may treasure it. What he cannot easily do is have his position altered by it, since the moving and the treasuring are themselves responses of a giver to what his giving produced. §11.2.2 held that nothing was taken and no act performed; here the analogous point is that nothing has been refused. The return arrives, is received, and does not reach.

Two observations complete the account.

The first concerns what would reach. §12.1.2 stated the criterion as what becomes of a disturbance, and the disturbance that would open a giving position is one that bears on the giving itself: an occasion on which what the adult supplied was not what was required, and the child's account of this alters the adult's account of what he had been doing. Such occasions exist and are not rare. What the mechanism above establishes is that the role supplies a reading of them too, under which a child who reports that what was given was not what he needed is a child who has not understood what he needs. ch. 15 treats the general form of a description

that governs the terms on which it could be refuted.

The second concerns why this chapter treats the case at length rather than as an instance. §12.1.1 held that the framework's utility turns on cases that cannot be reached from the extremes. The giving position is the extreme case of a household that is doing everything the available vocabulary asks of it. The adult supplies generously, the child is well provided for, the relation is warm, and nothing in it is withheld. §9.2.3 exhibited a household of this kind and §12.2.2 established that a closed loop is compatible with devotion. If the framework has anything to say that other accounts do not, this is where it must show, and ch. 90 must test whether it has.

13.2 The Sentence That States the Position

13.2.1 The Sentence as an Ontologized Position

A sentence occurs in households across every society in this book's coverage, in forms that differ verbally and agree in structure. Its content is that what the adult has done, he has done for the child.

The verbal forms should be given, since a discussion that named only one would suggest that the structure belongs to one setting. Anglophone households have several: the accounting of what was sacrificed, the recitation of what was worked for, the observation that everything was done for the children. Nordic and Northern European households, where the vocabulary of parental sacrifice is less used, carry the structure in the register of what was arranged, prioritised, or given up in order that a child should have what he has. East Asian households have the form most often quoted in the circulating literature, and its prominence there is a fact about which households have been written about rather than about which households produce the structure. §4.2 recorded the general form of this error, and §13.1.1 supplies the reason the structure is general: it follows from the giving role, and the giving role is not a cultural arrangement.

The sentence is worth examining because of what it does structurally, and it must be examined carefully, since the obvious reading of it is wrong and the wrong reading has been widely circulated.

The sentence is not a manipulation. Three things should be said before anything else is.

It is generally true. An adult who says that what he did, he did for a child has in most cases described his own conduct accurately. §13.1.1 established that the giving role fixes a direction, and an adult occupying it has in fact supplied a great deal at cost to himself. §10.2.3 established that the costs are real. A framework treating the sentence as a falsehood would be treating as false something the evidence supports.

It is generally sincere. The sentence is not, in the ordinary case, an instrument deployed to produce an effect. It is what an adult in the position of §12.2.2 arrives at when he considers what he has been doing, and §13.1.1 recorded that the self-description the role supplies is both accurate and creditable. An account attributing strategy to it misdescribes most instances of it.

And it is frequently said in distress. The sentence is most often uttered at a moment when the giving has not produced what was hoped, and it is a statement of bewilderment as much as of anything else. §13.1.2 established that what returns to a giver is read as a response to the

giving; the sentence is what that reading produces when the response is one the adult cannot make sense of.

What the sentence does structurally is a separate matter from all three, and it is the matter this book takes up.

The sentence states a position as the ground of everything that has passed. It does not defend a particular decision, explain a particular act, or answer a particular objection. It says that the whole of what the adult has done stands in a relation to the child's good, and it says this about the whole at once. §12.2.2 described a position becoming a property of the person occupying it; the sentence is that transformation given verbal form, since what it asserts is that the adult is one who acts for that reason rather than that certain acts were undertaken for a reason.

Proposition 13.3. *The sentence states the giving position as the ground of the relation's entire history. So stated, the history is not a set of acts each of which might be examined; it is a single thing with a single character, and no particular occasion within it stands separately.*

Three consequences follow.

The sentence makes the relation unanswerable all at once. An objection concerns an occasion: something that was done, or not done, on some particular matter. The sentence does not operate at the level of occasions, so an objection about an occasion does not meet it. §12.1.2 held that in an ossified relation a disturbance is received as an instance of what the account already covers, and the sentence supplies the account under which every occasion is an instance.

The sentence converts the ledger. §13.1.2 established that what a child supplies is placed on the ledger of the giving. The sentence states the ledger explicitly, and once stated, what the child might supply has a place assigned to it in advance. ch. 15 treats descriptions that govern the terms of their own refutation, and this sentence is the case in which the description is of the relation itself rather than of either party.

And the sentence is not weakened by being true. This is the feature that distinguishes the present analysis from an account of manipulation. A manipulation fails when exposed. The sentence is not exposed by being examined, because there is nothing in it that examination would find to be otherwise. §11.2.2 held that the adult who has stopped absorbing has performed no act; the corresponding point here is that the adult who says this sentence has stated no falsehood. What the sentence does, it does in virtue of what it is about rather than in virtue of any defect in it.

One matter must be stated plainly, since this subsection is the one most open to misuse.

Nothing here licenses treating an adult who says this sentence as having done something to a child. §9.3.2 recorded that this Part's argument is readily convertible into a justification, and the present subsection is convertible into an accusation, which is the same error in the other direction. The analysis is structural: it says what the sentence does in a relation, not what the person saying it is doing. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria by which a reader may identify a household as failing, and a reader who takes this subsection as supplying one has taken from it something it does not contain and that §13.2.2 makes harder still.

13.2.2 The Position of the Party Addressed

§13.2.1 described what the sentence does. This subsection asks what a party to whom it is addressed can do, and the answer differs according to who the party is. The difference is this chapter's re-derivation and it is performed here rather than deferred to the chapter's close.

Consider first an adult to whom such a sentence is addressed. The case is common: it occurs between adult children and parents, between spouses, and in professional relations where one party has borne the greater cost.

An adult can dispute the accounting. He can hold that what was given was not what was needed, that it was given for reasons that included the giver's own, that the cost was smaller than claimed, or that a benefit conferred does not settle a subsequent matter. Each of these is a move within an exchange, and each is available because the adult stands somewhere the exchange does not constitute. §7.1.1 named what supplies the standing: a relation, a history, or a setting maintaining an account of him that this relation does not govern. From there the sentence is a claim about a history, and a claim about a history is the kind of thing that can be assessed.

The adult may fail to prevail and the failure is not the point. What matters is that the sentence has been met with something, that the giver's account has been exposed to a competing account, and that the exposure is the operation §10.2.1 described. Whether the giver absorbs is a further question. The occasion existed.

Proposition 13.4. *An adult addressed by the sentence can dispute the accounting, because he stands in relations the accounting does not constitute and can therefore treat the history it asserts as a history rather than as the terms of his existence.*

The child's case is not this case with less capacity, and it must be stated as a distinct proposition.

The sentence, addressed to a young child, does not describe a transaction within his life. It describes the conditions of his life. What it says was done for him includes the arrangements under which he is fed, the setting in which he sleeps, the relations that maintain him, and the account of who he is by which he is known. §7.1.1 established that a young child has no prior description, no alternative setting, no exit, and no history to appeal to. Each of these is among the things the sentence claims to have been supplied.

To dispute the accounting would therefore require standing somewhere the accounting does not reach, and there is nowhere. A child who wished to say that what was given was not what he needed would be saying it from within an arrangement that the giving constitutes, in a vocabulary the arrangement supplied, to the party whose account of him is the only account there is. §7.2.1 established that refusal requires an account the description contradicts. Here the description is of the conditions under which he has any account at all.

Proposition 13.5. *The sentence addressed to a young child describes the conditions of his existence rather than a transaction within it. He cannot dispute the accounting, because disputing it would require a standpoint that the accounting claims to have supplied. This is a different proposition from the adult case and does not follow from it.*

Three consequences follow and they are what Part VI inherits.

The first concerns what the child does in its place. §7.1.1 held that what a relation supplies

is the material from which an account is made rather than a claim to be assessed. A child addressed by the sentence does not conclude that it is unanswerable; he has no occasion to entertain the question. What he acquires is a description of the relation under which everything in it is a gift, and §13.1.2 established what that does to whatever he might supply. ch. 15 treats what follows when a description of this scope is the one available.

The second concerns whether anything has gone wrong. Nothing in this subsection establishes that it has. §13.2.1 held that the sentence is generally true, and a description of the conditions of a child's existence which is accurate is not thereby a harm. What the propositions above establish is structural: that the sentence occupies a position from which it cannot be met, and that its unanswerability follows from the child's situation rather than from any feature of the sentence. Whether unanswerability costs a child anything is Part VI's question and §8.1.1 recorded that the book stands on it.

And the third concerns where a remedy could lie. §7.2.1 held that a remedy addressed to a party who cannot execute it is not a remedy. Nothing here can be addressed to the child. If anything is available it is on the adult's side, and §13.1.2 established that what would reach him is an occasion on which what he supplied was not what was required, together with a reading of that occasion which the giving role does not supply. ch. 77 inherits this and the inheritance is thin, since the role supplies the reading and the framework does not supply a means of suspending it.

One remark closes the section.

The two propositions above are stated separately because the difference between them is the whole of what Chapter 7 required. An account that treated the child's case as the adult's with less capacity would have written the second as a qualification on the first, and §7.2.1 recorded that a qualification is not a re-derivation. What distinguishes the cases is not how much the party can say. It is what the sentence is about: a passage in a life the party had independently of it, or the conditions under which he came to have a life at all.

13.3 The Close of the Part

13.3.1 The Findings of Part II

This Part set out to describe what happens to power in a relation constituted by asymmetry. Its results should be stated together, since each chapter's contribution was partial and the whole is what the Parts following will use.

Five things have been established.

Asymmetry is constitutive and its magnitude is the wrong variable. §9.1.1 held that a relation between parties alike in every relevant respect has no content. §9.1.2 held that asymmetry is several things varying independently, so there is no magnitude for a household to have more or less of. §9.3.1 supplied the variable that replaces it: whether what passes across the asymmetry moves in more than one direction.

Power is generated continuously and returned by an operation with a price. §10.1.1 defined power as the settling of matters in one party's terms and held that its generation cannot be stopped. §10.2.1 named absorption and distinguished it from courtesy, indulgence, and an adult's changing his mind. §10.2.3 established that the operation costs the adult his account,

uncommitted time, coherence with others, and standing.

The operation ceases without anyone deciding it should. §11.1.1 set out three routes and §11.1.2 established that the resulting state maintains itself, that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field, and that the household in it experiences nothing. §11.2.2 gave the formulation: an adult in whose household absorption has ceased has acquired nothing and has stopped surrendering.

Two households alike on every available measure may be in different states. §12.1.2 supplied the criterion, which is what becomes of a disturbance, and stated three difficulties with it that this Part has not resolved. §12.2.1 named the resulting condition and §12.2.2 described the corresponding hardening on the adult's side.

And the case in which all of this is hardest to see is the case of a household doing everything the available vocabulary asks. §13.1.1 identified giving with settling. §13.1.2 established that what returns to a giver arrives in a form that cannot reach him. §13.2.2 established that the sentence stating the position cannot be met by the party it constitutes.

Proposition 13.6. *Part II establishes that asymmetry generates power continuously, that an operation returns it at a price, that the operation ceases through routes requiring no decision, that the cessation maintains itself and is reported by no one, and that these are least visible where a household is most creditable.*

What has not been established should be stated with equal clarity, and it is more than a reader may expect.

Nothing in this Part shows that a child is worse off in a household where absorption has ceased. §12.2.1 said this plainly and §13.2.2 repeated it. The Part has produced a distinction, an account of what maintains each side of it, and a criterion that resists application. Whether anything turns on the distinction is the question ch. 30 and ch. 31 carry, and §8.3.1 recorded that a demonstration that the difference makes none would be the second most damaging finding against this book.

Nothing in this Part supplies a scale. §9.3.2 recorded the absence and §12.1.2 established that the criterion resists conversion into one for reasons internal to it. §8.1.1 required of the diagnostic Parts that they yield no instrument for ranking households, and this Part has met the requirement in the only way that counts, which is by producing something that could not be so used rather than by declining to use it.

And nothing in this Part has closed the normative gap. §9.3.2 recorded that the framework has no resources with which to hold that any arrangement is wrong in itself, and §7.3.1 established answerability without grounding it. ch. 42 carries this and the Parts between here and there proceed without it.

Two matters close the Part.

The first concerns what the Parts following will do with this material. ch. 15 and the Part containing it take up the descriptions themselves: how a description of a child governs the manner in which he is approached, what it does to the rules by which it could be refuted, and how it comes to be confirmed by what it produces. That Part inherits §12.1.2's account of a disturbance received as an instance and §13.2.2's account of a party who cannot dispute. The Part on the gaze takes up why a child requires confirmation at all, which this Part assumed without arguing. The Part on degradation is where the case is made or lost.

The second concerns how this Part should be read by anyone in the situations it describes. §9.3.2 warned that the argument is readily convertible into a justification and §13.2.1 warned that it is equally convertible into an accusation. Both conversions require taking a structural description as a verdict on a person, and §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria for such verdicts. What it supplies is a way of describing what happens to power in a relation where one party is being constituted. Whether that way of describing is worth having is the question ch. 90 puts, and this Part has done nothing to settle it beyond making the description available to be tested.

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Part III

The Symbol and the Child

Chapter 14

The Directions of Naming

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what a name does, and answers that it does something in two directions rather than one.

It opens the Part on symbols and supplies what the chapters following require. [Chapter 12](#) established that an account of a child may become unreachable and described the state; the present Part treats the descriptions themselves, and this chapter treats the moment at which one is applied. Its own contribution is the second direction: a name contracts what its object may be taken to be, and it contracts the language available to the party who applies it.

It does not treat how a name governs an adult's conduct, which is [ch. 15](#), nor how it governs the terms of its own refutation, which is [ch. 16](#). It does not hold that naming is avoidable, and [§14.1.1](#) states why nothing in the framework could support that.

The reader should carry forward the name as a settling that concerns a party rather than an occasion, the loss the namer sustains, and the argument that the name's efficiency is the mechanism of its effect rather than an incidental feature of it.

14.1 The Operation of a Name

14.1.1 The Name as a Settled Matter

[§10.1.1](#) held that what passes across an asymmetry settles something, and that the settling is what power consists in. A name is a settling of a particular kind, and the kind is what this subsection identifies.

Consider what is settled when an adult says of a child that he is shy, that he is difficult, that he is the responsible one, or that he is not a reader. Something has been closed. Before the naming, the question of what the child is with respect to this matter was open in the ordinary way, which is to say that occasions would have borne on it. Afterward the question has an answer, and the answer is held by the party the asymmetry favours.

Three features distinguish this from the settlings of [Chapter 10](#).

A name settles a party rather than an occasion. The settlings described in Part II concerned matters: what happened, what will be done, what a situation requires. Each was local, and each was exhausted by the occasion it settled. A name is not exhausted by any occasion, because its object is not an occasion. It is a standing answer to a question that will be put again.

A name is therefore available in advance. [§11.1.1](#) described the route by which accumulated settlings make further settling cheaper, and observed that a description in hand settles the next

ambiguous occasion at no cost. A name is the compact form of such a description. What Part II described as an accumulation, the present chapter describes as an act: naming does at once what the third route does over years.

And a name is portable. It can be stated to others, and stating it transfers it (Becker, 1963). §3.3.1 described how a way of describing travels and arrives where its origin is not visible; a name travels between adults in a household, between a household and a school, and between one setting and another, and §7.1.1 recorded that a child whose settings hold the same account of him has that account confirmed everywhere he goes.

Proposition 14.1. *A name settles a standing question about a party rather than a local question about an occasion. It is therefore available for settling occasions that have not yet arisen, and it is portable between the settings a child passes through.*

Two clarifications prevent the proposition from being read as more than it is.

Nothing here holds that naming is avoidable or that it should be avoided. §10.1.1 established that settling is what a relation with an asymmetry does and that a young child requires a great deal to be settled for him. Naming is among the operations by which adults conduct themselves toward children at all: a household in which no adult held any standing description of a child would be a household in which no adult had learned anything about him. §6.1.2 held that a stabilisation supports true description, and a name is frequently such a description. ch. 19 takes up what distinguishes names that remain answerable from those that do not, and the distinction is not that the first are absent.

And nothing here holds that names are inaccurate. §12.1.1 specified that the accounts held in both households of the framework's central pair are largely accurate, and the same specification governs this Part. A name may be an entirely correct summary of what a child has done and how he has been. The question this Part puts is what they do rather than whether names are true, and §14.1.2 takes up the first direction.

14.1.2 The Collapse of the Named

The first direction is the one accounts of labelling have described, and this subsection states what the framework adds to a description that is already available.

What a name does to its object is to contract the range of what the object may be taken to be. Before the naming, an occasion involving the child admitted of several readings; afterward one reading is supplied in advance and the others require work to reach. §12.1.2 described what becomes of a disturbance in a household where the account cannot be reached, and a name is the mechanism by which the account acquires that property with respect to a particular child.

Two things about this are established in the literature and should be granted before anything is added.

The contraction operates on the party doing the naming. A description held of a person alters what is noticed about him, what is recalled of him, and how ambiguous conduct is read. This is documented across a substantial experimental and observational literature (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Darley and Gross, 1983), and §11.1.2 recorded the mechanism in the form Part II required.

And the contraction is transmitted to the object. A person described in certain terms comes, over time and under certain conditions, to conduct himself in ways the description anticipates.

The literature on labelling in deviance and in schooling has established this for the cases it studied (Becker, 1963; Rist, 1970), and ch. 17 treats the mechanism at length.

What the framework adds concerns why the child's case is not the general case with a smaller subject.

§7.1.1 established that a young child has no prior description, no alternative setting, no exit, and no history to appeal to. Consider what each of these means for a name.

An adult who is named has been named before, by others, in other terms. The new name enters a field of existing ones and takes its place among them, and its taking a place among them is what makes it one description of him. A young child has no such field. §7.1.1 gave the formulation and it applies here directly: the name is not one account among several, it is the account, and there is nothing in the child's situation to make its singularity apparent to him.

An adult who is named in one setting is described otherwise in another, and the discrepancy is itself informative, since it establishes that description is a variable. A child whose settings are continuous receives the name in each of them, and §14.1.1 established that names are portable between settings. What an adult would experience as one party's view, the child experiences as how things are.

And an adult subject to a name he rejects can hold his own account against it, which §7.2.1 named among the operations a reserve supplies. §12.3.2 stated the replacement proposition for the child's case and it is the one this subsection needs: a child does not hold a competing account, because the name is among the materials from which his account of himself is being made.

Proposition 14.2. *A name applied to a subject with reserves is one description among those he is subject to. A name applied to a young child is a constituent of the account he is forming, and the difference is not one of degree.*

Two consequences follow.

The first concerns what the labelling literature can and cannot say about children. Its central finding is that a label alters conduct through the responses it produces, and this is correct. What the finding presupposes is a party who receives the label as a label: a person who has been described, who registers the description, and whose subsequent conduct is a response to being so described. §7.1.1 establishes that a young child is not in this position. The mechanism the literature describes therefore operates on him, and it does not exhaust what is happening, since what it treats as a response to a description is in his case also a constituent of the self that would be doing the responding.

The second concerns the sharpest version of the difficulty, which ch. 16 carries. A description a child cannot recognise as a description is one he cannot dispute, and §13.2.2 established the general form of this in the case of the sentence that states a position. Here it applies to a description of him: the child does not disagree with the name, and he is not persuaded by it either, since both would require standing where the name is a claim. §12.3.2 recorded the consequence, that ossification in the adult-child case produces a subject for whom the description is not the kind of thing that admits of disagreement.

One remark closes the subsection.

Nothing established here concerns harm. §14.1.1 recorded that names are frequently accurate and that a household without them would be one in which nothing had been learned.

What has been established is structural: the name occupies a different position in the child's situation than in an adult's, and the difference follows from the four lacks rather than from anything about names. Whether occupying that position costs a child anything is Part VI's question, and this Part supplies the mechanisms Part VI will need rather than the demonstration.

14.2 The Namer's Language

14.2.1 The Collapse of the Namer

The second direction is the one the accounts of §14.1.2 do not describe, and it is this chapter's contribution.

A name contracts what its object may be taken to be. It also contracts what the party who holds it is able to say, and the contraction is a loss sustained by the namer rather than inflicted on him or by him.

Consider what an adult must do in the absence of a name. A child behaves in some way that requires a response. Having no standing account of what the child is with respect to this matter, the adult must attend to the occasion: what happened, what preceded it, what the child seemed to want, what was different about today. The attending produces a description, and the description is of an occasion. It is laborious and it is specific.

Now consider the same adult with a name in hand. The occasion arises and the name answers it. §14.1.1 held that a name is a standing answer to a question that will be put again, and here the question is put and the answer is available. Nothing further is required, and the adult who requires nothing further does not produce a description of the occasion.

What follows is a loss and it is not the loss described in the preceding section.

Descriptions are maintained by being made. §6.1.2 held that a pattern not being maintained is being lost at a rate that may be slow, and the capacity to describe a particular child in particular terms is such a pattern. An adult who has not needed, for two years, to say anything more specific about a child than that he is shy has not merely refrained from saying it. He has lost the practice of assembling such descriptions of this child, and with the practice the vocabulary, and with the vocabulary the perceptual discriminations that the vocabulary sustained.

Proposition 14.3. *A name relieves its holder of the labour of describing the occasions it covers. The capacity to produce such descriptions is maintained by exercise, so a name held over time contracts what its holder is able to say about its object.*

Three features of this loss deserve statement, and the third is why no account requiring an agent can register it.

The loss is of a capacity rather than of information. The adult has not forgotten anything about the child and can report a great deal. What he cannot do is generate a description that the name does not already contain, and the two are not the same. §12.1.2 established that the framework's criteria concern what a relation makes possible rather than what it contains, and the present case is that distinction operating on a vocabulary.

The loss is unnoticed because nothing is missing. An adult in this position experiences no

difficulty, since every occasion that arises is answered. §2.6.2 recorded that a slow variable is invisible at the timescale on which the parties operate, and §12.2.2 recorded that an ossified account is experienced as knowing the child. Here the two combine: the adult knows his child, has an answer for everything the child does, and has had, for some years, no occasion on which the answer failed. Nothing in that experience contains an absence.

And the loss falls on the party who is generally taken to be the agent. §11.2.1 located the premise of the accounts that require an act, and observed that they cannot describe a household in which no act was performed. The present case is sharper. Here the party whom such an account would identify as the one who did something has himself lost something, by the same mechanism and at the same time, and no vocabulary of doing and being done to can state this. §11.2.2 held that an adult who has stopped absorbing has acquired nothing; the present subsection adds that he has also lost something, and that the two are one event described from two sides.

Two consequences follow.

The first concerns what the household loses. §1.27.10 holds that what develops includes the relation, the household's common knowledge, and its common practices. A contraction in what an adult can say about a child is a contraction in the household's common knowledge, since what a household knows about a child is held in what its members can say about him. §8.1.1 required that the diagnostic Parts show something is lost, and the present subsection identifies a candidate that is not a loss to the child at all.

The second concerns whether the loss is recoverable. §11.1.2 established that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field. The vocabulary case is the same: an adult who is prompted, years later, to describe a child in other terms is being asked to exercise a capacity that has not been exercised, and what he produces will be thin in a way he is unlikely to attribute to the naming. ch. 81 inherits this, and §7.2.1 constrains what it may say, since nothing here can be addressed to the child.

14.2.2 Efficiency as the Mechanism

The two preceding subsections described a contraction on each side. This one identifies what produces both, and the identification bears on what could be said about remedy.

A name is efficient. It answers occasions without the labour of description, it can be stated in three words, it can be transmitted to another adult in one sentence, and it is available at once whenever a matter arises. §11.1.1 established that where two courses are open and one costs less, the cheaper is taken without anyone choosing a policy. A name is the cheaper course made portable.

The efficiency is not incidental to what the name does. It is the mechanism.

Consider the counterfactual. A name that failed to answer occasions would be abandoned, since nothing would recommend it. A name that required as much labour to apply as a fresh description would confer no advantage and would not displace description. A name that could not be transmitted would not travel between settings, and §14.1.1 recorded that portability is among its features. In each case the property that makes the name useful is the property that produces the effects of §14.1.2 and §14.2.1. There is no version of a name that keeps the usefulness and loses the effects.

Proposition 14.4. *A name's effects follow from the properties that make it useful. A name that did not answer occasions cheaply would not be adopted, so no name can supply the economy without supplying what the economy consists in, which is the displacement of description.*

Three consequences follow and the second is the one that constrains this book's practical Parts.

The first is that the phenomenon has no defective instances. §13.2.1 established that the sentence examined there is not weakened by being true, and the parallel here is exact: a name is not weakened by being apt. The apter it is, the more occasions it answers, the more thoroughly it displaces the labour of describing them, and the more completely the capacity for such description contracts. §14.1.2 recorded that names are frequently accurate. The present proposition adds that accuracy aggravates rather than mitigates, and that this is a structural fact rather than a paradox.

The second is that no remedy can consist in better naming. An adult advised to use kinder names, more precise names, or provisional names is being advised to adopt something that will function as a name, and §14.1.1 established what a name does by being one. ch. 19 takes up whether any distinction among names survives this argument, and it is the Part's hardest question. What can be said here is that the distinction cannot be a matter of the name's content, since content is not what produces the contraction.

And the third is that the mechanism is not confined to households. §3.3.1 described a way of describing that arrives in a setting and becomes the way things are seen, and Chapter 3 traced the route by which developmental categories travel into instruments, records, and training. A diagnostic category, a reading level, a behavioural classification: each is a name in the sense of §14.1.1, each is adopted because it answers occasions economically, and each displaces the descriptions its users would otherwise have had to make. ch. 76 inherits this in its sharpest form, since the instruments this book has criticised are instruments for producing names at scale.

One matter is worth stating before the chapter closes, since the argument invites a conclusion it does not support.

Nothing here holds that a household should describe more and name less. The labour that naming displaces is real labour, §10.2.3 established that adults differ in what they can afford, and §5.2.2 established that the time such labour requires is the scarcest kind in most contemporary arrangements. An adult who names is doing what the conditions permit. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no instructions, and the present subsection is a case where the description of a mechanism and any recommendation that might be drawn from it come apart entirely: the mechanism operates, and what follows for what anyone should do is not settled by its operating.

14.3 The Bearing on What Follows

This chapter has described what a name is and what it does in each direction. The Part's remaining chapters take up what a name does once it is in place, and setting out the division tells a reader what each is answerable for.

Five things pass forward.

The governing of approach passes to ch. 15. §14.2.1 established that a name relieves its

holder of the labour of describing occasions. What it does to his conduct on those occasions is a further matter: a name settles how the adult goes into it rather than only how an occasion is read, what he expects, what he attends to, and what he does before anything has happened. That chapter treats the adult's conduct as its object and inherits the present chapter's account of why the conduct requires no decision.

The governing of refutation passes to [ch. 16](#). [§14.1.2](#) recorded that a child does not disagree with a name and is not persuaded by it, and [§12.3.2](#) supplied the underlying proposition. What remains is to describe the structure by which a name fixes what would count as evidence against it before any evidence arrives. That chapter carries the heaviest inheritance from Part II and it is where this Part's argument is most exposed.

The self-realisation passes to [ch. 17](#). [§14.1.2](#) granted that a description is transmitted to its object and that the literature has established this for the cases it studied. [§11.1.2](#) recorded that the confirmation a description receives is real. That chapter treats what the conduct of [ch. 15](#) produces in the world, and its object is neither the adult nor the child but what happens between them, so it is not a restatement of either.

The favourable case passes to [ch. 18](#). [§12.2.1](#) established that ossification is not confined to unflattering accounts and named the child held to be gifted. [§14.2.2](#) established that aptness aggravates. The chapter on names that admit rather than deprive inherits both, and it is the case in which nothing looks like harm.

And the question of whether any distinction among names survives passes to [ch. 19](#). [§14.2.2](#) fixed one constraint on its answer: the distinction cannot lie in the name's content, since content does not produce the contraction. That chapter must find the difference elsewhere or concede that there is none.

Proposition 14.5. *This chapter establishes what a name is and what it contracts on each side. It does not describe what a name does to conduct, to the rules of its own refutation, or to what occurs between the parties, and it supplies no distinction between names.*

Two matters close the chapter, and the first is the re-derivation it owes.

[§7.2.1](#) requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available or replaced. The proposition here concerns what a party does with a name applied to him. In the corpus, and in the labelling literature [§14.1.2](#) granted, a named party may accept the name, resist it, or perform it ironically, and each of these is a stance taken toward a description recognised as one. [§7.1.1](#) establishes that a young child takes no stance, since a stance requires a standpoint.

The replacement proposition is this. Where a name is applied to a young child, it is received as incorporated into what he has to go on in forming any description at all. The consequence is that the vocabulary of acceptance and resistance does not apply, and that an account asking whether a child has internalised a label has posed a question that presupposes the label and the child were separately there to begin with. [ch. 17](#) inherits this and must state its account without that presupposition.

The second matter concerns what this chapter has contributed. [§8.1.1](#) required that the diagnostic Parts show something is lost and that the loss not be a renaming of what other vocabularies already state. The labelling literature states the first direction, and this chapter has granted it rather than claiming it. The second direction is not stated there, and [§14.2.1](#)

identified a loss that falls on the adult, is invisible to him, and is unavailable to any account that requires an agent, since the party who would be the agent is among those who sustain it. Whether that loss matters is Part VI's question. That it is not a renaming is this chapter's claim, and [ch. 90](#) will test it.

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Chapter 15

The Symbol's Governance of Approach

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what a name does to an adult's conduct before an occasion has occurred.

It contributes the first of the three mechanisms this Part traces. [Chapter 14](#) established what a name is and what it contracts on each side; the present chapter treats what the holder of a name does with it, and its object is the adult's conduct rather than his account. [ch. 16](#) then treats what the name does to the terms on which it could be disputed, and [ch. 17](#) treats what the conduct produces.

It does not claim that the conduct it describes is deliberate, and [§15.3](#) argues that the party exercising the governance experiences responsiveness. It does not establish that anything is lost, which Part VI carries.

The reader should carry forward the approach as an act prior to the occasion, the four respects in which a name governs it, and the reason the fourth of these leaves no trace that any instrument records.

15.1 The Approach as an Act

15.1.1 The Priority of the Approach

An account of what an adult does with a child ordinarily begins with an occasion. Something happens, the adult responds, and the response is what there is to describe. This subsection argues that the description begins too late.

Consider what is already in place when an occasion arises. An adult entering a room where a child is working has, before he has seen anything, an expectation of what he will find. He has an orientation toward the child's activity: whether it is going well, whether it requires supervision, whether it is the kind of thing this child sustains. He has a readiness to intervene or a readiness to leave alone. He has a set of things he will notice and a set he will pass over. None of this was produced by the occasion, since the occasion has not yet been encountered.

This is what the term approach names in what follows. An approach is the orientation with which a party enters an occasion: what he attends to, what he anticipates, what he has prepared, and what he has already excluded from consideration.

Three features of the approach make it a distinct object of description.

The approach is prior to the occasion and therefore cannot be a response to it. Whatever the occasion turns out to contain, the orientation was in place beforehand. [§10.1.1](#) held that a settling closes a matter that was open; the approach settles what kind of occasion this will be

treated as, and it settles it before the occasion has supplied anything to settle it with.

The approach is not a belief and is not held propositionally. An adult asked what he expects can give an answer, and the answer will be a rationalisation of something that was not held in that form. §6.1.2 held that a pattern is maintained by what happens rather than by anyone's intention, and an approach is such a pattern: a regularity in how a party enters occasions of a certain kind, sustained by his having entered many of them (Bourdieu, 1990).

And the approach is what a name most directly governs. §14.1.1 held that a name is a standing answer to a question that will be put again. The question is put at the moment of approach, before anything has happened, and the name is what answers it. §14.2.1 established that the name relieves its holder of the labour of describing an occasion; the present chapter adds that it also relieves him of the labour of arriving at an occasion without an orientation.

Proposition 15.1. *An approach is the orientation with which a party enters an occasion, and it is in place before the occasion supplies anything. It is therefore not a response to what occurs and cannot be described by an account that begins with what occurs.*

Two consequences follow and the second bears on what this Part can hope to establish.

The first is that the approach is what the parties actually meet in. A child does not encounter an adult's account of him, which is held privately and stated rarely. He encounters the manner in which the adult comes toward him: the tone of the first question, whether help is offered before it is asked for, whether an explanation is given or assumed to be unnecessary, whether the adult sits down or remains standing. §14.1.2 held that a name is a constituent of the account a child is forming; the present observation locates where the constituent reaches him. It reaches him as conduct rather than as description.

The second is that the approach is difficult to observe and is not what observational instruments record. An instrument coding parental behaviour records what an adult did on an occasion (Ainsworth et al., 1978): whether he praised, whether he intervened, how he responded to a bid. Each of these is a response, and §15.1.1 has argued that responses are downstream of something the coding does not reach. Two adults may respond identically and have approached differently, and §15.2.2 argues that the difference is visible chiefly in occasions that did not occur.

15.1.2 The Approach and the Account

The relation between an adult's approach and his account of the child should be stated, since the two have been treated separately and the difference matters for what follows.

§12.1.2 made the criterion of the preceding Part turn on what becomes of a disturbance to an account. An account is a thing a party holds: it can be stated, it can be exposed to what a child supplies, and it can be altered. §10.2.1 defined absorption as its alteration and established that the operation is visible in a sequence.

An approach is not held in that way, and three differences follow.

An approach cannot be stated by the party who has it. He can state his account and will do so accurately. What he cannot do is report the orientation with which he entered a room, since the orientation was the condition of his entering rather than an object of his attention within it. This is not a failure of candour. §12.2.2 established that a party may occupy a position without the position being available to him as a position.

An approach is not exposed by what the child supplies in the way an account is. §12.1.2 held that a disturbance either reaches the account or is received as an instance. An approach is not in the path of that operation at all: whatever the child supplies, he supplies it into an occasion the approach has already shaped, so what arrives has already passed through the orientation before it can bear on anything. ch. 17 treats what this does to the evidence.

And an approach may persist after an account has been revised. An adult who has genuinely altered what he holds about a child, in the manner §10.2.1 describes, may continue for a long period to enter occasions as he entered them before. The revision was an event and the approach is a practice, and §11.1.2 established that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field. ch. 81 inherits this, and it is among the reasons that chapter cannot describe repair as restoration.

Proposition 15.2. *An account is held and can be exposed and altered. An approach is practised and is not in the path of what would expose it. An account may therefore be revised while the approach it produced continues.*

One remark closes the section.

Nothing above holds that approaches are unalterable or that the distinction between account and approach is a counsel of despair. §10.2.2 established that a rate can rise as well as fall, and what alters an approach is presumably the accumulation of occasions entered differently rather than a revision of what is held. What the distinction establishes is that the two do not move together and that the second lags. ch. 77 inherits the consequence, and §8.2.1 constrains what it may make of it.

15.2 The Governance

15.2.1 The Governed Respects

A name governs an approach in four respects. Three of them leave a trace and are treated here; the fourth does not and is treated separately, since what follows from its leaving none is the chapter's principal claim.

The first respect is attention. §14.1.2 granted that a description held of a person alters what is noticed about him, and the granting was of a documented finding. What the present chapter adds is where the alteration operates. It operates before the occasion, in the form of a readiness to register certain things and to pass over others, so that what an adult subsequently notices is not selected from what occurred. It is what the occasion supplied to a party already looking for it. An adult who holds that a child is careless enters a room prepared to see carelessness, and the preparation is not a bias in his judgement of what he sees. It is a condition on what reaches judgement at all.

The second respect is anticipation. An adult approaches an occasion braced or unbraced, and the difference is legible to the other party before anything is said. §15.1.1 held that a child encounters the approach rather than the account, and anticipation is the component of the approach that is hardest to conceal: it is carried in posture, in the interval before speaking, in what is said first. A child who is approached with the expectation that this will go badly is in a different situation from one approached without it, and he is in that situation before he has

done anything.

The third respect is preparation. An adult who holds a name has readied a response in advance. The intervention is formulated, the explanation is available, the correction is at hand. §14.2.1 established that a name relieves its holder of the labour of describing an occasion, and preparation is the correlate: the response requires no formulation either, since it was formulated before the occasion arose. What the adult brings is a response rather than a disposition to respond in a certain way, already made.

Proposition 15.3. *A name governs what an adult is ready to notice, what he anticipates, and what response he has prepared. Each of these is in place before the occasion and each conditions what the occasion can supply to him.*

Two observations bear on how these three should be understood.

The first is that none of them is a distortion of perception. §12.1.1 specified that the accounts at issue in this book are largely accurate, and the specification governs here. An adult prepared to see carelessness in a child who is careless will see carelessness and will be right. The three respects above do not produce error. They produce a particular relation between the adult and the occasion, in which what the occasion contains is met by something formed before it, and the meeting has the same character whether the name is apt or not. §14.2.2 established that aptness aggravates rather than mitigates, and the present observation is that proposition applied to conduct.

The second is that all three are ordinary and are, in most respects, what competence consists in. An adult who could not anticipate, could not prepare, and had no readiness to notice anything would be an adult meeting each occasion as though he had never met the child. §15.3 takes up what distinguishes governance from competence, and states why the distinction is harder to draw than the argument so far suggests.

15.2.2 The Unmade Approach

The fourth respect is what the name forecloses, and it differs from the other three in leaving nothing behind.

An adult who holds that a child does not read does not offer him the book. An adult who holds that a child cannot be trusted with the task does not set the task. An adult who holds that a child will not want to come does not ask. In each case an occasion that might have occurred does not occur, and what did not occur is governed by the name as completely as anything that did.

Three features of this respect distinguish it from the preceding three.

It has no behavioural trace. §15.1.1 recorded that an instrument coding parental behaviour records what an adult did on an occasion. An occasion that did not arise supplies no behaviour to code, and there is no record anywhere of the conversation not started, the task not offered, the question not asked. §5.5.1 recorded that no widely used instrument measures whether a child's account can alter an adult's; the present case is more severe, since the thing to be measured is the absence of an event that has no observed counterpart rather than a property of an observed event.

It is invisible to both parties. The adult did not decline to offer the book; the offering did not present itself as an option to be declined. §11.1.1 established that the cheaper course is

taken without anyone choosing a policy, and the foreclosed occasion is the limiting case: there was no course to take. The child, for his part, has not been refused anything, since nothing was proposed. §7.1.1 established that he has no standpoint from which to observe what is not happening, and a child cannot notice the absence of an occasion he has never had.

And it removes the occasions on which the name would have been tested. This is the feature that connects the present respect to the argument of Chapter 12. §12.1.2 made the criterion of that chapter turn on what becomes of a disturbance, and stated the asymmetry of evidence: one occasion of exposure establishes the capacity, and no number of undisturbed occasions establishes its absence. The foreclosed occasion is where the asymmetry acquires its mechanism. A name that forecloses the occasions on which it might have been disturbed is not maintained against disturbance. It has arranged that the disturbances do not arise.

Proposition 15.4. *A name forecloses occasions that would have occurred without it. The foreclosure leaves no behavioural trace, is not experienced as a refusal by either party, and removes the occasions on which the name would have been exposed.*

Two consequences follow and the first is what this Part contributes to the book's central case.

§8.1.1 required of the diagnostic Parts that they show something is lost and that the loss not be a renaming of what is otherwise sayable. The foreclosed occasion is the strongest candidate this book has produced. What is lost is not a state of the child, not a quantity anyone holds, and not an event that anyone could report; it is a set of occasions that would have been available and were not, and no vocabulary in the survey of Chapter 1 contains a term for it. §8.3.1 recorded that a demonstration that the framework's descriptions are available without it would be the most damaging finding against this book. Here is a description that is not.

The second consequence is a difficulty and it is severe. A claim about occasions that did not occur is a claim about a counterfactual, and §12.1.2 established the three difficulties that follow: no introspective access, resistance to instrumentation, and asymmetric evidence. The present case adds a fourth. There is no fact of the matter about which occasions a name foreclosed, since the occasions are individuated only by the description that says what would have happened, and §1.25.3 established that a redescription is always available. ch. 70 inherits this and must say whether anything can be done with a claim of this form. ch. 89 must record it if nothing can.

One remark closes the section.

The foreclosed occasion is where this Part's argument is at once strongest and least defensible, and the two are the same property. It is strongest because nothing else in the available vocabulary picks it out. It is least defensible because what picks it out cannot be brought into contact with evidence in the way a claim about an event can. §6.3.2 held that a permission is displaced by showing that what it picks out was already sayable, and is not refuted by the difficulty of applying it. On that standard the present claim stands. Whether that standard is enough is a question this book has raised against itself in §1.26.3 and has not answered.

15.3 The Adult's Position

15.3.1 The Experience of Responsiveness

The governance described in §15.2 is not experienced by the party exercising it as governance. This subsection says what it is experienced as, and the answer bears on every practical chapter of this book.

An adult whose approach is governed by a name experiences himself as responsive. He is attending to what is salient about this child, anticipating what this child is likely to do, and having ready what this child is likely to need. Each of these is a description of attentiveness, and each is accurate as a description of what he is doing.

What produced the salience is the name, and this is not available to him. §15.1.1 established that an approach is not held propositionally and that a party asked to state it will supply a rationalisation. The rationalisation will be in terms of the child: he is like this, so I do that. The order of explanation runs the other way, and §12.2.2 described the general form of such a reversal.

Proposition 15.5. *A governed approach is experienced as responsiveness to the child. The experience is accurate as a report of what the adult is doing and inverts the order of explanation, since what he is responding to was made salient by the name he is confirming.*

Three consequences follow.

The first is that the adult's testimony cannot settle the question. §12.1.2 established that a household cannot determine its own state by introspection, and the present subsection supplies the reason in the case of conduct. An adult asked whether he approaches his child in the terms of a fixed description will answer that he responds to the child as he finds him, and will answer sincerely, since that is what the approaching feels like from inside it.

The second is that the closed loop of §12.2.2 operates at the level of conduct as well as of standing. There the mechanism was that each occasion on which an adult's account prevailed confirmed that his account was the one that prevailed. Here it is that each occasion on which an adult's anticipation is met confirms the anticipation, and ch. 17 establishes that the meeting is frequently produced by the anticipating. The adult acquires evidence continuously and the evidence is real.

And the third is that no reproach is available. §11.2.2 held that an adult in whose household absorption has ceased has performed no act, and the same holds here with an addition: not only has he performed no act, he has performed the acts that any account of good practice would recommend. He attended, anticipated, and prepared. §11.2.1 recorded that accounts requiring an agent cannot describe such a case, and the present one is further from their reach than the case that chapter treated.

15.3.2 Governance and Competence

The difficulty this chapter has been approaching can now be stated. Everything described in §15.2 is also a description of an adult who knows his child, and the book owes an account of the difference or a concession that it cannot yet draw one.

The difficulty is not that the two look similar. It is that the same conduct instantiates both. An adult who has learned, over years, that this child needs a moment before being asked anything, and who therefore waits, is approaching the occasion with an orientation formed in

advance. So is an adult who has learned that this child is difficult and who therefore braces. The description of §15.1.1 covers both, and neither is a distortion.

Three candidate distinctions are available and the first two fail.

The first candidate is accuracy. It fails for the reason §14.2.2 gave: aptness aggravates. An accurate name governs an approach more thoroughly than an inaccurate one, since it answers more occasions and is disturbed by fewer. §12.1.1 specified that both households of the framework's central pair hold accurate accounts. Accuracy does not divide the cases.

The second candidate is content. It fails for the reason §14.2.2 fixed as a constraint on ch. 19: what produces the contraction is not what the name says. An adult who waits and an adult who braces are governed alike, and the difference in what they hold is a difference in the child's experience without being a difference in the structure. §12.2.1 established the parallel point, that ossification is not confined to unflattering accounts.

The third candidate is the one this book must use, and it is §12.1.2's criterion applied to approach rather than to account. The question is what becomes of an occasion that does not fit. An adult whose orientation is competence enters prepared and is met by something the preparation did not anticipate, and the occasion proceeds differently from there: the preparation is set aside, the attention goes to what is actually happening, and what he learns enters the orientation with which he next approaches. An adult whose orientation is governed by a name is met by the same unanticipated thing and the occasion does not proceed differently, since §12.1.2 established that what does not fit is received as an instance of what the account already covers.

Proposition 15.6. *Governance and competence are not distinguished by the accuracy of what the adult holds, nor by its content, but by what becomes of an occasion the orientation did not anticipate. The distinction is the criterion of §12.1.2 applied to conduct.*

Two difficulties with this answer should be stated, since it is the book's answer and not a provisional one.

The first is that it inherits every difficulty of the criterion it applies. §12.1.2 recorded three: no introspective access, resistance to instrumentation, asymmetric evidence. §15.2.2 added a fourth peculiar to this chapter, that the foreclosed occasion has no counterpart to be observed. An account of the difference between governance and competence that turns on what would happen to an unanticipated occasion is an account that cannot be applied by the parties or by an observer, and ch. 70 carries the whole of the problem.

The second is that the distinction is not a distinction between adults. §12.2.1 established that ossification admits of scope, and the same holds here. An adult may be governed with respect to one description of a child and competent with respect to others, and the same adult may be governed in one period and not in another as the conditions of §11.1.1 vary. Nothing in this chapter licenses sorting adults into the responsive and the governed, and §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria for such sorting.

One remark closes the section.

The concession this subsection makes is larger than it may appear. This chapter has described a mechanism, established that it operates before occasions and forecloses some of them, and identified what would distinguish it from ordinary competence. It has not supplied a means of telling which is occurring in any actual case, and §15.3.1 established that the

party best placed to report is the party least able to. §8.1.1 required that the diagnostic Parts show something is lost. What this chapter shows is what would have to be looked at. ch. 30 and ch. 31 must show that looking there finds something.

15.4 The Bearing on What Follows

This chapter has described what a name does to conduct before an occasion arises. What it has not described is what the conduct does, and the two chapters following divide that question between them.

Three things pass forward.

The production of evidence passes to ch. 17. §15.2.1 established that an adult approaches prepared to notice certain things, braced or unbraced, with a response formulated. §15.3.1 established that each occasion on which the anticipation is met confirms it. What the chapter has not shown is that the anticipating produces the meeting, and that is the claim ch. 17 must make good. Its object is what occurs between the parties rather than what either brings, and the present chapter supplies the mechanism by which the adult's side of it is in place beforehand.

The structure of refutation passes to ch. 16. §15.2.2 established that a name forecloses the occasions on which it would have been disturbed, which is one route by which a name escapes testing. The other route is that occasions arise and what they supply is read in terms the name has already fixed. §12.1.2 described that as a property of an account; the chapter following describes it as a structure with rules, and it inherits from §14.1.2 the observation that a child neither disagrees with a name nor is persuaded by it.

And the criterion passes to ch. 19. §15.3.2 established that the difference between governance and competence lies in what becomes of an unanticipated occasion, and §14.2.2 had already fixed that it cannot lie in content. The chapter closing this Part must say whether any distinction among names follows from this, given that the criterion is a property of what happens afterward rather than of the name itself.

Proposition 15.7. *This chapter establishes that a name governs an approach in four respects and that the fourth leaves no trace. It does not establish that the governed approach produces what it anticipates, does not describe the rules by which the name is protected from refutation, and supplies no distinction among names.*

Two matters close the chapter, and the first is the re-derivation.

§7.2.1 requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available in this case or replaced. The proposition here concerns what a party does when he is approached in a fixed manner. In the corpus, a party subject to such an approach may register it: he may notice that he is being handled, braced against, or managed, and the noticing is possible because he has been approached otherwise elsewhere. §7.1.1 named the condition, that a subject who is regarded differently in different places has evidence that regard is a variable.

The replacement proposition is this. Where a young child is approached in a manner governed by a name, he does not register the manner, because a manner is registered by contrast and he has no contrasting case. What he acquires in its place is a sense of what occasions of this kind are like, and §15.1.1 established that the approach is what he encounters rather than

the account. The consequence is that the governance reaches him as a property of the world rather than as a property of an adult. [ch. 17](#) inherits this and [ch. 16](#) inherits its sharper form, since a child who takes an approach for the world has nothing to which the approach could be compared.

The second matter concerns what this chapter has contributed to the Part. [Chapter 14](#) established what a name is and what it contracts. This chapter has located where the contraction operates on conduct, and has produced in [§15.2.2](#) the book's strongest candidate for something the available vocabulary does not contain. [§15.2.2](#) also recorded that the candidate is the least defensible thing in the Part, for the same reason that makes it the strongest. That is not a comfortable result and it is the honest one. [§8.3.1](#) listed the five things that would count against this book, and a reader who concludes that a claim about occasions which did not occur is a claim about nothing has reached the second of them by a route this chapter has laid out itself.

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Chapter 16

The Symbol's Governance of Refutation

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what would be required to refute a name, and answers that the name has settled the requirements in advance.

It contributes what this Part takes to be the more fundamental of the two governances.

Chapter 15 described what a name does to conduct before an occasion; the present chapter describes what it does to the terms on which it could be disputed, and the priority is that a name governing its own refutation is protected whatever conduct produces. It inherits the heaviest debts of Chapter 12, and §16.3 discharges the last of them.

It does not describe how the evidence is produced, which is ch. 17. It does not hold that adults arrange these rules, and §16.2.2 states why the mechanism requires no one to have devised anything.

The reader should carry forward the three rules, the three operators by which they are applied, and the argument that a child's refutation fails for structural reasons rather than for want of articulacy.

16.1 The Structure of Refutation

16.1.1 The Requirements of Refutation

A name is a claim about a party, and claims are ordinarily open to being shown wrong. This subsection sets out what showing a name wrong would involve, so that the following sections can identify which of the requirements a name itself supplies.

Three things are required to refute a claim of this kind.

There must be an agreed sense of what would count as evidence against it. A claim that a child is careless is refuted by instances of care, and the parties must agree that instances of care are what bear on it. Where they do not agree, evidence can be produced indefinitely without the claim being touched.

There must be a rule governing what an exception means. Any general claim about a person admits of exceptions, and every party knows it. What matters is whether an exception is taken to reduce the claim's standing or to leave it intact. A claim under which exceptions leave it intact is not thereby false (Popper, 1959), since a great many true claims about people have that character. It is a claim that instances cannot reach.

And there must be a standing for the disputant. The party offering the refutation must be one whose offering counts as an offering. §5.5.1 distinguished whether a child is asked from whether the asking has consequence, and the present requirement is that distinction appearing

in the structure of dispute: a party whose contribution is received as something other than a contribution has not disputed anything, whatever he has said.

Proposition 16.1. *Refuting a claim about a party requires an agreed sense of what bears on it, a rule under which exceptions reduce its standing, and a disputant whose contribution counts as a contribution. Each is a condition on the dispute rather than a move within it.*

Two observations follow and the second states the chapter's thesis.

The first is that these requirements are ordinarily met without anyone attending to them. Between adults who differ about a third party, the sense of what bears on the question is shared, exceptions are taken to count, and each party's contribution is received as a contribution. The requirements become visible only where one of them fails, and their ordinary invisibility is why an account of dispute that begins with the exchange of reasons describes only the part above the surface.

The second is that a name in a household supplies all three itself. This is the chapter's thesis and the sections following establish it. The name fixes what would count as evidence against it, since it is the description under which occasions are read. It fixes what an exception means, since the reading of an exception is part of what the name supplies. And it bears on the standing of the disputant, since the disputant most likely to offer a refutation is the party the name is about, and §14.1.2 established that the name is a constituent of his account of himself.

16.1.2 The Priority of This Governance

Why this governance is the more fundamental of the two should be stated, since the argument places it first and the Part treats it second.

Chapter 15 described a name shaping what an adult attends to, anticipates, prepares, and forecloses. Each of these could in principle be interrupted by an occasion. An adult prepared to see one thing may be confronted with another, and §15.3.2 made the difference between governance and competence turn on what becomes of such an occasion.

The present governance operates on that very question. A name that settles what an unanticipated occasion means has settled what becomes of it, and the criterion of §15.3.2 is therefore not independent of the name. Where the rules of refutation are governed, an occasion that does not fit is not an occasion that tests the name, since what it is taken to show is fixed before it arrives.

Proposition 16.2. *The governance of approach may be interrupted by an occasion that does not fit. The governance of refutation settles what such an occasion is taken to show, and therefore operates on the condition under which the first could be interrupted.*

Two consequences follow.

The first is that a name protected in this way requires no particular conduct to sustain it. §15.2.1 described attention, anticipation, and preparation, and an adult might be argued out of any of them. He might resolve to notice more, to brace less, to prepare nothing. None of this touches the rules by which what he then notices is read, and §15.3.1 established that the reading is not available to him as a reading.

The second is that this is where the two households of §12.1.1 differ. That subsection stated that the difference is in what becomes of a disturbance and §12.1.2 supplied the criterion. The

present chapter identifies the machinery: a household in the second state has rules under which disturbances are read, the rules are supplied by the descriptions it holds, and no disturbance reaches the description because the description says what disturbances are. §12.3.2 recorded that this produces a subject for whom the description is not the kind of thing that admits of disagreement, and §16.3 establishes it.

16.2 The Operators

16.2.1 The Readings of a Discrepant Occasion

An occasion arises that does not fit the name. The name supplies three readings under which it fails to count, and the readings are not alternatives to one another. Each applies to a different kind of discrepancy and between them they cover the field.

The first reading applies where the child has done well and the name says he does not. The occasion is read as unusual: this time he managed it, today was a good day, on this occasion he was able to. The reading is not a denial of what occurred, and it does not understate the achievement, which is frequently acknowledged warmly. What it does is locate the occasion outside the range the name describes, so that the name continues to describe the range and the occasion continues to be an exception. §16.1.1 held that refutation requires exceptions to reduce a claim's standing. Under this reading they do not, since being an exception is what has been said of them.

The second reading applies where the child has done as the name says. The occasion is read as confirmation, and what distinguishes this reading is a small addition: the occasion was expected. To read an occasion as confirming what was anticipated is to treat the anticipating as having been warranted, and §15.3.1 established that the adult acquires evidence continuously in this manner and that the evidence is real. §11.1.2 established that the description accumulates confirmation rather than staleness. This reading is the mechanism.

The third reading applies where the child objects to the name. The objection is read as a further instance of what the name describes, and this reading is the one that closes the structure. A child told that he is careless who protests that he is not has, on this reading, failed to take the matter seriously (Watzlawick et al., 1967). A child told that he is difficult who says the description is unfair is being difficult. A child told that he is lazy who explains what he was doing is making excuses. In each case the content of the objection is not examined, since the form of the objection has already been assigned a meaning by the name it objects to.

Proposition 16.3. *A name supplies three readings of a discrepant occasion: as an exception outside the range described, as expected confirmation, and, where the discrepancy takes the form of an objection, as a further instance of what is described. The three cover the field of what a discrepancy can be.*

Two features of the three readings should be marked.

The first is that each is frequently correct. A child who does well on one occasion may indeed have had a good day; a child who does as expected may indeed be as described; a child who protests may indeed be doing what the name says. §12.1.1 specified that the accounts at issue are largely accurate and the specification governs here. What is at issue is that they

are supplied in advance rather than that the readings are false, and §14.2.2 established that aptness aggravates.

The second is that the third reading is the one with no counterpart in the adult case. An adult who objects to a description of himself may be told that his objecting proves the point, and the telling is available. What is not available in the adult case is that the objection has nowhere else to go: §7.1.1 established that an adult may take the same objection elsewhere, to a party not governed by this description, and §7.2.1 established that a child's appeal within continuous settings returns the description it appealed against.

16.2.2 The Undevised Character of the Rules

Nothing in the preceding subsection requires that anyone have arranged it, and this should be established rather than asserted, since the three readings can be made to sound like a strategy.

No adult decides the readings. §15.3.1 established that a governed approach is experienced as responsiveness and that the party cannot report the orientation with which he entered an occasion. The readings operate at the same level. An adult who receives a good performance as unusual is not selecting among available interpretations; the occasion arrives already read, and what he could report afterward is that this time it went well.

The readings are not applied consistently and need not be. §12.2.1 established that ossification admits of scope, and an adult may read a child's objection as further evidence on one matter while receiving it as an objection on another. The structure described here is a structure of a name rather than of a person, and a household holds many names of which some are governed in this way and most are not.

And the readings are what any description does. This is the concession that keeps the chapter honest. A description under which nothing counted as an exception, everything counted as confirmation, and objections counted as evidence would be a description doing what descriptions do, since a description that could be overturned by any discrepant instance would be useless. §14.1.1 recorded that names are frequently accurate and §15.3.2 recorded that the three governed respects are what competence consists in. The same holds here.

Proposition 16.4. *The three readings require no party to have devised them, are not applied uniformly across a household's names, and are in themselves the ordinary operation of any description. What distinguishes the governed case is not their presence.*

What distinguishes the governed case must therefore be stated, and it is the criterion of §15.3.2 in its final form.

In the ungoverned case the three readings are available and are defeasible. An exception may be read as an exception, and on some occasion it is in its place read as showing that the name was too broad. A confirmation may be received as confirmation, and on some occasion it is in its place noticed that the confirmation was produced by the expecting. An objection may be read as an instance, and on some occasion the content of the objection is examined in its place. Each of these is a moment at which the name is exposed, and §12.1.2 held that exposure is the criterion.

In the governed case the readings are not defeasible, and the reason is that nothing outside them is available to defeat them. What would show that an exception is not an exception is a pattern of exceptions, and the exceptions are being read out of the pattern one at a time. What

would show that a confirmation was produced is a comparison with an occasion approached otherwise, and §15.2.2 established that such occasions are foreclosed. What would show that an objection had content is an examination of the content, and the third reading assigns the objection a meaning before its content is reached.

Proposition 16.5. *The governed case is distinguished by the readings being undefeatable, since what would defeat each of them is itself governed: the pattern of exceptions is dissolved one instance at a time, the comparison case is foreclosed, and the objection is assigned a meaning before its content is examined.*

One remark closes the section.

The structure described here is closed, and a reader may reasonably ask how anything ever changes. §10.2.2 established that a rate can rise as well as fall, and nothing in this book holds that a governed name is permanent. What the present section establishes is narrower: that the change does not come from within the structure, since every route by which evidence might reach the name has been shown to be governed. ch. 81 must say where it comes from in its place, and §7.2.1 constrains the answer, since it cannot come from the child.

16.3 The Child's Refutation

16.3.1 The Ground of Its Failure

The party most likely to dispute a name is the party it is about. This section establishes that a young child's dispute fails, that it fails structurally, and that the failure has nothing to do with how well he argues.

§16.1.1 named three requirements. Take them in turn for the child's case.

He cannot supply evidence that counts, because what counts is settled by the name and the first two readings of §16.2.1 dispose of what he supplies. Conduct that fits the name confirms it. Conduct that does not fit is an exception. There is no third category of conduct available to him, and §15.2.2 established that the occasions on which he might have produced something outside the range are foreclosed before they arise.

He cannot make an exception count, because making an exception count requires exhibiting a pattern, and a pattern is exhibited across occasions. §7.1.1 established that he has no history to appeal to. An adult in a comparable position says that this has been happening for months and that the description no longer fits; the saying requires a record and a standing to cite it. A child has neither, and §14.2.1 established that the adult's own capacity to describe the child in terms the name does not contain has been contracting over the same period.

And he cannot occupy the standing of a disputant, because the third reading has assigned his objection a meaning in advance. §16.2.1 set this out and §14.1.2 supplied the underlying condition: the name is a constituent of the account he is forming rather than a claim about an account he holds.

Proposition 16.6. *A child's refutation fails at each of the three requirements: what he supplies is disposed of by the readings, the pattern that would make an exception count cannot be exhibited by him, and his objecting has been assigned a meaning before its content is reached.*

Three consequences follow and the first is the one this book has been building toward.

The failure is not a failure of articulacy. A more articulate child does not do better. The child who says exactly what is wrong, in terms an adult would find compelling if a third party said them, meets the third reading of §16.2.1 in a sharper form, since fluency in objecting is itself readable as the thing objected to. §12.3.2 recorded that ossification produces a subject for whom the description does not admit of disagreement. The present subsection establishes it: the disagreement is available to him and has nowhere to land.

The failure is not registered as a failure. §13.2.2 distinguished a party who cannot answer from a party who does not experience the question as answerable. A child who objects and is met by the third reading does not conclude that the structure is closed; he has no vantage from which the structure is visible as a structure. What he acquires in its place is something about himself, and §14.1.2 established that this is what the name is doing rather than a side effect of its being disputed.

And the failure implicates no one. §16.2.2 established that the readings are not devised, and §15.3.1 established that the adult experiences responsiveness. An adult who receives a child's objection as an instance of what he is objecting to is not refusing to listen; he has listened, and what he heard was what he expected to hear. §11.2.2 held that the adult in Part II's case had acquired nothing and had stopped surrendering. Here the parallel is that he has refused nothing, and has heard something that was already read.

16.3.2 The Discharge of the Inherited Debt

§12.3.2 left this Part a proposition to establish, and it can now be stated as established rather than as asserted.

The proposition was that ossification in the adult-child case does not produce a subject who disagrees with how he is described, and produces in its place one for whom the description is not the kind of thing that admits of disagreement. Chapter 14 supplied the first element, that the name is a constituent of the account rather than a claim about it. Chapter 15 supplied the second, that the approach reaches the child as a property of the world rather than of an adult. The present chapter supplies the third, that every route by which the description might be reached is governed by the description.

Proposition 16.7. *A description that governs what counts as evidence, what an exception means, and what an objection is has removed the conditions under which it could be disagreed with. A subject constituted under such a description does not hold a competing account, and the framework's vocabulary of refusal does not apply to him.*

Two matters bear on what has and has not been shown.

The first is that the argument is structural throughout and contains no claim about frequency. Nothing here holds that most households govern their descriptions in this way, that most names are so protected, or that any particular household does. §16.2.2 established that the readings are the ordinary operation of any description and that most of a household's names are not governed. What the chapter establishes is that where the governance obtains, the structure is closed, and that its closure is not a matter of anyone's intransigence.

The second is that the chapter has not shown that closure harms anyone. This has been recorded at the close of every chapter of this Part and it is recorded again because the material

of the present chapter is the most likely to be read as a demonstration of harm. A child in the structure described here is a child about whom something is held that he cannot alter. Whether that costs him anything is Part VI's question, and §8.1.1 recorded that the book stands on ch. 30 and ch. 31 rather than here.

One observation completes the section, and it concerns why this chapter's material is not a description of cruelty.

Everything set out above operates as well, and frequently better, where the name is favourable and the household is devoted. A child held to be capable, whose failures are read as unusual, whose successes are received as expected, and whose protest that he is struggling is read as modesty or as a failure to recognise his own gifts, is in precisely the structure this chapter describes. §12.2.1 recorded that ossification is not confined to unflattering accounts and ch. 18 takes the case up. The structure is indifferent to the valence of what it protects, and a reader who has followed this chapter as an account of harsh households has followed only half of it.

16.4 The Bearing on What Follows

This chapter has described a structure and shown it to be closed. What produces the evidence the structure processes has not been described, and the chapter following supplies it.

Three things pass forward.

The production of the confirming occasions passes to ch. 17. §16.2.1 established that a name receives confirming occasions as expected and that the receiving is the mechanism by which confirmation accumulates. §15.3.1 established that the evidence so acquired is real. What neither chapter has established is that the approach produces the occasions it then receives as confirmation, and that claim is the next chapter's to make.

The favourable case passes to ch. 18. §16.3.2 closed by observing that the structure operates better where the name is favourable and the household devoted, and that a reader who has taken this chapter for an account of harsh households has taken half of it. The chapter on names that admit rather than deprive inherits the three readings in their favourable form.

And the question of whether any name escapes this passes to ch. 19. §14.2.2 fixed that the distinction cannot lie in content. §15.3.2 fixed that it lies in what becomes of an unanticipated occasion. §16.2.2 now adds a third constraint: it cannot lie in the absence of the three readings, since a description under which no discrepancy was ever read would be no description at all. The chapter closing this Part must find the distinction under all three constraints or state that there is none.

Proposition 16.8. *This chapter establishes that a governed name settles the conditions of its own refutation. It does not establish how the confirming occasions arise, does not treat the favourable case, and supplies no distinction between names that are so governed and names that are not.*

Two matters close the chapter, and the first is the re-derivation.

§7.2.1 requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available or replaced. The proposition here is the one §7.1.1 named first among the operations a reserve supplies: a subject may refuse a description offered of him. §16.3.1 has now established the child's case in detail rather than by inheritance, and the replacement proposition can be stated in its final form.

Where a description governs the conditions of its own refutation and is applied to a subject without reserves, refusal is not merely unavailable to him. It is unavailable in a manner that leaves no residue: he does not experience an attempt that failed, since §16.3.1 established that the failure is not registered as a failure, and he does not acquire the knowledge that refusal was attempted, which in the adult case is itself a standpoint. The corpus proposition holds that a subject may refuse and may be defeated. The proposition replacing it holds that a subject in this position has not been defeated, because nothing occurred that he could identify as an attempt.

The second matter concerns what this chapter has contributed to the Part and to the book. Chapter 14 showed what a name is. Chapter 15 showed what it does to conduct and produced in the foreclosed occasion the book's strongest and least defensible candidate. The present chapter has shown that the structure is closed and that its closure requires no one to have closed it. §8.1.1 required that the diagnostic Parts show something is lost, that the loss not be a renaming, that the child case be derived rather than assumed, and that nothing yield a scale. The third has been done here at length. The fourth holds, since nothing in this chapter could be used to rank households: §16.2.2 established that the readings are ordinary and that most of a household's names are ungoverned, so no household is characterised by them. The first two are Part VI's, and this Part has now supplied the mechanisms that Part will need.

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Chapter 17

The Self-Realisation of the Symbol

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks where the evidence for a name comes from, and answers that a substantial part of it is produced by the name.

It contributes the claim the two preceding chapters deferred. [Chapter 15](#) established that an approach is in place before an occasion and [Chapter 16](#) established that a confirming occasion is received as expected. Neither established that the approach produces what it then receives, and this chapter makes that claim good. Its object is what occurs between the parties rather than what either brings to the occasion.

It does not treat the favourable case, which is [ch. 18](#), and does not supply a distinction between names, which [ch. 19](#) must find. It does not hold that the evidence is illusory, and [§17.2](#) argues at length that the evidence is genuine and that its genuineness is the point.

The reader should carry forward the production of the occasion, the argument that the resulting evidence is real rather than distorted, the reason the loop closes faster in a household than elsewhere, and what a child acquires from occasions of this kind.

17.1 The Production of the Occasion

17.1.1 The Occasion as a Joint Product

An occasion involving two parties is produced by both of them. This is obvious when stated and it is systematically omitted from accounts of what a child did, which name a child and a conduct and leave the second party out of the description.

[§15.1.1](#) established that an adult enters an occasion with an orientation formed in advance, and [§15.2.1](#) set out what the orientation governs. The present subsection takes the next step. The orientation is not merely a lens through which the occasion is viewed. It is a component of the occasion, and the child's conduct is a response to a situation that includes it.

Consider a case in ordinary terms. A child is asked to do something he finds difficult. The asking is not a constant across households: it may be put as an instruction or as a question, it may be preceded by an explanation or not, it may come with an assumption that he will manage or with an assumption that he will not, and the assumption is legible whether or not it is stated. [§15.2.1](#) established that anticipation is carried in posture, in the interval before speaking, and in what is said first. A child asked in the second manner is in a different situation from a child asked in the first, and what he does next is a response to the situation he is actually in.

Three components of the produced occasion can be separated, and separating them shows

how much of what a child faces is supplied by the adult.

The first is the terms in which the task is set. A task described as something the child will find hard, something he need not worry about, or something that is simply the next thing to be done presents three different demands. The description is supplied by the adult and it is part of the task as the child encounters it.

The second is what the adult does during the occasion. §15.2.1 established that a response is prepared in advance. Where the preparation is an intervention, the intervention arrives at a moment determined by the adult's expectation rather than by the child's need, and the arrival alters what the child is doing. An adult who expects a child to falter intervenes at the first sign of difficulty, and the intervening removes the interval in which the child would have found his own way through it, whether or not he would have.

The third is what the occasion is taken to have been when it ends. §16.2.1 established that a name supplies the reading. The reading is not only applied afterward, since it is frequently stated: this went well, that was hard for you, you did that quickly. The statement is part of the occasion for the child, and §14.1.2 established that he has no competing account with which to receive it.

Proposition 17.1. *An occasion is produced jointly. The terms in which a task is set, the timing of an adult's intervention, and the account given of the occasion at its close are supplied by the adult, and the child's conduct is a response to a situation that includes them.*

Two observations follow.

The first is that this is not a claim about unusual households. Every adult supplies these components on every occasion, and there is no way of conducting an occasion with a child that supplies none of them. §16.2.2 established that the readings of a discrepant occasion are the ordinary operation of any description, and the same holds here: joint production is what an occasion between two parties is. What varies is what is supplied and whether it is governed by a name.

The second is that the omission of the second party from ordinary descriptions is not a lay error. §1.25 found that nineteen traditions treat the child as the bearer of what develops, and §2.3.1 located the historical route by which the individual unit was installed. An observational instrument coding what a child did on an occasion inherits the omission, since the code is applied to the child's conduct and the adult's contribution appears, if at all, as a separate variable rather than as a component of what the child was responding to. ch. 70 inherits this and it is among the reasons an instrument built on §1.26.3 cannot take the form the existing instruments take.

17.1.2 The Child's Supply Into a Produced Occasion

The consequence for the child's conduct should be stated precisely, since it is easy to overstate and the overstatement would be false.

The child is not determined by the occasion. He brings capacities, dispositions, a history, and whatever he has made of previous occasions, and what he does is his. Nothing in this chapter holds that a child approached in a certain manner will conduct himself in a certain way, and §1.27.6 recorded why the framework cannot hold anything of that form.

What is claimed is narrower and it concerns the space of what is available to him.

An occasion presents a child with a range of things he might do. The range is not fixed by his capacities alone: it is fixed by his capacities together with the situation, and §17.1.1 established that the adult supplies a substantial part of the situation. A child asked in a manner that assumes he will falter has available to him the responses that the manner leaves open, and among the responses it makes less available is the one in which he proceeds without difficulty, since proceeding without difficulty is now a contradiction of what has been signalled to him.

Proposition 17.2. *An approach alters the range of conduct available to a child on an occasion. It does not determine what he does within that range, and the alteration of the range is sufficient for what this chapter claims.*

Three consequences follow and the third is what the following section requires.

The first is that the alteration operates without the child's noticing it. §7.1.1 established that he has no alternative setting against which to compare, and §45.4 stated the replacement proposition: he does not register the manner, because a manner is registered by contrast. A child for whom a certain range has been made available does not experience a range having been made available. He experiences what there is to do.

The second is that the alteration is not always in the direction of the name. An adult who expects difficulty may produce, in a particular child on a particular occasion, a determination to prove otherwise. §16.2.1 established what becomes of such an occasion: it is read as an exception. The alteration of the range is therefore compatible with occasional conduct that contradicts the name, and §16.2.2 established that the reading disposes of it.

And the third is that what the child does is genuinely his. This must be stated with emphasis, since the argument of the following section depends on it. The conduct is not produced by the adult in the sense of being caused by him while the child is passive. The child assessed the situation, such as it was, and did something. That the situation was partly supplied does not make the response less his own, and §17.2 argues that this is precisely why the evidence the occasion yields is not spurious.

17.2 The Genuineness of the Evidence

17.2.1 Against the Distortion Account

The mechanism described so far invites an account this book must refuse, and refusing it is what distinguishes the present chapter from the literature on expectancy and bias.

The account it invites runs as follows. An adult holds a description, the description biases his perception, and he therefore sees what is not there. His confidence in the description is unwarranted, since it rests on distorted evidence, and the remedy is to correct the perception: to look more carefully, to check the judgement against a standard, to be aware of the bias and to discount for it.

Everything in this account is available in the existing literature and a good deal of it is true. §14.1.2 granted the documented finding that a description held of a person alters what is noticed and how ambiguous conduct is read. Perception is biased and the bias is real.

The present chapter claims something different and stronger, and the difference should be stated flatly. Where an approach produces the occasion, the evidence the occasion yields is not

distorted. It is accurate. The child did what the adult observed him doing, the observation is correct, and a second observer present in the room would record the same thing.

Proposition 17.3. *Where a name governs an approach and the approach produces the occasion, the evidence the occasion yields is genuine. The adult's observation is accurate, and its accuracy is what makes the confirmation it supplies unanswerable.*

Three considerations establish this and each bears separately.

The first is that the child's conduct is his own. §17.1.2 established this and stated why the emphasis matters. A child who falters, having been approached in a manner that made faltering more available, has faltered. Nothing hypothetical is involved and no charitable re-description is owed. The adult who reports that the child faltered is reporting what occurred.

The second is that the counterfactual is unavailable to anyone. To show that the conduct was produced would require comparing this occasion with the occasion that would have obtained under a different approach, and §15.2.2 established that such occasions are foreclosed. Neither party has access to the comparison. The adult cannot know what would have happened had he entered differently, and §15.3.1 established that he does not experience himself as having entered in any particular manner at all.

And the third is that repetition strengthens the evidence properly. Where an approach is stable, occasions of the same kind recur and the child's conduct on them is consistent. Consistency across occasions is what evidence for a disposition consists in, and an adult who has observed the same thing forty times has better evidence than one who has observed it once. §11.1.2 recorded that the description accumulates confirmation rather than staleness. The present subsection supplies the reason: the confirmation is evidentially sound by any ordinary standard.

Two consequences follow and both are uncomfortable.

The first is that the remedies the distortion account recommends do not reach this case. An adult advised to look more carefully will look more carefully at an occasion that has been produced, and will see accurately what is there. An adult advised to check his judgement against a standard will find the judgement confirmed. An adult advised to be aware of his bias and discount for it will be discounting for a distortion that has not occurred, and §15.3.1 established that what he would need to be aware of is not available to introspection. ch. 77 inherits this and it is a hard inheritance, since the obvious practical advice has been shown not to apply.

The second is that the case cannot be distinguished from the case where the name is simply correct. A child who is careless, approached by an adult who holds that he is careless, behaves carelessly and the adult observes it. A child who has been made careless in the manner of §17.1.1, approached identically, behaves carelessly and the adult observes it. §12.1.1 established that the framework's central pair of households cannot be told apart by any available measure, and the present subsection establishes the same for the two cases at the level of an occasion. Nothing in the occasion distinguishes them.

17.2.2 The Standing of the Claim

The preceding subsection has made this chapter's claim harder to defend rather than easier, and the difficulty should be faced rather than passed over.

If the evidence is genuine, if the counterfactual is unavailable, and if nothing in an occasion distinguishes a produced conduct from a spontaneous one, then a reasonable reader will ask what the claim of this chapter amounts to. It cannot be that the adult is wrong about the child. It cannot be that the evidence is bad. It appears to be a claim about what would have happened otherwise, and §15.2.2 conceded that claims of that form cannot be brought into contact with evidence in the way claims about events can.

Three things can be said and none of them dissolves the difficulty.

The first is that the claim is not about any particular occasion. §6.3.2 distinguished assertions from permissions, and the present chapter's contribution is a permission: it makes available a description under which an adult's accurate observation of a child is also an observation of something the adult's own approach contributed to. The description does not say of any occasion that this is what happened there. It says that this is a thing that happens, and that no vocabulary in the survey of Chapter 1 contains it.

The second is that the mechanism is not exotic. Each of its components is separately documented. That expectations alter conduct toward a person is established (Darley and Gross, 1983). That conduct toward a person alters what he does is established (Snyder et al., 1977). That what he does is then observed accurately is trivial. §14.1.2 granted the first two and the third requires no granting. What this chapter has done is join them and state what the joining implies, which is that a description can be made true by being held.

And the third is that the difficulty is shared with every account of self-fulfilment and is not peculiar to this framework. The literature on self-fulfilling prophecy faces it, and its experimental designs address it by supplying the missing counterfactual under controlled conditions (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Jussim and Harber, 2005): two groups, one description manipulated, and a comparison the parties themselves could not have made. §14.1.2 cited that literature and the citing was not decorative. The mechanism has been demonstrated where a comparison could be arranged, and this chapter's claim is that it operates where no comparison can be.

Proposition 17.4. *The claim of this chapter is a permission rather than an assertion about particular occasions. Its components are separately established and its difficulty is that the comparison which would confirm it in a given case is the comparison the mechanism forecloses.*

One further matter belongs here, since it bears on how much weight this chapter can carry. §8.3.1 listed a demonstration that the framework's descriptions are available without it as the most damaging finding against this book. A reader may hold that the self-fulfilling prophecy literature is such a demonstration: that what this chapter describes is that literature's phenomenon under another name, and that the framework has added nothing.

The reply has three parts and it should be assessed rather than accepted.

The literature's phenomenon is an effect on outcomes. What is measured is that children of whom more was expected performed better, and the finding is about performance. This chapter's phenomenon is an effect on the conditions of an occasion, of which performance is one consequence among others, and §17.1.1 identified three components of which only the first bears on performance directly.

The literature's phenomenon requires the expectation to be false. Its designs manipulate a description at random, so that the description does not track anything about the child, and

the finding is that a false description became true. This chapter's phenomenon operates where the description is accurate, and §14.2.2 established that aptness aggravates. The literature does not describe the accurate case, since its method requires the inaccurate one.

And the literature's phenomenon leaves the child's standing untouched. It describes something that happened to a child's performance. §14.1.2 established that a name applied to a young child is a constituent of the account he is forming, and §17.4.1 states what he acquires from occasions of the kind this chapter describes. That is not a claim about performance and the literature contains no term for it.

17.3 The Closure of the Loop in a Household

17.3.1 The Household as the Fastest Case

The mechanism of the preceding sections operates wherever a description governs an approach. It operates in schools, in clinics, in workplaces, and in any setting where one party's account of another shapes how the second is met. This section argues that it closes faster in a household than in any of them, and identifies five reasons.

The first is frequency. Occasions between a household's adults and a young child are numerous, they occur daily, and they are not confined to a domain. A teacher meets a child in one setting for a portion of a year. A household meets him in every setting he has, across the whole of his early life. §10.2.2 established that what matters is a rate, and the rate of occasions here is higher than in any other relation a child is in.

The second is that no other description competes. §7.1.1 established that a young child has no alternative setting and §14.1.1 established that names are portable between the settings he has. Where a school holds a description that differs from the household's, the child is subject to two, and §7.1.2 recorded that a difference between settings is itself a reserve. Where the settings agree, or where the household is effectively the only setting, nothing competes.

The third is that the household supplies the terms in which the child would describe anything. §14.1.2 established that a name applied to a young child is a constituent of the account he is forming. In a school the child arrives with terms already acquired elsewhere. In a household the terms themselves are supplied, and §1.27.10 holds that a household's common knowledge and common practices are among the things that develop.

The fourth is that the adult's account is not subject to professional review. A teacher's description of a child is stated to colleagues, recorded, and passed on, and each of these exposes it to a second party who may hold otherwise. §12.1.2 made exposure the criterion. A household's description is stated to whoever is in the household, and where the household's adults agree, or where there is one adult, it is stated to no one who might not.

And the fifth is that the household's occasions are unbounded in kind. A teacher's description governs occasions of a certain sort. A household's description governs eating, sleeping, speaking, playing, and every other thing a child does, so the accumulated confirmation of §17.2.1 is drawn from a domain with no edges.

Proposition 17.5. *The loop closes faster in a household because occasions are more frequent and unbounded in kind, because no competing description is available, because the terms of any description are themselves supplied there, and because the adult's account is exposed to no pro-*

fessional review.

Two observations qualify this and neither is minor.

The first is that the five reasons are conditions rather than constants, and Chapter 5 established that they vary. In the configuration of distributed kin, several adults hold accounts and the fourth reason weakens considerably. In the configuration of institutional provision, a child's day contains many professional adults and the second and fifth weaken. §5.6.1 recorded that a configuration is not a property of a society, and the present observation is that the speed at which a loop closes is a property of an arrangement rather than of households in general.

The second is that speed is not severity. A loop that closes quickly is not thereby a loop that closes on something damaging, and §12.2.1 established that the mechanism is indifferent to the valence of what it closes on. ch. 18 takes the favourable case and the present section supplies its condition: the same five reasons operate there.

17.4 The Child's Acquisitions

17.4.1 The Acquisition

The preceding sections have described what happens to the adult's evidence. This section states what happens on the other side, and it is what distinguishes this chapter's claim from an account of an effect on performance.

A child in the loop of §17.3 acquires three things, and none of them is a belief about himself.

He acquires a sense of what occasions of this kind are like. §45.4 stated the replacement proposition: he does not register the manner in which he is approached, since a manner is registered by contrast. What he acquires in its place is an expectation of how such occasions go, and the expectation is accurate, since they have gone that way. §15.1.1 established that an approach is not held propositionally, and the child's counterpart is the same: he does not conclude that tasks of this kind go badly, he approaches them as tasks that go badly.

He acquires a repertoire fitted to those occasions. §17.1.2 established that an approach alters the range of conduct available on an occasion. Across many occasions with a stable range, what he practises is what the range permits, and §14.2.1 established that a capacity not exercised contracts. The parallel is exact and it runs on the child's side: what he has had occasion to do, he has become able to do; what the occasions did not admit, he has had no occasion to practise.

And he acquires the description as a constituent. §14.1.2 established this and the present chapter supplies its material. The description is not received as a claim and then evaluated. It arrives as the terms in which occasions are conducted, it is confirmed by occasions that were produced under it, and §16.3.1 established that nothing he supplies can reach it. What he is forming an account of himself from includes it.

Proposition 17.6. *A child in a closed loop acquires an expectation of how such occasions go, a repertoire fitted to the range they admit, and the governing description as a constituent of his own account. None of the three is a belief he holds and none is available to him for examination.*

Three consequences complete the chapter's argument.

The first is that the child's acquisition is not an error either. §17.2.1 established that the

adult's evidence is genuine and the symmetry holds here. A child whose expectation of such occasions is that they go badly has an accurate expectation, and a child whose repertoire is fitted to a narrow range has a repertoire that fits the occasions he has had. Nothing false has been acquired by anyone. This is the sharpest form of the difficulty Chapter 12 identified: both parties are correct, and the correctness is what the loop is made of.

The second is that what has been foreclosed is not experienced as foreclosure. §15.2.2 established that the foreclosed occasion has no trace and that the child cannot notice the absence of an occasion he has never had. The present section adds that he also does not experience a narrowed repertoire, since a repertoire is compared with a wider one and he has no access to a wider one. ch. 31 carries this and it is the sharpest form in which that chapter inherits its problem.

And the third is that this is where Part VI's question becomes precise. The book has asked throughout whether anything is lost. What this chapter identifies is a candidate: not a false belief, not a damaged capacity, not an injury anyone could report, but a range of occasions that were not had and a repertoire that was therefore not developed. §8.1.1 required that the loss not be a renaming of what is otherwise sayable, and §17.2.2 argued that the self-fulfilment literature does not contain it. Whether it is real, and whether anything follows from it, is what ch. 30 and ch. 31 must establish.

17.5 The Bearing on What Follows

Two things pass forward and one debt is discharged.

The favourable case passes to ch. 18. Every mechanism of this chapter operates where the name is favourable: the occasion is produced, the evidence is genuine, the loop closes at the household's speed, and the child acquires an expectation, a repertoire, and a constituent. §17.3.1 recorded that the five reasons for the household's speed apply there unchanged. What that chapter must add is what differs, since a child held to be capable and a child held to be careless are not in the same position however alike the mechanism.

The question of a distinction among names passes to ch. 19 with a third constraint added. §14.2.2 fixed that it cannot lie in content. §45.4 fixed that it lies in what happens afterward. §16.2.2 fixed that it cannot lie in the absence of the three readings. The present chapter adds that it cannot lie in accuracy, since §17.2.1 established that the evidence in the governed case is accurate and that accuracy is what makes it unanswerable.

Proposition 17.7. *This chapter establishes that a governing description produces part of the evidence that confirms it and that the evidence is genuine. It does not distinguish the favourable case, supplies no distinction among names, and does not establish that the narrowing it describes costs a child anything.*

The debt discharged is the one §10.3.1 and §45.4 both recorded. Part II held that a description alters what there is to absorb and that the confirmation it receives is real, and stated the claim without establishing it. §17.1.1 and §17.2.1 have now established it: the alteration operates by the adult's supplying components of the occasion, and the confirmation is real because the child's response to a partly supplied situation is genuinely his.

One remark closes the chapter.

The three chapters of this Part so far have described a name, its governance of conduct, its governance of refutation, and its production of its own evidence. Taken together they describe something closed, and a reader may conclude that the account is too closed to be true, since children plainly do escape the descriptions held of them and households plainly do revise. §16.2.2 recorded that the change does not come from within the structure and that ch. 81 must say where it comes from. The present chapter adds one observation bearing on that. §17.3.1 established that the five conditions of closure are conditions rather than constants, and that they vary with the arrangements of Chapter 5. A loop closes at a speed, and the speed depends on how many adults hold accounts, how many settings a child has, and whether any of them differ. That is not a remedy and it is where a remedy would have to operate.

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Chapter 18

Authorising Labels

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what changes when the name a child is given is a favourable one. It contributes the case in which nothing looks like harm and is therefore the Part's hardest. Chapter 14, Chapter 15, Chapter 16, and Chapter 17 described a mechanism without regard to what the name says. This chapter establishes that the mechanism runs unchanged under a favourable name, identifies the one respect in which the favourable case differs, and states why that respect makes it more difficult rather than less.

It does not hold that praise is harmful, that a child should not be well thought of, or that favourable descriptions should be withheld. §18.3.2 states this at length because the chapter invites the reading.

The reader should carry forward the transaction an authorising label performs, the argument that the four mechanisms are indifferent to valence, the conditionality that distinguishes this case, and the sense in which it mirrors the case of the child around whom a household's defaults have rerouted.

18.1 The Offer of an Authorising Label

18.1.1 The Terms of Admission

Favourable names of the kind this chapter treats occur across every society in this book's coverage, and the verbal forms differ while the transaction agrees.

East Asian households have a family of terms of which 懂事 is the most examined (Chao, 1994): a child who understands what is required without being told, who anticipates what the household needs, and who does not add to what the adults are carrying. 乖 names a related and narrower thing. The comparison 别人家的孩子 sets the child against a standard held elsewhere. Anglophone households have the good child, the easy one, the one who never gave us any trouble, and the child described as mature for his age or as an old soul. Northern European households, where the vocabulary of praise for compliance is less used, carry the transaction in the register of the child who manages, who is independent, who can be relied on to sort himself out. §14.1.1 established that names travel between settings; the present observation is that the transaction travels between languages, and that its prominence in one literature is a fact about which households have been written about.

The transaction is this. A favourable name admits a child. It states that he is acceptable, that he has been found so, and that the finding is available to be relied on. §14.1.2 established that a name settles a standing question about a party. Here what is settled is the question of

whether he is what the household would have him be, and the answer is that he is.

Three features of this transaction distinguish it from the depriving case.

The name is welcomed. A child who is told he is careless has been told something he would rather not have been told, and §16.3.1 established that his objection fails structurally. A child who is told he is 懂事 has been told something he wanted to hear, and nothing in him moves to object. The structural analysis of Chapter 16 therefore has less work to do here, since the party who might have disputed does not wish to.

The name is a description of what the household values. A depriving name reports a difficulty. An authorising name reports a fit, and §1.27.10 holds that a household's common values are among the things that develop. To be named 懂事 is to be told what the household holds to be good and told simultaneously that one is it. Two things are conveyed at once and the child receives them together.

And the name confers a standing that can be lost. This is the feature the following sections develop. A child named as careless is in a position that cannot deteriorate through his conduct, since his conduct is what the name already covers. A child named as 懂事 holds something, and §18.2.2 establishes what holding it requires of him.

Proposition 18.1. *A favourable name admits a child as acceptable, conveys what a household values in the act of stating that he embodies it, and confers a standing that his subsequent conduct may sustain or fail to sustain. The third feature has no counterpart in the depriving case.*

Two observations complete the account of the transaction.

The first is that the admission is frequently the household's whole warmth, and this should be said before anything critical. An adult who names a child 懂事 is expressing something that is not available to be expressed in other terms in many households: that the child is loved, that he is a credit, that his presence is a relief. §5.2.2 established that the conditions of most contemporary arrangements leave little uncommitted time, and a name that carries affection compactly is doing work that the conditions make necessary. To treat such a name as an instrument of control would misdescribe most instances of it.

The second is that the transaction is not primarily verbal. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach rather than an account, and the same holds here. A child learns that he is the one who does not add to what the adults are carrying from how he is met when he does not, and from what happens when he does. §15.2.2 established that occasions are foreclosed without trace, and the occasions foreclosed by an authorising name are those on which the child would have added something.

18.2 The Mechanism Under a Favourable Name

18.2.1 The Findings Applied

Each finding of this Part was stated without reference to what a name says. This subsection applies them and establishes that none is weakened by the name being favourable.

The contraction of Chapter 14 operates unchanged. §14.1.2 held that a name contracts the range of what its object may be taken to be, and a favourable name contracts it in the same manner: a child who is the one who manages is not, on any given occasion, available to be

taken as a child who is struggling. §14.2.1 held that the namer's own capacity to describe contracts by disuse, and here the disuse is of the vocabulary in which the child's difficulty would have been described. An adult who has not needed to describe this child's difficulty for two years has lost the practice of describing it, and §14.2.2 established that the loss follows from the name's usefulness rather than from its content.

The governance of approach operates unchanged and in one respect more thoroughly. §15.2.1 named attention, anticipation, and preparation. An adult approaching a child he holds to be capable attends to what is going well, anticipates that it will, and prepares nothing, since nothing is expected to be required. §15.2.2 named the fourth respect and it is the sharpest here. The occasions foreclosed by a favourable name are the occasions on which help would have been offered, difficulty would have been enquired after, or a task would have been set at a level the child might not have managed. Each of these is an occasion the child does not have, and none of them leaves a trace.

The governance of refutation operates unchanged and §16.3.2 anticipated the case. The three readings of §16.2.1 apply with their valences reversed and their structure intact: a failure is read as unusual, a success is received as expected, and a protest that the child is struggling is read as modesty, as tiredness, or as a failure to see his own gifts. §16.3.1 established that the child's refutation fails at all three requirements, and here it fails while the child has less reason to attempt it and less standing to be believed if he does, since what he would be disputing is a description everyone regards as generous.

And the self-realisation of Chapter 17 operates unchanged. §17.1.1 established that an occasion is produced jointly, and a child approached as capable is in a situation in which capability is more available and difficulty less so. §17.2.1 established that the resulting evidence is genuine. A child who manages, having been approached as one who manages, has managed, and the adult who reports it is reporting what occurred.

Proposition 18.2. *The contraction, the governance of approach, the governance of refutation, and the self-realisation each operate under a favourable name without alteration. The mechanism is indifferent to what the name says.*

Two observations follow.

The first is that the favourable case is harder to see, and for a reason beyond the general invisibility of §15.3.1. An adult who holds an unfavourable description of a child may at least be uneasy about holding it, and the unease is a small purchase for anything that might disturb it. An adult who holds a favourable one has nothing to be uneasy about. §13.1.1 established that a role supplying a creditable self-description terminates the introspection that would examine it, and the same holds for a creditable description of another.

The second is that the child has less to bring against it. §14.1.2 established that a name applied to a young child is a constituent of the account he is forming. A constituent that is favourable is one he has reason to keep, and §18.2.2 establishes what keeping it requires. The depriving case leaves a child with something he would be rid of if he could. The authorising case leaves him with something he would not.

18.2.2 The Conditionality

The one respect in which the favourable case differs can now be stated, and it is what makes the case difficult rather than merely parallel.

An authorising name is conditional in a way a depriving name is not. §18.1.1 recorded that it confers a standing his conduct may sustain or fail to sustain. A child named as careless cannot fall further by being careless; a child named as 懂事 can cease to be so, and the ceasing would be a loss of what the name conferred.

Three consequences follow and the second is the chapter's principal result.

The first is that the child acquires a stake in the description. §17.4.1 established that a child acquires an expectation, a repertoire, and the description as a constituent. In the favourable case he acquires in addition an interest in the description continuing to hold, and the interest is his own rather than something imposed. §16.3.1 established that a child's refutation fails structurally. Here the structural failure is joined by something else: he does not attempt the refutation, because the description is one he would keep.

The second is that what the description requires becomes what he does. A child admitted as the one who does not add to what the adults are carrying has been given the terms of his admission, and the terms are met by not adding. §17.1.2 established that an approach alters the range of conduct available. Here the range is altered on the child's side as well: the conduct that would put the description at risk is conduct he has reason not to produce, and §17.4.1 established that a repertoire is fitted to the occasions had. What he does not practise is asking, needing, faltering visibly, and requiring something of an adult.

Proposition 18.3. *An authorising name confers a standing that conduct may fail to sustain. The child acquires an interest in sustaining it, and the conduct that would put it at risk is conduct he has reason not to produce and therefore does not practise.*

The third consequence concerns what happens when the description is at risk. A child who is struggling, and who holds a description under which he does not struggle, is in a position with no good move. Reporting the difficulty puts the description at risk. Not reporting it leaves the difficulty unaddressed. §7.2.1 established that a young child cannot appeal to a party outside the relation, and §16.2.1 established that the report, if made, is read as modesty or as tiredness. The position is closed on every side, and ch. 31 inherits it.

One further matter belongs here.

Nothing in this section requires the household to have demanded anything. §16.2.2 established that the readings are not devised, and the same holds for the conditionality: no adult states that the child's standing depends on his continuing to manage, and most would deny it sincerely and correctly, since they would not withdraw their regard if he faltered. The conditionality is a feature of how a standing conferred by description operates rather than of anyone's intention, and §11.2.2 established the general form. The child is not responding to a threat. He is responding to what he has been given.

18.3 The Mirror of Abandonment

18.3.1 Conditional Recognition in Family Form

The sense in which this case mirrors abandonment should be stated carefully, since the comparison is strong and the two cases are not equivalent.

A child around whom a household's defaults have quietly rerouted, so that little is asked of him and little is offered, is in a position [ch. 35](#) treats. Nothing was done to him, no one decided anything, and what he lacks is occasions. [§15.2.2](#) established that foreclosed occasions leave no trace.

The child of the present chapter is in a position with the same structure and the opposite surface. A great deal is asked of him and a great deal is offered. What he lacks is also occasions: those on which he would have been met while not managing. [§18.2.2](#) established that the conduct putting his standing at risk is conduct he does not practise, so the occasions on which an adult would have met a struggling child do not arise, and the adult's capacity to meet one contracts by the mechanism of [§14.2.1](#).

Proposition 18.4. *The child around whom defaults have rerouted and the child admitted under a favourable description both lack a class of occasions. In the first the occasions were never offered; in the second they are not produced, because producing them would put at risk what the child holds.*

Three respects in which the cases differ should be recorded, since the parallel would otherwise overstate.

The first is that the second child is not unattended. He is attended to closely, and [§18.1.1](#) recorded that the naming is frequently the household's whole warmth. What is absent is a particular occasion within it rather than attention, and [§5.5.1](#) distinguished a condition being absent from a condition being untested. The distinction applies here in its sharpest form: the household has not failed to meet a struggling child, since no struggling child has presented himself.

The second is that the second child's position is one he maintains. [§18.2.2](#) established that he has an interest in the description and acts to sustain it. The first child does nothing to maintain his position and could not alter it if he tried. [§7.3.1](#) located what a subject is owed in the position he occupies, and the two positions differ in whether the subject is a party to their maintenance.

And the third is that the second case is invisible to any observer including a sympathetic one. A household in which little is asked of a child can be noticed by someone who looks. A household in which a child manages, is praised for managing, and does not report difficulty presents nothing to notice. [§12.1.1](#) held that the framework's utility turns on cases that cannot be reached from the extremes, and this case cannot be reached at all by an account attending to what is done to children.

18.3.2 The Boundaries of the Chapter's Claim

This chapter is the one in this book most open to misuse, and the misuses should be named.

It does not hold that praise is harmful. Nothing in [§18.2.1](#) concerns praise, which is a response to an occasion, and the chapter's object is a standing description of a party. [§14.1.1](#) distinguished a settling of an occasion from a settling of a party, and an adult who tells a child

that he did something well has settled an occasion. **ch. 19** takes up what distinguishes the two and it is among the more consequential things that chapter must do.

It does not hold that a child should be thought less well of. §17.2.1 established that the evidence in the governed case is genuine, and a child who is capable is capable. An adult advised to hold a less favourable description would be advised to hold a false one, and §14.2.2 established that the mechanism does not operate through falsity.

It does not hold that the household has done something. §18.2.2 established that no adult states the condition and that most would deny it sincerely and correctly. §11.2.2 established the general form: what is described is a state of a relation rather than an act, and §11.2.1 established that accounts requiring an agent cannot describe such states.

And it does not hold that the child is damaged. §17.4.1 identified what a child acquires and recorded that none of it is false. A child who has practised managing has become able to manage, which is a real capacity and not a deficit. What the chapter identifies is a class of occasions not had, and §8.1.1 recorded that whether such an absence costs anything is Part VI's question and not this Part's.

Proposition 18.5. *This chapter concerns standing descriptions of a party rather than responses to occasions, operates where the description is accurate, requires no act by any adult, and identifies an absence of occasions rather than a deficit in a child.*

One remark closes the section, and it concerns the neutrality this book has committed itself to.

§18.1.1 gave the verbal forms across several languages and stated that the transaction travels between them. The point requires emphasis here because the East Asian terms are the ones with a literature attached, and a chapter drawing on that literature could be read as an account of one arrangement's characteristic error. It is not. §13.1.1 established that the giving role is not a cultural arrangement, and the same holds for the naming relation: a household admits a child under a description wherever descriptions are held, and the terms available differ while the transaction does not. A reader who takes this chapter as a description of 懂事 in particular has taken a general mechanism for a local one, and §4.2 recorded the general form of that error.

18.4 The Bearing on What Follows

Two things pass forward and one constraint is added.

The closed position passes to **ch. 31**. §18.2.2 described a child who is struggling under a description in which he does not struggle, and established that reporting puts the description at risk while not reporting leaves the difficulty unaddressed. That chapter must say what becomes of a difficulty that has no route by which it could be reported, and §18.3.1 added that no observer is positioned to notice.

The comparison with abandonment passes to **ch. 35**. §18.3.1 established that both cases lack a class of occasions and differ in whether the subject is a party to maintaining his position. That chapter treats the case in which a household's defaults rerouted, and it inherits the observation that the two cases are structurally alike and are opposite on every surface a household or an observer could attend to.

The constraint added for **ch. 19** is the fourth. §18.3.2 distinguished a response to an oc-

casion from a standing description of a party, and held that praise belongs to the first. If that distinction is to do work, the chapter closing this Part must establish it, and must do so without appealing to content, to accuracy, or to the absence of the three readings, each of which has already been ruled out.

Proposition 18.6. *This chapter establishes that the Part's mechanism is indifferent to the valence of the name and that the favourable case adds a conditionality with no counterpart in the depriving one. It does not establish that anything is lost, and it supplies no distinction between a name and a response to an occasion beyond naming one.*

One matter closes the chapter and it is the re-derivation.

§7.2.1 requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available or replaced. The proposition here concerns what a party does with a favourable description he holds under. In the corpus, an adult so described may enjoy it, may find it burdensome, may decline the terms on which it was offered, and may hold it at a distance while continuing to receive its benefits. Each of these requires a standpoint from which the description is one thing and he is another, and §7.1.1 established that a young child has none.

The replacement proposition is this. Where a young child is admitted under a favourable description, he does not hold the description at a distance, and the question of whether its terms are acceptable to him does not arise for him. What arises in its place is the maintaining, and §18.2.2 established that the conduct which would put the description at risk is not practised. The consequence is that an account asking whether a child has accepted the terms of his admission has posed a question that presupposes he was in a position to weigh them, and §14.3 recorded the general form of this error at the close of Chapter 14.

References

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Chapter 19

Good Symbols and Bad Symbols

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks whether any distinction among names survives the four preceding chapters, and answers that one does.

It closes this Part and it is constrained on four sides. §14.2.2 established that a distinction cannot lie in what a name says. §45.4 established that it must be a property of what happens afterward. §16.2.2 established that it cannot lie in the absence of the three readings. §17.2.1 established that it cannot lie in accuracy. The chapter must find a distinction under all four or concede there is none, and §19.1 states the case for conceding before the distinction is offered.

It does not supply a means of applying the distinction, and §19.3.3 states why the criterion inherits every difficulty of §12.1.2. It does not license sorting names into the good and the bad.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between a name that positions and a name that essentialises, the criterion of refutability by the object, and the account of what praise is that §19.3.2 supplies.

19.1 The Case Against Any Distinction

19.1.1 The Exclusions of the Constraints

The case for holding that no distinction survives should be put at full strength, since a chapter that offered a distinction without first stating why it is difficult would have understated its own problem.

Consider what has been ruled out.

Content has been ruled out. §14.2.2 established that a name's effects follow from the properties that make it useful, and that there is no version of a name that keeps the usefulness and loses the effects. A gentler name answers occasions as economically as a harsher one, displaces the labour of description as thoroughly, and travels between settings as readily. §18.2.1 established the point in its strongest form: the four mechanisms of this Part operate under a favourable name without alteration.

Accuracy has been ruled out. §17.2.1 established that the evidence in the governed case is genuine and that its genuineness is what makes the confirmation unanswerable. An accurate name is not a safer name. §14.2.2 established that aptness aggravates, since an apter name answers more occasions and is disturbed by fewer.

The absence of the readings has been ruled out. §16.2.2 established that the three readings

of a discrepant occasion are the ordinary operation of any description, and that a description under which no discrepancy was ever read would be no description at all. A name that could be overturned by any discrepant instance would supply nothing.

And a fourth candidate should be added here and ruled out with the others, since a reader will reach for it. Provisionality has been ruled out. A name offered tentatively, as a working description that might be revised, is a name in the sense of §14.1.1: it settles a standing question about a party, it is available in advance of occasions, and it is portable. §15.3.1 established that the party holding it cannot report the orientation it produces, and a tentative holding produces an orientation as surely as a confident one. The tentativeness is a feature of how the adult would describe his own holding, and §15.1.1 established that such descriptions are rationalisations of something not held in that form.

Proposition 19.1. *A distinction among names cannot lie in what they say, in whether they are accurate, in whether discrepancies are read under them, or in the tentativeness with which they are held. Each of these has been ruled out by a finding of this Part.*

Two further considerations strengthen the case for conceding.

The first is that the obvious practical distinctions collapse into content. Advice to describe conduct rather than character, to say what a child did rather than what he is, to use temporary language rather than permanent, and to avoid comparison: each of these is advice about what to say. §14.2.2 established that what produces the contraction is not what the name says, so advice of this form addresses the wrong variable. ch. 77 inherits the difficulty.

The second is that this book has committed itself against a distinction of a certain shape. §8.2.1 recorded that the book supplies no diagnostic criteria and §8.1.1 required that the diagnostic Parts yield no scale for ranking households. A distinction between good and bad names, if it were applicable, would be exactly such a scale, since names are what a household holds and a scale over names is a scale over households. Any distinction this chapter offers must therefore be one that cannot be so used, and §19.3.3 establishes that the one offered cannot.

One observation completes the case.

A reader may conclude at this point that the correct result is the concession, and that this Part has described a mechanism from which no household escapes and about which nothing can be said. That conclusion would be consistent with everything established so far. §6.3.2 held that a permission is displaced by showing that what it picks out was already sayable, and a Part that ended in the concession would still have supplied the descriptions of Chapter 14 through Chapter 18. The distinction offered below is therefore not required by the Part's argument. It is offered because there is one, and §19.2.1 states what it is.

19.2 Position and Essence

19.2.1 The Distinction That Survives

The distinction is between a name that states a position and a name that states an essence, and it survives the four constraints because it concerns neither what the name says nor how it is held but what kind of thing it makes its object.

Consider two names a school might apply. A child is a first-year pupil. A child is a poor

student. Both are descriptions, both are settled, both are portable, both answer occasions economically, both may be accurate, and §19.1.1 established that none of these distinguishes them.

What differs is what each says the child is. The first locates him: he stands in a certain place in an arrangement, and the arrangement is what supplies the description. §12.2.2 distinguished a position occupied from a property brought, and the first name is of the first kind. The second attributes: it says something about him that he carries into arrangements rather than something an arrangement confers.

Proposition 19.2. *A name that states a position describes where its object stands in an arrangement. A name that states an essence describes what its object is independently of arrangements. The distinction concerns what kind of thing the name makes its object rather than what the name says of him.*

Four consequences follow and together they establish that the distinction does work.

The first is that a positional name carries its own expiry. To be a first-year pupil is to be one for a year, and the name contains the condition of its own ceasing. §14.1.1 established that a name is a standing answer to a question that will be put again, and a positional name answers the question only while the position holds. An essential name has no such condition, and §11.1.2 established that settled matters do not decay.

The second is that a positional name locates the arrangement as the thing that could be otherwise. If a child is described as the youngest in a class, the description invites attention to the class, and §17.1.1 established that an occasion is produced jointly. An essential name locates nothing outside the child, and §1.25 recorded that nineteen traditions treat the child as the bearer of what develops. An essential name is the bearer commitment appearing in a household's ordinary speech.

The third is that a positional name is refutable by a change in the arrangement, whereas an essential name is refutable only by the child's conduct, which Chapter 16 established is governed. This is where the distinction meets the constraint of §45.4, which required that any distinction be a property of what happens afterward. What happens afterward differs: a positional name is disturbed by the arrangement changing, and arrangements change for reasons having nothing to do with the child or the name.

And the fourth is that a positional name admits a description of the same child under other positions without contradiction. A first-year pupil is also the eldest of three, the one who walks to school, the one who has been here two months. §7.1.2 established that reserves are reserves against particular descriptions and that a child may have several. Positional names multiply, and their multiplying is itself a reserve in the sense of §7.1.1, since each supplies a standpoint from which the others are seen as descriptions. An essential name resists this: a child who is lazy is not simultaneously several other essential things, and where a household holds several essential names of one child they tend toward consistency with one another.

19.2.2 The Separation from Content

The objection to be met is that the distinction just drawn is a distinction of content after all, since whether a name states a position or an essence appears to be a matter of what the name says.

It is not, and three considerations establish this.

The first is that the same words go either way. To say that a child is the responsible one may state a position, where the household has several children and responsibilities are distributed among them, or an essence, where it says what this child is. §18.1.1 recorded that a favourable name conveys what a household values while stating that the child embodies it, and the embodying is the essential reading. Nothing in the words settles which is operating.

The second is that what settles it is how the name behaves across occasions, which is a property of what happens afterward rather than of the name. A name states a position where the household's conduct treats the arrangement as the thing that could be otherwise, and states an essence where it treats the child as such. §15.3.2 made the difference between governance and competence turn on what becomes of an unanticipated occasion, and the present criterion is that criterion applied to the question of what a name is about.

And the third is that a household can convert one into the other without changing a word. A child described as the one who helps may be so described for years while the helping is a role he occupies, and the description may at some point become a description of his nature, with no announcement and no alteration in the phrase. §12.2.2 described the general form of this conversion, in three stages, and the present observation is that names undergo it as positions do.

Proposition 19.3. *Whether a name states a position or an essence is not determined by its words. It is determined by whether the household's conduct treats the arrangement or the child as the thing that could be otherwise, and a name may convert from one to the other without any change in what is said.*

Two observations follow.

The first is that this explains a fact the outline of this Part recorded and has not yet accounted for: that some ordinary descriptions are unobjectionable and others are not, and that the difference is not gentleness. A first-year pupil and a poor student differ in this respect and not in kindness, and a household may hold a harsh positional name and a tender essential one. §18.2.1 established that the mechanism is indifferent to valence, and the present distinction cuts across valence rather than tracking it.

And the second is that a good name, on this account, knows that it is a name. This is a compressed way of stating the distinction and it should be unpacked rather than left as a formula. A positional name carries within it the reference to an arrangement, and an arrangement is a thing that could be otherwise. To hold such a name is therefore to hold, in the same act, the terms under which it would cease to apply. An essential name carries no such reference, and to hold it is to hold something that presents itself as a report of how things are. §7.1.1 established that a reserve supplies a standpoint from which a description can be seen as a description. A positional name supplies a small one within itself.

19.3 The Criterion

19.3.1 Refutability by the Object

The distinction of §19.2.1 can be stated as a criterion, and the criterion is the one this Part has been working toward.

A name is of the first kind where its object could, in principle, be the party who refutes it. A name is of the second where he could not.

The criterion follows from what has been established rather than being added to it. §16.1.1 named three requirements for refuting a claim about a party: an agreed sense of what bears on it, a rule under which exceptions reduce its standing, and a standing for the disputant. A positional name meets all three in a manner an essential name does not. What bears on it is whether the arrangement holds, which is a matter about which a child may be right. An exception is an occasion on which the position did not obtain, which reduces the name's application directly. And the child's standing to observe that he is no longer in a position is not itself governed by the name, since the name is about an arrangement rather than about him.

Proposition 19.4. *A name admits refutation by its object where the object could be the party who shows it no longer applies. Positional names admit this and essential names do not, since an essential name governs the standing of anyone who would dispute it and its object above all.*

Three consequences follow.

The first is that the criterion is the Part's version of §12.1.2. That subsection made the criterion of Chapter 12 turn on what becomes of a disturbance to an account. The present criterion asks who could supply the disturbance, and the two are the same question asked at different points. §15.3.2 applied the first to conduct. This applies it to names.

The second is that the criterion does not require that the child ever refute anything. §12.1.2 established that the criterion concerns a capacity rather than a frequency, and the same holds here. A positional name may go unrefuted for years, and its being of the first kind consists in the child's being among the parties who could refute it.

And the third is that the criterion explains why the depriving and authorising cases behave alike. §18.2.1 established that the mechanism is indifferent to valence, and §18.2.2 established that the favourable case adds a conditionality. Both are essential names: each says what the child is, neither refers to an arrangement, and in neither could the child be the party who shows it no longer applies. §16.3.1 established the failure in the depriving case and §18.2.2 established that in the favourable case the child does not attempt it.

19.3.2 The Praise Question

§18.3.2 held that praise is a response to an occasion rather than a standing description of a party, and left the distinction to be established here. It can now be established, and doing so shows the criterion doing work.

A response to an occasion says something about the occasion. That was well done. You worked at that for an hour. That was a difficult thing to say and you said it. Each of these settles a matter in the sense of §10.1.1, and each is exhausted by the occasion it settles, which §14.1.1 identified as the mark distinguishing a settling from a naming.

A standing description says something about the party. You are good at this. You are hard-working. You are brave. Each of these is available in advance of occasions and answers them, and §14.1.1 established that this is what a name is.

The two are frequently confused because the second is often intended as an emphatic form of the first. An adult who says that a child is hard-working may mean only that the child

worked hard, and the meaning is honest. §15.1.1 established that what an adult would report about his own holding is a rationalisation, and the operative question is what the utterance does rather than what was meant.

Proposition 19.5. *A response to an occasion is exhausted by the occasion. A standing description is available in advance of occasions and answers them. The second is a name in this Part's sense and the first is not, however alike they sound.*

Two observations qualify this and neither is small.

The first is that a sequence of responses to occasions can constitute a name. §11.1.1 established that accumulated settlings make further settling cheaper, and a household in which a child is told forty times that he did something well has a description in hand whether or not anyone stated it. The distinction between a response and a name therefore does not track what is uttered on a given occasion, and §19.2.2 established the general form of this point.

The second is that the literature on praise has reached a partly parallel finding by a different route, and the parallel should be granted without overstating the agreement. Work distinguishing praise directed at an attribute from praise directed at effort or process reports differences in what children subsequently do (Mueller and Dweck, 1998; Dweck, 2006), and the finding has been influential. The present chapter's distinction is not that one, since effort is as available as ability to be made a standing description, and a child who is the hard-working one holds an essential name of the second kind. What the two accounts share is the observation that the grammatical object of the utterance matters. Where they differ is that the present account locates the difference in whether the object of the description is the child or an arrangement, and §17.2.2 recorded the general form of this kind of partial overlap with an existing literature.

19.3.3 The Cost of the Criterion

The criterion inherits difficulties and they should be stated before the Part closes.

It is counterfactual. §19.3.1 stated it as a matter of who could refute a name, and §12.1.2 established the three difficulties that follow: no introspective access, resistance to instrumentation, and asymmetric evidence. An adult asked whether his child could show him that a description no longer applies will answer that of course he could, and §15.3.1 established that the answer will be sincere.

It is scope-relative. §12.2.1 established that ossification admits of scope and the same holds here. A household holds many descriptions of a child, of which some are positional and some essential, and no household is characterised by the criterion. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria for identifying a household as failing, and the present criterion is consistent with that refusal precisely because it applies to names rather than to households.

And it does not yield advice. §19.1.1 established that the practical distinctions collapse into content and that the present distinction is not one of content. An adult cannot adopt positional names by choosing different words, since §19.2.2 established that the same words go either way and that what settles it is how the household's conduct treats the arrangement. ch. 77 inherits this, and the inheritance is thin.

Proposition 19.6. *The criterion is counterfactual, applies to names rather than to households,*

and cannot be acted on by choosing different words. It identifies a difference and supplies no procedure.

19.4 The Close of the Part

19.4.1 The Findings of Part III

Six chapters have described what a name is and what it does, and the results should be stated together.

A name settles a standing question about a party, is available in advance of occasions, and is portable between settings. It contracts what its object may be taken to be, and it contracts what its holder is able to say, which is a loss falling on the party an agent-requiring account would call the agent. Its effects follow from the properties that make it useful, so accuracy aggravates and no remedy consists in better naming.

A name governs an approach in four respects, of which the fourth forecloses occasions and leaves no trace. It governs the conditions of its own refutation, supplying three readings of a discrepant occasion which are the ordinary operation of any description and which, in the governed case, cannot be defeated. It produces part of the evidence that confirms it, and the evidence is genuine, which is what makes the confirmation unanswerable. The loop closes fastest in a household, for five reasons that vary with the arrangements of [Chapter 5](#).

The mechanism is indifferent to what the name says. A favourable name adds a conditionality with no counterpart in the depriving case, and the child acquires an interest in sustaining a description whose maintenance requires that he not practise asking, needing, or faltering visibly.

And one distinction survives: between a name that states a position and one that states an essence, identifiable by whether its object could be the party who refutes it.

Proposition 19.7. *Part III establishes what a name is, four mechanisms by which it operates, their indifference to valence, and one distinction among names. It establishes nothing about harm.*

What the Part has not established should close it, as it has closed every chapter.

It has not shown that a child in any of the structures described is worse off. [§17.4.1](#) identified what a child acquires and recorded that none of it is false, and [§18.3.2](#) recorded that a practised capacity is a real capacity rather than a deficit. What the Part has identified is a class of occasions not had and a repertoire therefore not developed, and [§8.1.1](#) recorded that whether such an absence costs anything is Part VI's question.

It has not supplied a scale. [§19.3.3](#) established that the surviving distinction applies to names rather than to households, that no household is characterised by it, and that it cannot be acted on by choosing words. [§8.1.1](#) required that the diagnostic Parts yield no instrument for ranking households, and this Part meets the requirement in the manner [§13.3.1](#) identified as the only one that counts, which is by producing something that could not be so used.

And it has not shown that the mechanisms it describes are avoidable. [§14.1.1](#) recorded that a household in which no adult held any standing description of a child would be a household in which no adult had learned anything about him, and [§16.2.2](#) recorded that the readings are what any description does. Nothing in this Part is a description of a mistake.

One remark closes the Part.

§16.4 recorded that a reader may find the account too closed to be true, since children do escape descriptions held of them and households do revise. The Part's answer has been given in pieces and can be stated once. The structure is closed from within: §16.2.2 established that every route by which evidence might reach a governed name is itself governed, and §16.3.1 established that the child cannot supply what would reach it. What is not closed is the arrangement. §17.3.1 established that the five conditions of closure are conditions rather than constants, that they vary with how many adults hold accounts and how many settings a child has, and §19.2.1 established that a positional name refers to an arrangement and is disturbed when the arrangement changes. Arrangements change for reasons having nothing to do with any household's descriptions. That is where escape comes from in this account, and ch. 81 must say whether anything follows from it that a household could act on.

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Part IV

The Gaze and Recognition

Chapter 20

The Structure of Subject Confirmation

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks why a subject requires confirmation from another, and answers that the requirement is structural rather than a weakness in particular subjects.

It supplies what [Chapter 10](#) and [Chapter 14](#) assumed. Those Parts described what becomes of a child under a description and under a fixed direction of settling, and both presupposed that the descriptions matter to him. This chapter establishes why they do, and [ch. 24](#) then establishes what follows normatively.

It does not treat what happens when confirmation is scarce, which is [ch. 21](#), nor what recognition is owed, which is [ch. 24](#). It does not hold that a subject requiring confirmation is dependent in any pejorative sense, and [§20.1.2](#) states why the framework cannot hold this.

The reader should carry forward the impossibility of self-confirmation, the distinction between confirmation and approval, and the sense in which a child's day is the literal architecture of the problem.

20.1 The Impossibility of Self-Confirmation

20.1.1 The Structural Argument

A subject cannot confirm himself, and the reason is not that subjects are weak or that self-assessment is unreliable. It is that confirmation is a relation and a relation requires two terms.

[§6.1.1](#) held that terms are stabilisations within a process and that the process is prior in the order of explanation. [§6.1.2](#) held that a stabilisation is a self-maintaining pattern and that it is maintained rather than possessed. Take these together and a question arises that this chapter answers: what maintains the pattern that is a subject?

Consider what would be required for a subject to maintain himself. He would have to hold an account of himself and to hold it as warranted, and the warrant would have to come from somewhere. Three candidates present themselves and each fails.

The first is that the warrant comes from the account's coherence. A subject might hold an account of himself that hangs together, and the hanging together might be what warrants it. This fails because coherence is cheap. [§1.25.3](#) established that a redescription is always available, and an account of oneself that is coherent and false is not difficult to hold. Coherence rules out very little, and what it rules out is not what is at issue.

The second is that the warrant comes from the subject's own conduct. A subject might hold that he is a certain way because he observes himself being that way. This fails for a rea-

son Chapter 17 established. §17.1.1 held that an occasion is produced jointly, and a subject observing his own conduct is observing conduct produced in situations he did not wholly supply. §17.2.1 established that the resulting evidence is genuine, and the present point is that it is genuine evidence about a jointly produced occasion, which is not the same as evidence about him alone.

The third is that the warrant comes from nowhere and is not needed. A subject might simply hold what he holds. This fails because it does not describe a stabilisation rather than because it is impossible. §6.1.2 held that a pattern which is not being maintained is being lost at a rate that may be slow. An account held without warrant is not a stable account, and §7.1.2 established that what maintains a subject is a process other than the one in question, which is to say a process outside him.

Proposition 20.1. *A subject cannot supply his own warrant. Coherence rules out too little, self-observation observes jointly produced occasions, and an unwarranted account is not a maintained one. What maintains a subject is therefore something other than the subject.*

Two consequences follow and the second is what the chapter needs.

The first is that this argument is available in several traditions and the framework does not claim it. §1.10 recorded that the psychoanalytic tradition holds a version of it, §1.20 recorded a version in which the subject is constituted under a regard (Lacan, 1977), and the philosophical literature on recognition holds another (Hegel, 1977; Honneth, 1995). §6.3.2 held that a permission is displaced by showing that what it picks out was already sayable, and the impossibility of self-confirmation was sayable before this book. What the framework adds is stated in §20.2.1 and it concerns what confirmation consists in rather than that it is required.

The second is that the argument applies to adults as fully as to children. §7.1.2 established that adults may lack reserves and that the framework's account of a position applies to whoever occupies it. An adult requires confirmation and receives it continuously, from colleagues who treat him as competent, from friends who treat him as the person he takes himself to be, and from institutions that address him under a description. §7.1.1 established that what a reserve supplies is a stabilisation not maintained by the relation in question, and the present section identifies what the reserve is doing: it is confirming him.

20.1.2 The Separation from Weakness

The argument invites a reading the framework must refuse, and refusing it matters for everything that follows.

The reading is that a subject requiring confirmation is thereby dependent, that dependence is a deficiency, and that a mature subject would require less of it. This reading is available in ordinary thought about self-reliance, it has a long history, and it is wrong on the framework's account rather than merely unkind.

Three considerations establish this.

The first is that the requirement is not a quantity that could be reduced. §9.2.2 located an error of this form in the vocabulary of reduction, which requires that what is reduced be a magnitude. Confirmation is not a magnitude a subject consumes. It is a relation in which he stands, and §20.1.1 established that standing in some such relation is what being a maintained

pattern consists in. A subject who required less confirmation would not be a more independent subject; he would be a less stabilised one.

The second is that what looks like independence is a difference in the source. §7.1.1 established that reserves are relations, histories, and settings that maintain a subject. An adult who appears to require little confirmation from any particular party is an adult whose confirmation is distributed across many, so that no single source is conspicuous. §7.1.2 established that reserves accumulate unevenly. The appearance of self-sufficiency is the appearance of a well-distributed portfolio, and §9.1.2 recorded that constitutive weight is the asymmetry least often named.

And the third is that the pejorative reading has a specific effect on how children are described. If requiring confirmation is a weakness, then a child who requires a great deal of it is exhibiting a deficiency to be outgrown, and §1.25 recorded that nineteen traditions treat the child as the bearer of what develops. The pejorative reading is that commitment applied to the present case: it locates in the child a property, namely neediness, which the framework locates in a structure.

Proposition 20.2. *Requiring confirmation is not a deficiency and is not a quantity that maturity reduces. What changes with maturity is the number and independence of the sources, and a subject appearing self-sufficient is one whose confirmation is distributed rather than absent.*

One observation completes the section.

The distinction just drawn does practical work later in this book and it is worth marking where. ch. 77 must state what follows from the framework for what adults do, and §8.2.1 recorded that it supplies descriptions rather than instructions. A practical literature that treats a child's need for confirmation as something to be gradually withdrawn, so that he learns not to require it, is operating on the pejorative reading. On the present account such a withdrawal does not produce independence. It produces a subject with fewer sources, and §7.1.1 established what a subject with few sources is exposed to.

20.2 The Nature of Confirmation

20.2.1 The Operation

The preceding section established that a subject requires something from outside himself and did not say what. This section says what, and the saying is where the framework adds to an argument several traditions already hold.

Confirmation is the treating of a party as the party he is taken to be, in the conduct of an occasion. It is not primarily a statement about him, is not a judgement of his worth, and does not require anyone's approval.

Three features belong to the definition.

Confirmation operates in conduct rather than in assertion. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach rather than an account and that the approach is what the parties meet in. An adult who addresses a child as one who can be reasoned with has confirmed him as such, whether or not anything is said about his capacity for reason, and an adult who explains at length that he respects a child's judgement while consulting him about nothing has not.

§10.2.1 distinguished absorption from courtesy by whether the adult's account is exposed. The present distinction is its counterpart: confirmation is distinguished from assurance by whether the conduct treats the party as what the assurance says he is.

Confirmation is specific to a description. §7.1.2 established that reserves are reserves against something and §12.2.1 established that ossification admits of scope. The same holds here. A party is confirmed as competent, as reliable, as someone whose account bears on things, or as someone whose difficulty is real, and being confirmed in one respect leaves the others open. There is no global confirmation of a subject, and §22.1.1 takes up what follows when a household's available confirmations are few.

And confirmation admits of a kind of failure that is not disconfirmation. A party may be neither confirmed nor contradicted: the occasion may simply not address him under any description at all. §15.2.2 established that a foreclosed occasion leaves no trace, and the present observation is its counterpart on the recognition side. ch. 32 treats the case at length and §20.2.2 states its structure here.

Proposition 20.3. *Confirmation is the treating of a party, in the conduct of an occasion, as the party he is taken to be. It operates in conduct rather than assertion, is specific to a description rather than global, and may fail by absence rather than by contradiction.*

Three things confirmation is not should be separated, since each is frequently offered in its place.

Confirmation is not praise. §19.3.2 established that a response to an occasion is exhausted by the occasion and that a standing description is available in advance. Praise is a response and confirmation is neither: it is a property of how an occasion is conducted. A household may praise a great deal and confirm little, where the praise is warm and the conduct of occasions treats the child as one whose account bears on nothing. §13.1.2 established the mechanism in the giving position.

Confirmation is not approval. To be confirmed as the party one is taken to be is compatible with being taken to be in the wrong. An adult who tells a child that what he did was wrong, and who conducts the occasion as one between parties each of whom has an account, has confirmed him. §9.3.1 distinguished answerability from deference and the present point follows: the child whose objection is heard, considered, and rejected has been treated as a party who could have been right.

And confirmation is not being liked. §18.3.2 recorded that a favourable description admits a child, and §18.2.2 established that admission carries a condition. Being liked is a favourable standing description in the sense of Chapter 19. Confirmation is not a description at all, and §19.3.1 supplies the reason it cannot be one: a description settles a standing question about a party, and confirmation is what occurs when a party is treated as such on an occasion.

20.2.2 Confirmation and Its Absence

The third feature of §20.2.1 requires its own treatment, since the case it names is the one this book's Part on degradation will need.

A party may be contradicted: treated as other than he is taken to be, told he is wrong about himself, addressed under a description he does not hold. This is disconfirmation and it is

legible. §7.1.1 established that an adult subject to it may recognise it as a description operating, and §16.3.1 established that a child may not.

A party may also be unaddressed. The occasion proceeds, things are done, and at no point is he treated as anyone in particular. §15.2.2 established that the foreclosed occasion has no behavioural trace. The unaddressed party is that structure operating within an occasion rather than by an occasion's not arising: something happened, he was present, and nothing in what happened bore on who he was taken to be.

Proposition 20.4. *Absence of confirmation is not disconfirmation. A party contradicted has been addressed under a description; a party unaddressed has not been addressed at all, and the second leaves nothing for him to identify as having occurred.*

Two consequences follow and both pass forward.

The first is that the second case is the harder to report. A child who is told he is stupid has something to report, and §7.2.1 established that reporting it will not succeed. A child whom no occasion addresses has nothing to report, and §12.3.2 established the general form: he is not a party who disagrees with how he is described, since he is not being described. ch. 31 inherits this and ch. 32 treats the deliberate form of it.

The second is that the two cases are frequently confused in accounts of family harm. §11.2.1 established that accounts requiring an agent describe correctly the cases in which someone acted. Disconfirmation is such a case: someone said something, and the saying can be identified. Absence of confirmation is not, and §11.2.2 established that an absence of conduct is not thereby nothing. A household in which a child is regularly contradicted is a household an agent-requiring account can describe. A household in which nothing addresses him is not, and the second may be the worse case.

20.3 The Child's Position

20.3.1 The Architecture of a Day

Everything established so far applies to any subject. This section states what is peculiar to a young child, and the peculiarity is not that he requires more.

An adult's confirmations are numerous, distributed, and largely independent of one another. §20.1.2 established that this is what self-sufficiency consists in. Consider what this means concretely across a day: he is addressed as competent at work, as familiar by a shopkeeper, as a friend by a friend, as an authority on something by someone who asks him, and as the person he has long been by anyone who has known him long. No single source carries much of the load, and the failure of any one is absorbed by the others.

A young child's confirmations are few, are supplied by the same parties, and are therefore not independent. §7.1.1 established the four respects in which he lacks reserves and §17.3.1 established the five reasons a household's descriptions close on him faster than any other setting's. The present section adds the consequence for confirmation specifically. The parties who confirm him are the parties who describe him, and Chapter 16 established that the description governs the terms on which it could be disputed. His confirmation therefore arrives through the same channel as everything else about him, and there is no second channel.

Proposition 20.5. *An adult's confirmations are numerous, distributed, and independent. A young child's are few and arrive through the same parties who supply his descriptions, so that no source of confirmation is independent of any other.*

Three consequences follow and the third is what [ch. 21](#) requires.

The first is that the child's position is not one of greater need. [§20.1.2](#) refused the pejorative reading and it must be refused here in its most tempting form. A child is not a subject who requires an unusual quantity of confirmation. He is a subject whose confirmations are undiversified, and [§9.1.2](#) established that the founding asymmetry lies in the ranges rather than in what either party needs.

The second is that this is a fact about arrangements rather than about childhood. [§5.6.1](#) established that arrangements differ in how many adults are available and how many settings a child has, and [§17.3.1](#) established that the conditions of closure vary with them. A child in the distributed-kin configuration has more sources than a child in the configuration of dispersal, and [§7.1.2](#) established that reserves accumulate unevenly across arrangements. Nothing in this chapter is a claim about children as such.

And the third is that scarcity of sources produces competition for them. This has not been argued here and it is the subject of the chapter following. [§22.1.1](#) takes up what happens when the sources of confirmation available in a setting are few and the parties requiring confirmation are many, and [ch. 21](#) establishes that the scarcity is structural rather than a matter of what any household possesses.

20.4 The Bearing on What Follows

Three things pass forward and one supplies this Part's connection to the last.

The scarcity passes to [ch. 21](#). [§20.3.1](#) established that a child's confirmations are few and undiversified, and left the question of why the available sources should be scarce in a setting rather than merely few for a given child. That chapter treats the structural singularity of the confirming regard, and inherits from [§5.6.1](#) the observation that arrangements differ in how many parties are available to supply it.

The competition passes to [ch. 22](#). [§20.2.1](#) established that confirmation is specific to a description rather than global, which bears directly on whether it can be scarce at all: a household with one child and many available descriptions differs from a household in which one description is the one that matters. That chapter must establish under what conditions recognition becomes a thing parties compete for, and [§20.2.2](#) supplies the terms in which the loser's position should be described.

The absence passes to [ch. 32](#) and [ch. 31](#). [§20.2.2](#) established that absence of confirmation is not disconfirmation and that the unaddressed party has nothing to report. Both chapters inherit this, the first for the case where the absence is produced deliberately and the second for the case where it is not.

Proposition 20.6. *This chapter establishes that confirmation is required structurally, that it operates in conduct, that its absence differs from its contradiction, and that a child's sources are undiversified. It does not establish that confirmation is scarce, does not treat competition for it, and says nothing about what is owed.*

One matter closes the chapter and it is the connection to the preceding Part.

Chapter 14 through Chapter 19 described what a description does to a child and assumed throughout that descriptions matter to him. The present chapter supplies the reason and the reason is now statable in one sentence: a description matters to a subject because being addressed under it is among the things that maintain him, and §20.1.1 established that a subject is maintained from outside or not at all. This is also why the foreclosed occasion of §15.2.2 is not merely an absence of activity. An occasion that does not arise is an occasion on which a party would have been addressed and was not, and §20.2.2 established what that absence is.

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Chapter 21

The Singularity of the Gaze

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks why confirmation should be scarce, and answers that in certain arrangements one regard becomes the one that counts, so that what is abundant becomes unavailable.

It supplies the condition §20.3.1 identified and did not explain. That subsection established that a child's confirmations are few and undiversified. The present chapter establishes that fewness is produced by arrangements rather than being a fact about childhood, and identifies the structure that produces it.

It does not treat what follows when parties compete for a singular regard, which is ch. 22. It does not evaluate any society's arrangements, and §21.3.1 treats the arrangements in which singularity appears symmetrically and as responses to conditions.

The reader should carry forward the failure of the resource hypothesis, the account of what makes a regard singular, and the observation that singularity is a property of a structure rather than of a culture or of a quantity of resources.

21.1 The Resource Hypothesis

21.1.1 The Hypothesis and Its Failure

An account is widely held according to which competition among households over children's attainment is competition over scarce goods. Places at selective institutions are limited, credentials confer advantage, advantage is positional, and households therefore compete because the goods in question cannot be had by everyone. This subsection grants the account and then identifies what it does not explain.

The account is strong and its strength should be stated first.

Positional goods are real and their logic is well understood (Hirsch, 1976; Frank and Cook, 1995). Where a good's value depends on how many others hold it, obtaining it is competitive by construction, and the competition does not abate as the good becomes more available. §5.3.2 recorded that command over resources determines which configurations are available to a household, and an account grounded in scarce goods explains a great deal about what households do.

The account explains variation across time. Where the number of selective places falls relative to the number of candidates, competition intensifies, and the intensification follows the ratio rather than anything about the households. This has been documented across several societies and periods (Brown, 2000), and no framework denying it would be worth much.

And the account explains the direction of household effort. Where a credential is what confers advantage, effort goes to the credential, and §3.3.1 described the general mechanism by which what is measured becomes what is pursued. ch. 28 takes this up as its subject.

Proposition 21.1. *Where a good is positional, competition for it does not abate as it becomes more available, and the intensity of competition follows the ratio of places to candidates. This accounts for much of what households do about attainment.*

The account's limit is reached at an observation it predicts wrongly, and the observation is not obscure.

On the resource account, competition should be most intense where resources are scarcest, since a household with little has most to gain from the positional good and most to lose from failing to obtain it. A household already possessed of what the credential confers should compete least, having least at stake.

The observation runs the other way. Households at the upper end of the distribution compete hardest, invest most, and organise a child's time most thoroughly around attainment. §5.3.2 recorded that such households resemble one another across societies in the intensity of adult involvement, in purchased enrichment, and in the treatment of a child's schedule as something to be managed (Lareau, 2011; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2019). The finding is not marginal and it holds across the coverage of Chapter 5.

Two replies are available to the resource account and neither succeeds.

The first holds that upper-end households compete hardest because they can, and that intensity tracks capacity rather than need. This is correct as far as it goes and does not rescue the account, since the account explains competition by what is at stake. A household with less at stake competing more intensely is a household whose conduct the account's own variable predicts wrongly, and the observation that it has the means to do so explains how rather than why.

The second holds that what such households compete for is the maintenance of position rather than the credential, so that they have as much at stake as anyone. This is a better reply and it relocates the account's variable rather than defending it. Maintenance of position is not a scarce good in the sense the account requires; it is a relation to others, and §12.2.2 established that a relation to others is not a holding. The reply concedes that what is being competed for is not a resource.

Proposition 21.2. *Competition over children's attainment is most intense where resources are least scarce. The resource account predicts the opposite, and the available replies either explain capacity rather than motive or relocate the object of competition to something that is not a resource.*

Three observations complete the section, and the third states what the remainder of the chapter must supply.

The first is a caution about the evidence. The finding that upper-end households invest most is drawn from research conducted disproportionately in particular societies, and §4.1.1 recorded that a sampling objection is correct and insufficient. What can be said is that the finding recurs across the several societies where it has been examined and that it is inconsistent with the resource account's prediction in each. What cannot be said is that it holds universally, and §4.3.1 recorded that the evidence this book would need does not exist.

The second is that nothing here disputes that resources matter. §5.3.2 established that command over resources determines which configurations are available, and a household unable to purchase provision has fewer options than one that can. The claim is narrower: that the intensity of competition over a child's standing is not explained by what the household stands to gain materially.

And the third is that a competing explanation is required rather than merely a criticism. §10.1.2 established the general form of this obligation, that displacing an account requires saying what varies in its place. §21.2.1 supplies the answer: what is scarce is the regard under which a child can be confirmed rather than the good, and the scarcity is produced by the structure of the confirming rather than by the quantity of anything.

21.2 The Structure of Singularity

21.2.1 The Nature of Singularity

§20.2.1 established that confirmation is specific to a description rather than global. It follows that confirmation is abundant in principle: a party may be confirmed as competent at one thing, as reliable in another, as a person whose account bears on a third, and the descriptions do not compete with one another. A setting containing many available descriptions contains many available confirmations.

A regard is singular where one description is the one under which confirmation counts. The other descriptions remain available and cease to matter, and the ceasing is the phenomenon this chapter names.

Three components produce singularity and they are separable.

The first is that the descriptions become commensurable. Where a child is competent at one thing and another child at a second, no comparison arises unless the two competences are placed on a common scale. §3.3.1 described the mechanism by which a way of describing becomes an administrative fact, and a scale is such a way of describing. What a scale supplies is a matter of the possibility of one: two parties who were not comparable become comparable, and §2.3.1 recorded that the schoolroom's assembling of children by age was the historical instance of exactly this.

The second is that the scale acquires a single direction. Commensurability alone yields comparison without ranking, since two parties may be compared in several respects at once and come out differently in each. A scale acquires direction where the respects are weighted into one, so that a party is above or below another simpliciter. §9.2.2 located an error of this form in the vocabulary of reduction, and the present case is its counterpart: what varies independently is treated as a magnitude.

And the third is that the position on the scale becomes what a party is confirmed as. This is the step that matters and it does not follow from the first two. A household may hold a scale, may know a child's position on it, and may confirm him under a dozen descriptions the scale does not touch. Singularity obtains where the position on the scale has become the description under which confirmation is conducted, so that confirmation under any other description is felt as consolation rather than as confirmation.

Proposition 21.3. *A regard becomes singular where descriptions are made commensurable, the*

resulting scale acquires a single direction, and position on that scale becomes the description under which confirmation is conducted. The three are separable and only the third produces singularity.

Four consequences follow and they establish that singularity is structural.

The first is that singularity does not require scarcity of anything. §21.1.1 established that the resource account fails. What the present account supplies in its place is a scarcity produced by structure: confirmation is abundant in principle and becomes scarce when only one description confers it. Nothing has to be in short supply for this to occur, and §20.2.1 established that confirmation is not a substance that could be.

The second is that singularity explains what the resource account could not. A household with abundant resources faces the same structure as one without, since the structure concerns which description confirms rather than what anyone holds. §5.3.2 recorded that upper-end households resemble one another across societies, and the resemblance follows: they are households for which the scale's confirmations are the ones available, and having resources does not supply an alternative description under which a child might be confirmed in its place.

The third is that singularity is not produced by anyone's decision. §16.2.2 established the general form. No party in a household decides that position on a scale shall be what counts, and §3.3.1 established that a way of describing arrives in a setting and becomes the way things are seen. A household that finds itself conducting confirmation in the scale's terms has not chosen to, and §15.3.1 established that the parties experience responsiveness to what matters rather than a choice about what shall matter.

And the fourth is that singularity is reversible in principle by the availability of a second description. §7.1.2 established that reserves are supplied by relations, settings, and histories that the relation in question does not govern. A child confirmed under a description the scale does not touch, by a party the scale does not govern, has a reserve in exactly the sense that chapter defined. ch. 23 takes this up and §21.3.1 identifies where such parties are found.

21.2.2 The Instruments of Commensuration

The first two components of §21.2.1 are supplied by instruments, and the instruments are the subject of Chapter 3.

A ranking makes children commensurable and supplies a direction in one operation. A mark on a common scale does the same. An age norm does it across children who have never met, since a child described as behind is being compared with a distribution. §2.3.2 established that each of the founding instruments renders a child as a position in a distribution and that each was administrative before it was scientific. The present observation is that the instrument's output is precisely the commensurable, directed scale that §21.2.1 identified as singularity's first two components.

Proposition 21.4. *The instruments described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 supply commensurability and direction as their normal output. They do not supply the third component, and singularity obtains only where the third is added.*

Two observations follow and both matter for how this chapter is read.

The first is that the instruments are not thereby indicted. §2.3.2 granted that they answer

real administrative questions, and §3.3.1 established that what an instrument installs is a way of describing rather than a judgement. An instrument that produces a scale has produced a scale, and §21.2.1 established that the third component is what makes a scale singular. A school may rank and a household may confirm a child under a dozen descriptions the ranking does not touch.

The second is that the third component is where a household's own conduct enters, and this is the only point in the chapter at which it does. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria for identifying a household as failing, and the present observation is not such a criterion. What it identifies is where the mechanism operates: not in whether a household knows a child's position, but in whether the position has become the terms in which he is met. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach rather than an account, and singularity is a property of approaches.

21.3 The Arrangements in Which Singularity Appears

21.3.1 The Arrangements Compared

Singularity is a property of a structure and the structure is realised in arrangements that differ. This section describes several, and it describes them under the commitment §1.26.4 stated: an arrangement is a response to conditions, and describing one as a deformation prejudges the conditions it responds to.

Four arrangements can be distinguished by what supplies the scale and how many scales are available.

There are arrangements in which a public examination is the principal route to further education and to a range of occupations. The examination is administered at a common age, it produces a mark on a single scale, and the mark determines what follows. §2.5.2 treated the imperial examination and established that a sorting apparatus of great longevity produced no science of individual differences, so the present observation concerns contemporary arrangements rather than that history. Examination-centred arrangements are found across East Asia, across South Asia, in France, in much of the Middle East and North Africa, and in a number of Latin American and African systems. The scale is singular by construction, since the examination is one examination.

There are arrangements in which selection is distributed across many institutions with their own criteria, so that several scales operate and a candidate is assessed on a compound of them. Admission in the United States is the examined case: marks, tests, activities, essays, and recommendations enter a judgement that no single scale represents. §21.2.1 established that commensurability and direction are separable components, and the present arrangement supplies commensurability across a wider domain while making the direction less legible. A household in such an arrangement does not know what the scale is, and the response documented in the literature is to invest in every candidate dimension.

There are arrangements in which selection is deferred and the scale operates late. Several Northern European systems admit to higher education on the basis of a school-leaving qualification with wide availability, and the sorting that occurs earlier is between tracks rather than by rank. §5.2.1 recorded that provision differs in what it is for, and a system in which early

sorting is by kind rather than by position supplies more than one description under which a child may be doing well.

And there are arrangements in which no institutional scale reaches most children, because participation in the institution is partial. §5.3.1 described households in which subsistence requires a child's participation, and §2.3.1 established that the removal of children from production was a condition under which the developmental question became askable. Where a child's day is substantially outside the institution, the institution's scale is one of several things bearing on how he is regarded.

Proposition 21.5. *Arrangements differ in whether one scale or several supply commensuration, in how legible the direction is, in how early sorting occurs, and in how much of a child's day the scale reaches. Singularity is more available in some of these than in others and is not produced by any of them alone.*

Three observations govern how this comparison should be read, and the first two are the ones the commitment of §1.26.4 requires.

The first is that none of these arrangements is a mistake and each answers a real problem. A public examination administered at a common age is a device for allocating scarce places without regard to who a candidate's family is, and §2.5.2 recorded that this was its purpose in the case examined there. A distributed and compound assessment is a device for admitting qualities a single examination cannot detect. A deferred sorting is a device for not fixing a child's course before it can be known. Each answers a difficulty the others answer less well, and §4.3.1 recorded that this book supplies no ranking of arrangements.

The second is that singularity is not confined to the first arrangement and may be more severe in the second. An arrangement with one legible scale supplies a household with a clear object and a bounded one: a mark is obtained or it is not, and the obtaining is over. An arrangement with an illegible compound supplies no bound, since no achievement is sufficient and every dimension remains open. §21.2.1 established that singularity consists in position becoming the description under which confirmation is conducted, and an unbounded position is one under which confirmation is never complete. A reader who takes examination-centred arrangements to be the case this chapter is about has taken the most legible instance for the most severe.

And the third is that within-arrangement variation exceeds between-arrangement variation, as §5.3.2 established for the conditions generally. Households in every arrangement differ in whether the third component of §21.2.1 obtains, and §21.2.2 established that the first two components are supplied by instruments while the third is not. Nothing follows about a society from anything in this section.

21.3.2 The Household's Position

One matter remains and it concerns what a household can do about an arrangement it did not make.

§21.2.1 established that singularity requires a third component and that the component is a property of approaches rather than of what a household knows. It follows that a household in an examination-centred arrangement is not thereby a household in which a child is confirmed

only under his mark, and that a household in a deferred-sorting arrangement is not thereby one in which he is confirmed under several descriptions.

Two considerations complicate this and neither should be omitted.

The first is that the household does not control what the child encounters elsewhere. §14.1.1 established that names are portable and §17.3.1 established that a child's settings may agree or differ. A household may confirm a child under many descriptions while every other setting he enters confirms him under one, and §7.1.2 established that a reserve requires a process the description does not govern. What the household supplies is one such process and it is not the only one that bears.

The second is that the household's own confirmations are subject to the same pressure. §11.1.1 established that a description settles occasions cheaply and that the cheaper course is taken without anyone choosing a policy. Where a scale is available and legible, confirming a child under it is cheap, and confirming him under a description the scale does not touch requires the labour §14.2.1 described. A household under the conditions of §5.2.2 has less of what that labour requires.

Proposition 21.6. *Whether a household's confirmations are singular is not determined by the arrangement it is in. The arrangement determines what is cheaply available and what the child encounters elsewhere, and the household's capacity to supply an alternative description is subject to the conditions of Chapter 5.*

One remark closes the section.

§21.1.1 established that competition is most intense where resources are least scarce, and the present chapter has supplied an account under which this is intelligible. Households with resources are households for which the scale's confirmations are available and abundantly pursued, and §21.2.1 established that resources supply no alternative description. A household that can purchase a great deal cannot purchase a second regard under which a child might be confirmed, since §20.2.1 established that confirmation is a property of how occasions are conducted rather than a good. This is the chapter's answer to the observation it began with, and ch. 23 takes up what would supply what cannot be purchased.

21.4 The Bearing on What Follows

Three things pass forward.

The competition passes to ch. 22. §21.2.1 established that confirmation is abundant in principle and becomes scarce where one description confers it. What follows for parties who require confirmation from the same source has not been treated, and that chapter must establish under what conditions recognition becomes something parties take from one another. §20.2.2 supplies the terms in which the position of the party who does not obtain it should be described.

The alternative description passes to ch. 23. §21.2.1 established that singularity is reversible in principle by the availability of a second description supplied by a party the scale does not govern, and §21.3.2 established that a household cannot purchase one. That chapter must say what supplies it, and it inherits the constraint that whatever supplies it must not be an instrument, since §21.2.2 established that an instrument's normal output is a scale.

And the indices pass to [ch. 28](#). [§21.2.2](#) established that the first two components of singularity are the ordinary output of instruments described in [Chapter 3](#). The Part on goals and indices treats what happens to a household organised around measured quantities, and it inherits from this chapter the observation that measurement supplies commensurability and direction without supplying the third component, so that the question for that Part is what adds the third.

Proposition 21.7. *This chapter establishes that the resource account fails, that singularity is produced by three separable components of which instruments supply two, and that arrangements differ in what they make cheaply available. It does not establish what follows for competition, what would supply an alternative description, or that any arrangement is worse than another.*

Two matters close the chapter and the first is the re-derivation.

[§7.2.1](#) requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available in this case or replaced. The proposition here concerns what a party does when the regard under which he can be confirmed is singular. In the corpus, and in the literature on positional competition granted in [§21.1.1](#), a party may withdraw from the competition. He may decide that the scale does not measure what he values, may seek confirmation in a domain the scale does not reach, and may hold that the whole arrangement is a poor one. Each of these requires a standpoint from which the scale is one scale, and [§7.1.1](#) established that a young child has none.

The replacement proposition is this. Where a young child's confirmations are conducted under a single description, he does not experience the description as one among the possible ones, and the operation of withdrawing from a competition is unavailable to him because the competition is not something he entered. [§45.4](#) established that a governed approach reaches him as a property of the world; the present proposition is its counterpart on the recognition side, that a singular regard reaches him as what regard is. The consequence is that an account asking whether a child has internalised a competitive standard has posed a question presupposing that he encountered the standard as a standard.

The second matter concerns what this chapter has contributed and what a reader may fairly dispute.

The contribution is an account of scarcity that does not appeal to scarce goods. [§21.1.1](#) established that the resource account predicts wrongly on an observation that is not obscure, and [§21.2.1](#) supplied a mechanism under which the observation is intelligible. [§8.3.1](#) listed a demonstration that the framework's descriptions are available without it as the most damaging finding against this book. The relevant test here is whether the literature on positional competition already contains the account, and it does not, since that literature's variable is the ratio of places to candidates and this chapter's is the number of descriptions under which confirmation is conducted.

What a reader may dispute is the third component. [§21.2.1](#) held that commensurability and direction do not produce singularity and that position becoming the description of confirmation does. Nothing in this chapter establishes that the third component ever obtains, that it is common, or that it can be detected. [§12.1.2](#) established that a household cannot determine its own state by introspection and [§15.3.1](#) established that the parties experience responsiveness. A reader who holds that the third component is a distinction without a difference has raised

the objection [ch. 90](#) must answer, and this chapter has not answered it.

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Chapter 22

The Zero-Sum Form of Recognition

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks how recognition becomes something parties take from one another, and answers that a singular regard converts an abundant thing into a divided one. It supplies what [Chapter 21](#) left owing. That chapter established that a regard becomes singular where position on a scale becomes the description under which confirmation is conducted, and did not say what follows for parties who require confirmation from the same source. The present chapter establishes the conversion, describes what the party who does not obtain recognition is left with, and treats ranking as the device by which the conversion is effected at scale.

It does not treat what would restore abundance, which is [ch. 23](#), nor what is owed to a party who obtains nothing, which is [ch. 24](#).

The reader should carry forward the argument that recognition is not intrinsically scarce, the two conditions under which it becomes divided, and the account of ranking as a device that produces singularity rather than reporting it.

22.1 The Divisibility of Recognition

22.1.1 The Contingent Scarcity of Recognition

Recognition has no natural scarcity, and establishing this is necessary before the conditions of its scarcity can be identified.

[§20.2.1](#) established that confirmation is the treating of a party, in the conduct of an occasion, as the party he is taken to be. Three features of that definition bear on divisibility.

Confirmation is not a substance transferred. [§10.2.1](#) distinguished absorption from a gift by observing that a gift is a transfer of something held. Confirmation is not held by anyone and is therefore not transferred: an adult who confirms a child has not thereby less of anything, and [§10.1.1](#) established that what passes across an asymmetry settles matters rather than moving holdings.

Confirmation is specific to a description. [§20.2.1](#) established this and [§21.2.1](#) drew the consequence: a setting containing many available descriptions contains many available confirmations, and two parties confirmed under different descriptions are not in competition.

And confirmation is not exhausted by being given. An adult who treats one child as a party whose account bears on things is not thereby unable to treat another so. The occasions are separate and the treating is a property of each.

Proposition 22.1. *Recognition is not a holding, is specific to a description, and is not exhausted*

by being supplied. It is therefore not scarce by its nature, and any scarcity in it is produced by something other than its own character.

Two conditions convert this abundant thing into a divided one, and they must both obtain.

The first is singularity, in the sense §21.2.1 established. Where one description is the one under which confirmation counts, the many available descriptions cease to supply alternatives, and parties who would have been confirmed under different descriptions are now candidates for the same one.

The second is comparison within the description. Singularity alone does not divide, since a description may be one that several parties satisfy. Where the description is a position on a scale, and a scale has one top, satisfying it is not something several parties can do. §21.2.1 established that a scale acquires a single direction as its second component, and the present observation is that a directed scale supplies a description that is by construction not shareable.

Proposition 22.2. *Recognition becomes divided where a single description confers it and the description is a position on a directed scale. Neither condition alone divides, and the division is a property of the description rather than of anything anyone possesses.*

Three observations follow.

The first is that the division is not an intensification of an existing scarcity. §21.1.1 established that the resource account predicts wrongly, and the present account explains why: there was nothing scarce to intensify. What has occurred is the construction of a scarcity out of something abundant, and §21.2.1 established that the construction requires no shortage of anything.

The second is that this is not confined to households or to institutions. Any setting in which one directed description confers confirmation divides it, and §7.1.2 established that the framework's account of a position applies to whoever occupies it. A workplace with a single legible measure of standing divides recognition among adults in the same manner (Espeland and Sauder, 2007).

And the third is that the division operates independently of anyone's intent. §16.2.2 established the general form and it holds here. Two parties competing for a single description have not decided to compete, since the description was already the one under which confirmation was conducted, and §15.3.1 established that the parties experience responsiveness to what matters. §22.2.1 treats the case in which the parties are children in one household and did not choose to be candidates for anything.

22.2 The Conversion in Two Settings

22.2.1 Children in One Household

The household case is the one this book must treat and it is the one where the conversion is least visible, since a household is not ordinarily thought of as a setting in which children compete for anything.

Consider what a household supplies. §20.3.1 established that a young child's confirmations arrive through the same parties who supply his descriptions and that no source is independent of any other. Where a household contains two children, both are confirmed by the same parties,

and §22.1.1 established that this alone divides nothing: an adult may confirm one child as careful and another as quick, and the two descriptions do not compete.

The conversion occurs where the household's confirmations run through a single description. Where one description is the one under which a child is met, and the description admits of more and less, two children in one household are candidates for one thing. §21.2.1 established that this is singularity and §22.1.1 established that a directed description is not shareable.

Three features of the household case distinguish it.

The parties did not choose to be candidates. §7.1.1 established that a child cannot leave and §22.1.1 established that the division operates without anyone's intent. A child in this position has not entered a competition, is not competing in any sense he could recognise, and §21.4 stated the replacement proposition: the operation of withdrawing is unavailable because the competition is not something he entered.

The comparison is frequently explicit and frequently kind. §18.1.1 recorded that a favourable name conveys what a household values while stating that the child embodies it. Where a household states what it values by naming the child who embodies it, the naming is a confirmation of one child and a specification, for the other, of the description under which confirmation is available. Nothing hostile need be said and §18.2.2 established that no adult states a condition.

And the comparison operates on descriptions the household did not construct. §21.2.2 established that instruments supply commensurability and direction as their normal output, and a household's children arrive home carrying marks. §14.1.1 established that names are portable, and a scale is portable in the same manner: it enters a household from outside and supplies a description under which the household's children are already comparable.

Proposition 22.3. *Where a household's confirmations run through one directed description, its children become candidates for a single thing. They did not enter a competition, the comparison may be entirely kind, and the description under which they are compared frequently originates outside the household.*

Two observations follow and the second concerns what the ordinary vocabulary supplies.

The first is that the second child's position is the one §20.2.2 described. He has not been told anything about himself, has not been disparaged, and has nothing to report. What has occurred is that the description under which confirmation is conducted has been satisfied by someone else, and §20.2.2 established that a party unaddressed has not been addressed at all. ch. 31 inherits this and it is among the cases that chapter must reach.

The second is that the ordinary vocabulary describes this as favouritism and thereby mis-describes it. Favouritism names a preference held by an adult, and §11.2.1 established that accounts requiring an agent describe correctly the cases in which someone acted. An adult who prefers one child has done something and could do otherwise. The case described here requires no preference: the adult may hold both children in equal regard, and the division follows from there being one description rather than from anyone's leaning toward anyone. §11.2.2 established the general form, and the present case is its counterpart in a setting with two children.

22.2.2 Children in One Classroom

The classroom case is where the structure is most legible, and it is worth treating because the legibility shows what the household case conceals.

A classroom assembles children of an age, sets them the same tasks, and assesses them on a common scale. §2.3.1 established that this arrangement was the condition under which the developmental question became askable, and §2.3.2 established that the founding instruments render a child as a position in a distribution. The classroom therefore supplies all three components of §21.2.1 by construction: commensurability, direction, and, where the position is what a child is met under, singularity.

Three observations distinguish this case from the household.

The scale is public. Every party knows where every other stands, or can infer it, and §22.3.1 treats what publicity does to a measure. In a household the comparison is available to the parties and is not announced; in a classroom it is announced, and the announcing is what a ranking is.

The parties are numerous and the top is one. §22.1.1 established that a directed description is not shareable, and where thirty parties are candidates for one description, twenty-nine do not obtain it. §20.2.2 established that the position of a party who is not addressed is different from that of a party contradicted, and in a classroom the twenty-nine are addressed: they are addressed as occupying the positions they occupy.

And the adult supplying the confirmation is not one whose regard the child requires in the sense of §20.3.1. A teacher is one source among a child's several and is present for a portion of a year, and §17.3.1 established that the household's loop closes faster for five reasons. This is why the classroom case, though more legible, is not the more severe one.

Proposition 22.4. *A classroom supplies all three components of singularity by construction, makes the resulting comparison public, and produces many parties who do not obtain the single description. Its regard is nonetheless one among a child's several, which the household's is not.*

One observation completes the section and it concerns why the two cases are treated together.

§14.1.1 established that names travel between settings and §17.3.1 established that a child whose settings agree has an account confirmed everywhere he goes. The classroom supplies a scale, the scale enters the household, and §22.2.1 established that a household's children arrive home carrying marks. Where the household then conducts its confirmations under the description the classroom supplied, the two settings have become one for the present purpose, and §7.1.2 established that a reserve requires a process the description does not govern. The child in that situation has no setting in which a different description confers confirmation, and this is the condition ch. 23 must address.

22.3 Ranking as a Device

22.3.1 The Operation of a Ranking

A ranking is generally understood to report a state of affairs. This subsection argues that it produces one, and the argument is available in the literature on measurement (Espeland and

Sauder, 2007; Espeland and Stevens, 1998) and is granted rather than claimed.

A ranking takes parties who differ in many respects and returns an order. §21.2.1 established that commensurability and direction are the first two components of singularity and that instruments supply them. A ranking supplies both in one operation and adds a third thing the components do not require: it makes the order public and continuous, so that a party's position is available to him and to everyone at all times.

Three effects follow and each is documented.

Parties act on the ranking rather than on what it measures. Where a position is what confers standing, effort goes to the position, and §3.3.1 described the general mechanism by which what is measured becomes what is pursued. ch. 28 treats this at length.

The ranking alters what it measures. Where parties act on it, the underlying distribution changes in response to the measurement (Sauder and Espeland, 2009), and the measurement subsequently reports a distribution it helped produce. §17.2.1 established the general form of this: the evidence is genuine and is genuine evidence about a jointly produced situation.

And the ranking supplies a description that did not exist before it. Before a ranking, a party is competent at various things. After it, he is somewhere in an order, and this is a description of him that the ranking created rather than found. §14.1.1 established that a name settles a standing question about a party, and a position in a public order is such a name.

Proposition 22.5. *A ranking supplies commensurability, direction, and publicity in one operation, alters the distribution it reports by being acted upon, and creates a description of each party that did not exist before the ranking existed.*

Two matters close the section.

The first is that nothing here holds that ranking is illegitimate. §21.2.2 established that instruments answer real administrative questions and §21.3.1 established that each arrangement answers a difficulty the others answer less well. A ranking allocates scarce places by a rule rather than by who a candidate's family is, and §2.5.2 recorded that this was the purpose of the case examined there. A book that treated ranking as a mistake would be treating an answer to a real problem as an error.

The second is that the household is not obliged to adopt the description a ranking supplies. §21.3.2 established that whether a household's confirmations are singular is not determined by the arrangement it is in, and §21.2.1 established that the third component is where a household's own conduct enters. What a ranking supplies is a description that is cheap to confirm under, and §11.1.1 established that the cheaper course is taken without anyone choosing a policy. The household's position is a claim of that adopting it requires nothing and declining it requires labour.

22.4 The Bearing on What Follows

Two things pass forward and one debt is discharged.

The question of what restores abundance passes to ch. 23. §22.1.1 established that recognition is not scarce by its nature and that two conditions divide it. It follows that removing either condition restores it, and §22.2.2 identified what the child in the compounded case lacks: a setting in which a different description confers confirmation. That chapter must say what supplies

such a setting, and it inherits from §21.3.2 the constraint that a household cannot purchase one and from §21.2.2 the constraint that an instrument cannot be it.

The position of the party who obtains nothing passes to ch. 24. §22.2.1 established that the second child has not been told anything about himself and has nothing to report. §20.2.2 established that this is an absence rather than a contradiction. What such a party is owed has not been treated anywhere in this book, and §7.3.1 established only that the parties to a constitutive relation are answerable. The chapter closing this Part must say what answerability requires where a child supplies no reason to confirm him.

Proposition 22.6. *This chapter establishes that recognition is divided by two conditions rather than being scarce by nature, that the division requires no one's intent, and that ranking produces the description it appears to report. It does not establish what restores abundance and says nothing about what is owed.*

The debt discharged is §20.3.1's. That subsection established that a child's confirmations are few and undiversified and left the scarcity unexplained. Chapter 21 supplied the structure and the present chapter has supplied its consequence: the fewness is a fact about how many descriptions confer confirmation among them, and a child with four attentive adults all conducting confirmation under one description has one source rather than four.

Two matters close the chapter.

The first is the re-derivation. §7.2.1 requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available or replaced. The proposition here concerns what a party does when recognition in a setting has become divided and he is not obtaining it. In the corpus, and in the ordinary case among adults, such a party may seek recognition elsewhere, may revalue what the setting values, or may hold that the setting's measure does not measure him. §7.1.1 established that each requires a standpoint the young child lacks, and §21.4 stated the replacement proposition for singularity generally.

What must be added for the divided case is this. Where recognition is divided among children in one household, the party who does not obtain it cannot seek it elsewhere within the household, since the household is one setting with one description, and cannot revalue what the household values, since §18.1.1 established that a favourable name conveys what a household values in the act of stating that another child embodies it. The consequence is that the operation available to him is to become the party the description names, and §18.2.2 established what pursuing a description requires a child to stop practising. ch. 31 inherits this.

The second matter concerns the neutrality this chapter has had to maintain. §21.3.1 treated four arrangements symmetrically and §22.3.1 declined to treat ranking as a mistake. The present chapter's material is nonetheless the material most often used to characterise particular societies, and the characterisation is available in a substantial popular literature. What this chapter has established is that the conversion requires singularity and a directed description, that both may obtain in any arrangement, that a household in any arrangement may decline the third component at a cost in labour, and that within-arrangement variation exceeds between-arrangement variation as §5.3.2 established for the conditions generally. A reader who takes this chapter as an account of one society's examination culture has taken a structural claim for a cultural one, and §4.2 recorded the general form of that error.

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Draft

Chapter 23

The Possibility of Mutual Confirmation

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what would restore to a child a description under which he might be confirmed otherwise, and answers that it is a reversal in the direction of confirming rather than a second source of the same kind.

It supplies the Part's positive material. [Chapter 21](#) established that singularity is reversible in principle by a description the scale does not govern, and [Chapter 22](#) established that a household cannot purchase one and that an instrument cannot be one. The present chapter identifies what remains, and the answer is the counterpart in this Part of what [Chapter 10](#) identified in the Part on asymmetry.

It does not hold that the adult's confirming regard should be reduced, and [§23.1](#) argues that its reduction is abandonment rather than remedy. It does not treat what is owed to a child who confirms no one, which is [ch. 24](#).

The reader should carry forward the refusal of abolition, the account of what a child confirms an adult as, and the conditions under which the reversal is available.

23.1 Against the Abolition of the Adult's Gaze

23.1.1 The Impossible Remedy

An account of the preceding two chapters invites a remedy, and the remedy is impossible in a way worth setting out, since the setting out shows what a real remedy would have to look like.

The remedy runs as follows. If a child's confirmations are undiversified, arrive through parties who also describe him, and are conducted under a single description, then the adult's regard is the problem. Reduce its weight. Let the child be less dependent on what the adults think of him. Cultivate in him a capacity to confirm himself, so that the singular regard loses its power.

Three considerations establish that this cannot be done, and the third establishes that it should not be wished for.

The first is that self-confirmation is unavailable in principle. [§20.1.1](#) established that a subject cannot supply his own warrant, that coherence rules out too little, that self-observation observes jointly produced occasions, and that an unwarranted account is not a maintained one. A programme of cultivating self-confirmation is a programme of cultivating something that does not exist, and [§20.1.2](#) established that a subject requiring less confirmation would be a less stabilised subject rather than a more independent one.

The second is that the reduction cannot be performed by the party whose regard is at issue.

Suppose an adult resolves that his regard shall matter less to a child. The resolving is itself conducted in occasions, and §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach rather than an account. An adult withholding the weight of his regard is an adult conducting occasions in a certain manner, and §20.2.2 established what a party is left with where occasions do not address him.

The third is that the reduction, if achieved, would be the case ch. 35 describes. §18.3.1 established that a child around whom a household's defaults have rerouted lacks a class of occasions and that nothing was done to him. A child whose adults have deliberately made their regard weigh less is in that position by design. §20.1.2 recorded that a practical literature treating a child's need for confirmation as something to be withdrawn is operating on the pejorative reading, and the present observation states what the withdrawal amounts to.

Proposition 23.1. *The adult's confirming regard cannot be abolished, cannot be reduced by the party who holds it without the reduction being conducted as an absence of address, and would if reduced constitute the case this book describes as abandonment.*

Two consequences follow.

The first is that a remedy must operate on something other than the weight of the adult's regard. §21.2.1 established that singularity has three components and that the third is where a household's conduct enters. A remedy operating on the third component would be one that supplied a second description rather than one that weakened the first, and §21.3.2 established that a household cannot purchase one.

The second is that this closes off the most available practical advice. §19.1.1 established that the obvious distinctions among names collapse into content, and the present section establishes the parallel for the gaze: the obvious remedy collapses into abandonment. ch. 77 inherits both, and the inheritance is thin in the same manner.

23.1.2 The Residue of Availability

Three things have been ruled out and one remains, and the remaining one is what this chapter treats.

A second adult supplying a second description has not been ruled out and is not what this chapter is about. §5.6.1 established that arrangements differ in how many adults are available, and §7.1.2 established that a reserve is supplied by a process the description in question does not govern. A grandmother who holds a different account of a child supplies exactly this (Rogoff, 2003), and §17.3.1 established that the distributed-kin configuration weakens the household's closure for this reason. This is a real remedy where the arrangement supplies it, it is a matter of who is present rather than of what anyone does, and §5.6 established that arrangements are largely not chosen by the households subject to them.

What has been ruled out is purchase, instrumentation, and abolition. §21.3.2 established that a household cannot buy a second regard, §21.2.2 established that an instrument's normal output is the scale rather than an alternative to it, and §23.1.1 has established the third.

What remains is a reversal in the direction of the confirming, and §23.2.1 states what this is.

Proposition 23.2. *Where the arrangement does not supply a second party, and where purchase,*

instrumentation, and abolition are unavailable, what remains is an alteration in the direction of confirmation rather than in its source, its weight, or its number.

One observation completes the section and it concerns the shape of this book's argument.

Chapter 9 established that what bears on generation is a question of whether what it produces moves in more than one direction, and Chapter 10 named the operation by which it moves. The present Part has arrived at the same place by a different route. §20.3.1 established that a child's confirmations are undiversified, Chapter 21 established that the scarcity is structural, Chapter 22 established that division requires no one's intent, and the remedies that would operate on quantity have each been ruled out. What is left is direction, and §23.2.1 establishes that the operation in question is the counterpart of absorption on the recognition side.

23.2 The Reversal

23.2.1 The Terms of a Child's Confirmation

The question this section answers is the one the Part has been approaching and which sounds implausible when first put: what would it be for an adult to be confirmed by a child.

§20.2.1 established that confirmation is the treating of a party, in the conduct of an occasion, as the party he is taken to be, and that it operates in conduct rather than in assertion. Nothing in that definition requires that the confirming party be the more capable one, the older one, or the one whose account settles matters. It requires only that an occasion be conducted in a certain way (Benjamin, 1988).

A child confirms an adult whenever an occasion is conducted in terms that treat the adult as a party of a certain kind. Three cases can be distinguished and the third is the one that matters.

A child confirms an adult as competent by relying on him. This is continuous and largely invisible, and it is what an adult in the giving position of §13.1.1 receives abundantly. §13.1.2 established that what returns to a giver is read as gratitude and placed on the ledger of the giving, and confirmation of this kind is subject to the same reading. It reaches the adult and does not alter his position.

A child confirms an adult as the party who decides by accepting what is decided. This too is continuous and it is what §10.1.1 described from the other side: an asymmetry settles matters in one party's terms, and the settling's going unchallenged is a confirmation of the party whose terms they are. §12.2.2 established that a position occupied continuously becomes a property of the party occupying it, and this case is the mechanism by which it does.

A child confirms an adult as a party whose account can be wrong, by supplying an account that bears on it (Trevanthen and Aitken, 2001). This is the case that alters the adult's position, and it is rare. §10.2.1 defined absorption as the alteration of what the favoured party holds, by what the other supplies, retained afterward. The present observation is that absorption and mutual confirmation are the same event described in two vocabularies: absorbing is what the adult does, and confirming the adult as a party who could be wrong is what the child has thereby been permitted to do.

Proposition 23.3. *A child confirms an adult continuously as competent and as the party who decides, and neither alters the adult's position. He confirms the adult as a party whose account can be wrong only where the adult's account is altered by what he supplies, and this is absorption described from the child's side.*

Three consequences follow and the second is the chapter's principal result.

The first is that mutual confirmation is not symmetrical and is not a reciprocity. §9.3.1 established that return is not reciprocity, that the parties are not doing the same thing, and that nothing requires a child to supply what an adult supplies. §7.3.1 established that the child is owed more rather than less. Nothing here holds that the adult's confirming and the child's are equivalent operations, and §23.2.2 states what the asymmetry between them consists in.

The second is that the reversal supplies exactly what §21.2.1 identified as missing. That subsection established that singularity is reversible by a description the scale does not govern, supplied by a party the scale does not govern. A child who has confirmed an adult as a party whose account can be wrong stands, in that occasion, as a party whose account bore on something. §7.1.2 established that a reserve is a process maintaining an account of a subject that the description in question does not govern. The occasion in which a child's account altered an adult's is such a process, and it is one no scale supplied and no purchase could obtain.

And the third is that this explains why the two Parts of this book arrive at one operation. §23.1.2 observed the convergence and the present subsection accounts for it. Absorption and mutual confirmation are one thing, and the Part on asymmetry described it in terms of what becomes of power while the present Part describes it in terms of what maintains a subject. §6.2.1 held that subject, meaning, value, creation, and normativity co-emerge and that none is prior. The convergence of the two Parts is that claim appearing in the book's own structure.

23.2.2 The Boundaries of the Reversal

Four things the reversal is not should be separated, since each is what a reader is likely to substitute.

It is not the adult deferring. §9.3.1 established that answerability is not deference and that an adult who hears a child's account, considers it, and maintains his own has done what the condition requires. §23.2.1 requires that the account be altered by what the child supplies, and altering an account is not the same as adopting the child's. An adult may revise his view in a direction the child did not propose, having been moved to revise by what the child supplied.

It is not the adult performing uncertainty. An adult who states that he might be wrong, invites correction, and holds precisely what he held has conducted an occasion in which nothing was altered. §10.2.1 distinguished absorption from courtesy by whether the account is exposed, and §20.2.1 established that confirmation operates in conduct rather than in assertion. A stated openness is an assertion.

It is not the child being made responsible for the adult. §7.3.1 established that answerability runs from the parties to the child rather than from the child to the parties, and nothing in this chapter reverses that. A child whose account alters an adult's has not thereby acquired a duty to supply accounts, to attend to the adult's state, or to manage anything. ch. 24 takes up what is owed and the direction is unchanged.

And it is not an occasion the adult can arrange. §12.1.2 established that a household cannot

determine its own state by introspection, and §15.3.1 established that a governed approach is experienced as responsiveness. An adult who sets out to be altered by a child has set out to do something that consists in his account being exposed to what arrives, and the setting out does not produce the arriving. §23.3.1 states what does.

Proposition 23.4. *The reversal is not deference, not performed uncertainty, not a transfer of responsibility to the child, and not something an adult can arrange. It consists in an account's having been altered by what the other party supplied.*

23.3 The Conditions of the Reversal

23.3.1 The Conditions of Its Availability

The reversal cannot be arranged and can be made more or less available, and this section states by what.

Four conditions bear, and each has been established elsewhere in this book.

Occasions of a certain kind must exist. §10.2.1 established that what may be absorbed is conduct rather than primarily objections, questions, difficulty, and what a child makes, and §5.3.1 established that arrangements in which parties are engaged in one activity supply such occasions continuously. §5.2.2 established that arrangements differ in whether uncommitted time exists at all, and §10.2.3 established that absorption requires time not committed in advance.

The adult's account must be exposed on such occasions. §12.1.2 made this the criterion distinguishing the two households and §16.2.1 established what prevents exposure where a name governs the readings. This condition is not one an adult can meet by deciding to, and §23.2.2 established why.

The child must supply something. §17.1.2 established that an approach alters the range of conduct available on an occasion, and §18.2.2 established that a child under a favourable description does not practise supplying difficulty. A child who has learned what the occasions admit supplies what they admit, and §17.4.1 established that his repertoire is fitted to the range he has had.

And the adult must have something to spare. §10.2.3 established four costs and §7.1.2 established that an adult without reserves is one for whom being wrong is expensive. §12.2.2 established that where standing has sedimented into a property of the person, absorbing is a disturbance to what the adult takes himself to be, and §13.1.1 established that the giving role raises the cost further.

Proposition 23.5. *The reversal is available where occasions of the right kind exist, where the adult's account is exposed on them, where the child supplies something, and where the adult can afford the surrender. Three of the four are conditions of arrangements and dispositions rather than of decisions.*

Two observations complete the section.

The first is that the conditions are not independent and mostly move together. An arrangement supplying few uncommitted hours is one in which costs are high, in which a child learns

quickly what occasions admit, and in which the cheaper course of §11.1.1 is taken. §5.6.1 established that conditions occur in configurations rather than singly, and the present observation is that instance.

The second is that the one condition an adult has any purchase on is the third, and the purchase is indirect. §17.1.2 established that an approach alters the range of conduct available. An adult cannot decide to be altered, and the range of what a child supplies is partly a function of how occasions are conducted, so that an approach which admits difficulty is one on which difficulty may be supplied. ch. 77 inherits this as the thinnest of the practical inheritances and §8.2.1 constrains what may be made of it.

23.4 The Bearing on What Follows

Two things pass forward and one convergence is recorded.

The unreached case passes to ch. 24. §23.3.1 established four conditions and §23.2.1 established that the reversal consists in a child's account having altered an adult's. Nothing in this chapter addresses the child who supplies nothing that alters anything, whether because the conditions are absent or because he has nothing of the kind to supply. §22.2.1 described such a child and §20.2.2 established that his position is an absence rather than a contradiction. The chapter closing this Part must say what is owed to him, and it must say it without appeal to what he might supply.

The practical thinness passes to ch. 77. §23.1.1 established that the obvious remedy collapses into abandonment, §23.2.2 established that the reversal cannot be arranged, and §23.3.1 established that three of its four conditions are properties of arrangements rather than of decisions. What that chapter inherits is a description of an operation together with an argument that it is not available to be performed on purpose, and §8.2.1 recorded that the book supplies descriptions rather than instructions.

Proposition 23.6. *This chapter establishes that the adult's regard cannot be abolished, that what remains is a reversal in the direction of confirming, that the reversal is absorption described from the child's side, and that it cannot be arranged. It says nothing about the child who supplies nothing.*

The convergence recorded is between this Part and the second. §23.2.1 established that absorption and mutual confirmation are one event in two vocabularies, and §6.2.1 supplies the reason: subject, meaning, value, creation, and normativity co-emerge, so an account of what becomes of power and an account of what maintains a subject are accounts of one thing. §6.2.2 imposed the discipline that a claim belongs either to the ontological statement or to a component, and the present convergence belongs to the statement.

Two matters close the chapter, and the first is the re-derivation.

§7.2.1 requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available or replaced. The proposition here concerns mutual confirmation between parties. In the corpus, mutual confirmation between adults is an operation each may perform and each may decline: a party may confirm another as one whose account bears on things, may withhold the confirming, and may make the withholding known. The reciprocity is real and the parties are positioned alike.

The replacement proposition is this. Between an adult and a young child, mutual confirmation is not an operation the child performs. §23.2.1 established that a child confirms an adult as a party who can be wrong only where the adult's account is altered by what he supplies, and the altering is the adult's. The child's part is to supply something, and §23.3.1 established that what he supplies is a function of what the occasions have admitted. The consequence is that mutual confirmation between these parties is an operation with one performer and one occasion-supplier, and an account describing it as reciprocal has attributed to the child a capacity to confirm that requires the adult to have already exposed his account.

The second matter concerns what this chapter has and has not achieved for the Part.

§20.3.1 established a problem: a child's confirmations are few, arrive through the parties who describe him, and are not independent of one another. Chapter 21 and Chapter 22 established that the fewness is structural and that the available remedies are unavailable. The present chapter has identified what remains and has established that it cannot be arranged, that three of its four conditions are properties of arrangements, and that the fourth is a disposition an adult cannot adopt by deciding to.

This is a thin result and it should be called one. §8.1.1 required that the diagnostic Parts show something is lost and that the loss not be a renaming. The present Part has supplied a mechanism by which a thing that is abundant becomes scarce, and a description of what would reverse the scarcity together with an argument that the reversal is not at anyone's disposal. Whether the scarcity costs a child anything remains Part VI's question, and ch. 24 now takes up the question this Part cannot avoid: what is owed to a child in the position the three preceding chapters have described.

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Chapter 24

The Priority of Recognition

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what a child is owed who supplies nothing, and answers that recognition is the condition of generation rather than its reward.

It closes this Part and it is the chapter on which the framework's normative standing rests. [Chapter 22](#) left the position of the party who obtains nothing undescribed, and [Chapter 23](#) established that the reversal it identified requires a child to supply something. The present chapter must state what is owed where nothing is supplied, and must do so without appeal to what recognising him might yield.

It does not close the gap [§1.27.3](#) recorded, and [§24.4](#) states plainly what the framework cannot derive. It does not treat authority, which is [ch. 42](#).

The reader should carry forward the utilitarian re-entry and its disguises, the sense in which recognition is a condition, the case of the child who will yield nothing, and the account of what this chapter has and has not established.

24.1 The Utilitarian Re-entry

24.1.1 The Move and Its Disguises

A framework that grounds recognition in what recognising produces has made recognition conditional on production, and this section establishes that the move is available in several forms of which most do not announce themselves.

The plain form is rarely held. Few accounts state that a child is owed regard in proportion to what he will contribute, and an account stating it would be recognised as objectionable. What circulates in its place are formulations that entail it while appearing not to.

Four disguises should be separated.

The first is potential. A child is owed recognition because of what he might become, what is latent in him, what he could achieve given the right conditions. The formulation is generous in tone and it is the plain form with a temporal displacement: what grounds the regard is still an expected yield, and the expectation has merely been moved into the future. [§18.1.1](#) established that a favourable name admits a child on terms, and an account grounding recognition in potential has stated the terms.

The second is investment. A child is owed provision, attention, and regard because these produce outcomes that repay them, in his own life or in a society's. [§3.3.1](#) described how a way of describing becomes an administrative fact, and this formulation has become one: the vocabulary of returns to early intervention is the standard language in which the case for

provision is made to those who fund it (Heckman, 2006). §3.2.4 recorded that indicators travel and that a contested claim may be settled by transit. The formulation is effective and it grounds the regard in the return.

The third is flourishing. A child is owed the conditions under which he can develop fully, realise his capacities, become what he is capable of being. This is the most philosophically respectable of the four (Nussbaum, 2011) and it is the hardest to see through. What grounds the regard is a state the child is to reach, and §1.26.3 defined development as what a child becomes able to continue doing rather than as a state. An account grounding recognition in a state to be reached has made the regard instrumental to the state.

And the fourth is the one this framework is peculiarly exposed to. A child is owed recognition because recognition is what makes generation possible, and generation is what the framework values. §6.2.1 defined generativity as the production of states not previously available, and an account grounding recognition in its contribution to generativity has replaced usefulness with generativity while leaving the structure of the justification untouched.

Proposition 24.1. *Grounding recognition in potential, in returns, in a state to be reached, or in contribution to generativity are four forms of one move. Each makes the regard conditional on a yield, and the fourth is available in this framework's own vocabulary.*

Two observations establish why the fourth is the dangerous one.

The first is that it is sayable in the framework's terms without any distortion. §6.2.2 imposed the discipline that a claim belongs either to the ontological statement or to a component. An account holding that recognition should be extended because it sustains generation is drawing on the ontological statement directly, and §6.2.1 established that generativity is the property the framework attends to throughout. Nothing in the framework's vocabulary marks the move as illegitimate.

The second is that the move generalises beyond the individual case and becomes worse in generalising. Where recognition is grounded in its contribution to generation, the question of whose generation arises. A party whose recognition contributes little to any generation, and whose maintenance costs something, is a party for whom the ground fails. §7.3.1 established that the framework locates what a subject is owed in the position he occupies, and the present observation is that grounding it in yield would relocate it to what he produces.

24.1.2 The Wall

The framework's response is a prohibition and the prohibition must be stated as such, since it cannot be derived from anything already established.

A dynamical observation is not a normative justification, and the framework must not permit the first to function as the second.

§6.2.1 established that generation is the production of states not previously available, and the framework studies what supports it, what impedes it, and what redirects it. These are descriptive matters and they are legitimate. What is forbidden is the inference from a description of what sustains generation to a reason for doing it.

Three consequences follow and the third is the operative one.

The first is that the framework may observe that recognition sustains generation. §20.1.1 established that a subject cannot supply his own warrant and §23.2.1 established what a reversal

in the direction of confirming does. These are observations about how subjects are maintained and they stand.

The second is that the framework may not offer this observation as the reason a child is owed recognition. The observation says what recognition does. A reason would say why it should be extended, and §1.27.3 recorded that the framework's normative claims stand in need of a derivation this book has not supplied.

And the third is that the prohibition must hold in the hard case or it holds nowhere. Where a child's recognition sustains a great deal, the observation and the reason coincide and nothing is tested. Where a child's recognition sustains nothing that anyone can identify, the observation supplies no reason and the framework must still be able to say that he is owed it. §24.3 takes this up and it is the chapter's centre.

Proposition 24.2. *The framework may describe what recognition sustains and may not offer the description as a reason for extending it. The prohibition is tested only where the description supplies nothing, and a framework that abandoned it there would not hold it anywhere.*

Two matters complete the section.

The first is that this prohibition is not peculiar to the present chapter and governs the whole framework. An account holding that a household's arrangements are justified by their contribution to generation, that a practice is legitimate because it sustains a system's capacity to continue generating, or that a party's exclusion is intelligible at the level of the whole, has made the forbidden inference. ch. 42 inherits the prohibition and ch. 76 must apply it to this book's own instruments.

The second is that the prohibition has a cost and the cost is severe. A framework that may not justify by yield has fewer resources than one that may, and §9.3.2 recorded that this book cannot establish that any arrangement is wrong in itself. The prohibition removes the most available route to a normative conclusion and supplies no replacement, and §24.4 states what follows.

24.2 Recognition as a Condition

24.2.1 The Order of Priority

The framework's positive claim can now be stated, and it is a claim about order rather than about value.

Recognition is a condition of generation and not among its products. A subject is confirmed and thereafter generates; he does not generate and thereby earn confirmation.

§20.1.1 established that a subject cannot supply his own warrant and that what maintains him is something other than himself. §6.1.2 established that a stabilisation is maintained rather than possessed and that a pattern not being maintained is being lost. Take these together with §6.2.1, which holds that generativity is a property of processes that produce states not previously available, and the order follows. A process produces new states only where it is proceeding, and a subject participates in a process only while he is maintained. Confirmation is what maintains him. It is therefore prior in the order of explanation to anything he generates.

Proposition 24.3. *Recognition stands to generation as a condition to what occurs under it. A*

subject who is not confirmed is not a subject who generates less; he is one whose maintenance is failing, and what he might have generated does not arise.

Three consequences follow and each rules out a reading.

The first is that recognition cannot be a reward, since a reward is given for something and the something would have to have occurred first. §13.1.2 established that what returns to a giver is read as a response to the giving, and a recognition given for what a child has produced is a recognition placed on that ledger. §18.2.2 established what a child under such terms does not practise.

The second is that recognition cannot be proportioned. A condition either obtains or does not; it is not supplied in quantities matching what it enables. §20.1.2 established that requiring confirmation is not a magnitude that maturity reduces and §9.2.2 located the general error of treating what is not a magnitude as one. An account distributing recognition in proportion to yield has treated a condition as a resource.

And the third is that this is a claim about order and not about worth. Nothing in the argument establishes that a child is valuable, that his existence is good, or that anyone should care about him. §1.27.3 recorded that the framework's normative claims stand in need of a derivation not supplied here, and §24.4.1 states this plainly. What has been established is that where recognition is made to depend on generation, the dependence is on something recognition is a condition of, and the arrangement is therefore incoherent in the way a demand for a fee before the service that produces the means of paying it is incoherent.

24.2.2 The Separation of Order from Justification

The preceding subsection establishes an order and a reader may take the order to supply the reason this chapter has said the framework lacks. It does not, and the distinction is fine enough to require statement.

The order establishes that grounding recognition in generation is incoherent. It does not establish that recognition ought to be extended. An arrangement in which a child is not confirmed, and in which nothing is therefore generated, is not shown by anything in §24.2.1 to be an arrangement that should not obtain. It is shown to be an arrangement in which what would have been generated is not, and §24.1.2 forbids the inference from that description to a reason.

Proposition 24.4. *The order of priority refutes the justification by yield without supplying a justification of its own. It establishes what recognition is a condition of and does not establish that the condition should be met.*

Two observations follow.

The first is that this is a narrower result than it may appear and the narrowness should be stated. §24.1.1 identified four disguises of the utilitarian move and the present result disposes of them, since each grounds recognition in a yield and yields are downstream of the condition. What remains ungrounded is the positive claim, and §24.4 states its status.

The second is that the framework is in this respect worse off than the accounts it criticises. An account grounding recognition in potential can say why a child should be recognised. An account grounding it in returns can say so and can quantify it. §9.3.2 recorded the general form of this cost and the present case is its sharpest instance: the framework has removed the avail-

able grounds and put nothing in their place, and §24.1.2 established that putting something in their place is precisely what it must not do if the something is a yield.

24.3 The Child Who Will Yield Nothing

24.3.1 The Case Stated Without Mitigation

The prohibition of §24.1.2 is tested by a case, and the case must be stated without the mitigations that ordinarily soften it.

Consider a child who will not excel at anything, who will not contribute what a society counts as contribution, who will not repay what is spent on him, and whose recognition will not produce a capacity, an achievement, or a return of any kind that anyone could point to. The case is not hypothetical and it is not rare. It includes children with profound and permanent impairments, children whose circumstances foreclose what might otherwise have followed, and children who simply will not turn out to be good at things.

Four mitigations are ordinarily offered and each must be set aside.

The first is that everyone contributes something. This is frequently true and it is not universally true, and an argument resting on it holds only for the cases where it obtains. Setting it aside is what tests the prohibition, and §24.1.2 established that a prohibition holding only in easy cases holds nowhere.

The second is that we cannot know what a child will yield. This is also true and it is an epistemic point rather than a normative one. §2.6.2 established that what decides an outcome may be invisible at the timescale on which parties operate. An argument resting on our ignorance grounds recognition in a possibility of yield, which is the first disguise of §24.1.1 wearing a modest hat.

The third is that recognising him benefits those who recognise. This relocates the yield rather than removing it, and §13.1.2 established the mechanism by which a return to the giving party is placed on the giving's ledger. An account holding that a household is improved by recognising a child who yields nothing has said what the recognition produces.

And the fourth is that his existence has intrinsic worth. This is a different claim rather than a mitigation, and it is one the framework does not make. §6.1.1 established that terms are stabilisations within processes and §7.3.1 established that the framework locates what a subject is owed in the position he occupies rather than in a property he possesses. An appeal to intrinsic worth is an appeal to such a property, and §7.3.1 recorded that the framework holds nothing supplies one.

Proposition 24.5. *The case of a child who will yield nothing is not disposed of by observing that everyone contributes something, that we cannot know, that recognising him benefits others, or that he has intrinsic worth. The first two ground recognition in a yield, the third relocates it, and the fourth is a claim the framework does not make.*

What the framework says about this case can now be stated, and it has two parts.

The first is that the child is in the position §7.3.1 described. He is a subject being constituted within relations, the parties to those relations are the only parties who could be answerable for the constituting, and §7.3.1 established that the framework derives a stronger obligation on

those parties from the child's inability to refuse, appeal, withdraw, or leave. Nothing in that derivation refers to what he will produce. It refers to his position, and his position is unaltered by what will come of it.

The second is that the framework must be able to say the sentence §24.1.2 was built to protect, and it can now be said in full. Even where recognising a child produces nothing, and even where the resources spent on him would produce more elsewhere, and even where the household's or the society's generation would in fact proceed more freely without him, he is owed recognition. §24.1.2 established that a dynamical observation supplies no reason, and the sentence just stated is what that prohibition amounts to when the observation runs the other way.

24.3.2 The Generalised Form

The case generalises beyond childhood and the generalisation is where the prohibition earns its severity.

§24.1.2 forbade the inference from a description of what sustains generation to a reason for doing it. Consider what the permitted inference would license at scale. Where a party's presence in a system impedes the system's generation, and where the description of that impediment were permitted to supply a reason, the removal of that party would have a reason. §7.1.2 established that the framework's account of a position applies to whoever occupies it, and the party in question need not be a child.

The framework must therefore hold, and this book states it explicitly, that where the destruction of a party would in fact allow a system's generation to proceed more freely, the destruction remains unjust, and the observation that it would so proceed supplies no reason whatever.

Proposition 24.6. *Where the removal of a party would in fact free a system's generation, the framework holds that the removal is unjust and that the dynamical observation supplies no reason for it. This is sayable only because recognition is not grounded in generativity.*

Two observations complete the section.

The first is that this is why the prohibition is the framework's most important commitment rather than a technical scruple. A framework using the vocabulary of generativity is peculiarly exposed to the sentence just forbidden, since the sentence is true in its own descriptive terms. §6.2.2 established that a framework with components can absorb an objection by relocating a claim, and the present prohibition is the one place where no relocation is permitted.

The second is that the prohibition constrains this book's own later Parts. ch. 28 treats households organised around measured quantities, ch. 42 treats the exercise of authority, and ch. 37 treats what passes between generations. Each supplies occasions on which a practice might be described as serving a system's continued generation, and §24.1.2 forbids the description from becoming a justification in every one of them.

24.4 The Limits of the Framework

24.4.1 The Undischarged Derivation

This chapter has stated a prohibition and a positive claim, and the positive claim is not derived. This subsection says so plainly, since a chapter of this kind is where a book is most tempted to overstate.

What has been established is this. Grounding recognition in yield is incoherent, since recognition is a condition of what the yield would consist in. The four available disguises of that grounding each reduce to it. A framework using the vocabulary of generativity is exposed to a further form of the same move and must prohibit it explicitly. And the prohibition is tested only in the case where the yield is nothing, so it must hold there.

What has not been established is that anyone ought to extend recognition to anyone. §1.27.3 recorded the gap in Part I, §9.3.2 recorded that the framework cannot establish any arrangement wrong in itself, and §7.3.1 established only that the relational account is not disabled from stating obligations, which is what the objection there alleged. The present chapter has stated an obligation and has not grounded it.

Proposition 24.7. *This chapter refutes the grounding of recognition in yield and does not supply an alternative grounding. The obligation it states is stated rather than derived, and ch. 42 inherits the derivation.*

Three observations bear on how this should be assessed.

The first is that the position is not unusual in ethical theory and the book should not pretend otherwise. Accounts holding that persons are owed regard unconditionally generally treat the unconditionality as basic rather than derived, and an account deriving it from something further would make it conditional on that thing. §6.2.2 imposed the discipline that a claim belongs to the ontological statement or to a component, and the present claim belongs to neither: it is a commitment the framework adopts and defends against a specific corruption rather than a consequence of anything.

The second is that the defence is nonetheless substantive. §24.1.1 identified four routes by which the corruption enters, §24.1.2 stated the prohibition, and §24.3.2 stated what the prohibition costs and protects. A framework that adopted the commitment without identifying the routes would be more vulnerable, and §6.2.2 established that a framework's exposure lies in where a claim may be relocated to.

And the third is that the undischarged derivation is now the largest thing this book owes. ch. 42 must supply it, and §9.3.2 recorded that until it does, the Parts between here and there proceed without it. A reader keeping account of what the book has promised should note that this is the promise on which the practical Parts depend most heavily, since §8.2.1 established that those Parts trade in descriptions of what acts do and ch. 77 must say why any of it matters.

24.5 The Close of the Part

24.5.1 The Findings of Part IV

Five chapters have treated the gaze and recognition, and the results should be stated together.

A subject cannot confirm himself, and the requirement for confirmation from another is structural rather than a deficiency. Confirmation is the treating of a party, in the conduct of an

occasion, as the party he is taken to be; it operates in conduct rather than assertion, is specific to a description, and may fail by absence rather than by contradiction. A young child's confirmations are few and arrive through the parties who also describe him, so that no source is independent of any other.

Confirmation is not scarce by nature. It becomes scarce where descriptions are made commensurable, the resulting scale acquires a direction, and position on that scale becomes the description under which confirmation is conducted. Instruments supply the first two components as their normal output and do not supply the third. Arrangements differ in what they make cheaply available, and the arrangement with the most legible scale is not the one in which singularity is most severe.

Recognition so made scarce is divided among parties who did not enter a competition. In a household the division requires no preference and no one has done anything; in a classroom it is public and the regard is one among a child's several. A ranking produces the description it appears to report.

What would restore an alternative description cannot be purchased, cannot be supplied by an instrument, and cannot be obtained by reducing the weight of the adult's regard, which is abandonment. What remains is a reversal in the direction of confirming, and that reversal is absorption described from the child's side. It cannot be arranged, and three of its four conditions are properties of arrangements rather than of decisions.

And recognition is a condition of generation rather than among its products, so grounding it in yield is incoherent in four available forms. The framework must prohibit the inference from what recognition sustains to a reason for extending it, must hold the prohibition where the yield is nothing, and must be able to say that a party whose removal would free a system's generation is owed recognition nonetheless.

Proposition 24.8. *Part IV establishes why confirmation is required, how it becomes scarce, what division does, what would reverse it, and that recognition cannot be grounded in what it produces. It establishes nothing about harm and does not derive the obligation it states.*

What the Part has not established should close it.

It has not shown that a child whose confirmations are singular is worse off. §17.4.1 established what a child acquires from a closed loop and recorded that none of it is false, and the same holds here: a child confirmed under one description is confirmed, and §20.2.2 established that the absence of confirmation under other descriptions is not a contradiction of him. Whether the absence costs him anything is Part VI's question.

It has not supplied a scale. §21.3.2 established that whether a household's confirmations are singular is not determined by its arrangement, §21.3.1 treated four arrangements symmetrically, and §22.3.1 declined to treat ranking as a mistake. Nothing here ranks households or societies, and §22.4 recorded the specific temptation this Part's material carries.

And it has not derived what it asserts. §24.4.1 stated this and it is the Part's principal debt. One remark closes the Part.

Chapter 20 opened by observing that the two preceding Parts had assumed descriptions matter to a child without saying why. The five chapters have supplied the reason and have arrived, by a route that began with self-confirmation and passed through scarcity and division, at the same operation Chapter 10 identified from the side of power. §23.2.1 established that

this is one event in two vocabularies rather than a coincidence of two arguments. What Part V now takes up is what happens where the description under which confirmation is conducted has been supplied by a measure, and §21.2.2 established that this is the ordinary output of the instruments Chapter 3 traced.

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Part V

Goals, Indices, and Optimisation

Chapter 25

The Threefold Distinction Among Goals

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what kinds of goal a household may hold for a child, and answers that three kinds must be distinguished because they behave differently under pursuit.

It opens this Part and supplies the taxonomy the remaining chapters use. §21.2.2 established that instruments supply commensurability and direction as their normal output and do not supply the third component of singularity. The present Part treats what a household does with what instruments supply, and this chapter establishes that the answer depends on which kind of goal is at issue.

It does not hold that structural goals are illegitimate, and §25.1 states at length that they are rational, that households pursuing them are doing something sensible, and that a book denying this would be denying something obvious.

The reader should carry forward the three kinds, the property that distinguishes each, and the argument that they cannot be traded against one another because they are not commensurable.

25.1 Structural Goals

25.1.1 The Nature of a Structural Goal

A structural goal is one with a terminal state, a measure of progress toward it, and an ordering over means.

Marks, examination results, admission to an institution, a level of proficiency in an instrument or a language, a physical standard, a credential (Muller, 2018): each of these is a state a child may or may not reach, each admits of degrees, and for each there are things a household may do that make reaching it more likely. §21.2.1 established that a scale supplies commensurability and direction, and a structural goal is a position on such a scale treated as a destination.

Three features belong to the definition.

A structural goal has a terminal state. There is something that constitutes having reached it, and reaching it ends the pursuit. An examination is passed, a grade is obtained, a place is offered. §21.3.1 recorded that an arrangement with one legible scale supplies a bounded object, and boundedness is what a terminal state provides.

A structural goal admits of a measure of progress. At any point before the terminal state, a party may be nearer or further, and the nearness is assessable. This is what makes the goal governable: a household may know how things stand and may act on the knowing.

And a structural goal orders means. Given the goal, some courses of action serve it better

than others, and the ordering is a matter of fact rather than of preference. §22.3.1 established that parties act on a measure where the measure is what confers standing, and the ordering of means is what they act on.

Proposition 25.1. *A structural goal has a terminal state, admits of a measure of progress, and orders the means available. These three features make it optimisable, and optimisation is the appropriate response to a goal of this kind.*

Four observations establish that this book does not treat structural goals as errors, and the four should be read together, since the remaining chapters of this Part will describe what optimisation does and a reader may take the description for a condemnation.

The first is that structural goals are frequently the ones that matter most materially. §5.3.2 established that command over resources determines which configurations are available to a household, and credentials are among the routes by which resources are obtained. A household attending closely to a child's examination results is attending to something that bears on what will be available to him, and §5.6 established that the conditions of Chapter 5 are largely not chosen by the households subject to them. A book advising indifference to structural goals would be advising indifference to a child's material circumstances.

The second is that pursuit of a structural goal is rational in the strict sense. Given a terminal state that is wanted, a measure of progress, and an ordering over means, taking the means that serve the state is what rationality consists in. §21.1.1 granted that positional competition is real and that its logic is well understood. Nothing in this book supplies a reason to act otherwise with respect to a goal of this kind.

The third is that a great many structural goals are also good for the child in ways nothing in this framework disputes. Literacy is a structural goal, measured and optimisable, and §1.26.3 defines development as becoming able to continue generating relations and meanings, for which literacy is among the most powerful means available. ch. 64 treats this at length. A framework that treated the measurability of literacy as a mark against it would be confusing a property of the measure with a property of the thing.

And the fourth is that the alternative to a structural goal is frequently no goal at all rather than a generative goal. §5.2.2 established that arrangements differ in what time exists, and a household that abandoned structural goals would not thereby acquire the occasions §23.3.1 identified. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no instructions and the present observation states why an instruction of that form would be worse than useless.

One matter completes the section and it bears on the Part's argument.

Nothing said so far distinguishes a household that holds structural goals from one in which the third component of §21.2.1 obtains. A household may pursue a child's examination results with great seriousness and confirm him under a dozen descriptions the results do not touch, and §21.3.2 established that whether a household's confirmations are singular is not determined by the arrangement it is in. The question this Part puts is a question of what happens to the other kinds where structural goals are the ones that can be measured, and §25.2.1 identifies what the other kinds are.

25.2 Generative Goals

25.2.1 The Nature of a Generative Goal

A generative goal is one with a direction and no terminal state.

Exploration, play, wandering, encounter, conversation that goes somewhere neither party intended: each of these is something a household may want for a child, each is a thing a child may do more or less of, and none has a state that constitutes having done it. §6.2.1 defined generativity as the production of states not previously available, and a generative goal is a goal whose pursuit consists in occasions of that kind occurring.

Three features distinguish it from the structural kind and each is a negation of one of the three in §25.1.1.

A generative goal has no terminal state. There is no condition that constitutes having explored, having played, or having encountered enough. This is not because the goal is vague; it is because what the goal names is a process rather than a destination, and §6.1.2 established that a process is maintained rather than possessed.

A generative goal admits no measure of progress. A party is not nearer to having played than he was yesterday, since there is nothing to be nearer to. Quantities associated with it can be measured, and this is where the difficulty of this Part begins: hours of unstructured time can be counted, and §26.3.1 establishes what counting them does.

And a generative goal does not order means. Given the goal of a child's exploring, there is no course of action that serves it better than another, since what the goal names is an occurrence whose value lies in its not having been arranged. §23.2.2 established that the reversal of Chapter 23 cannot be arranged, and the present observation is the same structure appearing in the taxonomy of goals: an arranged exploration is a structured activity, and it may be a good one, and it is not the thing the goal named.

Proposition 25.2. *A generative goal has a direction and no terminal state, admits no measure of progress, and orders no means. Its pursuit consists in occasions of a certain kind occurring, and an occasion arranged to serve it is an occasion of a different kind.*

Three observations follow and the third is the one this Part must hold to.

The first is that generative goals have a perfectly definite direction despite having no terminal state. §6.2.1 established that a process is generative where it produces states not previously available, and a household may want more of this or less. That there is no state constituting enough of it does not make the wanting vague, and §1.26.3 defined development in the same form: what a child becomes able to continue doing, which is a direction and not a destination.

The second is that generative goals are not the opposite of structural ones and do not compete with them for time in any simple way. A child working at an instrument may be pursuing a structural goal and may, in the same hour, encounter something that was not available before. §5.3.1 established that arrangements in which parties are engaged in one activity supply occasions of joint creation continuously, and those arrangements are not ones in which the activity is unstructured. §25.4.1 takes this up.

And the third is that a generative goal cannot be pursued by pursuing it. This is the feature that makes the whole Part difficult, and it should be stated in its sharpest form rather than softened. Where an adult arranges an occasion in order that a child should encounter something not previously available, the arranging supplies the occasion's terms, and §17.1.1 established that an adult who supplies an occasion's terms has supplied a component of what the child

then does. The occasion may be excellent. What it cannot be is an occasion whose character consists in its not having been arranged.

25.2.2 The Difficulty Stated Early

The consequence of the third observation should be drawn here rather than deferred, since a reader will otherwise draw a conclusion this Part does not support.

If a generative goal cannot be pursued by pursuing it, a household appears to have nothing to do. This appearance is what makes the material dangerous, and three things bear on it.

The first is that occasions of the kind in question arise without being arranged, and arise more or less readily under different conditions. §5.3.1 established that a household producing what it consumes supplies occasions of joint creation as a by-product of what it is doing, and that a household in the wage arrangement must arrange deliberately what the first produced incidentally. §5.2.2 established that arrangements differ in whether uncommitted time exists. What a household can bear on is the conditions under which such occasions arise, and this is not the same as arranging them.

The second is that the difficulty is not peculiar to this Part or to this framework. §23.2.2 established that the reversal cannot be arranged and §23.3.1 established that three of its four conditions are properties of arrangements. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies descriptions rather than instructions, and the recurrence of this shape across three Parts is what that refusal amounts to in practice.

And the third is that deliberate protection of the unarranged is itself an arrangement, and ch. 51 treats what follows. A household that sets aside an hour in which nothing shall be arranged has arranged an hour, and §26.3.1 establishes what the setting-aside does to what occupies it. This is the sharpest form of the difficulty and this book does not resolve it.

Proposition 25.3. *A household cannot pursue a generative goal directly, can bear on the conditions under which occasions of that kind arise, and cannot protect the unarranged by arranging its protection. The third of these is a difficulty this book states and does not resolve.*

25.3 Non-Structural Norms

25.3.1 The Norms That Cancel When Stated as Goals

A third kind must be distinguished, and it differs from both preceding kinds in a way that is easy to miss.

Consider honesty, humility, and kindness (Elster, 1983). Each is something a household may want a child to have, each is a matter about which households care a great deal, and each behaves peculiarly when made the object of pursuit.

The peculiarity is this. A child who is honest in order to be honest is not thereby dishonest, and something has nonetheless gone wrong: what he is doing is producing an appearance of honesty, and honesty is not an appearance. A child who is humble in order to be humble is exhibiting a state that contradicts what it exhibits. A child who is kind in order to be kind has made the other party a means to his own kindness, and the kindness has become something conducted for a reason external to the other party.

Proposition 25.4. *Certain norms cancel when pursued as goals. Honesty pursued produces an appearance of honesty, humility pursued contradicts itself, and kindness pursued makes the other party a means. The cancellation is a property of the norms rather than of anyone's sincerity.*

Three observations establish what kind of thing this is.

The first is that these are not generative goals under another name. A generative goal has a direction and no terminal state, and §25.2.1 established that its pursuit consists in occasions occurring. A non-structural norm is not an occurrence and not a direction; it is a character of how a party conducts himself, and §19.3.1 distinguished a description of a party from a response to an occasion. What cancels here is the making of a character into an object.

The second is that the cancellation does not make the norms unimportant, and the inference to unimportance is the error this section exists to block. §7.3.1 established that the framework locates what a subject is owed in the position he occupies, and §24.1.2 established that the framework may not justify by yield. Norms of this kind are among the things a household most wants for a child and the wanting is not confused. What is confused is the treating of them as objectives.

And the third is that they are acquired in a manner the taxonomy of goals cannot describe. §17.4.1 established that a child acquires an expectation, a repertoire, and a description as a constituent, and that none of the three is a belief. A child in a household where accounts are given honestly acquires honesty in that manner, and ch. 60 treats the mechanism. The acquisition is real, it is not the result of anyone's pursuing an objective, and §15.1.1 established that what a child encounters is an approach rather than an account.

Two matters close the section.

The first is that a household stating such a norm as a goal has not done something harmful and has done something ineffective. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria for identifying a household as failing, and the present observation is not one. An adult who tells a child to be kind has said something true about what he values, and §18.1.1 established that a household conveys what it values in the act of stating that a child embodies it. What the statement does not do is produce the thing named, and §25.3.1 establishes why.

The second is that the three kinds are now available and §25.4 states the relation among them. §25.1.1 established what makes a goal optimisable, §25.2.1 established what makes one unpursuable, and the present subsection has established what makes a norm self-cancelling. The Part's remaining chapters treat what happens where the first kind is the only kind that can be measured.

25.4 The Incommensurability of the Three

25.4.1 The Ground of Their Untradeability

The three kinds cannot be traded against one another, and the reason is that no rate of exchange exists between them rather than that they are equally important.

Consider what a trade would require. A household deciding how much of a child's time to give to examination preparation and how much to leave unarranged would need a common measure in which an hour of each could be valued. §21.2.1 established that commensuration is an operation performed on things that were not previously comparable, and the operation

is available: hours are hours. What is not available is a valuation, since §25.2.1 established that a generative goal admits no measure of progress and §25.3.1 established that a non-structural norm is not an objective at all.

Proposition 25.5. *The three kinds of goal admit no common measure. A structural goal has a measure of progress, a generative goal has none, and a non-structural norm is not the kind of thing progress toward which could be assessed. A household trading among them is trading in a currency only one of them possesses.*

Three consequences follow and the second is what the Part's remaining chapters develop.

The first is that a household is not thereby paralysed. Households allocate a child's time continuously and the allocating is not irrational. What the proposition establishes is that the allocation is not an optimisation, and §25.1.1 established that optimisation is the appropriate response to a goal with a terminal state, a measure, and an ordering over means. Where the goods are not commensurable, the allocation is a judgement, and ch. 77 takes up what a judgement of this kind consists in.

The second is that where a trade must nonetheless be made, it will be made in the currency that exists. This is the Part's central mechanism and ch. 27 develops it. A household facing a decision about time, holding one goal with a measure and two without, will find that the decision presents itself in terms of the measurable one, and §11.1.1 established that the cheaper course is taken without anyone choosing a policy. Nothing has been traded away, since there was no rate at which to trade. What has happened is that one term of the decision was articulable and the others were not.

And the third is that the incommensurability is not a defect in the taxonomy. §1.27.9 recorded the risk that a vocabulary general enough for every domain does no work in any, and a reader may take three incommensurable kinds to be an evasion. The reply is that the incommensurability is the finding. §2.4.6 established the general form: fixing the elements common to a description does not fix the space, and a taxonomy reporting that its kinds do not reduce to one another has reported something about the kinds.

25.5 The Bearing on What Follows

Four things pass forward.

The generative kind passes to ch. 26. §25.2.1 established that a generative goal cannot be pursued by pursuing it and §25.2.2 established that a household can bear only on the conditions under which such occasions arise. That chapter treats childhood as the domain in which occasions of this kind are most abundant, and must say what play is without describing it as preparation for anything, since a preparation is a means to a terminal state.

The mechanism of substitution passes to ch. 27. §25.4.1 established that a decision presenting one measurable term and two unmeasurable ones will present itself in the measurable term. That chapter must state what this does to a household's capacity to hold the other two, and §14.2.1 supplies the form of the answer, that a capacity not exercised contracts.

The household form of index governance passes to ch. 28. §22.3.1 established that a ranking produces the description it appears to report and §21.2.2 established that instruments supply two of singularity's three components. That chapter treats the domestic instruments, and §8.2.1

constrains how they may be described.

And the guardrail passes to **ch. 29**. §24.1.2 established that a dynamical observation supplies no normative justification, and the formulation that a thing is done for a child's future is the local form in which the forbidden inference presents itself. That chapter must hold the wall where it is most seductive, since the formulation is frequently sincere and sometimes true.

Proposition 25.6. *This chapter distinguishes three kinds of goal and establishes that they admit no common measure. It does not treat what childhood supplies, what substitution does, what household indices are, or what becomes of the wall under the formulation that names a child's future.*

One matter closes the chapter and it concerns what this Part is for.

§8.1.1 required that the diagnostic Parts show something is lost and that the loss not be a renaming. The preceding Parts identified candidates: occasions not had, a repertoire not developed, confirmations conducted under one description. The present Part identifies the mechanism by which these become general rather than particular, and the mechanism is that a household holding three kinds of goal can measure one. §25.4.1 established that this does not produce a trade, since no rate exists. What it produces is a decision made in the only terms available, repeated daily, by parties who have chosen nothing, and §11.1.1 established what accumulates under such repetition.

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Chapter 26

Childhood as the Domain of Generative Goals

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what play is, and answers that it is the clearest instance of a generative goal, which is to say that its character consists in its not being a means to anything. It discharges the obligation §25.5 imposed. Chapter 25 established that a generative goal has a direction and no terminal state and cannot be pursued by pursuing it. The present chapter treats the domain in which occasions of this kind are most abundant, and must describe it without the vocabulary of preparation, since a preparation is a means to a terminal state and would place play among the structural goals.

It does not hold that play has no effects, and §26.1 grants at length that the effects are documented. It does not hold that arranged activities are worthless, and §26.2.3 states this plainly.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between a definite direction and a predictable effect, the account of play as injection, and the argument that the phrase learning through play performs the substitution this Part exists to describe.

26.1 The Developmental Account of Play

26.1.1 The Achievement

A body of work establishes that play bears on development, and this section treats it in the form §1.25 used for the traditions of Chapter 1: the achievement is granted at its strongest before any premise is located.

The achievement is substantial and it is empirical rather than merely programmatic.

The literature established that play is not idleness. Before it, play was widely regarded as what children did when nothing was required of them, and the regard has a history: §2.3.1 recorded that the removal of children from production was a condition under which the developmental question became askable, and play acquired its status as an object of study in the same period. What the literature showed is that a great deal occurs during play that occurs less readily elsewhere, and the showing was necessary.

The literature established specific associations. Pretend play is associated with the development of a capacity to represent what is not the case (Lillard et al., 2013), which bears on a range of later competences. Rule-governed play is associated with the regulation of conduct, and the Vygotskian observation that a child in play conducts himself in advance of his ordi-

nary capacity (Vygotsky, 1978) has held up in a substantial subsequent literature. Physical play is associated with motor development and with the calibration of risk (Pellegrini and Smith, 2005). Play with objects is associated with the acquisition of physical understanding.

The literature established institutional consequences. §3.3.1 described how a claim becomes an administrative fact, and this one has: early-years curricula across a large part of the coverage of Chapter 5 are organised around play, provision is inspected against it, and practitioners are trained in it. §3.2.4 recorded the channel by which such consequences travel.

And the literature supplied a defence of childhood against encroachment. Where a case had to be made that young children should not be doing something else, the case was made in these terms, and it was frequently made against pressure to introduce formal instruction earlier. §5.2.1 recorded that provision differs in what it is for, and this literature is a substantial part of why some provision is for what it is for.

Proposition 26.1. *The literature on play established that a great deal occurs during play, identified specific associations with later competences, secured institutional protection for play in early provision, and supplied the terms in which childhood has been defended against the introduction of formal instruction.*

Two matters belong to the account of the achievement before the premise is located.

The first is that this book's disagreement is narrow and does not concern the findings. §6.3.2 distinguished refuting an assertion from displacing a description, and nothing in this chapter disputes that pretend play is associated with representational capacity or that rule-governed play bears on regulation. What is at issue is what the associations are taken to establish about what play is.

The second is that the literature's practical effect has been largely protective, and a chapter locating its premise should say so. §6.3.1 committed this book to the finitude of practice and §2.5.2 recorded that a practice may be the best available under conditions whose alternatives have not been formulated. The play literature has defended a great deal that would otherwise have been lost, and §26.2.3 states why nothing here recommends withdrawing that defence.

26.1.2 The Location of the Premise

§1.1.1 holds that a premise is located by attending to what an account's verbs require, and the play literature's verbs are those of production.

Play develops, promotes, supports, fosters, builds, and lays foundations for. Each of these takes an outcome as its object, and the outcome is a state the child is to reach. §25.1.1 established that a goal with a terminal state, a measure of progress, and an ordering over means is a structural goal, and an account establishing that play produces such outcomes has established that play is a means to them.

The premise is that play's standing rests on what it yields.

Proposition 26.2. *The developmental literature grounds play's value in what play produces. Its characteristic verbs take outcomes as objects, and an activity valued by its outcomes is a means to them, which is what §25.1.1 defines as a structural goal.*

Three consequences follow and the third is where the difficulty becomes practical.

The first is that the grounding is the move §24.1.1 identified. That subsection separated four disguises of the utilitarian re-entry, of which the second was investment and the third was flourishing. An account holding that play should be protected because of what it produces has grounded the protection in a yield, and §24.1.2 established that the framework may describe what an activity sustains and may not offer the description as the reason for it.

The second is that the grounding is vulnerable in a specific way. Where an activity is valued for its outcomes, an activity producing the outcomes more efficiently is a better means. §25.1.1 established that a structural goal orders means, and the ordering does not favour play in principle. If direct instruction were shown to produce representational capacity faster than pretend play, the grounding would recommend direct instruction, and §26.1.1 recorded that the literature's practical effect has been to resist exactly this.

And the third is that the vulnerability is not hypothetical. Provision organised around play is inspected, and §22.3.1 established that parties act on a measure where the measure confers standing. Where play is protected because it develops something, the protection extends to play that can be shown to develop it, and §26.3.1 treats what has happened to the word in consequence.

One observation completes the section.

Nothing here holds that the literature was wrong to make the argument it made. §2.5.2 recorded that a practice may be the best available under conditions whose alternatives have not been formulated, and an argument for protecting childhood addressed to parties who required a demonstration of yield is an argument that had to be made in the currency those parties held. §25.4.1 established that where a trade must be made, it will be made in the currency that exists. The play literature's grounding is that proposition operating at the level of a research programme rather than of a household.

26.2 Play as Injection

26.2.1 The Definite Direction and the Unpredictable Effect

The framework's account of play can now be given, and it requires a distinction that §25.2.1 stated formally and that this section makes concrete.

Play is the injection of perturbation into a process. Its direction is perfectly definite and its historical effect is unpredictable, and the two together are what a generative goal consists in.

Consider what a child does in play. He does something that was not called for. Nothing in the situation required it, no outcome depends on it, and §17.1.1 established that an occasion is produced jointly, so an occasion in which the adult has supplied no terms is one in which what occurs is not a response to terms. §6.2.1 defined generativity as the production of states not previously available, and this is what a perturbation does to a process: it introduces a state the process would not otherwise have entered.

The direction is definite. More perturbation of this kind and less; occasions on which something not called for occurs, and occasions on which everything that occurs was called for. §25.2.1 established that a generative goal has a direction without a terminal state, and a household may want more of this without there being an amount that constitutes enough.

The effect is unpredictable and is unpredictable in principle rather than for want of re-

search. §2.4.6 established that a system's trajectory near a stability boundary is sensitive to perturbation, and that what follows from a given perturbation is not determined by its magnitude. Which of a child's thousands of unrequired acts turns out to have mattered is not knowable in advance, is frequently not knowable afterward, and §2.6.2 established that what decides an outcome may be invisible at the timescale on which the parties operate.

Proposition 26.3. *Play injects states a process would not otherwise have entered. Its direction is definite and admits of more and less; its effect in any instance is unpredictable in principle. A goal with this pair of properties cannot be pursued through its effects.*

Three consequences follow and the second is the chapter's principal result.

The first is that this account does not compete with the developmental findings. §26.1.1 granted the associations and the granting stands. That pretend play is associated with representational capacity is consistent with the present account and is explained by it: a child doing what is not called for is doing something that requires representing what is not the case, and the association follows. What the present account denies is that the association is what play is for.

The second is that the account explains why the findings take the form they do. Associational findings are what the literature reports, and the reporting is not a weakness in the research. §26.2.1 establishes why no stronger finding is available: where the effect of an instance is unpredictable in principle, what can be established is a statistical association across many instances, and no account of which instance produced what is obtainable. §17.2.1 established that evidence about jointly produced occasions is genuine and is evidence about the occasions rather than about either party, and the parallel holds here.

And the third is that a household cannot select the valuable play. This is what makes the material practically hard, and §25.2.2 anticipated it. Where the effect of an instance is unknowable, there is no basis on which to encourage the instances that matter and discourage the rest. §25.1.1 established that a structural goal orders means, and the present observation is that a generative goal supplies no ordering, so a household attending to which play is worthwhile is attending to something about which nothing can be known.

26.2.2 The Separation of Play from Preparation

The conclusion the chapter owes can now be stated and it must be stated carefully.

A preparation is an activity undertaken in view of a subsequent state, and its value derives from that state. §25.1.1 established the form. To describe play as preparation for adulthood, for school, or for a competence is to place it among the means, and §26.1.2 established that the developmental literature's verbs do exactly this.

Three considerations establish that the description is wrong, and the third is the one this framework contributes.

The first is that the description makes play dispensable in principle. §26.1.2 established that where an activity is valued for its outcomes, an activity producing them more efficiently is a better means. A preparation is by construction replaceable by a better preparation, and §26.1.1 recorded that the literature's practical effect has been to resist replacement.

The second is that the description misidentifies what a child is doing. A child at play is not undertaking anything in view of a subsequent state, and §15.1.1 established that what

parties do is conducted under orientations rather than under stated purposes. An account describing his activity as preparation has attributed to it a structure it does not have, and §20.1.2 established that attributing to a child a deficiency the framework locates in a structure is the general form of this error.

And the third is that childhood on this account is not a period of preparation for a subsequent period. §1.26.3 defined development as a child becoming able to continue generating relations and meanings, which is a direction and not a destination, and §1.27.10 held that what develops includes the relation, the household culture, and its common practices. A period whose value lay in what followed it would be a period valued by its yield, and §24.1.2 established the prohibition. Childhood is where a certain kind of occasion is abundant, and its abundance is the fact rather than a resource to be spent.

Proposition 26.4. *Play is not preparation. A preparation is replaceable by a more efficient preparation, attributes to a child a purposive structure his activity does not have, and values a period by what follows it, which the framework prohibits.*

26.2.3 The Boundaries of the Claim

Four things this chapter does not hold should be named, since the argument invites each.

It does not hold that arranged activities are worthless. A child in a music lesson, at a sport, or at a structured task is doing something with a terminal state and a measure, and §25.1.1 established that such goals are rational, frequently material, and often good for the child in ways nothing here disputes. §25.2.1 recorded that a child working at an instrument may in the same hour encounter something not previously available.

It does not hold that a household should arrange less. §25.2.2 established that a household cannot protect the unarranged by arranging its protection, and the corollary is that a recommendation to arrange less is a recommendation this book cannot make. ch. 51 treats the general difficulty and §8.2.1 recorded what this book supplies.

It does not hold that children who play more turn out better. §26.2.1 established that the effect of an instance is unpredictable in principle, and a claim about outcomes across children would be a claim of exactly the kind the account forbids itself. §4.3.1 recorded that the longitudinal evidence this book would need does not exist.

And it does not hold that the developmental literature should stop making its argument. §26.1.2 recorded that the argument had to be made in the currency its audience held, and §25.4.1 established that where a trade must be made it will be made in the available currency. A framework observing that a protective argument rests on a grounding it disputes has not thereby supplied a better argument to the parties who required the first.

Proposition 26.5. *This chapter opposes neither arranged activity, nor a household's arranging, nor the developmental literature's protective argument. It disputes an account of what play is, and supplies no replacement for the argument that account underwrites.*

26.3 The Optimising Redescription

26.3.1 The Performance of the Phrase

A phrase has become standard across early-years provision and household advice in much of the coverage of [Chapter 5](#), and this section examines what it does.

The phrase holds that children learn through play. Its intent is protective, its use is nearly always benign, and [§26.1.1](#) granted that the literature it summarises has defended a great deal.

What the phrase performs is the substitution [§25.4.1](#) described. It takes an activity of the generative kind and states its value in the currency of the structural kind, and the statement is what makes it usable: an adult who must justify an hour to a party who counts outcomes has a justification. [§25.4.1](#) established that where a trade must be made it will be made in the currency that exists, and the phrase is that proposition compressed into four words.

Three consequences follow and each is documented in practice.

The first is that the play which can be shown to teach acquires a standing the rest does not. Where play is valued as a mode of learning, provision is organised around play with identifiable learning content, and [§22.3.1](#) established that parties act on a measure where the measure confers standing. What results is an activity retaining the name and acquiring a terminal state, a measure of progress, and an ordering over means, and [§25.1.1](#) established that these three are what a structural goal has.

The second is that the residue becomes indefensible. Where play's standing rests on what it teaches, play that teaches nothing identifiable has no defence available in the terms the defence is conducted in. [§26.2.1](#) established that the effect of an instance is unpredictable in principle, so the play whose value the framework's account locates most clearly is precisely the play for which the standard defence cannot be made.

And the third is that the adult's own capacity to describe what a child is doing contracts. [§14.2.1](#) established that a description relieves its holder of the labour of describing occasions and that the capacity so relieved contracts by disuse. An adult who describes what a child is doing as learning through play has a description that answers the occasion, and [§14.2.2](#) established that a description's usefulness is the mechanism of its effects. What contracts is the capacity to describe an hour that produced nothing and was not wasted.

Proposition 26.6. *The phrase states a generative activity's value in structural currency. It thereby confers standing on the play that can be shown to teach, leaves the remainder undefended in the terms the defence is conducted in, and displaces the vocabulary in which an unproductive hour could have been described.*

Two observations complete the section.

The first is that this is not an argument for abandoning the phrase. [§26.2.3](#) recorded that this book supplies no better argument to the parties who required the first, and a household or a practitioner who must justify an hour to an inspector, a funder, or a sceptical relative is in the position [§25.4.1](#) described. [§8.2.1](#) recorded that this book supplies descriptions rather than instructions, and the description here is of what the phrase does rather than of what anyone should say.

The second is that the phrase is an instance of a pattern this Part will meet repeatedly. [ch. 27](#) treats the general mechanism, of which this is one case: where a household or an institution holds goods of three kinds and can measure one, what is said about the other two will be said in the terms of the first, and [§14.2.1](#) established what happens to a vocabulary that is not

exercised.

26.4 The Bearing on What Follows

Three things pass forward.

The substitution mechanism passes to [ch. 27](#). [§26.3.1](#) exhibited one instance and [§25.4.1](#) stated the general proposition. That chapter must state what the substitution does to a household's capacity to hold the unmeasured goods, and [§14.2.1](#) supplies the form of the answer.

The unselectability passes to [ch. 28](#). [§26.2.1](#) established that a household cannot select the valuable play, since the effect of an instance is unpredictable in principle. That chapter treats households organised around measured quantities and inherits the observation that the goods in question are hard to measure, and beyond that such that no measure could identify the instances that mattered.

And the protection problem passes to [ch. 51](#). [§25.2.2](#) established that a household cannot protect the unarranged by arranging its protection, and [§26.2.3](#) recorded that this book cannot recommend arranging less. That chapter must state what remains available and [§8.2.1](#) constrains what it may make of it.

Proposition 26.7. *This chapter establishes that play is a generative goal whose direction is definite and whose effects are unpredictable in principle, that it is therefore not preparation, and that the standard protective phrase performs a substitution. It does not establish that anything is lost where the substitution occurs.*

One matter closes the chapter and it is the re-derivation.

[§7.2.1](#) requires that a corpus proposition concerning what a subject may do be established as available or replaced. The proposition here concerns what a party does with an activity whose value has been restated in terms he does not accept. In the corpus, and among adults, a party may hold the restatement to be a distortion, may pursue the activity on his own terms while accepting the public justification, and may name the difference between what he is doing and what it is said he is doing. [§7.1.1](#) established that each requires a standpoint from which the restatement is one description among possible ones.

The replacement proposition is this. Where an activity is restated for a young child in the terms of what it produces, he does not hold the restatement at a distance, since [§14.1.2](#) established that a description supplied to him is a constituent of the account he is forming. What he acquires is an activity that has a purpose, and [§26.2.1](#) established that the activity's character consisted in its not having one. The consequence is that the substitution does not merely misdescribe what the child is doing; it alters what he is doing, since [§17.1.1](#) established that the terms in which an occasion is set are a component of the occasion. [ch. 27](#) inherits this and it is the sharpest form in which that chapter's problem arises.

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Chapter 27

Optimisability and the Contraction of Degrees of Freedom

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what happens to a household that can measure one of the three kinds of goal, and states the answer in the most conservative form the argument supports.

It supplies the mechanism [Chapter 25](#) and [Chapter 26](#) both deferred to it. [§25.4.1](#) established that a decision presenting one measurable term and two unmeasurable ones will present itself in the measurable term, and [§26.3.1](#) exhibited an instance. The present chapter states the general claim, and every qualification in it is load-bearing.

It does not hold that optimisation is harmful, that measurement should be resisted, or that a household organised around a measure is doing something wrong. [§27.2.2](#) lists what is not claimed and the list is longer than the claim.

The reader should carry forward the notion of projection onto a unified space, the contraction claim in its conservative form, and the argument that the mechanism requires no party to be optimising anything.

27.1 Projection onto a Unified Space

27.1.1 The Operation

The operation this chapter concerns can be stated with some precision, and the precision matters because a loose statement of it would be either trivial or false.

A household holds many things about a child. He is at a certain level in reading, is difficult about food, has a friend he sees often, laughs at a particular kind of joke, is frightened of a particular thing, has begun asking a question he had not asked before. These are not comparable with one another and no operation is required for a household to hold them all.

Projection is the operation by which several of these are placed on a common space in which each has a value and the values combine. [§21.2.1](#) established that commensuration makes comparable what was not, and projection is commensuration extended: it takes what a household holds about a child and represents it as a position in a space with a small number of dimensions, each admitting of more and less.

Three features belong to the operation.

Projection loses information, and the losing is not incidental. A representation with fewer dimensions than the thing represented discards whatever varies within a dimension, and [§14.1.2](#) established that a description contracts the range of what its object may be taken to

be. Nothing here is unfamiliar; every description discards, and §14.1.1 recorded that a household without descriptions would be one that had learned nothing.

Projection supplies an ordering that did not exist. Before it, a child who reads well and eats poorly is not thereby anywhere in particular. After it, if reading and eating have been placed on a common space, he has a position, and §22.3.1 established that a measure creates a description of each party that did not exist before the measure existed.

And projection makes optimisation available. §25.1.1 established that a structural goal has a terminal state, a measure of progress, and an ordering over means, and a projected space supplies the second and third for anything represented in it. This is what the operation is for and it is why it is performed.

Proposition 27.1. *Projection represents what a household holds about a child as a position in a space of few dimensions, each admitting of more and less. It discards what varies within a dimension, supplies an ordering that did not previously exist, and makes optimisation available for whatever it represents.*

Two observations bear on how the operation should be understood.

The first is that projection is useful and is frequently necessary. A household that could not represent a child's situation compactly could not act on it, could not communicate it to a second adult, and could not decide anything about it. §11.1.1 established that a description settles occasions cheaply and §14.2.2 established that a description's usefulness is the mechanism of its effects. The present chapter's claim concerns what follows from a useful operation rather than from a mistaken one.

The second is that projection is not performed by households alone and is largely not performed by them at all. §21.2.2 established that instruments supply commensurability and direction as their normal output, and a household receives projections it did not construct: a report, a percentile, a developmental screen, a comparison with a norm. §14.1.1 established that names are portable, and a projected space is portable in the same manner.

27.2 The Contraction Claim

27.2.1 The Claim in Its Conservative Form

The claim of this chapter can now be stated, and it is stated in the weakest form the argument supports, since a stronger form would exceed what has been established and the material is such that a stronger form is very easy to reach for.

Where a household's account of a child is projected onto a unified optimisable space, the household's capacity to retain what the projection does not represent is reduced.

Every term in that sentence is doing work.

The claim is about a capacity, not about an outcome. §12.1.2 established that the framework's criteria concern what a relation makes possible rather than what it contains, and the present claim is of that kind. It says nothing about what happens to any child, and §4.3.1 recorded that the evidence for a claim about outcomes does not exist.

The claim is about retention, not about perception. Nothing here holds that a household ceases to notice what falls outside the projection. §14.2.1 established that what contracts is

the capacity to assemble descriptions rather than the possession of information, and the parallel holds: a household may notice a great deal it can no longer hold in a form that bears on anything.

The claim is that the capacity is reduced, not that it is destroyed. §12.2.1 established that ossification admits of scope and the same qualification governs here. A household retains a great deal, and the claim concerns a direction of change rather than an end state.

And the claim is conditional on projection onto a unified space. A household holding many descriptions that do not combine is not the case described, and §27.1.1 established that projection is the operation of making them combine. §21.3.2 established that whether a household's confirmations are singular is not determined by its arrangement, and the same holds here.

Proposition 27.2. *Where an account of a child is projected onto a unified optimisable space, the capacity to retain what the projection does not represent is reduced. The claim concerns a capacity rather than an outcome, retention rather than perception, a reduction rather than a destruction, and holds only where the space is unified.*

The argument for the claim has three steps and each has been established elsewhere.

The first step is that a projected space supplies a cheap description and the alternatives are expensive. §11.1.1 established that where two courses are open and one costs less, the cheaper is taken without anyone choosing a policy. A household asked how a child is doing, and holding a projection, has an answer; a household holding no projection must assemble one, and §14.2.1 established what assembling costs.

The second step is that a capacity not exercised contracts. §14.2.1 established this for the case of a name and stated it generally: descriptions are maintained by being made, and a party who has not needed to assemble one has lost the practice of assembling it, and with the practice the vocabulary, and with the vocabulary the perceptual discriminations the vocabulary sustained.

And the third step is that what falls outside a projection has no other route into a household's deliberations. §25.4.1 established that where goods are incommensurable and a decision must be made, the decision presents itself in the currency that exists. A consideration that cannot be stated in the projection's terms is not thereby weighed less; it is not weighed, since weighing is the operation the projection makes available.

27.2.2 The Boundaries of the Claim Here

Six things are not claimed and the list is longer than the claim, which is the appropriate proportion for material of this kind.

It is not claimed that optimisation is bad. §25.1.1 established that optimisation is the appropriate response to a goal with a terminal state, a measure, and an ordering over means, and a household optimising such a goal is doing the correct thing.

It is not claimed that measurement should be resisted. §21.2.2 established that instruments answer real administrative questions, §22.3.1 declined to treat ranking as a mistake, and §2.5.2 established that a practice may be the best available under conditions whose alternatives have not been formulated.

It is not claimed that a household organised around a measure has failed. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria for identifying a household as failing, and §5.2.2 established

that the conditions of most contemporary arrangements make the cheap course the available one.

It is not claimed that the contraction produces a worse outcome for a child. §8.1.1 recorded that whether an absence costs anything is Part VI's question, and the present chapter identifies a mechanism rather than a harm.

It is not claimed that the contraction is detectable. §12.1.2 established the three difficulties of a counterfactual criterion and §15.2.2 added a fourth. A household cannot determine by introspection what it has ceased to be able to hold, since §14.2.1 established that the loss is unnoticed because nothing is missing.

And it is not claimed that anything could be done about it by deciding to. §25.2.2 established that a household cannot protect the unarranged by arranging its protection, and ch. 51 treats the general form.

Proposition 27.3. *The claim of this chapter is compatible with optimisation being appropriate, measurement being legitimate, the household being blameless, no outcome being worse, the contraction being undetectable, and nothing being available to be done about it.*

One observation completes the section.

A reader may hold that a claim compatible with so much is not a claim about anything. §8.3.1 listed a demonstration that the framework's descriptions are available without it as the most damaging finding against this book, and §1.26.3 conceded that the book's central position cannot be refuted by counterexample. The reply available here is the one §6.3.2 supplied: the claim is a permission, it is displaced by showing that what it picks out was already sayable, and §27.4.1 takes up whether the existing literature on measurement already contains it.

27.3 The Mechanism Without an Optimiser

27.3.1 The Absence of an Optimising Party

The account so far may suggest a household deliberately maximising something, and this section establishes that no such household is required and that the mechanism operates better where none exists.

§16.2.2 established that the three readings of a discrepant occasion require no party to have devised them, and §11.2.2 established that an adult in whose household absorption has ceased has performed no act. The present mechanism has the same structure and it should be set out.

Consider a household with no policy about anything. An adult is asked how the child is getting on and answers in the terms available. A decision arises about an hour and is settled by whichever consideration can be stated. A report arrives and is read. A comparison suggests itself and is noticed. None of these is an optimisation and none is undertaken in view of maximising anything.

What accumulates across such occasions is what §11.1.1 described. Each occasion settled in the projection's terms makes the projection better established, each answer given in its vocabulary maintains that vocabulary, and each consideration that could not be stated goes unstated. §11.1.2 established that settled matters do not decay and that the resulting pattern is self-maintaining.

Proposition 27.4. *The contraction requires no party to be maximising anything. It follows from occasions being settled in the terms that are available, which is what occurs where one kind of consideration can be stated and two cannot.*

Three consequences follow and the second is the one that matters for this book's argument.

The first is that a household exhibiting the mechanism will not recognise the description. §15.3.1 established that a governed approach is experienced as responsiveness, and the parallel holds: an adult answering in the terms available experiences himself as answering, and §12.1.2 established that introspection cannot settle the question.

The second is that the mechanism operates in households that would describe themselves as resisting it. An adult who holds that marks matter less than a child's happiness, and who says so, is holding a consideration he can state. What he cannot do is weigh it against a mark, since §25.4.1 established that no rate of exchange exists, and the weighing that occurs will be conducted in whichever term admits of weighing. §26.3.1 exhibited the same structure at the level of a phrase.

And the third is that the mechanism is stronger where the projection is externally supplied. §27.1.1 established that households receive projections they did not construct, and a projection arriving from an institution carries what §3.3.1 described: a way of describing that arrives where its origin is not visible and becomes a feature of the procedure. §21.2.2 established that this is the ordinary output of the instruments Chapter 3 traced.

27.4 The Objections

27.4.1 The Existing Critiques

A literature criticising measurement exists and is substantial, and §8.3.1 requires that this chapter say what it adds.

Three existing accounts should be distinguished.

The first holds that measures are gamed. Where a measure confers standing, parties act on the measure rather than on what it was meant to track, and the measure ceases to track it. This is well established, it is documented across domains (Campbell, 1979; Muller, 2018), and §22.3.1 granted it. The present chapter's claim is not this: gaming concerns the relation between a measure and what it measures, and the contraction claim concerns what falls outside the measure altogether.

The second holds that measures are incomplete and that what they omit matters. This is closer and is not the same. An account holding that a mark omits a child's kindness has said that something is missing from the measure, and the remedy such an account suggests is a better measure or a supplementary one. §25.4.1 established that the goods in question admit no common measure, so a supplementary measure of the second kind would be a measure of a good that has none, and §26.2.1 established that the effect of an instance of the third kind is unpredictable in principle.

And the third holds that quantification changes what is quantified. This is the strongest of the three (Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Merry, 2016) and §22.3.1 granted it: a ranking produces the description it appears to report. The present chapter's claim differs in its object. That literature concerns what happens to the measured thing; the contraction claim concerns what

happens to the party doing the measuring, and specifically to his capacity to hold what he is not measuring. §14.2.1 identified this loss in the case of a name and recorded that no account requiring an agent can register it.

Proposition 27.5. *The contraction claim is not the gaming claim, not the incompleteness claim, and not the reactivity claim. Its object is the measuring party's capacity to retain what falls outside the measure, and the existing critiques do not treat this.*

Two further objections should be met.

The first holds that the claim proves too much, since every description discards and the argument would condemn description as such. §27.1.1 granted that every description discards and §14.1.1 recorded that a household without descriptions would be one that had learned nothing. The claim's condition is unification: a household holding several descriptions that do not combine retains what each omits in the others, and §19.2.1 established that positional names multiply and that their multiplying is itself a reserve. What the claim concerns is the case where the descriptions have been made to combine.

The second holds that the claim is unfalsifiable. §27.2.1 conceded that the contraction is not detectable by the household and §27.2.2 conceded five further things. §1.26.3 recorded that this book's central position has the same property and did not disguise it. What can be said is what §6.3.2 supplies: the claim is displaced by showing that what it picks out was already sayable, §27.4.1 has argued that it was not, and ch. 70 must say whether anything more can be done with it.

27.5 The Bearing on What Follows

Two things pass forward.

The household instruments pass to ch. 28. §27.1.1 established that households receive projections they did not construct and §27.3.1 established that the mechanism is stronger where the projection is external. That chapter treats the domestic instruments specifically, and inherits the requirement that they be described without moralising, since §27.2.2 established that a household organised around a measure has not failed.

The teleological formulation passes to ch. 29. §27.3.1 established that the contraction requires no party to be maximising anything, and the formulation naming a child's future is the form in which a household states what it is doing where it states anything at all. That chapter must hold the wall of §24.1.2, and it inherits from the present chapter the observation that the formulation is frequently the only articulable term in a decision that had two others.

Proposition 27.6. *This chapter establishes that projection reduces the capacity to retain what it does not represent, that the reduction requires no optimiser, and that the existing critiques of measurement do not contain the claim. It establishes no harm, supplies no remedy, and concedes that the contraction is not detectable from within.*

One matter closes the chapter and it concerns the standing of what has been argued.

§8.1.1 required of the diagnostic Parts that they show something is lost and that the loss not be a renaming. This chapter has identified a loss of a particular kind: not a capacity of a child, not a state of a relation, but a household's capacity to hold what its own representation omits.

§14.2.1 identified the same loss in the case of a name and recorded that it falls on the party an agent-requiring account would call the agent. The present chapter has established that it also follows from operations no one performs deliberately, using instruments no one designed for the purpose, in households that would describe themselves as resisting exactly this. Whether the loss matters is Part VI's question. That it is not a renaming of the existing critiques is this chapter's claim, and ch. 90 will test it.

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Chapter 28

The Household Form of Index Governance

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what a household's own instruments do, and answers that each is individually reasonable and that their accumulation alters what an adult is able to see.

It supplies the domestic case that [Chapter 27](#) treated in general terms. [§27.1.1](#) established that households largely receive projections they did not construct, and this chapter examines the projections they construct themselves, together with those they adopt.

It does not hold that any instrument should be abandoned, and [§28.1](#) grants each its function. [§27.2.2](#) listed six things this Part does not claim and every one of them governs here.

The reader should carry forward the account of what each instrument does, the argument that accumulation does something none of them does singly, and the distinction between what a household can see and what it can weigh.

28.1 The Domestic Instruments

28.1.1 The Instruments and Their Functions

Households hold instruments, and the instruments should be described before anything is said about them.

The report is the first and the most widely distributed. A school states a child's position at intervals, and [§22.3.1](#) established that such a statement supplies commensurability, direction, and publicity in one operation. A household receives it without having sought it, and [§3.3.1](#) established that a way of describing arrives where its origin is not visible.

The report's function is real. It tells a household something it could not otherwise know, since a household cannot assess a child's standing in a domain it does not observe, and [§5.3.2](#) established that households differ in their familiarity with what a school expects. A household with a report knows something; a household without one is guessing.

The comparison is the second. A child is placed against a distribution: against classmates, against a norm, against a sibling at the same age, against what an adult remembers of himself. [§22.2.1](#) established that the description under which children are compared frequently originates outside the household, and [§2.3.2](#) established that the founding developmental instruments render a child as a position in a distribution.

The comparison's function is also real. [§20.1.2](#) established that a subject's standing is not assessable from within, and the same holds for a household's assessment of a child: an adult with no comparison has no way of knowing whether what he observes is unusual. Where a

difficulty is real and early, a comparison is what detects it.

The record is the third. A household counts what a child does: hours practised, books read, minutes at a screen, portions eaten, times a behaviour occurred. Each of these is a quantity a household constructs itself, and §27.1.1 established that projection makes optimisation available for whatever it represents.

The record's function is real and is frequently protective. A household that counts hours at a screen is a household that has noticed something worth noticing, and §2.6.2 recorded that a slow variable is invisible at the timescale on which parties operate. A record makes a slow variable visible, which is what records are for.

The schedule is the fourth. A child's time is allocated in advance across activities, and the allocation is written or held. §5.2.2 established that arrangements differ in whether uncommitted time exists at all, and a schedule is what a household constructs where several commitments must be met.

The schedule's function is real and is frequently the only way the day can be conducted. §5.6.1 established that the configuration of the long day is increasing across every society in this book's coverage, and a household in it cannot conduct a day without allocating it.

And the target is the fifth. A household states what shall be reached: a level, a mark, a piece completed, a habit established. §25.1.1 established that a goal with a terminal state and a measure of progress is optimisable, and a target is a structural goal made explicit.

The target's function is real. It communicates to a child what is expected, and §5.5.1 distinguished a child being consulted from the consultation having consequence. A target is at least a statement a child may hold an adult to.

Proposition 28.1. *The report, the comparison, the record, the schedule, and the target each supply a household with something it could not otherwise have. Each answers a difficulty that is real, and no household in the arrangements of Chapter 5 could conduct itself without instruments of these kinds.*

Two observations complete the section and both are required before the following one.

The first is that this chapter's argument does not concern any instrument's accuracy. §17.2.1 established that evidence produced under a governed approach is genuine, and the same holds here: a report reports, a comparison compares, a record records. §27.4.1 distinguished the gaming claim and the incompleteness claim from the contraction claim, and neither of the first two is what this chapter argues.

The second is that no instrument in the list was designed to do what §28.2 describes. §16.2.2 established the general form and it holds here with particular force, since each instrument has a stated purpose, each serves it, and §27.3.1 established that the mechanism at issue requires no party to be maximising anything.

28.2 The Operation of Accumulation

28.2.1 The Operation No Single Instrument Performs

Each instrument of §28.1.1 represents one thing. This section states what happens when a household holds several, and the answer is that they combine in a manner none of them per-

forms alone.

Consider a household holding all five. It has a report stating a position, a comparison locating the child against a distribution, records of several counted quantities, a schedule allocating the week, and targets naming what shall be reached. Each was adopted separately and for its own reason.

What the five together supply is a space. §27.1.1 defined projection as the representation of what a household holds about a child as a position in a space of few dimensions, and the five instruments are dimensions. They are commensurable in the minimal sense that each is a quantity, they share a direction in the minimal sense that each has a better and a worse, and §21.2.1 established that commensurability and direction are the first two components of singularity.

Proposition 28.2. *Instruments adopted separately, each for its own reason, jointly constitute a space in which a child has a position. The constituting is performed by no instrument and is not among the purposes for which any was adopted.*

Three features of the resulting space deserve statement.

The first is that the space is unified without anyone having unified it. §27.2.1 made the contraction claim conditional on unification and observed that a household holding several descriptions that do not combine retains what each omits in the others. The present observation is that instruments of this kind do combine, since each answers the question of how the child is doing, and the answers are read together whether or not anyone has constructed a formula.

The second is that the space is asymmetric in what it can represent. Every dimension it contains is one on which a child may be doing better or worse. §25.2.1 established that a generative goal admits no measure of progress and §25.3.1 established that a non-structural norm is not an objective, so neither kind has a dimension in the space. §25.4.1 established the consequence: a decision presenting one measurable term and two unmeasurable ones presents itself in the measurable term.

And the third is that the space is stable in a way its components are not. Any single instrument may be dropped, disputed, or discounted; a household may decide that a report matters less than it did. What is harder to drop is the space, since dropping it would require the household to hold what it holds about the child in some other form, and §14.2.1 established that a capacity not exercised contracts.

Two consequences follow and both bear on how this chapter should be read.

The first is that no adult performed the operation and no adult can point to it. §27.3.1 established that the mechanism requires no party to be maximising anything, and the present case shows how: five reasonable adoptions, each defensible, produce jointly what none produces and what no one adopted.

The second is that the operation is invisible in the ordinary way. §15.3.1 established that a household cannot determine its own state by introspection, and §27.2.1 conceded that the contraction is not detectable. An adult asked whether he holds a unified space would not recognise the description, and would be answering sincerely.

28.2.2 The Domestic Case Compared with the Institutional

The literature on index governance treats institutions, and this section states how the household case differs, since the differences bear on what may be inferred from the existing findings.

Four differences should be marked.

The household's instruments are fewer and less formal. An institution's indices are documented, audited, and stated in advance (Power, 1997); a household's are held loosely and may never be written. §22.3.1 established that publicity is among what a ranking supplies, and the household's space is largely unpublished.

The household's subject cannot leave. §7.1.1 established that a young child has no exit and §7.2.1 established what follows. An employee subject to an institution's indices may leave, may work elsewhere, and may hold the indices to misrepresent him; §45.4 stated the replacement proposition for the child's case.

The household's instruments reach further. §17.3.1 established five reasons the household's loop closes faster than any other setting's, of which the fifth was that its occasions are unbounded in kind. An institution's indices govern a domain; a household's space, once constituted, is available for any occasion.

And the household has no counter-party. An institution measured by indices is measured by someone, and the someone may be argued with, appealed to, or held to account. §16.2.2 established that a household's readings are not devised, and the present observation is its counterpart: there is no party to whom a household's space could be objected, because no party constructed it.

Proposition 28.3. *The household's instruments are less formal, reach further, govern a subject who cannot leave, and were constituted by no party who could be objected to. The findings of the institutional literature therefore transfer to this case in some respects and not in others.*

One observation completes the section.

§27.4.1 distinguished this Part's claim from the gaming, incompleteness, and reactivity claims, and the present comparison adds a fourth distinction. The institutional literature's characteristic finding is that an organisation subject to indices reorganises itself around them (Sauder and Espeland, 2009; Muller, 2018), which is a finding about an organisation's conduct. The present chapter's claim concerns what a household is able to hold, and §27.2.1 established that this is a claim about a capacity rather than about conduct. A household may reorganise around nothing and still be in the position described.

28.3 Seeing and Weighing

28.3.1 The Residue of Visibility

The claim of this Part is easy to overstate in one particular direction, and this section states the limit precisely.

Nothing in §28.2 holds that a household ceases to see what its instruments do not represent. §27.2.1 established that the claim concerns retention rather than perception, and the distinction is the subject of this section.

An adult in a household holding the five instruments sees a great deal they do not rep-

resent. He sees that the child was pleased with something, that he has been quiet since a particular afternoon, that he has begun asking about a subject he had not asked about, that something between him and another child has altered. §15.1.1 established that an adult attends under an orientation and §15.2.1 established what an orientation governs, and neither establishes that anything ceases to be perceptible.

What changes is what such an observation can do.

Proposition 28.4. *An observation falling outside a household's instruments remains perceptible. What it lacks is a form in which it could bear on a decision, since the decisions are conducted in a space it has no dimension in.*

Three things follow and the second is the operative one.

The first is that the observation is frequently reported and frequently sincere. An adult says that the child has seemed quiet, and the saying is a real report of a real perception. §20.2.1 established that confirmation operates in conduct rather than assertion, and the present observation is its counterpart on the household's side: the report is an assertion, and what it does not do is enter the deliberation in which the week is allocated.

The second is that this is what §25.4.1 described, seen from the household's position. That subsection established that where goods are incommensurable and a decision must be made, the decision presents itself in the currency that exists. The present observation adds what this feels like from inside: it does not feel like a good being outweighed. It feels like a consideration that was mentioned and then the decision was made, and the two events are unconnected in a way no party notices, since §27.3.1 established that no party is weighing anything.

And the third is that the perception itself may contract over time, though the claim here is weaker than the claim about weighing. §14.2.1 established that descriptions are maintained by being made and that the perceptual discriminations a vocabulary sustained contract with the vocabulary. An adult who has had no occasion to state what he noticed, because the noticing bore on nothing, is an adult exercising a capacity less. §27.2.1 confined the claim to retention, and the present observation is that the two are connected at a remove.

28.3.2 The Evaluation Functional

The object this Part has been circling can now be named, and naming it is the chapter's contribution.

What accumulates is not a policy, a preference, or a set of values. It is a functional: a way of taking what is known about a child and returning an assessment of how things stand. §27.1.1 established that projection supplies an ordering that did not previously exist, and a functional is what does the ordering.

Three properties of the household's functional matter.

It is implicit. No household writes one, no adult could state its weights, and §15.1.1 established that a party asked to state such a thing supplies a rationalisation. What can be observed is its output: how things are taken to stand.

It is stable across occasions. §11.1.2 established that settled matters do not decay, and a functional applied on many occasions is applied in the same terms on each. This is what makes it a functional rather than a series of judgements.

And it has a domain. What is not in the space is not in the domain, and §28.3.1 established that an observation outside the space remains perceptible while lacking a form in which it could bear. §25.2.1 and §25.3.1 established that two of the three kinds of goal have no dimension available to them.

Proposition 28.5. *What accumulates is an implicit evaluation functional: stable across occasions, unstatable by the parties who apply it, and defined on a domain that excludes two of the three kinds of goal.*

Two consequences complete the chapter's argument.

The first is that the functional is what an adult consults when he asks himself how the child is doing. §15.3.1 established that a governed approach is experienced as responsiveness, and the present case is its counterpart: an adult who consults the functional experiences himself as considering how things are.

The second is that the functional determines what counts as a problem. This is where the Part's material bears on the diagnostic Parts. A difficulty falling within the domain registers as a difficulty and is addressed; a difficulty falling outside it does not register as a difficulty at all, and §20.2.2 established that a party unaddressed has nothing to identify as having occurred. ch. 31 inherits this and it is among the mechanisms by which that chapter's phenomenon operates.

28.4 The Bearing on What Follows

Three things pass forward.

The functional passes to ch. 31. §28.3.2 established that it determines what counts as a problem and that a difficulty outside its domain does not register as one. That chapter must show that something is lost where this occurs, and §8.1.1 recorded that the book stands on it.

The justificatory formulation passes to ch. 29. §28.1.1 established that each instrument has a stated purpose and §28.2.1 established that no party performed the operation the instruments jointly perform. Where a household is asked why the week is allocated as it is, the answer available names the child's future, and that chapter must treat the formulation under the prohibition of §24.1.2.

And the measurement problem passes to ch. 70. §28.3.2 established that the functional is implicit and unstatable by the parties who apply it. Part XII must say whether such a thing can be brought into contact with evidence, and §27.2.1 conceded that the contraction it produces is not detectable from within.

Proposition 28.6. *This chapter establishes that domestic instruments are individually reasonable, that their accumulation constitutes a space no party constructed, and that what results is an implicit evaluation functional determining what counts as a problem. It establishes no harm and recommends no change to any instrument.*

One matter closes the chapter and it concerns the description this Part has been required to give.

§8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria for identifying a household as failing, and the material of this chapter is the material most readily converted into such criteria. A reader in

possession of the list in §28.1.1 may count his own instruments and conclude something. The conclusion would be unavailable on the argument given: §28.1.1 established that each instrument answers a real difficulty, §28.2.1 established that the operation is performed by no party and is invisible to all, §27.2.1 established that the resulting contraction is not detectable, and §27.2.2 established that nothing could be done about it by deciding to. A household counting its instruments has counted its instruments. What it cannot do is determine, by counting them, whether the thing this chapter describes has occurred.

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Chapter 29

The Formulation That Names a Child's Future

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what is done by the formulation that a thing is done for a child's future, and answers that it converts a description into a justification at the point where the conversion is hardest to detect.

It closes this Part and it is the Part's guardrail. §24.1.2 established that the framework may describe what a practice sustains and may not offer the description as a reason for it. The present chapter treats the local form in which that prohibition is most likely to fail, since the formulation is frequently sincere, is sometimes correct, and is the only account most households have of why the week is allocated as it is.

It does not hold that the formulation is false, and §29.2 grants at length that it is often true. It does not hold that adults using it are doing something objectionable.

The reader should carry forward the three respects in which the formulation is correct, the account of what it does that its correctness does not license, and the statement of what remains sayable once the prohibition is enforced.

29.1 The Formulation

29.1.1 The Nature and Location of the Substitution

A formulation occurs wherever a household must account for what it does with a child's time, and it takes forms that differ verbally and agree in structure.

An hour is allocated to a task, an activity is required, a preference is overridden, a comparison is made, an instrument is consulted (Lareau, 2011). Asked why, an adult answers that it is for the child's future: for what will be open to him, for what he will need, for what he will be glad of. §18.1.1 recorded that the sentence stating a giving position appears across every society in this book's coverage, and the present formulation is at least as widely distributed.

Three features locate it structurally.

The formulation states a relation between a present act and a future state. §25.1.1 established that a structural goal has a terminal state and orders means, and the formulation asserts that the present act is a means to such a state. This is what makes it an account rather than an assertion of preference.

The formulation is the only account most households have available. §25.4.1 established that a decision presenting one measurable term and two unmeasurable ones presents itself

in the measurable term, and §28.3.2 established that what accumulates is a functional whose domain excludes two of the three kinds of goal. An adult asked to justify an allocation is asked to state a reason, and the reason available is the one his instruments represent.

And the formulation names a party who cannot be consulted. The child whose future is at issue does not exist yet in the relevant sense, and the adult speaks for him. §13.2.2 established that a child cannot dispute an accounting describing the conditions of his existence, and the present case is sharper: the party on whose behalf the claim is made is the adult he will become rather than the child now, and §7.1.1 established that the child has no standpoint from which either could be assessed.

Proposition 29.1. *The formulation asserts that a present act is a means to a future state, is frequently the only account a household's instruments make available, and speaks on behalf of a party who does not yet exist and cannot be consulted.*

Two observations complete the section.

The first is that the formulation is structurally identical to the move §24.1.1 identified. That subsection separated four disguises of the utilitarian re-entry, of which the first was potential, described as the plain form with a temporal displacement. The present formulation is that displacement stated in a household's own voice, and §24.1.2 established the prohibition it is subject to.

The second is that this chapter would be worthless if it treated the formulation as a rationalisation. §13.2.1 established that the sentence examined there is generally true, generally sincere, and frequently said in distress, and that a framework treating it as a falsehood would be treating as false something the evidence supports. The same holds here and more strongly, and §29.2 establishes it before anything critical is said.

29.2 The Respects in Which It Is Correct

29.2.1 The Grants Made

A chapter treating this formulation as an error would be defeating a claim no one holds. This section grants it at full strength, and the granting is not preliminary to a dismissal.

The formulation is frequently true as a matter of fact. §25.1.1 established that structural goals are frequently what matters materially and that credentials are among the routes by which resources are obtained. A child who acquires a competence has acquired something that will be available to him, a child who does not has not, and §5.3.2 established that command over resources determines which configurations are available. An adult who says that an hour is for the child's future is frequently saying something the evidence supports.

The formulation is frequently the responsible thing to say. §7.3.1 established that the parties to a constitutive relation are answerable for the constituting, and answerability extends to what a child will face. An adult who declined to consider a child's future would be declining part of what the position requires, and §10.1.1 established that a young child requires that a great many matters be settled for him. §20.1.2 recorded that a practical literature treating a child's dependence as something to be withdrawn from is operating on a mistaken reading, and an adult who refused to act on the child's behalf in matters the child cannot assess would be

making the same error in another form.

And the formulation is frequently said under conditions that leave nothing else to say. §5.2.2 established that arrangements differ in what time exists, §10.2.3 established that adults differ in what they can afford, and §28.3.2 established that what a household can weigh is what its instruments represent. An adult who states the formulation is stating the reason his situation makes available, and §11.1.1 established that the available course is taken without anyone choosing a policy.

Proposition 29.2. *The formulation is frequently true as a matter of fact, is frequently what answerability requires, and is frequently the only reason a household's conditions make storable. A framework treating it as a rationalisation would misdescribe most instances of it.*

Two further grants belong here, since the argument that follows must not be read as resting on their denial.

The first is that a household acting on the formulation frequently produces what it names. Children who practise acquire competences, children whose households attend to their schooling do better on the measures schooling employs, and §17.2.1 established that evidence of this kind is genuine. Nothing in this chapter holds that the acts the formulation justifies fail to produce their effects.

The second is that the alternative frequently on offer is worse. §25.1.1 recorded that the alternative to a structural goal is frequently no goal at all, and an adult persuaded to abandon the formulation without acquiring another does not thereby acquire the occasions §23.3.1 identified. §26.2.3 recorded that this book supplies no better argument to the parties who required the first.

29.3 The Limits of Its Licence

29.3.1 The Wall Held Locally

Everything granted in §29.2 is compatible with the prohibition, and this section states why.

§24.1.2 established the prohibition in its general form: the framework may describe what a practice sustains and may not offer the description as the reason for it. The formulation of this chapter does exactly what the prohibition forbids, and it does so while being true.

The structure is this. That an act produces a future state is a description. That the future state is good is a further claim. That the act is therefore justified is a third, and it follows from the first two only where the future state's goodness is what justifies acts. §24.2.1 established that recognition is a condition of generation rather than among its products, and §24.1.2 established that a framework grounding what is owed in what is produced has made the owing conditional on the producing.

Proposition 29.3. *That an act produces a future state does not establish that the act is justified, and the truth of the description supplies no part of the justification. The formulation is a description functioning as a justification, and its truth is what makes the function invisible.*

Three consequences follow and the third is where the chapter's material bears on practice. The first is that the prohibition is not a claim about consequences. Nothing here holds

that a household should disregard what will be available to a child, and §29.2.1 granted that considering it is what answerability requires. What is prohibited is the inference from a consequence to a warrant, and §24.2.2 established the general form: the order of priority refutes the grounding by yield without supplying a grounding of its own.

The second is that the formulation, once functioning as a warrant, is unanswerable in the manner §13.2.2 described. A child who objects to an allocation is objecting to something justified by a state he cannot assess, on behalf of a party he is not yet. §16.3.1 established that a child's refutation fails at three requirements, and here it fails at a fourth: the party in whose interest the act is done is not available to be consulted, and the adult speaks for him.

And the third is that the formulation absorbs what would otherwise count against it. §16.2.1 established that a name supplies three readings of a discrepant occasion, and the formulation supplies the same. A child's distress at an allocation is read as evidence that he does not yet understand what is at stake. His resistance is read as what the allocation exists to overcome. His compliance is read as confirmation. §16.2.2 established that such readings are the ordinary operation of any description, and §19.3.1 supplied the criterion: a name admits refutation by its object where the object could be the party who shows it no longer applies. The formulation does not, since its object is a state the child cannot assess.

29.3.2 The Generalised Danger

The chapter's material connects to the framework's most serious exposure and the connection should be stated.

§24.3.2 established that where the removal of a party would in fact free a system's generation, the framework holds the removal unjust and holds that the dynamical observation supplies no reason. The present formulation is that structure at domestic scale and in a benign register.

Consider the parallel precisely. In both cases a description is true: the act does produce the state, the removal does free the generation. In both cases the description is offered as the reason. In both cases the party on whose behalf the reason is given is unable to assess it. And in both cases, §24.1.2 established, the framework must hold that the truth of the description supplies no warrant.

Proposition 29.4. *The formulation and the generalised sentence §24.3.2 prohibits have one structure: a true description offered as a justification, on behalf of a party unable to assess it. The difference is scale and register, and the prohibition is the same prohibition.*

Two observations complete the section.

The first is that this is why the outline of this book treats the present chapter as a guardrail rather than as a topic. §24.1.2 recorded that a framework using the vocabulary of generativity is peculiarly exposed to the forbidden inference, and §24.1.1 recorded that nothing in the framework's vocabulary marks the move as illegitimate. The domestic form is the one an author of this book would be likeliest to make himself, since it is benign, since it is true, and since §29.2.1 granted that it is frequently what answerability requires.

The second is that the parallel does not equate the cases morally and is not offered to. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies no criteria for identifying a household as failing, and an argument holding that a household allocating an hour is doing what a system removing a party

does would be an absurdity. What is claimed is a structural identity in the form of the justification, and §6.2.2 imposed the discipline that a claim belongs to the ontological statement or to a component. The present claim belongs to the prohibition, and the prohibition is indifferent to scale by construction.

29.4 The Residue of the Sayable

29.4.1 The Permitted Forms

A prohibition that left a household nothing to say would be a prohibition no one could observe, and this section states what remains.

Four things remain sayable and each is a description rather than a justification.

That an act produces a state remains sayable. §24.1.2 permitted description and §29.2.1 granted that the descriptions in question are frequently true. An adult may say that practice produces competence, that a competence will be available, and that its absence will be felt. ch. 77 will hold that a recommendation is a description of what an act does under conditions that hold, and the present forms are of that kind.

That the household is acting under conditions it did not choose remains sayable, and is said too rarely. §5.6 established that arrangements are largely not chosen by the households subject to them, §5.2.2 established what the conditions supply, and §25.4.1 established why the decision presents itself as it does. An adult who says that the hour is allocated this way because of what the arrangement requires has described his situation accurately, and the description locates the constraint outside the child.

That the adult is uncertain remains sayable. §2.6.2 established that what decides an outcome may be invisible at the timescale on which parties operate, and §26.2.1 established that the effect of an instance is unpredictable in principle. An adult who says that he does not know whether this will matter has said something true, and §19.3.1 established that a description admitting refutation by its object differs from one that does not.

And that the adult is answerable remains sayable. §7.3.1 established that the parties to a constitutive relation are answerable for the constituting, and §13.2.2 established that a child cannot dispute an accounting covering the conditions of his existence. An adult who states what he is doing without stating that it is thereby warranted has left the warrant open, and §12.1.2 made exposure the criterion by which the two households are distinguished.

Proposition 29.5. *A household may say that an act produces a state, that its conditions require what they require, that the outcome is uncertain, and that it is answerable for what it does. None of these is the prohibited inference and none is unavailable to a household in ordinary circumstances.*

One observation completes the section.

The difference between the permitted and prohibited forms is not a difference of words, and §19.2.2 established the general point: the same words go either way and what settles it is how the household's conduct treats what is said. An adult stating that an hour is for the child's future, and treating the statement as ending the matter, has made the prohibited inference. An adult stating the same words, and remaining answerable for the allocation to whatever the child supplies, has not. §19.3.1 supplied the criterion and it applies here unchanged.

29.5 The Close of the Part

29.5.1 The Findings of Part V

Five chapters have treated goals, indices, and optimisation, and the results should be stated together.

Three kinds of goal must be distinguished. A structural goal has a terminal state, a measure of progress, and an ordering over means, and optimisation is the appropriate response to it. A generative goal has a direction and none of the three, cannot be pursued by pursuing it, and is realised in occasions whose character consists in their not having been arranged. A non-structural norm cancels when made an objective. The three admit no common measure.

Childhood is the domain in which generative occasions are most abundant, and play is their clearest instance. Play injects states a process would not otherwise have entered; its direction is definite and its effect in any instance is unpredictable in principle. It is therefore not preparation, and the phrase stating its value in the currency of what it teaches performs a substitution that leaves the remainder undefended.

Where a household's account of a child is projected onto a unified optimisable space, the capacity to retain what the projection does not represent is reduced. The claim concerns a capacity rather than an outcome, retention rather than perception, and a reduction rather than a destruction. It requires no party to be optimising anything and is not detectable from within.

The instruments a household holds are individually reasonable and jointly constitute a space no party constructed. What results is an implicit evaluation functional, stable across occasions and unstatable by those who apply it, which determines what registers as a problem.

And the formulation naming a child's future is frequently true, frequently what answerability requires, and frequently the only reason a household's conditions make statable. Its truth is what makes its function as a justification invisible, and the prohibition of §24.1.2 applies to it unchanged.

Proposition 29.6. *Part V establishes a taxonomy of goals, an account of play, a conservative claim about what projection reduces, a description of household instruments and what they jointly constitute, and the local enforcement of the framework's central prohibition.*

What the Part has not established should close it.

It has not shown that a child is worse off in a household with a unified space. §27.2.2 listed this among six things not claimed, §27.2.1 confined the claim to a capacity, and §8.1.1 recorded that whether an absence costs anything is Part VI's question.

It has not condemned any instrument, any arrangement, or any household. §28.1.1 granted each instrument its function, §25.1.1 granted that optimisation is the appropriate response to a structural goal, and §29.2.1 granted the formulation three times over.

And it has not supplied a remedy. §25.2.2 established that a household cannot protect the unarranged by arranging its protection, §27.2.2 conceded that nothing could be done by deciding to, and ch. 51 inherits the difficulty in its general form.

One remark closes the Part.

§25.5 stated what this Part was for: the preceding Parts identified candidate losses, and this Part identifies the mechanism by which they become general rather than particular. That mechanism can now be stated in one sentence. A household holds three kinds of goal and

can measure one; the measurable one is therefore the one in which decisions are conducted, the capacity to hold the others contracts through disuse, and the account a household gives of what it is doing is the account its instruments make available. Nothing in this requires a decision, a preference, or an error. [ch. 30](#) and [ch. 31](#) must now show that something is lost where it occurs.

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Draft

Part VI

Forms of Degradation

Chapter 30

The Levels of Degradation

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what it would mean for something to be lost in the descriptions this book has traced, and states the distinction on which the book's whole case depends.

It is the hinge of the argument. §8.1.1 required of the diagnostic Parts that they show something is lost, that the loss not be a renaming of what other vocabularies already state, that the child's case be derived rather than assumed, and that nothing yield a scale for ranking households. Five Parts have supplied mechanisms: absorption and its ceasing, the governance of names, the singularity of the gaze, the contraction of degrees of freedom. None of them has shown that anything is lost.

§30.1 states the distinction and returns it to the three conditions named in §1.26.3, which promised that this chapter would state them in the negative. §30.2 faces the difficulty that the two levels appear identical from outside, and locates the discriminator in what follows a restored occasion rather than in anything observable at rest. §30.3 sets the distinction against the accounts nearest to it, since a distinction that renamed what those accounts already state would fail the requirement §8.1.1 imposed. §30.4 states what would establish that the distinction is real and what this book can furnish, which is less. §30.5 states why the distinction resists becoming a scale.

The reader should carry forward the definition of the two levels, the reason they are behaviourally identical from outside, and an honest account of the distinction's standing, which is that of a coherent and derived distinction awaiting a demonstration ch. 31 begins and this book does not complete.

30.1 The Levels Distinguished

§1.26.3 named three conditions on the relations within which development occurs. They must be able to support, so that what a child ventures is held rather than left to fail alone. They must be able to revise, so that an account given of a child can be altered by what the child does. And they must be able to create jointly, so that something can arise between the parties that neither brought. That section promised that this chapter would state the three conditions in the negative. The distinction this chapter draws is the form that promise takes.

30.1.1 Generation Blocked

The first level is the one every prior Part has been describing without naming, and naming it here is the first step toward the distinction the chapter needs.

A relation is at the first level where the occasions on which its generative operations would be exercised have contracted while the grammar those operations exercise remains available. §10.2.2 established that power is generated continuously by an asymmetry and returned or accumulated; at the first level the occasions on which it might be returned have contracted, through the routes §11.1.1 described, and §11.1.2 established that the contraction maintains itself. What has not happened is any change in what the relation is equipped to do were the occasions to return.

In the terms of §1.26.3, the first level is a contraction in the exercise of support and of joint creation. Support is something a relation does on an occasion, and §5.2.2 described the conditions under which the occasions for doing it become few. Joint creation is likewise occasional, and §10.2.3 described what it costs the party who makes the occasions available. Both conditions are met by a relation intermittently, and both admit of more and less without ceasing to be met at all.

The grammar remains available throughout. §6.1.2 held that a pattern is maintained rather than possessed, and at the first level the pattern that has lapsed is a pattern of exercise rather than of capacity. An adult whose occasions for absorbing have contracted has not lost the capacity to absorb; he has lost the occasions on which it is exercised, and §11.2.2 established that this is a cessation rather than an act.

The blockage is therefore reversible in a qualified sense. §11.1.2 established that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field and does not restore the prior rate at once, so reversibility at the first level is neither instantaneous nor guaranteed. What distinguishes it from the second level is that the grammar which would receive a restored occasion is still there to receive it.

The qualification requires development, since the sense in which the first level is reversible is easily overstated and the overstatement would misrepresent what Part VI describes. Three things must hold for a restored occasion to raise the rate. The occasion must arise, which §5.2.2 established is governed by conditions the household does not control. What the child supplies within it must be taken up, which §39.2.2 established is a property of the exchange rather than of either party's intention. And the taking up must recur, since §62.1.3 established that what is at issue is a rate and §78.3.2 that an adult who has responded once has altered a rate by one occasion's worth. A relation at the first level is reversible in the sense that none of the three is foreclosed, and in no stronger sense. §11.1.2 established that the field into which a restored occasion arrives has been altered by the interval, so the three conditions are harder to meet after a contraction than before it, and §23.2.2 established that their conjunction cannot be arranged by any party who wants it.

Two observations bear on how much of this book the first level accounts for.

The first is that most of what has been described so far is compatible with the first level alone. §11.1.1, §15.2.2, and §28.3.2 each describe a contraction of occasions or of the capacity to retain them, and none by itself establishes that a grammar has been altered. A reader who concluded that this book had shown only a variable rate of opportunity would have concluded something the argument to this point supports, and the remainder of this chapter exists because that conclusion is insufficient for the case Part VI must carry.

The second is that the first level leaves the household's accumulated practices in place. §1.27.10 held that what develops includes the household's common practices and common knowledge, and a blockage at the level of occasion leaves those practices intact and available

to whatever occasions return.

Proposition 30.1. *Generation is blocked at the first level where the occasions for a relation's generative operations have contracted while the grammar those operations exercise remains available. In the terms of §1.26.3 the conditions of support and joint creation are met less often, and the blockage concerns opportunity, is reversible in the qualified sense of a restored occasion arriving into a changed field, and leaves the household's accumulated practices in place.*

30.1.2 Grammar Rewritten

The second level is where the distinction this chapter exists to draw becomes visible, and it requires a claim beyond anything the preceding Parts individually established.

A relation is at the second level where what has changed is the grammar itself: the rules by which occasions are read, what counts as evidence, what an exception means, and what a child's account is taken to be. Chapter 16 supplied the apparatus. §16.2.1 established that a name supplies three readings of a discrepant occasion, and §16.2.2 established that where those readings are undefeatable no occasion, however produced, can reach the description. At the second level, restoring the occasions of §30.1.1 would not restore anything, because what receives an occasion has itself changed.

The condition of §1.26.3 that fails here is the second, and its position among the three is what makes the failure structural. Support and joint creation are exercised on occasions and admit of a rate. Revisability is a property of the rules by which occasions are read, and a rule either leaves an account answerable to what a child does or leaves it unanswerable. There is no rate at which a household revises in the sense the keynote requires; there is a grammar that permits revision and a grammar that does not.

§12.2.2 supplied the mechanism by which the second condition fails. A position occupied continuously is identified with and then taken as an essence, and the identification is a transformation of what a description is directed at rather than a failure to exercise a capacity. §12.3.2 established the sharpest instance, a subject for whom a description is not the kind of thing that admits of disagreement at all. §19.2.1 distinguished a name stating a position from one stating an essence, and the second level consists in a name's having become, or having always been, essential in that sense: a name whose object could not, in the terms available, be the party who shows that it no longer applies.

The alteration is not undone by the return of occasions. §23.2.2 established that mutual confirmation cannot be arranged and §23.3.1 established that most of its conditions are properties of arrangements. An arrangement that restores uncommitted time does not thereby restore a grammar that has been altered, since the alteration is not what the pressures on time directly produced. §11.1.2 established that the fall is self-maintaining by mechanisms outlasting the conditions that began it, and the second level is what those mechanisms complete.

What this does to the child is the subject of §14.1.2, which established that the account at issue is a constituent of the account the child is forming rather than one he holds among others. The second level is therefore not a restriction on what a child may do. It is a settlement of what he is taken to be, reached by rules that no longer answer to his conduct.

Proposition 30.2. *Grammar is rewritten at the second level where the rules by which occasions*

are read have themselves changed, so that restored occasions do not reach a description that has become, or always was, essential rather than positional. In the terms of §1.26.3 the condition of revisability has failed, and its failure is structural because revisability is a property of rules and admits of no rate.

30.1.3 Kind and Degree

The claim that the two levels differ in kind carries most of what Part VI will assert, and it meets an immediate objection. §12.2.2 described a process that is gradual. A gradual process appears to yield differences of degree, and a reader entitled to that inference would take the two levels to name regions of one continuum, arbitrarily divided. The objection deserves an answer, and this section gives three, none of which the book will adjudicate between.

The first answer is that the crossing is a threshold. Sedimentation accumulates continuously, and what accumulates is the difficulty of defeating the readings §16.2.1 identified. While any one of those readings remains defeasible, a discrepant occasion can reach the description. When the last of them ceases to be defeasible, no occasion can. The approach is continuous and the crossing is not, in the way that the last removed support is continuous with the others and the collapse it produces is not. What this answer costs is the locating of the threshold. Nothing in the account says how much sedimentation exhausts the last defeating reading, and a distinction whose instances cannot be identified is weaker than one whose instances can.

The second answer is that the two levels are predicated of different things and are therefore not on one scale at all. The first level is predicated of a rate, the frequency with which occasions arise and are taken. The second is predicated of a rule, whether the readings a name supplies remain defeasible. A rate and a rule do not stand in the relation of more and less, and on this answer no quantity of the first level constitutes the second, however extreme. What this answer must then explain is how a process operating on rates produces a change in rules, and it may not answer that enough rate-change becomes rule-change, since that concedes the first answer. The explanation available is the third route of §11.1.1, in which accumulated settlements make further settling cheaper, which describes a process that changes the terms in which subsequent occasions are read rather than merely their number.

The third answer accepts the objection. There is one underlying quantity, the degree to which an account remains answerable to what a child does, and the two levels name regions of it. On this answer the chapter's distinction is a useful division of a continuum rather than a discovery about its structure. What this answer costs is severe and should be stated plainly: a continuum admits of ordering, and §30.5 will hold that the distinction must not become a scale on which households are ranked. What it gains is the natural treatment of intermediate cases, which the first two answers must treat as either pre-threshold or as belonging to a category the account does not supply.

The chapter leaves the three unadjudicated, and the reason is that its case does not depend on the choice. What survives all three is the claim on which Part VI rests: that the loss at issue is a loss of answerability rather than of opportunity, and that a description of a child which cannot be altered by what the child does removes a condition §1.26.3 named as constitutive. Under the first answer this removal happens at a point; under the second it is a change in the sort of thing the description is; under the third it is the far end of a range. In all three

it is a removal, and in all three what is removed is the same. Chapter 33 requires only that answerability can fail, and does not require that it fail all at once. Chapter 31 requires only that the failure have a phenomenology, and does not require that the phenomenology mark a threshold.

Proposition 30.3. *The two levels admit of three constructions: a threshold crossed discontinuously, a difference in what the levels are predicated of, and a continuum of answerability divided for convenience. The book's case in Part VI is invariant across them, since each construes as a removal the same loss of answerability, and the arguments that follow require neither that the removal be sudden nor that it be total.*

30.2 Indistinguishability from Outside

A distinction that made no difference to anything observable would be idle. The distinction drawn in §30.1 makes very little difference to anything observable, and this section states how little, and what remains.

30.2.1 The Identical Appearance

Two households, one at each level, present the same face to an observer.

In each, occasions on which a child might be absorbed arise seldom and are seldom taken. In each, the child's account of himself agrees with the household's account of him, since at the first level the occasions that would produce a discrepancy have contracted, and at the second the discrepancies that arise do not reach the description. In each, the adults report the child accurately by their own lights, and §16.2.2 established that they do so without any awareness of a rule being applied. In each, an observer asking whether the household's description of the child is correct receives confirmation from every party to it, including the child.

The reason the appearance is identical is that the difference between the levels concerns what would happen under a condition that, in both households, is not obtaining. At the first level the grammar would receive a restored occasion. At the second it would not. Where no occasion is restored, the two are indiscernible, and the routes of §11.1.1 ensure that occasions are precisely what has become scarce.

The identity is not merely a matter of what an observer happens to record. It holds for every quantity this book has been able to define. §10.2.2 characterises a relation by the rate at which generated power is returned against the rate at which it is generated, and at both levels the first rate is at or near zero. §21.3.2 characterises a household by its distribution of address, and the distributions are alike. §20.2.1 characterises an occasion by what it confirms, and the occasions confirm the same description in both. A reader who supposes that some further quantity would separate them is invited to name one that does not presuppose the answer, and §30.2.2 states why the quantity that would separate them is not of that kind.

This is a stronger difficulty than it first appears, and two considerations sharpen it.

The first is that the child cannot supply the discriminating report. §14.1.2 established that at the second level the description is a constituent of the account the child is forming, so a child at the second level does not experience a description as imposed, and reports it as he reports anything he takes himself to know. A child at the first level, whose occasions have merely

contracted, may equally report the description without objection, since he has not been given occasion to test it. The testimony is the same and is sincere in both cases.

The second is that duration does not discriminate. A relation may remain at the first level indefinitely, and §11.1.2 established the mechanism by which it maintains itself without progressing. An observer who watched for years and saw no change would have distinguished nothing, since no change is what both levels predict.

A third consideration is worth adding because it disposes of the most natural proposal for separating the cases. It might be thought that the levels differ in what happens when the child is older, since a subject who reaches adolescence at the second level has a different trajectory from one who does not. §7.1.2 established that the founding asymmetry is a matter of degree that changes, and a child acquiring terms elsewhere acquires a standpoint. The proposal fails for two reasons. §34.1.2 established that whether a second setting supplies divergence is settled by whether the settings agree, which is independent of the level the household stands at, so a child at the first level whose settings converge is worse placed than a child at the second whose settings diverge. And §31.3.2 established that what a subject who has acquired later terms produces is a redescription whose content is partly supplied by those terms, so a difference in later report is evidence about the terms and not about the earlier state.

What the three considerations establish jointly is that the levels are indiscernible across the interval an observer could survey, and not in the present alone. §31.2.2 adds the retrospective case and §30.2.2 the prospective, and between them nothing remains that a party inside or outside the household could consult.

Proposition 30.4. *The two levels are indiscernible under observation of a relation at rest. They differ in what would follow a restored occasion, they agree in every respect where no occasion is restored, and the contraction of occasions that constitutes the first level is what makes the discriminating condition rare.*

30.2.2 The Discriminator and Its Cost

What follows from §30.2.1 is not that the distinction is empty. It is that the distinction is dispositional, and dispositional distinctions are settled by intervention rather than by observation.

The discriminating condition can be stated exactly. Restore an occasion on which the description at issue would be tested, and observe whether the description alters. At the first level the grammar receives the occasion and the description is answerable to what the child does within it, with the qualification of §11.1.2 that a single occasion arriving into a changed field alters little and that what is at issue is a direction of change rather than a completed revision. At the second level the readings of §16.2.1 absorb the occasion, and §16.2.2 established that they do so however the occasion is produced.

This gives the distinction genuine content. It also gives it a cost, and the cost is severe enough that stating it plainly is the honest course.

The first part of the cost is that the intervention cannot be arranged at will. §23.2.2 established that mutual confirmation is not something a party can arrange, and §23.3.1 established that most of the conditions on its arising are properties of arrangements rather than of intentions. The probe that would discriminate between the levels is therefore not a procedure an

observer can execute. It is a condition that may or may not obtain, and a household cannot produce it by deciding to.

The second part of the cost is that a failed probe is uninformative in one direction. If a restored occasion alters the description, the relation was at the first level. If it does not, either the relation is at the second level or the occasion was not of the kind that would have tested the description. §15.2.2 established that a name forecloses occasions without trace, so an observer has no independent way of confirming that the occasion he arranged was the occasion required. The inference runs cleanly in one direction and not in the other.

The third part of the cost belongs to ch. 35 and is noted here. An intervention performed in order to discriminate is an intervention performed for a reason external to the relation, and §28.3.2 established what happens to an occasion whose point is the producing of a result. The probe is therefore in tension with the conditions under which the thing probed occurs.

Proposition 30.5. *The discriminator between the levels is what follows a restored occasion, which makes the distinction dispositional. It cannot be reliably applied, since the restoring of a generative occasion is not something a party arranges, a negative result does not distinguish a rewritten grammar from an occasion that failed to test the description, and an occasion arranged in order to discriminate is altered by the reason for which it was arranged.*

30.3 The Neighbouring Vocabularies

§8.1.1 required that the loss described here not be a renaming of what other vocabularies already state. Several existing accounts describe something close, and this section sets the distinction against the nearest of them. The nearest are treated in two groups, since they fail to coincide with the second level for two different reasons.

30.3.1 Accounts That Locate the Loss Elsewhere

The first group describes a loss of the resources by which a subject might articulate or contest an account given of him, and locates the loss outside the relation in which the account is given.

Fricker (2007) describes hermeneutical injustice, in which a gap in collective interpretive resources leaves some experiences unintelligible to those who undergo them, so that a subject cannot render his own situation communicable. The proximity to the second level is real and is the closest this book comes to being anticipated. Three differences hold them apart. The deficit Fricker describes is collective, residing in the interpretive resources a society makes available, whereas the second level is local to a relation and two households of identical social position may differ in it. The deficit Fricker describes is prior to the subject's encounter with it, whereas §12.2.2 described a grammar produced within the relation it then governs. And Fricker's subject has an experience seeking articulation, which is what the missing resources fail to accommodate, whereas §7.1.1 and the founding asymmetry it rests on hold that the child has no prior account being denied expression. What is removed at the second level is the condition under which an account of him could have been answerable to him at all, which is a loss upstream of the loss of articulation.

Two further features of Fricker's account bear on the comparison and both make the accounts harder to separate rather than easier, which is why they are stated. Her deficit is not a

matter of anyone's intention, and the parties who benefit from a gap in interpretive resources need not have produced it or noticed it, which is the structure §35.1.1 arrived at by a different route. And her account is explicitly concerned with a wrong done to a subject in his capacity as a knower, which is a wrong of standing rather than of welfare, and §31.5.2 located the loss of this book in a standing also. A reader who holds that the second level is hermeneutical injustice occurring within a household rather than within a society has made an objection this section must answer rather than deflect.

The answer is the third difference, and it should be stated at greater length than the first two. Fricker's subject undergoes something and lacks the resources to render it communicable, so the experience is prior to the deficit and persists through it. The account requires this: without an experience seeking articulation there is nothing the missing resources fail to accommodate, and the injustice consists in the gap between what the subject underwent and what he could convey. §7.1.1 denies the child the prior term. He does not undergo something and fail to render it communicable; the terms in which he would register what he undergoes are the terms his household supplies, and §33.1.2 established that the faculty performing the registering is constituted within them. §31.1.2 draws the consequence, which is that at the second level there is no experience awaiting articulation, and ch. 31 develops it. The two accounts are therefore not the same account at two scales. They differ in whether the subject has something the vocabulary fails to accommodate, and the difference is the founding asymmetry.

Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) and Bourdieu (1990) describe habitus and the misrecognition by which an imposed order is taken as natural, and Bourdieu (1984) describes the mechanism at the scale of class reproduction. The proximity here is the naturalisation, which resembles the passage from position to essence §19.2.1 distinguished. The difference is the locus and the necessity of the imposing order. Bourdieu's mechanism reproduces a structure of social positions and requires that structure to be doing the imposing, whereas the second level requires no dominant order and no external structure being reproduced, and §11.2.2 established that it requires no party who imposes. A household may reach the second level with respect to a description that no social structure supplies and that serves no reproduction.

Honneth (1995) and the exchange in Fraser and Honneth (2003) describe misrecognition as an injury to the conditions of practical self-relation, which Part IV engaged directly. The difference bearing on this chapter is that Honneth's struggle for recognition presupposes parties able to contest the terms on which they are recognised. The second level is the removal of contestability, and is therefore a condition under which the struggle Honneth describes could not begin.

30.3.2 Accounts That Presuppose a Reserve

The second group describes the phenomenon closely and presupposes, in describing it, something the second level denies.

Winnicott (1965b), developing the account of Winnicott (1965a), describes a false self formed in compliance with the environment's demands, concealing a true self which remains and which the false self protects. The phenomenology is close to what §14.1.2 described. The presupposition is decisive: Winnicott's account requires a true self held in reserve, and the concealment is intelligible only as concealment of something. §7.1.1 established that the child's

position is defined by the absence of exactly such a reserve. If the Winnicottian picture were correct in general, the second level would be impossible, since a reserve would always remain against any description and no grammar could become unanswerable. The relation between the accounts is therefore one of incompatibility rather than of restatement, and [ch. 31](#) bears on which is correct.

[Miller \(2003\)](#) describes a child who meets a parent's need and loses access to his own feeling in doing so, and of the accounts considered here this is nearest in phenomenon. It requires a parent whose need is doing the work. [§11.2.2](#) established that the mechanism of this book operates without such a party, and [ch. 35](#) carries the argument. A household in which no adult needs anything of the child may reach the second level by the routes of [§11.1.1](#) alone.

[Seligman \(2011\)](#) describes learned helplessness, in which a subject who has found action and outcome uncorrelated ceases to act. This describes the first level well, and its distance from the second is instructive. Helplessness is an expectancy concerning outcomes, and an expectancy is revisable by evidence, which is why the phenomenon is reversible under the conditions its literature specifies. Revisability by evidence is precisely what the second level removes. The helpless subject holds a belief that the world does not answer to him; the subject at the second level holds no belief that could be corrected, since the terms in which a correction would be stated are the terms that have been settled.

Proposition 30.6. *The second level is not a renaming of hermeneutical injustice, of misrecognition under habitus, of the struggle for recognition, of the false self, of the drama of the compliant child, or of learned helplessness. The first three locate the loss in resources or structures outside the relation, and the second three presuppose either a reserve the child does not have, a party whose need drives the mechanism, or a belief that evidence could revise.*

30.4 Showing It Is Real

The distinction has been defined, its constructions canvassed, its discriminator located, and its neighbours distinguished. None of that shows that any relation has ever been at the second level. This section states what would show it and what this book supplies.

What would establish the distinction is a demonstration that the two levels come apart in a case. The form such a demonstration would take follows from [§30.2.2](#): two relations alike in the observable respects of [§30.2.1](#), each meeting a restored occasion of the kind that would test the description at issue, differing in whether the description alters. The design is stated more carefully in [ch. 31](#) and its requirements are taken up again in Part XI, where [§30.2.2](#)'s costs become constraints on instrument design.

What this book supplies is less, and the shortfall should be stated without softening.

It supplies a distinction that is coherent, in that the two levels are defined by conditions that can hold separately. It supplies a derivation, in that both levels follow from mechanisms established before this chapter rather than being posited to make the case come out. It supplies a differentiation from the nearest existing accounts, discharging the requirement of [§8.1.1](#) that the loss not be a renaming. And [ch. 31](#) supplies a phenomenological demonstration, which shows what the second level is like from within for a subject who has left it, and which is evidence of a kind.

It does not supply the demonstration the distinction requires. No case is presented in which the discriminating condition was applied and the levels came apart, and §30.2.2 gave the reasons why such a case is hard to produce and harder to interpret. A reader who holds that the distinction is a redescription of the first level, elaborated to make a case Part VI needs, has not been refuted by this chapter. He has been given a distinction with content, an account of what would settle the question, and an admission that this book does not settle it.

Proposition 30.7. *This chapter establishes that the distinction is coherent, derived from prior mechanisms, and distinct from the nearest existing accounts. It does not establish that any relation is at the second level, and the demonstration that would establish it is one whose conditions §30.2.2 showed to be difficult to arrange and ambiguous to interpret.*

30.5 The Distinction and the Ranking of Households

§8.1.1 required that nothing in the diagnostic Parts yield a scale on which households are ranked. A distinction between a worse and a better condition invites exactly such a scale, and the third construction of §30.1.3 invites it more than the others.

30.5.1 The Distinction's Resistance to Instrumentation

Three features of the distinction resist its use as a ranking, and the third is the one that does the work.

The first is that the distinction is not observational. §30.2.1 established that the levels are indiscernible at rest, so a household's level is not a quantity that can be read from it. An instrument purporting to report it would be reporting something else.

The second is that any measure of it would be subject to the results of Part V. §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is the producing of a result, and a household that knew its level was being assessed would produce the occasions the assessment rewards. The measure would record the production of such occasions, which is compatible with either level.

The third is that the distinction has no household-level bearer. A relation is at the second level with respect to a particular description, since §16.2.2 defined the condition in terms of the readings a given name supplies. A household may therefore be at the second level with respect to one description of a child and at the first with respect to others, and nothing in the account aggregates these into a single quantity. There is no fact of the form that this household is at the second level, only facts of the form that this description in this household has ceased to be answerable. A ranking requires a bearer that admits of comparison, and the distinction supplies none.

The third feature deserves development, since it is what distinguishes this book's position from a reticence about measurement in general. Nothing here holds that households are incomparable or that comparison is distasteful. §70.4.1 proposes quantities defined on relations and §74.4.1 states what an assessment on those lines would report. The claim is narrower and is structural: the condition of §30.1.2 is defined with respect to a particular description in a particular relation, and there is no operation taking a set of such conditions and returning a value for the household. Summing them would require that the descriptions be commensurable,

and §21.2.1 established that parties differing in many respects are rendered comparable only by an instrument, which would be the instrument this section holds does not exist. Averaging them would require a denominator, and nothing counts the descriptions in force in a household, since §44.1.1 established that most are never formulated and §15.2.2 that the occasions foreclosed by them leave no trace.

A fourth feature may be added and it concerns time. §62.1.3 establishes that the quantities this framework can define are rates over periods, and a rate over a period is not a property a household has at a moment. A ranking requires values obtaining simultaneously, and a set of rates computed over different periods for different descriptions supplies none. §12.1.2 recorded the corresponding difficulty for the criterion of ch. 12.

This third feature also limits the concession made in §30.1.3. The continuum construction admits degrees of answerability, and degrees admit of ordering. What it does not admit is the ordering of households, since the quantity it grades belongs to a description within a relation. A household containing many descriptions is not thereby ordered against another, and the reading that appeared most dangerous to §8.1.1 turns out to be constrained by the same feature that constrains the others.

Proposition 30.8. *The distinction does not yield a scale for ranking households. It is not observational, any measure of it would be subject to the optimisation results of Part V, and it has no household-level bearer, since the condition is defined with respect to a particular description and does not aggregate.*

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Draft

Chapter 31

The Disappearance of Pain

The Work of This Chapter

Chapter 30 defined a distinction and did not show that any relation stands on the far side of it. This chapter takes up the demonstration, and its first task is to explain why the demonstration is hard in a particular way.

The difficulty is not that the evidence is scarce. It is that the state at issue removes the experience by which it would be reported. §31.1 establishes this and draws the consequence without softening it: from the inside, the second level is preferable to the first. §31.2 shows that the adults are in no better position, so the state has no witness within the household at all.

What remains is the report of a subject who has left, and §31.3 states what such reports can and cannot bear. §31.4 puts them against the objection §8.3.1 ranked as most damaging, that the framework renames what other vocabularies already say. §31.5 states what is lost, on an authority that cannot be welfare, and concedes what remains underived.

The reader should carry forward the reason a hedonic argument is unavailable here, the structure of the retrospective report and its defects, and the fact that this chapter's demonstration is partial.

31.1 The Object of the Disappearance

31.1.1 Pain as the Registering of a Discrepancy

The pain this chapter concerns is narrow, and the argument depends on keeping it narrow.

It is what it is like for a child to be given an account of himself that does not fit. It is not physical pain, and it is not unhappiness at large. A child at the first level may be unhappy about a great many things, and a child at the second may be cheerful. The pain at issue arises at a particular juncture and has a particular structure, and three conditions are required for it.

There must be an account in force. §15.2.2 established that a name governs which occasions arise, and §14.1.2 established that in the child's case the account is a constituent of what he is forming rather than one opinion he holds about himself. Where no account is in force there is nothing for an occasion to be discrepant with.

There must be something that fails to fit it. §16.2.1 established that a discrepant occasion is one the name must do something with, and the occasions in question are ordinary: a child described as careless takes trouble over something, a child described as difficult is easy for an afternoon.

And there must be a grammar in which the failure can register. This is the condition that

does the work. §16.2.2 established that a name supplies readings which absorb a discrepancy, and that these readings are applied without any party devising them. While at least one of those readings remains defeasible, the discrepancy has somewhere to go: it can press against the account, and the pressing is what is felt.

The feeling need not be articulate, and in the child's case it generally is not. §7.1.1 established that the child lacks an alternative account from which to state an objection, so what he has is not the thought that a description is wrong. It is closer to friction: the sense that something in the room does not add up, attaching to no proposition he could produce. §14.1.2 described the difficulty of holding such a sense against an account that has no competitor.

Proposition 31.1. *The pain at issue in this chapter is the registering of a discrepancy between an account in force and an occasion that fails to fit it. It requires an account, a discrepant occasion, and a grammar in which at least one reading of the discrepancy remains defeasible. It need not be articulate, and in the child's case it is generally inarticulate friction rather than a stated objection.*

31.1.2 The Second Level Has Nothing to Register

The third condition of §31.1.1 is exactly what §30.1.2 defined the second level by removing.

Where the readings a name supplies have ceased to be defeasible, a discrepant occasion is absorbed as it arises. §16.2.2 established that the absorption operates however the occasion is produced, so there is no occasion of the required kind that escapes it. What follows is that nothing presses against the account, and therefore nothing is felt to press.

The formulation matters and should be stated in its strong form. The pain is not suppressed at the second level, and it is not borne. A suppressed pain is present and held down, and a borne pain is present and endured, and both presuppose the discrepancy that at the second level does not arise. What the second level removes is the occasion of the pain rather than its expression. There is nothing it is like to be misdescribed in a household where nothing counts as misdescription.

Three consequences follow, and the third is why this chapter exists.

The first concerns the child's report. A child at the second level, asked whether the household's account of him is right, agrees, and §30.2.1 established that he does so sincerely. He is not concealing a reservation. The question of whether the description fits does not present itself to him as a question, since §12.3.2 established that a description of this kind is no longer the sort of thing that admits of disagreement.

The second concerns comparison across the levels. A child at the first level retains the grammar in which discrepancies register, and therefore retains the friction. He is, in the narrow respect this section has defined, in more discomfort than his counterpart at the second level. This is not a marginal artefact of the definitions. It is what the definitions entail, and §30.1.3 showed that it holds under each of the three constructions offered there.

The third is the consequence that governs the rest of the chapter. Any measure of a child's condition that consults his experience will rank the second level at least as favourably as the first. §28.3.2 established what an index does to what it measures, and the present point is prior to that: even an honest index, honestly administered, and consulting the child directly, would find the second level no worse and would often find it better. The improvement is real

as improvements of that kind go, and it is produced by the removal of the capacity to register that anything is wrong.

This is what the chapter's title names. The pain disappears, and its disappearance is not the ending of a harm. It is the removal of the signal by which the harm would have been reported, and the removal is what makes the state difficult to establish and easy to mistake for a household in good order.

Proposition 31.2. *At the second level the discrepancy that would occasion pain does not arise, so the pain is absent rather than suppressed or endured. A child at the second level is therefore in less discomfort, in the narrow sense of §31.1.1, than a child at the first, and any measure consulting his experience will find his condition no worse. The disappearance of the pain is the removal of the signal by which the loss would be reported.*

Two things follow for the argument. The chapter leaves proceeding to others by exhibiting suffering, and §31.5 must locate the loss on an authority that is not welfare. And the household itself cannot supply a report of the state, which §31.2 now takes up.

31.2 The Household Without a Witness

31.2.1 The Adults Register Nothing Either

A reader who accepted §31.1.2 might expect the adults to supply what the child cannot. They do not, and the reason is structural rather than a matter of their attention.

§11.3.1 recorded the aggravating condition directly: in a household where absorption has ceased, the adult experiences nothing either. §11.2.2 established that the ceasing is a cessation rather than an act, and a cessation has no moment at which it is performed and therefore no moment at which it is noticed. §5.2.2 described the conditions under which occasions contract, and those conditions are experienced by the adult as ordinary pressure on time rather than as a change in what the relation does.

The grammar is likewise invisible from the adult's position. §16.2.2 established that the readings absorbing a discrepancy are not devised by any party, and an adult applying them experiences himself as observing his child accurately. Asked whether his account of the child is answerable to evidence, he answers that of course it is, and he is sincere in the way §30.2.1 described. The readings that would absorb the counter-evidence are not available to him as readings, since to see them as readings would be to see the account as one description among others, which is what §19.2.1 established the essential name forecloses.

There is therefore no party inside the household to whom the state appears as a state. The child does not register a discrepancy, the adult does not register a cessation, and neither is withholding anything. §32.2.1 in ch. 32 distinguishes this from the deliberate case, which is a different phenomenon requiring a different treatment.

Proposition 31.3. *No party within the household is positioned to report the second level. The child does not register a discrepancy, and the adult experiences the contraction of occasions as ordinary pressure and the operative readings as accurate observation. Neither is concealing anything, and the absence of a witness is a structural feature of the state rather than a failure of attention.*

31.2.2 The Lost Record

A second difficulty compounds the first. A household in which absorption has ceased has also lost the record of what it was.

§15.2.2 established that a name forecloses occasions without leaving a trace, and the proposition bears repeating in the present context because its consequence is evidential. An occasion that did not arise leaves nothing behind. There is no record of the conversations that were not had, and no party can report their absence, since reporting an absence requires a sense of what would otherwise have occupied the place.

The household's own history is therefore reconstructed from what remains, and what remains is the record the current grammar produced. §12.2.2 established that the identification of a party with a position accumulates, and a household reviewing its past reviews it through the account now in force. A child described as difficult supplies, on review, a history of difficulty, and §16.2.1 established the readings by which the counter-instances in that history are handled as they are recalled.

This is the point at which the evidential problem becomes acute rather than merely severe. §30.2.2 located the discriminator between the levels in what follows a restored occasion, and noted that the intervention cannot be reliably arranged. The present section adds that the retrospective route is also compromised, since the record against which a change would be assessed has been assembled by the grammar whose alteration is at issue.

Proposition 31.4. *The household cannot supply a record against which the state could be assessed. Occasions foreclosed by a name leave no trace, and the household's account of its own past is assembled by the grammar currently in force. Neither contemporaneous report nor retrospective review from within the household is therefore available as evidence.*

31.3 The Retrospective Report

31.3.1 The Separation of the Report from Recollection

§31.2 exhausted the witnesses available within the household. What remains is the report of someone who was at the second level and is no longer, and the form such a report can take is settled by what §31.1.2 established.

If nothing registered at the time, nothing was stored. A subject at the second level did not undergo an experience of being misdescribed, so there is no such experience for him to recall. A report presenting itself as the recollection of that experience is therefore one of two things. It may be an accurate report by someone who was at the first level, where the friction of §31.1.1 did occur and could be remembered. Or it is a reconstruction that has misidentified itself.

This bears on a formula common in the literature §11.2.1 surveyed, in which a subject reports having known throughout that something was wrong. The account developed here predicts that such a report, where the second level obtained, is retrospective in origin whatever its phenomenology of certainty. The prediction is uncomfortable, since it declines to take a subject's account of his own history at face value, and §1.26.3 conceded the general difficulty that arises when a framework can explain away the testimony that would embarrass it. What limits the damage here is that the framework does not claim the report is false. It claims the

report is a redescription, and §31.3.2 states what a redescription can and cannot carry.

Proposition 31.5. *The report of a subject who has left the second level is not recollection. Nothing registered at the time, so no experience of misdescription was stored, and a report presenting itself as recollection of that experience either belongs to a subject who was at the first level or has misidentified its own form.*

31.3.2 The Reconstructive Form and Its Defects

What the subject does in its place is acquire, later and in another relation, a grammar in which the earlier account becomes describable, and describe it.

The mechanism is familiar outside this framework. Hacking (1995) describes how actions and experiences come to be redescribed under concepts that were unavailable when they occurred, so that a past is revised by the arrival of terms rather than by the recovery of facts. Bruner (1990) describes the narrative form such revision takes and the demands the form imposes on its material. The present account adds only that the terms whose arrival matters here are terms in which an account of oneself can be treated as one description among others, which §7.1.2 established the child did not have.

The report that results has a characteristic content. It is not a report that something hurt. It is a report that there was no way to say a thing, that a question did not present itself as a question, that what is now obviously contestable was then simply how matters stood. §12.3.2 described the condition from the theoretical side, and the reports in question describe the same condition from the position of someone who has acquired the terms to name it.

Three defects attach to reports of this kind, and the first is severe.

The first is that the reconstruction is built from materials the later vocabulary supplies. Hacking (2002) describes the looping by which a classification alters the people classified and their accounts of themselves, and a subject who acquires his terms from a therapeutic setting, from the family-of-origin literature of §11.2.1, or from this book, will produce a report shaped by those terms. This is §8.3.1's most damaging finding arriving by a side road: where the report is an artefact of a vocabulary, the report is evidence for that vocabulary rather than for the state it purports to describe.

The second is that no independent check exists. §31.2.2 established that the household's record was assembled by the grammar at issue, so the reconstruction cannot be tested against a contemporaneous account. The two sources of evidence are compromised by the same mechanism, which is why the compromise cannot be repaired by consulting both.

The third is that a reconstruction is under pressure toward coherence. A subject rendering his history intelligible produces an intelligible history, and Bruner (1990) established how much the narrative form contributes to what it appears merely to report. Intelligibility is not accuracy, and a report that makes good sense of a past is thereby somewhat less likely to have preserved the parts of it that made no sense.

Proposition 31.6. *The report is a retroactive redescription, in which terms acquired later render describable an account that was not describable at the time. It is subject to three defects: the terms are supplied by a vocabulary that may itself shape the report, no independent record survives against which it could be checked, and the narrative form exerts pressure toward a coherence the*

original need not have had.

31.4 The Findings of the Report

31.4.1 A Report of Unavailability

The defects of §31.3.2 are real and this section does not dissolve them. It identifies what survives them.

The distinctive content of these reports is a claim about what could not be said. That content is structural rather than phenomenological, and its structural character is what makes it usable. Chapter 30 did not define the second level by a feeling. It defined it by a grammar in which the readings of §16.2.1 have ceased to be defeasible, which is a claim about what a set of terms permitted. A report that a thing could not be said is a report of the same kind, made from a position that now has the terms.

The first defect bites less against a report of this shape than against a report of content, and the reason should be stated carefully, since the point is easy to overstate. A later vocabulary supplies terms. It does not, by supplying them, supply the fact that they were previously missing. A subject who acquires the concept of an unanswerable description acquires a means of stating that his earlier position lacked it, and the acquisition does not by itself make the earlier lack real. What it does is separate two things a critic must now distinguish: whether the vocabulary generated the content of the report, and whether it generated the report's claim of prior absence. The looping Hacking (2002) describes operates readily on the first. It operates less readily on the second, since a classification that alters how a person understands himself does not thereby install a memory of having been unable to understand himself.

This is a reduction in the force of the objection and it falls short of an answer. What would answer it is convergence: reports produced by subjects who acquired their later terms from different and mutually uncongenial vocabularies, agreeing on the claim of prior unavailability while differing in how they characterise what was unavailable. ch. 70 takes up the design, and this book does not carry it out.

Proposition 31.7. *What survives the defects is the report's claim of prior unavailability, which is a structural claim of the same kind as the definition of the second level rather than a phenomenological one. A later vocabulary supplies the terms in which the claim is stated without thereby supplying the claim that they were formerly absent, and convergence across mutually uncongenial vocabularies would test the residue.*

31.4.2 Against Synonymy, and the Winnicottian Adjudication

§8.3.1 ranked as most damaging a demonstration that the phenomena of this Part are statable, with no loss, in a vocabulary already available. Two candidates were named there and both are now in a position to be assessed.

The transactional tradition of §1.13 holds that child and context shape each other continuously over developmental time (Sameroff, 2009). It describes the first level well, and better in some respects than the vocabulary of this book, since the contraction of occasions is a change

in the rate of mutual influence and that is what transactional models are built to represent. What the tradition does not contain is a distinction between a relation in which influence has become rare and a relation in which a description has ceased to answer to what the child does. Mutual influence admits of degree throughout, and a model whose primitive is influence has no term for the alteration §30.1.2 defined. The second level is therefore not statable there, and the phenomena of §31.1 are not statable there either, since they are defined by that alteration.

The psychoanalytic candidate is the harder case and §30.3.2 left it open. Winnicott (1965) holds that compliance forms a false self concealing a true self which persists. The choice of §31.3.2 bears directly on the disagreement, since the two accounts make different predictions about the report.

If the Winnicottian picture is correct, a subject leaving the second level recovers something that was held. The report is then recollection in the strict sense, its content was determined before the later vocabulary arrived, and reports gathered under different later vocabularies should converge on that content.

If the account developed here is correct, the subject constructs something new. The report's content is then partly determined by the terms in which it was built, and reports gathered under different later vocabularies should differ in content while agreeing on the claim of prior unavailability that §31.4.1 isolated.

The two accounts therefore come apart in what a suitably designed collection of reports would show, and §7.1.2 states what turns on the outcome: the founding asymmetry holds that the child has no reserve, and a demonstration that reports converge on content would count heavily against it. This book withholds running the comparison. It states the disagreement in a form that admits of one.

Proposition 31.8. *The second level is not statable in the transactional vocabulary, which represents degrees of mutual influence and has no term for a description ceasing to answer. The disagreement with the psychoanalytic account is not verbal, since the two predict different things about reports gathered under different later vocabularies, convergence on content favouring the reserve and divergence with agreement on prior unavailability favouring the account given here.*

31.5 The Loss Without Hedonic Support

31.5.1 The Unavailability of a Welfare Argument

The chapter now states what is lost, and it must do so without the resource that arguments of this kind ordinarily use.

§31.1.2 established that a child at the second level is in less discomfort, in the narrow sense defined there, than a child at the first. No argument is therefore available from present suffering, and the point should be put at its full strength rather than conceded and set aside. A household at the second level may contain a child who is content, who reports himself content, and who is content.

An argument from future suffering fares no better, and for two reasons. It defers the hedonic claim without changing its form, so it inherits whatever the present argument would have inherited. And it depends on an exit that is not guaranteed. §31.3.2 made the acquisi-

tion of a later vocabulary the condition of the report, and nothing ensures that a given subject encounters a relation supplying one. A subject who never acquires the terms never produces the report and never undergoes the distress that producing it involves. On the hedonic ledger such a life is unblemished, and the account must say so.

This is §8.3.1's second finding in its strongest form, and §4.3.1 already conceded that the evidence to run the test does not exist. A reader may fairly say at this point that a difference which produces no suffering at any time, in a household that functions and a child who is content, is a difference the book has not yet shown to matter.

Proposition 31.9. *No hedonic argument is available. A child at the second level is not in more discomfort at the time, and an argument from later suffering both defers the same form of claim and depends on an exit that many subjects never make. The loss must therefore be stated on an authority that is not welfare, or it is not established.*

31.5.2 The Loss and Its Authority

What is lost is stated by §1.26.3 and was stated in the negative by §30.1.2. The relation has ceased to be one in which an account given of the child can be altered by what the child does. The child's standing as a party to whom a description of him is answerable has gone, and §30.1.3 established that this holds under each construction of the distinction.

The authority on which that counts as a loss is ch. 24. §24.2.1 held that recognition is prior to welfare, so that a condition of recognition is not the kind of thing an improvement in welfare compensates. §24.1.2 established what the utilitarian re-entry attempts and where it is refused. Applied here, the priority yields the chapter's conclusion: the contentment of §31.5.1 does not offset the loss of §30.1.2, since the two are not quantities on one scale, and §24.3.1 stated the position in its hardest form.

The conclusion is therefore conditional, and the condition is not discharged in this book so far. §24.4.1 recorded that ch. 24 stated the priority and did not derive it, and ch. 42 carries the derivation. Until it is carried, this chapter establishes a conditional: that if recognition is prior in the way §24.2.1 asserts, then the second level is a loss, and a loss that no improvement in the child's experience repairs.

What the chapter has established unconditionally is smaller and is worth separating out. The state is real enough to be described, has a form that distinguishes it from the transactional and psychoanalytic vocabularies, produces a characteristic report whose structural content survives the defects of its form, and is invisible to any measure consulting the experience of those inside it. Chapter 32 takes up the deliberate case, and ch. 33 takes up what becomes of a subject for whom the reconstruction of §31.3.2 is the only route to an account of his own past.

Proposition 31.10. *What is lost is the child's standing as a party to whom an account of him is answerable, which §1.26.3 named as a condition of development. That this constitutes a loss rests on the priority of recognition over welfare asserted in §24.2.1 and not yet derived, so the chapter's conclusion is conditional on a derivation ch. 42 owes.*

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Chapter 32

Silence Within the Household

The Work of This Chapter

Chapter 10 and ch. 31 described relations in which occasions have contracted. This chapter describes a condition in which the occasions occur, a party is present at them, and nothing within them bears on who he is taken to be.

§20.2.2 distinguished being contradicted from being unaddressed and recorded that the second is the case Part VI would need. §32.1 takes it up and holds that being unaddressed within an occasion is a position assigned rather than an absence of anything. §32.2 separates the case in which no party withholds from the case in which one does, since §11.2.1 rejected the requirement of an agent without denying that agents exist.

§32.3 takes up what §7.1.2 left open, that an adult possesses resources a child does not, and holds that the resources are what the operation works on. This is where the adult case and the child case come apart most sharply, and §32.3.2 states the divergence. §32.4 holds that the cases described here are ordinary, and states what the vocabulary of non-interference cannot say about them.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between the two silences, the account of why a reserve fails to protect, and the reason the cases are not rare.

32.1 The Unaddressed Within the Occasion

32.1.1 Silence as a Position Assigned

§20.2.2 established the distinction on which this chapter rests. A party may be contradicted, which is legible and which he may resist. A party may also be unaddressed: the occasion proceeds, things are done, and at no point is he treated as anyone in particular.

The second is not the absence of a relational event. It is one, and the argument for saying so runs through §20.2.1. If confirmation is something a relation performs on an occasion, then an occasion in which a party is present and unconfirmed has performed something also. What it performs is the assignment of a position, the position of one whose being addressed is not required for the occasion to proceed as it does. §19.2.1 distinguished positional names from essential ones, and the position assigned here is initially of the first kind and is subject to the sedimentation §12.2.2 described.

This separates the chapter's subject from the subject of ch. 10 in a way worth stating precisely. There, the occasions did not arise. §15.2.2 established that a foreclosed occasion leaves no behavioural trace, and §31.2.2 drew the evidential consequence. Here the occasion arises, and the party is in it. Something happened, he was present, and nothing in what happened

bore on who he was taken to be.

The difference matters in two respects. The first is evidential and is favourable: the silent occasion leaves a trace for the party who was in it, since he was there and can in principle report that he was there. The second is not favourable. A foreclosed occasion is not an event in anyone's life. An occasion in which one is present and unaddressed is an event, and it accumulates.

The sharpest form of the position is the one in which address is available and is directed elsewhere. §21.2.1 established that the gaze is singular and §22.1.1 established that its scarcity is a property of arrangements rather than of the gaze itself. Where a household's address is concentrated, the unaddressed party is unaddressed in the presence of the addressing, and §22.2.1 and §22.2.2 described the arrangements in which this is routine.

Proposition 32.1. *Being unaddressed within an occasion is the assignment of a position rather than the absence of a relational event. The occasion performs the assignment by proceeding as it does without requiring the party to be addressed, and unlike the foreclosed occasion of §15.2.2 it leaves a trace for the party who was present at it.*

32.1.2 The Still-Face Analogue and Its Limits

Developmental psychology possesses one experimental procedure closely related to what this chapter describes, and §1.13 recorded it.

In the still-face procedure (Tronick et al., 1978), a caregiver interacting normally with an infant is instructed to hold a neutral expression and cease responding while remaining present and facing the child. The infant of a few months responds with a rapid and organised change of state, attempting to re-engage and then withdrawing. Tronick (2007) develops the mutual regulation model in which ordinary interaction consists of continuous small mismatches and their repair.

What the procedure establishes is precisely the proposition §32.1.1 requires. The cessation of address within a continuing occasion is registered as an event by a subject of a few months. Being unaddressed is therefore not the null condition against which relational events are measured, and a framework treating it as an occurrence is not thereby postulating something exotic.

Three limits should be recorded, and the third bears on the previous chapter.

The procedure is brief and experimental, and the conditions of this chapter are extended and ordinary. Nothing in the still-face literature licenses the inference from a two-minute cessation to a household's standing distribution of address, and the inference is not made here.

The procedure supplies a contrast the ordinary case may lack. The infant in the procedure has just been addressed and registers a change. A party unaddressed as a matter of course has no such contrast available, and §31.2.2 established that the record against which he might compose one is assembled by the arrangement in question.

And the procedure measures distress. §31.1.2 established that the second level produces no distress, since the grammar in which a discrepancy would register has been altered. The still-face is therefore evidence about the first level and about the capacity §31.1.1 named, and it is evidence that the capacity is present early. It is not evidence about the state ch. 30 defined, and a reading of it as such would mistake the phenomenon.

Proposition 32.2. *The still-face procedure establishes that cessation of address within a continuing occasion is registered as an event in the first months, which is what §32.1.1 requires. It does not establish the extended case, it supplies a contrast the ordinary case lacks, and it measures a distress that §31.1.2 holds the second level does not produce.*

32.2 The Forms of Silence

32.2.1 Silence Without a Withholder

The condition described in §32.1 arises in most cases without any party withholding anything, and the point requires emphasis because the natural reading of the condition is the opposite.

§31.2.1 established that the adults in such a household experience the contraction of occasions as ordinary pressure on time. §22.1.1 established that the concentration of address is a property of arrangements, and §21.3.2 established how a household's standing arrangement distributes it. Where a household's attention has settled on one member, on a difficulty, or on the sustaining of the household itself, the remaining members are unaddressed by the operation of the settlement rather than by anyone's decision.

There is accordingly no agreement, tacit or otherwise. §11.2.1 recorded the achievement of the accounts requiring an agent and located their premise, and the present section is that argument applied to a specific condition. No one has decided that this party shall not be addressed. No one has noticed that he is not.

This produces a difficulty peculiar to the condition and worth stating on its own. A party who reports that nobody in the household speaks to him is heard as making an accusation. The accusation is false, since no one is withholding, and the parties accused can establish its falsity without difficulty and in good faith. The falsity of the accusation is then taken to dispose of the report. What the report described was accurate and what it was heard as claiming was not, and the household has a procedure for the second and none for the first.

§11.2.2 established that describing a cessation as unperformed is not an exculpation, and the same holds here. That no one withheld does not entail that nothing occurred, and the whole of §32.1.1 was directed at establishing what occurred.

Proposition 32.3. *Silence in the sense of this chapter generally involves no party who withholds. It arises from the standing distribution of address within an arrangement, and a report of it is characteristically heard as an accusation whose falsity the household can establish, so that an accurate report is disposed of by the refutation of a claim it did not make.*

32.2.2 The Deliberate Case

Cases in which a party does withhold exist and are not uncommon, and §11.2.1 rejected the requirement of an agent without denying that agents occur.

The deliberate case has a shape of its own. A party ceases to address another and the ceasing is chosen, is maintained, and is legible to the one who maintains it. It may be punitive, it may be a withdrawal from conflict, and it may be understood by the withholder as restraint. §16.2.1 supplies the readings under which its continuation is justified to the party maintaining

it.

Two things should be said about how this relates to the rest of the chapter, and they pull in opposite directions.

The first is that the deliberate case does not operate by a different mechanism. What reaches the unaddressed party is the same in both: occasions occur, he is present, and nothing in them bears on who he is taken to be. §32.1.1 located the effect in the structure of the occasion, and the withholder's state of mind is not among the features that structure comprises. The deliberate case is faster, since a settled arrangement is slower to form than a decision is to take, and it is otherwise the same operation.

The second is that the deliberate case must nonetheless be kept apart, because it admits a vocabulary the structural case does not. Where a party withholds, there is something he did, something he may be asked to stop, and something for which he may be answerable. ch. 42 takes up the last of these. Importing that vocabulary into the structural case is the error §11.2.1 identified, and the consequence of the error is that a household in which no one is answerable concludes that nothing is happening.

Proposition 32.4. *The deliberate case operates by the mechanism of §32.1.1 and differs in speed rather than in kind, since the withholder's state of mind is not among the features of the occasion that do the work. It is kept separate because it admits a vocabulary of answerability that the structural case does not, and the transfer of that vocabulary to the structural case yields the conclusion that nothing is occurring there.*

32.3 Silence and the Party With a Reserve

32.3.1 The Reserve as the Object of the Operation

§7.1.2 established that an adult ordinarily holds an account of himself maintained by processes outside any single relation, and that the child's position is defined by the absence of one. The natural inference is that the reserve protects, and that an adult subject to the condition of §32.1 may hold the relation's account of him at a distance. The inference is wrong in a way that this section states and that ch. 33 develops.

The reserve is maintained rather than possessed, in the sense §6.1.2 gave, and what maintains it is confirmation arriving from somewhere. §20.2.1 established what confirmation consists in. A relation in which a party is present and unaddressed supplies, on each occasion, an instance requiring accommodation within the account he holds of himself, and the instances accumulate at the rate the arrangement produces them.

The accommodation available to him is where the operation does its work. He must explain to himself why he is not addressed, and two forms of explanation exist. The first attributes the silence to the others: they are preoccupied, they are unkind, this is how they are. The second attributes it to himself: he is not someone whose being addressed is required.

The first explanation is exactly what the structural case withholds. §32.2.1 established that no one is withholding, and the party can see this. The others are not unkind, they are visibly under pressure, they address him when he speaks, and they would be distressed to learn he felt neglected. An explanation locating the cause in their conduct is unavailable to a fair-minded

person, and the fairer-minded he is the less available it is.

The second explanation is always available and is always sufficient. It requires no one to have done anything, it accounts for every instance, and §16.2.1 established that a description accounting for every instance is one no instance can defeat.

The reserve is therefore not bypassed. It is the instrument of the outcome. A party without an account of himself has nothing that must accommodate the instances; a party with one must accommodate them, and the accommodation available is the one that revises the account in the direction the silence indicates. What protects him in the case of contradiction, where he may hold that the other is wrong about him, works against him here, where there is no one to be wrong.

Proposition 32.5. *A reserve fails to protect against silence and supplies the mechanism by which the damage proceeds. The unaddressed occasions require accommodation within the account the party holds, an explanation locating the cause in the conduct of others is unavailable where no one withholds, and the explanation locating it in himself accounts for every instance and is therefore undefeatable in the sense of §16.2.1.*

32.3.2 The Divergence of the Cases

The account of §32.3.1 applies to a party who holds an account of himself. The child does not, and the divergence is the sharpest instance in this book of the asymmetry §7.1.1 established.

For the adult, silence supplies material that an existing account must process, and the processing revises the account. The damage is a revision, it proceeds by inference the party performs himself, and it is in principle reportable by him, since he holds the terms in which it is stated. §31.3.2 described the later acquisition of such terms; the adult in this case has them throughout.

For the child, there is no account to revise. §14.1.2 established that the description at issue is a constituent of what he is forming. Silence does not turn his reserve against him, since there is nothing to turn. It operates a stage earlier, by determining what is formed. The child unaddressed as a matter of course does not conclude that he is someone whose being addressed is not required; he forms an account in which the question of whether it is required does not arise.

Three consequences follow.

The damage differs in kind and not in severity, and the framework should decline to rank them. The adult is damaged by a revision he performs; the child is damaged by a formation that occurs without a competitor. §30.1.3 declined a comparable ordering for a comparable reason.

The two are separately possible within one household. An adult may be destroyed by an arrangement in which a child is addressed adequately, and a child may be unaddressed in a household where the adults confirm each other. §21.3.2 established that a household's distribution of address is a structure with positions, and the positions are occupied independently.

And the reportability differs. The adult can, in principle, report the operation while it proceeds, since he holds the terms. The child cannot, and §31.3 established what his report must therefore be. A literature built on adult testimony will accordingly represent the adult

case well and the child case badly, and will tend to describe the second in the vocabulary of the first.

Proposition 32.6. *Silence damages an adult by supplying material that revises an account he holds, and damages a child by determining an account he is forming. The two are differences in kind, are separately possible within one household, and differ in reportability, so that testimony gathered from adults represents the child's case in a vocabulary that does not fit it.*

32.4 The Ordinariness of the Class

32.4.1 The Ordinariness of the Cases

Nothing in the foregoing requires a household in difficulty, and the chapter would be misread as describing an unusual condition.

§5.2.2 established the conditions under which the occasions for address contract, and those conditions are the ordinary ones of employment, distance, and the number of hours in a day. §10.2.3 established what address costs the party who supplies it, and a party who has less to spend spends less. Neither describes a household that has gone wrong.

§22.1.1 established that the gaze is not intrinsically scarce, and the proposition cuts both ways. Its scarcity is produced by arrangements, and arrangements producing it are common. A household attending to an ill member, to a member in difficulty, or to the securing of its own circumstances has concentrated its address for reasons that are good, and §22.2.1 described what this is like for the member on the other side of the concentration. §22.2.2 described an arrangement in which being unaddressed is the modal condition by construction, since one adult cannot address thirty children and the design does not pretend otherwise.

The claim is therefore that the condition of §32.1 is a normal operating state of arrangements with finite attention. What is not normal is its persistence in a single position over long periods, and §11.1.2 established the mechanism by which a distribution once settled tends to remain.

Proposition 32.7. *The condition described in this chapter is a normal operating state of arrangements with finite attention and does not indicate a household in difficulty. What distinguishes the damaging case is the persistence of a single party in the unaddressed position, which §11.1.2 established that settled distributions tend to produce.*

32.4.2 The Limits of the Vocabulary of Non-Interference

§1.22.3 recorded a tradition holding that a child possesses a nature which unfolds where it is not obstructed, and that the adult's task is the removal of obstruction. It recorded also the difficulty this chapter is in a position to state.

That tradition's vocabulary contains a term for excessive intervention and no term for withdrawn response. A child left alone in a prepared environment and a child left alone in a household that has ceased to address him are both, assessed by non-interference, unobstructed. The two are distinguished by nothing the vocabulary contains, and the condition of §32.1 is therefore not merely unrecognised within it. It is unstatable.

The point is worth separating from a weaker one. The tradition is not committed to holding that the second child is doing well, and its practitioners would recognise the case and object to it. What they would object to it in is a vocabulary imported from elsewhere. §6.3.2 established that a framework earns its place by making sayable what was not sayable, and §8.3.1 recorded that the most damaging finding against this book would be that its descriptions were available already. The present case is the converse: a description this book makes routine is one an established tradition cannot construct, and the inability follows from the tradition's central commitment rather than from an oversight it could repair.

This also bears on §31.4.2. The transactional vocabulary can represent the contraction of address as a change in the rate of mutual influence, and the non-interference vocabulary cannot represent it at all. The two failures are different, and neither leaves the phenomena of this Part stable elsewhere without loss.

Proposition 32.8. *The condition described in this chapter is unstable in the vocabulary of non-interference, since a child unaddressed and a child unobstructed are indistinguishable under a criterion of non-obstruction. The inability follows from the tradition's central commitment, and it is the converse of the finding §8.3.1 ranked as most damaging.*

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Chapter 33

The Interpreter and Its Undoing

The Work of This Chapter

The five Parts before this one described mechanisms, and [ch. 30](#) stated the distinction they were for. This chapter names the faculty on which all of them operate and states what becomes of it.

[§33.1](#) defines the interpreter as the capacity by which a subject takes what happens as bearing on who he is, and holds that in the child's case the faculty is constituted by the grammar it will later apply. [§33.2](#) states the chapter's central claim, that the faculty is undone while remaining in good order, and refuses the picture on which degradation damages a capacity.

[§33.3](#) develops what [§32.3.1](#) established, that a reserve is the instrument of the damage, and draws the consequence that scrupulousness accelerates it. [§33.4](#) takes up the subject for whom [§31.3.2](#) is the only route to his own past. [§33.5](#) states what the first six Parts have jointly produced and what they have left undone.

The reader should carry forward the claim that the interpreter is not malfunctioning, the reason a reserve fails, and the consequence for what repair can address.

33.1 The Faculty

33.1.1 The Nature of the Interpreter

Every occasion a party is present at admits of being taken as bearing on who he is, and most are not so taken. The interpreter is the capacity by which the distinction is drawn.

The term is used narrowly here. It does not name introspection, since what is read is an occasion rather than an inner state. It does not name the attribution of mental states to others, which is a separate capacity with its own literature. It names the operation by which what happened is registered as pertaining, or as failing to pertain, to the question of who the subject is.

Three features of the faculty matter for what follows.

It is constitutive rather than optional. [§14.1.2](#) established that the child's account of himself is under formation and that the descriptions in force are among the materials. Forming an account from materials requires reading the materials, and the reading is what this faculty performs. A subject who did not perform it would have no account of himself to hold, which is a different condition from holding a poor one.

It operates on occasions and not on propositions. [§20.2.1](#) established what confirmation consists in on an occasion, and the interpreter is what takes an occasion as confirming. A

subject told in words that he is capable, in a household whose occasions do not treat him as one, has been supplied with a proposition his interpreter will read against the occasions. §19.3.1 established which of the two governs where they diverge.

And it is not private. Gadamer (2004) holds that understanding proceeds from within a tradition the interpreter did not choose and that the standing anticipations it brings are what make understanding possible rather than what obstruct it. The point transfers directly. Chapter 14 established that naming runs in two directions, and the terms in which a subject reads an occasion as bearing on him are terms a household supplied.

Proposition 33.1. *The interpreter is the capacity by which a subject takes an occasion as bearing on who he is. It is constitutive of having an account of oneself rather than optional, it operates on occasions rather than on propositions and governs where the two diverge, and the terms in which it operates are supplied from outside the subject.*

33.1.2 Its Formation Within a Grammar

The adult's case and the child's come apart at the point of formation, and the divergence is the one §32.3.2 identified in another connection.

An adult brings to a relation an interpreter already formed elsewhere. §7.1.2 established what this affords him, and §32.3.1 established its limits. The child brings none. §7.1.1 established that he has no standpoint outside the relation from which its account of him could be assessed, and the present chapter adds the reason: the faculty by which such an assessment would be performed is itself under construction within the relation.

What this means concretely is that the rules of §16.2.2 are not rules the child's interpreter encounters and applies. They are the rules it is made of. §16.2.1 established that a name supplies three readings of a discrepant occasion; in the adult's case those readings are available to him and he may or may not employ them, and in the child's case they are the shape his reading takes.

The consequence should be stated carefully, since an overstatement is available and is false. The child's interpreter is not thereby a copy of the household's. §1.27.10 established that what develops includes the household's common practices, and a practice admits of variation in those who take it up. What holds is weaker and is sufficient: the child has no access to terms his household's practice does not supply, and the assessment of the household's account of him would require exactly such terms.

This is the founding asymmetry of ch. 7 restated at the level of the faculty, and it is why the book has insisted that the child's case is derived rather than assumed. The adult unaddressed in a relation reads that relation with an interpreter formed elsewhere. The child unaddressed in his household reads it with an interpreter that household formed.

Proposition 33.2. *The child's interpreter is constituted by the grammar it will subsequently apply, so that the readings of §16.2.1 are the shape his reading takes rather than devices available to him. He is not thereby a copy of the household, and what holds is that the terms in which its account of him could be assessed are terms only that household supplies.*

33.2 The Undoing

33.2.1 The Intact Faculty

A picture is available on which what this book describes damages a capacity, and the picture should be stated at its strongest before it is refused, since much of the practice surrounding these phenomena presupposes it.

On that picture, adverse conditions produce a subject who reasons badly about himself. He generalises from too little, he discounts evidence in his own favour, he holds beliefs about himself that the facts do not support. The condition is a defect in his processing, and it is addressed by supplying the missing evidence and correcting the inference. An influential family of therapeutic practices is organised around this account, and where the account holds the practices are effective.

This book holds that the subjects it describes reason well, and §17.2.1 already refused the corresponding account of the child at the level of the occasion.

The argument is §32.3.1 and it should be reviewed in the present terms. A party unaddressed within occasions that occur must accommodate the instances. Two explanations are available. The first attributes the silence to the others, and §32.2.1 established that in the structural case this explanation is false and that the party can see it is false. The second attributes it to himself, and it accounts for every instance. A subject who adopts the second has performed a sound inference from accurate premises to the explanation with the greater coverage. Nothing has gone wrong in his processing.

The same holds for the child's case by §33.1.2. A child whose interpreter is constituted by a grammar in which the readings of §16.2.1 are undefeatable does not thereby misapply those readings. He applies them correctly, and §16.2.2 established that correct application is what makes the description unreachable.

Two consequences follow and both are uncomfortable.

The first is that a practice premised on correcting distortion has, in these cases, nothing to correct. It may supply counter-evidence, and §16.2.1 established what becomes of counter-evidence where the readings hold. It may challenge the inference, and the inference is valid.

The second is that the ordinary marks of a damaged faculty are absent. The subject is not confused, is often articulate about his situation, and reports it consistently. §30.2.1 established the general point and the present section gives its first-person form.

Proposition 33.3. *The subjects described in this book reason soundly. The self-locating explanation of §32.3.1 follows validly from accurate premises and has the greater coverage, and the child of §33.1.2 applies his grammar's readings correctly rather than misapplying them. A practice premised on correcting a distorted faculty therefore has nothing in these cases to correct.*

33.2.2 The Undoing Defined

If the faculty is intact, the word undoing requires a sense, and this section supplies it.

The interpreter is undone where its correct operation produces an account under which its further operation cannot improve matters. The undoing is therefore a property of what the faculty has produced rather than of the faculty, and it consists in the produced account's

having closed the route by which an account is ordinarily revised.

The mechanism is [ch. 16](#) in the first person. [§16.2.2](#) established that where the readings a name supplies are undefeatable, no occasion reaches the description. The subject whose interpreter has produced such an account will read each subsequent occasion through it, correctly, and each reading will confirm it. [Chapter 17](#) established that the symbol realises itself in the real, and the present point is that the interpreter is the agent of the realisation.

Three features distinguish this from the pictures it may be confused with.

It is not a belief the subject could abandon on reflection. [§12.3.2](#) established that the description has ceased to be the kind of thing that admits of disagreement, and reflection is performed by the faculty whose product is at issue.

It does not require the account to be unflattering. An account under which a subject is exceptional, indispensable, or uniquely capable closes revision in exactly the way an unflattering one does, and [§18.1.1](#) established that admitting labels operate by the same mechanism as depriving ones. The undoing concerns answerability rather than valence.

And it does not require completeness. [§30.1.3](#) held that the argument requires only that answerability can fail, without requiring that it fail all at once or across every description. A subject may be undone with respect to one account of himself while remaining answerable with respect to others, and [§30.5.1](#) established that this is why no household-level quantity results.

Proposition 33.4. *The interpreter is undone where its correct operation produces an account under which its further operation cannot improve matters, so that the undoing is a property of the product rather than of the faculty. It is not a belief reflection could abandon, it does not require the account to be unflattering, and it may hold with respect to one description while others remain answerable.*

33.3 The Fate of the Reserve

33.3.1 The Reserve as an Operation

[§32.3.1](#) held that a reserve fails to protect and supplies the mechanism of the damage. The present section states why, in terms the preceding sections have made available.

A reserve is naturally pictured as a holding: an account of himself the subject possesses, kept elsewhere, available to be consulted when a relation presses. On that picture its robustness is a matter of its content, and a well-founded account of oneself should withstand a good deal.

[§6.1.2](#) refused the picture in the general case, holding that a pattern is maintained rather than possessed. A reserve is maintained by the interpreter's continuing operation on the occasions the subject encounters. It is therefore not a stored object that adverse occasions must overcome. It is an operation those occasions are the input to.

What follows is the result this chapter exists to state. A reserve cannot be robust against material that its own maintaining operation must process. The content of the account does not shield it, since the account is the running output of a faculty now working on the occasions of [§32.1](#). [§7.1.2](#) distinguished degrees of reserve, and the distinction survives: a subject confirmed

in several relations has more inputs and the corrupted one is a smaller share. What does not survive is the picture on which a reserve is a defence.

The sharpest form of the result concerns the subject's virtues, and it should be stated without softening because it is the chapter's least comfortable claim.

§32.3.1 established that the explanation locating the cause in others is unavailable where no one withholds, and that the fairer-minded the subject the less available it is. A subject disposed to charity toward others, reluctant to attribute ill will, and scrupulous about evidence will reject the external explanation more quickly and more thoroughly than a subject less so disposed. He will therefore arrive at the self-locating explanation sooner. The dispositions that make him a good interpreter of other people are the dispositions that accelerate his undoing, and no error is committed at any step.

Proposition 33.5. *A reserve is the running output of the interpreter rather than a stored account, so it cannot be robust against material its own maintaining operation processes. Degrees of reserve survive as a matter of how many relations supply inputs, and the picture of a reserve as a defence does not. Scrupulousness accelerates the outcome, since a subject reluctant to attribute ill will rejects the external explanation more thoroughly and reaches the self-locating one sooner.*

33.3.2 The Faculty Beyond the Reach of Repair

Three routes of repair suggest themselves and the first two are closed by the foregoing.

Supplying counter-evidence is closed by §16.2.2. An occasion produced in order to demonstrate that a description is wrong is an occasion the readings absorb, and §28.3.2 established what is additionally true of occasions produced in order to produce a result.

Correcting the inference is closed by §33.2.1. There is no error to locate. A practice that proceeds by identifying a faulty inference will either find none, in which case it has nothing to offer, or will manufacture one, in which case it has told a sound reasoner that he reasons badly and has added a second description he must accommodate.

What remains is the material. §23.3.1 established that most of the conditions on the reversal are properties of arrangements rather than of intentions, and §23.2.2 established that the reversal cannot be arranged. The interpreter operating on different occasions produces a different account, and this is the only route the framework identifies. ch. 81 takes up its practical form and §31.5.1 recorded that nothing guarantees the occasions arrive.

This is a thin result and it should not be dressed as more. What the chapter establishes is where repair cannot proceed and where alone it could, and it establishes nothing about how the arrangements are to be altered or by whom. ch. 42 and ch. 77 carry those questions, and §8.2.1 recorded from the outset that this book supplies descriptions rather than procedures.

Proposition 33.6. *Repair cannot proceed by supplying counter-evidence, which the readings absorb, nor by correcting the inference, since none is faulty and a practice insisting otherwise supplies a further description the subject must accommodate. What remains is alteration of the occasions the interpreter operates on, which §23.2.2 established cannot be arranged directly.*

33.4 The Subject Whose Past Is Reconstruction

33.4.1 The Position After Exit

§31.3.2 established that a subject who has left acquires terms his earlier position lacked and describes that position in them. This section states what his situation is.

He is in an unusual relation to his own history. His interpreter now operates in terms that permit an account of himself to be treated as one description among others, and §7.1.2 named the condition. What it operates on, where the past is concerned, is material assembled under the earlier terms. §31.2.2 established that the household's record was assembled by the grammar at issue, and §31.3.1 established that no experience of misdescription was stored to be recovered.

Ricoeur (1976) distinguishes an event from its inscription and holds that what is inscribed acquires a career independent of the occasion that produced it. The distinction is useful here with a qualification the present case forces. The subject has an inscription, in the form of a household's record and his own retained impressions, and it was produced under the grammar whose operation is what he now wishes to assess.

His interpreter is therefore in good order and his materials are not. This inverts the position of §33.2.1, where the materials were accurate and the conclusion damaging, and the inversion is worth marking as the chapter's structural symmetry. In the household, a sound faculty worked on accurate material and produced an account that closed. After exit, a sounder faculty works on material the closed account assembled.

Proposition 33.7. *After exit the subject's interpreter operates in terms permitting an account of himself to be held as one description among others, while the material concerning his past was assembled under the terms he has left. His faculty is in good order and his materials are not, which inverts the position of §33.2.1.*

33.4.2 The Limits of Recovery

Three things are unavailable to him and the framework should say so plainly rather than leaving the impression that exit restores access.

What it was like is unavailable because there was nothing it was like. §31.1.2 established that the discrepancy which would have been felt did not arise. A subject who reports remembering the pain of those years is reporting something §31.3.1 holds he did not undergo in the form he now gives it, and the framework's position is that his report is a redescription rather than a falsehood.

The foreclosed occasions are unavailable because they left nothing. §15.2.2 established that a name forecloses occasions without trace. What did not happen cannot be recovered by anyone, and the subject's sense that something is missing from his account of those years is, on this framework, accurate and unfillable.

And the counterfactual is unavailable. §30.2.2 established that the discriminator between the levels lies in what a restored occasion would have produced, and no such occasion was restored at the time. What he would have become is not a fact his reconstruction can reach, and §1.22.3 recorded the difficulty attending accounts that posit a nature which would have

unfolded.

The consequence for his account is that it is reliable about structure and unreliable about magnitude. He can establish, on the reasoning of §31.4.1, that certain terms were unavailable to him. He cannot establish how much of what he became is owed to that, and §31.3.2 recorded the pressure toward coherence that will supply an answer if he does not resist it. ch. 89 records that this book leaves him without a procedure for the second question, and §8.2.1 records that supplying one was never among its undertakings.

Proposition 33.8. *The subject after exit cannot recover what it was like, since nothing was registered; cannot recover the foreclosed occasions, since they left no trace; and cannot recover what he would otherwise have become. His reconstruction is accordingly reliable about the structure of his position and unreliable about how much of what he became is owed to it.*

33.5 The Product of the First Six Parts

33.5.1 The Convergence

The mechanisms of the preceding Parts have been stated separately and are one thing, and this section states what.

Chapter 7 established that the child has no standpoint outside the relation, and §33.1.2 gave the reason at the level of the faculty. Chapter 10 named the operation returning power to a relation and ch. 11 showed it failing without an author, which determines how many occasions the interpreter has to work on. Chapter 16 supplied the readings, which determine what the interpreter does with an occasion that does not fit. Chapter 20 and ch. 21 established what an occasion confirms and how scarce confirmation is made by arrangements, which determines the quality of the material. Chapter 27 established what happens to occasions produced in order to produce a result, which closes the route by which the material might be improved deliberately.

Each Part therefore describes a condition on the material a well-functioning interpreter works on, and none describes a defect in the interpreter. This is the unification the Part was for. The book's mechanisms are the conditions under which a faculty in good order, operating correctly, produces an account of its owner that forecloses its own revision.

Stated this way the argument's exposure is also visible. It requires that the faculty be as §33.1.1 described, that its formation be as §33.1.2 described, and that the inference of §32.3.1 be sound. §8.3.1 recorded what would count against the book, and the first two of its five findings bear on this chapter directly.

Proposition 33.9. *The mechanisms of Parts I to VI are jointly the conditions under which an interpreter in good order produces an account of its owner that forecloses revision. Each prior Part states a condition on the material the faculty operates on, and none states a defect in the faculty.*

33.5.2 The Undischarged Debts

Three debts stand at the close of this chapter and the Part does not discharge them.

The first is the derivation §24.4.1 recorded. §31.5.2 established that the loss of answerability counts as a loss on the priority §24.2.1 asserts, and that the priority was stated rather than derived. Nothing in the present chapter improves that position. If the priority fails, this chapter has described a faculty producing an account under conditions that produce it, and has not shown that anything is wrong.

The second is empirical. §30.2.2 established that the discriminator is dispositional and hard to apply, and §31.4.1 identified convergence across vocabularies as the available test. Chapter 70 carries the design and this book does not execute it.

The third belongs to this Part. Chapter 35 must show that the account holds where no party is available to be held responsible, which §32.2.2 distinguished but did not settle, and ch. 36 must treat what becomes of a subject who revises his account of his past after acquiring the terms of §33.4.1.

Proposition 33.10. *The chapter leaves three debts. The priority of recognition on which the loss depends is asserted and not derived, the empirical test of §31.4.1 is designed and not run, and the remaining chapters of this Part must extend the account to the case without an available agent and to the retrospective revision of a subject's own history.*

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Chapter 34

The Installation of Symbols in School

The Work of This Chapter

Every chapter of this Part so far has described a single relation. This one describes a child in two settings and states what becomes possible when there are two.

§34.1 holds that a second setting can supply what §7.1.1 held the child lacks, and states the condition under which it does. §34.2 describes what school does that a household does not, which is to state a child's position under a procedure, publicly, at intervals, with institutional warrant.

§34.3 states the chapter's result. Where two settings converge on a description, the child has no setting in which it is contestable, and the condition of ch. 30 is reached between settings by two settings each of which is in good order internally. §34.4 records what school is not being blamed for and states the chapter's position on the boundary its title crosses.

The reader should carry forward the conditions under which a second setting supplies a reserve, the account of installation, and the result that convergence produces degradation without a degrading setting.

34.1 The Second Setting

34.1.1 The Supply of a Second Setting

Before school, the household is ordinarily the only setting producing a standing account of a child. School is the first party that produces one without having formed him.

Two features distinguish the account it produces, and both matter later.

It is produced by parties who did not constitute the child. §14.2.1 established that a household's naming operates in two directions and that each party is a term of the relation it names. A teacher meets a child already formed, describes him from a position outside that formation, and departs at the end of a year. The description is accordingly positional in the sense §19.2.1 defined, and it is positional as a matter of the teacher's situation rather than of the teacher's care.

And it is produced under a procedure. A household's account of a child accumulates through acquaintance and is revised without anyone recording the revision. A school's account is produced at intervals by an operation designed to produce it, and §22.3.1 established what such an operation supplies.

Bronfenbrenner (1979) supplied the vocabulary in which relations between a child's settings could be stated, and Bronfenbrenner (1977) named the level at which two settings a child

inhabits bear on one another. The present chapter takes the level and does not take the account, since what is at issue here is a question about descriptions and their contestability rather than about the ecology of development.

Proposition 34.1. *School produces the first standing account of a child by parties who did not constitute him and under a procedure designed to produce it. The account is positional as a consequence of the describing party's situation, and the operation producing it is periodic and deliberate where a household's is continuous and unrecorded.*

34.1.2 The Reserve and Its Condition

§7.1.1 established the founding asymmetry, that the child has no standpoint outside the relation from which its account of him could be held as one account among others. A second setting bears directly on this, and the bearing is favourable.

A child described one way at home and another at school has encountered the same person under two descriptions. §19.2.1 held that what distinguishes a positional name from an essential one is that a positional name refers to an arrangement. A description that varies with setting is visibly attached to a setting, and the child who meets both has been supplied, without anyone intending it, with the experience §7.1.2 said he lacked.

This is the first point in this book at which an institution repairs rather than degrades, and it should be marked as such. §23.3.1 established that the conditions of the reversal are properties of arrangements, and the arrangement in question here is the ordinary one of a child attending school. Nothing needs to be done well for the effect to obtain. It is enough that the two settings describe him differently.

The condition on the effect is exact and is the hinge of the chapter. The reserve is supplied with respect to descriptions on which the settings differ, and with respect to those alone. A child regarded as capable at school and as difficult at home has an alternative setting with respect to the second description and no alternative with respect to a description both settings share. §30.5.1 established that the condition of ch. 30 attaches to particular descriptions rather than to households, and the present section is that proposition doing work: a child may hold a reserve against one description of himself and none against another, in the same two settings, on the same day.

Proposition 34.2. *A second setting supplies a reserve by describing the child differently, which renders the description visibly attached to an arrangement. The effect requires no one to act well and follows from the divergence itself. It obtains with respect to descriptions on which the settings differ and does not extend to descriptions they share.*

34.2 The Installation

34.2.1 The Operations Combined

§22.3.1 established what a ranking performs, drawing on the literature on commensuration (Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Espeland and Sauder, 2007). A school states a child's position at intervals, and in doing so supplies commensurability, direction, and publicity in a single

operation.

Commensurability is supplied by the procedure. §21.2.1 established that parties differing in many respects are rendered comparable only by an instrument, and a school's assessment is such an instrument. §21.2.2 established what follows for the gaze.

Direction is supplied by the ordering. A position in an order is better or worse than positions adjacent to it, and no separate act of evaluation is required for this to be so.

Publicity is what a household does not supply and is the operative novelty. A household's account of a child is held by the household and is not stated. A school's is stated, is recorded, and is available to the child, to his parents, and to the parties who will teach him next. Sauder and Espeland (2009) establish the reactivity of public rankings, that parties who are ranked alter their conduct in response to the ranking rather than to the thing it purports to measure. §28.3.2 established the framework's version of the same result, and ch. 27 established what a contracted set of degrees of freedom does.

What the three together produce is a description of the child that arrives with its own evidence. §16.2.1 established that a name supplies readings of a discrepant occasion, and a description backed by a recorded position has a reading available that a household's account does not: the record.

Proposition 34.3. *A school states a child's position under a procedure that supplies commensurability, direction, and publicity together. Publicity is the operation a household does not perform, and it produces a description that arrives with a record, which furnishes a reading of discrepant occasions that a household's account cannot furnish.*

34.2.2 The Authorised Symbol

§18.1.1 established that labels admitting a child operate by the mechanism labels depriving him operate by, and §18.2.1 applied the findings. This section states what an institution adds to a symbol.

It adds warrant. A description produced by a school is produced by a party licensed to produce descriptions of that kind, and the licence is what §16.2.2 would call an additional reading: a discrepant occasion may be met with the observation that the assessment was conducted properly. A parent who doubts the description is in the position of doubting a procedure, and the procedure is not obviously wrong.

The empirical bearing is established. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) report that teachers given arbitrary information about which pupils would advance produced measurable differences in those pupils, and the finding is the school-setting form of ch. 17. §17.1.1 established that an occasion is a joint product and §17.1.2 established what the child contributes to one that has been produced. The expectancy literature exhibits the mechanism operating where the initiating description was known to be arbitrary, which is the strongest form the demonstration can take.

Two cautions attach.

The first concerns Foucault (1977), whose account of the examination §1.20 recorded. That account holds the examination to be a technique by which individuals are made objects of knowledge and thereby governed. The proximity is real and the difference is the one §32.4.2

drew in another case: the Foucauldian account locates the operation in a regime of power that the examination serves, and the present account requires no regime and no service. A school assessing children in order to teach them performs the operations of §34.2.1 whatever it is serving.

The second concerns Dweck (2006), whose distinction between fixed and incremental theories of ability resembles §19.2.1. The resemblance is instructive and the subjects differ. Dweck's variable is the child's theory of his own ability, and the present chapter's is the setting's account of the child. The two interact, and conflating them would locate in the child a property this book locates in a relation, which §1.25.1 identified as the move common to the traditions this book surveyed.

Proposition 34.4. *An institution adds warrant to a symbol, which supplies a further reading of discrepant occasions in the form of the procedure's propriety. The expectancy literature demonstrates the self-realisation of such descriptions where the initiating information was arbitrary. The account requires no regime the examination serves, and its variable is the setting's account of the child rather than the child's theory of his own ability.*

34.3 The Convergence of Settings

34.3.1 The Case of Agreement

§34.1.2 established that divergence supplies a reserve. This section states what agreement supplies.

Two settings that do not communicate, arriving at the same description of a child, present that description to him as corroborated. The structure is the one §20.2.1 identified in the favourable case and is here operating adversely: an account confirmed from an independent source is an account with a second footing.

What makes this consequential is that independent corroboration is precisely what would otherwise defeat a reading. §16.2.1 established the readings by which a discrepant occasion is absorbed, and §16.2.2 established that a reading is defeasible while some occasion could reach it. A second setting is the paradigm of such an occasion, since it is the one source a household's readings are not constructed to handle. Where the second setting agrees, the strongest available defeater has been consumed.

The child's position under agreement is therefore worse than his position in a household alone, and the reason is not that two settings are more forceful than one. It is that the arrival of a second setting is the event on which a reserve would have been supplied, and the event has occurred and has supplied none.

Nothing in this requires the settings to communicate, and Hacking (2002) describes the looping by which a classification alters the party classified, which is one mechanism by which they need not. A child described as difficult at home arrives at school having been treated as difficult, and §34.2.2 established what a school does with what it encounters. The agreement may be produced by the child's conduct rather than by any transmission of the description, and it is not thereby less corroborating.

Proposition 34.5. *Where two settings agree on a description, the description is presented to the*

child as independently corroborated, and the arrival of a second setting is the occasion on which a reserve would otherwise have been supplied. The agreement consumes the strongest defeater available to a household's readings, and it requires no communication between the settings.

34.3.2 Degradation Without a Degrading Setting

The result of this chapter follows from §34.3.1 and extends ch. 11 in a direction that Part has not taken.

Neither setting need be at the second level. A household may be answerable with respect to every description it holds, in the sense §30.1.2 defined, and a school may assess properly and revise its assessments as evidence arrives. Each may be, considered alone, a setting in good order.

A description the two share is nonetheless one the child has no setting in which to contest. Within the household, the description is corroborated by the school. Within the school, it is corroborated by the household, or by the conduct the household's account has produced. The child moves between two settings each of which is answerable in its own terms and encounters, with respect to this description, no terms in which an alternative could be stated. The condition of §30.1.2 obtains without either setting satisfying it.

§11.2.1 rejected the requirement of an agent, and the present result is the corresponding proposition at the level of settings. Degradation of the kind this Part describes requires neither a party who does anything nor a setting that is failing. It requires two settings that agree.

Two consequences follow.

The first concerns intervention. An intervention directed at either setting will find that setting in order, and §33.3.2 established the analogous result for interventions directed at the subject. What would alter the position is a description on which the settings differ, and neither setting is positioned to supply one, since each is describing the child as it finds him.

The second concerns how common this is. §32.4.1 held that the conditions of the preceding chapter are ordinary, and the present conditions are more ordinary still. Settings agree about children frequently, and agreement is generally taken to indicate that the description is correct. §12.1.2 established that the framework's criterion resists conversion into an instrument, and the present case shows why the resistance matters: agreement between settings is exactly what an instrument would record as corroboration.

Proposition 34.6. *The condition of §30.1.2 can obtain across two settings neither of which satisfies it, where the settings agree on a description. This extends §11.2.1 from parties to settings, it renders interventions directed at either setting ineffective, and it obtains under conditions that are ordinary and that are generally read as evidence of the description's correctness.*

34.3.3 The Educational Literature on Power

A body of work treats the operations of §34.2.1 as exercises of power, and it was not surveyed when this chapter examined what a school performs.

Freire (1970) describes a model on which knowledge is deposited by a party who has it into parties who do not, and holds that the model constitutes the relation as one of domination

whatever the depositor intends. §37.1.1 declined a transfer model on ontological grounds and Freire declines it on political ones, and the two declinings are independent.

Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) holds that all pedagogic action imposes a cultural arbitrary and is in that respect symbolic violence, and that pedagogic authority is what conceals the imposition. §37.3.1 recorded what this framework retains from that tradition and where it departs, and the departure holds here: the account requires a structure whose reproduction the imposition serves, and §34.3.2 established that this framework's result requires no such structure and no setting that is failing.

Two accounts stand nearer and each supplies something.

Rancière (1991) holds that a teacher who explains produces the incapacity the explanation was to remedy, and that emancipation proceeds from presupposing the equality of intelligences rather than from establishing it. §55.5.1 distinguished supplying a term from supplying the word a child is reaching for, and §54.3.2 established the general form. The proximity is real and the difference is that Rancière's presupposition is a stance a teacher adopts, and §46.2.2 established that a party's account of what he is doing is poor evidence about what his practice does.

Biesta (2006) and Biesta (2010) distinguish qualification and socialisation from subjectification, and hold that an education organised around what can be measured attends to the first two. §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is a result, and §34.2.1 what a school's assessment performs.

What this chapter adds to all four is §34.3.2. Each of these accounts locates a defect in what a school does, and this chapter's result is that the condition may obtain between two settings neither of which is defective, which none of them states.

Proposition 34.7. *Freire (1970) declines a transfer model on political grounds where §37.1.1 declines it on ontological ones. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) requires a structure whose reproduction the imposition serves. Rancière (1991) and Biesta (2006) stand nearer. What this chapter adds is that the condition may obtain between two settings neither of which is defective, which none of them states.*

34.4 The Bearing and the Boundary

34.4.1 The Scope of the Finding About School

A reading of this chapter as an indictment of schooling would misunderstand its argument, and the misunderstanding is available enough to be worth closing.

The operations of §34.2.1 are what a school is for. Commensuration is required in order to teach thirty children who differ, and §22.2.2 established that the arrangement makes being unaddressed the modal condition by construction rather than by neglect. Publicity is required in order that anyone be accountable for what is taught. A school that declined these operations would be worse at the thing it exists to do.

Nor is the chapter's result an artefact of assessment done badly. §34.3.2 required that both settings be in good order, and an assessment conducted carefully and revised responsibly participates in the result exactly as a careless one does. The result turns on agreement rather than

on quality.

What the chapter identifies is accordingly a structural feature of a child's inhabiting two settings, and §34.1.2 established that the same structure is the source of the only repair this book has so far located that requires no one to do anything. The two results are the same proposition under the two conditions, and a chapter that recorded the second without the first would misrepresent what school does.

Proposition 34.8. *The operations producing the result are constitutive of what a school does and are not defects in it. The result requires both settings to be in good order and turns on agreement rather than on quality, and the structure producing it is the same structure that supplies a reserve where the settings differ.*

34.4.2 The Scope of the Chapter

This chapter has treated a setting most of whose occupants are past early childhood, and the book's title names that period. The position should be stated rather than left to inference.

The framework's claims are most visible in early childhood, for the reason §7.1.1 gave: the founding asymmetry is at its most complete where the child has no alternative setting at all, and it is there that the mechanisms of this book operate without competing explanations. The book concentrates there accordingly.

Its own reasoning nonetheless crosses that boundary at particular points, and §34.1.2 is one of them. A framework holding that a reserve is supplied by a second setting cannot decline to examine the setting that supplies it. §8.2.1 recorded what this book does not undertake, and a restriction of its material to a period its arguments range beyond was not among the undertakings. A book that stopped at a boundary its own reasoning crossed would misdescribe its subject in order to keep a promise its title had made loosely.

The crossings are few and are marked where they occur. The treatment of formal operation in Part X is the other principal one, and the Part on generations treats educational traditions at a scale that has no age.

Proposition 34.9. *The framework's claims are most visible in early childhood and the book concentrates there. Its reasoning crosses that boundary where the material requires, as it does here, since a framework holding that a second setting supplies a reserve is committed to examining the setting that supplies it.*

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Chapter 35

Degradation Without a Perpetrator

The Work of This Chapter

§11.2.1 rejected the requirement of an agent for the case of absorption's ceasing. This chapter carries the argument across the whole of the Part and states what the rejection costs.

§35.1 sets out the candidates for a bearer of fault that the preceding chapters have removed, and describes the household in which the removal is most complete. §35.2 compares the resulting case with neglect, and holds that it is a different structure rather than a mild instance of that one.

§35.3 treats a proposal made in good faith that produces the case by design, and holds that the benignity of the intention does not alter the position. §35.4 states what a subject who accepts this account is left with, which is less than the accounts requiring an agent offer him, and states the one thing the framework has to put in its place.

The reader should carry forward the completeness of the removal, the distinction from neglect, and the fact that answerability has been asserted here and derived nowhere in this book so far.

35.1 The Removals Performed by the Part

35.1.1 The Candidates and Their Elimination

An account holding that a child has been damaged invites the question of who damaged him. This Part has removed, one at a time, each party the question might fasten on, and the removals should be assembled.

A party who acted has been removed by §11.2.2. The ceasing of absorption is a cessation, and a cessation has no moment at which it is performed.

A party who withheld has been removed by §32.2.1. Where a household's address has concentrated elsewhere, the unaddressed party is unaddressed by the operation of a settlement rather than by anyone's decision, and the parties around him would be distressed to learn of it.

A setting that failed has been removed by §34.3.2. Two settings each answerable in its own terms produce, where they agree, a description the child has no setting in which to contest.

A faculty that malfunctioned has been removed by §33.2.1. The subject reasons soundly from accurate premises, and the child applies his grammar's readings correctly.

And a description that was cruel has been removed by §33.2.2. An account under which a subject is exceptional closes revision as an unflattering one does, and §18.1.1 established that

admitting labels operate by the mechanism depriving labels operate by.

What remains after the removals is a state, and no bearer for the question the state invites.

This is not an accumulation of excuses, and the distinction matters. An excuse concedes that something was done and offers a reason for not holding the doer to it. Each of the removals above was argued from a mechanism established before the question of fault arose, and §1.1.1 recorded the method by which the framework locates what an account presupposes. The absence of a perpetrator is a finding about the structure rather than a leniency the framework extends.

Proposition 35.1. *This Part removes each candidate bearer of fault in turn: the party who acted, the party who withheld, the setting that failed, the faculty that malfunctioned, and the description that was cruel. Each removal follows from a mechanism established independently of the question of fault, so the result is a finding about the structure of the case rather than a leniency.*

35.1.2 The Rerouted Household

§18.3.1 described a household around which defaults have quietly rerouted, so that little is asked of a child and little is offered him. This is the case in which the removals of §35.1.1 are most complete, and it is worth describing on its own.

The rerouting generally begins in something real. A child was ill for a period, or was difficult at four, or was easy and appeared to need less than his siblings. The household adjusted, as households do. Tasks went to whoever performed them without friction, conversations went to whoever sustained them, and the adjustments were made one at a time and were each of them sensible.

What results has two features and each maps onto a mechanism.

Little is asked of him, which contracts the occasions on which ch. 10 named the operation. §10.2.2 established that what characterises a relation is the rate of absorption against the rate at which power is generated, and a party of whom little is asked generates few occasions on which the rate could be non-zero.

Little is offered him, which is the condition of §32.1. He is present at the household's occasions and is not addressed within them, and §32.1.1 established that this assigns a position rather than leaving him outside one.

The household will describe the arrangement, accurately, as having made room for him. It asked less of him because more was hard for him. It offered less because he seemed to want less. §16.2.1 established what a description accounting for every instance is proof against, and the difficulty here is that the rerouting was in fact a response to something about the child at each step. The account is not a rationalisation applied afterward. It is the true history of a set of decisions each of which was correct.

Proposition 35.2. *The rerouted household is the case in which the removals are most complete. Its defaults settled around something real about the child, each adjustment was locally correct, and the arrangement contracts both what is asked of him and what is offered to him. Its account of itself is accurate, which is what makes the account proof against the instances.*

35.2 The Comparison with Abandonment

35.2.1 The Requirements of Neglect

A category exists for harm done by what was not done, and the comparison must be made carefully, since a reader may reasonably take this book to be describing neglect in an elaborate vocabulary.

The category is an achievement and should be granted as one, in the form §1.25 uses. To make an omission actionable required treating an absence as a wrong, which the law and the clinical literature had to construct against the presumption that a wrong requires a deed. Children are protected now who would not have been, and the protection rests on the construction.

The category has three requirements. There must be a duty, specifiable in advance, that a party stood under. There must be an omission against it, identifiable as the failure to do a particular thing. And there must be harm crossing a threshold, since a category triggering on every shortfall would trigger on every household.

Nelson et al. (2007) report the developmental position of children raised in institutions and the recovery observed in those placed in family care, and the study is useful here for what it establishes about the far end of the range. Deprivation of that severity is measurable by available instruments, its effects are large, and its remediation is detectable. The cases of this book stand at a different place and are not a lesser quantity of the same thing.

Proposition 35.3. *The category of neglect requires a duty specifiable in advance, an omission identifiable as the failure to do a particular thing, and harm crossing a threshold. It is an achievement, since making an omission actionable required constructing a wrong that consists in an absence.*

35.2.2 The Case Beyond the Category's Reach

Each of the three requirements fails for the case of §35.1.2, and the failures are instructive rather than merely technical.

No duty was breached. The adults fed, housed, and attended the child, and §5.2.2 established the conditions under which the occasions of address contract in households doing all of this. The rerouting was accommodation, and a duty framed so as to prohibit it would prohibit responsiveness to a child's apparent preferences.

No omission is specifiable. §15.2.2 established that a foreclosed occasion leaves no trace, and an omission must be identified in order to be charged. What was not done here is a class of occasions that would have arisen and did not, and §31.2.2 established that no record of them exists to be consulted. A category requiring the identification of what was omitted cannot reach an omission constituted by absence of trace.

And no threshold is crossed. §12.1.1 established that two households differing in the respect this book identifies may be alike on every available measure, and §30.2.1 established the same for the two levels. A threshold applied to available measures returns the same value for both.

The conclusion is that the case is a different structure rather than a mild instance of neglect, and the distinction protects something. A reader who classified these cases as sub-threshold

neglect would have concluded that they fall below the level at which anything need be said, which is what a threshold is for. The claim here is that they are not on that scale.

Proposition 35.4. *The case fails each requirement of the category: no duty was breached, since the rerouting was accommodation; no omission is specifiable, since foreclosed occasions leave no trace; and no threshold is crossed, since the households are alike on available measures. It is therefore a different structure rather than a sub-threshold instance of neglect.*

35.3 The Reduction Performed Deliberately

35.3.1 The Remedy That Produces the Case

A proposal is made in good faith which produces the condition of this chapter by design, and §23.1 treated it under a different aspect.

The proposal holds that a child's dependence on adult approval is itself the difficulty, and that an adult should accordingly arrange for his regard to weigh less. Its motive is the protection of the child from the conditionality §18.2.2 described, and the motive is sound.

§20.1.1 established that self-confirmation is unavailable in principle, and §20.1.2 established that a subject requiring less confirmation is a less stabilised subject rather than a more independent one. What follows for the proposal is the observation §23.1 recorded: a child whose adults have deliberately arranged for their regard to weigh less is in the position of §35.1.2 by design.

The result deserves to be stated in its strongest form. The remedy manufactures the condition, and it manufactures it in the variant where the removals of §35.1.1 are most complete, since every party acted well, acted deliberately, and acted on advice.

Proposition 35.5. *A proposal to reduce the weight of an adult's regard, made in order to protect a child from conditionality, produces the position of §35.1.2 by design. It produces the variant in which fault is least locatable, since every party acted well and on advice.*

35.3.2 The Irrelevance of Intention to the Position

§32.2.2 established that a withholder's state of mind is not among the features of an occasion that perform the work. The present section applies the proposition where the intention is benign, which is the harder direction and the one that matters here.

An adult arranging for his regard to weigh less is an adult conducting occasions in a certain manner. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach rather than an account of one, and §20.2.2 established what a party is left with where the occasions he is present at do not address him. The child has no access to the intention, and would not be differently placed if he had, since what reaches him is the occasion.

Two things follow and the framework should say both.

The first is that benign intention and punitive intention produce the same structure in the occasion, which means the framework cannot credit the good intention with a different outcome. This is uncomfortable and it is not an accusation. An adult following considered advice

in order to protect his child is doing what a reasonable person does, and §11.2.2 established that describing an outcome is not assigning a fault.

The second is that this is where the framework earns a claim it made early. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies descriptions of what acts do rather than instructions, and the present case shows what the refusal is for. A literature issuing the instruction produced the case. A description of what the instruction does is the only thing that would have prevented it, and the description is available only from an account that declines to locate the matter in anyone's intentions.

Proposition 35.6. *Benign and punitive intentions produce the same structure in the occasion, since what reaches the child is the approach rather than the account of it. The framework cannot therefore credit good intention with a different outcome, and the case illustrates why it supplies descriptions of what acts do in place of instructions.*

35.4 The Complaint Without an Address

35.4.1 The Subject's Residue

A person who accepts this account of his history has been given something and has lost something, and the loss should be stated without mitigation.

The accounts requiring an agent offer him an address for his complaint. They name a party, they state what that party did, and they thereby give his sense that something went wrong a place to attach. §11.2.1 granted that these accounts made intergenerational harm sayable, and the address is a substantial part of what the saying consists in.

This account offers him a mechanism. It holds that occasions contracted through routes requiring no decision, that a description became unreachable without anyone rendering it so, and that the parties around him were doing their best under conditions they did not choose. §33.3.1 adds that his own faculties operated correctly throughout.

What he is left with is accurate and is thinner. He cannot be angry at a mechanism, and §31.5.1 established that he cannot appeal to suffering, since at the second level there was none to appeal to. He has a description under which nothing was done to him and something was nonetheless lost.

The framework should decline two consolations available at this point. It should not say that understanding is its own remedy, since §33.3.2 established that understanding does not alter the material. And it should not say that the absence of a perpetrator means the loss was smaller, since §31.5.2 located the loss in the condition of answerability and the location has nothing to do with whether anyone is at fault.

§4.3.1 recorded that this book's positions carry costs and undertook to state them. This is among the largest. A framework whose descriptions are accurate and are useless to the people they describe has a defect that its accuracy does not repair, and ch. 89 records the matter as open.

Proposition 35.7. *A subject who accepts this account exchanges an address for his complaint for a mechanism. He cannot be angry at a mechanism and cannot appeal to suffering, and the framework declines the consolations that understanding remedies the loss or that the absence of*

fault makes it smaller. The thinness of what remains is a cost of the position rather than an objection to its accuracy.

35.4.2 Answerability Without Act

One thing is available in place of the address, and its standing in this book should be described exactly, since overstating it here would be the most tempting error in the Part.

§7.3.1 held that the parties to a constitutive relation are answerable for the constituting, and that answerability of this kind does not require an act. If that holds, then the absence of a perpetrator and the presence of someone answerable are compatible, and a subject is not obliged to choose between an accurate account of his history and a party who owes him something.

The proposition is asserted in this book and is derived nowhere in it. §24.4.1 recorded the position and §31.5.2 recorded that the whole of Part VI's conclusion stands on a priority stated in ch. 24 and not established there. Answerability without act is the same debt in a second form, since a party answerable for a relation without having acted within it is answerable on grounds the framework has not supplied.

Chapter 42 carries both. Until it does, the position at the close of this chapter is that Part VI has removed every bearer of fault, has described what the removal leaves a subject with, and has named the thing that would repair the position without having shown that anyone is entitled to it.

Proposition 35.8. *Answerability for a constitutive relation, which §7.3.1 holds does not require an act, is what would reconcile the absence of a perpetrator with a party who owes the subject something. It is asserted in this book and derived in none of it so far, and it is the same debt as the priority on which §31.5.2 rests.*

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Chapter 36

Betrayal and Retrospective Rewriting

The Work of This Chapter

§33.5.2 required of this chapter that it treat what becomes of a subject who revises his account of his past after acquiring the terms §33.4.1 described. The revision produces an experience this Part appears to have made unavailable, and the chapter is about that appearance.

§36.1 holds that betrayal has two components, that the Part has removed one of them, and that the sense of betrayal tracks the other accurately. §36.2 states what the rewriting characteristically gets wrong and predicts the direction of the error.

§36.3 treats the encounter between a subject's rewritten account and a household's account of the same history, and holds that both may be accurate. §36.4 closes the Part against the requirements §8.1.1 imposed.

The reader should carry forward the analysis of betrayal into two components, the predicted direction of error in retrospective accounts, and the Part's own statement of what it has and has not established.

36.1 The Sense of Betrayal in This Framework

36.1.1 Betrayal Without a Betrayer

A subject who has acquired the terms of §33.4.1 and applied them to his history frequently reports having been betrayed. The report sits badly with everything this Part has established, and the discomfort is worth taking seriously rather than resolving by telling him he is mistaken.

Betrayal in the ordinary case has two components and they are usually found together.

There is a party who acted against the subject's interest while standing in a relation that gave the subject reason to expect otherwise. This is the component the ordinary case foregrounds, and it supplies the addressee of the complaint.

And there is the discovery that the relation was other than the subject took it to be. The friend was not a friend in the respect that mattered. What is disturbing here is not only the deed; it is that the subject's understanding of his own situation, held throughout, was wrong about the thing it most needed to be right about.

The second component can obtain without the first, and the case of this Part is the case in which it does. A subject who discovers that the relation which constituted him was one in which an account of him could not be reached has discovered that his situation was other than he took it to be, in the respect that bore most heavily on him. §30.1.2 defined the condition and §33.1.2 established that the discovery is unavailable at the time.

His sense of betrayal therefore has an object. What it lacks is an addressee, and §35.4.1 stated what that lack amounts to.

Proposition 36.1. *Betrayal comprises a party who acted against the subject while standing in a relation giving reason to expect otherwise, and the discovery that the relation was other than the subject took it to be. The second component obtains without the first in the cases of this Part, so the sense of betrayal has an object and lacks an addressee.*

36.1.2 The Accuracy of the Sense

The framework should decline to tell such a subject that he feels something the facts do not support, and the reason is one it has already committed itself to.

§33.2.1 held that the subjects described in this book reason soundly, and the holding was not a courtesy. It followed from the inference being valid and the premises accurate. The same applies to the present case. A subject who registers that the relation constituting him was one in which he could not be reached has registered something true, and §31.4.1 established that his report of prior unavailability is the part of his testimony that survives the defects of its form.

What the sense adds to the registration is a demand: that someone answer for it. §35.4.2 named the proposition that would ground the demand and recorded that this book has not derived it. The demand is therefore not shown to be unwarranted, and it is not shown to be warranted either. It is left standing without support, which is a different condition from being refuted.

Two errors are available here and the chapter refuses both.

The first treats the absence of a perpetrator as showing the sense to be an error, and §31.5.2 forecloses it: the loss was located in the condition of answerability, and that location is independent of whether anyone is at fault.

The second treats the strength of the sense as evidence that a perpetrator must exist after all. §36.2.1 describes what that route produces.

Proposition 36.2. *The sense of betrayal registers something true, since the subject's report of prior unavailability is reliable and his reasoning is sound. The demand it carries, that someone answer, rests on a proposition this book asserts and has not derived, so the demand stands unsupported rather than refuted.*

36.2 The Rewriting and Its Failure Modes

36.2.1 The Manufacture of an Agent

The framework makes a prediction here, and stating it as a prediction rather than as an observation is what makes it useful.

A sense carrying a demand seeks an addressee. §35.4.1 established that the account offered in this Part supplies none, and §31.3.2 established that the rewriting proceeds under pressure toward coherence. A rewriting conducted under those two conditions is under pressure to supply the addressee the account withholds.

The material for supplying one is always available. §1.25.3 established that a description accommodates what it encounters, and §11.2.1 recorded that any household furnishes candidates: a remark, a preference shown to a sibling, an occasion on which an adult was harsh. None of these need be invented. They occurred, and the question is whether they bear the weight the rewriting places on them.

The prediction is accordingly that retrospective accounts produced by subjects of the cases this Part describes will systematically over-attribute intention. Particular acts will be assigned an explanatory role out of proportion to what they could have produced, and the assignment will be sincere and will be supported by real memories.

Two things follow and both matter for how the prediction is used.

It is not a criticism of the subjects. The pressure is structural, it arises from the absence §35.4.2 recorded, and a subject who resisted it would be holding a sense of grievance with no object at all, which §35.4.1 established is what the framework offers him.

And it is testable in the form §31.4.1 identified. The claim of prior unavailability and the attribution of particular acts should behave differently across subjects who acquired their later terms from different vocabularies, since the first is a report of structure and the second is supplied by the rewriting. ch. 70 carries the design.

Proposition 36.3. *Retrospective accounts of the cases this Part describes will systematically over-attribute intention, since the sense of betrayal carries a demand for an addressee that the account withholds and any household furnishes real candidates. The over-attribution is structural rather than a fault in the subjects, and it is distinguishable in principle from the report of prior unavailability, which does not vary with the vocabulary of the rewriting.*

36.2.2 Over-Attribution and Its Limit

A framework predicting that subjects over-attribute is in danger of licensing a use it should refuse, and this section states the limit.

§33.4.2 established that the rewriting is reliable about structure and unreliable about magnitude. The prediction of §36.2.1 concerns the second, and it does not license the inference that a subject reporting a particular act is reporting falsely. Acts occur. Some households contain a great many, and §32.2.2 established that deliberate withholding is not uncommon. A framework whose account of structural degradation was used to discount reports of things that were done would have been turned to a purpose the opposite of its own.

The asymmetry to hold onto is this. That a rewriting over-attributes does not show that the structure it reports is absent, and that a structure is present does not show that the acts reported did not occur or did not matter. The two findings are independent, and §35.1.1 removed candidates for the structural case rather than establishing that no household contains a perpetrator.

What the framework does not supply is a procedure for apportioning between them in an individual case. §8.2.1 recorded the general refusal and §4.3.1 recorded that the costs of such refusals would be stated. This is one: a subject wanting to know how much of what he became is owed to what was done to him and how much to what was not done will not find the answer here, and ch. 89 records it as open.

Proposition 36.4. *The prediction of over-attribution concerns magnitude and does not license discounting reports that particular acts occurred. That a structure is present does not show the acts did not matter, and that a rewriting over-attributes does not show the structure is absent. The framework supplies no procedure for apportioning between them in an individual case.*

36.3 The Confrontation

36.3.1 The Accurate Accounts in Conflict

A subject who has rewritten his history commonly puts it to the parties who shared it, and the encounter has a structure this Part is in a position to describe.

He reports that he was not reached, that occasions passed in which nothing bore on who he was, and that an account of him was in force which nothing he did could alter. §31.4.1 established that this part of his report is reliable.

They report that they did their best under difficult conditions, that they made room for him, and that they loved him. §35.1.2 established that this report is accurate, that the household's defaults rerouted around something real, and that each adjustment was locally correct. §31.2.1 established that they registered nothing at the time and are not now concealing anything.

Both accounts are true, and the parties experience them as contradictory. The reason is that each is heard as a claim about fault. Heard that way they do contradict, since one asserts a wrong and the other denies one. Neither is a claim about fault, and §35.1.1 established that no such claim is available in these cases to either party.

This is why the encounters characteristically produce estrangement rather than resolution. Each party experiences the other as lying, since each holds an accurate account and hears the other's as its denial. §32.2.1 described a smaller instance of the same structure, in which an accurate report is disposed of by the refutation of a claim it did not make.

Proposition 36.5. *In the confrontation the subject's report of not having been reached and the household's report of having done its best are both accurate. They are experienced as contradictory because each is heard as a claim about fault, and neither is one. The encounter therefore produces estrangement, since each party holds a true account and hears the other's as its denial.*

36.3.2 The Unavailability of Repair

A reader may expect the chapter to identify what would make such an encounter go well, and the framework's resources for this are thin in a way that should be stated.

§33.3.2 established that repair cannot proceed by supplying counter-evidence or by correcting an inference, and that what remains is alteration of the material the interpreter operates on. A confrontation consists of accounts, which is to say of inference and evidence. It is therefore conducted entirely in the register the framework has already identified as ineffective.

The household's natural response compounds this. Told that a child was not reached, adults commonly set about reaching him, and §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is the producing of a result. §23.2.2 established that the reversal cannot be arranged. The demonstration offered in good faith is the kind of occasion least able to do what

is wanted of it.

What the framework can say is narrow. The estrangement of §36.3.1 rests on a misreading that can in principle be corrected, since neither account is a claim about fault and each party could come to hear the other's as it is meant. That is a change in what the accounts are taken to assert rather than a restoration of anything, and ch. 81 holds that repair is not restoration. Whether the correction is available in practice is not a question this book answers.

Proposition 36.6. *The confrontation is conducted in the register of accounts and inference, which §33.3.2 established to be the register in which repair cannot proceed. A household's attempt to demonstrate is subject to the results of Part V. What can be corrected is the misreading of each account as a claim about fault, which alters what the accounts are taken to assert without restoring anything.*

36.4 The Findings of Part VI

36.4.1 The Part's Findings

§8.1.1 imposed four requirements on the diagnostic Parts, and the Part should be closed against them.

The first was that something be shown to be lost. §31.5.2 located the loss in the child's standing as a party to whom an account of him is answerable, and §31.5.1 established that no hedonic route to the conclusion exists, since a child at the second level is in less discomfort rather than more. The requirement is met conditionally, on a priority ch. 24 asserted and did not derive.

The second was that the loss not be a renaming. §31.4.2 held that the transactional vocabulary lacks a term for a description ceasing to answer, §32.4.2 held that the vocabulary of non-obstruction cannot state the case at all, and §30.3.2 held that the psychoanalytic account presupposes a reserve the founding asymmetry denies. The requirement is met.

The third was that the child's case be derived rather than assumed. §33.1.2 supplied the derivation at the level of the faculty: the child's interpreter is constituted by the grammar it will subsequently apply, so the terms in which the household's account could be assessed are terms only that household supplies. The requirement is met.

The fourth was that nothing yield a scale for ranking households. §30.5.1 established that the condition attaches to particular descriptions and has no household-level bearer, and §34.3.2 established that it can obtain across two settings neither of which satisfies it. The requirement is met, and §30.1.3 established that it survives the construction of the distinction most likely to threaten it.

Six mechanisms were added to the Part's inheritance. The two levels and the discriminator between them. The disappearance of the pain by which the loss would have been reported. The position of the unaddressed within occasions that occur. The undoing of an interpreter that is not malfunctioning. The production of the condition between two settings in good order. And the removal of every bearer of fault, with the account of what that removal leaves a subject holding.

Proposition 36.7. *Part VI meets three of the four requirements of §8.1.1 outright and the first*

conditionally, on a priority asserted in ch. 24 and derived nowhere so far. It adds the two levels, the disappearance of pain, the position of the unaddressed, the undoing of a sound interpreter, the between-settings result, and the removal of every bearer of fault.

36.4.2 The Residue Left by the Part

Three things are owed and the Part does not supply them.

The first is the derivation on which its central conclusion depends. §24.4.1 recorded the position, §31.5.2 made the conclusion conditional on it, and §35.4.2 showed the same debt in a second form. Chapter 42 carries both, and if it fails, this Part has described a structure and has not shown that anything about it is wrong.

The second is the demonstration. §30.4 stated what would establish the distinction and §30.2.2 established why it is hard to apply. §31.4.1 and §36.2.1 identify what a suitably designed collection of reports would distinguish. Chapter 70 carries the design and this book does not execute it.

The third is practical. Every chapter of this Part has closed a route by which the condition might be addressed, and §36.3.2 closed the last of them. What remains is the alteration of arrangements, which §23.2.2 established cannot be arranged directly. Chapter 77 takes up what can be said, and §8.2.1 recorded from the outset that it will not be instructions.

The Part therefore ends where §8.1.1 said the book stands or falls, having done what that section asked of it and having left the ground on which the doing rests to be supplied later.

Proposition 36.8. *The Part leaves three debts: the derivation of the priority on which its conclusion is conditional, the demonstration that the distinction obtains in a case, and the practical question of what may be done. The first is owed by ch. 42, the second by ch. 70, and the third by ch. 77.*

References

Part VII

The Co-Generation of Knowledge

Chapter 37

The Ontology of the Transmission Model

The Work of This Chapter

This Part concerns what passes between generations and what a household makes that no generation supplied. The present chapter settles what kind of thing is at issue.

§37.1 considers three candidates for the object of transmission and holds that it is a grammar. §37.2 discharges an obligation §3.2.5 withdrew rather than met, that a mechanism observed among professions and ministries is not thereby established in a household, and argues the household case on its own footing rather than by extension.

§37.3 separates what the reproduction traditions supply from the transmission model they carry, and states the extension §1.16.9 proposed: that a household reproduces a structure and may also generate one. §37.4 states what follows for the Part and for the Part before it.

The reader should carry forward the grammar as the object of transmission, the argument for household scale, and the distinction between reproducing a grammar and generating one.

37.1 The Object of Transmission

37.1.1 The Candidate Objects

Something passes from one generation to the next in a household, and accounts of childrearing generally presuppose an answer to what it is without stating one. Three answers are available and the first two are defective in ways this book has already established.

The first is that what passes is a possession. On this account a parent holds something, competence or knowledge or advantage, and conveys some portion of it to a child. The model is intuitive and is embedded in ordinary language about what parents give their children.

Its defect is the one §10.2.1 identified in another connection. A transfer is a movement of something held, and what is at issue here is not held by anyone in a form that could move. §6.1.2 established that a pattern is maintained rather than possessed, and a household's way of proceeding is a pattern in that sense. There is additionally no conservation: a parent does not have less of it afterward, which a transfer model must either accommodate or ignore.

The second is that what passes is a disposition. On this account rearing installs in the child a tendency, and the tendency is thereafter a property of him which he carries into subsequent settings.

Its defect is the recurring one. §1.25.1 identified the move common to the traditions surveyed in ch. 1, which is to locate in a child a property that belongs to a relation. §34.1.2 sup-

plied the concrete difficulty: a child described one way at home and another at school is not exhibiting one disposition differently, and an account committed to dispositions must treat the divergence as measurement error or as two dispositions.

The third is that what passes is a grammar: the terms in which a situation can be described, the distinctions available for making sense of a child, and the moves a household can recognise as moves. This is the account of §37.1.2 and the remainder of the chapter develops it.

Proposition 37.1. *Transmission is not the conveyance of a possession, since what is at issue is maintained rather than held and no conservation obtains, and it is not the installation of a disposition, since that locates in the child a property belonging to the relation and cannot accommodate a child described differently in two settings.*

37.1.2 The Grammar as the Object

A grammar in the sense used here is what ch. 16 described from within a single relation: the rules by which occasions are read, what counts as evidence about a child, what an exception means, and what may be said about a person in this household.

Three features of a grammar bear on how it could pass between generations, and the third supplies the mechanism.

It is held by no one. §16.2.2 established that the readings a name supplies are applied without any party devising them, and §31.2.1 established that an adult operating within a grammar experiences himself as observing accurately. There is accordingly no party who could hand it over, which is why the possession model fails and why the failure is not a detail.

It is not propositional. A household does not transmit beliefs about children. It transmits what counts as a description of a child, which is prior to any belief expressed in such a description. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach rather than an account of one, and the same priority holds across generations.

And it is transmitted by the formation of the receiving faculty. §33.1.2 established that the child's interpreter is constituted by the grammar it will subsequently apply, so that the readings of §16.2.1 are the shape his reading takes. This is the whole of the mechanism. Nothing is conveyed, nothing is installed, and nothing needs to be taught. A faculty forms within a set of terms and thereafter operates in them.

Bernstein (1971) described codes acquired in a household and encountered subsequently elsewhere, and the description is at the level this chapter requires, since a code in his sense governs what can be said rather than what is said. The present account differs in declining the class-structural derivation his account gives the codes, for the reason §37.3.1 states.

Proposition 37.2. *What passes is a grammar: the rules by which occasions are read and the terms in which a child may be described. It is held by no party, it is prior to the beliefs expressed within it, and it passes by the formation of the child's interpreter within it, which §33.1.2 established. Transmission accordingly requires no act of transmitting.*

37.2 The Argument for Household Scale

37.2.1 The Obligation Inherited

Chapter 3 described theories moving between institutional settings and undertook to supply the present chapter with a mechanism. §3.2.5 then conceded that a mechanism observed at the scale of professions and ministries is not thereby established at the scale of a household, and ch. 3 recorded that its goal statement had overstated what it delivers, passing the question here without an answer.

The concession was correct and the reason is worth restating, since it constrains what may now be argued. An institution transmitting a commitment has personnel who are trained, documents that are circulated, and procedures that are audited. A household has none of these. An argument holding that households transmit grammars because ministries install commitments would be an argument from the presence of machinery to a case in which the machinery is absent.

The obligation is therefore not dischargeable by extension, and §37.2.2 argues the household case on its own footing.

Proposition 37.3. *The obligation inherited from ch. 3 cannot be discharged by extending the institutional case, since institutional transmission proceeds through training, documents, and audit, and a household has none of these. The household case requires an argument of its own.*

37.2.2 The Argument

The argument runs in the direction opposite to the one ch. 3 attempted, and the inversion is what makes it available.

Institutional transmission requires a medium because the parties receiving a commitment already possess the faculties with which they will assess it. A ministry official arrives with terms in which the new commitment can be described, compared with alternatives, and found wanting. Machinery is required precisely because reception is not guaranteed, and ch. 3 described what becomes of a theory in transit through parties equipped to resist it.

Household transmission requires no medium because the receiving faculty does not yet exist. §33.1.2 established that the child's interpreter is constituted within the grammar in question, and §7.1.1 established that he holds no standpoint from which its terms could be compared with others. There is nothing to overcome, and accordingly nothing that machinery would be needed to overcome.

What follows is that the household case is the primitive one and the institutional case is the derivative. Transmission through machinery is what transmission looks like where the receiving parties are already formed, and it is the harder case rather than the easier one. Chapter 3's difficulty was that it argued from the derivative case to the primitive, and the concession of §3.2.5 records the difficulty accurately.

Two consequences follow and both bear on later chapters.

The first is that household transmission should be expected to be more reliable than institutional transmission rather than less, which is the opposite of what an argument by extension would have predicted. §12.2.2 established that a position occupied continuously is identified with, and the identification operates without the resistance an already formed party supplies.

The second concerns a case that might be thought to test the account. A household containing two grammars, through migration, remarriage, or an adult reared elsewhere, is neither a special case nor the case in which the mechanism is most visible. It is ordinary, and §34.1.2 established what a child encountering two accounts of himself is thereby supplied with. The book declines both the reading that treats such households as exceptional and the reading that treats them as privileged evidence.

Proposition 37.4. *Household transmission requires no medium, since the receiving faculty is constituted within the grammar transmitted and holds no standpoint from which its terms could be resisted. The household case is therefore the primitive one and institutional transmission is the derivative case, in which machinery is required because the receiving parties are already formed.*

37.3 Reproduction and Generation

37.3.1 The Supply of the Reproduction Traditions

§1.15 surveyed the traditions holding that rearing reproduces an existing arrangement, and §1.16.9 stated the limit this section develops.

Two commitments of those traditions are retained here and are not qualified. Rearing has material conditions, and §5.2.2 put the proposition to work in describing what contracts the occasions of address. And a household is not sealed from the structure it stands in, which §21.3.2 presupposed in describing how a household's arrangement distributes address.

What is declined is the transmission model these traditions carry. On that model what passes is capital converted at an institution, a code encountered and acquired, or a position into which a subject is installed, and the household is the conduit through which the surrounding structure reaches the child. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) and Bourdieu (1990) give the fullest statement.

The ground of the refusal is stated in §1.16.9 and is not that the model is wrong about what it describes. It is that a theory of reproduction is a theory of persistence, so that its mechanisms are mechanisms of persistence, and each explains why the arrangement at the end resembles the arrangement at the beginning. Such an account has no term for a household that produces something the surrounding structure did not supply.

Proposition 37.5. *The reproduction traditions supply the commitments that rearing has material conditions and that a household is not sealed from its position, and both are retained. Their transmission model is declined because a theory of persistence has mechanisms of persistence, and none of them describes a household producing what the surrounding structure did not supply.*

37.3.2 The Generative Case

§1.16.9 named the cases at issue. A family arrives at a way of valuing that its position does not underwrite. A household develops a manner of settling disagreement for which the surrounding society has no name. Parents and children jointly construct an understanding of some part of the world that neither brought and that is not a diluted version of anything available outside.

The claim of this section is that such cases are generation of a grammar rather than defective transmission of one, and three readings must be refused for the claim to stand.

They are not incomplete transmission. An incomplete transmission delivers less of what was transmitted, and the cases at issue deliver something that was not in the household's inheritance at all. A household whose manner of settling disagreement has no name in the surrounding society has not partially acquired a named manner.

They are not resistance in the sense the tradition has developed. Resistance, on that account, is conduct opposing an arrangement which delivers the reproductive outcome by another route. The cases here do not deliver the reproductive outcome, and an account that classified every departure as resistance would be unfalsifiable in the way §1.26.3 described.

And they are not noise. §1.16.9 recorded that they occur and are not rare, and a category that treats a non-rare and structured phenomenon as error is doing the work of protecting the theory rather than describing the world.

What licenses the positive claim is a commitment the book made at the outset. §1.26.3 held that development occurs within relations able to create jointly, so that something can arise between the parties that neither brought. Generation of a grammar is that condition operating at the scale of a household and over the span of a rearing. The generative case is accordingly not an addition to the framework made in order to answer the reproduction traditions. It is the third condition of the keynote, extended across generations.

Proposition 37.6. *A household may generate a grammar the surrounding structure did not supply. Such cases are not incomplete transmission, since they deliver what was not in the inheritance; not resistance, since they do not deliver the reproductive outcome; and not noise, since they are structured and not rare. The claim is the third condition of §1.26.3 operating at household scale across generations.*

37.4 The Bearing on What Follows

37.4.1 The Inheritance of an Unanswerable Grammar

The Part preceding this one and the present chapter together yield a proposition neither states alone, and it should be stated carefully because an overstatement is available.

§30.1.2 established that a grammar may become unanswerable, so that no occasion reaches a description. §37.1.2 establishes that a grammar is what passes between generations, and §37.2.2 establishes that it passes without requiring anything of the parties. What follows is that the terms in which descriptions are rendered unanswerable are themselves transmissible.

The overstatement to avoid is that the condition of ch. 30 is inherited. It is not. What is inherited is a grammar, and whether a description within it becomes unanswerable for the next child depends on the conditions of Part VI obtaining again: on whether occasions contract as §11.1.1 described, on whether address concentrates as §32.1.1 described, and on whether a second setting supplies the divergence §34.1.2 identified. A household transmitting a grammar in which unanswerability is readily reached may nonetheless rear a child in whom no description reaches it.

This preserves what §30.5.1 established. The condition attaches to particular descriptions

and has no household-level bearer, and the present section adds no bearer at the level of a lineage. A family does not carry the second level down its generations, and it may carry terms in which the second level is more easily reached.

Proposition 37.7. *The terms in which a description is rendered unanswerable are transmissible, since a grammar is what passes and §30.1.2 located unanswerability in a grammar. The condition itself is not inherited, since whether it obtains for the next child depends on the conditions of Part VI obtaining again, and no bearer at the level of a lineage is thereby introduced.*

37.4.2 The Programme of the Part

The chapters following take up what a household makes rather than what it passes on, and the order is from the material to the habitual.

Chapter 38 treats the generation of common experience, which is the smallest unit in which §37.3.2 could be observed, and asks what makes an occasion shared rather than merely simultaneous.

Chapter 39 treats the relational structure of questioning, and §17.1.2 supplies its starting point, since a question put by a child is the clearest case of something entering a relation from the party the asymmetry does not favour.

Chapter 40 treats the reproduction of curiosity, which is where the Part's two halves meet: a disposition to inquire is neither transmitted as a possession nor generated from nothing, and the chapter states what it is in its place.

Chapter 41 treats the accumulation of epistemic habit and closes the Part.

One constraint governs all four. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies descriptions of what acts do rather than instructions, and the temptation to breach it is greater in this Part than elsewhere, since an account of how households generate knowledge invites the question of how to do it. §35.3.1 recorded what became of a proposal in a neighbouring case, and the caution is inherited.

Proposition 37.8. *The Part proceeds from the generation of common experience through the structure of questioning and the reproduction of curiosity to the accumulation of epistemic habit. The constraint of §8.2.1 bears more heavily here than elsewhere, since an account of how households generate knowledge invites instructions the framework declines to supply.*

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Chapter 38

The Generation of Common Experience

The Work of This Chapter

§37.4.2 named this chapter the smallest unit in which the generation of §37.3.2 could be observed. Its question is what makes an occasion shared rather than merely simultaneous.

§38.1 establishes that co-presence is insufficient, using the limiting case ch. 32 supplied, and considers two available accounts of the difference. §38.2 states this book's criterion, that an occasion is shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what the occasion became.

§38.3 takes up the object §1.27.10 named among the results of rearing and states what holding something in common consists in. §38.4 states why the chapter supplies no instruction, which is the constraint §37.4.2 recorded as bearing more heavily on this Part than on others.

The reader should carry forward the criterion of joint production, the account of what a household holds in common, and the reason sharing resists being arranged.

38.1 Simultaneity and Sharing

38.1.1 The Separation of Presence from Sharing

Two parties may be present at the same occasion without having shared it, and this book has already described the limiting case.

§32.1.1 established that a party may be present at an occasion within which nothing bears on who he is taken to be, and that the occasion assigns him a position by proceeding as it does. Such a party was at the occasion in the sense that he was in the room. He was not at it in the sense this chapter is after.

The observation generalises past that case. A family at a meal, a household watching something together, a parent and child in a car for an hour: each is an occasion at which parties are co-present for a definite period, and each may or may not be shared. Nothing about the duration settles it, and nothing about the physical arrangement settles it.

What is wanted is accordingly a criterion, and the criterion must do two things. It must distinguish the shared occasion from the merely simultaneous one. And it must not do so by stipulating that occasions are shared where the parties enjoyed them, since §31.1.2 established that what a party registers is a poor guide to the structure of what he is in.

Proposition 38.1. *Co-presence is insufficient for sharing, and §32.1.1 supplies the limiting case of a party present at an occasion within which nothing bears on him. A criterion is therefore*

required, and it may not proceed by what the parties registered, since §31.1.2 established that registration is a poor guide to structure.

38.1.2 The Available Accounts and Their Locations

Two accounts of the difference are available and both describe something real.

The first is joint attention. On this account an occasion is shared where the parties attend to the same object and each registers that the other is attending. Tomasello et al. (2005) develop the account into a theory of shared intentionality, holding that the capacity to form joint goals is what distinguishes human cognition, and Tomasello (2008) extends it to the origins of communication. Trevarthen (1979) had established the earlier form of the coordination and Trevarthen and Aitken (2001) developed it.

The second is epistemic. On this account an occasion is shared where the parties know the same thing about it and each knows that the other knows, with the regress continued as far as the account requires.

Both are granted. The developmental literature on joint attention describes a capacity that exists, emerges on a schedule, and is absent in conditions where its absence matters. Nothing here disputes it.

What this book declines is where the two accounts locate the condition, and the objection is the one §1.25.1 identified as running through the traditions of ch. 1. On both accounts, whether an occasion is shared is settled by facts about the parties: what each attends to, what each knows, what each registers about the other. The occasion itself is the setting in which those facts obtain rather than the thing that has the property.

Reddy (2008) presses a related objection from within the developmental literature, holding that an infant comes to know minds through engagement with them rather than through observation of them, and that the observational stance misdescribes what is happening. The present chapter's difference from the accounts it declines is of that shape, and §38.2.1 states it.

Proposition 38.2. *The joint-attention and epistemic accounts each describe something real and each locates sharing in facts about the parties, which is the move §1.25.1 identified as common to the traditions this book surveyed. The occasion is thereby treated as the setting in which the condition obtains rather than as its bearer.*

38.2 The Occasion as Jointly Produced

38.2.1 The Criterion

§17.1.1 established that an occasion is a joint product and §17.1.2 established what a child contributes to one. The criterion of this chapter follows from those propositions.

An occasion is shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what the occasion became.

The formulation is deliberately about the product rather than about the parties. A test of it is available and is counterfactual in the manner §30.2.2 described. Remove one party's contribution and ask whether the occasion would have been the same. Where it would have

been, that party was present at the occasion and did not share it. Where it would not, his supply is in the product and the occasion is shared to that extent.

Three things follow from stating it this way.

Sharing admits of degree without admitting of a scale. An occasion may take up much of what a party supplied or little, and §30.5.1 established why the resulting quantity does not aggregate into a rating of anyone.

Sharing does not require that either party know it obtained. A parent may not notice that a child's remark redirected the afternoon, and the redirection is in the product whether noticed or not. This is the respect in which the criterion departs most sharply from §38.1.2.

And sharing is not settled at the time. §10.2.1 established that absorption is identifiable across a sequence rather than within an occasion, and the same holds here for the same reason: whether a contribution was taken up is a question about what followed.

Proposition 38.3. *An occasion is shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what the occasion became. The criterion is counterfactual, it admits of degree without yielding a scale, it does not require either party to know that sharing occurred, and whether it obtained is visible across a sequence rather than within the occasion.*

38.2.2 The Reach of the Criterion

The criterion sorts cases differently from the accounts of §38.1.2, and the divergences are where its content lies.

It admits deep asymmetry. A child supplies little and an adult supplies most of what an occasion becomes, and the occasion is shared provided the child's little is in the product. §10.1.1 established that asymmetry is constitutive rather than a defect, and sharing on this criterion is compatible with it. An account requiring symmetry of contribution would find no shared occasions in early childhood at all.

It admits disagreement. Parties whose disagreement shaped what happened have shared the occasion, and §23.3.1 established that a relation's capacity to be altered by what a party supplies is what matters rather than the agreeableness of the alteration.

It excludes the arranged occasion. §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is the producing of a result. Where an adult has settled in advance what an occasion will become, the child's supply is not in the product however fully he participates, since the product was fixed before he supplied anything. An activity conducted in order that a child shall have shared something is the clearest instance, and it is common.

And it excludes the performance. A parent who does something for a child, in a manner the child's contribution cannot alter, has produced an occasion the child attended. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach, and the approach here is one that does not admit of being answered.

The last two exclusions are what give the criterion its bite, and they are why §38.4.2 holds that the chapter yields no instruction.

Proposition 38.4. *The criterion admits occasions of deep asymmetry and occasions of disagreement, and excludes the occasion whose outcome was settled in advance and the performance the child's contribution cannot alter. The exclusions turn on whether the product was fixed before*

the party supplied anything.

38.3 The Object Held in Common

38.3.1 The Second Keynote and Its Object

§1.27.10 stated the second of this book's keynote claims, holding that rearing generates relations rather than producing a child, and naming among its results the relation between the parties, the culture of the household, and the knowledge, values, and practices held in common. This section says what the last of those consists in.

Holding something in common is not a coincidence of contents. Two parties who happen to know the same fact, having learned it separately, hold nothing in common in the sense at issue. The condition is not that the same item is in two heads.

What a household holds in common is the residue of its shared occasions in the sense of §38.2.1. A way of referring to something, arrived at because of what each party supplied on some occasion and retained afterward. A settled manner of handling a recurring disagreement, which neither party brought and which emerged from occasions in which both were taken up. A joke whose sense depends on an afternoon that neither could now reconstruct.

Three features distinguish this from what a household merely contains.

It cannot be inventoried by asking the parties. §38.2.1 established that sharing need not be noticed, and what is held in common is correspondingly available for use without being available for report.

It is not divisible. A party who leaves the household does not take a portion with him, and the items in question do not survive as items in a single person. This is the respect in which the object differs most from the possessions of §37.1.1.

And it is the material of a grammar. §37.1.2 established that what passes between generations is the terms in which a situation can be described and the moves a household can recognise. What is held in common in the present sense is those terms in the course of being made.

Proposition 38.5. *What a household holds in common is the residue of its shared occasions, and not a coincidence of contents across two parties. It cannot be inventoried by asking them, since sharing need not be noticed; it is not divisible among them; and it is the material from which the grammar of §37.1.2 is made.*

38.3.2 The Accumulation and Its Maintenance

§37.3.2 claimed that a household may generate a grammar the surrounding structure did not supply, and §38.3.1 identifies the process by which it does so. This section states its form.

The accumulation is incremental and has no threshold. Each shared occasion adds terms, and no occasion is the one on which a household acquires a way of proceeding. §30.1.3 treated a comparable question about the two levels and offered three constructions; the present case needs none of them, since nothing here turns on whether a boundary is crossed.

The accumulation is maintained rather than stored. §6.1.2 held that a pattern is maintained

by what happens, and what a household holds in common is a pattern in that sense. It decays where the occasions that would maintain it cease, and §10.2.2 established what governs the rate at which such occasions arise. A household whose shared occasions have contracted does not retain what it held in common and lose the capacity to add to it. It loses both, at rates the same conditions govern.

And the accumulation is what §34.1.2 draws on. A child who has terms from his household that his school does not supply has, with respect to descriptions statable in those terms, the standpoint §7.1.1 held he lacks. This is the favourable case of the same structure that produced the unfavourable one, and it is worth marking that a household's holdings in common are among the few things this book has identified that operate protectively without anyone intending them to.

Proposition 38.6. *What is held in common accumulates incrementally and without a threshold, and is maintained by continued sharing rather than stored. It decays where the occasions maintaining it cease, and its decay and the loss of capacity to add to it are governed by the same conditions. Terms a household holds and a second setting does not supply are among the sources of the standpoint §7.1.1 held the child to lack.*

38.4 The Bearing on What Follows

38.4.1 The Smallest Unit of Generation

§37.4.2 named this chapter as treating the smallest unit in which generation could be observed, and the description can now be made exact.

A single shared occasion in the sense of §38.2.1 is that unit. It is the smallest thing that has a joint product, and §37.3.2 located generation in the arising of something neither party brought. Below that level there are contributions and there is no product for them to be in.

This bears on the empirical programme. §31.4.1 identified convergence across vocabularies as one test the framework admits, and the present chapter supplies another of a different kind. Whether a contribution is taken up into what an occasion becomes is a question about a sequence of occasions, and §10.2.1 established that the corresponding question about absorption is answerable across a sequence. Chapter 70 carries the design, and the observation to record here is that the unit is small, is frequent, and does not require the parties to report anything.

The qualification of §30.2.2 applies unchanged. The criterion is counterfactual, an occasion arranged in order to test it is altered by the arranging, and a negative result is ambiguous between a contribution not taken up and a contribution not of the kind that would have been.

Proposition 38.7. *A single shared occasion is the smallest unit in which generation could be observed, since it is the smallest thing possessing a joint product. The unit is small and frequent and requires no report from the parties, and the difficulties §30.2.2 identified attach to it unchanged.*

38.4.2 The Unarrangeability of Sharing

§37.4.2 recorded that the constraint against instructions bears more heavily on this Part than elsewhere, and this section discharges it for the present chapter.

The difficulty is internal to the criterion rather than a matter of the framework's reticence. §38.2.2 excluded the occasion whose outcome was settled in advance. An occasion arranged in order that something shall be shared is an occasion one party has settled the character of before the other has supplied anything, and it therefore fails the criterion in the respect the arranging was meant to secure. §23.2.2 established the general form of this result and §35.3.1 recorded what became of a proposal that ignored it in a neighbouring case.

What can be arranged is narrower and is worth stating, since a chapter that closed without it would leave a false impression.

Occasions can be made available. §5.2.2 established what contracts them and §25.2.2 recorded that a household setting aside an hour has arranged an hour rather than arranged what occupies it. The distinction is the whole of what this chapter licenses: the occurrence of occasions is arrangeable and their character is not.

And the exclusions can be avoided. An adult who refrains from settling in advance what an occasion is for has not thereby produced a shared occasion, and he has removed the feature that would have prevented one. §8.2.1 recorded that this book describes what acts do, and the description here is that determining an occasion's outcome in advance forecloses the thing the determining was generally meant to secure.

Proposition 38.8. *Sharing cannot be arranged, since an occasion whose character one party settles in advance fails the criterion in the respect the arranging was meant to secure. What can be arranged is the occurrence of occasions and the removal of the features that foreclose sharing, which is a description of what determining an outcome does rather than an instruction.*

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Chapter 39

The Relational Structure of Questioning

The Work of This Chapter

§37.4.2 named a question put by a child as the clearest case of something entering a relation from the party the asymmetry does not favour. This chapter states what a question is relationally and what turns on it.

§39.1 gives the criterion, that a question is one only where the answer could go against the asker, and shows that the criterion is the same structure this book has already stated twice. §39.2 treats the child's question and holds that an answer is an occasion in the sense of ch. 38 rather than a conveyance of content.

§39.3 treats questions put to a child and holds that they probe the answerability ch. 30 defined, which supplies a naturally occurring form of a discriminator §30.2.2 held could not be arranged. §39.4 describes how questions cease.

The reader should carry forward the criterion, the account of an answer as an occasion, and the result that questioning supplies an unarranged probe of a household's grammar.

39.1 The Constituents of a Question

39.1.1 The Criterion

A question, considered as a relational event rather than as a grammatical form, is a move by which one party puts something to another such that what comes back may go against him.

Habermas (1984) distinguishes action oriented toward understanding from action oriented toward an outcome, and Habermas (1987) develops what becomes of a form of life in which the second displaces the first. §1.16 recorded the debt. The bearing here is direct: an exchange in which the asker requires a particular answer is conducted toward an outcome, and a question asked under that requirement is a question in form only. A validity claim that cannot be redeemed against the party who raised it is not being submitted to anyone.

The criterion this yields is that a question obtains where the answer could go against the questioner. Going against is not disagreement in particular. It covers any way in which what comes back could alter what the questioner held: it could disappoint him, correct him, complicate what he took to be settled, or require him to revise an account he had of the matter or of the party he asked.

The criterion is the same structure this book has stated twice already, and the recurrence is worth marking, since it is the framework's central form appearing at a third scale.

§19.3.1 held that a symbol is good where it is refutable by what it describes. §30.1.2 held that a relation is answerable where an account of a child can be altered by what the child

does. And a question is a question where an answer can go against the asker. In each case the condition is that something be exposed to alteration by what it is directed at, and in each case the failure is the same failure: an operation that runs in one direction and cannot be reached from the other.

Proposition 39.1. *A question obtains where the answer could go against the questioner, in the sense of altering what he held. This is the structure of §19.3.1 and §30.1.2 at a third scale, the condition in each case being that something be exposed to alteration by what it is directed at.*

39.1.2 The Interrogative Forms That Fail the Criterion

Four forms satisfy the grammatical description and fail the criterion, and all four are ordinary.

The rhetorical question seeks no answer and is not offered as seeking one. Nothing is at stake here and it is listed for completeness.

The examination question is asked by a party who knows the answer, in order to establish whether the other does. §34.2.1 established what a school performs by assessing, and the examination question is that operation at the scale of a single exchange. No answer can go against the asker, since he has already settled what the answer is.

The question with a required answer offers a choice one branch of which is unacceptable. §18.3.1 described the labels that admit on terms, and a question of this form is the same operation in interrogative dress. A child asked whether he wants to help has been told to help by a route that will additionally hold him to having chosen it.

And the reproach in interrogative form asks why a child did something, in circumstances where no account he gives will be received as an account. §16.2.1 established what becomes of material offered to a description whose readings are undefeatable.

None of these is vicious and the chapter is not an objection to any of them. An examination question is a legitimate instrument and a household could not be run without questions of the third kind. The claim is narrower: these forms do not perform what §39.1.1 identified, and a household whose questions to a child are exhausted by them contains no questions in the operative sense, whatever its interrogative frequency.

Proposition 39.2. *The rhetorical question, the examination question, the question with a required answer, and the reproach in interrogative form all fail the criterion, since in none can the answer go against the asker. None is vicious and each has legitimate uses, and a household whose questions are exhausted by them contains none in the operative sense regardless of how often it asks.*

39.2 The Question from the Disfavoured Party

39.2.1 The Operation of a Child's Question

§10.1.1 established that an asymmetry generates power continuously in favour of one party. A question put by a child is among the few moves by which something enters the relation from the other side, and three features of it follow.

It requires something of the adult. §10.2.2 established that what characterises a relation is the rate at which generated power is returned, and a question is an occasion on which the child requires the adult to supply rather than an occasion on which the adult elects to. The requirement is weak and is real.

It is unbidden in respect of its topic. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach and that the approach governs what follows. A question is the case in which the child makes the approach and thereby settles, for that occasion, what is at issue. §17.1.2 established that the child's conduct is his own, and this is the clearest instance of it entering the record.

And it exposes him. To ask is to display not having known, and §18.3.1 established what becomes of displays of that kind where recognition is conditional. The cost is borne by the party the asymmetry already disfavours, which is why the rate at which children ask is sensitive to conditions in a way the rate at which adults ask is not.

Proposition 39.3. *A child's question requires something of the adult rather than awaiting his election, settles the topic of the occasion from the side the asymmetry disfavours, and exposes the child by displaying that he did not know. The cost falls on the disfavoured party, which is why the rate of children's questions is sensitive to conditions.*

39.2.2 The Answer as an Occasion

§37.1.1 declined the model on which what passes between parties is a content conveyed. The consequence for answering is the substance of this section.

An answer is an occasion, and §38.2.1 applies to it unchanged. It is shared to the extent that what the child supplied is in what the answer became. What the child supplied is the question: its particular shape, the thing about the matter that struck him, the point at which his understanding gave out.

Two answers conveying the same content therefore differ relationally, and the difference is not a matter of warmth or of manner. An answer produced to the question's shape has taken up what the child supplied. An answer delivering a prepared account of the topic has not, and §38.2.2 classified it as a performance the child attended.

Two consequences follow and both run against the natural expectation.

An answer may be incomplete, or may be an admission of not knowing, and be shared. A parent who says that he does not know and asks what made the child wonder has produced an occasion in which the child's supply is in the product. §37.3.2 located generation in the arising of what neither party brought, and exchanges of this kind are where it is most often observed.

And an answer may be complete, correct, and generous, and fail. The completeness is what does it: an account settled in advance of the asking cannot have been shaped by the asking. This is not an argument for answering badly. It is the observation that the property making an answer good as information and the property making it a shared occasion are different properties, and that §28.3.2 established what happens where the first is optimised.

Proposition 39.4. *An answer is an occasion and is shared to the extent that the question's particular shape is in what the answer became. An admission of not knowing may therefore be shared and a complete correct answer may fail to be, since an account settled before the asking cannot have been shaped by it. The property that makes an answer good as information and the property*

that makes it a shared occasion are distinct.

39.3 The Question Put to a Child

39.3.1 The Test Performed by an Adult's Question

The criterion of §39.1.1 applied to questions running the other way yields the chapter's principal result.

An adult's question to a child is a question where the child's answer could go against the adult: where it could alter what he held about the matter, or about the child. §30.1.2 defined the second level as the condition in which an account of a child cannot be altered by what the child does. A question whose answer could alter such an account is therefore a test of exactly the condition ch. 30 was concerned with.

This supplies something ch. 30 said was hard to obtain. §30.2.2 located the discriminator between the levels in what follows a restored occasion, and recorded three costs: the occasion cannot be arranged at will, a negative result is ambiguous, and an occasion arranged in order to discriminate is altered by the arranging.

Questions put to children are not arranged for that purpose. They occur constantly, for reasons internal to running a household, and they occur in both households and at both levels. The third cost of §30.2.2 accordingly does not attach to them, since nothing about an ordinary question was produced in order to test anything.

The first two costs remain. Whether a given question was of the kind that could have altered the adult's account is not settled by observing the exchange, and §15.2.2 established that the questions foreclosed leave no trace. What the present section establishes is narrower and is real: the discriminator has a naturally occurring instance, which ch. 30 did not identify, and ch. 70 inherits it as a design point.

Proposition 39.5. *An adult's question to a child tests whether the account he holds of the child can be altered by what the child supplies, which is the condition §30.1.2 defined. Since such questions occur for reasons internal to running a household, they escape the third cost §30.2.2 identified, and the discriminator thereby acquires a naturally occurring instance.*

39.3.2 The Examination Form

A household may come to put questions to its children in the form §39.1.2 named second, and the route by which it does requires no decision.

§34.2.1 established what a school performs and §34.2.2 established the warrant its descriptions carry. A household in contact with that operation acquires its forms, and §37.1.2 established that forms of this kind pass without anyone conveying them. The questions asked at a table come to resemble the questions asked in a classroom, which is to say they come to be questions whose answers the asker already has.

§28.2.2 established what distinguishes a household organised around measured quantities from an institution so organised. Where a child's position is stated at intervals, the household's questions to him tend toward checks on that position, and a check is an examination question

by construction.

What results is a household in which the interrogative rate is high and the rate of questions in the sense of §39.1.1 is low, and in which no party has done anything. The parents ask constantly and are attentive. §39.3.1 established what such questions do not test, and the consequence is that a household of this kind has removed, without noticing, the naturally occurring occasions on which its account of a child could have been altered.

This is a route toward the condition of §30.1.2 that Part VI did not name, and it belongs with the routes of §11.1.1 rather than constituting a new kind.

Proposition 39.6. *A household acquires the examination form from the setting that practises it, without conveyance and without decision, and a household organised around measured quantities converts its questions into checks. The result is a high interrogative rate and few questions in the operative sense, which removes the naturally occurring occasions on which an account of a child could have been altered.*

39.4 The Foreclosure of Questions

39.4.1 The Cessation of Questions

§15.2.2 established that an approach not made leaves no trace, and a question not asked is the case of that proposition most directly relevant to this Part. Three routes lead to it and none requires a prohibition.

The first is cost. §39.2.1 established that asking exposes the asker, and §18.3.1 established what recognition conditional on performance does to displays of not knowing. Where the cost rises, the rate falls, and no one need have discouraged anything.

The second is futility. Where answers do not take up what was asked, in the sense §39.2.2 defined, the asking is met and is not answered. §11.1.2 established that a fall in a rate maintains itself, and the mechanism holds here: a child who has been answered by prepared accounts several times has less reason to supply the question that occasioned them.

The third is displacement. An answer available without being asked of anyone need not be put to a party, and a child with access to a source of answers may obtain them without an exchange. The framework's claim about this is narrow and should not be inflated into a complaint about a technology. What is claimed is that an answer obtained without an exchange is not an occasion in the sense of §38.2.1, so that the informational transaction succeeds and the relational one does not occur. Whether this matters depends on what the relational one was doing, which ch. 40 and ch. 41 take up.

Proposition 39.7. *Questions cease through cost, where asking exposes the asker and exposure is penalised; through futility, where answers do not take up what was asked and the fall maintains itself; and through displacement, where an answer obtainable without an exchange makes the exchange unnecessary. None requires a prohibition and none leaves a trace.*

39.4.2 The Requirements Passing Forward

Two things follow for the chapters remaining.

Chapter 40 inherits a constraint. If a question is a relational event of the kind §39.1.1 described, then curiosity cannot be the disposition to ask that ordinary usage takes it for, since §37.1.1 declined the disposition model and §39.4.1 established that the rate of asking is governed by conditions the child does not control. What curiosity is in its place is that chapter's question.

Chapter 41 inherits an object. §38.3.2 established that what a household holds in common accumulates by shared occasions and is maintained rather than stored. Exchanges of the kind §39.2.2 described are among the occasions that build it, and what accumulates from many of them is the subject of that chapter.

Proposition 39.8. *The chapters remaining inherit a constraint and an object. Curiosity cannot be a disposition to ask, since the disposition model was declined and the rate of asking is governed by conditions outside the child's control. What accumulates from exchanges of the kind described here is the object of the Part's closing chapter.*

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Chapter 40

The Reproduction of Curiosity

The Work of This Chapter

§37.4.2 named this chapter as the place where the Part's two halves meet, holding that a disposition to inquire is neither transmitted as a possession nor generated from nothing. §39.4.2 added a constraint, that curiosity cannot be the disposition to ask which ordinary usage takes it for.

§40.1 states the difficulty with the disposition account and separates two things ordinary usage conflates, so that the evident variation between children is affirmed rather than denied. §40.2 gives the account: curiosity is a stabilised rate at which questions are supplied and taken up, which is a property of a relation in the form §10.2.2 established for absorption.

§40.3 distinguishes the maintenance of that rate within a relation from the passage of the practice between generations, and holds that both are required. §40.4 states what follows for measurement and why the chapter again yields no instruction.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between what a child supplies and the rate at which it is taken up, and the account of reproduction in its two senses.

40.1 The Boundaries of Curiosity

40.1.1 The Disposition Account and Its Difficulty

Ordinary usage treats curiosity as a trait. A child is curious or is not, in the way he is tall or is not, and the property is his and travels with him.

§37.1.1 gave the general objection to accounts of this shape, that they locate in a child a property belonging to a relation, and §1.25.1 identified the move as running through the traditions of ch. 1. The present case admits a sharper objection than the general one.

§39.4.1 established that the rate at which a child asks is governed by cost, by futility, and by displacement, none of which he controls. A trait account must therefore treat the observed rate as an underlying quantity modified by conditions, and this requires the underlying quantity to be identifiable independently of the rate. No such identification is available. What is observed in every case is a rate of asking within conditions, and the trait is inferred from it and then used to explain it.

Deci and Ryan (1985) develop the fullest account of the kind, holding that intrinsic motivation is sustained where three needs are met and undermined where they are not. Two things should be said about it.

Its findings are granted. That engagement is undermined by evaluation and by contingent

reward is established, and §28.3.2 states the framework's own version of the result.

Its ontology is declined, and the point of disagreement is precise. The account names relatedness among the needs a person has. To treat relation as something a person needs is to treat the person as the bearer and the relation as a supply, which reverses the order §1.26.3 asserted. On the present account a relation is the ground within which a party comes to have needs at all, and §33.1.2 established the form the priority takes.

Proposition 40.1. *The trait account requires an underlying quantity identifiable independently of the rate of asking, and none is available, since what is observed in every case is a rate within conditions the child does not control. Accounts naming relatedness among a person's needs treat the person as bearer and the relation as supply, reversing the order §1.26.3 asserted.*

40.1.2 The Bearing of Individual Variation

Children evidently differ, and a framework denying it would be describing something other than children. The chapter denies nothing of the sort, and the distinction it draws is what allows the variation to be affirmed.

§17.1.2 established that a child brings capacities, dispositions, and a history, and that what he does is his. Variation in what a child supplies to an occasion is accordingly real, is not reducible to his relations, and is not at issue here.

Two things are being distinguished. There is what a child supplies, which varies between children for reasons including temperament. And there is the rate at which what he supplies is taken up into what follows, which §39.2.2 established is a property of the exchange. Ordinary usage names both curiosity, and the conflation is what makes the trait account appear obvious: a child observed asking a great deal is observed in a relation where his asking is taken up, and the observation is attributed to him alone.

The case that separates them is available and this book has already established it. §34.1.2 described a child regarded one way at home and another at school. A child who asks constantly in one setting and rarely in the other is not exhibiting a single trait at two magnitudes, and an account committed to the trait must treat one setting as suppressing what the other reveals, which requires knowing in advance which setting is the revealing one.

Proposition 40.2. *What a child supplies varies between children and the framework affirms it. The rate at which what he supplies is taken up is a property of the exchange, and ordinary usage names both curiosity. A child asking constantly in one setting and rarely in another separates them, since a trait account must designate one setting as revealing and has no ground for the designation.*

40.2 Curiosity as a Maintained Rate

40.2.1 The Account

Curiosity, in the sense this book can use, is the stabilised rate at which a party's questions are supplied and taken up.

Two components are named and neither suffices alone. Supply is what the child contributes, in the sense of §39.2.1. Uptake is what §39.2.2 defined, an answer in which the question's particular shape is in what the answer became. A relation in which questions are supplied and not taken up has a high supply rate and no curiosity in the present sense, and §39.4.1 established that such a relation does not retain its supply rate for long.

The form of the account is one this book has used before. §10.2.2 held that what characterises a relation is the rate at which generated power is returned against the rate at which it is generated, and that neither figure alone characterises anything. The present account has that form: what characterises a relation with respect to inquiry is the rate of uptake against the rate of supply.

Three consequences follow.

Curiosity is predicated of a relation. A child is not curious, and a relation is one in which his questions are taken up at some rate. Ordinary usage will not be displaced by this and need not be, provided the predication is understood where the framework's claims are being assessed.

It admits of degree and yields no ranking, for the reason §30.5.1 gave. The rate attaches to a relation and to a domain within it, and a child's questions about one matter may be taken up while his questions about another are not.

And it is visible across a sequence rather than within an occasion, which §38.2.1 established for the general case and which holds here for the same reason.

Proposition 40.3. *Curiosity is the stabilised rate at which questions are supplied and taken up. Supply alone is insufficient, since a relation that does not take up what is supplied loses the supply. The account has the form of §10.2.2, predicates curiosity of a relation, admits of degree without ranking, and is visible across a sequence.*

40.2.2 The Ground of Stabilisation

A rate that merely fluctuated with conditions would not be worth naming, and this section states why the rate settles.

The mechanism is the one §11.1.2 established, running in the favourable direction. A child whose questions have been taken up has reason to supply more, since §39.2.1 established that asking carries a cost and uptake is what the cost purchases. More supply produces more occasions on which uptake could occur. An adult who has found such exchanges worth having is more available for the next, and §10.2.3 established what availability of this kind costs and therefore what sustains it.

The symmetry with ch. 11 is exact and is worth stating, since this book has described self-maintenance predominantly in the adverse direction. A fall maintains itself because each unreturned occasion makes the next less likely. A rate maintains itself because each occasion taken up makes the next more likely. The mechanism is one mechanism and its direction is set by whether uptake occurs.

What follows is that neither direction requires anyone to decide anything, and §11.2.2 established the consequence for the adverse case. The favourable case inherits the corresponding consequence: a household in which inquiry flourishes has not thereby done something

admirable that another household omitted, and §5.2.2 established what governs whether the occasions are available at all.

Proposition 40.4. *The rate stabilises by the mechanism of §11.1.2 running in the favourable direction, since uptake is what the cost of asking purchases and each occasion taken up makes the next more likely. The mechanism is one mechanism whose direction is set by whether uptake occurs, and neither direction requires a decision by anyone.*

40.3 The Senses of Reproduction

40.3.1 Maintenance Within a Relation

Reproduction in the first sense is the persistence of the rate across time within a single relation, and §40.2.2 supplied its mechanism.

Two features distinguish it from the persistence the reproduction traditions describe. §37.3.1 recorded that their mechanisms explain why an arrangement at the end resembles the arrangement at the beginning, and the resemblance is of a structure to itself. What persists here is a rate, which is maintained by the occasions that instantiate it and has no existence apart from them. §6.1.2 established the general form.

The consequence is that maintenance is continuous work performed by nobody. A household does not possess a rate of uptake which it might neglect. It has occasions in which uptake occurs or does not, and the rate is the description of what has been happening. §38.3.2 established the corresponding point for what a household holds in common, and the two are the same proposition about different objects.

Decay accordingly requires no event. §5.2.2 established what contracts the occasions, and a rate maintained only by occasions falls when they contract, at the pace §11.1.2 described.

Proposition 40.5. *Reproduction in the first sense is the persistence of a rate within a relation, maintained by the occasions instantiating it and possessing no existence apart from them. It is continuous work performed by nobody, and its decay requires no event beyond the contraction of occasions.*

40.3.2 Transmission of the Practice

Reproduction in the second sense is what passes between generations, and this section discharges the promise §37.4.2 made for the chapter.

What passes is not curiosity. §37.1.1 established that a possession model fails, and a rate is conspicuously not the kind of thing a parent could hold and convey. What passes is the practice of answering in the manner §39.2.2 described: taking up the shape of what was asked rather than delivering a prepared account of the topic.

That practice is part of a grammar in the sense §37.1.2 defined. It settles what counts as having answered, which is prior to any particular answer, and §33.1.2 established how a party comes to operate within such terms without being taught them. An adult answered in that manner as a child has terms in which an answer is the kind of thing that is shaped by a question, and he answers accordingly without having formed a view about answering.

The two halves of the Part meet here, and the meeting is what §37.4.2 anticipated. The practice is transmitted, in the sense of ch. 37. The occasions in which a rate is established are generated, in the sense of ch. 38. Neither accounts for the phenomenon alone: a transmitted practice with no occasions establishes no rate, and occasions in a household lacking the practice are answered in the manner §38.2.2 excluded.

This also states what a household generating the practice without having received it is doing, which §37.3.2 claimed occurs. It arrives at terms in which answers are shaped by questions, having encountered no such terms, and §37.3.2 refused the readings on which this is defective transmission or noise.

Proposition 40.6. *What passes between generations is the practice of answering in the manner §39.2.2 described, which is part of a grammar and passes as §33.1.2 established. Transmission and generation are both required, since a transmitted practice without occasions establishes no rate and occasions without the practice are answered in the manner the criterion excludes.*

40.4 The Bearing on What Follows

40.4.1 The Consequences for Measurement

The account yields an observable, and stating it is among the more useful things this Part supplies to the Part on method.

Existing instruments assess curiosity as a property of a child, by report or by observation of his conduct, and ch. 69 will ask of each instrument surveyed what it locates the property in. Instruments of this kind return a figure characterising the child, and §40.1.2 established that the figure conflates what he supplies with the rate at which it has been taken up.

What the present account proposes for measurement is the proportion of a child's questions that alter what follows. The quantity is defined on the exchange rather than on the child, it requires no report from either party, and §38.4.1 established that the unit is small and frequent. Chapter 70 carries the design.

The difficulties are those §30.2.2 identified and one further. Whether an answer was shaped by a question is a counterfactual matter, an exchange conducted in order to be assessed is altered by the assessing, and a household informed that the proportion is measured will produce answers that appear shaped. §28.3.2 established the general result and ch. 76 takes up whether an instrument can escape it.

Proposition 40.7. *The account proposes the proportion of a child's questions that alter what follows as an observable defined on the exchange rather than on the child. Existing instruments locate curiosity in the child and thereby conflate what he supplies with the rate at which it is taken up. The proposal inherits the difficulties of §30.2.2 together with the reactivity §28.3.2 established.*

40.4.2 The Consequences for Practice

The chapter reaches the result its two predecessors reached, and the recurrence should be addressed rather than repeated silently.

An adult who takes up a child's question in order to maintain a rate has settled in advance what the exchange is for, and §38.2.2 excluded occasions of that description. §38.4.2 established the general form and §35.3.1 recorded what became of a proposal that ignored it. Curiosity in the sense of §40.2.1 accordingly cannot be cultivated by cultivating it.

That three consecutive chapters arrive here is a feature of the structure rather than a reticence of the author. The same proposition produces it each time: an occasion whose outcome one party settles in advance is not an occasion in which the other's supply is in the product. Any practice defined by its intended result runs into it, and §8.2.1 recorded the position at the outset.

What the chapter licenses is what its predecessors licensed. Occasions can be made available, and §25.2.2 recorded the limit of that licence. And the features that foreclose uptake can be described, which is what §39.2.2 did in describing what a prepared answer does.

Proposition 40.8. *Curiosity cannot be cultivated by cultivating it, since an exchange whose purpose one party settles in advance excludes the other's supply from the product. The recurrence of this result across three chapters follows from a single proposition about occasions, and what remains available is the making of occasions and the description of what forecloses uptake.*

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Chapter 41

The Accumulation of Epistemic Habit

The Work of This Chapter

§39.4.2 gave this chapter an object, what accumulates from many exchanges of the kind §39.2.2 described, and §39.4.1 deferred to it a question about answers obtained without an exchange.

§41.1 states what an epistemic habit is, holding that its object is what does not fit, and shows that the readings of ch. 16 are the household case of it. §41.2 states how habits accumulate and answers the deferred question.

§41.3 draws the consequence that the structure of ch. 30 is not confined to a child's account of himself, and marks what does not generalise with it. §41.4 closes the Part.

The reader should carry forward the object of an epistemic habit, the account of what an exchange supplies that retrieval does not, and the limits on the generalisation.

41.1 The Nature of an Epistemic Habit

41.1.1 The Object

An epistemic habit is a settled manner of handling what does not fit.

The specification of the object is what gives the notion content. Material that fits what a party already holds requires no handling and is absorbed without anything being done. The variation between parties, and the thing a household could transmit, lies in what is done with material that fails to fit: a fact that sits badly with an account, an answer that does not address what was asked, a person who behaves in a way the description of him does not accommodate.

Several manners are available and the list is not exhaustive. The discrepancy may be set aside as noise. It may be explained away by a reading that preserves what was held. It may be allowed to stand unresolved. It may occasion revision of what was held. Or it may be put to another party, which ch. 39 treated.

The account is not a ranking of these, and the point requires emphasis because the vocabulary invites one. Setting a discrepancy aside is frequently correct, since most discrepancies are noise and a party who revised on each would hold nothing stable. §16.2.1 established that the readings absorbing a discrepancy are ordinary and are not devised by anyone. What distinguishes a habit worth examining is whether anything could fail to be absorbed, rather than whether it absorbs, which is the condition §16.2.2 identified.

Proposition 41.1. *An epistemic habit is a settled manner of handling what does not fit, and the specification of that object is what gives the notion content, since material that fits requires no handling. The available manners include setting aside, explaining away, allowing to stand,*

revising, and putting to another party. No ranking among them is asserted, since absorbing a discrepancy is frequently correct.

41.1.2 Its Relation to the Readings

ch. 16 described a household's settled manner of handling occasions that do not fit a name, and §41.1.1 has described a settled manner of handling what does not fit generally. The relation between them is that the first is the second applied to descriptions of a person.

This has a consequence for the reach of Part VI. The readings of §16.2.1 were introduced to explain how a description of a child becomes unreachable, and if they are an instance of a more general habit then the habit is applied to descriptions of everything else as well. §41.3 develops the point.

Dewey (1922) is the nearest precursor and the debt should be stated rather than implied. He holds that habits are ways of incorporating and using an environment rather than possessions of individuals, that they are formed in interaction rather than acquired by instruction, and that what is called character is a set of them. Dewey (1938) makes inquiry the transformation of an indeterminate situation into a determinate one, which places the discrepant at the centre of the account. §1.19 recorded that his position is relational in a sense close to this book's own, and the present chapter is where the closeness is greatest.

Three things the present account adds should be identified, since §8.3.1 ranked redescription of an available vocabulary as the most damaging finding available against this book.

The object is specified narrowly as what fails to fit within a relation's terms, and the terms are those §37.1.2 identified. Dewey's habits are ways of dealing with situations generally, and the present account concerns one thing done within them.

The founding asymmetry has no counterpart in his account. §7.1.1 established that a child forming his first habits holds no alternative from which the household's manner could be assessed, and §33.1.2 established the consequence. Dewey's inquirer is equipped, and the case of a party acquiring his first manner of handling misfit without a competitor is not one his account distinguishes.

And unanswerability has no term in his vocabulary. §30.1.2 defined a condition in which no discrepancy can reach a description, and an account for which inquiry is the transformation of indeterminacy has no name for a situation that cannot become indeterminate.

Proposition 41.2. *The readings of ch. 16 are an epistemic habit applied to descriptions of a person, so the habit is applied to descriptions of everything else also. The account is nearest to Dewey (1922) and Dewey (1938), and adds the narrow specification of the object, the founding asymmetry of a party acquiring his first manner without a competitor, and the condition in which nothing can fail to fit.*

41.2 The Accumulation of Habits

41.2.1 The Unit and the Residue

§38.4.1 identified the shared occasion as the smallest unit in which generation could be observed, and the exchanges of §39.2.2 are the instances that matter here.

What accumulates from many of them is not a stock of knowledge. §37.1.1 declined the possession model and the decline applies to items of knowledge as it applies to anything else. What accumulates is the manner: what this party does when something does not fit.

The mechanism is the one §33.1.2 established and requires nothing further. A child's interpreter is constituted within the terms his household supplies, and among those terms are the terms in which a misfit is registered as a misfit and the moves by which it is handled. He acquires the manner by operating in it, and §37.1.2 established that this requires no act of transmission on anyone's part.

Two features follow from §38.3.2 and hold here unchanged.

The accumulation is maintained rather than stored, so a habit is what a party has been doing rather than something he possesses and might neglect. It decays where the occasions that instantiate it cease, and §39.4.1 established the routes by which they do.

And it is not inventoriable by asking. §38.2.1 established that sharing need not be noticed, and a party's manner of handling misfit is among the things least available to him for report, since it governs what he registers as requiring handling at all.

Proposition 41.3. *What accumulates from exchanges is a manner of handling misfit rather than a stock of knowledge. It is acquired by operating within the terms a household supplies, requires no act of transmission, is maintained rather than stored, and is not available to the party for report, since it governs what he registers as requiring handling.*

41.2.2 The Displacement Question Answered

§39.4.1 named displacement as a route by which questions cease, holding that an answer obtainable without an exchange makes the exchange unnecessary, and deferred to this chapter the question of whether that matters.

The answer follows from §41.2.1 and is narrow.

What an exchange supplies, and retrieval does not, is an occasion of handling a misfit in company. The structure is this. A child asks, and what comes back does not quite address what he was asking, since §39.2.2 established that an answer shaped by a question is shaped by a particular thing that struck the child and rarely matches it exactly. Something must then be done with the remainder. Whatever is done is done with another party present, in terms that party supplies, and §33.1.2 established that terms supplied from outside are the whole of how a manner is acquired.

Retrieval supplies content. Where the retrieved content fits, no misfit arises and no occasion of handling one occurs. Where it does not fit, the misfit arises and is handled alone, which is to say with whatever manner the party already has, and an occasion in which an existing manner is exercised is not an occasion in which one is acquired.

Three limits on the claim should be stated, since the topic invites a stronger version than the framework supports.

It does not hold that retrieved answers are inferior as answers. The informational transaction succeeds, and §39.2.2 already established that the property making an answer good as information is distinct from the property at issue here.

It does not hold that household exchanges are the only source of the habit. Classrooms, reading, and other children supply occasions of the same structure, and §34.1.2 established what a second setting supplies.

And it asserts nothing about magnitude. §33.4.2 distinguished reliability about structure from reliability about magnitude, and the present claim is structural: retrieval supplies content and does not supply this occasion. How much turns on that is not settled here and ch. 70 would be required to settle it.

Proposition 41.4. *An exchange supplies an occasion of handling a misfit in company, since an answer shaped by a question rarely matches it exactly and the remainder must be handled in terms another party supplies. Retrieval supplies content, so where it fits no misfit arises and where it does not the misfit is handled with the manner already held. The claim is structural and asserts nothing about the magnitude of what turns on it.*

41.3 The Generalisation of Part VI

41.3.1 Unanswerability Beyond the Self-Account

§41.1.2 established that the readings of ch. 16 are the household case of a general habit. The consequence for Part VI is stated here.

§30.1.2 defined the second level as the condition in which the readings a name supplies have ceased to be defeasible, so that no occasion reaches the description. Nothing in that definition restricted the description to a description of a person. What it required was a set of readings adequate to absorb every discrepancy, and §41.1.1 established that a manner of handling misfit is what supplies them.

A party whose habit absorbs whatever fails to fit will therefore hold accounts of matters other than himself that no evidence reaches. The structure is the same structure, and §12.3.2 described its sharpest form, a subject for whom a description is no longer the kind of thing that admits of disagreement.

This is what the Part's title names. §1.27.10 placed the knowledge held in common among the results of rearing, and the present section holds that what is transmitted alongside it is the manner in which such knowledge is held, including whether it is held answerably.

Proposition 41.5. *The condition §30.1.2 defined does not depend on the description being a description of a person. A habit absorbing whatever fails to fit yields accounts of any matter that no evidence reaches, so the structure of ch. 30 extends to what a party holds about the world.*

41.3.2 The Limits of the Generalisation

The structure generalises and the moral weight does not, and conflating them would be the most damaging error available at this point in the book.

§31.5.2 located the loss of Part VI in the child's standing as a party to whom an account of him is answerable, and §24.2.1 supplied the authority on which that counts as a loss, which was the priority of recognition over welfare. Neither applies to an unanswerable account of the tides. A party who cannot be argued out of a view about navigation has a defective view and has not been wronged, and nothing in ch. 24 bears on the case.

Two further limits belong here.

The chapter withholds offering an account of belief formation in general. Epistemology possesses a substantial literature on the fixation of belief which this book has not engaged, and §1.23 recorded the general policy on matters outside the framework's undertaking. What is claimed is that one route by which a manner of holding beliefs is acquired runs through the relations of a household.

And the chapter does not hold that households are the sole source. §41.2.2 named others, and §34.1.2 established that a second setting may supply a manner the first did not. What the household case has is priority in time and the absence of a competitor, which §33.1.2 established and which is why it is the case this book treats.

ch. 90 inherits a question from this section. If the structure of ch. 30 extends as §41.3.1 holds, the projection test must ask whether existing accounts of dogmatism, of ideology, and of motivated reasoning can be read as projections of it, and where each mapping fails.

Proposition 41.6. *The structure generalises and the moral weight does not, since the loss of §31.5.2 was located in a child's standing and §24.2.1 supplies no authority regarding an unanswerable account of an impersonal matter. The chapter offers no general account of belief formation and does not hold households to be the sole source of epistemic habit, their case having priority in time and no competitor.*

41.4 The Findings of Part VII

41.4.1 The Part's Findings

The Part took up two debts and added an account of its own.

The first debt was ch. 3's. §3.2.5 conceded that a mechanism observed among professions and ministries is not established at household scale, and §37.2.2 discharged the obligation by arguing the household case on its own footing, holding that household transmission requires no medium because the receiving faculty is constituted within what is transmitted, and that the household case is accordingly the primitive one.

The second was §1.16.9's. §37.3.2 held that a household may generate a grammar the surrounding structure did not supply, refused the readings on which such cases are incomplete transmission, resistance, or noise, and grounded the claim in the third condition of §1.26.3 rather than in an addition made to answer the reproduction traditions.

The account added has four parts. §37.1.2 identified what passes between generations. §38.2.1 gave the criterion by which an occasion is shared, and §38.3.1 used it to say what a household holds in common, which §1.27.10 had named among the results of rearing without specifying. §39.1.1 gave the criterion for a question and showed it to be the structure of §19.3.1 and §30.1.2 at a third scale. And §40.2.1 and §41.1.1 gave the two rates the Part is finally about.

Two results were not anticipated when the Part opened and are worth marking. §39.3.1 supplies a naturally occurring instance of a discriminator §30.2.2 held could not be arranged. And §40.2.2 establishes that the self-maintenance of ch. 11 and the self-maintenance of a rate of inquiry are one mechanism whose direction is set by whether uptake occurs.

Proposition 41.7. *The Part discharges the obligation ch. 3 withdrew, by arguing household scale on its own footing; establishes the generative case as the third condition of §1.26.3 at household scale; and supplies the object of transmission, the criterion of sharing, the criterion of a question, and the two rates. It adds a naturally occurring discriminator and the identification of adverse and favourable self-maintenance as one mechanism.*

41.4.2 The Residue Left by the Part

Three deficiencies stand at its close.

The generative case is argued and is not exhibited. §37.3.2 refused three readings of the phenomena and did not present a case in which a household was shown to have generated what its position did not supply. The position is that of §30.4 in the preceding Part: a claim with content, an account of what would establish it, and no demonstration.

The observables are proposed and are not tested. §38.4.1 and §40.4.1 define two quantities on exchanges rather than on children, and both inherit the reactivity of §28.3.2 and the counterfactual difficulty of §30.2.2. Chapter 70 carries them.

And the practical question is left where four chapters have left it. §40.4.2 stated why the result recurs and what remains available, and ch. 77 carries what can be said.

One exposure should be recorded rather than left for a reader to find. §41.1.2 identified Dewey (1922) as the nearest precursor and named three additions. ch. 90 must test whether the additions are sufficient, since a Part that turned out to redescribe Dewey in a new vocabulary would fall to the finding §8.3.1 ranked as most damaging, and the resemblance here is closer than anywhere else in the book.

Proposition 41.8. *The Part leaves the generative case argued and unexhibited, its two observables proposed and untested, and the practical question where its chapters left it. Its principal exposure is the proximity of §41.1.1 to Dewey (1922), which ch. 90 must test against the finding §8.3.1 ranked as most damaging.*

References

John Dewey. *Human Nature and Conduct*. Henry Holt, New York, 1922.

John Dewey. *Experience and Education*. Macmillan, New York, 1938.

Part VIII

Authority and Governance

Chapter 42

The Relational Form of Authority

The Work of This Chapter

Three chapters have recorded a debt to this one. §24.4.1 stated an obligation and did not ground it. §31.5.2 made the conclusion of Part VI conditional on that obligation. §35.4.2 showed the same debt in a third form, as answerability for a relation by a party who performed no act within it.

§42.1 states what is owed and why the natural route to paying it would defeat what it was meant to secure, which §24.4.1 anticipated. §42.2 states what authority is in this framework and separates answerability from deference, since the two are commonly identified and the identification is what makes the obligation appear unacceptable.

§42.3 supplies two grounds of different strength, one derived and narrow and one that states what denial costs without compelling anyone. §42.4 says which of the three debts is discharged, which is discharged in part, and which remains.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between answerability and deference, the epistemic ground for answerability, and an accurate account of how much this chapter settles.

42.1 The Debt and Its Difficulty

42.1.1 The Debts Owed

The debt has three forms and they are not the same claim, which matters because they may be discharged separately.

The first is the priority of recognition over welfare. §24.2.1 asserted it, §24.1.2 refuted the grounding of recognition in yield, and §24.3.1 put the assertion in its hardest form, that it holds where the yield is nothing. §24.4.1 recorded that the refutation of a rival grounding is not a grounding.

The second is the conditional of Part VI. §31.5.2 located the loss in the child's standing as a party to whom an account of him is answerable, and held that this counts as a loss on the priority just named. If the priority fails, §36.4.2 recorded, Part VI has described a structure and has not shown anything wrong with it.

The third is answerability without act. §7.3.1 held that parties to a constitutive relation are answerable for the constituting and that answerability of this kind requires no act, and §35.4.2 recorded that the proposition is what would reconcile the absence of a perpetrator with a party who owes the subject something.

The third is the narrowest and the second depends on the first. This ordering is what allows

the chapter to discharge unequally.

Proposition 42.1. *Three debts are owed: the priority of recognition over welfare, the conditional on which Part VI's conclusion rests, and answerability for a constitutive relation by a party who performed no act. The third is narrowest, the second depends on the first, and they may therefore be discharged separately.*

42.1.2 The Threat Posed by Derivation

§24.4.1 recorded a difficulty which this section states as the constraint governing the chapter.

An obligation derived from a further consideration holds where that consideration holds and lapses where it does not. To derive the obligation to extend recognition from a fact about what recognition produces would make the obligation conditional on the production, which §24.1.2 identified as the move the framework exists to refuse. To derive it from a property the child possesses would make it conditional on the property, and §24.3.1 constructed the case in which every candidate property is absent.

The difficulty is therefore not that a derivation has not been found. It is that a derivation of the usual form would supply something weaker than what is wanted, and would supply it in the shape the framework has already refused.

Two responses to this are available and the chapter takes both.

The first is to derive something narrower which does not have this defect, because it is not a claim about what anyone is owed. §42.3.1 derives answerability from what a constitutive relation is, and the derivation does not make answerability conditional on any yield or on any property of the child.

The second is to state what the denial of the wider claim costs, without asserting that the denial is incoherent. §42.3.2 does this, and §42.4.2 records that it is not a derivation.

Proposition 42.2. *A derivation of the usual form would make the obligation conditional on whatever it derived from, which is the structure §24.1.2 refused and which §24.3.1 constructed a case against. The difficulty is accordingly in the form of the demand rather than in the absence of an argument.*

42.2 Authority as a Relational Position

42.2.1 The Sense of Authority in This Framework

Authority in this framework is a position within a relation and is not a property of a person or a permission conferred from outside.

§10.1.1 established that an asymmetry generates power continuously in favour of one party, and §10.2.2 established that what characterises the relation is the rate at which the generated power is returned. Authority is the standing occupancy of the favoured position, and §19.2.1 established the difference between a name stating a position and one stating an essence, which applies here to the parent as it applied to the child.

Three consequences follow and each departs from an ordinary usage.

Authority is not conferred by having been right. A parent who has judged well retains the position he occupied before judging, and a parent who has judged badly does not vacate it. §12.2.2 established what continuous occupancy of a position produces, and the production operates on the favoured party as it operates on the other.

Authority is not something a child grants. §7.1.1 established that he holds no standpoint from which the granting could be performed, and an account making authority depend on a child's acknowledgement would make it depend on a capacity the founding asymmetry denies him.

And authority is not diminished by being answerable. This is the subject of §42.2.2 and is where the chapter's practical content lies.

Proposition 42.3. *Authority is the standing occupancy of the position an asymmetry favours. It is not conferred by having judged well, is not granted by the child, who holds no standpoint from which to grant it, and is not diminished by being answerable.*

42.2.2 Answerability Distinguished from Deference

The obligation this chapter concerns is commonly rejected because it is heard as a different obligation, and separating the two is a precondition of assessing either.

Answerability is the condition that what the other party does bear on the account one holds of him. §30.1.2 defined its failure, §19.3.1 gave the corresponding condition for a symbol, and §39.1.1 gave it for a question. An adult is answerable to a child where the child's conduct can alter what the adult takes him to be.

Deference is the disposition to do what the other party wants. It concerns the settling of outcomes rather than the holding of accounts.

The two are independent, and both directions of the independence matter.

An adult may be fully answerable and refuse everything a child asks. He may hold an account of the child that is continuously exposed to revision by what the child does, and still decide bedtimes, schooling, and the hundred matters a household settles. §19.3.1 established that a symbol's being refutable by its object is a condition on the symbol rather than a constraint on what may be done, and the same holds here. Nothing in answerability transfers a decision.

And an adult may defer completely and be unanswerable. A parent who accedes to whatever a child wants may hold an account of him that nothing alters, and the deference may be the mechanism by which it is protected: a party who never tests his account against a refusal has removed the occasions on which it could have been corrected. §28.3.2 bears on this, and §35.3.1 recorded a neighbouring case in which a well-meant practice produced the condition it was adopted to prevent.

The identification of the two is therefore an error with a direction. It makes answerability look like the abdication of a position, which no adult responsible for a child can accept, and the appearance is what has made the obligation seem unacceptable rather than merely unproved.

Proposition 42.4. *Answerability is the condition that what a child does bear on the account held of him, and deference is the disposition to do what he wants. They are independent in both directions: an adult may be answerable and refuse everything asked, and may defer completely while holding an account nothing alters. Their identification makes answerability appear to be*

the abdication of a position, which is why the obligation has seemed unacceptable rather than unproved.

42.2.3 The Term and Its Prior Occupants

The word this chapter uses has an owner, and §8.3.1 ranked as most damaging the finding that a description was available already in a vocabulary that does not require this framework.

Bakhtin (1990) and Bakhtin (1993) make answerability the central term of an ethics. A subject has, in that account, no alibi in being: he occupies a position no other occupies and must answer from it with acts for which no general rule substitutes. The account is dialogic, it holds that a person is never finalised by any description of him, and it is the origin of the term in the sense this book uses it.

Two things must be said and the second is what this chapter adds.

The debt is real and is acknowledged here rather than at the close. The motif of a subject who cannot be finalised by an account, and of a relation in which each party must respond from a position that is his, is Bakhtin's and is not this book's discovery. §30.1.2 defined a condition in which a description ceases to be alterable by its object, and unfinalisability is that condition's negation stated eighty years earlier.

What Bakhtin does not supply is a criterion of legitimacy. His answerability is a demand on a subject: it says how one must act, from a position one cannot vacate. The present chapter uses the term for a property of an account: whether what a child does can alter what an adult holds. The two are related and are not the same, and a framework that conflated them would have taken a term of ethics and used it as a test of authority without argument.

Lindemann (2014) and Nelson (2001) come nearer still, and the proximity should be stated at its full strength. To hold a person in her identity, on that account, is to treat her in accordance with the stories used to make sense of who she is; the practice begins in infancy, it is performed by families before it is performed by anyone else, and identities damaged by a master narrative may be repaired by a counterstory. §14.1.2 and §16.2.1 describe the same practice from the other side, and §31.3.2 describes something close to narrative repair.

The difference is again the use to which the material is put. Lindemann's norm is fidelity: an identity is held well where it is held in accordance with who the person is, and badly where a master narrative distorts her. The present chapter's norm is answerability: an account is held well where what the person does can alter it, whatever it holds. The two come apart in a case worth stating. An adult holding an account of a child that is accurate, generous, and unalterable by anything the child does holds it well by fidelity and badly by answerability, and §33.2.2 established that an account under which a subject is exceptional closes revision as an unflattering one does.

Proposition 42.5. *The term is Bakhtin (1990)'s and the debt is acknowledged. His answerability is a demand on a subject and the present chapter's is a property of an account, and the two are not the same. Lindemann (2014)'s holding is nearer, and its norm is fidelity where the present norm is answerability, which come apart in the case of an accurate account that nothing the person does can alter.*

42.3 The Derivation

42.3.1 The Argument from What a Description Requires

The narrow derivation proceeds from what is required for an adult's account of a child to be an account of that child, and it does not pass from a fact to an obligation in the manner §1.27.3 identified as problematic.

§19.3.1 established that a symbol is good where what it describes can refute it. §41.1.2 established the general form, that a description whose readings absorb every discrepancy is one nothing can reach. §41.3.1 established that this holds of descriptions of any subject matter.

Apply this to an adult holding an account of a child. Where the readings that account supplies are undefeatable, no conduct of the child's reaches it. The account then stands in no relation to the child that would make it an account of him rather than an account he happens to be attached to. Chapter 17 established what such an account does in the world, and §16.2.2 established that its holder experiences himself as observing accurately throughout.

What follows is a requirement internal to the adult's own position. An adult who wishes to know what his child is like is committed to holding his account of the child answerable to what the child does, because an unanswerable account is a way of having no purchase on the child at all rather than a way of being wrong about him. The commitment is not imported from ethics and does not depend on anything the child is owed.

Two features of this derivation should be stated exactly.

It is genuinely derived. The premises are §19.3.1 and §41.3.1, both established independently and neither introduced for the present purpose, and the conclusion follows from what it is for a description to be about something.

And it is narrow. It establishes that answerability is a condition of the adult's own enterprise, and it establishes nothing about what the child is owed. An adult indifferent to what his child is actually like is not reached by it, and §42.3.2 takes up his case.

Proposition 42.6. *An account of a child whose readings absorb every discrepancy stands in no relation to the child that would make it an account of him. An adult holding an account of his child is therefore committed, by what a description requires, to holding it answerable to what the child does. The derivation is genuine and is narrow, establishing a condition on the adult's own enterprise and nothing about what the child is owed.*

42.3.2 The Cost of Denial

The wider claim is not derived here and this section states what can be said in its place, in the form §42.1.2 indicated.

Consider an adult who occupies the position §42.2.1 described and denies that he is answerable to the party he constitutes. §33.1.2 established what that position involves: the faculty by which the child will assess anything at all, including how he was treated, is being constituted within terms this adult supplies.

The denial therefore has a particular structure. The adult claims authority over the standard by which his own conduct in the relation could be assessed. He is not asserting that his conduct is good, and he is not asserting that a criticism of it would fail. He is occupying the

position from which the terms of any such criticism are issued, and declining to be reached by what issues from it.

§12.3.2 described the corresponding condition in a subject for whom a description has ceased to be the kind of thing that admits of disagreement. The adult in the present case has produced that condition with respect to himself, and §41.1.2 established that the operation is the same operation.

What this shows is not that the denial is incoherent, and the chapter declines to claim that it is. A party may occupy such a position and maintain it, and no contradiction has been demonstrated. What has been shown is that in doing so he has placed his conduct in the relation outside the reach of assessment altogether, which removes him from the practice within which justification is offered and received rather than securing him a position within it.

Whether that consequence is decisive is not something this book establishes. §4.3.1 recorded that the framework cannot establish any arrangement wrong in itself, and the present section does not establish it either.

Proposition 42.7. *An adult denying answerability to a party he constitutes claims authority over the standard by which his own conduct could be assessed, which is the condition §12.3.2 described applied reflexively. The denial has not been shown to be incoherent. What has been shown is that it places his conduct outside the reach of assessment, which is an exit from the practice of justification rather than a position within it.*

42.3.3 The Rival Grounds of Legitimacy

Two accounts ground the legitimacy of authority over a child on something other than answerability, each is well developed, and neither is answered by anything said so far.

Raz (1986) holds that an authority is legitimate where the subject would better conform to the reasons that already apply to him by following its directives than by acting on his own judgement. Applied to a child, the account is strong: an adult knows a great deal a child does not, the child's conformity to reasons is improved by deference, and the improvement is measurable in the outcomes.

The account is a rival and not a variant, and the point of divergence is exact. On the service conception an authority may be wholly legitimate and wholly unanswerable. An adult whose directives improve a child's conformity to reason, and whose account of the child no conduct of the child's alters, satisfies the normal justification thesis entirely. §42.3.1 holds that such an adult has no purchase on the child at all, and the two accounts return opposite verdicts on the same case.

Brighouse and Swift (2014) ground parental authority in the goods distinctively available through the parent and child relationship, subject to the child's independent interests. The account is nearer to this book than the service conception, since it locates the justification in the relation rather than in the outcomes, and §1.27.10 located what develops in a relation also.

The divergence here is narrower and is still a divergence. On that account what justifies the adult's position is what the relationship supplies to both parties, and the question whether the adult's account of the child is alterable does not arise as a condition. A relationship supplying the goods in full, in which the adult's description of the child is settled, is legitimate on that account and defective on this one.

What follows is that this chapter's criterion is not established by being stated. §42.3.1 derived answerability from what a description requires, which is an argument that an unanswerable account is not an account of the child. It is not an argument that the two rival grounds are wrong, and a reader holding either of them has not been answered.

The honest position is that the criterion is complementary rather than replacing. §42.4.2 recorded that the priority of recognition remains asserted, and the present section adds that even a reader granting the priority may ground legitimacy elsewhere. ch. 89 carries this.

Proposition 42.8. *Raz (1986) holds that an authority is legitimate where it improves the subject's conformity to reason, which an unanswerable authority may do entirely, so the two accounts return opposite verdicts on one case. Brighouse and Swift (2014) ground authority in relationship goods, which a relation with a settled description of the child may supply in full. Neither is answered here, and the criterion is complementary rather than replacing.*

42.3.4 Power That Aims at Its Own Dissolution

One account states something close to this book's position about power and states it in the vocabulary of power, which this book has largely avoided.

Wartenberg (1990) distinguishes forms of power rather than treating power as one thing, and identifies transformative power as the form whose exercise aims at its own dissolution: the party in the favoured position acts so as to bring about the other's independence of him, and the relation is one whose success is its own supersession. Teaching and parenting are his paradigm cases.

Three things this framework takes from it.

Power is not one thing, and §10.1.1 established that an asymmetry generates power continuously without establishing that what is generated is domination. Lukes (2005) and Allen (1999) develop the corresponding distinctions, the second under the headings of power over, power to, and power with.

An asymmetric relation may be legitimate in virtue of what it is for. §42.2.1 held that authority is the standing occupancy of the position an asymmetry favours, and Wartenberg supplies the account under which such occupancy is not thereby domination.

And the child's eventual independence is internal to the relation rather than its ending. §7.1.2 established that the founding asymmetry is a matter of degree that changes, and §45.4.1 that which levels a child can reach varies with the terms available to him.

What this framework adds is a test applicable now. Transformative power is identified by its aim, and §46.2.2 established that a party's account of what an arrangement is for is poor evidence about what it does. Answerability is a property of what occurs on occasions, and §39.3.1 identified naturally occurring instances by which it is exercised. An adult who intends his power to dissolve, and holds an account of the child that nothing the child does alters, has the aim and fails the test.

Proposition 42.9. *Wartenberg (1990) identifies transformative power as the form whose exercise aims at its own dissolution, with parenting and teaching as paradigms, and this framework takes from it that an asymmetric relation may be legitimate in virtue of what it is for. What it adds is a test applicable now, since a form identified by its aim is subject to §46.2.2, and an adult*

may hold the aim and fail the test.

42.4 The Discharged and the Outstanding

42.4.1 The Gap Recorded in Part I

§1.27.3 recorded that a framework describing what relations do cannot by itself establish what anyone ought to do, and the present chapter should say precisely how it stands with respect to that gap.

The derivation of §42.3.1 does not cross it. Its conclusion is a condition on an enterprise: an adult who wants an account of his child that is about his child must hold it answerable. This is of the form that anyone pursuing an end is committed to its conditions, and §1.27.3 did not treat commitments of that form as problematic. What it delivers is correspondingly limited, since an adult who is not pursuing that end incurs no requirement.

The argument of §42.3.2 does not cross it either, and does not claim to. It describes a consequence of a denial and leaves the assessment of that consequence to the reader.

The gap is therefore not closed by this chapter. What the chapter establishes is that the framework is not disabled from stating obligations, which §7.3.1 had already established against the objection raised there, and that one obligation of a restricted kind follows from materials the book established for other purposes.

An accurate summary is that the book stands where §24.4.1 said accounts of this kind generally stand. The unconditional claim is adopted and defended against a specific corruption, and it is not derived. §6.2.2 imposed the discipline that a claim belongs to the ontological statement or to a component, and this claim belongs to neither.

Proposition 42.10. *Neither argument of this chapter crosses the gap §1.27.3 recorded. The first states a condition on an enterprise and binds only those pursuing it, and the second describes a consequence without assessing it. The unconditional claim remains adopted and defended rather than derived.*

42.4.2 The Outstanding Questions

The three debts of §42.1.1 stand differently at the close of the chapter and the differences should be recorded plainly.

Answerability without act is discharged. §42.3.1 derives answerability from what a description requires, and the derivation makes no reference to any act performed within the relation. §35.4.2 sought a ground on which a party could owe something without having done anything, and a condition arising from occupancy of a position is such a ground. This is the third debt and it was the narrowest.

The conditional of Part VI is discharged in part. §31.5.2 located the loss in the child's standing as a party to whom an account is answerable. §42.3.1 establishes that answerability is a condition on the adult's holding an account of the child at all, which supplies a ground for calling its absence a defect. It does not supply a ground for calling it a wrong done to the child, and §31.5.1 established that no hedonic route to that conclusion exists. Part VI's conclusion is

accordingly better supported than it was and is not established.

The priority of recognition over welfare is not discharged. §42.1.2 gave the reason this is not a failure of effort, and §42.4.1 recorded where the book therefore stands. ch. 89 must carry it, and a reader who rejects the priority is not answered by this chapter.

The chapters following take up what a normative order does rather than what grounds it. ch. 43 treats when such an order is closed, ch. 44 treats contestability, ch. 45 treats levels, and ch. 46 treats what boundaries do to the conditions of generation.

Proposition 42.11. *Answerability without act is discharged, the conditional of Part VI is discharged in part, since a ground is supplied for calling unanswerability a defect and none for calling it a wrong, and the priority of recognition over welfare is not discharged and passes to ch. 89.*

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Chapter 43

Maintenance and Closure

The Work of This Chapter

Chapter 42 treated the position from which a normative order issues. This chapter treats the order itself: what keeps one in existence, and what it is for one to be closed.

§43.1 holds that a normative order is maintained rather than possessed and describes the work by which it persists. §43.2 defines closure as the condition in which the order cannot be reached by what occurs within it, which is the structure of §30.1.2 at the level of an order rather than a description.

§43.3 discharges a debt §2.5.1 recorded, that this Part would treat the closure of the tradition ch. 2 surveyed and that the treatment would not be flattering. §43.4 states what follows for households.

The reader should carry forward the account of maintenance, the definition of closure, and the distinction between an order that is demanding and one that is closed.

43.1 The Maintenance of a Normative Order

43.1.1 Orders Are Maintained Rather Than Held

A normative order is a settled distribution of what may be required of whom, what counts as a failure, and what follows from one. Households have them, and §16.2.2 established that the parties operating within one generally could not state it.

§6.1.2 held that a pattern is maintained rather than possessed, and the proposition applies here with a consequence worth drawing out. There is no document, no agreement, and no moment of adoption. A household's order is what its parties have been doing, and §37.1.2 established that this is also true of the terms in which they describe each other.

Two things follow.

An order cannot be changed by deciding to change it, in the sense that a decision alters what parties intend and not what they have been doing. §23.3.1 established that the conditions on a reversal are properties of arrangements, and §35.3.1 recorded what became of a proposal that treated a normative matter as settleable by resolution.

And an order decays without work. §38.3.2 established that what a household holds in common decays where the occasions maintaining it cease, and an order is among the things so held. A household in which the occasions have contracted does not retain its order and lose the capacity to revise it. It loses both.

Proposition 43.1. *A normative order is what a household's parties have been doing rather than something adopted or held. It is not alterable by decision, since a decision changes intentions and*

not practice, and it decays where the occasions maintaining it contract.

43.1.2 The Work of Maintenance

If an order persists only through what is done, the doing is worth describing, and three kinds of occasion perform it.

The first is the ordinary application. An order is maintained principally by being applied without remark to cases that fit it, and §41.1.1 established that material fitting what a party holds requires no handling. Most of what maintains a household's order is invisible for this reason.

The second is the marked case. Where something does not fit, the order is either applied with a reason given, extended, or set aside, and each is a moment at which the order is exhibited to the parties. §16.2.1 established the moves available where a description meets a discrepancy, and the moves available to an order are of the same kind.

The third is the contested case, in which a party subject to the order objects to its application. This is the occasion on which an order could be altered by what a party subject to it does, and §43.2.1 makes it the criterion.

The three are unequal in frequency and in what they establish. A household may go years without a contested case and its order is maintained throughout by the first kind. What the contested case supplies is information rather than maintenance: it is the occasion on which whether the order is closed becomes visible, and §39.3.1 identified the corresponding occasion for a description of a child.

Proposition 43.2. *An order is maintained by ordinary application, by the marked case in which it is applied with a reason or extended or set aside, and by the contested case. The first performs most of the maintenance and the third performs little of it, supplying in its place the occasion on which closure becomes visible.*

43.2 Closure

43.2.1 The Nature of Closure

A normative order is closed where nothing that occurs within it can alter it.

The definition is the structure of §30.1.2 applied at a different level. There, a description of a child was unanswerable where the readings it supplied absorbed every discrepancy. Here, an order is closed where the objections available to those subject to it are absorbed by moves the order itself supplies.

Three moves perform the absorption and each has an innocent form.

An objection may be met by the observation that the objector is subject to the order, so that his objecting is itself a failure the order describes. This is the strongest of the three and the most complete, since it converts the occasion of contest into an instance of the order's application.

An objection may be met by the observation that the objector does not yet understand, with understanding to arrive later. §7.1.1 established that the child's case supplies this move its most natural application, and the move is frequently correct.

And an objection may be met by the observation that the order has always obtained, so that the burden falls on the party proposing a departure. §12.2.2 established what continuous occupancy produces, and an order occupying a household continuously acquires the same standing.

What makes an order closed is not that these moves are made. It is that no objection could fail to be met by one of them, and §16.2.2 established that this condition is compatible with every party acting in good faith and none devising anything.

An important distinction follows. An order may be extremely demanding and open, requiring a great deal and remaining alterable by what those subject to it do. And an order may be undemanding and closed. Severity and closure are independent, and conflating them is the error that makes closure hard to see, since the orders that attract attention are the severe ones.

Proposition 43.3. *An order is closed where no objection available to those subject to it could fail to be absorbed by moves the order supplies: that objecting is itself a failure, that the objector does not yet understand, or that the order has always obtained. Closure is independent of severity, and a demanding order may be open while an undemanding one is closed.*

43.2.2 Exit and Its Absence

Closure as defined concerns alteration from within. A second question concerns whether those subject to an order may leave it, and the two come apart.

An order permitting exit is not thereby open. A party who may leave has an alternative to submission and has no route to changing what he submits to, and §34.1.2 established what a second setting supplies, which is a standpoint rather than a purchase.

An order forbidding exit is not thereby closed. A household from which a young child cannot depart may nonetheless be one in which his objections alter what is required of him, and §7.1.1 established that exit is unavailable to him in every case, so an account making openness depend on exit would find no open households containing young children.

The two conditions are therefore separate and both matter. §43.2.1 concerns whether the order answers to those within it. Exit concerns whether they are held within it. An order that is closed and from which exit is impossible is the limiting case, and it is the case §43.3.2 examines.

Proposition 43.4. *Closure and the availability of exit are independent conditions. An order permitting exit may answer to nobody within it, and an order from which exit is impossible may answer to those within it, which must be so if households containing young children are to be describable as open at all.*

43.2.3 Orders as Instituted and Revisable

A literature treats the making of normative orders and their revisability, and three of its results bear on §43.2.1.

Cover (1983) holds that a normative order is inseparable from the narratives that give it meaning, that communities generate legal meaning continuously, and that an institution which settles which meanings stand does so by extinguishing others. §43.1.1 established that an order

is what its parties have been doing, and the bearing is that a household's order is generated in the same manner and by the same means.

Castoriadis (1987) distinguishes the instituting from the instituted, holding that a society's significations are its own creation and that a society may or may not hold them as such. §50.1.2 established that a variable which never moves is registered as background, and §85.3.2 that an arrangement a household has never altered may not be registered as an arrangement. The distinction states the general form of that result.

Unger (1987) treats the revisability of formative contexts directly, holding that an arrangement may be more or less open to challenge from within and that the difference is a property of the arrangement rather than of anyone's attitude to it. §45.1.2 established that contestability applies separately at each level, and Unger's account is the corresponding claim at the scale of a social order.

Two further positions bear and are recorded. Habermas (1996) grounds an order's legitimacy in the inclusion of those subject to it in the discourse that produces it, and §45.4.1 established why a child cannot be so included, which makes the account inapplicable to the case rather than false. Thompson (1975) holds that a constraint may be a human good despite serving a structure, which is the position §46.3.1 takes about boundaries and §42.3.4 about asymmetric power.

What this framework adds is the specific condition. Each of these accounts holds that orders are made and may be remade, and §43.2.1 states what it is for a particular order to have ceased to be remakeable by those within it, which is a criterion rather than a thesis about institution in general.

Proposition 43.5. *Cover (1983) holds that orders are generated continuously by the communities inhabiting them, Castoriadis (1987) distinguishes the instituting from the instituted, and Unger (1987) treats revisability as a property of an arrangement. Habermas (1996) grounds legitimacy in the inclusion of those subject, which §45.4.1 established is unavailable for a child. What the framework adds is a criterion for a particular order having ceased to be remakeable.*

43.3 The Case of the Formation Tradition

43.3.1 The Supply of the Tradition

§2.5.1 recorded that the tradition ch. 2 surveyed is the one from which this book takes its organising question, and the debt should be restated before the criticism is made.

Tu (1985) presents the tradition's central claim, that a person becomes fully a person through cultivation, that cultivation proceeds through practice, and that its content is supplied by relations already structured. ch. 2 recorded three things this yields that the developmental traditions of ch. 1 do not: an account of formation as the assumption of relational positions rather than the acquisition of capacities, a treatment of the adult as under formation alongside the child, and a vocabulary in which what passes between generations is a practice rather than a content.

Each of these is retained in this book. §1.27.10 states the first as a keynote, §14.2.1 states the second, and §37.1.2 states the third. The framework's debt is substantial and is not diminished

by what follows.

Proposition 43.6. *The formation tradition supplies the account of becoming as the assumption of relational positions, the treatment of the adult as under formation alongside the child, and the vocabulary in which a practice rather than a content passes between generations. All three are retained in this book.*

43.3.2 The Locus of Its Closure

§2.5.1 recorded that the tradition's account of relational positions was also an account of a hierarchy of obligation from which exit was not contemplated, and undertook that the treatment here would not be flattering.

The tradition's order is closed in the sense of §43.2.1, and the closure is structural rather than incidental to particular institutions.

The first move of §43.2.1 is available to it in an unusually complete form. Where the positions are constitutive of personhood, a party objecting to what his position requires is objecting from a standpoint the order does not supply, and the objection is describable within the order as a failure of cultivation. §12.3.2 described the corresponding condition in an individual subject, and the parallel is exact: what is at issue ceases to be the kind of thing about which the parties could differ.

The second move is available wherever the objector is junior, which within a hierarchy of the relevant kind he generally is with respect to whoever he is objecting to.

The third is available because the order's warrant is its antiquity, which §12.2.2 established is what continuous occupancy produces.

The order additionally forbade exit in the sense §43.2.2 distinguished, and the limiting case of that section is accordingly instantiated.

Two things should be said about the scope of this finding, since a criticism of this kind is easily overextended and easily dismissed.

It does not follow that the tradition's account of formation is wrong. §43.3.1 recorded what is retained here, and the retained claims concern how persons are formed rather than what may be required of them. An account of formation may be correct and the normative order it was embedded in closed.

And it does not distinguish this tradition from others by the mere fact of closure. §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity, and an order need not be ancient or hierarchical to be closed. §43.4.2 states the corresponding finding for contemporary households, which is where this chapter's interest chiefly lies.

Proposition 43.7. *The formation tradition's order is closed, since a party objecting to what his position requires objects from a standpoint the order does not supply and his objection is describable within it as a failure of cultivation. The finding does not impugn the tradition's account of formation, which concerns how persons are formed rather than what may be required of them, and does not distinguish it from other orders, since closure requires neither antiquity nor hierarchy.*

43.4 The Bearing on Households

43.4.1 Closure and the Second Level

The relation between this chapter's condition and the condition of [ch. 30](#) should be stated, since they are the same structure at different levels and are not the same thing.

[§30.1.2](#) concerned a description of a child that nothing the child does can reach. [§43.2.1](#) concerns an order that nothing done within it can alter. A household may exhibit either without the other.

A household whose order is closed may hold answerable descriptions of its children. The rules stand and are not open to objection, and what any particular child is like remains something the household finds out. [§42.2.2](#) established the corresponding independence at the level of a single adult.

A household whose order is open may hold a description of a child that nothing reaches. The rules are discussed, amended, and objected to, and an account of one member is nonetheless undefeatable. Nothing in the openness of an order requires that its parties be answerable about each other.

Where both obtain the case is the one [§34.3.2](#) described from another direction, and [§35.1.1](#) established that neither condition requires anyone at fault.

Proposition 43.8. *Closure of an order and unanswerability of a description are the same structure at different levels and are independent. A household with a closed order may hold answerable descriptions of its children, and a household with an open order may hold a description of a child that nothing reaches.*

43.4.2 The Consequences for Households

Three findings bear on the contemporary case and none requires an ancient order.

Closure requires no severity, which [§43.2.1](#) established. A household with few rules, all of them mild, may absorb every objection to them by the second move of that section, and [§7.1.1](#) established that the move is always available against a child.

Closure requires no decision. [§43.1.1](#) established that an order is what has been done, and [§16.2.2](#) established that its moves are applied without being devised. [§35.1.1](#) removed the bearers of fault for the case of a description, and the removal holds here for the same reasons.

And closure is invisible in the absence of contest. [§43.1.2](#) established that the contested case performs little maintenance and supplies the information, and [§15.2.2](#) established that an objection not raised leaves no trace. A household whose children have stopped objecting is indistinguishable, on the evidence available to it, from a household whose order they endorse.

The last of these is the practically consequential one and it inherits the difficulty of [§30.2.2](#) unchanged. [ch. 44](#) takes up contestability directly and [ch. 70](#) carries what could be measured.

Proposition 43.9. *Closure requires no severity, no decision, and no ancient warrant, and is invisible where contest has ceased, since objections not raised leave no trace. A household whose children have stopped objecting is indistinguishable on available evidence from one whose children endorse its order.*

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Chapter 44

Rules, Sanction, and Contestability

The Work of This Chapter

§43.4.2 held that closure is invisible where contest has ceased and passed the treatment of contestability here. This chapter supplies it, together with an account of what a rule is and of what enforces one.

§44.1 distinguishes the rules a household states from the rules it operates, and holds that the divergence is absorbed by the moves §16.2.1 identified. §44.2 holds that the sanction performing most of the work in a household is the withdrawal of regard, which no party administers and which leaves no trace.

§44.3 gives the criterion for a rule's being contestable and states the three conditions on contest being available at all. §44.4 supplies an observable and states what the chapter does not prescribe.

The reader should carry forward the divergence between stated and operative rules, the account of sanction, and the three conditions on contest.

44.1 The Nature of a Rule

44.1.1 Rules as Settled Expectations

A rule in a household is a settled expectation about what will be required and what will follow from failing to meet it. §43.1.1 established that an order is what its parties have been doing, and a rule is a component of one in that sense.

Three features follow from taking rules to be settled expectations rather than adopted propositions.

A rule may exist without ever having been formulated. Most household rules are of this kind, and §16.2.2 established the general point about the moves a household makes without devising them. A child knows a great deal about what will be required of him and could state little of it.

A rule may be formulated and not exist. A household may announce a requirement it does not apply, and the announcement is then a statement about the household's self-description rather than about its practice.

And a rule's content is settled by its application. §43.1.2 established that ordinary application performs most of the maintenance of an order, and it is also what fixes the rule's extent, since where a requirement is applied and where it is waived is what the requirement amounts to.

Proposition 44.1. *A rule is a settled expectation about what will be required and what will*

follow from failing to meet it. It may exist unformulated and may be formulated without existing, and its content is fixed by where it is applied and where waived rather than by its statement.

44.1.2 The Stated Rule and the Operative Rule

The two may diverge, and what a household does with the divergence is the chapter's first result.

Divergence is ordinary and is not generally dishonest. A household states that everyone helps after meals and in practice one child is asked and another is not, for reasons that accumulated as §35.1.2 described. Nobody has decided that the rule shall be unequal, and §35.1.1 established the general form of such a case.

What matters is what happens when a party notices. A child observing that he is asked and his sibling is not has produced a discrepancy, and §16.2.1 established the moves by which a discrepancy is absorbed. Applied here, the moves are that he is older, that he is better at it, or that his sibling has other difficulties. Each may be true.

Two conditions can then obtain. Under the first, the observation reaches the household's account of its own practice, which is revised or the practice altered. Under the second, the readings absorb the observation and the divergence persists with the stated rule intact. §43.2.1 defined closure by exactly this condition, and the present section locates it at the level of a single rule.

The consequence is that a household's stated rules are poor evidence about its order. §12.1.1 established a corresponding result, and it follows here that asking a household its rules establishes little about what it requires or about whether the requirements answer to anyone.

Proposition 44.2. *Stated and operative rules diverge ordinarily and without dishonesty. What distinguishes households is whether a party's observation of the divergence reaches the household's account of its practice or is absorbed by the readings of §16.2.1. A household's stated rules are accordingly poor evidence about its order.*

44.2 Sanction

44.2.1 The Operation of a Sanction

A sanction is what follows a failure to meet a requirement, and the framework's interest in it is narrow.

The literature on discipline concerns which sanctions produce which outcomes in children, and §1.17 recorded the principal typologies. Baumrind (1967) and Baumrind (1971) distinguish styles by the combination of demand and responsiveness, and the classification has organised a great deal of subsequent work.

The framework's question is different and can be put to any sanction. §32.1.1 established that an occasion assigns a position by proceeding as it does, and a sanction is an occasion. What it does relationally is settled by what it says about who the party sanctioned is taken to be, which is prior to what it does to his conduct.

Two sanctions identical in severity therefore differ relationally. A consequence applied to

an act leaves the account of the party intact and addresses what he did. A consequence applied to a party addresses what he is, and §19.2.1 established the difference between a positional description and an essential one. §16.2.1 then establishes what becomes of subsequent conduct offered against an essential description.

This is a distinction the discipline literature also draws, and the framework's version of it differs in its ground. The literature distinguishes them by their effects on the child. The present account distinguishes them by what they do to the answerability of the household's account of him, which §42.3.1 established is a condition on that account being about him at all.

Proposition 44.3. *A sanction is an occasion and assigns a position by proceeding as it does. Two sanctions identical in severity differ according to whether what follows addresses an act or a party, and the framework grounds the distinction in what each does to the answerability of the household's account rather than in effects on the child.*

44.2.2 The Withdrawal of Regard

The sanction performing most of the work in most households is not among those the discipline literature enumerates.

§20.2.1 established what confirmation consists in on an occasion and §21.2.1 established that the gaze is singular. What follows a child's failure, in the ordinary case, is that the occasions of address contract for a period. Nobody has imposed anything. The adult is displeased, is occupied with the consequences of what happened, and addresses the child less, and §32.1.1 established what a party present at unaddressing occasions is thereby assigned.

Three features make this the consequential case.

It is not administered. §11.2.2 established that a cessation has no moment at which it is performed, and the contraction here is a cessation. No adult has decided to withdraw anything, and an adult asked whether he is punishing the child by withdrawal would sincerely deny it.

It is not proportioned. A sanction that is imposed can be scaled to the failure and can be concluded. A contraction of address ends when the conditions producing it end, and §11.1.2 established that a contracted rate does not simply resume.

And it leaves no trace. §15.2.2 established that foreclosed occasions leave nothing behind, so neither party can subsequently establish what occurred. A child reporting that he was punished by being ignored is in the position §32.2.1 described, in which an accurate report is disposed of by the refutation of a claim it did not make.

§18.3.1 recorded the corresponding point about recognition extended on terms. What the present section adds is that the mechanism operates as a household's principal sanction without being classified as a sanction by anyone, including by those who study sanctions.

Proposition 44.4. *The contraction of address following a child's failure is the sanction that performs most of the work in most households. It is not administered, since it is a cessation; it is not proportioned, since it ends with the conditions producing it; and it leaves no trace, so neither party can subsequently establish that it occurred.*

44.3 Contestability

44.3.1 The Criterion

A rule is contestable where an objection to it could alter it.

The criterion is §43.2.1 at the level of a single requirement, and §39.1.1 gives its form in the case of a question. In each the condition is that something be exposed to alteration by what it is directed at, and §39.1.1 recorded that this is the framework's central form.

Three things the criterion does not require should be stated, since each is commonly supposed.

It does not require that objections succeed. A rule sustained against every objection made to it may be contestable, provided the sustaining proceeded by considering the objection. What the criterion excludes is the rule against which no objection could count, and §16.2.1 identified the moves by which an objection is prevented from counting.

It does not require that the child be right. §42.2.2 established the corresponding independence, and a household in which children's objections are considered and generally rejected satisfies the criterion.

And it does not require that objections be invited. A household may not solicit contest and may remain contestable, and §38.4.2 established the general difficulty with soliciting conditions of this kind.

Turiel (1983) reports that children distinguish requirements they treat as alterable by an authority from requirements they treat as not so alterable, and apply the distinction from an early age. The finding bears on this section and the framework reads it differently from the tradition that produced it. Read as a finding about the child, it describes a developing competence in classifying rules. Read relationally, it establishes that children arrive at a household already equipped to register which of its requirements admit of contest, which is what §44.3.2 requires them to be able to do.

Proposition 44.5. *A rule is contestable where an objection to it could alter it. The criterion does not require that objections succeed, that the child be right, or that contest be invited, and excludes only the rule against which no objection could count. Turiel (1983) establishes that children register which requirements admit of contest, which the relational reading takes as a condition being met rather than as a competence being acquired.*

44.3.2 The Conditions of Contest

Three conditions must hold for a child to contest a rule, and each has been established elsewhere in this book.

He must have terms. §37.1.2 established that a household supplies the terms in which its practice can be described, and an objection requires a way of saying what is wrong. A household whose grammar contains no term for a requirement being unequal has a child who registers the inequality and cannot state it, and §31.4.1 described the position from the other side.

There must be an occasion. §5.2.2 established what contracts the occasions of address, and an objection requires one in which it can be raised and taken up. §39.2.2 established what

distinguishes an occasion in which something is taken up from one in which it is met.

And the objection must be able to reach. §16.2.2 established that where the readings absorbing a discrepancy are undefeatable, no occasion reaches the description, and the same holds of a requirement.

The three fail independently and produce different appearances. A child lacking terms is quiet and appears content. A child lacking occasions is quiet and appears busy. A child whose objections are absorbed argues and appears difficult, and §18.3.1 established what a household does with a child so described.

The third case is the one worth marking, since it inverts the natural expectation. A household whose order is closed may contain a child who objects constantly, and his objecting is evidence that he retains terms and occasions and is not evidence that the objections reach anything.

Proposition 44.6. *Contest requires terms in which the objection can be stated, an occasion on which it can be raised, and a grammar in which it could reach the requirement. The three fail independently: a child lacking terms appears content, a child lacking occasions appears busy, and a child whose objections are absorbed appears difficult, so that frequent objection is evidence of terms and occasions rather than of contestability.*

44.4 The Bearing on What Follows

44.4.1 The Observable

The chapter yields a quantity defined on a household rather than on a child, and it is among the more tractable this book proposes.

The quantity is the proportion of a household's operative rules that have been altered by an objection from a party subject to them. It is defined over a period, it requires no report about anyone's state, and it distinguishes the case §44.3.2 identified as inverting expectation, since a household with many objections and no alterations returns a low value.

Its difficulties are three and two are familiar. §30.2.2 established that the underlying condition is counterfactual, and a rule that was never objected to yields no information. §28.3.2 established that a household aware of the measure will produce alterations, and ch. 76 takes up whether an instrument can escape this.

The third is specific. §44.1.2 established that a household's stated rules are poor evidence about its operative ones, so the quantity requires the operative rules to be identified, which cannot be done by asking. Chapter 70 inherits the difficulty, which §30.2.2 stated in its general form.

Proposition 44.7. *The proportion of a household's operative rules altered by objection from a party subject to them is a quantity defined on the household, requiring no report of anyone's state, and distinguishing frequent objection from contestability. It inherits the counterfactual difficulty and the reactivity, and requires the operative rules to be identified, which §44.1.2 established cannot be done by asking.*

44.4.2 The Prescriptions Withheld

Two prescriptions suggest themselves and neither follows.

The first is that households should have fewer rules or milder ones. §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity, and §42.2.2 established the corresponding independence at the level of a single adult. A household reducing its requirements has altered the demands it makes and has altered nothing about whether they answer to anyone.

The second is that households should invite contest. §44.3.1 established that the criterion does not require invitation, and §38.4.2 established what becomes of an occasion arranged in order that something shall occur within it. An invitation to object, issued in order that objection shall occur, is an occasion whose character the inviting party has settled in advance.

What the chapter describes is what particular moves do. §16.2.1 identifies the moves by which an objection is prevented from counting, and §8.2.1 recorded that describing what an act does is the form this book's practical content takes. Chapter 77 carries what may be said beyond that.

Proposition 44.8. *Neither reducing requirements nor inviting objection follows from the chapter. Severity is independent of closure, and an invitation issued so that objection shall occur is an occasion whose character the inviting party has settled in advance. What the chapter supplies is a description of what the absorbing moves do.*

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Chapter 45

The Levels of Household Governance

The Work of This Chapter

§44.3.1 gave a criterion for a rule's being contestable and treated rules as though they lay on one plane. They do not, and this chapter distinguishes the levels at which a household settles things.

§45.1 distinguishes three and holds that contestability is level-relative, so that the question whether a household is closed has no single answer. §45.2 takes up a case §10.2.3 deferred here, in which two adults differ in the rate at which they absorb, and holds that the difference is generally absorbed rather than settled.

§45.3 states what transfers from the study of self-governing institutions and what does not. §45.4 states the child's position across the levels and what follows.

The reader should carry forward the three levels, the level-relativity of contestability, and the finding that a second adult may supply the divergence §34.1.2 located between settings.

45.1 The Levels of Settlement

45.1.1 The Levels Distinguished

Ostrom (1990) distinguishes three levels at which a self-governing arrangement settles matters, and the distinction transfers to households with the qualifications §45.3.2 records.

At the operational level a household settles particular cases. Whether this child goes to bed now, who clears this table, whether this request is granted.

At the collective level it settles what the operational rules are. What bedtimes are, how chores are allotted, what sorts of request are granted.

At the constitutional level it settles who settles the collective questions, and by what procedure. This level is where a household is least articulate, and §44.1.1 established that a rule may exist without ever having been formulated. The constitutional arrangements of most households have never been stated by anyone in them.

Two observations about the transfer.

The levels are not ranks of importance. An operational decision may matter more to a party than a constitutional one, and §43.2.1 established that severity and closure are independent.

And the levels are not always distinct in practice. A single exchange may settle a case and thereby fix a rule, and §44.1.1 established that a rule's content is fixed by where it is applied. The distinction is analytic and the framework uses it to ask a question that cannot otherwise be put.

Proposition 45.1. *A household settles matters at three levels: particular cases, the rules governing them, and who settles the rules. The levels are not ranks of importance and are not always distinct in practice, and households are least articulate at the third, whose arrangements have generally never been stated by anyone within them.*

45.1.2 Contestability Is Level-Relative

§44.3.1 held that a rule is contestable where an objection could alter it. Applied across the levels of §45.1.1, the criterion yields three separate questions, and a household may answer them differently.

The common configuration is contestability at the operational level with closure above it. Children may argue about tonight and are heard, may occasionally argue about what the rule is and are sometimes heard, and do not raise who decides such things, since §44.3.2 established that contest requires terms and the constitutional level is where a household has fewest.

Three consequences follow.

The question whether a household is closed has no single answer, which §30.5.1 established for the corresponding question about descriptions. A household is closed with respect to a level, and §43.3.2 should be read accordingly.

The appearance of openness is produced at the operational level, since that is where contest is visible and frequent. A household in which arguments occur daily and are attended to may be entirely closed above the level at which they occur, and nothing in the daily evidence distinguishes it.

And a party may be reached at one level and not at another. §39.3.1 held that an adult's question tests whether his account of the child can be altered. The corresponding test at the constitutional level is whether the child could raise the question of who decides, and §15.2.2 established that a question not raised leaves no trace.

Proposition 45.2. *Contestability applies separately at each level, and the common configuration is operational contestability with closure above it. The question whether a household is closed accordingly has no single answer, the appearance of openness is generated at the level where contest is visible, and closure at the constitutional level leaves no trace, since the questions foreclosed there are not asked.*

45.2 The Household with Two Adults

45.2.1 The Difference Between Adults

§10.2.3 recorded that where two adults share responsibility, one absorbing readily and the other less so, the difference between them is itself a matter to be settled, and deferred the treatment here.

The difference is ordinary and requires no fault. §5.2.2 established what governs the occasions available to an adult, and two adults in one household generally face different conditions: different employment, different hours, different histories of having been absorbed themselves, which §40.3.2 established passes without conveyance.

What it produces is a household in which a child stands in two relations differing in the respect §10.2.2 identified as characterising a relation. The rates differ, and §21.3.2 established that a household's distribution of address is a structure with positions.

The consequence worth marking is favourable and has not been available to this book before. §34.1.2 held that a second setting supplies a reserve by describing a child differently, and that the effect requires nobody to act well. A second adult who holds a different account of the child performs the same office within the household, and §7.1.2 established what a standpoint of that kind affords.

This is a repair that requires no second institution, and it is available in the ordinary case of two adults who see a child differently. §34.3.1 established the unfavourable counterpart: where the two adults converge, the strongest available defeater has been consumed within the household rather than between the household and a school.

Proposition 45.3. *Two adults sharing responsibility ordinarily differ in the rate at which they absorb, for reasons requiring no fault. Where they hold different accounts of a child, the second adult performs within the household the office §34.1.2 assigned to a second setting. Where they converge, the defeater is consumed internally.*

45.2.2 The Household's Disposal of the Difference

Three things may be done with the difference of §45.2.1 and the second is much the commonest.

It may be absorbed as character. The household describes one adult as the patient one and the other as the strict one, and the descriptions settle. §12.2.2 established what continuous occupancy of a position produces, and §14.2.1 established that the party who names is altered by the naming. The difference then ceases to be a matter that could be settled and becomes a fact about who these people are.

It may be settled by allocation. One adult handles homework and the other handles bedtime, and the boundary is observed. This is a collective-level move in the sense of §45.1.1, it is efficient, and it resolves recurring friction between the adults.

Its cost is not generally noticed and follows from §45.2.1. Allocation reduces the domains in which the child encounters two accounts of himself. Where each adult governs separate matters, the child meets one account per matter, and the divergence that would have supplied a reserve has been organised away. The household has traded a condition it did not know it had for a reduction in friction it was aware of.

It may be contested, which is rare, since §45.1.2 established that the level at which the allocation would be raised is the one at which households have fewest terms.

Proposition 45.4. *The difference is absorbed as character, settled by allocation, or contested, and allocation is commonest. Allocation reduces the domains in which a child encounters two accounts of himself, so a household trades a condition supplying a reserve for a reduction in friction, without the trade being visible to it.*

45.3 The Supply of the Governance Literature

45.3.1 The Transferable Findings

§1.16.8 recorded that this chapter would draw on the governance literature produced by experiments in collective self-organisation, and three of its findings transfer.

The first is the level structure of §45.1.1, which Ostrom (1990) established in studying arrangements that endured over long periods.

The second concerns the cost of raising a grievance. Among the features distinguishing durable arrangements from those that failed is the availability of conflict-resolution mechanisms that are cheap to reach. §44.3.2 established the corresponding conditions in a household, and the commons finding supplies independent support for treating cost as the operative variable rather than permission. An arrangement may permit objection and place it out of reach.

The third concerns graduated response. Durable arrangements met failures with responses proportioned to them and escalating, and §44.2.2 established that a household's principal sanction is neither proportioned nor concluded.

Proposition 45.5. *Three findings transfer from the study of durable self-governing arrangements: the level structure, the finding that cheapness of access to grievance procedures rather than their formal availability distinguishes durable arrangements, and the finding that durable arrangements respond in proportioned and escalating ways, which §44.2.2 established a household's principal sanction does not.*

45.3.2 The Limits of the Transfer

Three disanalogies are decisive and the third is the one that matters most for this book.

The parties differ. Those governing a common resource are adults with prior standing, alternative options, and lives outside the arrangement. §7.1.1 established that the child has none of these, and §43.2.2 established that exit is unavailable to him in every case.

The justification differs. Self-governing arrangements are commonly justified by the consent of those governed, and a child neither consented to his household nor could have. §7.3.1 established that the framework states obligations without recourse to consent, and the present point is that the commons literature's justificatory structure cannot be borrowed along with its findings.

And the object differs. A common resource exists independently of the arrangement governing it and would exist if the arrangement dissolved. What a household governs includes the parties themselves, and §33.1.2 established that the faculty by which a child would assess the arrangement is constituted within it. There is accordingly no standpoint of the kind the commons case supplies, and §42.3.1 located the framework's obligation in exactly this feature.

Proposition 45.6. *The parties differ, since those governing a commons have prior standing and exit and a child has neither; the justification differs, since consent is unavailable; and the object differs, since what a household governs includes the faculty by which its arrangement would be assessed. The findings transfer and the justificatory structure does not.*

45.4 The Bearing on What Follows

45.4.1 The Child and the Constitutional Level

The child is not a party at the constitutional level and cannot be made one, and stating what follows prevents two errors.

He cannot be made one because §7.1.1 established that he holds no standpoint outside the arrangement, and a party to a constitutional question must be able to consider alternatives to what is proposed. A household extending a vote to a young child on who settles its rules has performed a ceremony, and §38.4.2 established what an occasion arranged in order to secure something becomes.

The first error is to conclude that the constitutional level is therefore beyond assessment. §42.2.2 separated answerability from deference, and the separation holds here: a constitutional arrangement may be answerable to a party who is not a participant in it, in the sense that what he does can alter it. A child who cannot vote on who decides may nonetheless be the reason an allocation is revised.

The second error is to conclude that nothing changes. What changes as a child grows is which levels he can reach, and §44.3.2 supplies the conditions: he acquires terms, occasions become available to him, and §34.1.2 establishes that a second setting supplies terms the household did not. A household whose constitutional arrangements were unreachable at seven may be reachable at fifteen, and §7.1.2 recorded that the founding asymmetry is a matter of degree that changes.

Proposition 45.7. *The child cannot be a party at the constitutional level, since he holds no standpoint from which alternatives could be considered. It does not follow that the level is beyond assessment, since answerability does not require participation, nor that nothing changes, since which levels he can reach varies with the terms and occasions available to him.*

45.4.2 The Consequences

Two things follow for the chapters remaining and one for the Part on method.

Chapter 46 inherits the question of what a boundary does, and §45.2.2 supplies its clearest case: an allocation between two adults is a boundary, it resolves friction, and it removes a condition. Whether boundaries generally have this form is that chapter's question.

Chapter 77 inherits a constraint that has now been stated four times, and §44.4.2 established its form for the case of rules. Nothing here recommends that households distribute authority differently, and §45.2.2 described what an allocation does rather than advising against one.

Chapter 70 inherits an observable. §44.4.1 defined a quantity over a household's operative rules, and the present chapter refines it: the quantity should be computed separately at each level, since a single figure would be dominated by the operational level, where contest is frequent, and would be insensitive to the level where closure matters most.

Proposition 45.8. *An allocation between adults is the clearest case of a boundary that resolves friction and removes a condition, which ch. 46 inherits. The observable of §44.4.1 must be computed separately by level, since a single figure would be dominated by the operational level and insensitive to closure above it.*

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Draft

Chapter 46

Boundaries and the Conditions of Generation

The Work of This Chapter

§45.4.2 passed this chapter a case and a question. An allocation between two adults resolves friction and removes a condition, and the question is whether boundaries generally have that form.

§46.1 states what a boundary is and distinguishes two things it may do. §46.2 holds that the same boundary may protect the conditions of generation and remove them, and that which it does is settled by what it makes unavailable rather than by what it forbids.

§46.3 treats boundaries that are required, since a chapter finding only costs in them would misdescribe households. §46.4 closes the Part.

The reader should carry forward the two operations a boundary performs, the criterion distinguishing them, and an accurate statement of what Part VIII has settled.

46.1 The Nature of a Boundary

46.1.1 Boundaries as Settled Unavailabilities

A boundary is a settled arrangement under which some class of occasion does not arise.

The formulation is deliberately about occasions rather than about permissions. §44.1.1 established that a rule is a settled expectation about what will be required, and a boundary differs in that its content is what will not come up. A household in which money is not discussed with children has a boundary, and the boundary consists in the occasions that do not occur rather than in a prohibition anyone issued.

Three features follow.

A boundary need not be stated, and §44.1.1 established the general point. Most household boundaries have never been formulated and are visible only in what is absent.

A boundary need not be intended. §35.1.2 described defaults settling around something real, and a class of occasion may cease to arise for reasons no party selected. §35.1.1 removed the bearers of fault for such cases.

And a boundary leaves no trace, which is the feature that governs the chapter. §15.2.2 established that a foreclosed occasion leaves nothing behind, and a boundary is a standing arrangement for foreclosing a class of them. Its effects are accordingly invisible to the parties on both sides of it.

Proposition 46.1. *A boundary is a settled arrangement under which a class of occasion does not arise. It need not be stated, need not be intended, and leaves no trace, since what it produces is the absence of occasions and §15.2.2 established that such absences leave nothing behind.*

46.1.2 The Operations a Boundary May Perform

The framework distinguishes two operations, and the distinction is what the chapter is for.

A boundary may protect. §25.2.2 recorded that a household setting aside an hour has arranged an hour, and the setting aside is a boundary: a class of occasion, in that case the arranged and purposive kind, is kept from arising. §28.3.2 established what an occasion produced in order to produce a result becomes, and a boundary excluding such occasions from a domain preserves the conditions §38.2.1 requires.

A boundary may remove. §45.2.2 described an allocation between two adults, which keeps each from the other's domain and thereby keeps the child from encountering two accounts of himself within it. §34.1.2 established what divergence supplies, and a boundary organising divergence away removes it.

The two operations are performed by boundaries of the same form, and nothing in the form distinguishes them. Both are settled arrangements under which a class of occasion does not arise, both are generally unstated, and both are invisible in the manner §46.1.1 described.

Proposition 46.2. *A boundary may protect the conditions of generation by excluding occasions that would foreclose them, and may remove those conditions by excluding occasions that would supply them. The two operations are performed by arrangements of the same form, and nothing in the form distinguishes them.*

46.2 The Determination of a Boundary's Operation

46.2.1 The Criterion

What settles which operation a boundary performs is what it makes unavailable rather than what it excludes.

§23.3.1 established that the conditions on generation are properties of arrangements, and §38.2.1 and §39.1.1 named two of them: an occasion whose outcome is not settled in advance, and an exchange in which what comes back may go against the party who initiated it. A boundary protects where what it excludes are occasions that would have foreclosed these. It removes where what it excludes are occasions that would have supplied them.

Applied to the two cases of §46.1.2, the criterion gives the right answers for the right reasons.

The hour set aside excludes purposive occasions. §28.3.2 established that such occasions have their outcome settled in advance, and §38.2.2 excluded them from the shared. What the boundary makes unavailable is a class of occasion that could not have supplied the conditions, so the conditions are left intact.

The allocation between adults excludes each adult from the other's domain. What it makes unavailable is the encounter with two accounts, and §45.2.1 established that this is what a

second adult supplies. The boundary removes.

The criterion is therefore not a matter of the boundary's subject matter or of its strictness. A strict boundary around one domain may protect and a mild boundary around another may remove, and §43.2.1 established the corresponding independence for closure.

Proposition 46.3. *A boundary protects where what it makes unavailable are occasions that could not have supplied the conditions of generation, and removes where what it makes unavailable are occasions that would have supplied them. The criterion turns on what becomes unavailable rather than on the boundary's subject matter or strictness.*

46.2.2 The Difficulty of Applying the Distinction

The criterion of §46.2.1 is stated in terms the parties cannot apply, and the reason has been established twice already.

§46.1.1 established that a boundary leaves no trace, and §31.2.2 established that a household's record of its own past is assembled by the arrangement in question. The occasions a boundary excludes are accordingly not available for inspection by anyone, and a household cannot determine what its boundaries have made unavailable by examining what has happened.

Two consequences follow.

A household's account of why a boundary exists is poor evidence about what it does. The reasons given will be the reasons that were operative when it settled, and §35.1.2 established that these are frequently accurate and locally correct. Accuracy about origin establishes nothing about effect.

And the boundaries most likely to remove are the ones least likely to be examined, since a boundary that resolves friction is experienced as working. §45.2.2 established that an allocation is adopted because it reduces friction between adults, and a household reviewing it finds that it does.

§30.2.2 governs the case. Whether a boundary removed a condition is settled by what would have occurred without it, and §15.2.2 established that this is precisely what leaves no evidence.

Proposition 46.4. *The criterion cannot be applied by the parties, since a boundary leaves no trace and the household's record is assembled by the arrangement at issue. A household's account of why a boundary exists is poor evidence about what it does, and the boundaries most likely to remove conditions are those least likely to be examined, since resolving friction is experienced as working.*

46.3 Boundaries That Are Required

46.3.1 The Office of Boundaries

A chapter locating only costs in boundaries would misdescribe households, and three classes of boundary are required by the framework's own commitments.

Boundaries protecting a party from what he cannot yet handle are required by the founding asymmetry itself. §7.1.1 established that a child holds no standpoint from which to assess what he encounters, and a household exposing him to everything on the ground that occasions are generative would be treating him as equipped in the way that section denies. §7.3.1 established that the framework states obligations, and this is among them.

Boundaries protecting the conditions themselves are required by §46.2.1, and §25.2.2 recorded the sharpest instance and its difficulty.

And boundaries sustaining the adults are required by §10.2.3, which established what absorption costs the party who performs it, and by §5.2.2, which established what governs whether occasions are available at all. An adult without boundaries around his own capacity has fewer occasions to give, and §11.1.2 established what a contracted rate does.

The third is worth emphasis because the framework's vocabulary invites the opposite conclusion. Nothing here holds that more occasions are better without limit, and the rate at issue in §10.2.2 is a ratio.

Proposition 46.5. *Three classes of boundary are required by the framework's own commitments: those protecting a party from what the founding asymmetry establishes he cannot assess, those protecting the conditions of generation, and those sustaining the capacity of the adults, since §10.2.3 established what absorption costs and §10.2.2 concerns a ratio rather than a total.*

46.3.2 The Recommendations Withheld

The chapter reaches, for the fifth time in this book, a position in which it describes and does not advise, and the reason here is specific rather than general.

§46.2.2 established that the parties cannot determine which operation a given boundary performs. A recommendation to remove boundaries that remove conditions would therefore be a recommendation the recipients cannot apply, and §8.2.1 recorded the policy on instructions of that kind.

A weaker recommendation is available and should be stated at its weak strength. §46.2.2 established that boundaries adopted to resolve friction are experienced as working and are least examined. It follows that a household examining any boundary at all will most likely be examining one that is not of that class, and that the class most likely to remove conditions is systematically under-examined. This is a description of a selection effect rather than an instruction, and it does not tell anyone which boundary to examine.

ch. 77 carries what may be said, and §45.4.2 recorded that the constraint has now been stated at every point where it arises.

Proposition 46.6. *No recommendation follows, since the parties cannot determine which operation a boundary performs. What can be stated is a selection effect: boundaries adopted to resolve friction are experienced as working and are least examined, so the class most likely to remove conditions is systematically under-examined.*

46.4 The Findings of Part VIII

46.4.1 The Part's Findings

The Part was owed the largest debt in the book and did not discharge all of it, and the accounting should be exact.

§42.4.2 recorded the outcome. Answerability without act is discharged, by the derivation of §42.3.1 from what a description requires. The conditional of Part VI is discharged in part, a ground having been supplied for calling unanswerability a defect and none for calling it a wrong done to the child. The priority of recognition over welfare is not discharged and passes to ch. 89.

Four things were added.

§42.2.2 separated answerability from deference and showed them independent in both directions, which removes the appearance that the obligation requires an adult to abdicate a position.

§43.2.1 defined closure and established that it is independent of severity and of exit, and §43.3.2 discharged the debt §2.5.1 recorded to the formation tradition.

§44.2.2 identified the contraction of address as the sanction performing most of a household's work, and established that it is unadministered, unproportioned, and traceless.

And §45.1.2 established that contestability is level-relative, so that the appearance of openness is generated where contest is visible and closure above that level leaves no trace.

Proposition 46.7. *The Part discharges answerability without act, discharges the conditional of Part VI in part, and leaves the priority of recognition underived. It adds the separation of answerability from deference, the definition of closure and its independence from severity and exit, the identification of the contraction of address as the principal sanction, and the level-relativity of contestability.*

46.4.2 The Residue Left by the Part

Three deficiencies stand at its close and the first is the book's largest.

The priority of recognition over welfare remains asserted. §42.1.2 argued that a derivation of the usual form would defeat what it established, and §42.4.1 recorded that neither argument offered crosses the gap §1.27.3 identified. A reader who rejects the priority is not answered by this book, and §31.5.2 makes the conclusion of Part VI conditional on it. This is the point at which the framework is most exposed.

The observables are proposed and untested, and this Part has added two: the proportion of operative rules altered by objection, computed by level, and the identification of a household's operative rules, which §44.1.2 established cannot be done by asking. Chapter 70 carries both.

And the practical question stands where five chapters have left it. §46.3.2 gave the specific reason in the present case, that the parties cannot determine which operation a boundary performs, and ch. 77 inherits the accumulated constraint.

Proposition 46.8. *The priority of recognition remains asserted, which is the book's largest exposure, since §31.5.2 makes Part VI conditional on it. Two further observables are proposed and untested, and the practical question stands where the Part's five chapters have left it.*

References

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Part IX

Generations and History

Chapter 47

The Family as a Field of Constraint

The Work of This Chapter

§37.3.1 retained from the reproduction traditions the commitment that rearing has material conditions and that a household is not sealed from the structure it stands in. This Part takes up what follows across time, and the present chapter states what a constraint is and how one operates.

§47.1 distinguishes constraining from determining and holds that constraints operate on rates rather than on occasions, which is why their effects are invisible occasion by occasion. §47.2 holds that the constraints on a household form a field rather than a list, and states what a household's position in it consists in.

§47.3 holds that constraint reduces the occasions available and does not reduce answerability, which §42.3.1 established is a condition on holding an account rather than a demand for occasions. §47.4 states the Part's programme.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between constraint and determination, the result that constraints act on rates, and the reason constraint is not an excuse.

47.1 The Nature of a Constraint

47.1.1 Constraint Distinguished from Determination

A constraint alters what is available to a household without selecting among what remains.

The distinction matters because the framework would be false if it collapsed. §17.1.2 established that a child is not determined by the occasions he is in and that what he does is his, and §1.27.6 recorded why the framework cannot hold anything of the deterministic form. The same holds of adults. A household under severe material pressure is not thereby a household of a particular kind, and §11.2.2 established that describing a cessation is not assigning a fault.

What a constraint does is alter a distribution. Where the hours available to an adult contract, the occasions on which absorption might occur become fewer, and §5.2.2 established the mechanism. Which of the remaining occasions are taken, and what happens within them, is not settled by the constraint.

Two consequences follow and both bear on how the Part should be read.

Constraints do not predict households. Two households under identical constraints may differ in every respect this book has described, and §12.1.1 established the converse, that households differing in the respect the book identifies may be alike on every available measure.

And a constraint's removal does not produce an outcome. §11.1.2 established that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field, and §23.3.1 established that the conditions on re-

versal are properties of arrangements. Relieving a household's material pressure alters what is available and does not thereby alter what is done with it.

Proposition 47.1. *A constraint alters what is available to a household without selecting among what remains. Constraints therefore do not predict households, since two under identical constraints may differ in every respect described here, and the removal of a constraint alters availability without altering what is done with it.*

47.1.2 Constraints Operate on Rates

The level at which a constraint acts is the level at which this book characterises relations, and the coincidence is what makes constraint consequential here.

§10.2.2 held that what characterises a relation is the rate at which generated power is returned against the rate at which it is generated, and that neither figure alone characterises anything. §40.2.1 gave the corresponding rate for inquiry. Constraints operate on both, by altering how many occasions arise.

Three things follow, and the third is the reason constraint is hard to see.

A constraint's effect is not locatable in any occasion. No particular exchange is the one the constraint prevented, and §15.2.2 established that foreclosed occasions leave no trace. A household under constraint can point to nothing that went wrong.

A constraint's effect accumulates without a threshold. §38.3.2 established that what a household holds in common accumulates by occasions and decays where they cease, and a reduced rate produces a reduced accumulation continuously.

And a constraint's effect is invisible to those inside it, since what they observe is their own conduct on the occasions that did arise, and §31.2.1 established that adults experience the contraction as ordinary pressure on time. The constraint is felt as pressure and its relational consequence is not felt at all.

Proposition 47.2. *Constraints operate on the rates at which occasions arise, which is the level at which §10.2.2 characterises relations. Their effects are accordingly not locatable in any occasion, accumulate without a threshold, and are invisible to those subject to them, who experience the constraint as pressure and its relational consequence not at all.*

47.2 The Field

47.2.1 The Ground of the Field Formulation

The constraints on a household are commonly enumerated: income, hours, housing, health, the number of adults, the presence of a member requiring care. The enumeration is useful and misdescribes the object in two respects.

The constraints are not independent. Hours depend on income, income on health, health on housing, and §5.2.2 treated several of these together for that reason. A list invites the treatment of each as a separate quantity with a separate effect, and the effects are not separable.

And they do not combine additively. A household with two adults and low income stands differently from a household with one adult and the same income, and §45.2.1 established

what a second adult supplies beyond additional hours. The relevant object is a configuration.

What a field adds to a list is the representation of position. A household occupies a location in a structure of possibilities, some regions of which are reachable from where it stands and some of which are not. §23.3.1 established that the conditions on a reversal are properties of arrangements, and the present formulation says which arrangements are within reach.

Nothing in this requires a metric. The framework asserts that positions differ in what is reachable from them and does not assert that positions can be ordered, and §30.5.1 established the general reason for such reticence.

Proposition 47.3. *The constraints on a household form a configuration rather than a list, since they are interdependent and do not combine additively. A field represents a household's position in a structure of possibilities, some regions of which are reachable from where it stands. The claim requires no metric and asserts no ordering of positions.*

47.2.2 The Household's Position and What It Governs

A household's position in the field governs three things this book has treated separately.

It governs the occasions available, by §47.1.2.

It governs the distribution of address within the household, which §21.3.2 established is a structure with positions. A household attending to a member in difficulty has concentrated its address for reasons its position supplies, and §32.4.1 established that arrangements producing this are ordinary.

And it governs which second settings are available, which §34.1.2 established supply the divergence that furnishes a reserve. A household's position determines which school its children attend and which other households they encounter, and §34.3.1 established what follows where the settings converge.

The third is the one Part IX will develop, since it is where position and time interact. §34.3.2 established that convergence between settings produces the condition of ch. 30 without either setting failing, and a household's position governs how likely convergence is. Households whose surrounding settings resemble them closely have fewer available divergences, and this is a property of position rather than of anyone's conduct.

Proposition 47.4. *A household's position governs the occasions available, the distribution of address within it, and which second settings its children encounter. The third is consequential, since §34.3.2 established that convergence between settings produces the condition of ch. 30 without either failing, and position governs how likely convergence is.*

47.3 Constraint and Responsibility

47.3.1 Constraint and the Absence of Fault

§35.1.1 removed each candidate bearer of fault for the cases of Part VI, and the present chapter supplies the account of why the removals were available.

An adult whose occasions have contracted under constraint has not failed to do something he could have done. §11.2.2 established that a cessation has no moment of performance, and

§47.1.2 establishes that the constraint operates on the rate rather than on any occasion at which he might have acted differently.

This is the material content of the claim that degradation of the kind this book describes requires no perpetrator. §11.2.1 rejected the requirement and §35.2.2 established that the category of neglect cannot reach the case. The present chapter states what occupies the place where a perpetrator would be: a position in a field, which no party selected and which alters what is available to everyone in it.

Proposition 47.5. *An adult whose occasions have contracted under constraint has not failed to do something available to him, since the constraint operates on the rate rather than on any occasion. What occupies the place a perpetrator would occupy is a position in a field that no party selected.*

47.3.2 The Limits of Constraint as Excuse

The framework would be objectionable if the foregoing entailed that a constrained household owes nothing, and it does not entail this. The reason is precise and follows from ch. 42.

§42.3.1 derived answerability from what a description requires: an account of a child whose readings absorb every discrepancy stands in no relation to the child that would make it an account of him. That derivation makes no reference to how many occasions the adult has.

The consequence is that constraint and answerability operate on different things. Constraint reduces the occasions on which a child might be absorbed, addressed, or answered. Answerability concerns what happens to the adult's account of the child on the occasions that do arise. An adult with one occasion a week is answerable on that occasion in exactly the sense an adult with twenty is answerable on each of his.

Two further points hold the position in place.

§42.2.2 established that answerability requires nothing to be done differently, only that what the child does bear on the account held of him. It is therefore not a demand on a resource the constrained household lacks.

And §44.2.2 established that the contraction of address following a failure is unadministered and traceless. A household under constraint has more such contractions and has not thereby acquired a licence for them, since the licence would have to come from somewhere and §47.3.1 established only that fault is not locatable.

The position is accordingly that constraint explains a household's rates and does not alter what its adults are answerable for. §35.4.1 recorded what a subject is left with under this account, and the present section adds that the account does not additionally relieve the parties of the one obligation ch. 42 was able to derive.

Proposition 47.6. *Constraint reduces the occasions available and does not reduce answerability, since §42.3.1 derived answerability from what a description requires without reference to how many occasions obtain. An adult with few occasions is answerable on each in the sense an adult with many is answerable on each of his.*

47.4 The Bearing on the Part

47.4.1 The Programme

The chapters following take up what the field does over time.

Chapter 48 treats the mechanism by which a grammar survives the passage from a child's household to the household he later forms, and §40.3.2 supplies its starting point.

Chapter 49 treats what becomes of educational traditions across generations, which is the field's institutional aspect, and §34.4.2 recorded that the treatment crosses the boundary named in this book's title.

Chapter 50 treats constraints that move on a timescale exceeding a childhood, which §11.1.1 identified as a third route and which §47.1.2 establishes to be invisible for a structural reason.

Chapter 51 treats whether what this book has described as unarrangeable can be protected, which §25.2.2 recorded as the sharpest form of a difficulty this book does not resolve.

Proposition 47.7. *The Part treats the mechanism of transmission across households, the renewal of educational traditions, constraints moving on a timescale exceeding a childhood, and the question whether the unarrangeable can be protected.*

47.4.2 The Limits of the Account

Two limits should be recorded before the Part proceeds.

The framework supplies no account of how fields are constituted. Why households occupy the positions they occupy is a question for the traditions surveyed in §1.15, which §37.3.1 recorded are retained for exactly this purpose. This book takes a household's position as given and asks what follows within it, and §1.23 recorded the general policy.

And the framework supplies no threshold. §47.1.2 established that constraint accumulates without one, and it follows that the book cannot say when a household's position becomes severe enough to matter. §30.1.3 treated the corresponding question about the two levels and left three constructions open; the present case admits no such treatment, since nothing here turns on a boundary being crossed.

Proposition 47.8. *The framework supplies no account of how fields are constituted, taking a household's position as given and retaining the reproduction traditions for that question. It supplies no threshold at which constraint becomes severe enough to matter, since §47.1.2 established that its effects accumulate without one.*

References

Chapter 48

The Mechanism of Intergenerational Transmission

The Work of This Chapter

Chapter 37 established what passes between generations and how it passes within a household. This chapter treats the passage itself: what becomes of a grammar when the child who formed within it becomes an adult in a household of his own.

§48.1 states why the question is not answered by ch. 37 and establishes that transmission is partial. §48.2 identifies the four occasions on which a grammar is altered in transit and holds that the meeting of two grammars in a new household is the principal one.

§48.3 asks which parts of a grammar survive the passage and holds that the parts governing what counts as evidence survive best, for a reason §33.1.2 supplies. §48.4 states what follows.

The reader should carry forward the four alteration points, the finding that the two-adult household is where grammars meet, and the asymmetry in what survives.

48.1 The Problem of the Passage

48.1.1 The Persistence of the Question

§37.1.2 established that a grammar passes by the formation of the child's interpreter within it, and §37.2.2 established that this requires no medium. Both concern a single household. Neither establishes what happens next.

The gap is this. A child forms within a grammar and becomes, twenty years later, an adult supplying terms to a child of his own. Between the two he has been a party to other relations, has occupied other settings, and has in the ordinary case formed a household with a party reared elsewhere. §33.4.1 described one such trajectory in the extreme case, and the ordinary case has the same shape with milder terms.

§33.1.2 recorded a qualification bearing directly on this. The child's interpreter is not a copy of the household's grammar, and what holds is weaker: that the terms in which the household's account could be assessed are terms only that household supplies. The qualification leaves open how much of the grammar survives, and the present chapter takes the question up.

Transmission is accordingly partial by the framework's own commitments, and a chapter holding that grammars reproduce intact would contradict §37.3.2, which held that households generate what their inheritance did not contain.

Proposition 48.1. *Chapter 37 established how a grammar passes within a household and left open how much survives the interval between a child's formation and his own household. Transmission is partial by the framework's commitments, since §33.1.2 denied that the child's interpreter is a copy and §37.3.2 held that households generate what they did not inherit.*

48.1.2 The Conditions of an Answer

An account of partial transmission must supply two things and the second is the harder.

It must identify the occasions on which alteration can occur, since §43.1.1 established that what is maintained by practice is altered by practice and by nothing else. §48.2 supplies four.

And it must say what governs which parts alter. A theory holding that grammars change at random would explain the fact of change and nothing about its pattern, and §37.3.2 required that generation be structured rather than noise. §48.3 takes this up.

One constraint governs both. §47.1.2 established that constraints operate on rates, and the alteration occasions identified below are occasions whose availability a household's position governs. The account is accordingly not one of free revision, and §47.2.2 established which settings a position makes available.

Proposition 48.2. *An account of partial transmission must identify the occasions on which alteration occurs and say what governs which parts alter. Both are constrained by position, since §47.1.2 established that constraints operate on the availability of occasions.*

48.2 The Loci of Alteration

48.2.1 The Occasions of Alteration

Four kinds of occasion alter a grammar in transit and this book has established each independently.

The first is the second setting. §34.1.2 established that a setting describing a child differently renders a description visibly attached to an arrangement, and §34.3.1 established what follows where the settings agree in its place. A child whose school supplies terms his household does not carries those terms forward.

The second is the second adult. §45.2.1 established that two adults differing in the rate at which they absorb perform within a household the office a second setting performs between them.

The third is exit and reconstruction. §31.3.2 established that a subject acquiring later terms describes his earlier position in them, and §33.4.1 established that his interpreter then operates in terms permitting an account of himself to be held as one description among others. This is the strongest alteration and §31.5.1 established that it is not guaranteed to occur.

The fourth is the meeting of two grammars in a new household, and §48.2.2 argues that it is the principal one.

Proposition 48.3. *Four kinds of occasion alter a grammar in transit: a second setting, a second adult, exit and reconstruction, and the meeting of two grammars in a household newly formed. Each has been established independently in this book.*

48.2.2 The Meeting of Two Grammars

The fourth occasion is the principal one for three reasons, and the argument turns on what [ch. 45](#) established.

It is the most common. Second settings that diverge are not guaranteed, [§34.3.1](#) established that convergence is ordinary, and [§35.4.1](#) established that exit is rare. Two adults reared in different households are the standard case.

It is the most extensive. A second setting supplies divergence with respect to descriptions of the child, and [§34.1.2](#) recorded that the supply extends no further. A partner supplies divergence with respect to the whole grammar: what counts as a reason, what is discussed, what a failure means, what is done when something does not fit, which [§41.1.1](#) identified as the object of an epistemic habit.

And it is the occasion on which the grammar is in use rather than under description. [§43.1.1](#) established that an order is altered by practice, and two adults running a household together are engaged in continuous practice on every matter the grammar covers.

[§45.2.2](#) established what households do with the difference, and the finding now bears on transmission across generations. Where the difference is absorbed as character, the two grammars persist side by side and the child encounters both. Where it is settled by allocation, each grammar governs separate domains and the child encounters one per domain, which [§45.2.2](#) established organises the divergence away. Where it is contested, which is rare, something is generated in the sense of [§37.3.2](#).

The three outcomes are accordingly the three fates of an inherited grammar, and which obtains is settled by a collective-level move that no party makes with transmission in view.

Proposition 48.4. *The meeting of two grammars in a newly formed household is the principal alteration occasion, being the most common, the most extensive, since a partner diverges across the whole grammar rather than in descriptions of the child alone, and the occasion on which the grammar is in continuous use. Its three outcomes, absorption as character, allocation, and contest, are the three fates of an inherited grammar.*

48.3 The Survivals of the Passage

48.3.1 The Asymmetry

Parts of a grammar survive unequally, and the pattern follows from how each part was acquired.

[§37.1.2](#) distinguished what a grammar contains: the terms in which a situation can be described, the distinctions available, and the moves a household recognises. To these [§41.1.1](#) added the manner of handling what does not fit, and [§41.1.2](#) established that the readings of [ch. 16](#) are its household case.

The claim of this section is that the parts governing what counts as evidence survive better than the parts governing what is required.

The reason is [§33.1.2](#). Requirements are encountered as requirements: a party subject to one registers it as something demanded of him, and [§44.3.1](#) established the conditions under which he may contest it. What counts as evidence is not encountered at all, since it governs

what he registers. A party who has left a household may reject its bedtimes and retain its account of what settles a disagreement, having never met the second as a proposition.

Two observations support this and neither is decisive.

§44.1.2 established that stated rules and operative rules diverge, and requirements are among the things a household states. What is stated can be rejected.

And §41.2.1 established that a manner of handling misfit is not available to the party for report, since it governs what he registers as requiring handling. What cannot be reported cannot be deliberately revised.

Proposition 48.5. *The parts of a grammar governing what counts as evidence survive the passage better than the parts governing what is required, since requirements are encountered as requirements and may be contested, while what counts as evidence governs what is registered and is not encountered as a proposition at all.*

48.3.2 The Consequence for Deliberate Departure

The asymmetry of §48.3.1 has a consequence for the common case of an adult who has resolved to rear differently from how he was reared.

His resolution operates on what he can state. He identifies requirements he objects to, sanctions he suffered, and things that were said to him, and he declines to reproduce them. §31.3.2 established the terms in which such an identification is made, and §36.2.1 established the direction in which the accompanying account errs.

What the resolution does not reach is the manner of handling what does not fit, since §41.2.1 established that it is not available for report. An adult who has resolved against his household's severity may reproduce its manner of absorbing a discrepancy exactly, applied to milder requirements, and §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity.

This is the mechanism by which a household differing from its predecessor in every stated respect may be closed in the way its predecessor was closed. Nothing has been reproduced deliberately, the departure is genuine at the level it operates on, and §35.1.1 applies unchanged.

The finding should not be read as holding that deliberate departure is futile. §48.2.1 identified three further alteration occasions, and §48.2.2 established that a partner diverges across the whole grammar rather than at the level a resolution reaches. What the finding holds is that the resolution operates on one part and that the part it does not reach is the part **ch. 30** concerns.

Proposition 48.6. *A resolution to rear differently operates on what can be stated and does not reach the manner of handling what does not fit, which is not available for report. A household may therefore differ from its predecessor in every stated respect and be closed as its predecessor was closed, since §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity.*

48.4 The Bearing on What Follows

48.4.1 The Addition to the Reproduction Traditions

§37.3.1 declined the transmission model of the reproduction traditions while retaining two of their commitments, and the present chapter is where the declining is repaid.

Those traditions explain persistence and §1.16.9 recorded that their mechanisms are mechanisms of persistence. The present chapter supplies an account of partial persistence with a pattern: §48.3.1 says which parts persist, §48.2.1 says where alteration occurs, and §48.2.2 says which occasion does most of it.

The account additionally predicts a pattern those traditions do not. §48.3.2 holds that deliberate departure succeeds at the level of requirements and fails at the level of what counts as evidence, which is a differential prediction about what changes between generations and what does not. ch. 70 inherits it, and §44.4.1 supplies the quantity in which it would be tested, computed for two households in succession.

Proposition 48.7. *The chapter supplies an account of partial persistence with a pattern, identifying which parts persist and which occasion performs most of the alteration. It predicts that deliberate departure succeeds at the level of requirements and fails at the level of what counts as evidence, which is a differential prediction the reproduction traditions do not make.*

48.4.2 The Unestablished Claims

Two things are asserted here without support and should be marked.

The asymmetry of §48.3.1 is argued from how each part is acquired and is not demonstrated. No case is presented in which the parts of a grammar were traced across a generation, and §30.4 recorded the corresponding position for the central distinction of Part VI. The argument is available and the demonstration is not.

And the ranking of the four occasions in §48.2.2 is argued from frequency, extent, and continuity of use, none of which has been measured. A reader holding that exit and reconstruction do more work would not be refuted by anything in this chapter, and §31.3.2 established that the reports on which such a comparison would rest are subject to defects of their own.

Proposition 48.8. *The asymmetry in what survives is argued from how each part is acquired and is not demonstrated, and the ranking of the four alteration occasions is argued from properties none of which has been measured. Neither is established.*

References

Chapter 49

The Renewal of Educational Traditions

The Work of This Chapter

§47.4.1 named this chapter as treating the field's institutional aspect. A tradition of rearing or of teaching is a grammar at a scale larger than a household, and this chapter asks what keeps one in existence and what alters it.

§49.1 states what transfers from ch. 37 and what the presence of a medium adds. §49.2 distinguishes a tradition that persists from one that renews, using the distinction §37.3.2 drew at household scale.

§49.3 holds that traditions are carried by parties whose epistemic habits formed in households, which constrains what a tradition can become. §49.4 applies the criterion of §43.2.1 at institutional scale.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between persistence and renewal, the constraint households place on traditions, and the institutional forms of the three absorbing moves.

49.1 A Tradition as a Grammar at Scale

49.1.1 The Transferable Findings

§37.1.2 identified a grammar as the terms in which a situation can be described, the distinctions available, and the moves a body of practitioners can recognise as moves. A tradition of teaching has all three, and ch. 2 surveyed several.

Three propositions transfer without qualification.

A tradition is maintained rather than held, which §43.1.1 established for a normative order and §6.1.2 for patterns generally. There is no party who possesses a tradition and could convey it, and §16.2.2 established that its moves are applied without being devised.

A tradition's content is fixed by its application. §44.1.2 established the divergence between what a body states and what it operates, and the divergence is wider at institutional scale, since a tradition states itself in documents that outlive the practices they describe.

And a tradition supplies readings of what does not fit. §41.1.2 established that the readings of ch. 16 are an epistemic habit applied to descriptions of a person, and a tradition's readings are the same habit applied to what its practitioners encounter.

Proposition 49.1. *A tradition is a grammar at institutional scale. It is maintained rather than held, its content is fixed by application rather than by what it states of itself, and it supplies readings of what does not fit, in the manner §41.1.2 established.*

49.1.2 The Additions Made by the Medium

§37.2.2 held that household transmission requires no medium because the receiving faculty is constituted within what is transmitted, and that institutional transmission is accordingly the derivative case, requiring machinery because the receiving parties are already formed. The consequence for traditions is the subject of this section.

A tradition must be conveyed to parties equipped to resist it, and three kinds of machinery perform the conveying: training, which ch. 3 examined; documents, which state the tradition and outlive its practices; and the allocation of positions, which determines who practises under its name.

Two things follow.

A tradition can fail to transmit, which a household grammar cannot in the same way. §37.2.2 established that there is nothing for a household's transmission to overcome, and an institutional tradition meets resistance at every conveyance. Traditions are accordingly less stable than household grammars, which inverts the expectation an argument from institutional weight would produce.

And a tradition can be altered deliberately, which §43.1.1 held a household order cannot. The machinery is available to be redirected: training may be changed, documents rewritten, positions reallocated. §48.3.2 established the corresponding limit at household scale, and the limit holds here in a modified form that §49.3.1 states.

Proposition 49.2. *A tradition is conveyed through training, documents, and the allocation of positions, since its recipients are already formed. It can therefore fail to transmit and can be altered deliberately, neither of which holds of a household grammar in the same way, so traditions are less stable than household grammars.*

49.2 Persistence and Renewal

49.2.1 The Distinction

§37.3.2 distinguished a household reproducing a grammar from one generating a grammar its inheritance did not contain, and the distinction applies here.

A tradition persists where its practitioners continue to apply what they received. §37.3.1 established that theories of persistence have mechanisms of persistence, and the machinery of §49.1.2 is such a mechanism.

A tradition renews where it produces terms it did not receive, and §37.3.2 refused three readings of the corresponding household phenomenon: incomplete transmission, resistance, and noise. The refusals hold here for the same reasons, with one addition. At institutional scale a fourth reading is available, that the terms were imported from a neighbouring tradition, and ch. 3 established that theories move between settings. The reading is frequently correct and §49.2.2 states what would distinguish importation from generation.

A tradition may also merely change, by drift, by loss, or by the failure of its machinery. Change is not renewal, and §49.2.1 requires that the terms be produced rather than lost.

Proposition 49.3. *A tradition persists where its practitioners apply what they received, renews*

where it produces terms it did not receive, and changes where its machinery fails. Renewal at institutional scale must additionally be distinguished from importation from a neighbouring tradition, which [ch. 3](#) established to be common.

49.2.2 The Sources of Renewal

[§48.2.1](#) identified four occasions on which a household grammar is altered, and the institutional analogues are three.

The encounter with a neighbouring tradition corresponds to the second setting, and [ch. 3](#) established what happens to a theory in transit. What distinguishes importation from renewal is whether the receiving tradition has terms the exporting one lacks, and [§3.3.1](#) established the mechanism by which a commitment arrives without the premise that generated it.

The encounter with practice that does not fit corresponds to the discrepant occasion, and [§41.1.1](#) established the moves available. A tradition meeting cases its terms do not accommodate either absorbs them, which [§49.1.1](#) established it is equipped to do, or extends its terms, which is renewal.

And the arrival of practitioners formed elsewhere corresponds to the meeting of two grammars, which [§48.2.2](#) held is the principal alteration occasion at household scale. [§49.3.1](#) argues that it is the principal one here also, and for a related reason.

Proposition 49.4. *Three occasions alter a tradition: encounter with a neighbouring tradition, encounter with practice its terms do not accommodate, and the arrival of practitioners formed elsewhere. The first is distinguished from renewal by whether the receiving tradition possesses terms the exporting one lacks.*

49.3 The Household and the Tradition

49.3.1 Traditions Are Carried by Parties Formed in Households

The claim of this section is that household grammars constrain what an educational tradition can become, and the argument runs through [ch. 41](#).

Every practitioner of a tradition was a child in a household. [§33.1.2](#) established that his interpreter was constituted there, and [§48.3.1](#) established that the parts of a grammar governing what counts as evidence survive the passage better than the parts governing what is required.

What a practitioner brings to a tradition is accordingly not a set of views, which training may alter, but a manner of handling what does not fit, which [§41.2.1](#) established is not available to him for report. [§49.1.2](#) held that a tradition is conveyed to parties already formed, and the present section specifies what they are formed in.

Two consequences follow.

A tradition cannot adopt a manner of handling discrepancy that its practitioners do not already possess. Training may supply propositions and may require procedures, and [§3.3.1](#) established what becomes of a commitment conveyed as a procedure. What it cannot supply is the manner, since [§33.1.2](#) established how manners are acquired and training is not that.

And a tradition's capacity to renew is therefore bounded by the variety of household gram-

grams among its practitioners. Where those grammars are alike, the tradition meets discrepancy in one way, and §34.3.1 established what follows where the sources of divergence agree.

Proposition 49.5. *A tradition's practitioners bring a manner of handling what does not fit which their households supplied and which is not available to them for report. A tradition cannot therefore adopt a manner its practitioners do not possess, and its capacity to renew is bounded by the variety of household grammars among them.*

49.3.2 Convergence at Scale

§34.3.2 established that where a household and a school converge on a description, the child has no setting in which to contest it, and that this obtains without either setting failing. The present section states the corresponding result one level up.

Where a tradition and the households it serves share a grammar, the tradition meets no discrepancy from that quarter. Practitioners formed in those households find its terms natural, parents find its practices recognisable, and §34.2.2 established what warrant an institution adds to a description. Each party corroborates the other.

The result is that a tradition is least likely to renew where it fits its constituency best, and §49.3.1 supplies the mechanism. This inverts the ordinary assessment, on which a tradition well matched to those it serves is functioning well.

Two qualifications hold the claim within bounds.

Fit is not a defect. A tradition whose terms its constituency finds unusable is failing at what it exists to do, and §34.4.1 established the corresponding point about the operations of a school.

And renewal is not an end in itself. §49.2.1 distinguished renewal from change, and nothing in this book holds that a tradition producing new terms is thereby better than one applying terms that work. What is claimed is that the conditions under which renewal could occur are the conditions of divergence, and that fit removes them.

Proposition 49.6. *A tradition is least likely to renew where it fits the households it serves most closely, since practitioners and parents corroborate each other and no discrepancy arises. Fit is not thereby a defect and renewal is not an end in itself; what is claimed is that fit removes the divergence under which renewal could occur.*

49.4 The Closure of a Tradition

49.4.1 The Absorbing Moves in Institutional Form

§43.2.1 identified three moves by which an order absorbs objection, and each has an institutional form.

That the objector is subject to the order becomes the observation that he is untrained. An objection to a tradition's practice from a party who has not been formed in it is describable within the tradition as evidence of his not having been formed in it, and §16.2.1 established what a reading accounting for every instance is proof against.

That the objector does not yet understand becomes the observation that understanding arrives with experience, which in a tradition organised by seniority is available against most

objectors most of the time.

And that the order has always obtained becomes the tradition's antiquity, which §12.2.2 established is what continuous occupancy produces and which §43.3.2 found operating in the case examined there.

A tradition is closed where no objection available to its practitioners could fail to be met by one of these, and §43.2.1 established that this is compatible with every party acting in good faith.

The independence results of ch. 43 hold unchanged. Closure is independent of severity, so a permissive tradition may be closed. It is independent of exit, so a tradition practitioners may leave freely may answer to none of them.

Proposition 49.7. *The three absorbing moves take institutional form as the observation that the objector is untrained, that understanding arrives with experience, and that the tradition is ancient. A tradition is closed where no objection could fail to be met by one of them, and closure remains independent of severity and of exit.*

49.4.2 Scope and Limits

Two limits should be recorded and the first concerns this book's title.

The chapter has treated institutions most of whose subjects are past early childhood, and §34.4.2 stated the position: the framework's claims are most visible in early childhood, the book concentrates there, and its reasoning crosses that boundary where the material requires. A Part treating what passes between generations cannot decline to treat the institutions through which much of it passes, and this is the second of the crossings §34.4.2 said would be marked where they occur.

The second concerns what the chapter has established. §49.3.1 argues from §48.3.1, which §48.4.2 recorded is argued and not demonstrated. The present chapter accordingly inherits that deficiency and adds nothing to its repair. §49.3.2 is a further inference from the same materials, and a reader who rejects the survival asymmetry has grounds to reject both.

Proposition 49.8. *The chapter crosses the boundary named in this book's title, which §34.4.2 anticipated and which a Part on transmission between generations cannot avoid. Its central claims rest on the survival asymmetry of §48.3.1, which is argued and not demonstrated, and a reader rejecting that asymmetry has grounds to reject them.*

References

Chapter 50

The Slow Variable and Structural Blindness

The Work of This Chapter

§11.1.1 described a route by which absorption ceases in which accumulated settlings make each further settling cheaper. That route is a variable moving slowly relative to the occasions it governs, and this chapter generalises it.

§50.1 defines a slow variable by the relation between its rate and an observation window, and holds that a variable slower than the window is registered as a constant. §50.2 states the consequence: such a variable enters a grammar as background rather than as something that could be otherwise, which §43.2.1 identified as the third absorbing move. §50.3 treats the household case at length, as §1.16.5 required. §50.4 applies the account to this book, whose own position was formed under conditions it cannot fully reconstruct. The reader should carry forward the definition, the reason slow variables are registered as constants, and the reflexive application.

50.1 Slow Variables

50.1.1 The Definition

A variable is slow relative to an observation window where its movement over the window is small compared with its variation across windows.

The definition is relational and nothing is slow in itself. The number of hours an adult is available to a child moves appreciably over a generation and negligibly over a month, and §5.2.2 treated it at the scale where it appears fixed. The same quantity is fast relative to a century.

The window that matters for this book is a childhood. A variable moving appreciably over a generation and negligibly over eighteen years is slow in the sense that governs what follows, and §50.1.2 states why.

Three quantities this book has treated are slow in that sense.

The accumulated settlings of §11.1.1, which make each further settling cheaper, move within a childhood and slowly. §12.2.2 established the mechanism and ch. 12 described the state produced.

The distribution of address within a household, which §21.3.2 established is a structure with positions, settles early and moves thereafter by increments.

And the household's position in the field of ch. 47 moves on a scale exceeding a childhood

entirely, since it is constituted by arrangements no household controls.

Proposition 50.1. *A variable is slow relative to a window where its movement over the window is small compared with its variation across windows. Nothing is slow in itself. The accumulated settlements of §11.1.1, a household's distribution of address, and its position in the field are slow relative to a childhood.*

50.1.2 The Registration of a Slow Variable as Background

A party observing within a window shorter than a variable's period of movement has no evidence that it moves.

§41.1.1 established that a manner of handling what does not fit is what an epistemic habit consists in, and a slow variable never presents a misfit. Each occasion is consistent with the one before, and the accumulation across a childhood is not an occasion at all. §47.1.2 established the corresponding point for constraints, that their effects are not locatable in any occasion.

Two features follow and both matter.

A slow variable is registered as background. It does not appear as a quantity that has a value, and §43.1.1 established that an order is what has been done rather than something adopted. A child reared in a household of a certain size, at a certain distance from other households, with a certain number of available adults, does not register these as settings that could have been otherwise. They are the conditions under which everything he registers is registered.

And a slow variable is therefore available for the third absorbing move. §43.2.1 identified the move by which an objection is met with the observation that the order has always obtained, and a slow variable makes the observation true. §12.2.2 established that continuous occupancy produces the standing, and a variable that has not moved within anyone's window has occupied continuously by the only measure available.

Proposition 50.2. *A party observing within a window shorter than a variable's movement has no evidence that it moves, since a slow variable presents no misfit on any occasion. It is registered as background rather than as a quantity, and it supplies the third absorbing move of §43.2.1 with a true premise.*

50.2 Structural Blindness

50.2.1 The Nature of the Blindness

Structural blindness is the condition of a party who cannot register a variable because its period exceeds his window, and three features distinguish it from ignorance.

It is not remediable by attention. A party attending closely to his circumstances registers the occasions that occur within them, and §50.1.2 established that the variable presents no occasion. Attention improves the resolution and does not extend the window.

It is not remediable by testimony from within. Parties in adjacent windows share the condition, and §49.3.2 established what follows where the available sources agree. A household consulting neighbouring households consults parties whose windows overlap its own.

And it is not registered as a limitation. §31.2.1 established that a party operating within a grammar experiences himself as observing accurately, and a party blind to a slow variable experiences his circumstances as simply how things are, which §50.1.2 established is what background consists in.

Proposition 50.3. *Structural blindness is the inability to register a variable whose period exceeds the observing window. It is not remediable by attention, since the variable presents no occasion; nor by testimony from parties in adjacent windows, who share the condition; and it is not registered as a limitation.*

50.2.2 The Extension of a Window

Three things extend an observation window and each has been treated elsewhere in this book.

Records extend it, and §31.2.2 established the difficulty. A household's record of its own past is assembled by the arrangement in question, so a record extends a window only where it was made for another purpose or by another party.

Testimony from a non-adjacent window extends it, which is what an older generation supplies. §48.3.1 established that what survives the passage best is the manner of handling what does not fit, and what an older party can report is accordingly least likely to concern the variable at issue, since it is the part of a grammar he cannot report.

And measurement extends it, which is why ch. 70 matters to this chapter. A quantity recorded at intervals across generations is a quantity whose movement can be seen without anyone having observed it move, and §44.4.1 and §40.4.1 defined two such quantities.

The third is the only one that reaches variables slower than a generation, and §50.4.1 records what follows for a book written before any such series exists.

Proposition 50.4. *Records extend a window where made for another purpose, testimony from a non-adjacent window extends it but least reports the part of a grammar at issue, and measurement across generations extends it. Only the third reaches variables slower than a generation, and no such series exists.*

50.3 The Domestic Case

50.3.1 The Condition and Its Invisibility

§1.16.5 recorded that the developmental literature has barely addressed what it is to be reared under a particular condition, and suggested that this chapter would explain why.

The explanation is §50.1.2. A condition constituted by a slow variable is not a condition anyone reared under it can report, since it is the background against which reports are made. §31.4.1 established that a subject who has acquired later terms can report prior unavailability, and the case here is harder: the terms in question are not supplied by any later relation, since the parties to later relations occupy adjacent windows.

The literature's silence is therefore not an oversight. §1.25.1 identified the move common to the traditions surveyed, which is to locate in a child what belongs to a relation, and a variable

slower than a childhood is not locatable in either. It belongs to the field of [ch. 47](#), and [§47.4.2](#) recorded that this book takes a household's position as given.

Two consequences for the framework's own claims.

[§30.1.3](#) offered three constructions of the distinction between the two levels and held the argument invariant across them. Nothing in this chapter disturbs that, and the present chapter adds that a household's position in the field, which governs how likely convergence is by [§47.2.2](#), is itself a slow variable and therefore not among the things a household could take into account.

And [§30.2.2](#) established that the discriminator between the levels is what follows a re-stored occasion. Where the condition foreclosing occasions is a slow variable, no restoration occurs within the window, and the discriminator is unavailable for reasons additional to those recorded there.

Proposition 50.5. *A condition constituted by a slow variable cannot be reported by those reared under it, since it is the background against which reports are made and later relations occupy adjacent windows. The developmental literature's silence follows from this rather than from oversight, and the discriminator of [§30.2.2](#) is unavailable where the foreclosing condition moves slower than the window.*

50.3.2 The Consequences for Households

Three findings and none is actionable, for the reason [§50.2.1](#) established.

A household cannot assess its own position, and [§47.4.2](#) recorded that the framework takes position as given. What the present chapter adds is that the household is structurally unable to register its position as a position, which is a stronger condition than being uninformed about it.

A household's account of why it does what it does will not mention the slow variables governing it, and [§46.2.2](#) established the corresponding point about boundaries, that a household's account of why one exists is poor evidence about what it does.

And a household comparing itself with neighbouring households learns nothing about the variables it shares with them. [§34.3.1](#) established what convergence between two settings consumes, and the present case is convergence across a whole neighbourhood of windows.

Proposition 50.6. *A household is structurally unable to register its position as a position, its account of its own practice will not mention the slow variables governing it, and comparison with neighbouring households yields nothing about the variables it shares with them.*

50.4 The Reflexive Case

50.4.1 This Book's Own Position

[§1.26.4](#) recorded that this book's own position was formed under conditions it cannot fully reconstruct, and that its blindness to its own moment's slow variable is a specific case of what the present chapter argues in general. The debt is discharged here.

The argument applies to the book without modification. Its author occupies a window, the traditions it surveys occupy adjacent windows, and §50.2.2 established that only measurement across generations reaches variables slower than one. ch. 70 proposes such measurement and §46.4.2 recorded that none has been performed.

What follows is a specific and unrepairable limitation. The framework's terms were formed under conditions it registers as background, and a variable governing what this book finds natural to say is by definition not among the things it has said. §50.2.1 established that this is not remediable by attention, so the author's care is not to the point.

Two things can nonetheless be done and both are done here.

The limitation can be stated, which prevents the book from being read as offering a view from outside its own conditions. §4.3.1 recorded the undertaking to state costs, and this is among them.

And the shape of the correction can be indicated. §50.2.2 established that measurement across generations is the only route, so a successor working from a series this book proposes and does not possess would be positioned to identify what the framework took as background. ch. 89 records the matter and ch. 91 states what would be required.

Proposition 50.7. *The account applies to this book. Its terms were formed under conditions it registers as background, the limitation is not remediable by attention, and only measurement across generations of the kind ch. 70 proposes would identify what it has taken for granted. The limitation is stated rather than repaired.*

50.4.2 The Limits of the Licence

A chapter of this kind invites two misuses and both should be closed.

It does not licence the dismissal of any claim on the ground that its holder occupies a window. Every party occupies one, including the party making the objection, and §1.26.3 recorded the general difficulty with arguments that explain away whatever would embarrass them. The chapter identifies a limitation on what can be registered and supplies no ground for preferring one account within a window to another.

And it does not licence the treatment of slow variables as explanations. §47.1.1 established that constraints alter what is available without selecting among what remains, and a slow variable is a constraint by §50.1.1. An account attributing a household's condition to a variable it could not register would be attributing it to something that determines nothing, and §35.1.1 established that the absence of a bearer of fault is a finding about structure rather than a licence to supply a substitute.

Proposition 50.8. *The chapter withholds licenceing dismissing claims on the ground that their holders occupy windows, since every party does and §1.26.3 recorded the difficulty with such arguments. Nor does it licence treating slow variables as explanations, since §47.1.1 established that constraints alter availability without selecting among what remains.*

References

Chapter 51

The Protection of the Unoptimisable

The Work of This Chapter

§25.2.2 recorded that deliberate protection of the unarranged is itself an arrangement, called this the sharpest form of a difficulty, and passed it here. This chapter treats it.

§51.1 states the difficulty exactly and shows that it is not peculiar to this framework.

§51.2 draws two distinctions that narrow it, between arranging availability and arranging content, and between arrangements that specify much and little.

§51.3 states what the chapter has to offer in place of a solution. A protection is a symbol in the sense of ch. 19, it is therefore subject to the criterion that chapter established, and whether it survives is settled by the order it sits within rather than by its own design.

§51.4 closes the Part.

The reader should carry forward the two distinctions, the condition on a protection, and the finding that the problem is a property of an order rather than of a protection.

51.1 The Difficulty

51.1.1 The Statement

The difficulty has three steps and each has been established.

§27.1.1 established that where a domain admits of an index, activity within it contracts toward what the index registers, and §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is producing a result. Generative occasions are damaged by being aimed at.

It follows that such occasions require protection from the pressures that would aim them, and §25.2.2 recorded a household setting aside an hour in which nothing shall be arranged.

And the protection is itself an arrangement. §26.3.1 established the mechanism precisely: an adult who must justify an hour to a party who counts outcomes has a justification only in the currency that counts, and stating the hour's value in that currency performs the substitution §25.4.1 described. The phrase holding that children learn through play is that substitution compressed, and its intent is protective throughout.

The difficulty is therefore not that protection is ineffective. It is that the act of protecting supplies a description of what is protected, the description is stated in the currency in which justification is demanded, and the currency is the one whose operation the protection existed to exclude.

Proposition 51.1. *Generative occasions are damaged by being aimed at, therefore require protection, and protection supplies a description of what is protected in the currency in which justification is demanded, which is the currency the protection existed to exclude. The difficulty*

concerns the act of protecting rather than the effectiveness of protections.

51.1.2 The Generality of the Difficulty

The framework would be in a worse position if the difficulty followed from its own commitments alone, and it does not.

Any account holding that some activity is damaged by being performed for a purpose external to it faces the same structure. The activity must be defended where resources are allocated, defence proceeds in the terms allocation uses, and the terms are external by construction. §1.16 recorded the general form in the vocabulary of a tradition that has treated it, and §26.3.1 recorded the specific instance in early-years provision.

Two things follow from the difficulty's generality.

The framework need not solve it in order to be correct about what produces it, and §27.1.1 and §28.3.2 stand independently of anything in this chapter.

And a solution, were one available, would not be this book's to supply. It would belong to whatever governs how justification is demanded, which §47.4.2 recorded is outside the framework's undertaking and §1.15 retained the traditions for.

Proposition 51.2. *The difficulty follows from any account holding that an activity is damaged by being performed for an external purpose, since defence proceeds in the terms allocation uses. The framework's claims about what produces it stand independently, and a general solution would belong to whatever governs how justification is demanded.*

51.2 The Distinctions Drawn

51.2.1 Arranging Availability and Arranging Content

§38.4.2 established that the occurrence of occasions is arrangeable and their character is not, and the distinction bears directly on protection.

An arrangement fixing when something will not happen leaves open what happens. §46.1.1 defined a boundary as a settled arrangement under which a class of occasion does not arise, and §46.2.1 established that a boundary protects where what it makes unavailable are occasions that could not have supplied the conditions. An hour in which nothing is arranged excludes the purposive occasion, which §38.2.2 established could not have been shared in any case.

What the arrangement does not do is determine what occupies the hour, and §38.2.1 established that what occupies it is shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what it became. The arrangement cannot secure this and does not foreclose it.

The difficulty of §51.1.1 accordingly attaches at one remove. It is not that arranging availability determines content. It is that arranging availability produces a description, and the description may govern content by the mechanism ch. 15 established.

This narrows the problem to a form the book has treated. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach, and the question is whether the protected hour is encountered as a protected hour or as an hour.

Proposition 51.3. *An arrangement fixing when something will not happen leaves open what happens, and excludes a class of occasion that could not have been shared in any case. The difficulty attaches at one remove: the arrangement produces a description, and the description may govern content by the mechanism [ch. 15](#) established.*

51.2.2 Degrees of Specification

Protections differ in how much they say, and the difference bears on how much there is to be optimised against.

A protection specifying an occasion's purpose supplies a criterion of success, and [§34.2.1](#) established what a criterion permits. An hour set aside for the development of imagination can be assessed for whether imagination developed.

A protection specifying only that a period is unarranged supplies no criterion, since nothing is being attempted. [§41.1.1](#) established that material fitting what a party holds requires no handling, and an hour with no purpose presents no result to be handled.

The difficulty of [§51.1.1](#) operates on the first more readily than the second, and [§26.3.1](#) concerned a phrase that supplies a purpose in four words. What makes the phrase consequential is that it converts the second kind of protection into the first.

Two qualifications.

Thin protections are harder to defend, which is the whole of why thick ones are adopted. [§26.3.1](#) established that an adult who must justify has a justification only in the currency that counts, and a protection stating no purpose has nothing to offer such a demand.

And thinness is not proof against the difficulty. A household may treat an unarranged hour as itself an achievement, and [§12.2.2](#) established what a description occupying a position continuously becomes.

Proposition 51.4. *A protection specifying a purpose supplies a criterion of success and a protection specifying only that a period is unarranged supplies none. The difficulty operates more readily on the first, and thin protections are correspondingly harder to defend, since a protection stating no purpose has nothing to offer a demand for justification.*

51.3 The Condition on a Protection

51.3.1 A Protection Is a Symbol

[§51.2.1](#) located the difficulty in the description a protection produces, and this section identifies what kind of thing that description is.

[ch. 15](#) established that a symbol governs approach, [ch. 17](#) established that it realises itself in what it describes, and [§16.2.2](#) established that its readings absorb what does not fit. A household's protected hour is a symbol in exactly this sense: it governs how the hour is approached, it produces occasions conforming to itself, and it supplies readings of hours that go badly.

[§18.1.1](#) established that labels admitting operate by the mechanism labels depriving operate by, and a protection is an admitting label applied to a period of time. Nothing in its benign intent exempts it, and [§33.2.2](#) established that an account under which something is valuable

closes revision as an unflattering one does.

The consequence is that the chapter's question has an answer already available in the book. §19.3.1 established the criterion distinguishing good symbols from bad, which is refutability by what the symbol describes.

Proposition 51.5. *A protection is a symbol in the sense of ch. 15: it governs how the protected occasions are approached, realises itself in them, and supplies readings of occasions that go badly. Its benign intent does not exempt it, since §18.1.1 established that admitting labels operate by the mechanism depriving labels operate by.*

51.3.2 The Condition, and Where It Is Settled

Applying §19.3.1, a protection survives as a protection where what happens within it can refute it.

A household that would notice that its unarranged hour has become an ordeal for everyone, and abandon it, holds the protection answerably. A household for which the hour's value is settled holds it in the condition §30.1.2 defined, and §16.2.1 supplies the readings by which a badly going hour is absorbed: they were tired, it takes time, next week will be better.

This is the chapter's answer and its scope should be stated exactly. It does not dissolve the difficulty of §51.1.1, since a protection remains an arrangement producing a description. What it establishes is that protections are not uniformly defeated by the difficulty, and that what distinguishes those that survive is the condition this book has applied at four other scales.

The consequential part follows. Whether a protection can be held answerably is not settled by the protection's design. §26.3.1 established that the substitution occurs where an adult must justify in a currency that counts, and §28.2.2 established what distinguishes a household organised around measured quantities. A household whose order demands that everything justify itself in one currency cannot hold any protection answerably, since the demand is what converts thin protections into thick ones and thick protections supply the criterion that fore-closes refutation.

The protection problem is accordingly a property of an order rather than of a protection, and ch. 43 and ch. 44 treated orders. §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity, and the present result is its counterpart: a household may be mild, well intentioned, and organised so that no protection it adopts can survive.

Proposition 51.6. *A protection survives where what happens within it can refute it, which is §19.3.1 applied to an arrangement. Whether it can be held answerably is settled by the household's order rather than by the protection's design, since a household whose order demands justification in one currency converts thin protections into thick ones. The problem is a property of an order.*

51.4 The Findings of Part IX

51.4.1 The Part's Findings

The Part treated what the field of constraint does over time and added five results.

§47.1.2 established that constraints operate on the rates at which occasions arise, which is the level at which §10.2.2 characterises relations, and that their effects are therefore not locatable in any occasion. §47.3.2 established that constraint reduces occasions and does not reduce answerability, since §42.3.1 derived answerability without reference to how many occasions obtain.

§48.2.2 identified the meeting of two grammars in a newly formed household as the principal occasion on which an inherited grammar is altered, and §48.3.1 held that the parts governing what counts as evidence survive better than the parts governing what is required. §48.3.2 drew the consequence, that a household may differ from its predecessor in every stated respect and be closed as its predecessor was closed.

§49.3.1 established that a tradition cannot adopt a manner of handling discrepancy its practitioners do not possess, and §49.3.2 that a tradition is least likely to renew where it fits its constituency best.

§50.1.2 established that a variable slower than an observation window is registered as background rather than as a quantity, and §50.4.1 applied the result to this book.

And §51.3.2 established that whether a protection can be held answerably is settled by the order it sits within.

Proposition 51.7. *The Part establishes that constraints act on rates without reducing answerability, that the meeting of two grammars is the principal alteration occasion and that what counts as evidence survives best, that a tradition is least likely to renew where it fits best, that variables slower than a window are registered as background, and that the protection problem is a property of an order.*

51.4.2 The Residue Left by the Part

Three things.

The survival asymmetry of §48.3.1 is argued from how each part of a grammar is acquired and is not demonstrated, and §49.4.2 recorded that ch. 49 rests on it. A reader rejecting it has grounds to reject both chapters.

The field of ch. 47 is described and not constituted. §47.4.2 recorded that the framework takes a household's position as given and retains the reproduction traditions for the question of how positions arise, and §50.3.2 added that a household is structurally unable to register its position as a position.

And the difficulty of §51.1.1 is narrowed and not dissolved. §51.3.2 identified what distinguishes protections that survive and located the distinguishing factor in an order rather than in a protection, which relocates the problem without removing it. ch. 76 meets the same difficulty in the form it takes for an instrument, and §51.1.2 recorded that a general solution would not be this book's to supply.

Proposition 51.8. *The Part leaves the survival asymmetry argued and undemonstrated, the field described and not constituted, and the protection difficulty narrowed and not dissolved, its solution having been relocated from the design of a protection to the order the protection sits within.*

References

Draft

Part X

The Generative Development of Human Capacities

Chapter 52

Capacity as the Stabilisation of Relational Conditions

The Work of This Chapter

This Part treats the development of particular human capacities, and the present chapter states what a capacity is on this framework and in what sense relation is its ground.

§52.1 declines the account on which a capacity is something a child possesses and holds in its place that a capacity is a stabilised pattern, in the sense §6.1.2 established for patterns generally. §52.2 distinguishes three grades of claim about relation's role and states which this book makes, holding that relation is a condition of something's counting as a capacity rather than a cause of anyone's having one.

§52.3 states what the position leaves untouched, since a framework denying maturation would be describing something other than children, and sets the account against those nearest to it. §52.4 states the Part's structure and the order of its chapters.

The reader should carry forward the three grades of claim, the division between conditions and causes, and the five-section architecture the Part's central chapters follow.

52.1 The Nature of a Capacity

52.1.1 Against the Possession Account

The developmental traditions surveyed in ch. 1 treat a capacity as something a child has, and §1.25.1 identified this as the move common to them.

§37.1.1 gave the general objections in the case of what passes between generations, and two transfer.

The first concerns individuation. A capacity is a capacity to do something, and what counts as the something is settled by terms. §37.1.2 established that a household supplies the terms in which a situation can be described, and §34.1.2 established that a child may be described as possessing an ability in one setting and lacking it in another. A possession account must treat one setting as revealing and has no ground for the designation, which §40.1.2 established for the case of curiosity.

The second concerns maintenance. §6.1.2 held that a pattern is maintained rather than possessed, and capacities behave accordingly: they are exercised or they attenuate, and §38.3.2 established the corresponding point for what a household holds in common. A possession is not the kind of thing that requires continuous work to remain in existence.

Neither objection denies that children differ in what they can do, and §17.1.2 established

that what a child brings is his. What is declined is the inference from a difference in performance to a property located in the performer, and §40.1.1 gave the sharper form of the objection: a trait account requires an underlying quantity identifiable independently of the performances from which it is inferred.

Proposition 52.1. *A capacity is not a possession of a child. What a capacity is a capacity for is settled by terms a setting supplies, so a possession account must designate one setting as revealing without ground; and capacities require continuous exercise to persist, which possessions do not. Neither objection denies that children differ.*

52.1.2 Capacity as Stabilisation

A capacity is a stabilised pattern of what a party reliably does under some range of conditions. Three features of the formulation carry weight.

It is dispositional and therefore counterfactual, which §30.2.2 established brings difficulties this Part inherits. What a party reliably does under conditions that have not obtained is not settled by anything observed.

It is defined over a range of conditions, and the range is part of the capacity rather than a qualification on it. A child who does something at home and not at school has a capacity whose range is the first, and §34.1.2 established that the two settings differ in what they supply. Nothing requires the range to be wide.

And it is stabilised, which §40.2.2 established is a condition maintained by a mechanism rather than a state reached. §11.1.2 established that the mechanism runs in both directions, and a capacity that is not exercised is not thereby held in reserve.

Proposition 52.2. *A capacity is a stabilised pattern of what a party reliably does under a range of conditions. The formulation is counterfactual, includes the range as part of the capacity rather than as a qualification, and is maintained by a mechanism running in both directions.*

52.2 The Sense in Which Relation Is Ground

52.2.1 The Grades of Claim

Claims about relation's role in development differ in strength and are frequently run together. Three should be separated.

The weak claim is that relations are among the causes of a capacity's development. Every tradition surveyed in ch. 1 accepts some version of this, and the accepting is compatible with locating the capacity in the child.

The middle claim is that relations constitute the conditions under which a capacity stabilises, so that the range in §52.1.2 is set relationally. This is stronger and is still a claim about what produces and sustains a capacity.

The strong claim is that relation is a condition of something's counting as a capacity at all, so that the question what a child can do has no determinate answer independent of the terms a relation supplies.

This book makes the third, and §52.2.2 states it exactly. The Part's chapters argue the second in each of the nine cases and the third for the class.

Proposition 52.3. *Three claims must be separated: that relations are among the causes of development, which every tradition accepts; that relations constitute the conditions under which a capacity stabilises; and that relation is a condition of something's counting as a capacity at all. This book makes the third for the class of capacities and argues the second in each case.*

52.2.2 The Transcendental Claim

The strong claim concerns conditions and not causes, and the distinction is what makes it defensible.

To say that relation is the ground of capacity is not to say that relation produces capacities. Causes of development include maturation, nutrition, injury, and a great deal else, and §52.3.1 states the position on these. The claim is that what it is for a child to be able to do something is settled by terms that no child supplies himself, and that the supplying is done in relations.

The argument runs in three steps.

A capacity is individuated by what it is a capacity for, which §52.1.1 established.

What it is a capacity for is settled by a description, since abilities are picked out under descriptions and nothing picks out an ability except under one.

And descriptions are supplied relationally. §37.1.2 established that the terms in which a situation can be described are what passes between generations, and §33.1.2 established that a child's own faculty for registering what he is doing is constituted within them.

What follows is that the question what a child can do has no answer prior to the terms in which the doing is picked out, which is a claim about the conditions of the question rather than about the child.

Two things this does not entail should be marked at once.

It does not entail that a child cannot do what nobody has terms for. §37.3.2 held that households generate terms their inheritance did not contain, and the generation occurs because something is done that the existing terms do not accommodate. The claim concerns individuation and not possibility.

And it does not entail that all descriptions are equally good. §19.3.1 supplied the criterion distinguishing them, and §42.3.1 established that a description absorbing every discrepancy has no purchase on what it describes.

Proposition 52.4. *Relation is the ground of capacity in the sense that what it is for a child to be able to do something is settled by descriptions no child supplies himself and which relations supply. This concerns conditions rather than causes, leaves the causes of development untouched, and entails neither that a child cannot do what nobody has terms for nor that all descriptions are equally good.*

52.3 The Commitments Left Untouched

52.3.1 Maturation and What the Child Brings

A framework denying that children mature would be describing something other than children, and this section states the position plainly because the vocabulary of the preceding section invites the opposite reading.

Children mature. Nervous systems develop on schedules that vary within limits, and the schedules constrain what is available at a given age in ways no relation alters. §17.1.2 established that a child brings capacities, dispositions, and a history, and that what he does is his.

The relation between this and §52.2.2 is that the two answer different questions. Maturation answers what a child is in a position to do. The relational claim answers what counts as his doing it. A child who could not have walked at nine months cannot be described as walking at nine months whatever terms are supplied, and a child who walks at fourteen months walks under a description that a household and a literature supply.

§47.1.1 established the general form of this division for constraints, that they alter what is available without selecting among what remains, and maturation is a constraint in that sense.

Two consequences.

The framework makes no predictions that compete with maturational ones, and a finding that some capacity emerges on a schedule robust across settings is not evidence against anything here.

And the framework's claims are not tested by manipulating relations to produce capacities earlier. §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion aimed at a result, and ch. 70 inherits the difficulty.

Proposition 52.5. *Children mature, and maturation constrains what is available at an age in ways no relation alters. Maturation answers what a child is in a position to do and the relational claim answers what counts as his doing it. The framework accordingly makes no predictions competing with maturational ones.*

52.3.2 The Nearest Accounts

Three positions stand close enough to require distinguishing, and §8.3.1 ranked redescription of an available vocabulary as the most damaging finding available against this book.

Vygotsky (1978) holds that higher functions appear twice, between people and then within the individual, and Vygotsky (1986) develops the account for language and thought. Wertsch (1985) and Cole (1996) elaborate the tradition, and Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff (2003) develop participation as the unit. This is the nearest position and §1.4 recorded the debt.

The difference is at the point §52.2.1 separated. Vygotsky's claim is the middle one: the interpersonal is the origin of the intrapersonal, and internalisation is a process by which what was between becomes within. The account is genetic and the terminus is a function located in the individual. The present claim concerns individuation rather than origin, and holds that the relational condition does not drop out when the function is established, since what the function is a function for continues to be settled by terms. §1.25.1 identified the move by which a property belonging to a relation is located elsewhere, and internalisation is a transfer of exactly that kind.

Dynamic systems accounts, of which Thelen and Smith (1994) is the fullest and Thelen et al.

(2001) the most developed statement, hold that capacities are emergent stabilities in a system comprising the child and the environment. van Geert (1991) and Fischer (1980) supply formal treatments. The proximity here is to §52.1.2 and is close, since stabilisation is the shared notion. The difference is that these accounts individuate the capacity by its dynamics and this account individuates it by a description, and §52.2.2 argued that a dynamics does not pick out an ability without one. ch. 70 takes up whether the present account can do formal work these accounts do, and §46.4.2 recorded that a framework failing that test would be decoration.

Interactionist accounts hold that development results from the interaction of organism and environment. These make the weak claim of §52.2.1 and are compatible with everything in this book and with its denial.

Proposition 52.6. *The sociocultural tradition makes the middle claim, that the interpersonal is the origin of the intrapersonal, and its terminus is a function located in the individual; the present claim concerns individuation rather than origin and holds that the relational condition does not drop out. Dynamic systems accounts share the notion of stabilisation and individuate by dynamics rather than by description. Interactionist accounts make the weak claim and are compatible with any position here.*

52.4 The Architecture of This Part

52.4.1 The Sectional Architecture

The nine chapters treating particular functions follow one architecture, and stating it here prevents each from restating it.

The first section gives the established account in full survey form. What the developmental literature has established about the function is granted seriously and at length, and §8.3.1 recorded that a framework failing to grant what its rivals have established would be worthless.

The second locates the ontological premises of that account, by attending to what its verbs require. §1.25.1 identified the recurring move, and the section asks in each case where the relational condition drops out.

The third states the conditions of generation: what relation constitutes the function's space of possibility, in the sense §52.2.2 defined.

The fourth states the forms of closure, in the function's own idiom. §30.1.2 defined the general condition and each function admits a specific form of it.

And the fifth states the implications for practice, as a description of what acts do. §8.2.1 recorded the policy and §40.4.2 explained why the result recurs.

Proposition 52.7. *Each of the nine function chapters gives the established account in full survey form, locates its ontological premises by attending to its verbs, states the conditions of generation, states the forms of closure in the function's idiom, and states implications for practice as descriptions of what acts do.*

52.4.2 The Functions and Their Order

The order runs from functions where the relational claim is hardest to defend to those where it is easiest, which is the reverse of the order of exposition that would flatter the framework.

Chapter 53 and ch. 54 come first, and are the hardest cases, since perceiving and moving appear to require nothing from anyone. §52.2.2 concerns individuation and the two chapters must show that individuation does work here rather than merely applying a formula.

Chapter 55 follows, at greater length, since it is where the sociocultural tradition is strongest and where §52.3.2 must be made good in detail.

Chapter 56 and ch. 57 treat the operations Piaget described, and the second is the third marked crossing of the boundary named in this book's title, which §34.4.2 recorded.

Chapter 58 treats the child's developing capacity to enter relations, which is distinct from the ground of §52.2.2 and must be kept so. A ground is not a capacity, and an account conflating them would make the framework circular.

Chapter 59, ch. 60, and ch. 61 complete the nine.

Chapter 62 then treats what happens where functions interact, and ch. 64 treats what it is to read a child's development, which is where the Part's practical content is gathered.

Proposition 52.8. *The nine chapters run from perception and movement, where the relational claim is hardest to defend, through language, the two operational chapters, the capacity to enter relations, self-regulation, normativity, and aesthetic capacity. The capacity to enter relations must be kept distinct from the ground, since conflating them would make the framework circular.*

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Draft

Chapter 53

The Generation of Perception

The Work of This Chapter

§52.4.2 placed this chapter first because it is the hardest case. Perceiving appears to require nothing from anyone, and a framework holding that relation is the ground of capacity must show that the claim does work here rather than being applied by formula.

§53.1 gives the established account, which is substantial and is granted in full. §53.2 locates its ontological premises by attending to what its verbs require, and holds that the relational condition drops out at the individuation of what was discriminated.

§53.3 states the conditions of generation, holding that which differences are marked and what counts as the same are settled relationally. §53.4 states closure in perception's idiom, and §53.5 states what particular acts do.

The reader should carry forward the reinterpretation of perceptual narrowing, which is the literature's own central developmental finding and which supplies this chapter's premise.

53.1 The Established Account

53.1.1 The Early Capacities

The literature of the last half-century established that infants perceive far more, and far earlier, than the traditions surveyed in [ch. 1](#) had supposed, and the finding is granted without qualification.

[Spelke et al. \(1992\)](#) and [Spelke and Kinzler \(2007\)](#) report that infants in the first months represent objects as cohesive, bounded, and continuous through occlusion, and treat violations of these as surprising. [Baillargeon et al. \(1985\)](#) established the method by which such expectations are demonstrated in infants who cannot act on them.

[Gibson \(1979\)](#) supplied the theoretical account within which much of this work proceeds, holding that perception is the direct pickup of information available in an ambient array, and that what is perceived are affordances, which are relations between an animal's capacities and the environment's properties. [Gibson \(1988\)](#) developed the developmental account, in which exploratory activity is what discovers affordances.

[Held \(2006\)](#) reports on the role of active movement in the calibration of perception, and the finding that perceptual development requires the perceiver to move is well established.

Two features of this body of work should be marked before it is examined.

The Gibsonian account is already relational in one sense, since an affordance is a relation between a creature and a surface. §52.2.1 distinguished the grades of such claims, and this is

the middle claim about the organism and its environment rather than any claim about relations between persons.

And the methods establish what infants discriminate by measuring differential response, which §53.2.1 takes up.

Proposition 53.1. *Infants perceive substantially more and earlier than the traditions of ch. 1 supposed, representing objects as cohesive and continuous and requiring active movement for perceptual calibration. The Gibsonian account is relational as between creature and environment, which is the middle claim of §52.2.1 and not a claim about relations between persons.*

53.1.2 Perceptual Narrowing

The literature's central developmental finding is that early perceptual capacity is broad and becomes selective, and this chapter's argument turns on it.

Werker and Tees (2005) reports the case that has been established most fully. Infants in the first months discriminate speech contrasts from languages they have never heard, including contrasts adult speakers of their own language cannot hear. Between roughly six and twelve months this discrimination declines for contrasts absent from the surrounding language and is maintained for those present in it. The pattern has been found for face discrimination across species and across unfamiliar human populations, and for other domains.

The finding is standardly described as tuning, as commitment, or as the loss of unused discriminations, and the standard explanation is that experience with a particular environment shapes which distinctions the perceptual system maintains.

Three features of the finding matter here and none is disputed.

It concerns which differences remain perceptible rather than how acutely a difference is registered. What is lost is not resolution and is the treating of two things as different at all.

It is driven by the distribution of what the infant encounters, and the encounters that drive it are overwhelmingly encounters with persons speaking and persons' faces.

And it is not reversible on ordinary timescales, which is why adult speakers cannot hear contrasts they discriminated at four months.

Proposition 53.2. *Early perceptual capacity is broad and becomes selective, discrimination declining for contrasts absent from the surrounding environment and being maintained for those present. What is lost is the treating of two things as different rather than resolution, the process is driven by the distribution of encounters, which are overwhelmingly encounters with persons, and it is not readily reversible.*

53.2 Its Ontological Premises

53.2.1 The Requirements of the Verbs

§1.25.1 identified the move by which a property belonging to a relation is located elsewhere, and the way to find it is to ask what an account's verbs require of their subject.

The verbs of this literature are that an infant detects, discriminates, represents, extracts, and expects. Each takes the infant as subject and something in the array as object, and each is

satisfied by facts about the infant and the array alone.

This is appropriate to what the experiments establish. An experiment presents two arrays and measures whether responses differ, and where they do the infant has discriminated. Nothing in that procedure requires a third party, and the framework does not dispute what the procedure establishes.

What the verbs do not supply is the individuation of the object. An infant discriminates A from B, where A and B are the arrays the experimenter constructed. That the infant responded differently to two things the experimenter distinguished does not establish that the infant carved the world at that joint, and the literature is careful about this in its methods and silent about it in its ontology.

Proposition 53.3. *The verbs of the literature take the infant as subject and something in the array as object, and are satisfied by facts about the two alone. This is appropriate to what the experiments establish. The verbs do not supply the individuation of the object, since the arrays compared were carved by the experimenter.*

53.2.2 The Locus of the Omission

The premise located is that the joints at which the world is carved are given, so that the developmental question is which of the given distinctions a perceptual system retains.

§53.1.2 is the finding this premise organises. Narrowing is described as loss, tuning, or commitment, and each description presupposes a set of distinctions that existed to be lost, tuned, or committed to. §52.2.2 held that what a capacity is a capacity for is settled by a description, and the premise here is that the descriptions are supplied by the world rather than by anyone.

The premise is not obviously false and this book does not refute it. What the framework holds is narrower and follows from the finding itself.

Narrowing is driven by the distribution of encounters, and §53.1.2 recorded that the encounters driving it are overwhelmingly with persons. Which contrasts a child continues to hear is settled by which contrasts the people around him produce, and which faces he continues to distinguish is settled by whose faces he sees. The literature states this and treats the persons as a source of stimulus distribution.

What the framework adds is that the distribution is not a natural fact about an environment. §47.2.2 established that a household's position governs which settings its children encounter, and §37.1.2 established what a household supplies. The array a child encounters is the array a set of relations produces, and to treat it as a stimulus distribution is to describe a relational structure in terms that omit the structure.

Proposition 53.4. *The premise located is that the joints at which the world is carved are given, so that development is the retention of some among given distinctions. The framework does not refute it and observes that the distribution driving narrowing is produced by relations, so that describing it as a stimulus distribution omits the structure that produces it.*

53.3 The Conditions of Generation

53.3.1 The Marked Differences

The first condition is that a difference be responded to differently by someone.

§53.1.2 established that discriminations are maintained where the environment sustains them, and the framework's specification is that sustaining consists in differential response. A contrast that no party ever treats as making a difference is a contrast whose maintenance has no support, and §6.1.2 established that a pattern unmaintained does not persist.

The specification does more work than the general finding in one respect. It predicts that what matters is the differential response rather than the frequency of exposure, since a difference encountered constantly and never responded to differently supplies nothing to maintain the discrimination. ch. 70 inherits this as a design point and §53.5.2 states what would distinguish the two.

Two familiar cases illustrate the condition without establishing it.

A child in a household where one adult's approach and another's are met with the same conduct by everyone has less to sustain a discrimination between them than a child in a household where the difference is acted upon.

And a child whose distress and whose fatigue are met identically has less to sustain the distinction between them, which ch. 59 takes up, since the distinction in question is between his own states.

Proposition 53.5. *The first condition of generation is that a difference be responded to differently by some party, since §6.1.2 established that an unmaintained pattern does not persist. The specification predicts that differential response rather than frequency of exposure is what maintains a discrimination.*

53.3.2 The Constitution of Sameness

The second condition concerns equivalence rather than difference and is the more consequential.

Perceiving requires that distinct arrays be taken as presentations of one thing, and no array supplies its own equivalence class. The same face in two lights, the same word in two voices, the same room from two doorways: each is a pair of arrays treated as one thing, and §52.2.2 held that what a capacity is a capacity for is settled by a description.

Equivalence classes are maintained by treatment. A parent who responds to a child's two very different vocalisations as the same request has treated them as equivalent, and a parent who responds differently has not. §38.2.1 established that what each party supplied is in what an occasion became, and an occasion in which a child's contribution is assimilated to a class is an occasion in which the class is exercised.

Two consequences.

The child's own equivalence classes are not observable independently of the responses that maintain them, which §30.2.2 established for the general case.

And an equivalence class is a description in the sense of ch. 16, which is what §53.4.1 requires.

Proposition 53.6. *Perceiving requires that distinct arrays be taken as presentations of one thing, and no array supplies its own equivalence class. Equivalence classes are maintained by differential and assimilating treatment, and an equivalence class is a description in the sense of [ch. 16](#).*

53.3.3 The Perception of One's Own States

The two conditions apply to a class of arrays the preceding sections have not mentioned, and the omission would misrepresent the function's range.

A child's own bodily states are arrays in the sense [§53.3.2](#) defined. Hunger, fatigue, the early phase of an illness, the sensation preceding distress, and the difference between exertion and strain each present as something registered, and each must be taken as a presentation of one thing across occasions that differ. [§53.3.1](#) established that a difference is maintained where some party responds to it differently, and [§53.3.2](#) that no array supplies its own equivalence class.

Three features distinguish this class and the third is why it is treated here rather than left to [ch. 59](#).

The child has privileged access and no privileged individuation. That he registers something is not in question, and [§53.1.1](#) recorded what the literature establishes about early discrimination. What is at issue is under which description he registers it, and [§52.2.2](#) established that a capacity is picked out only under a description no child supplies himself.

The responses that individuate are responses to conduct rather than to the state. An adult does not encounter a child's fatigue and cannot; he encounters a child who has stopped, and responds to that. [§15.1.1](#) established that a child encounters an approach, and the approach here supplies the description under which what he registered is subsequently taken.

And the class is where the conditions of [ch. 54](#) and this chapter meet. [§54.2.2](#) established that a movement is individuated by what it accomplishes and that the individuation is supplied by what the movement is met with. A state registered in the course of moving is registered under a description the same meeting supplies, and [§54.3.3](#) states what follows.

Proposition 53.7. *A child's own bodily states are arrays in the sense of [§53.3.2](#) and require equivalence classes no array supplies. He has privileged access and no privileged individuation, the responses that individuate are responses to his conduct rather than to the state, and the class is where the conditions of [ch. 54](#) and this chapter meet.*

53.3.4 The Interoceptive Literature

A body of work bears directly on [§53.3.3](#) and three of its findings are used here.

[Craig \(2002\)](#) established the neuroanatomical case for treating the sense of the body's physiological condition as a sensory system in its own right rather than as a by-product of other systems. [Seth \(2013\)](#) develops a predictive account on which what is registered is the outcome of inference rather than a transcription of a signal.

[Garfinkel et al. \(2015\)](#) establishes that interoception is not one capacity. Objective performance at detecting a bodily signal, self-reported sensitivity to bodily states, and the correspondence between confidence and performance are dissociable, and a party may score well on one

and poorly on another. The bearing on this chapter is a caution rather than a support: §53.3.3 holds that a child's states require equivalence classes he does not supply, and the dissociations establish that no single quantity records how well he registers them.

Barrett (2017) supplies the account nearest the framework's position. On the theory of constructed emotion, what is registered is categorised by concepts the party has acquired, so that an emotion is the application of a learned category to interoceptive material rather than the detection of a state that was already of that kind. §53.3.2 holds that no array supplies its own equivalence class, and this account holds the same of the arrays at issue here.

The proximity requires the treatment §8.1.1 requires. Barrett's account is constructionist about the categories and locates their acquisition in a party's history with a language and a culture. The framework locates it in particular relations, and §53.3.1 holds that what maintains a distinction is a party's responding to it differently. The two are compatible and are not the same claim, and Meins et al. (2002) supplies the developmental case the framework requires, reporting that caregivers who comment appropriately on an infant's mental states predict his later understanding of minds.

What the framework adds is the closure form. §59.4.1 defines a repertoire of states no experience extends, and an account on which categories are learned has no term for a set of categories that nothing encountered can extend, which §55.4.1 established of a language and §30.1.2 of a description.

Proposition 53.8. *Craig (2002) and Seth (2013) establish interoception as a system in its own right, Garfinkel et al. (2015) that it is not one capacity, and Barrett (2017) that what is registered is categorised by learned concepts, which is §53.3.2 applied to these arrays. Barrett locates acquisition in a language and a culture and the framework in particular relations, and what the framework adds is the closure form of §59.4.1.*

53.4 The Forms of Closure

53.4.1 Closure in Perception's Idiom

§30.1.2 defined closure as the condition in which no occasion reaches a description, and §53.3.2 established that an equivalence class is a description. Closure in perception's idiom is accordingly an equivalence class that no encounter can revise.

The form is ordinary and is mostly benign. A mature perceiver assimilates enormous variety to stable classes and could not function otherwise, and §41.1.1 established that absorbing a discrepancy is frequently correct.

What distinguishes the case this book is concerned with is the same thing that distinguished it before: whether anything could fail to be assimilated. §16.2.2 established the condition and it transfers without modification.

§53.1.2 supplies the strongest available instance and it is not a pathology. An adult who cannot hear a contrast is in a condition no encounter revises, and the condition was produced by an ordinary distribution of encounters in infancy. This is closure of a perceptual class, it is universal, and no party is at fault, which §35.1.1 established is the general shape.

Proposition 53.9. *Closure in perception's idiom is an equivalence class no encounter can revise.*

The form is ordinary and mostly benign, and what distinguishes the concerning case is whether anything could fail to be assimilated. Adult inability to hear a contrast discriminated in infancy is closure of a perceptual class, is universal, and involves no party at fault.

53.4.2 The Perception of Persons

The case that matters most for this book is the one in which the equivalence class is a class of persons or of their conduct.

§17.1.1 established that a symbol realises itself in what it describes, and §16.2.1 established the readings by which a discrepancy is absorbed. Where the description is perceptual, the absorption occurs before anything is registered as requiring handling, and §41.2.1 established that a manner of handling misfit governs what a party registers as a misfit at all.

A child who has come to perceive an adult's expression as anger will perceive it so on the occasions when it is fatigue, and the correction §42.3.1 requires is unavailable, since nothing presents itself as a candidate for correction. This is the second level of ch. 30 operating at the level at which evidence would arrive.

The finding should be stated with its limit. Nothing here holds that such perceptions are common, and §48.4.2 recorded the general position on claims argued and not demonstrated. What is established is that the framework's central condition has a perceptual form, and that where it obtains perceptually it forecloses the occasions on which its non-perceptual forms would be corrected.

Proposition 53.10. *Where an equivalence class is a class of persons or of their conduct, absorption occurs before anything is registered as requiring handling. A child perceiving an adult's expression as anger perceives it so when it is fatigue, and the correction §42.3.1 requires is unavailable, since nothing presents as a candidate for it. The condition is not claimed to be common and is established as possible.*

53.5 The Implications for Practice

53.5.1 The Operation of Marking

§52.4.1 recorded that this section states what acts do rather than what should be done.

Responding differently to two things maintains the discrimination between them, by §53.3.1. Responding identically to two things maintains their equivalence, by §53.3.2. Neither is a recommendation and both describe what an act does.

Two applications follow and both are descriptions.

An adult who responds to a child's states by their consequences for the household assimilates states that differ for the child, since what distinguishes distress from fatigue is not their consequences for anyone else. ch. 59 takes up what follows.

And an adult whose responses are governed by a settled description of the child treats occasions as equivalent that the description makes equivalent, which §17.1.1 established produces occasions conforming to the description. The perceptual form of this is that the adult's own perception of the child narrows, and §14.2.1 established that the party who names is altered

by the naming.

Proposition 53.11. *Responding differently to two things maintains their discrimination and responding identically maintains their equivalence. An adult responding to a child's states by their consequences for the household assimilates states that differ for the child, and an adult whose responses follow a settled description narrows his own perception of the child.*

53.5.2 The Conditions of Test

The chapter makes one claim that departs from the established account in a testable way, and §46.4.2 recorded that the framework's observables are proposed and untested.

§53.3.1 predicts that differential response rather than frequency of exposure maintains a discrimination. The established account attributes narrowing to the distribution of input, and the two diverge where a contrast is frequent in the input and is never acted upon differentially by anyone. A child hearing a contrast constantly in ambient speech that no party ever treats as making a difference should, on the present account, lose it, and should on the standard account retain it.

The design is stated more carefully in ch. 75, and two difficulties attach. §28.3.2 established what becomes of an arranged occasion, and a contrast marked in order to test the prediction has been marked. And §30.2.2 established that a negative result does not distinguish a prediction's failure from a probe that failed to probe.

Proposition 53.12. *The chapter predicts that a contrast frequent in the input and never treated by any party as making a difference will not be maintained, where the established account predicts it will. The prediction diverges from the established account and inherits the difficulties §28.3.2 and §30.2.2 identified.*

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Chapter 54

The Generation of Movement

The Work of This Chapter

§52.4.2 placed movement second among the hard cases. A child's moving appears to be the clearest instance of something he does by himself, and the chapter must show that the claim of §52.2.2 does work here.

§54.1 gives the established account, which has already displaced a maturational premise by its own means and which is granted in full. §54.2 locates the premise remaining, which concerns the individuation of a task.

§54.3 states the conditions of generation, holding that a movement is stabilised by what it is met with. §54.4 states closure in the idiom of a repertoire, and §54.5 states what particular acts do, including one that is nearly universal and whose effect is not generally noticed.

The reader should carry forward the stepping case, the account of anticipatory completion, and the prediction it yields.

54.1 The Established Account

54.1.1 From Maturation to Dynamics

The study of motor development supplies the clearest instance in this literature of a premise displaced by evidence, and the displacement is granted here in full.

Gesell (1925) established the maturational account, on which motor milestones unfold in a fixed sequence governed by neural ripening and are little affected by circumstance. The account organised the field for decades and supplied the normative schedules still in use.

Thelen and Fisher (1982) reported the case that undid it. The newborn stepping response was held to disappear at around two months through cortical inhibition of a subcortical reflex, which the maturational account explained straightforwardly. Thelen established that infants whose legs were submerged, and infants whose legs were weighted, produced and suppressed the response according to the ratio of leg mass to muscle strength. Nothing had been inhibited. The infants had grown heavier faster than they had grown stronger, and the response returned when the load was altered.

Thelen and Smith (1994) developed this into a general account on which a motor capacity is a stable pattern arising from the assembly of many components, none of which contains the pattern, and Thelen et al. (2001) extended it to perseverative reaching. Gibson (1988) and Held (2006) established the reciprocity of movement and perception, and §53.1.1 recorded that perceptual calibration requires the perceiver to move.

Proposition 54.1. *The maturational account of Gesell (1925) was displaced by Thelen and Fisher (1982), which established that the disappearance of newborn stepping was a change in the ratio of leg mass to strength rather than a neural inhibition. A motor capacity is on the resulting account a stable pattern assembled from components none of which contains it.*

54.1.2 The Findings of the Dynamic Account

Three propositions of that account bear on this chapter and each is retained.

A motor capacity is assembled rather than possessed, which §52.1.2 adopted as the general formulation for capacities and which the motor case supplied.

The assembly includes the task and the surface. Whether an infant steps depends on what he is held over and how, and Thelen and Smith (1994) established that the same infant exhibits and fails to exhibit a capacity as the arrangement is altered.

And variability is the material of development rather than noise in it. Infants produce many movements, most unsuccessful, and what stabilises is selected from what was produced, which §37.3.2 treated in another connection.

The account is accordingly relational in the sense §52.2.1 called the middle claim, and its relata are a body, a task, and a surface.

Proposition 54.2. *The dynamic account establishes that a motor capacity is assembled rather than possessed, that the assembly includes the task and the surface so that the same infant exhibits and fails to exhibit a capacity as the arrangement varies, and that variability is the material from which stabilisation selects. Its relata are a body, a task, and a surface.*

54.2 Its Ontological Premises

54.2.1 The Requirements of the Verbs

The verbs of the dynamic account are that a pattern assembles, stabilises, and destabilises, and that an infant explores, produces, and selects.

These verbs are unusually well suited to the framework's purposes, and the chapter should say so. They take a system as subject rather than a child, they make the outcome depend on an arrangement, and they do not locate a capacity anywhere. §1.25.1 identified the move the framework resists, and this account largely declines it.

The premise that remains is in the term the account does not analyse. A pattern stabilises with respect to a task, and the task appears throughout as given. An infant is described as reaching for an object, as learning to walk, as solving the problem of locomotion over a surface, and in each case what would count as success is settled before the analysis begins.

Proposition 54.3. *The verbs of the dynamic account take a system as subject, make outcomes depend on arrangements, and locate no capacity anywhere, so the account largely declines the move §1.25.1 identified. The premise remaining is that a task is given, since what would count as success is settled before the analysis begins.*

54.2.2 The Locus of the Omission

§52.2.2 held that what a capacity is a capacity for is settled by a description, and the motor case makes the point unusually concrete.

A movement is individuated by what it accomplishes. The same trajectory of an arm is a reach for a cup, a gesture, a push, or a failure to do any of these, and nothing in the trajectory settles which. The literature individuates by the experimenter's task, exactly as §53.2.1 found for perception, and the individuation is appropriate to what an experiment establishes.

Outside an experiment the individuation is supplied by what the movement is met with. An arm extended toward a cup is a reach where someone treats it as one, and §53.3.2 established that equivalence classes are maintained by treatment. §38.2.1 established that an occasion is shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what it became, and a movement met and completed is a movement taken up.

The Gibsonian notion of an affordance is close here and stops short. Gibson (1979) holds that what is perceived are relations between a creature's capacities and the environment's properties, so that a surface affords walking for a creature of a certain size. The relata are a creature and a surface. What the present account adds is that in the human case what a thing affords is settled additionally by what is permitted, what is responded to, and what is treated as having been done, and §47.2.2 established that these are properties of arrangements.

Proposition 54.4. *A movement is individuated by what it accomplishes and no trajectory settles which accomplishment it is. Outside an experiment the individuation is supplied by what the movement is met with. The Gibsonian affordance relates a creature and a surface, and the present account adds that in the human case what a thing affords is settled by what is permitted, responded to, and treated as done.*

54.3 The Conditions of Generation

54.3.1 A Movement Is Stabilised by What It Meets

§54.1.2 established that variability is the material and that what stabilises is selected from what was produced. The condition of generation is what performs the selection.

In the cases the literature studies, the selection is performed by the physics. A movement that gets the infant across the floor is selected because it gets him across the floor, and §54.1.1 established that the ratio of mass to strength governs what is available.

Where the movement's accomplishment is constituted by another party, the selection is performed by that party's response. A vocalisation that is answered, a gesture that is met, an arm extended that receives a cup: each is a movement whose accomplishment consists in what followed, and §53.3.1 established that differential response is what maintains a distinction.

Two consequences follow and the second is the chapter's principal finding.

The set of movements a child stabilises is accordingly a joint product in the sense §17.1.1 defined, for the class of movements whose accomplishment is social. §38.2.1 applies to these unchanged.

And a movement that is anticipated is a movement that does not complete. §54.3.2 states this at length.

Proposition 54.5. *What stabilises a movement is what performs the selection among produced variability. Where the accomplishment is physical the physics selects, and where the accomplishment is constituted by another party the party's response selects. The movements a child stabilises are accordingly a joint product for the class whose accomplishment is social.*

54.3.2 Anticipatory Completion

An adult attending closely to a child frequently completes the child's movement before the child does, and the act is nearly universal, is generally an expression of care, and has an effect that is not usually noticed.

The structure is this. A child begins to reach for something out of range and the adult passes it to him. A child begins a word and the adult supplies it. A child begins to climb and the adult lifts him. In each case the accomplishment occurs and the child's movement does not complete.

Three propositions of this book apply.

§54.3.1 established that a movement is stabilised by what it accomplishes. A movement that did not complete accomplished nothing, and the accomplishment that occurred was the adult's.

§15.2.2 established that a foreclosed occasion leaves no trace. Neither party can subsequently establish that the child would have completed the movement, and the adult's experience is of having helped.

And §11.1.2 established that a rate maintains itself. A child whose movements are regularly completed initiates fewer, which produces fewer occasions on which completion could be withheld, and §40.2.2 established that the mechanism runs in both directions.

The finding should be stated with two limits. Anticipatory completion is often necessary, and a child reaching toward something dangerous should be intercepted. And nothing here holds that the effect is large, since §33.4.2 distinguished reliability about structure from reliability about magnitude.

Proposition 54.6. *An adult completing a child's movement before the child does produces the accomplishment while the child's movement does not complete, so nothing is stabilised in the child. The occasion leaves no trace, the adult's experience is of having helped, and the resulting reduction in initiation is self-maintaining. The act is often necessary and no claim is made about magnitude.*

54.3.3 The Proprioceptive Case

§53.3.3 established that a child's own states are arrays requiring equivalence classes, and held that the class is where the conditions of this chapter and ch. 53 meet. This section states the meeting.

A movement is registered by the party performing it, and what is registered includes position, effort, and the difference between a movement that is going well and one that is not. Gallagher (2005) distinguishes the body schema, which is a system of sensory and motor capacities operating without perceptual monitoring, from the body image, which is a system of

perceptions and beliefs about one's own body, and Merleau-Ponty (1962) supplies the account of the lived body on which the distinction rests. The present section concerns the second, since a belief about one's own body is a description and §52.2.2 established that descriptions are supplied. §54.2.2 established that a movement is individuated by what it accomplishes and that outside an experiment the individuation is supplied by what the movement is met with.

What follows is that the child's registration of his own movement is individuated by the same responses that individuate the movement. A child whose reaching is met as reaching registers what he did under that description, and a child whose reaching is met as a demand, as a nuisance, or as an occasion for assistance registers it under those. §38.2.1 established that an occasion is shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what it became, and the child's own record of what he did is among the things the occasion produces.

Two consequences follow and the second bears on §54.3.2.

The distinction between effort and strain is maintained by differential response, in the manner §53.3.1 established. An adult responding to both by intervening supplies nothing that maintains it, and §59.5.1 established the general form, which is that what distinguishes two states is not their consequences for anyone else.

And a movement completed by another party is not registered as an incomplete movement. §54.3.2 established that the accomplishment occurs and the child's movement does not complete, and the present section adds that no proprioceptive record of the incompleteness is thereby produced, since §15.2.2 established that what did not occur leaves no trace. The child does not experience having been interrupted.

Proposition 54.7. *A child's registration of his own movement is individuated by the same responses that individuate the movement. The distinction between effort and strain is maintained by differential response, and a movement completed by another produces no record of the incompleteness, so the child does not experience having been interrupted.*

54.4 The Forms of Closure

54.4.1 Closure in the Idiom of a Repertoire

Closure in this function's idiom is a repertoire that no attempt can extend.

§30.1.2 defined the general condition, and the specific form is reached where the movements a child initiates are confined to those already met, and the confinement removes the occasions on which the boundary would be tested. §54.3.2 supplies one route and §44.3.2 supplies the general form: an attempt requires an occasion, and the occasions have contracted.

The condition is compatible with high competence within the repertoire. A child whose initiated movements are all met and all succeed is a child whose repertoire is stable and unextended, and §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity. Nothing appears to be going wrong.

Proposition 54.8. *Closure in this idiom is a repertoire no attempt extends, reached where the movements a child initiates are confined to those already met and the confinement removes the occasions on which the boundary would be tested. It is compatible with high competence within the repertoire.*

54.4.2 The Description That Produces the Movement

The second form is the one that connects this chapter to [ch. 17](#).

A child described as clumsy is approached differently. He is watched, is warned, is helped sooner, and is given fewer occasions in which a movement could be attempted without supervision. [§17.1.1](#) established that an occasion is a joint product and [§15.1.1](#) established that a child encounters an approach.

What the approach produces is a child who attempts less, who attempts under observation, and whose attempts under observation go worse, which [§28.3.2](#) established for occasions whose point is producing a result. The description is then confirmed.

[§16.2.1](#) supplies the readings by which a successful attempt is absorbed: he was lucky, it was easy, he is improving. [§16.2.2](#) established that these are applied without being devised, and the adults are attentive and concerned throughout.

Proposition 54.9. *A child described as clumsy is approached with supervision and assistance, attempts less, and attempts under observation, which [§28.3.2](#) established goes worse. The description is confirmed by what it produced, and the readings of [§16.2.1](#) absorb successful attempts without any party devising them.*

54.5 The Implications for Practice

54.5.1 The Operation of Completion

[§52.4.1](#) recorded that this section describes what acts do.

Completing a child's movement accomplishes the thing and stabilises nothing in the child, by [§54.3.2](#). Withholding completion leaves the accomplishment uncertain and leaves the movement to complete or fail, and [§54.1.2](#) established that failure is the material development selects from.

Neither is a recommendation, and the reason is the one [§40.4.2](#) gave. An adult who withholds completion in order that a movement shall stabilise has made the occasion one whose outcome he has settled in advance, and [§38.2.2](#) excluded such occasions. [§38.4.2](#) established the general form.

What is available is the description. An adult who knows what completion does is differently placed from one who does not, and [§8.2.1](#) recorded that supplying such descriptions is the form this book's practical content takes.

Proposition 54.10. *Completion accomplishes the thing and stabilises nothing in the child; withholding it leaves the movement to complete or fail, which is the material development selects from. Neither is recommended, since withholding in order to produce stabilisation settles the occasion's outcome in advance.*

54.5.2 The Conditions of Test

The chapter yields a prediction that departs from the established account.

[§54.3.2](#) predicts that the rate at which a child initiates movements varies with the rate at

which his movements have been completed by others, independently of his competence. The dynamic account predicts that initiation varies with the stability of the relevant patterns, which is a matter of the child's own assembly.

The two diverge in the case of a competent child whose movements are habitually anticipated. The present account predicts low initiation with high competence within the repertoire, and §54.4.1 established that this is the closure form. The dynamic account has no reason to expect the combination.

ch. 75 carries the design. The difficulties are those §53.5.2 recorded, and one further: initiation rate is observable, which makes it more tractable than the observables of §44.4.1 and correspondingly more exposed to the reactivity §28.3.2 established.

Proposition 54.11. *The chapter predicts that initiation rate varies with the rate at which a child's movements have been completed by others, independently of competence, so that a competent child whose movements are habitually anticipated will initiate little. The dynamic account predicts initiation from the stability of the child's own patterns and has no reason to expect that combination.*

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Chapter 55

The Generation of Language

The Work of This Chapter

§52.4.2 placed this chapter third and at greater length, since it is where the tradition nearest this framework is strongest and where §52.3.2 must be made good in detail.

§55.1 gives the established account through its two principal positions. §55.2 holds that the two share a premise despite disagreeing about everything else, which is that a language exists to be acquired.

§55.3 states the conditions of generation and holds that what a child acquires is the language of a household, which includes what may be said, to whom, and about what. §55.4 states closure in this function's idiom and returns to a report ch. 31 relied on without explaining. §55.5 states what particular acts do.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between a language and the language of a household, and the account of what makes a thing unsayable within one.

55.1 The Established Account

55.1.1 The Nativist Account

Chomsky (1959) displaced the behaviourist account of language acquisition, and Chomsky (1965) and Chomsky (1980) developed the position that has organised the field since.

The argument granted here is the one from the poverty of the stimulus. What a child hears underdetermines the grammar he arrives at: the input contains errors, fragments, and no negative evidence, and children nonetheless converge on structures no exposure to the input alone would license. The inference is that substantial structure is contributed by the child rather than by the input, and that the contribution is species-specific and maturationally scheduled.

Two features of the position bear on this chapter.

The child is the locus of what is contributed, and §1.25.1 identified this as the move common to the traditions of ch. 1. The account is unusual in making the move explicitly and arguing for it rather than presupposing it.

And the input is characterised as a stimulus, which §53.2.2 found in the perceptual literature also, and which §55.2.2 takes up.

Proposition 55.1. *The nativist account holds that what a child hears underdetermines the grammar he arrives at, so that substantial structure is contributed by the child and is species-specific. It locates the contribution in the child explicitly and by argument, and characterises what the child encounters as input.*

55.1.2 The Usage-Based Response

Tomasello (1999) and Tomasello (2008) develop the principal alternative, on which grammatical structure is abstracted from usage rather than supplied in advance.

The account holds that a child begins with concrete item-based constructions, generalises across them, and arrives at abstract patterns by ordinary mechanisms of categorisation and analogy. Tomasello et al. (2005) supplies the account of shared intentionality on which this rests, holding that the capacity to form joint goals and to attend jointly is what makes linguistic communication possible, and §38.1.2 recorded the framework's engagement with that position.

Vygotsky (1986) supplies an older statement of a related view, in which speech is social before it is inner and thought is restructured by its acquisition, and Bruner (1990) develops the account of narrative form which §31.3.2 drew on.

Bernstein (1971) supplies the position closest to this chapter's concerns, holding that what is acquired is a code governing what can be said rather than a vocabulary, and §37.1.2 recorded the framework's debt and the point of departure.

Two features bear here.

The account is relational in the sense §52.2.1 called the middle claim, since joint attention between persons is where the structure comes from.

And it is developmental in the genetic sense: the interpersonal is the origin of the intrapersonal, and §52.3.2 recorded that the framework's difference from it concerns individuation rather than origin.

Proposition 55.2. *The usage-based account holds that grammatical structure is abstracted from usage by ordinary categorisation, resting on a prior capacity for joint attention. It is relational in the middle sense of §52.2.1 and genetic in its form, the interpersonal being the origin of the intrapersonal.*

55.2 Its Ontological Premises

55.2.1 The Shared Premise

The two positions disagree about the mechanism, the timing, the species-specificity, and the interpretation of nearly every finding. They agree about the target.

On both, there is a language which the child comes to have. The nativist holds that arriving at it requires antecedent structure and the usage-based theorist holds that it does not, and both take the endpoint to be a determinate object: the grammar of a natural language, possessed by its speakers and shared among them.

The premise is visible in the verbs. A child acquires a language, learns a construction, masters a rule, converges on a grammar. §54.2.1 found the corresponding structure in the motor literature, and each of these verbs takes the child as subject and a language as object.

The premise is not obviously false and this book does not refute it. A natural language is a real object of study and its description is a considerable achievement.

Proposition 55.3. *The nativist and usage-based accounts disagree about mechanism and agree about the target, which is a determinate language possessed by its speakers. The premise appears*

in verbs taking the child as subject and a language as object, and the framework does not refute it.

55.2.2 The Locus of the Omission

The condition drops out at the point where the language a child encounters is treated as a sample of the language he is acquiring.

No child encounters English. A child encounters particular people saying particular things in particular circumstances, and §47.2.2 established that a household's position governs which people and which circumstances. The literature treats this as sampling from a population, so that variation between children's environments is variation in the quantity and quality of a sample.

What the sampling description omits is that the utterances a child encounters are not merely instances of a language. They are also, and simultaneously, the operation of the grammar §37.1.2 defined: the terms in which situations are described in this household, the distinctions its members draw, and the moves they recognise. A child acquiring the first is acquiring the second, since they are carried by the same utterances.

Bernstein (1971) saw this and derived the codes from class structure, which §37.3.1 declined for the reason given there. What the present account retains is the level: a code governs what can be said, which is prior to what is said, and §15.1.1 established the corresponding priority for a child's encounter with an approach.

The consequence is that the two accounts of §55.1 are answering a question about one of two things a child acquires from the same material, and are silent about the other.

Proposition 55.4. *No child encounters a language. He encounters particular people saying particular things, and those utterances are simultaneously instances of a language and the operation of a household's grammar. The literature treats the first and is silent about the second, and the two are carried by the same material.*

55.3 The Conditions of Generation

55.3.1 The Language of a Household

What a child acquires, on the present account, is the language of a household, and the phrase requires specification since it is not a dialect.

It comprises three things.

The terms available for describing situations, which §37.1.2 identified as what passes between generations, and which include the terms for describing persons that ch. 14 treated.

The settled expectations about what may be said, to whom, and in what circumstances. §44.1.1 established that a rule may exist unformulated, and expectations of this kind are almost never formulated.

And the moves recognised as moves, which §39.1.1 treated for the case of a question. A household in which a certain kind of utterance is not recognised as an objection is a household in which objecting by that route does not occur, whatever is said.

§44.1.2 applies with unusual force here. A household's account of what may be discussed within it and what may in fact be discussed diverge ordinarily and without dishonesty, and §44.3.2 established the three conditions under which something can in fact be raised.

Proposition 55.5. *The language of a household comprises the terms available for describing situations, the settled and generally unformulated expectations about what may be said and to whom, and the utterances recognised as moves. A household's account of what may be discussed and what may in fact be discussed diverge in the manner §44.1.2 established.*

55.3.2 The Conditions of Sayability

Three conditions must hold for a thing to be sayable by a child in his household, and they are the conditions §44.3.2 identified, which is not a coincidence since contesting is done in speech.

There must be terms. §31.4.1 established that a subject who has acquired later terms can report their prior absence, and the absence in question is an absence in the household's language.

There must be an occasion. §5.2.2 established what contracts occasions and §39.2.2 established what distinguishes an occasion in which something is taken up.

And the saying must be able to reach. §16.2.2 established that where the readings absorbing a discrepancy are undefeatable, no occasion reaches the description, and an utterance is among the occasions so absorbed.

The three fail independently and produce different appearances, which §44.3.2 established for the case of objection. A child lacking terms says nothing and appears to have nothing to say. A child lacking occasions says nothing and appears busy or quiet. A child whose utterances are absorbed talks a great deal.

Proposition 55.6. *A thing is sayable by a child in his household where terms exist, an occasion exists, and the saying can reach a description. The three fail independently: a child lacking terms appears to have nothing to say, a child lacking occasions appears quiet, and a child whose utterances are absorbed talks a great deal.*

55.4 The Forms of Closure

55.4.1 The Language Closed to an Extension

Closure in this function's idiom is a language whose terms cannot be extended by what its speakers encounter.

The general condition is §30.1.2 and the specific form follows from §55.3.2. Where a household's terms do not accommodate something a child undergoes, and no occasion arises on which the deficiency could be marked, and any attempt to mark it is absorbed, the thing is not sayable and its unsayability is not sayable either.

Two features distinguish this from an ordinary limitation of vocabulary.

It is not remedied by supplying a word, and §3.3.1 established what becomes of a commitment conveyed without the premise that generated it. A term introduced into a household whose grammar has no place for it is used in the ways that grammar supplies.

And it is invisible in the manner §50.1.2 established for slow variables. A speaker does not register the absence of terms he has never had, and §41.1.1 established that material fitting what a party holds requires no handling.

§32.4.2 established that a tradition may lack a term for a condition and therefore be unable to state it, and the present section is that result at household scale.

Proposition 55.7. *Closure in this idiom is a language whose terms cannot be extended by what its speakers encounter, reached where terms do not accommodate what a child undergoes, no occasion arises to mark the deficiency, and attempts to mark it are absorbed. It is not remedied by supplying a word and is invisible to those within it.*

55.4.2 The Report of Prior Unavailability Explained

§31.4.1 identified as the reliable part of a retrospective report the claim that certain terms were unavailable, and used it without explaining what such unavailability consists in. The present chapter supplies the explanation.

The claim is a claim about the language of a household in the sense of §55.3.1. A subject reporting that there was no way to say a thing is reporting that his household's terms did not accommodate it, that no occasion arose on which the deficiency was marked, and that his attempts were absorbed.

Three things follow and the second matters for Part VI.

The claim is about a determinate object and is in principle checkable against it, unlike a claim about what the subject felt, which §31.3.1 established he did not undergo in the form he now gives it.

The claim's reliability, which §31.4.1 argued from the observation that a later vocabulary supplies terms without supplying the fact of their prior absence, receives a further support here. The subject's evidence for prior absence is that he now has terms his household's usage did not contain, and the containment is a fact about that usage.

And the convergence test §31.4.1 proposed acquires a sharper form. Subjects who acquired their later terms from different vocabularies should agree about which terms their households lacked while differing in how they characterise what was thereby unavailable, and ch. 75 inherits the refinement.

Proposition 55.8. *A report of prior unavailability is a claim about a household's language: that its terms did not accommodate something, that no occasion arose to mark this, and that attempts were absorbed. The claim concerns a determinate object, its reliability is supported by the fact that the subject's evidence is what that usage contained, and the convergence test acquires a sharper form.*

55.5 The Implications for Practice

55.5.1 The Operation of Supplying a Word

Two acts share a description and differ in what they do, and distinguishing them is the chapter's practical content.

Supplying a term for something the child has encountered adds to the terms available, which §55.3.1 identified as the first component of a household's language. This is how vocabularies grow and nothing here counts against it.

Supplying the word the child was reaching for is the act §54.3.2 described in the motor case. The child has begun a search, the accomplishment occurs, and the search does not complete. §54.3.1 established that what stabilises a movement is what it accomplishes, and the parallel holds: what completed was the adult's utterance.

The distinction is not one of manner or of timing alone. It turns on whether the child was searching, which §38.2.1 would settle by asking whether what he supplied is in what the occasion became. An adult who names a thing the child has not tried to name has supplied a term. An adult who names a thing the child is trying to name has completed a movement.

Neither is recommended, for the reason §54.5.1 gave. An adult who withholds a word in order that a search shall complete has settled the occasion's outcome in advance, and §38.2.2 excluded such occasions.

Proposition 55.9. *Supplying a term for something a child has encountered adds to the terms available. Supplying the word a child is reaching for completes a search that does not then complete, which is the act §54.3.2 described in the motor case. The distinction turns on whether the child was searching, and neither act is recommended.*

55.5.2 The Conditions of Test

The chapter yields one prediction and one refinement of an existing proposal.

The prediction concerns the two components §55.2.2 distinguished. Children of households alike in the quantity and variety of speech addressed to them, and differing in what may be said within them, should differ in what they can say about matters the household's expectations cover and not differ in general linguistic measures. The established accounts predict no such dissociation, since both measure acquisition against a language.

The refinement is the convergence test of §55.4.2, which now specifies what subjects should agree about.

The difficulties are those recorded throughout. §28.3.2 establishes that a household aware of what is measured produces it, and the present case is unusually exposed, since what may be said is alterable by a household in the short term in a way that a rate of uptake is not. ch. 76 takes this up.

Proposition 55.10. *The chapter predicts that children of households alike in speech quantity and differing in what may be said will differ in what they can say about the matters covered and not on general linguistic measures, a dissociation the established accounts do not predict. It refines the convergence test by specifying what subjects should agree about.*

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Chapter 56

The Generation of Concrete Operation

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter treats the operations Piaget described as concrete, and §52.4.2 placed it fourth.

§56.1 gives the operational account and the revision it has undergone. §56.2 locates the premise, which is that the task by which an operation is assessed is transparent to the child.

§56.3 states the conditions of generation and holds that reversibility in thought and answerability in a relation are the same structure, which is the strongest unification this Part offers. §56.4 states closure in this idiom and §56.5 states what particular acts do.

The reader should carry forward the identification of reversibility with answerability, and the account of what asking a question twice does.

56.1 The Established Account

56.1.1 The Operational Account

Piaget (1952) and Piaget (1954) established the account of infancy on which the later stages rest, and Piaget and Inhelder (1969) and Piaget (1970) give the mature statement.

The account holds that thought develops through the construction of operational structures, that an operation is an internalised action which is reversible, and that the concrete operations become available at around seven years and apply to material present to the child. Conservation is its central demonstration: a child who judges that quantity changes when a liquid is poured into a differently shaped vessel lacks the operation, and a child who judges that it does not has it and can say why.

Three features of the account are granted here.

It is constructivist. The structures are built by the child through his commerce with the world rather than supplied ready-made, and §52.2.1 would classify the environmental role as the weak or middle claim depending on the passage.

It is general. The operations are held to apply across content, which is what makes them structures rather than skills.

And it is developmental in the strong sense that the sequence is invariant, though the ages are not.

Proposition 56.1. *The operational account holds that thought develops through the construction of reversible operational structures, that the concrete operations apply to material present to the child, and that conservation demonstrates their presence. The account is constructivist,*

general across content, and committed to an invariant sequence.

56.1.2 The Revision

The account has been extensively revised and the revisions are granted.

Carey (2009) gives the fullest recent statement of the position that has displaced the general-structures view. Competences appear earlier than the operational account allowed, they appear unevenly across content rather than together, and what develops is better described as change in a domain's concepts than as the construction of a structure applying to all domains.

The unevenness is the finding that bears most on the present chapter. A child who conserves number may not conserve volume, and a child who classifies well with familiar material may not with unfamiliar, which is difficult for an account whose structures are content-general.

Two features of the revision matter here.

It preserves the location. The structures were in the child on the original account, and the domain-specific concepts are in the child on the revision, which §1.25.1 identified as the persisting move.

And it makes performance depend on the material, which is the beginning of the observation §56.2.2 completes.

Proposition 56.2. *The revision establishes that competences appear earlier and unevenly across content, which is difficult for content-general structures. It preserves the location of what develops in the child and makes performance depend on the material, which is where §56.2.2 takes it up.*

56.2 Its Ontological Premises

56.2.1 The Requirements of the Verbs

The verbs are that a child attains an operation, constructs a structure, decentres, and conserves. Each takes the child as subject, and §55.2.1 found the corresponding structure in the language literature.

The object differs from the previous cases in an instructive way. What a child attains here is a form of operating on descriptions rather than a description of the world: reversibility is a property of an operation rather than of what it operates on. The account is accordingly about the child's handling of material, which §41.1.1 identified as the object of an epistemic habit.

This makes the operational account the nearest of the developmental traditions to ch. 41, and the proximity should be recorded, since §8.3.1 ranked redescription as the most damaging finding.

The difference is that Piaget's operations are individuated logically and the manner of §41.1.1 is individuated by what a party does with what does not fit. A logical structure is content-general by construction, and §56.1.2 recorded that this is where the account has been revised.

Proposition 56.3. *The verbs take the child as subject, and their object is a form of operating on material rather than a description of the world, which makes the operational account the nearest*

developmental tradition to ch. 41. It differs in individuating operations logically, which commits it to the content-generality the revision has undermined.

56.2.2 The Transparent Task

The premise this chapter locates is that the task by which an operation is assessed is transparent to the child.

A conservation task consists of a question asked twice about an array altered in between. The account infers from a change of answer that the child judges quantity to have changed. The inference requires that the child take the second question to be asking what the first asked.

§39.1.1 established what a question is as a relational event, and §39.1.2 identified four forms that satisfy the grammatical description and fail the criterion. A question repeated after a visible action by the asker is, in the ordinary conduct of a household, an indication that the first answer was unsatisfactory, and §34.2.1 established what an examination question performs. A child who revises his answer has read the occasion as the ordinary conduct of adults would license.

The framework does not claim on this basis that children conserve earlier than the account holds. What it claims is narrower and follows from §52.2.2. What a child is credited with being able to do is settled by a description, the description here is supplied by the task, and the task's meaning to the child is a relational matter which the account treats as fixed.

Two things should be recorded plainly.

The observation has been pressed within the developmental literature itself, and the studies that pressed it are not surveyed here, which §56.5.2 records as a deficiency of this chapter.

And the framework's version is not an alternative empirical hypothesis. It is the claim that the assessment presupposes a relational condition, namely that the exchange is read by both parties in the same way, and that the presupposition is not itself assessed.

Proposition 56.4. *The premise is that the task is transparent to the child. A conservation task asks one question twice with a visible action between, which in ordinary household conduct indicates that the first answer was unsatisfactory. The framework claims that what a child is credited with is settled by a description the task supplies, and that the task's meaning to the child is a relational matter the account treats as fixed.*

56.3 The Conditions of Generation

56.3.1 Conservation as an Equivalence Judgment

§53.3.2 established that perceiving requires distinct arrays to be taken as presentations of one thing, and that equivalence classes are maintained by treatment. Conservation is a judgment of exactly this kind.

To conserve is to hold that the array before and the array after are the same in a respect, despite differing in others. The respect is quantity, and §53.3.2 established that no array supplies its own equivalence class.

The condition of generation is accordingly the one that chapter identified, applied to a

respect that is not perceptually given. Which respects are treated as surviving a transformation is settled by what the child's household treats as surviving one, and the cases are ordinary: whether a portion divided is still his portion, whether a toy lent is still his toy, whether a rule applied differently is still the same rule, which §44.1.2 treated.

The claim is not that conservation of liquid quantity is taught in households. It is that the general form, that a thing may remain the same in a respect through a transformation that alters its appearance, is a form a household exercises continuously and in matters that concern the child directly.

Proposition 56.5. *Conservation is a judgment that two arrays are the same in a respect despite differing in others, which §53.3.2 established requires an equivalence class no array supplies. Which respects survive a transformation is settled by what a household treats as surviving one, and the cases are ordinary and concern the child directly.*

56.3.2 Reversibility and Answerability

Piaget's criterion for an operation is reversibility: the child can undo the transformation in thought and return to the prior state. This section holds that reversibility and the answerability of §30.1.2 are the same structure, which is the strongest unification this Part offers.

§39.1.1 established the framework's central form: something is exposed to alteration by what it is directed at. §19.3.1 gave it for a symbol, §30.1.2 for an account of a child, and §39.1.1 for a question.

Reversibility is that form applied to a judgment. A judgment is reversible where the party who made it can return to the state before making it, which is to say where the making did not settle the matter. An irreversible judgment is one nothing can undo, which is the condition §16.2.2 defined for a description whose readings are undefeatable.

Two things follow.

The framework can state Piaget's criterion in its own terms without borrowing, which §8.3.1 required for any claim of this kind, and the statement is more general than his: reversibility is a property judgments may have about anything, and the operational account restricted it to logical transformations.

And a household bears on it. §44.3.2 established the conditions under which an objection can reach a requirement, and the same conditions govern whether a child's judgment can be revisited. A household in which what has been settled stays settled is a household exercising irreversibility continuously.

Proposition 56.6. *Reversibility is the framework's central form applied to a judgment: a judgment is reversible where the making of it did not settle the matter. The framework states Piaget's criterion in its own terms and more generally, since reversibility may hold of judgments about anything, and a household exercising irreversibility bears on whether a child's judgments can be revisited.*

56.4 The Forms of Closure

56.4.1 The Irreversible Judgment

Closure in this idiom is a judgment that nothing returns to.

§56.3.2 established the identification, and the closure form follows directly. Where a child's judgments are made and not revisited, and no occasion arises on which one is reopened, the practice of returning to a judgment is unexercised and §6.1.2 established that an unmaintained pattern does not persist.

The form is compatible with correct judgments throughout. A child whose judgments are right and are never revisited has no occasion to exercise reversal, and §54.4.1 recorded the corresponding point about competence within a repertoire.

Proposition 56.7. *Closure in this idiom is a judgment nothing returns to. Where judgments are made and not revisited, the practice of returning to one is unexercised and does not persist, and the condition is compatible with the judgments being correct.*

56.4.2 Correction Without Question

The second form concerns a household's characteristic response to a child's wrong answer.

Correcting an answer supplies the right one and closes the matter. Questioning an answer opens it, and §39.1.1 established that a question obtains where what comes back could go against the asker.

A household that corrects and does not question exercises the closing operation continuously. Each occasion terminates in a settled state, no occasion is one in which the child returns to a judgment, and §39.2.2 established that the property making a response good as information differs from the property at issue.

§39.3.2 established that a household acquires the examination form from the setting that practises it, and a correction is that form's completion: a question whose answer the asker holds, followed by the supplying of it.

Nothing here holds that children should not be corrected. §54.5.1 established the general position and §56.5.1 states what the acts do.

Proposition 56.8. *Correcting an answer supplies the right one and closes the matter, while questioning it opens it. A household that corrects and does not question exercises the closing operation continuously, and a correction completes the examination form §39.3.2 described.*

56.5 The Implications for Practice

56.5.1 The Operation of Re-Asking

Asking a child the same question again indicates, in the ordinary conduct of a household, that his first answer was unsatisfactory, which §56.2.2 established.

Two consequences follow and neither is a recommendation.

An adult who re-asks in order to give a child a further chance has supplied information about the first answer, and §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach. What reaches him is that the answer was wrong, whatever was intended.

And an adult who wants a judgment reopened has, in re-asking, closed it in a different way, since §39.1.1 requires that the answer be able to go against the asker and a re-asked question conveys that one answer is sought. §38.4.2 established the general form of this difficulty and §35.3.1 recorded a case in which ignoring it produced the condition it was meant to prevent.

What is available is the description, which §8.2.1 recorded is the form this book's practical content takes.

Proposition 56.9. *Re-asking a question indicates that the first answer was unsatisfactory, so an adult re-asking to give a further chance supplies that information whatever he intends. An adult seeking to reopen a judgment closes it differently, since a re-asked question conveys that one answer is sought.*

56.5.2 The Conditions of Test, and the Chapter's Deficiency

The chapter yields a prediction and carries a deficiency that should be stated.

The prediction follows from §56.3.2. Children of households differing in whether settled matters are reopened should differ in the reversibility of their judgments, and the difference should appear in domains unrelated to what those households settle. The operational account predicts no such association, since its structures develop from the child's commerce with the world, and the revision predicts none, since its concepts are domain-specific.

The deficiency is that the empirical literature bearing on §56.2.2 is not surveyed here. Studies establishing that performance on operational tasks varies with how the task is framed exist and would strengthen the section considerably, and §8.1.1 required the full survey form of any tradition the book engages. The present chapter surveys the operational account and its principal revision and does not survey that body of work, which a reader should weigh accordingly.

Proposition 56.10. *The chapter predicts that children of households differing in whether settled matters are reopened will differ in the reversibility of their judgments across unrelated domains, which neither the operational account nor its revision predicts. It does not survey the literature on task framing, which bears directly on §56.2.2 and which the standard of §8.1.1 would require.*

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Chapter 57

The Generation of Formal Operation and Abstraction

The Work of This Chapter

§52.4.2 recorded that this chapter is the third marked crossing of the boundary named in this book's title, since the operations it treats are attributed to adolescence. §34.4.2 stated the position and §57.5.2 applies it here.

§57.1 gives the established account and the revision that has qualified it most severely.

§57.2 locates the premise, which is that abstraction is distance from content.

§57.3 states the conditions of generation and holds that entertaining a proposition without asserting it is a move a household must recognise. §57.4 states closure in this idiom and §57.5 states what particular acts do.

The reader should carry forward the account of abstraction as licensed substitution, and the condition on the hypothetical.

57.1 The Established Account

57.1.1 The Formal Operations

Inhelder and Piaget (1958) gives the account and Piaget (1970) the general statement.

The operations described are those applying to propositions rather than to objects. The adolescent is held to become capable of reasoning about what is possible independently of what is the case, of generating the combinations of a set systematically, of isolating a variable by holding others constant, and of treating a proposition as an object about which further propositions may be formed. The pendulum task, in which the determinants of period must be identified by varying one factor at a time, is the standard demonstration.

The account holds these to constitute a stage succeeding the concrete operations of ch. 56, and to be general across content in the way §56.1.1 recorded.

Proposition 57.1. *The formal operations apply to propositions rather than objects and comprise reasoning about the possible independently of the actual, systematic combination, the isolation of variables, and the treating of a proposition as an object. They are held to succeed the concrete operations and to be general across content.*

57.1.2 The Revision

This stage has been qualified more severely than any other in the account, and the qualifications are granted.

Formal operational performance is not universal. Substantial proportions of adult populations do not exhibit it on the standard tasks, which is difficult for an account holding it to be a developmental stage.

It is not general across content. Performance varies with familiarity and with domain, and §56.1.2 recorded the corresponding finding for the concrete operations, which Carey (2009) develops.

And it tracks schooling. Performance on the standard tasks is closely associated with the extent and kind of formal education, and the association is among the most robust findings in this area.

The third is the one this chapter takes up. An account of a developmental stage whose attainment tracks an institution is an account of something other than maturation, and §52.3.1 distinguished the questions maturation answers from those it does not.

Proposition 57.2. *Formal operational performance is not universal, is not general across content, and tracks the extent and kind of schooling. An account of a developmental stage whose attainment tracks an institution is an account of something other than maturation.*

57.2 Its Ontological Premises

57.2.1 The Requirements of the Verbs

The verbs are that a subject abstracts, generalises, hypothesises, and reasons formally, and each takes the subject as subject in the manner §56.2.1 recorded.

The premise carried by the vocabulary is that abstraction is distance from content. The concrete operations are held to apply to material present, the formal to material absent, and development is the ascent from the first to the second. The spatial metaphor is not incidental: higher, more abstract, and more general are the terms in which the sequence is stated.

The premise organises the account's difficulties. If abstraction is distance from content, then performance should not depend on which content is distanced from, and §57.1.2 recorded that it does.

Proposition 57.3. *The verbs carry the premise that abstraction is distance from content, stated in a spatial vocabulary of ascent. The premise predicts that performance should not vary with the content abstracted from, and §57.1.2 recorded that it does.*

57.2.2 Abstraction as Licensed Substitution

The framework's alternative is that abstracting is substituting one description for another under a licence, and that which substitutions are licensed is settled relationally.

§53.3.2 established that perceiving requires distinct arrays to be taken as presentations of one thing and that no array supplies its own equivalence class. §56.3.1 established that conser-

vation is a judgment of that kind about a respect surviving a transformation. Abstraction on the present account is the same operation carried further: to treat this quantity as a quantity, this force as a force, this disagreement as a disagreement, is to substitute a description under which further moves become available.

Three consequences follow and the second is what the account is for.

Abstraction is not distance from content, since a substitution is as specific as what it substitutes for and takes one to a different description rather than to a higher one.

The dependence on content that §57.1.2 recorded is predicted rather than anomalous. A substitution licence is a licence for particular substitutions, and §37.1.2 established that the terms available for describing a situation are what a household supplies. A subject with the licence for one domain has it for that domain.

And the association with schooling is explained. §34.2.1 established that a school states a child's position under a procedure supplying commensurability, and commensuration is the institutional production of substitution licences. What schooling supplies is a large stock of them and practice in their use.

Proposition 57.4. *Abstracting is substituting one description for another under a licence, which is the operation of §53.3.2 carried further. Abstraction is accordingly not distance from content, the dependence on content is predicted rather than anomalous, and the association with schooling is explained, since commensuration is the institutional production of substitution licences.*

57.3 The Conditions of Generation

57.3.1 The Entertainable

The first condition concerns the hypothetical, which §57.1.1 recorded is the stage's defining operation.

To reason about what is possible independently of what is the case requires that a proposition be put without being asserted. This is a move in the sense §55.3.1 defined, and §55.3.2 established that a household's recognition of a move is a condition of its being made.

A household recognising the move treats a hypothetical as a hypothetical. A household not recognising it treats what is said as what is meant, and §16.2.1 established the readings by which a discrepant utterance is absorbed.

The consequence is stated in §57.5.1. What matters here is that the capacity to entertain a proposition is not exercised alone. A child entertaining something entertains it aloud, in a household, and what returns settles whether the entertaining was a move or an assertion.

Proposition 57.5. *Reasoning about the possible independently of the actual requires putting a proposition without asserting it, which is a move whose availability depends on a household's recognising it. A household not recognising it treats what is said as what is meant, and the capacity is not exercised alone, since a child entertains a proposition aloud and what returns settles which it was.*

57.3.2 The Counterfactual and Its Domestic Availability

The second condition concerns counterfactuals, and it connects this chapter to [ch. 30](#) by a route worth marking.

[§30.2.2](#) established that the discriminator between the two levels is what would follow a restored occasion, which is a counterfactual, and [§46.2.2](#) established that the parties cannot apply it. The present chapter adds that the capacity to entertain such a counterfactual is itself among the things a household's practice bears on.

The mechanism is [§57.3.1](#). A household in which what has been settled stays settled, which [§56.3.2](#) identified as exercising irreversibility, is a household in which the move of asking what would have happened otherwise is unrecognised. [§44.3.2](#) established that a move requires terms, an occasion, and the capacity to reach.

Two things follow.

A child in such a household has less practice in the operation on which [§30.2.2](#) depends, so the framework's own discriminator is least available where the condition it discriminates is most likely.

And this is a further instance of the general finding of [§43.4.2](#), that closure removes the means by which it would be detected, and [§50.1.2](#) established the corresponding result for slow variables.

Proposition 57.6. *The capacity to entertain a counterfactual depends on a household's recognising the move, and a household exercising irreversibility does not. The framework's own discriminator is accordingly least available where the condition it discriminates is most likely, which is a further instance of the finding that closure removes the means of its detection.*

57.4 The Forms of Closure

57.4.1 The Bounded Entertainable

Closure in this idiom is a bound on what can be entertained, and the bound is invisible for the reason [§55.4.1](#) established in the linguistic case.

A subject entertains what his substitution licences reach, and [§57.2.2](#) established that the licences are supplied. Propositions requiring a licence he lacks are not rejected and are not formed, so nothing presents itself as beyond his range. [§41.1.1](#) established that material fitting what a party holds requires no handling, and material that cannot be formulated supplies nothing to handle.

The form is universal and is mostly benign, as [§53.4.1](#) recorded for perceptual classes. Every subject has bounds and no subject registers them.

What distinguishes the concerning case is the same thing throughout: whether the bound can be extended by what is encountered. [§37.3.2](#) established that households generate terms their inheritance did not contain, and the extension occurs where something is encountered that the existing licences do not accommodate and the encounter is not absorbed.

Proposition 57.7. *Closure in this idiom is a bound on the entertainable, invisible because propositions requiring an absent licence are not formed rather than rejected. The form is universal and*

mostly benign, and what distinguishes the concerning case is whether the bound can be extended by what is encountered.

57.4.2 The Uncashable Abstraction

The second form is the converse and is characteristic of schooling.

§57.2.2 established that schooling supplies a large stock of substitution licences. A licence acquired without the practice of returning from it is a substitution that cannot be undone, and §56.3.2 established that a judgment nothing returns to is the closure form of the preceding chapter.

A subject who can describe a disagreement as a disagreement, and cannot return to what the parties said, has a substitution he cannot cash. §3.3.1 established what becomes of a commitment conveyed without the premise that generated it, and an abstraction conveyed without its cashing is the same structure.

This bears on the assessment of the framework itself. §50.4.1 recorded that this book's terms were formed under conditions it registers as background, and the present section adds a specific exposure: a vocabulary of the kind this book supplies is a stock of substitution licences, and a reader acquiring it without the practice of returning from it has acquired the closure form this section describes. ch. 89 records the matter.

Proposition 57.8. *A substitution licence acquired without the practice of returning from it is an abstraction that cannot be cashed, which is the closure form of §56.4.1. This book's own vocabulary is a stock of such licences, and a reader acquiring it without that practice acquires the condition described.*

57.5 The Implications for Practice

57.5.1 The Operation of Treating a Hypothetical as an Assertion

A child says what if we did not do this, and is answered as though he had proposed not doing it.

§57.3.1 established that what returns settles whether the entertaining was a move or an assertion. An adult who answers the proposal has treated the utterance as an assertion, and §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach rather than an account of one.

Three propositions apply.

§39.2.1 established that a move from the party the asymmetry disfavours carries a cost, and the cost here is that the child is held to a position he was examining.

§39.4.1 established that where a move is met and not taken up, the rate of the move falls, and §11.1.2 established that the fall maintains itself.

And §57.3.1 establishes what is thereby unexercised, which is the operation §57.1.1 identified as the stage's defining one.

Nothing here is a recommendation, and §56.5.1 gave the reason in the parallel case. What is described is what the act does.

Proposition 57.9. *Answering a hypothetical as a proposal treats the utterance as an assertion and holds the child to a position he was examining. The rate of the move falls and the fall maintains itself, and what is thereby unexercised is the operation §57.1.1 identified as the stage's defining one.*

57.5.2 Scope, and What Would Test This

Two matters close the chapter.

The scope position is that of §34.4.2. The operations treated here are attributed to adolescence, the book's title names early childhood, and the framework's reasoning reaches this material because §57.2.2 holds abstraction to be continuous with the equivalence judgments of ch. 53 and ch. 56. A treatment stopping before the operations that the same account covers would misdescribe the account in order to respect a boundary.

The prediction follows from §57.3.1. Children of households differing in whether hypothetical utterances are treated as hypothetical should differ in the rate at which they produce them, and should differ on formal operational tasks in a manner not accounted for by schooling, since the household condition is independent of it. The established account predicts variation with schooling and with maturation and predicts nothing from this quarter.

ch. 75 carries it, with the difficulties §53.5.2 recorded.

Proposition 57.10. *The chapter crosses the boundary named in this book's title because §57.2.2 holds abstraction continuous with the equivalence judgments of the preceding chapters. It predicts that children of households differing in whether hypothetical utterances are treated as hypothetical will differ in producing them and on formal tasks, independently of schooling, which the established account does not predict.*

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Chapter 58

The Generation of Relational Capacity

The Work of This Chapter

§52.4.2 recorded that this chapter treats a capacity which must be kept distinct from the ground of §52.2.2, since an account conflating them would make the framework circular. §58.1 draws the distinction and shows that no circularity arises, the argument turning on the difference between being in a relation and being able to enter one. §58.2 gives the established account, which is attachment theory and its successors, and §58.3 locates its premise in the passage from a classification of dyads to a property of children. §58.4 states the conditions of generation and §58.5 states closure in this idiom. §58.6 states what particular acts do.

The reader should carry forward the distinction between ground and capacity, and the observation about what the Strange Situation classifies.

58.1 The Ground and the Capacity

58.1.1 The Absence of Circularity

The objection to be answered is that a framework holding relation to be the ground of capacity, and then treating relational capacity as one capacity among others, has explained a thing by itself.

The objection fails, and the reason is that being in a relation and being able to enter one are different conditions.

§52.2.2 held that what it is for a child to be able to do something is settled by descriptions relations supply. The claim concerns individuation, and it is satisfied wherever a child stands in relations that supply descriptions, whatever the child can do. §7.1.1 established that an infant is constituted within relations he is in no position to enter as a party, and §10.1.1 established that the asymmetry is constitutive rather than a stage to be passed.

The capacity treated here is different. It is the child's own developing ability to enter a relation, sustain one, and continue one through difficulty, and §52.1.2 defined what a capacity is.

The ground accordingly operates before the capacity exists and does not depend on it. An infant with no capacity to enter a relation is nonetheless in relations that individuate everything he does, and the relations that individuate are not relations he entered.

Two consequences.

The capacity is grounded as the other eight are. What counts as entering a relation, sustaining one, or failing at either is settled by descriptions, and §52.2.2 applies to this capacity

without exception or special treatment.

And the framework cannot use the capacity to explain the ground. §6.2.2 imposed the discipline that a claim belongs to the ontological statement or to a component, and the ground is in the first and this capacity is in the second.

Proposition 58.1. *Being in a relation and being able to enter one are different conditions. The ground of §52.2.2 concerns individuation and is satisfied wherever a child stands in relations supplying descriptions, which §7.1.1 established holds of infants who can enter none. The ground therefore operates before the capacity exists, the capacity is grounded as the other eight are, and no circularity arises.*

58.1.2 The Components of the Capacity

The capacity is specified by the operations this book has already described, which prevents it from being a residual category.

It comprises the ability to supply something to an occasion, which §38.2.1 established is what makes an occasion shared; the ability to take up what another supplies, which §39.2.2 established for the case of an answer; the ability to sustain a relation through a discrepancy, which §41.1.1 identified as the object of an epistemic habit; and the ability to make a move the other party may answer against, which §39.1.1 established is what a question is.

The specification has a consequence worth marking. Each component is an operation performed within a relation, so the capacity is exercised nowhere else and is stabilised by what its exercises meet, which §54.3.1 established for the motor case.

Proposition 58.2. *The capacity comprises supplying something to an occasion, taking up what another supplies, sustaining a relation through a discrepancy, and making a move the other party may answer against. Each is performed within a relation, so the capacity is exercised nowhere else and is stabilised by what its exercises meet.*

58.2 The Established Account

58.2.1 Attachment and Its Successors

Bowlby (1951) established the position and Bowlby (1969) and Bowlby (1973) give the mature statement. Ainsworth et al. (1978) supplied the procedure that made it a research programme, and Main and Solomon (1990) extended the classification and developed the account of representation.

The account holds that an infant forms a bond with a caregiver serving a protective function, that the history of the caregiver's availability produces expectations about availability, that these are organised into internal working models, and that the models govern subsequent relationships. The Strange Situation classifies infants by their conduct on separation and reunion, and the classifications predict later measures.

This is the tradition nearest to this book in subject matter, and §8.1.1 records that ch. 90 must test whether it can be read as a projection of this framework and where the mapping fails.

Three things are granted without qualification. The findings are robust and have replicated widely. The account was relational before the field was. And the emphasis on availability rather than on instruction anticipates §54.3.1.

Proposition 58.3. *Attachment theory holds that the history of a caregiver's availability produces expectations organised into internal working models which govern subsequent relationships, and supplies a classification procedure whose results predict later measures. Its findings are granted, it was relational before the field was, and its emphasis on availability anticipates this book's.*

58.2.2 The Additions of the Successors

Two developments bear on this chapter.

The first is the elaboration of representation. Main and Solomon (1990) developed the account on which what is carried forward is a representation of relationships, assessable in adults through the coherence of their narratives about their own childhoods. §31.3.2 treated retrospective accounts and identified defects that bear on such assessments.

The second is the finding that classifications are relationship-specific. An infant may be classified differently with respect to two caregivers, which is difficult for an account whose object is a property the infant carries, and which §45.2.1 predicts, since two adults ordinarily differ in the rate at which they absorb.

Proposition 58.4. *The successors elaborated what is carried forward as a representation of relationships assessable through narrative coherence, and established that classifications are relationship-specific. The second is difficult for an account whose object is carried by the infant and is predicted by §45.2.1.*

58.3 Its Ontological Premises

58.3.1 From a Classification of Dyads to a Property of Children

The premise this chapter locates is visible in a passage the literature performs routinely.

The Strange Situation observes a pair. What is coded is the infant's conduct toward a particular adult on reunion, and the coding is undefined without that adult. The procedure classifies a dyad.

The results are reported, and are almost universally discussed, as classifications of children. The phrase is that an infant is securely attached, and the security is thereafter treated as something he has, carries into other settings, and may be measured for later.

§1.25.1 identified the move, and this is the clearest instance of it in the developmental literature, since the discrepancy is between a method and its vocabulary rather than between a theory and its evidence. §58.2.2 recorded that the literature itself established the finding that embarrasses the passage, namely that classifications differ across caregivers.

Two things should be said in fairness.

The tradition's careful statements make the dyadic point explicitly, and the slippage is in the vocabulary and its use rather than in the theory's best formulations.

And the concept of an internal working model is the theory's own attempt to say what an infant carries between relationships, which is a real question and one this framework must also answer. §58.1.2 gave the answer: what is carried is a stabilised set of operations, and §48.3.1 established which parts of what is acquired survive a passage.

Proposition 58.5. *The Strange Situation classifies a dyad, since the coding is undefined without the particular adult, and the results are reported as classifications of children. This is the clearest instance of the move §1.25.1 identified, since the discrepancy is between a method and its vocabulary. The tradition's careful statements make the dyadic point, and its own finding that classifications differ across caregivers embarrasses the passage.*

58.3.2 The Locus of the Omission

The condition drops out at the internal working model, which is where a relational history becomes a possession.

The concept does necessary work. Something must account for the fact that a child's conduct in a new relationship is not independent of his history, and §40.3.2 established the framework's version of the same requirement.

What the framework declines is the form. A model is a representation held by a party, and §37.1.1 declined the possession account for what passes between generations, and §41.2.1 established that what accumulates is a manner rather than a content and is not available for report. A representation is available for report by construction, which is what makes narrative assessment possible and which §48.3.1 predicts will capture the part of what is carried that survives least reliably.

Proposition 58.6. *The internal working model is where a relational history becomes a possession. The concept does necessary work, since something must account for a child's history bearing on new relationships. The framework declines the form, since a representation is available for report and §48.3.1 holds that the reportable part is the part surviving least reliably.*

58.4 The Conditions of Generation

58.4.1 The Exercise of the Operations

§58.1.2 specified four operations, and the condition of generation for each is that occasions arise on which it is exercised and met.

Supplying something to an occasion requires occasions in which what is supplied is taken up, which §38.2.1 defined and §38.2.2 established is excluded where an adult has settled the outcome in advance.

Taking up what another supplies requires having been taken up, since §40.3.2 established that what passes is the practice and §33.1.2 established how a manner is acquired.

Sustaining a relation through a discrepancy requires discrepancies that were sustained, and §41.1.1 established that a manner of handling misfit is what an epistemic habit consists in. A child whose household's discrepancies have all been absorbed has no practice in the alternative.

And making a move the other party may answer against requires that such moves have been answered against, which §39.1.1 defined and §39.3.1 identified as the naturally occurring instance.

Proposition 58.7. *Each of the four operations requires occasions on which it is exercised and met: supplying requires uptake, taking up requires having been taken up, sustaining a discrepancy requires discrepancies that were sustained, and making an answerable move requires moves that were answered against.*

58.4.2 Repair as the Distinctive Condition

The third operation deserves separate treatment, since it distinguishes this capacity from a general facility with people.

A relation that has never been under strain requires nothing of the third operation. What supplies practice in it is a discrepancy that was neither absorbed nor fatal: an occasion on which something went wrong between the parties and the relation continued in an altered form.

§23.2.2 established that a restoration cannot be arranged, and ch. 81 holds that repair is not restoration. The present chapter adds that what a child acquires from such an occasion is the operation itself, and §41.2.1 established that what accumulates is a manner rather than a memory.

Two consequences.

A household in which nothing goes wrong between the parties supplies no practice in this operation, and §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity. A mild and pleasant household may supply none.

And a household in which what goes wrong is not survived supplies none either, since the operation requires the continuation.

Proposition 58.8. *Practice in sustaining a relation through a discrepancy requires an occasion on which something went wrong and the relation continued in an altered form. A household in which nothing goes wrong supplies no such practice, and neither does one in which what goes wrong is not survived.*

58.5 The Forms of Closure

58.5.1 The Unrevisable Account of What Relations Are

Closure in this idiom is an account of what relations are that no relation revises.

§30.1.2 defined the general condition and §53.4.2 established the perceptual form. The present form is the same structure applied to a class: a party approaches each new relation under a description of what relations are, and Chapter 17 established that a description produces occasions conforming to itself.

The mechanism requires no unusual history. §16.2.1 supplies the readings by which a relation that goes otherwise is absorbed: it is early, they are being polite, it will change. §16.2.2 established that these are applied without being devised.

What distinguishes this from the internal working model of §58.3.2 is that no representation need be held. §41.2.1 established that a manner governs what a party registers as requiring handling, and a party whose manner absorbs every relational discrepancy has nothing to represent.

Proposition 58.9. *Closure in this idiom is an account of what relations are that no relation revises, which produces occasions conforming to itself and absorbs those that do not. It differs from the internal working model in requiring no representation, since a manner absorbing every discrepancy leaves nothing to be represented.*

58.5.2 Competence Without the Capacity

The second form is the one that matters practically and it is invisible on any measure of social functioning.

A party may perform the first two operations of §58.1.2 well and the last two not at all. He supplies to occasions, takes up what others supply, is agreeable and is liked, and has no practice in sustaining a discrepancy or in making a move that could be answered against.

§58.4.2 established what such practice requires, and §39.1.2 established that a great deal of interrogative and conversational activity fails the criterion. A party of this description is socially competent by every ordinary measure and lacks the operations on which a relation's continuation through difficulty depends.

§54.4.1 recorded the corresponding form for movement, that a repertoire may be stable, competent, and unextended. The present case is its relational counterpart.

Proposition 58.10. *A party may supply to occasions and take up what others supply while having no practice in sustaining a discrepancy or making an answerable move. Such a party is socially competent by ordinary measures and lacks the operations on which a relation's continuation through difficulty depends.*

58.6 The Implications for Practice

58.6.1 The Operation of Smoothing

An adult who prevents difficulty between a child and another party removes the occasion §58.4.2 identified as the distinctive condition.

The act is ordinary and is generally kind. A disagreement between children is resolved by an adult, a misunderstanding is explained away, a rupture is smoothed before either party has done anything about it.

§54.3.2 described the same structure in the motor case and the propositions transfer. The accomplishment occurs and is the adult's; the child's operation does not complete; the occasion leaves no trace, since §15.2.2 established that foreclosed occasions leave none; and the adult's experience is of having helped.

Nothing here is a recommendation. Children require protection, §46.3.1 established that boundaries protecting a party from what he cannot assess are required by the framework's own commitments, and §54.5.1 gave the reason no recommendation follows.

Proposition 58.11. *An adult who prevents difficulty between a child and another party removes the occasion supplying practice in sustaining a discrepancy. The structure is that of §54.3.2: the accomplishment is the adult's, the child's operation does not complete, and the occasion leaves no trace.*

58.6.2 The Conditions of Test

The chapter yields a prediction that separates it from the established account.

§58.5.2 predicts a dissociation between social competence as ordinarily measured and the two operations §58.4.2 concerns. Attachment classifications and measures of social functioning should fail to predict conduct in relationships under strain, and the household condition of §58.4.2, which is whether discrepancies occurred and were survived, should predict it.

The design difficulty is severe and specific. A relationship under strain cannot be arranged, which §23.2.2 established for the general case and §30.2.2 for the framework's central discriminator. What is available is the naturally occurring instance, and §39.3.1 established that such instances escape the third cost recorded there.

Proposition 58.12. *The chapter predicts a dissociation between social competence as ordinarily measured and conduct in relationships under strain, the latter being predicted by whether discrepancies occurred and were survived. Strain cannot be arranged, so the test depends on naturally occurring instances of the kind §39.3.1 identified.*

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Chapter 59

The Generation of Self-Regulation

The Work of This Chapter

§53.3.1 deferred to this chapter a case in which the distinction at issue is between a child's own states, and §53.5.1 recorded what an adult responding to states by their consequences for the household does.

§59.1 gives the established account. §59.2 locates the premise, which is that the states to be regulated are individuated prior to the regulating.

§59.3 states the conditions of generation and holds that states are individuated by the same differential response that maintains any other discrimination. §59.4 states closure in this idiom and supplies a mechanism ch. 31 required and did not have. §59.5 states what particular acts do.

The reader should carry forward the individuation claim and its bearing on the disappearance of pain.

59.1 The Established Account

59.1.1 Temperament and Effortful Control

Rothbart (2007) gives the account organising most current work. Temperament comprises constitutionally based individual differences in reactivity and regulation, present early and moderately stable, and effortful control is the regulative component: the capacity to inhibit a dominant response, activate a subdominant one, and direct attention away from what is salient.

The account holds that effortful control develops through the preschool years, varies substantially between children, and predicts a wide range of later outcomes. The predictive findings are robust and are granted.

Two features bear here.

The account is explicitly constitutional in its base and developmental in its regulative component, so it makes both a maturational and an experiential claim, and §52.3.1 recorded the framework's position on the first.

And its unit is the child. Reactivity and regulation are properties attributed to individuals and measured by parent report or by laboratory task, and §58.3.1 recorded the corresponding observation for attachment.

Proposition 59.1. *The established account holds that temperament comprises constitutionally based differences in reactivity and regulation, that effortful control is the regulative component and develops through the preschool years, and that it predicts later outcomes. The predictive*

findings are granted and the account's unit is the child.

59.1.2 From Co-Regulation to Self-Regulation

A second strand holds that regulation is performed jointly before it is performed alone.

Tronick (2007) develops the mutual regulation model, on which ordinary interaction consists of continuous small mismatches between the parties and their repair, and on which the infant's states are managed within the exchange rather than by either party separately. §32.1.2 recorded the framework's use of the associated procedure. Sameroff (2009) supplies the transactional statement, and Vygotsky (1978) the general form on which what is performed between parties comes to be performed by one.

The strand is granted and is the nearest to this book, and §52.3.2 recorded where the framework departs from the Vygotskian version: the difference concerns individuation rather than origin, and the relational condition does not drop out when the function is established.

Proposition 59.2. *A second strand holds that regulation is performed jointly before it is performed alone, states being managed within the exchange rather than by either party. It is the nearest account to this book, and the framework's departure is the one §52.3.2 recorded.*

59.2 Its Ontological Premises

59.2.1 The Requirements of the Verbs

The verbs are that a child regulates, inhibits, controls, modulates, and delays. Each takes the child as subject and a state or impulse as object.

The grammar of these verbs carries the premise. To regulate something is to act on something already there, and each verb presupposes a determinate item to be acted upon: an impulse to be inhibited, an arousal to be modulated, a desire to be delayed.

The presupposition is what makes the measurement possible. A task measuring inhibition must specify what was to be inhibited, and the specification is the experimenter's, which §53.2.1 and §56.2.2 found in the parallel cases.

Proposition 59.3. *The verbs take the child as subject and a state or impulse as object, and each presupposes a determinate item already there to be acted upon. The presupposition is what makes measurement possible, since a task measuring inhibition must specify what was to be inhibited.*

59.2.2 The Given State

The premise located is that a child's states are individuated prior to their regulation.

On this premise the developmental question is which regulative operations a child acquires and how well he performs them, and the states themselves are the given material. Distress, fatigue, frustration, excitement, and hunger are treated as items a child has, which he learns to manage and which a parent may learn to read.

§52.2.2 held that what a capacity is a capacity for is settled by a description, and the present premise is that in this domain the descriptions are supplied by the states themselves.

The premise is not obviously false and this book does not refute it. Some states are strongly individuated by their physiology and a child in pain is in pain whatever anyone says.

What the framework holds is that the premise is least defensible exactly where the account most needs it. The states that matter for effortful control are those distinguished by fine differences: frustration from fatigue, anxiety from excitement, boredom from unease. §53.3.2 established that distinct arrays are taken as presentations of one thing only under an equivalence class no array supplies, and a child's own states are arrays in that sense.

Proposition 59.4. *The premise is that a child's states are individuated prior to their regulation, so that development concerns which regulative operations he acquires. The premise is strongest for states individuated by their physiology and weakest for the fine distinctions effortful control concerns, which §53.3.2 established require an equivalence class no array supplies.*

59.3 The Conditions of Generation

59.3.1 States Are Individuated by Differential Response

§53.3.1 established that a difference is maintained where some party responds to it differently, and deferred to this chapter the case in which the difference is between a child's own states.

The condition transfers unchanged, and §53.3.3 established that it is the same condition rather than an analogue. A child's states are arrays requiring equivalence classes no array supplies, and what individuates them is the treatment they meet. This chapter's claim is accordingly not that regulation resembles perception in some respect; it is that the states a regulative operation would operate on are individuated by the mechanism ch. 53 described. A child whose distress and whose fatigue are met with the same response has, in those occasions, nothing sustaining a distinction between them. He is not thereby unable to feel two things. What he lacks is the maintenance §6.1.2 established a pattern requires, and §53.1.2 established that unmaintained discriminations are lost rather than dormant.

Two features make the case sharper than the perceptual one.

The child has no independent access. §7.1.1 established that he holds no standpoint outside the relation, and a state he cannot distinguish is not a state he can consult himself about. §14.1.2 established that the account at issue is a constituent of what he is forming.

And the individuation is what regulation would operate on. A regulative operation directed at an undifferentiated state is a single operation, and §59.1.1 recorded that the account's variance is in how well such operations are performed. The framework predicts variance in how many there are to perform.

Proposition 59.5. *A child whose differing states are met with the same response has nothing sustaining a distinction between them, and §53.1.2 established that unmaintained discriminations are lost rather than dormant. He has no independent access, and the individuation is what a regulative operation would operate on, so the framework predicts variance in how many operations there are to perform.*

59.3.2 The Child's Supply to a Joint Regulation

§59.1.2 recorded the account on which regulation is performed jointly before it is performed alone, and this section states the framework's version, which differs at one point.

The Vygotskian version holds that the adult's operation is internalised. §52.3.2 declined the form, since internalisation is a transfer verb and §37.1.1 declined the transfer model.

The framework's version is §38.2.1. A joint regulation is an occasion, and it is shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what the occasion became. What stabilises in the child is his own part in a joint operation rather than a copy of the adult's part, and §54.3.1 established the corresponding point for movement.

Two consequences follow and the second is practical.

An occasion in which the adult performs the whole regulation supplies the child nothing to stabilise, by §54.3.2. A child whose states are managed entirely by others has had the accomplishment occur without his part completing.

And an occasion in which the child performs the whole of it supplies no more, since §58.4.2 established that the operation at issue requires the other party's participation. A child left alone with a state has practised bearing it rather than regulating it jointly, and the two differ.

Proposition 59.6. *What stabilises in the child is his own part in a joint operation rather than a copy of the adult's, since §37.1.1 declined the transfer model. An occasion in which the adult performs the whole regulation supplies nothing to stabilise, and an occasion in which the child is left alone with a state supplies practice in bearing it rather than in regulating jointly.*

59.4 The Forms of Closure

59.4.1 The Unextendable Repertoire of States

Closure in this idiom is a repertoire of states that no experience extends.

§59.3.1 established what maintains a distinction and §54.4.1 established the corresponding form for movement. A child with two available descriptions of his condition, being fine and being upset, assimilates every state to one or the other, and §16.2.1 establishes what becomes of a state that fits neither.

The form is compatible with competent regulation. A child who reliably returns himself from upset to fine is regulating well by any available measure, and §58.5.2 recorded the corresponding case for relational capacity.

Proposition 59.7. *Closure in this idiom is a repertoire of states no experience extends, in which every condition is assimilated to one of the descriptions available. It is compatible with competent regulation, since a child who reliably returns himself from one description to the other regulates well by available measures.*

59.4.2 The Unrevisable Self-Description, and the Disappearance of Pain

The second form supplies a mechanism ch. 31 required and did not possess, and this is the chapter's principal contribution to the book.

§31.1.1 defined the pain at issue in Part VI as the registering of a discrepancy between an account in force and an occasion that fails to fit it, and required three conditions: an account, a discrepant occasion, and a grammar in which the failure can register. §31.1.2 held that at the second level the third fails.

The present chapter specifies what the third condition consists in for the case of a subject's own condition. To register that something does not fit is to distinguish one's present state from the state the account would predict, and §59.3.1 established that such distinctions are maintained by differential response.

What follows is that the disappearance of pain has a developmental history. A child whose states have been individuated coarsely has fewer distinctions available with which a discrepancy could be registered, and §59.4.1 established the closure form. §31.1.2 held that at the second level nothing presses against the account; the present section adds that what would press is a distinction, and that distinctions are maintained relationally.

Two qualifications hold this within bounds.

The claim is about a condition of the registering and not about its content. §31.3.1 established that nothing was stored, and nothing here supplies a stored state to be recovered.

And the two conditions are separable. A child with a fine repertoire of states may be in a household whose grammar absorbs every discrepancy, and a child with a coarse repertoire may be in one that does not. §30.1.3 declined a comparable ordering.

Proposition 59.8. *To register a discrepancy in one's own condition requires distinguishing the present state from the state an account would predict, and §59.3.1 established that such distinctions are maintained by differential response. The disappearance of pain of §31.1.2 accordingly has a developmental history, since what would press against an account is a distinction and distinctions are maintained relationally.*

59.5 The Implications for Practice

59.5.1 The Operation of Responding by Consequence

§53.5.1 recorded that an adult responding to a child's states by their consequences for the household assimilates states that differ for the child, and this section states why.

What distinguishes distress from fatigue is not their consequences for anyone else. A tired child and an upset child may both need to be got home, and an adult responding to the practical requirement responds identically. §59.3.1 established what an identical response supplies.

The act is ordinary, is frequently necessary, and is not a failure of attention. §5.2.2 established what governs the occasions available and §47.3.2 established that constraint reduces occasions without reducing answerability.

A second act belongs here. Telling a child that he is fine supplies a description of his state, and §14.1.2 established that in the child's case a description is a constituent of the account he is forming. Where the description is issued in order to settle the occasion, §28.3.2 establishes what the occasion becomes, and where it is repeated it acquires the standing §12.2.2 described.

Neither is a recommendation. §54.5.1 gave the reason, and an adult who withholds a settling description in order that a distinction shall be maintained has settled the occasion's pur-

pose in advance.

Proposition 59.9. *What distinguishes distress from fatigue is not their consequences for others, so an adult responding to the practical requirement responds identically and supplies nothing that maintains the distinction. Telling a child he is fine supplies a description of his state which in his case is constitutive, and neither act is recommended.*

59.5.2 The Conditions of Test, and the Chapter's Deficiency

The chapter yields a prediction and carries a deficiency.

The prediction follows from §59.3.1. The established account attributes variance in effortful control to how well regulative operations are performed. The framework predicts variance additionally in the number of states a child distinguishes, and predicts that the two dissociate: a child distinguishing few states should perform available operations well and should be poor at conduct requiring a distinction he does not draw. Measures of regulation as ordinarily constructed would record the first and miss the second.

The literature on delay of gratification is surveyed in §86.2.2 rather than here, and two of its findings bear on this chapter. Kidd et al. (2013) reports that children who had experienced an unreliable adult waited substantially less than children who had experienced a reliable one, which supports §59.3.2 in holding that what a child does with a state is not settled by his own operations alone. Watts et al. (2018) reports that the association between early delay and later outcomes is smaller than the original studies found and is reduced further under controls, and the framework accordingly does not lean on the original findings. §56.5.2 recorded a comparable gap in ch. 56, which remains.

Proposition 59.10. *The chapter predicts variance in the number of states a child distinguishes, dissociating from variance in how well operations are performed, which available measures would record only in part. It does not survey the delay-of-gratification literature, which bears directly on §59.2.2 and which the standard of §8.1.1 would require.*

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Draft

Chapter 60

The Generation of Normativity

The Work of This Chapter

§17.4.1 established that a child acquires an expectation, a repertoire, and a description as a constituent, that none of the three is a belief, and that a child in a household where accounts are given honestly acquires honesty in that manner. It passed the mechanism here.

§60.1 gives the established account through its two principal strands. §60.2 locates the premise, which is that a norm is a content a child comes to hold.

§60.3 states the conditions of generation and holds that what distinguishes a norm from a regularity is that deviation is answerable, so that closure of the kind ch. 43 defined converts norms into facts. §60.4 states that form and §60.5 states what particular acts do. The reader should carry forward the distinction between a norm and a regularity, and the finding that a closed order supplies facts where it appears to supply norms.

60.1 The Established Account

60.1.1 The Stage Accounts

Piaget and Inhelder (1969) gives the earlier account, on which a child passes from a heteronomous morality, in which rules are fixed and issue from authority, to an autonomous one, in which they are understood as agreements among parties and are alterable by agreement.

Kohlberg (1981) developed the fullest stage account, ordering moral reasoning by the kind of consideration a subject offers in justification, and holding the sequence to be invariant.

Two features are granted.

The accounts take justification as the datum. What is measured is what a subject says in answer to why, and §39.1.1 established what a question is as a relational event.

And the direction of development is toward alterability. Piaget's autonomous stage is defined by the recognition that a rule could be otherwise, which §60.3.1 takes up.

Proposition 60.1. *The stage accounts order development by the kind of consideration a subject offers in justification, and take the direction of development to be toward the recognition that a rule could be otherwise. Their datum is what a subject says in answer to why.*

60.1.2 Domains and Shared Intentionality

Turiel (1983) displaced the stage accounts in part by establishing that children distinguish domains from an early age, treating some requirements as alterable by an authority and others

as not, and §44.3.1 recorded the framework's use of the finding.

Tomasello (2019) supplies the recent account grounding normativity in shared intentionality, on which the capacity to form joint commitments with others is what makes obligation intelligible, and §55.1.2 recorded the related account for language.

Both are granted. The domain finding is robust and the shared-intentionality account addresses a question the stage accounts did not, which is what makes a norm binding rather than merely known.

Proposition 60.2. *Domain theory establishes that children distinguish requirements alterable by an authority from those not so alterable, from an early age. The shared-intentionality account grounds obligation in the capacity to form joint commitments, addressing what makes a norm binding rather than merely known. Both are granted.*

60.2 Its Ontological Premises

60.2.1 The Requirements of the Verbs

The verbs are that a child acquires a norm, internalises a rule, judges an act, and reasons morally.

Two carry the premise. Acquiring and internalising are transfer verbs, and §37.1.1 declined the transfer model for what passes between generations, §58.3.2 finding the same verb doing the same work in the attachment literature.

Judging and reasoning take the child as subject and an act as object, and are satisfied by facts about the child and the act. §53.2.1 recorded the corresponding structure.

Proposition 60.3. *Acquiring and internalising are transfer verbs of the kind §37.1.1 declined, and judging and reasoning take the child as subject and an act as object, being satisfied by facts about the two alone.*

60.2.2 The Norm as Content

The premise located is that a norm is a content which a child comes to hold, so that development concerns which contents he holds and how he justifies them.

The premise organises the measurement. A subject is presented with a case and asked what should be done and why, and what is recorded is the content of his answer and the form of his justification. §56.2.2 found the corresponding premise in the operational literature, that the task is transparent to the child.

The premise is not obviously false. Norms have contents, subjects hold them, and an account of moral development must say something about which.

What the framework holds is that the premise omits the condition that makes a content normative at all, and §60.3.1 states it.

Proposition 60.4. *The premise is that a norm is a content a child comes to hold, which organises the measurement of moral development by the content of an answer and the form of its justification. The premise is not false and omits the condition that makes a content normative.*

60.3 The Conditions of Generation

60.3.1 The Distinction of a Norm from a Regularity

A household exhibits many regularities. Meals occur at certain times, certain things are not done indoors, certain words are not used. Some of these are norms and some are simply how the household proceeds, and nothing in the regularity itself distinguishes them.

What distinguishes a norm is that deviation is answerable: a party who departs may be called to account, and the calling to account is intelligible to both parties as a demand for a reason. §7.3.1 established that the framework locates obligation in the position a party occupies, and §42.2.1 established that authority is the standing occupancy of a position.

Two consequences follow and the second is the chapter's finding.

Enforcement is insufficient. A regularity enforced by consequence produces compliance, and §44.2.1 established that a sanction assigns a position by proceeding as it does. Nothing in a consequence makes a requirement normative, since a consequence attaches to the deviation without a reason being owed.

And answerability must run in both directions, or what obtains is a fact rather than a norm. §44.3.1 held that a rule is contestable where an objection could alter it, and §39.1.1 established the framework's central form. A requirement that may be demanded of a child and may not be questioned by him is one he encounters as a feature of the world. §50.1.2 established that a variable which never moves is registered as background, and a requirement that never answers to anyone has the same standing.

Proposition 60.5. *What distinguishes a norm from a regularity is that deviation is answerable and a reason is owed. Enforcement is insufficient, since a consequence attaches without a reason being owed. Where answerability runs in one direction only, what obtains is a feature of the world rather than a norm.*

60.3.2 The Objects Acquired

§17.4.1 established that a child acquires an expectation, a repertoire, and a description as a constituent, and that none is a belief. This section supplies the mechanism it passed here, using the case that section named.

A child in a household where accounts are given honestly acquires three things.

An expectation that an account will be given, which §6.1.2 established is maintained by what happens rather than held as a proposition. He expects that when something has gone wrong an account will be produced, because accounts have been produced.

A repertoire of the moves available for giving one, which §58.1.2 established is exercised nowhere but in relations and §41.2.1 established accumulates as a manner rather than a content.

And a description as a constituent of what he is forming, which §14.1.2 established is the child's case. He is someone who gives accounts, in the sense that this is among the terms in which he is described and in which he registers what he does.

None is the belief that honesty is good, and the difference matters for two reasons.

A belief may be held and not acted on, and §44.1.2 established the corresponding divergence between what a household states and what it operates. The three things above are not separable from conduct in that way, since each is constituted by what has occurred.

And a belief may be acquired by being told. §3.3.1 established what becomes of a commitment conveyed without the premise that generated it, and a household that states the value of honesty without giving accounts supplies the belief and none of the three.

Proposition 60.6. *A child in a household where accounts are given honestly acquires an expectation maintained by what happens, a repertoire of moves exercised only in relations, and a description constitutive of what he is forming. None is the belief that honesty is good, which may be held without being acted on and may be acquired by being told.*

60.4 The Forms of Closure

60.4.1 The Norm That Has Become a Fact

Closure in this idiom is a requirement that has ceased to be the kind of thing about which a reason could be owed.

§60.3.1 established that answerability in both directions is what makes a requirement normative, and §43.2.1 established that an order is closed where no objection could fail to be absorbed. Where a household's order is closed, its requirements are met with the three moves that section identified, and a child encountering them encounters something that could not be otherwise.

The finding is that such a household does not produce a child with firmly held norms. It produces a child with facts. §60.1.1 recorded that the stage accounts take the direction of development to be toward the recognition that a rule could be otherwise, and closure removes the occasions on which that recognition would be exercised.

Two things follow that run against expectation.

A closed household may be indistinguishable from a well-normed one on any measure taking justification as its datum. §60.2.2 established that the measurement records the content of an answer and the form of its justification, and a child who reports the correct content and justifies it by appeal to how things are has answered.

And the deficiency appears only where judgment is required. §57.2.2 established that abstraction is licensed substitution, and applying a norm to a case it does not cover requires substituting a description under which it does. A child holding facts has nothing to substitute.

Proposition 60.7. *Closure in this idiom is a requirement about which no reason could be owed, produced where a household's order absorbs every objection. Such a household produces facts where it appears to produce norms, is indistinguishable from a well-normed one on measures taking justification as datum, and the deficiency appears only where a novel case requires judgment.*

60.4.2 The Norm Held Only as a Constituent

The second form concerns the third of the three things §60.3.2 identified.

A child may acquire the description as a constituent without the expectation or the repertoire. He is someone who does not lie, in the sense that this is among the terms in which he is described and registers himself, and he has neither the expectation that accounts will be given nor the moves for giving one.

§14.1.2 established that a description constitutive in this way is not one the child holds among others, and §16.2.1 established what becomes of an occasion that fails to fit it. An occasion on which he did lie is absorbed rather than registered, and §33.2.2 established that an account under which a subject is exceptional closes revision as an unflattering one does.

This is the condition **ch. 30** defined, applied to a normative self-description, and §18.1.1 established that admitting labels operate by the mechanism depriving labels operate by.

Proposition 60.8. *A child may acquire the constitutive description without the expectation or the repertoire, being someone who does not lie while having no moves for giving an account. Occasions failing to fit are absorbed rather than registered, which is the condition of **ch. 30** applied to a normative self-description.*

60.5 The Implications for Practice

60.5.1 The Operation of Giving a Reason

Giving a child a reason for a requirement supplies the second and third conditions of §44.3.2, which are an occasion and something the objection could reach, and §60.3.1 established that a reason owed is what distinguishes a norm.

Two things should be separated, since the practice literature runs them together.

A reason given is a reason that may be answered. §39.1.1 established that a question obtains where the answer could go against the asker, and the same holds of a justification: a reason offered is offered to a party who may find it insufficient. A household giving reasons and not receiving objections to them has supplied the form and not the condition.

A reason given in order to secure compliance is an occasion whose outcome the giver has settled in advance, which §38.2.2 excluded and §35.3.1 recorded a neighbouring case of.

Neither is a recommendation, and §44.4.2 gave the reason for the parallel case of rules.

Proposition 60.9. *Giving a reason supplies an occasion and something an objection could reach, which §60.3.1 established distinguishes a norm. A reason offered is offered to a party who may find it insufficient, so a household giving reasons and receiving no objections has supplied the form without the condition, and a reason given to secure compliance settles the occasion in advance.*

60.5.2 The Conditions of Test

The chapter yields a prediction that separates it from both established strands.

§60.4.1 predicts a dissociation. Children of households differing in whether requirements are answerable should not differ on measures taking justification as datum, since §60.2.2 established what those record, and should differ sharply on novel cases requiring a requirement to be extended to something it does not cover.

The stage accounts predict variation in the form of justification and therefore predict a difference on the first measure. Domain theory predicts that children distinguish domains and does not predict variation from this quarter.

The design difficulty is the familiar one and is acute here. §28.3.2 established that an occasion aimed at a result is altered by the aim, and a novel case presented in order to assess judgment is a case whose purpose the child may read, which §56.2.2 established for the operational tasks. ch. 75 carries it.

Proposition 60.10. *The chapter predicts that children of households differing in whether requirements are answerable will not differ on measures taking justification as datum and will differ on novel cases requiring extension of a requirement. The stage accounts predict a difference on the first measure and domain theory predicts none from this quarter.*

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Chapter 61

The Generation of Aesthetic Capacity

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter completes the nine functions, and it treats the one in which the difficulties of [ch. 51](#) are sharpest.

[§61.1](#) gives the established account, which for this function rests principally on one work and which this chapter is less able to survey than its predecessors. [§61.2](#) locates two premises rather than one, since accounts of aesthetic capacity divide over where to put it.

[§61.3](#) states the conditions of generation and holds that the aesthetic occasion is the purest instance of [§38.2.1](#), having no accomplishment outside itself. [§61.4](#) states closure in this idiom, including the form [§26.3.1](#) described. [§61.5](#) states what particular acts do.

The reader should carry forward the purest-case argument and its consequence, which is that this function is the most exposed of the nine to the difficulty [ch. 51](#) could not dissolve.

61.1 The Established Account

61.1.1 The Aesthetic as a Phase of Experience

Dewey (1934) supplies the account this chapter engages, and [§41.1.2](#) recorded that he is the nearest precursor to this framework anywhere in the book.

The account holds that the aesthetic is a phase which ordinary experience may reach rather than a special class of object. An experience, in his sense, is a stretch of activity that runs its course to a fulfilment rather than ceasing, and its aesthetic quality consists in that consummation. What distinguishes art from other activity is accordingly a matter of degree and organisation rather than of kind, and the aesthetic is continuous with the ordinary rather than separate from it.

Two features of the account are retained here without qualification.

Its unit is an episode rather than an object or a judgment, which [§38.2.1](#) adopted as the framework's unit for a different purpose and which [§38.4.1](#) identified as the smallest in which generation could be observed.

And it makes consummation internal. An experience in Dewey's sense is not directed at a result lying beyond it, and [§28.3.2](#) established what becomes of an occasion whose point is producing one.

Proposition 61.1. *The account holds that the aesthetic is a phase ordinary experience may reach, consisting in an activity running its course to a fulfilment rather than ceasing, and that art is*

continuous with ordinary activity. Its unit is an episode and its consummation is internal, and both are retained here.

61.1.2 The Unsurveyed Literature

§8.1.1 requires the full survey form of any tradition the book engages, and this chapter does not meet the standard.

There is a developmental literature on aesthetic response, on the sequence in which children's drawing changes, on the development of preference, and on what children take pictures and stories to be. It is not surveyed here and is not represented in this book's sources. A reader should treat §61.2 accordingly, since a premise located in one work is located less securely than one located across a tradition.

§56.5.2 and §59.5.2 recorded comparable gaps, and the three belong in one revision.

Proposition 61.2. *The developmental literature on aesthetic response, on children's drawing, and on the development of preference is not surveyed here and is not represented in this book's sources. The premise located in §61.2 is accordingly located less securely than in the preceding chapters.*

61.2 Its Ontological Premises

61.2.1 The Requirements of the Verbs

The verbs are that a subject appreciates, responds to, discriminates, prefers, and develops taste.

Two groups may be separated. Appreciating and responding to take a subject and an object, and are satisfied by facts about the two. Preferring and developing taste take a subject alone, the object having become a matter of what the subject is like.

The grammar of the second group carries a consequence worth marking. A taste is a property of a person, is reported as such, and is treated as terminating enquiry: that a subject prefers something is generally the end of what may be said, and §19.3.1 established the criterion under which a description is exposed to what it describes.

Proposition 61.3. *Appreciating and responding take a subject and an object and are satisfied by facts about the two. Preferring and developing taste take a subject alone, and a taste is reported as a property of a person which terminates enquiry.*

61.2.2 The Available Locations

Accounts of aesthetic capacity divide over where to place what develops, and both placements omit the same thing.

On the first, aesthetic properties are in the object and development is coming to detect them. Capacity is then a discriminative achievement, and §53.2.2 located the corresponding premise in the perceptual literature, that the joints are given.

On the second, the response is in the subject and development is the refinement of a private preference. Capacity is then a matter of what a person has come to be like, and §1.25.1

identified the move.

What both omit is that aesthetic occasions are characteristically shared. Looking at something, listening to something, and reading something are done in company far more often than alone in the years this book concerns, and §38.2.1 established what distinguishes an occasion shared from one merely simultaneous. A framework placing the capacity in the object or in the subject has no place to put the third party who was there.

Proposition 61.4. *Accounts place what develops either in the object, so that capacity is discriminative achievement, or in the subject, so that capacity is refined preference. Both omit that aesthetic occasions are characteristically shared, and neither has a place for the party who was also there.*

61.3 The Conditions of Generation

61.3.1 Attending Together Without a Purpose

The condition of generation is an occasion in which parties attend to something together and to no end beyond the attending.

Each element does work. Attending together is §38.2.1, and the occasion is shared to the extent that what each supplied is in what it became: what one party noticed alters what the other sees, and the noticing enters the episode. To no end beyond the attending is §61.1.1, and §38.2.2 excluded the occasion whose outcome one party settled in advance.

Two consequences follow.

What a child comes to attend to is settled by what has been attended to with him, in the manner §53.3.1 established for discriminations generally. A difference in a piece of music that no party has ever treated as making a difference has nothing sustaining it, and §53.1.2 established that unmaintained discriminations are lost rather than dormant.

And what a child comes to treat as worth attending to for its own sake is settled by what has been so attended to in his presence. §15.1.1 established that a child encounters an approach, and an approach to a thing which treats it as worth dwelling on is the whole of what is available to him about whether it is.

Proposition 61.5. *The condition of generation is an occasion in which parties attend to something together and to no end beyond the attending. What a child comes to attend to is settled by what has been attended to with him, and what he treats as worth attending to for its own sake is settled by what has been so treated in his presence.*

61.3.2 The Purity of the Case

The aesthetic occasion is the clearest instance of what ch. 38 described, and the reason makes this function the most exposed of the nine.

§38.2.2 excluded from the shared any occasion whose outcome a party settled in advance, and identified the difficulty as turning on whether the product was fixed before the other supplied anything. An occasion with an accomplishment external to itself always admits of having

its outcome settled: a reading lesson has a result, a walk has a destination, a conversation about arrangements has a matter to conclude.

An aesthetic occasion has none. There is nothing it is for, so there is nothing whose outcome could have been settled, and the criterion of §38.2.1 is met or fails on nothing but whether each party's supply is in what the episode became.

Two consequences follow and the second is the chapter's finding.

The aesthetic occasion is the best available instance for ch. 70, since §38.4.1 sought a unit in which generation could be observed and the confounding factor there identified is absent.

And it is the most vulnerable to what ch. 27 described, for the same reason. §26.3.1 established that an adult who must justify an hour to a party who counts outcomes has a justification only in the currency that counts. An occasion with no outcome has nothing to offer such a demand, and §51.2.2 established that thin protections are hardest to defend. The function whose occasions are purest is the function whose occasions are least defensible.

Proposition 61.6. *An aesthetic occasion has no accomplishment external to itself, so nothing about its outcome could have been settled in advance, which makes it the clearest instance of §38.2.1 and the best available unit for observation. For the same reason it is the least defensible against a demand for justification in a currency of outcomes.*

61.4 The Forms of Closure

61.4.1 Taste That Nothing Revises

Closure in this idiom is a preference that no encounter alters.

§61.2.1 recorded that a taste is reported as a property of a person and treated as terminating enquiry, and the closure form is the condition in which the report is accurate. A party who likes what he likes, and for whom no encounter with anything bears on it, holds a description of himself that nothing reaches, and §30.1.2 defined the general condition.

The form is ordinary and is not generally regarded as a deficiency. §33.2.2 established that the undoing concerns answerability rather than valence, and a settled taste is commonly regarded as a mark of maturity.

What distinguishes the case this book is concerned with is whether anything could alter it, and §16.2.2 established the condition. A party whose preferences have been tested against a great deal and have held is differently placed from one whose preferences have met nothing, and the two are indistinguishable by their preferences.

Proposition 61.7. *Closure in this idiom is a preference no encounter alters, which is the condition in which the ordinary report of a taste as a property of a person is accurate. The form is not generally regarded as a deficiency, and a party whose preferences have been tested and held is indistinguishable by his preferences from one whose preferences have met nothing.*

61.4.2 The Aesthetic Made Evaluable

The second form is the one §26.3.1 described and this function suffers most acutely.

The move is the substitution of a currency. An hour of attending to something for its own sake is defended by stating what it produces: that music improves mathematical performance, that drawing develops fine motor control, that reading fiction develops the understanding of other minds. Each claim may be true, and §26.3.1 established that the intent of such claims is protective and their use nearly always benign.

What the substitution does is supply the occasion with an outcome, and §61.3.2 established that having none was the whole of what made it the purest case. §28.3.2 then applies, and §38.2.2 excludes the occasion from the shared.

§51.3.2 located the resolution available and its limit. A protection survives where what happens within it can refute it, and whether it can be held answerably is settled by the household's order rather than by the protection's design. The present section adds that this function has no defence of its own to offer, since §61.3.2 established that it has nothing to put into the currency in which the demand is made.

Proposition 61.8. *Defending an aesthetic occasion by what it produces supplies it with an outcome, which §61.3.2 established was precisely what it lacked and what made it the purest case. The function has no defence of its own to offer against such a demand, and §51.3.2 located the only resolution available, which lies in a household's order rather than in anything this function supplies.*

61.5 The Implications for Practice

61.5.1 The Operation of Asking for a Subject Matter

Two acts are worth describing and both are ordinary.

Asking a child what his drawing is supplies the episode with a subject matter and a criterion. §39.1.2 established that a question whose answer the asker requires fails the criterion of §39.1.1, and a question of this form generally requires that the drawing be of something. §16.2.1 then supplies the readings by which an answer that is not absorbed.

Praising a child's drawing supplies an evaluation, and §18.3.1 established what recognition extended on terms does. §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion once its point is a result, and a child who has learned that drawings are praised has learned that drawing has an outcome.

Neither is a recommendation and neither is a criticism. §54.5.1 gave the general reason, and an adult who withholds a question in order that an episode shall remain purposeless has supplied it with a purpose.

Proposition 61.9. *Asking a child what his drawing is supplies the episode with a subject matter and a criterion, and praising it supplies an evaluation, which §28.3.2 established alters what the occasion is. Neither is recommended against, since withholding in order to preserve purposelessness supplies a purpose.*

61.5.2 The Conditions of Test

The chapter yields one proposal for ch. 70 and carries the deficiency §61.1.2 recorded.

The proposal follows from §61.3.2. Aesthetic occasions are the best available unit for observing whether what a child supplies is in what an occasion became, since the confounding factor of a settled outcome is absent. §38.4.1 sought such a unit and §30.2.2 recorded the difficulties attaching to it; the present proposal removes one of them and leaves the others.

The prediction is that children of households differing in whether things are attended to for their own sake should differ in the range of what they attend to, and should not differ on measures of preference, which §61.2.1 established record a property of a person.

The deficiency is that this chapter's premise-location rests on one work rather than on a surveyed tradition, and §61.1.2 recorded what would be required to repair it.

Proposition 61.10. *Aesthetic occasions are the best available unit for observing whether what a child supplies is in what an occasion became, the confounding factor of a settled outcome being absent. The chapter predicts a difference in the range of what children attend to and no difference on measures of preference, and its premise-location rests on one work rather than a surveyed tradition.*

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Chapter 62

The Coupling of Capacities

The Work of This Chapter

The nine chapters preceding treated functions separately, as §52.4.1 required. This chapter treats what holds between them.

§62.1 defines coupling as the sharing of a generative condition and shows that the claim is substantive rather than a restatement of the framework's generality. §62.2 identifies four conditions and states which functions draw on which.

§62.3 states what follows, which is a pattern of co-variation and dissociation that no rival account predicts, since rival accounts individuate capacities by domain or by structure.

§62.4 holds that closure propagates along the couplings rather than by domain, and states the limits of the account.

The reader should carry forward the four conditions, the predicted pattern, and the reason the pattern is what makes this Part a theory rather than a survey.

62.1 The Nature of Coupling

62.1.1 Coupling Defined

Two capacities are coupled where they draw on a common generative condition, so that an alteration in that condition bears on both.

§52.1.2 held that a capacity is a stabilised pattern maintained under a range of conditions, and §6.1.2 held that a pattern is maintained by what happens rather than possessed. Where two patterns are maintained by the same happenings they are not independent, and coupling is that relation.

Three features of the definition should be marked.

Coupling is a relation between capacities and is not itself a capacity, which distinguishes it from the general facility §58.1.2 was careful to specify.

Coupling is by condition rather than by content. Two functions concerning unrelated subject matters may be coupled, and two concerning the same subject matter may not be, which §62.2.2 illustrates.

And coupling is asymmetric in strength. A condition may be the whole of what maintains one capacity and one among several for another, and nothing here requires that coupled capacities vary together in the same degree.

Proposition 62.1. *Two capacities are coupled where they draw on a common generative condition, so that an alteration in that condition bears on both. Coupling is a relation rather than a capacity, holds by condition rather than by content, and may be asymmetric in strength.*

62.1.2 The Substance of the Claim

A framework holding relation to be the ground of all capacities might be thought to make coupling trivially true, since on that account everything shares a condition. The objection deserves an answer.

§52.2.1 separated the claim that relation is a condition of something's counting as a capacity from the claim that relations constitute the conditions under which a particular capacity stabilises. The first is general and yields nothing about which capacities co-vary. The second is specific, and §52.4.1 required each of the nine chapters to state the conditions for its function separately.

What the nine chapters produced is accordingly a set of specific conditions, not one condition repeated. §53.3.1 named differential response, §54.3.2 named the completion of a party's operation by another, §56.3.2 named exposure to alteration, and §57.2.2 named the licensing of a substitution. These are distinct, they were argued separately, and they do not all bear on every function.

The claim is therefore substantive in the way a claim of this kind must be: it says which functions are coupled, and it is refuted by a pattern of co-variation that crosses the couplings it names.

Proposition 62.2. *The general claim that relation is the ground of capacity yields nothing about which capacities co-vary. The nine chapters produced four distinct conditions, argued separately, which do not all bear on every function, so the coupling claim says which functions are coupled and is refuted by co-variation crossing the couplings it names.*

62.1.3 Capacities as Rates Over a Period

A further feature of the nine, implicit in each chapter and not yet stated together, is what makes coupling possible at all.

Every capacity Part X treated is a rate characterising a relation over a period. §52.1.2 held that a capacity is a stabilised pattern of what a party reliably does under a range of conditions, and §10.2.2 established the form such a characterisation takes: a figure over a period, defined on a relation, which no single occasion establishes and which neither party possesses.

The nine cases bear this out. §40.2.1 stated curiosity as the stabilised rate of supply against uptake. §54.5.2 gave initiation rate for movement. §53.3.1 gave the maintenance of a discrimination, which is a rate at which differences are responded to differently. §44.4.1 gave the proportion of a household's rules altered by objection, and §60.3.1 established that this is what makes a requirement normative. In each the quantity is defined on the relation and over a period.

Two consequences follow.

Coupling is possible because rates share inputs. Two rates computed over the same occasions are not independent, and §62.1.1 defined coupling as the sharing of a generative condition. A framework whose capacities were states rather than rates would have no comparable relation to state.

And nothing about a capacity so characterised is established by a single observation, which §38.2.1 and §10.2.1 established for the constituent operations and which ch. 70 inherits as its

central difficulty.

Proposition 62.3. *Every capacity Part X treated is a rate characterising a relation over a period, defined on the relation rather than on either party and established by no single occasion. Coupling is possible because rates computed over the same occasions share inputs, which a framework whose capacities were states could not state.*

62.2 The Shared Conditions

62.2.1 The Generative Conditions

The nine chapters generated four conditions, and each is one the book had established before Part X began.

The first is differential response. §53.3.1 held that a difference is maintained where some party responds to it differently, and that frequency of exposure does not substitute for this.

The second is uptake. §38.2.1 held that an occasion is shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what it became, and §54.3.2 established the corresponding negative condition, that an operation completed by another party does not complete in the one whose operation it was.

The third is exposure to alteration, which is the book's central form. §19.3.1 gave it for a symbol, §30.1.2 for an account of a child, §39.1.1 for a question, and §56.3.2 for a judgment.

The fourth is the licensing of substitution. §53.3.2 held that distinct arrays are taken as presentations of one thing only under an equivalence class no array supplies, and §57.2.2 generalised this.

Proposition 62.4. *Four conditions were generated: differential response, uptake, exposure to alteration, and the licensing of substitution. Each was established in the book before Part X began, and each was argued separately in the chapters that drew on it.*

62.2.2 The Assignment of Functions to Conditions

The assignment follows from the nine chapters and is stated here in one place.

Differential response is the condition of perception at §53.3.1, of self-regulation at §59.3.1, since a child's states are arrays in the same sense, and of aesthetic capacity at §61.3.1.

Uptake is the condition of movement at §54.3.1, of language at §55.5.1, of relational capacity at §58.4.1, and of self-regulation at §59.3.2, since a joint regulation is an occasion in the sense of ch. 38.

Exposure to alteration is the condition of concrete operation at §56.3.2 and of normativity at §60.3.1, and it is the condition on which the whole of Part VI turned.

The licensing of substitution is the condition of perception at §53.3.2, of concrete operation at §56.3.1, and of formal operation at §57.2.2.

Two features of the assignment are worth marking, since they are what make it a claim rather than a table.

Functions concerning unrelated matters share conditions. Perception and self-regulation share the first, and movement and language share the second, and in each pair the subject

matters have nothing in common.

And self-regulation and perception draw on the first without drawing on the second, while movement and language draw on the second without drawing on the first. The conditions cross the functions rather than partitioning them.

Proposition 62.5. *Differential response conditions perception, self-regulation, and aesthetic capacity; uptake conditions movement, language, relational capacity, and self-regulation; exposure to alteration conditions concrete operation and normativity; and substitution licensing conditions perception, concrete operation, and formal operation. Functions concerning unrelated matters share conditions, and the conditions cross the functions rather than partitioning them.*

62.3 The Predictions of Coupling

62.3.1 Co-Variation and Dissociation

The assignment of §62.2.2 yields a pattern, and the pattern is this Part's principal empirical content.

Functions sharing a condition should co-vary across households, and functions sharing none should dissociate. Perception and self-regulation should co-vary in the respects the first condition governs, which are the fineness of the discriminations each sustains, and §59.3.1 established what a child whose states are met identically lacks. Movement and language should co-vary in the respects the second governs, which are rates of initiation, and §54.5.2 and §55.5.1 stated the mechanism in each case.

The pattern separates this account from its rivals for a reason worth stating plainly. Accounts individuating capacities by domain predict that functions concerning the same subject matter co-vary. Accounts individuating by structure, of which §56.1.1 recorded the fullest, predict that functions sharing a logical form co-vary. Neither predicts that perception and self-regulation co-vary in the fineness of discrimination while movement and language co-vary in initiation, since those pairings answer to neither domain nor form.

Proposition 62.6. *Functions sharing a condition should co-vary and functions sharing none should dissociate: perception with self-regulation in fineness of discrimination, movement with language in rate of initiation. Accounts individuating by domain predict co-variation with subject matter and accounts individuating by structure predict it with logical form, and neither predicts these pairings.*

62.3.2 The Conditions of Failure

§8.3.1 required that the book state what would count against it, and this section does so for the Part.

Three findings would count.

A finding that the pairings of §62.3.1 do not obtain, and that co-variation follows domain or logical form in its place, would refute the assignment of §62.2.2 and would leave the four conditions without support as a set.

A finding that all nine functions co-vary together would be worse, and would indicate that the conditions are not distinct and that what is measured is one thing. §62.1.2 anticipated this as the form the triviality objection would take if the evidence supported it.

And a finding that the functions vary independently would refute the coupling claim entirely, leaving the nine chapters as nine separate accounts with no relation between them, which §52.4.2 recorded is what the Part exists to avoid.

The measurement difficulties are those recorded throughout, and one is specific. Each of the four conditions is defined counterfactually, which §30.2.2 established brings the difficulty this book has not resolved, and a test of co-variation requires all four to be assessed in the same households.

Proposition 62.7. *Three findings would count against the Part: that co-variation follows domain or logical form, that all nine functions co-vary together, or that they vary independently. The first refutes the assignment, the second indicates the conditions are not distinct, and the third refutes coupling entirely.*

62.4 Coupling and Closure

62.4.1 Closure Propagates by Condition

Each of the nine chapters stated a closure form in its function's idiom, and this section states the relation between them.

§30.1.2 defined closure as the condition in which nothing reaches a description, and §52.4.1 required each function's specific form. The forms were: an equivalence class no encounter revises, a repertoire no attempt extends, a language whose terms cannot be extended, a judgment nothing returns to, a bound on the entertainable, an account of relations nothing revises, a repertoire of states nothing extends, a requirement about which no reason is owed, and a preference no encounter alters.

The claim of this section is that these arise along the couplings of §62.2.2 rather than independently. Where a condition fails, the closure forms of the functions drawing on it appear together, and the functions drawing on other conditions are unaffected.

Two consequences follow.

Closure should cluster by condition rather than by domain, which is the same prediction as §62.3.1 in its negative form and is more readily observed, since §43.4.2 established that closure is invisible in the absence of contest and clustering supplies a second route to it.

And a household may be closed with respect to some functions and open with respect to others, which §30.5.1 required, since the condition attaches to descriptions rather than to households and §45.1.2 established the corresponding result for levels of an order.

Proposition 62.8. *The nine closure forms arise along the couplings rather than independently: where a condition fails, the closure forms of the functions drawing on it appear together. Closure should therefore cluster by condition rather than by domain, and a household may be closed with respect to some functions and open with respect to others.*

62.4.2 The Limits of the Argument

Three limits close the chapter.

The four conditions are not claimed to be exhaustive. §61.1.2, §56.5.2, and §59.5.2 recorded that three chapters surveyed their traditions incompletely, and a fuller survey might yield conditions those chapters missed. The set is what the nine chapters produced rather than what the domain contains.

The assignment of §62.2.2 is derived from the chapters and is not independently supported. Each assignment rests on the argument of the chapter that made it, and §48.4.2 recorded the general position on claims argued and not demonstrated.

And the propagation claim of §62.4.1 is the weakest of the three, since it requires both that the assignment be correct and that closure forms be identifiable in practice, which §43.4.2 established they are not where contest has ceased.

ch. 64 takes up what follows for reading a particular child's development, and ch. 70 takes up the measurement.

Proposition 62.9. *The four conditions are what the nine chapters produced rather than what the domain contains, three of those chapters having surveyed incompletely. The assignment rests on the arguments of the chapters that made it and is not independently supported, and the propagation claim requires both that the assignment be correct and that closure forms be identifiable, which they are not where contest has ceased.*

References

Chapter 63

The Reading of Development

The Work of This Chapter

§52.4.2 named this chapter as where the Part's practical content is gathered. Its subject is what an adult does when he reads a child's development.

§64.1 holds that reading is the application of terms rather than the detection of a state, which follows from §52.2.2. §64.2 treats the instruments a reading uses and the warrant they carry.

§64.3 states the chapter's principal finding, that a reading enters the conditions generating what it reads, and works it through the case in which the finding matters most. §64.4 closes the Part.

The reader should carry forward the finding of §64.3.1, and the qualification §64.3.3 attaches to it, which is as important as the finding.

63.1 The Nature of a Reading

63.1.1 The Separation of Reading from Detection

To read a child's development is to say what he can and cannot do, and the saying is the application of terms rather than the registering of a fact.

§52.2.2 established the ground. What it is for a child to be able to do something is settled by a description, since abilities are picked out under descriptions and nothing picks out an ability except under one. A reading accordingly does not find a capacity and report it. It individuates a capacity and attributes it.

§52.1.1 supplied the concrete difficulty. A child described one way at home and another at school is not exhibiting one property at two magnitudes, and a reading must settle which setting is the revealing one. The settling is done by the reader and is generally not registered as having been done.

Two consequences follow.

A reading is a description in the sense of ch. 14, and everything Part III established of descriptions holds of it. §14.1.1 established what a name settles, §16.2.1 the moves by which a discrepant occasion is absorbed, and Chapter 17 that a symbol realises itself in what it describes.

And a reading is made by a party occupying a position. §42.2.1 established that authority is the standing occupancy of the position an asymmetry favours, and a reading of a child's development is issued from that position by construction.

Proposition 63.1. *To read a child's development is to apply terms rather than to register a fact, since §52.2.2 established that abilities are picked out only under descriptions. A reading is accordingly a description in the sense of ch. 14, made by a party occupying the position an asymmetry favours.*

63.1.2 The Terms a Reading Uses

The terms available to a reader are supplied and are not chosen for the occasion.

§37.1.2 established that the terms in which a situation can be described are what passes between generations, and §49.3.1 established that a practitioner brings a manner of handling what does not fit which his household supplied and which is not available to him for report.

The terms of developmental reading come additionally from the traditions ch. 1 surveyed, and §1.25.1 established what those traditions share, which is the location of a property in the child. A reader using them locates a property in the child, and §16.2.2 established that he does so without devising anything.

This is the sense in which a reading is not innocent and no reader is at fault. §35.1.1 removed the bearers of fault for the general case and the removal holds here.

Proposition 63.2. *The terms available to a reader are supplied by the traditions surveyed in ch. 1 and by the grammar of his own formation, and §1.25.1 established that those traditions locate properties in the child. A reader accordingly locates a property in the child without devising anything and without being at fault.*

63.2 The Instruments

63.2.1 The Operation of a Table of Norms

A developmental norm states what proportion of children of an age do a thing, and a reading against it states where a child stands.

§34.2.1 established what such an operation performs: commensurability, direction, and publicity in a single act. §21.2.2 established that parties differing in many respects are rendered comparable only by an instrument, and a norm table is such an instrument.

Two features distinguish it from the school assessment ch. 34 treated.

Its terms are the traditions' terms, which §64.1.2 established locate properties in the child, and §54.1.1 recorded that the motor schedules still in use descend from an account the field has displaced.

And it is applied earliest, before the second setting of §34.1.2 exists. §7.1.1 established that the child holds no standpoint outside the relation, and a reading made in the first years is made where the asymmetry is most complete.

Proposition 63.3. *A table of norms is an instrument performing commensurability, direction, and publicity in one act. Its terms locate properties in the child, some descending from accounts the field has displaced, and it is applied before a second setting exists to supply divergence.*

63.2.2 The Warrant

§34.2.2 established that an institution adds warrant to a symbol, supplying a further reading of discrepant occasions in the form of the procedure's propriety.

A developmental reading carries warrant of an unusually strong kind. It is made by a party licensed to make it, using an instrument constructed for the purpose, and reported to parents who are not positioned to assess either. §16.2.1 then supplies the readings by which a discrepant occasion is absorbed: he was tired, he does it at home, he will catch up.

The consequence is that a developmental reading is among the most difficult descriptions in a child's life to defeat, and §19.3.1 established the criterion under which a description is good. Nothing here holds that such readings are inaccurate. What is claimed is that their warrant makes them hard to reach, which is a property of the description's standing rather than of its truth.

Proposition 63.4. *A developmental reading carries strong warrant, being made by a licensed party using a purpose-built instrument and reported to parties not positioned to assess either. Its warrant makes it hard to defeat, which is a property of its standing rather than of its accuracy.*

63.2.3 A Reading Is Held to the Criterion

§64.2.2 held that a developmental reading is hard to defeat and that this concerns its standing rather than its accuracy. This section states what follows, since a description hard to defeat is the object of the framework's central criterion.

§19.3.1 established that a symbol is good where what it describes can refute it, and §30.1.2 established the condition in which no occasion reaches a description. A reading of a child's development is a description of a child, so the criterion applies to it and is not suspended by the reading's provenance.

Three things follow.

A reading is good where the child's subsequent conduct can defeat it. This is a condition on the reading rather than on the reader's diligence, and §42.3.1 established that an account absorbing every discrepancy has no purchase on what it describes.

The instruments make defeat harder in a specific way. §64.2.1 established that a reading is made against a table and §64.2.2 that it carries the procedure's warrant. Conduct discrepant with the reading is accordingly met by the readings of §16.2.1 with the additional support that the assessment was properly conducted, which §34.2.2 identified as what an institution adds.

And re-assessment is not by itself refutation. A reading revised at a later assessment has been replaced by another reading made by the same means, and §30.2.2 established that what settles the matter is whether the description was answerable to what the child did in the interval. ch. 69 takes up whether any existing instrument records this.

Proposition 63.5. *A reading of a child's development is a description of a child, so the criterion of §19.3.1 applies to it and is not suspended by its provenance. It is good where the child's conduct can defeat it, its instruments make defeat harder by supplying the procedure's propriety as a further reading, and re-assessment is not by itself refutation.*

63.3 The Effect of a Reading on Its Object

63.3.1 The Reading Enters the Conditions

This is the chapter's principal finding and it follows from [ch. 62](#).

[§62.2.1](#) identified the four conditions generating the nine functions: differential response, uptake, exposure to alteration, and the licensing of substitution. Each is a condition on what adults do with what a child supplies.

A reading alters what adults do. This is not an incidental effect and is what a reading is for: a reading is made in order that the child be responded to appropriately, and responding differently is the whole of its point.

What follows is that a reading is not external to what it reads. It enters the conditions that generate the capacities it reports, and [§28.3.2](#) established the general result for occasions whose point is producing a result. [Chapter 17](#) established that a symbol realises itself in the real, and [Rosenthal and Jacobson \(1968\)](#) supplied the demonstration in the setting where the initiating description was known to be arbitrary.

The finding is accordingly not that readings are self-fulfilling in a loose sense. It is that the mechanism by which a capacity is generated runs through adult response, and a reading is an instrument for altering adult response.

Proposition 63.6. *The four conditions of [§62.2.1](#) are conditions on what adults do with what a child supplies. A reading alters what adults do, which is its purpose. A reading is therefore not external to what it reads, entering the conditions that generate the capacities it reports.*

63.3.2 The Case That Matters

The finding bears hardest on the case in which a child is read as behind, and the case should be worked through because it is the one in which the framework's terms are most easily misused.

A child read as delayed is approached differently, and the differences are the ones a concerned adult would make.

He is helped sooner, and [§54.3.2](#) established that a movement completed by another does not complete in the one whose movement it was.

He is spoken to more simply, and [§55.5.1](#) distinguished supplying a term from supplying the word a child is reaching for, the second completing a search that does not then complete.

He is supervised more closely, and [§54.4.2](#) established what attempting under observation does, which [§28.3.2](#) had established for occasions whose point is a result.

And his difficulties are anticipated, which removes the occasions [§58.4.2](#) identified as supplying practice in sustaining a discrepancy.

Each of these is a failure of one of the four conditions, by [§62.2.2](#). The reading therefore produces, by ordinary and careful means, a contraction in exactly the conditions under which the capacities it measured are generated.

[§35.1.1](#) applies without modification. No party has done anything but respond appropriately to information properly obtained.

Proposition 63.7. *A child read as delayed is helped sooner, spoken to more simply, supervised more closely, and has his difficulties anticipated. Each is a failure of one of the four conditions, so*

the reading produces by careful means a contraction in the conditions generating the capacities it measured, with no party having done other than respond appropriately.

63.3.3 The Inferences Withheld

The preceding section is the most misusable passage in this book, and this section states what it does not license. The qualification matters as much as the finding.

It does not follow that developmental difficulties are produced by their identification. Children differ, §17.1.2 established that what a child brings is his, and §52.3.1 established that maturation constrains what is available in ways no relation alters. Conditions with organic causes have organic causes, and nothing in this chapter bears on them.

It does not follow that assessment should be avoided. §46.3.1 established that boundaries protecting a party from what he cannot assess are required by the framework's own commitments, and a child who needs help needs it. A reading that identifies a child who requires assistance has done something no other instrument does, and the cost of not identifying him is borne by him.

It does not follow that help should be withheld. §54.5.1 established that completion accomplishes the thing and stabilises nothing, and also that withholding completion in order to produce stabilisation settles the occasion's outcome in advance. Neither is recommended, and an adult who withheld assistance from a child who needed it on the authority of this chapter would have misread it.

What does follow is a description. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies descriptions of what acts do, and the description here is that assistance has a cost which is not usually counted, that the cost falls on the conditions of generation, and that a party who knows this is differently placed from one who does not. ch. 77 carries what may be said beyond that.

Proposition 63.8. *Nothing here holds that difficulties are produced by their identification, that assessment should be avoided, or that help should be withheld, and an adult withholding assistance on this chapter's authority would have misread it. What follows is a description: assistance carries a cost to the conditions of generation which is not usually counted.*

63.4 The Findings of Part X

63.4.1 The Part's Findings

The Part treated nine functions under one architecture and produced four results beyond the nine chapters.

§52.2.2 stated the ground and §52.2.1 separated it from the two weaker claims with which it is commonly confused, holding that relation is a condition of something's counting as a capacity rather than a cause of anyone's having one. §52.3.1 established that this leaves maturation untouched, the two answering different questions.

§62.2.1 identified four conditions generating the nine functions, each established in the book before the Part began, and §62.2.2 showed that they cross the functions rather than partitioning them.

§62.3.1 derived a pattern of co-variation that accounts individuating by domain or by structure do not predict, and §62.3.2 stated three findings that would refute it.

And §64.3.1 established that a reading of development enters the conditions generating what it reads, since the conditions run through adult response and a reading is an instrument for altering it.

Several chapters also supplied results the Part did not anticipate. §59.4.2 supplied ch. 31 with a mechanism it required and lacked. §56.3.2 identified Piaget's criterion with the framework's central form. §60.4.1 established that a closed order supplies facts where it appears to supply norms. And §61.3.2 established that aesthetic occasions are the purest instance of §38.2.1 and the least defensible.

Proposition 63.9. *The Part states the ground and separates it from weaker claims, identifies four conditions that cross the nine functions rather than partitioning them, derives a pattern of co-variation rivals do not predict, and establishes that a reading of development enters the conditions generating what it reads.*

63.4.2 The Residue Left by the Part

Three deficiencies stand at its close.

Three chapters surveyed their traditions incompletely. §56.5.2 recorded that the literature on task framing is not surveyed, §59.5.2 that the literature on delay of gratification is not, and §61.1.2 that the developmental literature on aesthetic response is not. §8.1.1 requires the full survey form, and these three chapters do not meet it. The premises located in them are correspondingly less secure.

The predictions are derived and untested. §62.3.1 requires all four conditions to be assessed in the same households, each is defined counterfactually, and §30.2.2 established the difficulty this book has not resolved. Chapter 70 carries them.

And the Part has not shown that the framework can do formal work the accounts of §52.3.2 do. §46.4.2 recorded the standard: a Part XI whose models cannot do what dynamic systems accounts do would be decoration. §52.1.2 adopted stabilisation from those accounts and §62.1.1 added coupling, and whether the addition supports formal treatment is not settled here.

Proposition 63.10. *Three chapters do not meet the survey standard of §8.1.1, so the premises located in them are less secure. The predictions require four counterfactually defined conditions to be assessed together and are untested. And whether the account supports formal treatment of the kind dynamic systems accounts achieve is not settled here.*

References

Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson. *Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual Development*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1968.

Chapter 64

The Reading of Development

The Work of This Chapter

§52.4.2 named this chapter as where the Part's practical content is gathered. Its subject is what an adult does when he reads a child's development.

§64.1 holds that reading is the application of terms rather than the detection of a state, which follows from §52.2.2. §64.2 treats the instruments a reading uses and the warrant they carry.

§64.3 states the chapter's principal finding, that a reading enters the conditions generating what it reads, and works it through the case in which the finding matters most. §64.4 closes the Part.

The reader should carry forward the finding of §64.3.1, and the qualification §64.3.3 attaches to it, which is as important as the finding.

64.1 The Nature of a Reading

64.1.1 The Separation of Reading from Detection

To read a child's development is to say what he can and cannot do, and the saying is the application of terms rather than the registering of a fact.

§52.2.2 established the ground. What it is for a child to be able to do something is settled by a description, since abilities are picked out under descriptions and nothing picks out an ability except under one. A reading accordingly does not find a capacity and report it. It individuates a capacity and attributes it.

§52.1.1 supplied the concrete difficulty. A child described one way at home and another at school is not exhibiting one property at two magnitudes, and a reading must settle which setting is the revealing one. The settling is done by the reader and is generally not registered as having been done.

Two consequences follow.

A reading is a description in the sense of ch. 14, and everything Part III established of descriptions holds of it. §14.1.1 established what a name settles, §16.2.1 the moves by which a discrepant occasion is absorbed, and Chapter 17 that a symbol realises itself in what it describes.

And a reading is made by a party occupying a position. §42.2.1 established that authority is the standing occupancy of the position an asymmetry favours, and a reading of a child's development is issued from that position by construction.

Proposition 64.1. *To read a child's development is to apply terms rather than to register a fact, since §52.2.2 established that abilities are picked out only under descriptions. A reading is accordingly a description in the sense of ch. 14, made by a party occupying the position an asymmetry favours.*

64.1.2 The Terms a Reading Uses

The terms available to a reader are supplied and are not chosen for the occasion.

§37.1.2 established that the terms in which a situation can be described are what passes between generations, and §49.3.1 established that a practitioner brings a manner of handling what does not fit which his household supplied and which is not available to him for report.

The terms of developmental reading come additionally from the traditions ch. 1 surveyed, and §1.25.1 established what those traditions share, which is the location of a property in the child. A reader using them locates a property in the child, and §16.2.2 established that he does so without devising anything.

This is the sense in which a reading is not innocent and no reader is at fault. §35.1.1 removed the bearers of fault for the general case and the removal holds here.

Proposition 64.2. *The terms available to a reader are supplied by the traditions surveyed in ch. 1 and by the grammar of his own formation, and §1.25.1 established that those traditions locate properties in the child. A reader accordingly locates a property in the child without devising anything and without being at fault.*

64.2 The Instruments

64.2.1 The Operation of a Table of Norms

A developmental norm states what proportion of children of an age do a thing, and a reading against it states where a child stands.

§34.2.1 established what such an operation performs: commensurability, direction, and publicity in a single act. §21.2.2 established that parties differing in many respects are rendered comparable only by an instrument, and a norm table is such an instrument.

Two features distinguish it from the school assessment ch. 34 treated.

Its terms are the traditions' terms, which §64.1.2 established locate properties in the child, and §54.1.1 recorded that the motor schedules still in use descend from an account the field has displaced.

And it is applied earliest, before the second setting of §34.1.2 exists. §7.1.1 established that the child holds no standpoint outside the relation, and a reading made in the first years is made where the asymmetry is most complete.

Proposition 64.3. *A table of norms is an instrument performing commensurability, direction, and publicity in one act. Its terms locate properties in the child, some descending from accounts the field has displaced, and it is applied before a second setting exists to supply divergence.*

64.2.2 The Warrant

§34.2.2 established that an institution adds warrant to a symbol, supplying a further reading of discrepant occasions in the form of the procedure's propriety.

A developmental reading carries warrant of an unusually strong kind. It is made by a party licensed to make it, using an instrument constructed for the purpose, and reported to parents who are not positioned to assess either. §16.2.1 then supplies the readings by which a discrepant occasion is absorbed: he was tired, he does it at home, he will catch up.

The consequence is that a developmental reading is among the most difficult descriptions in a child's life to defeat, and §19.3.1 established the criterion under which a description is good. Nothing here holds that such readings are inaccurate. What is claimed is that their warrant makes them hard to reach, which is a property of the description's standing rather than of its truth.

Proposition 64.4. *A developmental reading carries strong warrant, being made by a licensed party using a purpose-built instrument and reported to parties not positioned to assess either. Its warrant makes it hard to defeat, which is a property of its standing rather than of its accuracy.*

64.2.3 A Reading Is Held to the Criterion

§64.2.2 held that a developmental reading is hard to defeat and that this concerns its standing rather than its accuracy. This section states what follows, since a description hard to defeat is the object of the framework's central criterion.

§19.3.1 established that a symbol is good where what it describes can refute it, and §30.1.2 established the condition in which no occasion reaches a description. A reading of a child's development is a description of a child, so the criterion applies to it and is not suspended by the reading's provenance.

Three things follow.

A reading is good where the child's subsequent conduct can defeat it. This is a condition on the reading rather than on the reader's diligence, and §42.3.1 established that an account absorbing every discrepancy has no purchase on what it describes.

The instruments make defeat harder in a specific way. §64.2.1 established that a reading is made against a table and §64.2.2 that it carries the procedure's warrant. Conduct discrepant with the reading is accordingly met by the readings of §16.2.1 with the additional support that the assessment was properly conducted, which §34.2.2 identified as what an institution adds.

And re-assessment is not by itself refutation. A reading revised at a later assessment has been replaced by another reading made by the same means, and §30.2.2 established that what settles the matter is whether the description was answerable to what the child did in the interval. ch. 69 takes up whether any existing instrument records this.

Proposition 64.5. *A reading of a child's development is a description of a child, so the criterion of §19.3.1 applies to it and is not suspended by its provenance. It is good where the child's conduct can defeat it, its instruments make defeat harder by supplying the procedure's propriety as a further reading, and re-assessment is not by itself refutation.*

64.3 The Effect of a Reading on Its Object

64.3.1 The Reading Enters the Conditions

This is the chapter's principal finding and it follows from [ch. 62](#).

[§62.2.1](#) identified the four conditions generating the nine functions: differential response, uptake, exposure to alteration, and the licensing of substitution. Each is a condition on what adults do with what a child supplies.

A reading alters what adults do. This is not an incidental effect and is what a reading is for: a reading is made in order that the child be responded to appropriately, and responding differently is the whole of its point.

What follows is that a reading is not external to what it reads. It enters the conditions that generate the capacities it reports, and [§28.3.2](#) established the general result for occasions whose point is producing a result. [Chapter 17](#) established that a symbol realises itself in the real, and [Rosenthal and Jacobson \(1968\)](#) supplied the demonstration in the setting where the initiating description was known to be arbitrary.

The finding is accordingly not that readings are self-fulfilling in a loose sense. It is that the mechanism by which a capacity is generated runs through adult response, and a reading is an instrument for altering adult response.

Proposition 64.6. *The four conditions of [§62.2.1](#) are conditions on what adults do with what a child supplies. A reading alters what adults do, which is its purpose. A reading is therefore not external to what it reads, entering the conditions that generate the capacities it reports.*

64.3.2 The Case That Matters

The finding bears hardest on the case in which a child is read as behind, and the case should be worked through because it is the one in which the framework's terms are most easily misused.

A child read as delayed is approached differently, and the differences are the ones a concerned adult would make.

He is helped sooner, and [§54.3.2](#) established that a movement completed by another does not complete in the one whose movement it was.

He is spoken to more simply, and [§55.5.1](#) distinguished supplying a term from supplying the word a child is reaching for, the second completing a search that does not then complete.

He is supervised more closely, and [§54.4.2](#) established what attempting under observation does, which [§28.3.2](#) had established for occasions whose point is a result.

And his difficulties are anticipated, which removes the occasions [§58.4.2](#) identified as supplying practice in sustaining a discrepancy.

Each of these is a failure of one of the four conditions, by [§62.2.2](#). The reading therefore produces, by ordinary and careful means, a contraction in exactly the conditions under which the capacities it measured are generated.

[§35.1.1](#) applies without modification. No party has done anything but respond appropriately to information properly obtained.

Proposition 64.7. *A child read as delayed is helped sooner, spoken to more simply, supervised more closely, and has his difficulties anticipated. Each is a failure of one of the four conditions, so*

the reading produces by careful means a contraction in the conditions generating the capacities it measured, with no party having done other than respond appropriately.

64.3.3 The Inferences Withheld

The preceding section is the most misusable passage in this book, and this section states what it does not license. The qualification matters as much as the finding.

It does not follow that developmental difficulties are produced by their identification. Children differ, §17.1.2 established that what a child brings is his, and §52.3.1 established that maturation constrains what is available in ways no relation alters. Conditions with organic causes have organic causes, and nothing in this chapter bears on them.

It does not follow that assessment should be avoided. §46.3.1 established that boundaries protecting a party from what he cannot assess are required by the framework's own commitments, and a child who needs help needs it. A reading that identifies a child who requires assistance has done something no other instrument does, and the cost of not identifying him is borne by him.

It does not follow that help should be withheld. §54.5.1 established that completion accomplishes the thing and stabilises nothing, and also that withholding completion in order to produce stabilisation settles the occasion's outcome in advance. Neither is recommended, and an adult who withheld assistance from a child who needed it on the authority of this chapter would have misread it.

What does follow is a description. §8.2.1 recorded that this book supplies descriptions of what acts do, and the description here is that assistance has a cost which is not usually counted, that the cost falls on the conditions of generation, and that a party who knows this is differently placed from one who does not. ch. 77 carries what may be said beyond that.

Proposition 64.8. *Nothing here holds that difficulties are produced by their identification, that assessment should be avoided, or that help should be withheld, and an adult withholding assistance on this chapter's authority would have misread it. What follows is a description: assistance carries a cost to the conditions of generation which is not usually counted.*

64.4 The Findings of Part X

64.4.1 The Part's Findings

The Part treated nine functions under one architecture and produced four results beyond the nine chapters.

§52.2.2 stated the ground and §52.2.1 separated it from the two weaker claims with which it is commonly confused, holding that relation is a condition of something's counting as a capacity rather than a cause of anyone's having one. §52.3.1 established that this leaves maturation untouched, the two answering different questions.

§62.2.1 identified four conditions generating the nine functions, each established in the book before the Part began, and §62.2.2 showed that they cross the functions rather than partitioning them.

§62.3.1 derived a pattern of co-variation that accounts individuating by domain or by structure do not predict, and §62.3.2 stated three findings that would refute it.

And §64.3.1 established that a reading of development enters the conditions generating what it reads, since the conditions run through adult response and a reading is an instrument for altering it.

Several chapters also supplied results the Part did not anticipate. §59.4.2 supplied ch. 31 with a mechanism it required and lacked. §56.3.2 identified Piaget's criterion with the framework's central form. §60.4.1 established that a closed order supplies facts where it appears to supply norms. And §61.3.2 established that aesthetic occasions are the purest instance of §38.2.1 and the least defensible.

Proposition 64.9. *The Part states the ground and separates it from weaker claims, identifies four conditions that cross the nine functions rather than partitioning them, derives a pattern of co-variation rivals do not predict, and establishes that a reading of development enters the conditions generating what it reads.*

64.4.2 The Residue Left by the Part

Three deficiencies stand at its close.

Three chapters surveyed their traditions incompletely. §56.5.2 recorded that the literature on task framing is not surveyed, §59.5.2 that the literature on delay of gratification is not, and §61.1.2 that the developmental literature on aesthetic response is not. §8.1.1 requires the full survey form, and these three chapters do not meet it. The premises located in them are correspondingly less secure.

The predictions are derived and untested. §62.3.1 requires all four conditions to be assessed in the same households, each is defined counterfactually, and §30.2.2 established the difficulty this book has not resolved. Chapter 70 carries them.

And the Part has not shown that the framework can do formal work the accounts of §52.3.2 do. §46.4.2 recorded the standard: a Part XI whose models cannot do what dynamic systems accounts do would be decoration. §52.1.2 adopted stabilisation from those accounts and §62.1.1 added coupling, and whether the addition supports formal treatment is not settled here.

Proposition 64.10. *Three chapters do not meet the survey standard of §8.1.1, so the premises located in them are less secure. The predictions require four counterfactually defined conditions to be assessed together and are untested. And whether the account supports formal treatment of the kind dynamic systems accounts achieve is not settled here.*

References

Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson. *Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual Development*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1968.

Part XI

Method and the Empirical Programme

Chapter 65

The Position of Method

The Work of This Chapter

This Part asks whether anything the preceding Parts describe can be established empirically. The question has been deferred to it more often than to any other, and this chapter states what the Part undertakes and on what ground.

§65.1 states the Part's justification as a claim to be argued rather than a presumption, since a Part of this kind is where a framework is most tempted to assume its own measurability.

§65.2 states four things the Part does not undertake.

§65.3 previews the two methods the Part sets against each other and states why neither is taken as the standard. §65.4 gives the programme and marks which chapters carry the constructive weight.

The reader should carry forward the Part's justifying claim, which is that a framework locating capacities in relations is committed to relational quantities being the things to measure, and that no existing instrument measures one.

65.1 The Ground of the Part

65.1.1 The Justifying Claim

The Part rests on a claim which is stated here and argued through [ch. 69](#) and [ch. 70](#), and which should not be assumed.

The claim is this. Existing instruments in developmental research measure a capacity located in a child. §52.2.2 held that a capacity is individuated by a description no child supplies himself, §52.1.2 held that a capacity is a stabilised pattern maintained under a range of conditions, and §62.1.3 held that every capacity Part X treated is a rate characterising a relation over a period. If those holdings are correct, then what should be measurable is the structure rather than the child, and the quantities are of a different kind from those instruments currently return.

Four such quantities have been named in the preceding Parts and none appears on any existing instrument.

The direction in which value moves between parties, and whether it reverses. §10.2.2 established that what characterises a relation is the rate at which generated power is returned against the rate at which it is generated, and [Chapter 12](#) distinguished the two stabilities by that ratio.

The number of independent sources from which a party is confirmed. §21.2.1 established the singularity of the gaze and §22.1.1 established that its scarcity is a property of arrange-

ments.

Whether a household's grammar retains a distinction. §53.3.1 established that a difference is maintained where some party responds to it differently, and §59.3.1 and §53.3.2 established the two cases in which this matters most.

And whether a description admits of refutation by what it describes. §19.3.1 gave the criterion, §30.1.2 gave its failure, and §64.2.3 established that a reading of a child's development is held to it.

Proposition 65.1. *The Part rests on the claim that a framework locating capacities in relations is committed to relational quantities being what should be measured, and that existing instruments measure a capacity located in a child. Four such quantities have been named: the direction of value flow and whether it reverses, the number of independent sources of confirmation, whether a grammar retains a distinction, and whether a description admits refutation by what it describes.*

65.1.2 The Argumentative Burden of the Claim

Three ways of failing are available to a Part of this kind, and stating them here is what distinguishes an argued position from an assumed one.

The first is that the quantities may not be measurable at all. §30.2.2 established that the framework's central discriminator is counterfactual, that the intervention establishing it cannot be arranged, that a negative result is ambiguous, and that an occasion produced in order to discriminate is altered by the production. Every quantity named in §65.1.1 inherits some part of this, and ch. 76 takes up whether any instrument escapes it.

The second is that they may be measurable and useless. An instrument returning a quantity that predicts nothing, or that predicts only what existing instruments already predict, would establish that the framework's vocabulary is redundant, and §8.3.1 ranked redescription of an available vocabulary as the most damaging finding available against this book.

The third is that the quantities may be measurable, useful, and harmful. §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is producing a result and §30.5.1 established why the framework has refused to yield a scale on which households are ranked. An instrument measuring the quantities of §65.1.1 would supply exactly such a scale, and ch. 76 is where the difficulty is faced rather than deflected.

Proposition 65.2. *The claim may fail in three ways: the quantities may not be measurable, since each inherits part of the difficulty §30.2.2 recorded; they may be measurable and redundant, which would be the finding §8.3.1 ranked most damaging; or they may be measurable, useful, and harmful, since an instrument returning them supplies the scale §30.5.1 refused.*

65.2 The Undertakings Declined

65.2.1 The Non-Deliverables

§8.2.1 recorded what the book does not undertake, and this Part requires four further exclusions of its own.

It does not supply an instrument. What is proposed are quantities and the designs by which they might be assessed, and [ch. 75](#) states the designs at the level of what would have to be held constant. Constructing an instrument requires decisions about items, populations, and administration that no argument in this book settles.

It does not report results. Nothing in the Part has been carried out, and [§64.4.2](#) recorded that the nine predictions of Part X are stated and untested. A reader encountering a quantity here should read it as a proposal.

It does not adjudicate between methods. [§65.3](#) states the position and [ch. 68](#) argues it: neither method is taken as the standard against which the other is assessed, and the Part's use of each is constrained by what the other establishes about its limits.

And it does not establish that the framework is correct. A quantity may be measurable and the framework may be wrong about what it measures, and [§62.3.2](#) stated three findings that would count against Part X specifically.

Proposition 65.3. *The Part withholds supplying an instrument, does not report results, does not adjudicate between the two methods, and does not establish that the framework is correct. What it supplies are quantities, the designs by which they might be assessed, and an account of what would follow from assessing them.*

65.2.2 The Ground of the Placement

The Part follows the treatment of the nine functions and precedes the treatment of practice, and the ordering carries an argument.

It follows Part X because its proposals are about those functions. [[§?? sub:instruments-supply-withhold](#)] recorded that each of the nine chapters proposed a quantity defined on an exchange rather than on a child, and [§62.3.1](#) produced the pattern of co-variation that a test would look for. A Part on method placed before them would have had nothing determinate to propose measuring.

It precedes Part XII because what may be said about practice depends on what may be established. [§40.4.2](#) recorded that every practical section of Part X reached the same position, that an act performed in order to secure a generative condition settles the occasion's outcome in advance. [ch. 77](#) inherits that constraint, and it inherits additionally whatever this Part establishes about what can be known.

Proposition 65.4. *The Part follows Part X because its proposals concern those functions, each of which supplied a quantity defined on an exchange, and precedes Part XII because what may be said about practice depends on what may be established about what can be known.*

65.3 The Methods in Question

65.3.1 The Refusal of a Standard

The Part sets two methods against each other and takes neither as the standard by which the other is judged, and the reason is that each is undefeated against the other in one direction.

The positivist method proceeds by observation, measurement, and the testing of stated hypotheses against evidence that could disconfirm them. [ch. 66](#) grants it fully and locates two limits.

The traditionalist method proceeds by the accumulated judgment of a practice, transmitted by participation, and delivers categories and a form of recognition that no measurement supplies. [ch. 67](#) grants it and locates its limit.

[ch. 68](#) states the asymmetry that makes the pairing necessary. Positivism cannot cure unfalsifiability in a framework whose central claims are counterfactual, and traditionalism cannot defeat the difficulty [§1.27.3](#) recorded. Each constrains the other's overreach, and neither can be used to certify the other.

Proposition 65.5. *Neither method is taken as the standard, since each is undefeated against the other in one direction: positivism cannot cure unfalsifiability in a framework whose central claims are counterfactual, and traditionalism cannot defeat the difficulty [§1.27.3](#) recorded.*

65.3.2 The Debts to Each

The book has drawn on both and the debts should be stated before the limits are.

To the positivist method it owes nearly all of what it has granted. [§53.1.2](#), [§54.1.1](#), [§58.2.1](#), [§57.1.2](#), and [§60.1.2](#) each recorded a finding the framework retains, and [§8.1.1](#) required the full survey form of any tradition engaged. A framework that granted nothing would have nothing to locate a premise in.

To the traditionalist method it owes its organising question. [§43.3.1](#) recorded that the formation tradition supplied the account of becoming as the assumption of relational positions, the treatment of the adult as under formation, and the vocabulary in which a practice rather than a content passes between generations. [§43.3.2](#) then found that tradition's order closed, and [§43.3.1](#) recorded that the finding does not impugn what is retained.

Proposition 65.6. *The framework owes the positivist method nearly all of what it grants, since a framework granting nothing would have no premise to locate, and owes the traditionalist method its organising question, which [§43.3.1](#) recorded and [§43.3.2](#) qualified without withdrawing.*

65.4 The Programme

65.4.1 The Chapters and What Each Carries

The Part proceeds in four movements.

The first is methodological. [ch. 66](#) and [ch. 67](#) grant each method and locate its limit, and [ch. 68](#) states the asymmetry between them.

The second is diagnostic. [ch. 69](#) surveys existing instruments and asks of each a single question, which is what it locates the property in. [§58.3.1](#) anticipated the answer for one case and [§40.1.2](#) for another.

The third is constructive and carries the Part's weight. [ch. 70](#) states the relational observables, [ch. 71](#) and [ch. 72](#) give them formal treatment, and [ch. 73](#) takes up the hardest of them. [ch. 74](#) applies the apparatus to the nine functions of Part X.

The fourth is critical. **ch. 75** states what would have to be held constant and what would falsify each proposal, and **ch. 76** turns the framework's own results on the instrument.

Proposition 65.7. *The Part proceeds methodologically through the two methods and their dialectic, diagnostically through a survey of existing instruments, constructively through the relational observables and their formal treatment, and critically through the designs and the framework's own results applied to the instrument.*

65.4.2 The Part's Principal Exposure

Two chapters carry a burden the others do not, and a reader should know in advance where the Part stands or falls.

ch. 72 must show that the framework can do formal work that existing dynamical accounts cannot. §52.3.2 recorded that dynamic systems accounts share the notion of stabilisation with this framework and individuate capacities by their dynamics rather than by a description. If the models proposed here do nothing those accounts do not already do, the chapter is decoration, and §8.3.1 ranked redescription as the most damaging finding available.

ch. 76 must face a difficulty the book has not resolved anywhere else. §28.3.2 established that an occasion aimed at a result is altered by the aim, §51.3.2 established that a protection survives only where what happens within it can refute it, and §46.3.2 established that the parties cannot determine which operation a boundary performs. An instrument is an intentional arrangement of exactly the kind these results concern, and a household knowing that its reversal rate is measured will produce reversals.

§4.3.1 undertook that the book would state the costs of its positions. The cost here is that the Part's constructive proposals and the Part's critical chapter are in tension, and **ch. 76** is required to state the tension fully, consider the responses available, and indicate a resolution rather than declining to reach one.

Proposition 65.8. *The Part is most exposed at two points. **ch. 72** must do formal work existing dynamical accounts cannot, or it is decoration. **ch. 76** must face the tension between the Part's constructive proposals and the framework's own results about what an intentional arrangement does, and is required to indicate a resolution rather than decline one.*

References

Chapter 66

The Positivist Method and Its Limit

The Work of This Chapter

§65.4.1 placed this chapter and the next in the Part's methodological movement, each granting a method and locating its limit.

§66.1 states what the method requires and what it has achieved, at the length §8.1.1 requires of any tradition this book engages. §66.2 states the first limit, which is the one §1.27.3 recorded and which is not peculiar to this method.

§66.3 states the second, which is peculiar to it and which this framework is unusually placed to state, being ch. 23 applied to inquiry itself. §66.4 states what the framework owes the method and what passes to ch. 68.

The reader should carry forward the second limit and the reason it is a limit rather than a refutation.

66.1 The Method Granted

66.1.1 The Requirements of the Method

The method at issue holds that a claim about development is established by observations which others could have made, recorded in terms others could apply, and compared against what would have been observed had the claim been false.

Four requirements follow and each does work.

Observations must be repeatable by parties other than the one who made them, which excludes what only one observer is positioned to notice.

Terms must be applied uniformly, which requires that what counts as an instance be settled before the observing, and §34.2.1 established what commensuration performs.

Comparison must be against a case in which the claim is false, which requires that such a case be constructible, and §30.2.2 established the difficulty this book has met repeatedly.

And the result must be stated as a quantity or as a relation between quantities, since otherwise there is nothing for a further study to disagree with.

Proposition 66.1. *The method requires observations repeatable by other parties, terms applied uniformly and settled before observing, comparison against a constructed case in which the claim is false, and a result stated as a quantity. Each requirement excludes something, and the exclusions are what the method's discipline consists in.*

66.1.2 The Achievements of the Method

The achievements are substantial and are granted without reservation, and a Part proposing alternatives has an obligation to state them.

It has settled questions that argument could not. §54.1.1 recorded that Thelen and Fisher (1982) displaced a maturational account of motor development which had organised the field for decades, and the displacement was accomplished by submerging infants' legs in water. No argument would have done it.

It has established findings that contradict what careful observers believed. Spelke et al. (1992) and Baillargeon et al. (1985) established capacities in infants that the traditions of ch. 1 had denied them, and Werker and Tees (2005) established a developmental pattern that observation without measurement would not have detected.

It has made claims about children answerable to something other than the authority of those making them, which §19.3.1 identified as the criterion distinguishing a good description, and §64.2.3 applied to readings of development.

And it has repeatedly embarrassed accounts that were congenial. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) is used in this book to support its own claims and is equally an instrument for embarrassing them.

Proposition 66.2. *The method has settled questions argument could not, established findings contradicting what careful observers believed, made claims about children answerable to something other than the authority of those making them, and repeatedly embarrassed congenial accounts. A Part proposing alternatives is obliged to state this.*

66.2 The First Limit

66.2.1 The Problem Undefeated

§1.27.3 recorded two difficulties attending an empirical programme and separated them. The first is that no accumulation of findings about what is the case entails a conclusion about what ought to be done.

The limit is real and this book has met it directly. §42.4.1 recorded that neither argument of ch. 42 crosses the gap, and §42.4.2 recorded that the priority on which Part VI's conclusion depends remains asserted.

Two features of the limit should be marked.

It is not peculiar to this method. Any programme issuing recommendations on evidential grounds passes through a premise about what is worth wanting, and §1.27.3 recorded that the premise was not measured. A traditionalist method issuing recommendations is in the same position with respect to its own warrant, which ch. 67 takes up.

And it does not impugn the findings. A finding that a practice predicts an outcome stands whatever is true about whether the outcome should be sought, and §66.1.2 recorded what such findings have accomplished.

Proposition 66.3. *No accumulation of findings entails a conclusion about what ought to be done, and this book has met the limit directly rather than claiming to cross it. The limit is not*

peculiar to this method, since any programme issuing recommendations passes through an un-measured premise, and it does not impugn the findings.

66.2.2 The Limit as a Division of Labour

A Part of this kind is tempted to treat the gap as a defeat of the method, and the temptation should be refused.

The method does not claim to cross the gap. What it claims is to establish what is the case, and §66.1.1 stated the requirements under which it does so. A criticism holding that it fails to do what it does not undertake is not a criticism.

What the gap establishes is a division of labour. §8.1.1 recorded that this book's diagnostic Parts must show that something is lost, and §31.5.2 located the loss in a standing whose value is asserted rather than measured. The empirical programme could establish that the standing is removed under specified conditions and could not establish that its removal matters.

Proposition 66.4. *The method does not undertake to cross the gap, so its failure to do so is not a criticism of it. What the gap establishes is a division of labour: an empirical programme could establish that a standing is removed under specified conditions and could not establish that the removal matters.*

66.3 The Second Limit

66.3.1 Mutual Confirmation Applied to Inquiry

The second limit is peculiar to the method and this framework is unusually placed to state it, since the statement is ch. 23 applied to the relation between an inquirer and those he studies.

§23.2.1 established what mutual confirmation consists in, and §23.3.1 established that its conditions are properties of arrangements. §23.2.2 established that it cannot be arranged, and §23.1.1 established what follows for parties who want it.

The observational relation is arranged so that it cannot obtain, and the arrangement is the method's discipline rather than a failing.

§66.1.1 established that terms must be settled before the observing. What a subject does can therefore alter which value is recorded and cannot alter what the terms are, and §30.1.2 defined the condition in which conduct cannot reach a description.

§66.1.1 established that observations must be repeatable by other parties. The particular inquirer is accordingly required to be replaceable, and §21.2.1 established that the gaze is singular and that its being this party's is not incidental to what it does.

And the inquirer is confirmed in nothing by the subject. §20.2.1 established what confirmation consists in on an occasion, and a measurement occasion supplies the inquirer with a value.

What follows is that the relation between inquirer and subject has, by construction, the structure §30.1.2 defined. This is not an accusation. The structure is adopted deliberately, for reasons §66.1.2 recorded, and the achievements depend on it.

Proposition 66.5. *The observational relation is arranged so that mutual confirmation cannot obtain: terms are settled before observing so conduct cannot reach them, the inquirer is required to be replaceable, and the subject confirms the inquirer in nothing. The relation has by construction the structure §30.1.2 defined, and the structure is adopted deliberately and the achievements depend on it.*

66.3.2 The Cost of the Estrangement

The structure has three consequences for what such a method can find, and the third is the one bearing on this Part.

Occasions constructed for measurement are occasions with a purpose. §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is producing a result, and §38.2.2 excluded such occasions from the shared. A method whose occasions are of this kind cannot observe the phenomena ch. 38 described, since the observing constitutes the exclusion.

The subject reads the occasion. §56.2.2 established this for the operational tasks and §39.1.2 established that a question whose answer the asker holds fails the criterion of §39.1.1. What is measured is conduct under a description the subject may have registered, and §15.1.1 established that what reaches him is an approach.

And what the method can find is bounded by what its terms individuate. §52.2.2 held that a capacity is picked out only under a description, §66.1.1 requires the descriptions to be settled before observing, and §53.2.2 and §58.3.1 located specific cases in which the settled terms carried a premise the findings then confirmed.

The third is a limit on discovery rather than on accuracy. A method whose terms are settled in advance is exact about what those terms pick out and is silent about what they do not, and §32.4.2 established that a vocabulary may be unable to state a condition rather than merely failing to notice it.

Proposition 66.6. *Measurement occasions have a purpose and are accordingly excluded from the shared, the subject reads the occasion under a description he may register, and what can be found is bounded by what the settled terms individuate. The third is a limit on discovery rather than on accuracy, since a vocabulary may be unable to state a condition rather than failing to notice it.*

66.4 The Consequences

66.4.1 The Debt to the Method

The debt is larger than the criticisms and should be stated in the same place as them.

Every empirical proposition this book relies on was established by the method criticised here. §53.1.2 is the premise of ch. 53, §54.1.1 of ch. 54, §58.2.1 of ch. 58, and Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) appears at four points in Part X. A framework arguing that the method has limits, on the strength of findings the method produced, is in a position it should state rather than obscure.

The Part's constructive chapters additionally propose to use the method. §65.4.1 placed

ch. 70 and ch. 75 in the Part's constructive and critical movements, and both propose measurement in the sense §66.1.1 defined. §66.3.2 accordingly applies to this framework's own proposals, and ch. 76 takes up what follows.

Proposition 66.7. *Every empirical proposition this book relies on was established by the method criticised here, and the Part's constructive chapters propose to use it. The criticisms of §66.3.2 therefore apply to this framework's own proposals, which ch. 76 must face.*

66.4.2 The Inheritance of the Dialectic

Two limits have been located and they are of different kinds, which ch. 68 requires.

The first is a limit on entitlement. The method establishes what is the case and does not establish what should be sought, and §66.2.2 established that this is a division of labour rather than a defeat.

The second is a limit on discovery. The method's terms are settled before observing, its occasions have a purpose, and §66.3.2 established that both bound what can be found.

ch. 67 treats a method whose position on each is the reverse, and ch. 68 states the asymmetry, which §65.4.1 anticipated: positivism cannot cure unfalsifiability and traditionalism cannot defeat the first limit.

Proposition 66.8. *The chapter locates a limit on entitlement, which is a division of labour rather than a defeat, and a limit on discovery, arising from terms settled before observing and occasions constructed with a purpose. ch. 67 treats a method whose position on each is the reverse.*

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Chapter 67

The Traditionalist Method and Its Limit

The Work of This Chapter

§66.4.2 recorded that this chapter treats a method whose position on each of the two limits is the reverse of the preceding one.

§67.1 states what the method requires and what it delivers. §67.2 states where it is strong, which is at the two points §66.3.2 identified as costs of the other method.

§67.3 states its limit, and the statement is uncomfortable for this book, since the limit has the structure §43.2.1 defined and this book uses the method. §67.4 states the debt and what passes to ch. 68.

The reader should carry forward the identification of the method's verification procedure with the closure form of ch. 43, and the reflexive application of it in §67.4.1.

67.1 The Method Granted

67.1.1 The Requirements of the Method

The method at issue proceeds by developing categories in which a situation can be described, submitting them to parties positioned to encounter what they describe, and retaining what is recognised.

Gadamer (2004) gives the fullest account of its structure, holding that understanding proceeds from within a tradition the interpreter did not choose and that the anticipations it supplies are what make understanding possible. Ricoeur (1976) treats the relation between an event and its inscription, and §33.4.1 used the distinction. Tu (1985) presents a tradition operating by this method over a longer period than the discipline of ch. 1 has existed.

Three requirements distinguish it from the method of ch. 66.

Terms are developed in the encounter rather than settled before it, which §66.1.1 recorded is the reverse of the first method's discipline.

Confirmation is by recognition. A description is retained where parties encountering what it describes find that it states their situation, and §23.2.1 established what recognition consists in between parties.

And accumulation is by commentary. What survives is what successive practitioners found worth restating, and §49.1.1 established that a tradition's content is fixed by its application rather than by what it states of itself.

Proposition 67.1. *The method develops terms in the encounter rather than settling them beforehand, confirms by recognition rather than by comparison against a constructed case, and accumulates by commentary. Each requirement is the reverse of one §66.1.1 stated.*

67.1.2 The Deliverances of the Method

The deliveries are substantial and the first is easily overlooked because it is presupposed by the method that criticises it.

It delivers the categories. §66.1.1 established that terms must be settled before observing, and the settling is done with terms that came from somewhere. Attachment, the false self, the unconscious, the zone of proximal development, and the working model were each developed by the method of this chapter and were subsequently operationalised by the method of the last. §58.2.1 and §30.3.2 recorded two of these.

It delivers descriptions of what is not readily constructed. §23.2.2 established that mutual confirmation cannot be arranged and §30.2.2 that the framework's central discriminator cannot be applied at will. A method requiring that a case be constructible cannot reach conditions that cannot be constructed, and a method proceeding by encounter can.

And it delivers a statement of what a person is for. §2.5.1 recorded that the tradition surveyed in ch. 2 organises itself around how a person becomes fully a person, and §66.2.1 established that the other method establishes what is the case and not what should be sought.

Proposition 67.2. *The method delivers the categories the other method subsequently operationalises, delivers descriptions of conditions that cannot be constructed and therefore cannot be reached by a method requiring construction, and delivers a statement of what a person is for, which §66.2.1 established the other method does not.*

67.2 The Strengths of the Method

67.2.1 The Terms Developed in the Encounter

§66.3.2 identified as the third cost of the other method that what can be found is bounded by what its settled terms individuate, and this method has no such bound.

The consequence is that discoveries of a particular shape are available to it. §32.4.2 established that a vocabulary may be unable to state a condition rather than failing to notice it, and a method developing terms in the encounter is positioned to notice that its terms will not accommodate something, which §41.1.1 identified as the object of an epistemic habit.

This book is an instance. §31.4.1 and §55.4.2 identified a claim of prior unavailability as the reliable residue of a retrospective report, and no instrument returned that finding. It arose from attending to what such reports characteristically say.

Proposition 67.3. *The method's terms are developed in the encounter, so what it can find is not bounded in the way §66.3.2 established for a method whose terms are settled beforehand. It is positioned to notice that its terms will not accommodate something, which a method applying settled terms is not.*

67.2.2 Recognition in the Room

The second strength concerns the relation between the parties, and it is the reverse of the second cost §66.3.1 located.

§66.3.1 established that the observational relation is arranged so that mutual confirmation cannot obtain: terms are settled beforehand, the inquirer is replaceable, and the subject confirms the inquirer in nothing.

The traditionalist encounter reverses each. The terms may be altered by what the party says, which is §30.1.2's condition met rather than failed. The particular practitioner is not replaceable, and §21.2.1 established that the gaze is singular. And a practitioner whose account is corrected by a party has been confirmed in something by him.

What follows is that the method's characteristic occasion satisfies the criterion of §38.2.1, which §66.3.2 established the measurement occasion cannot. This is the strongest thing that can be said for the method within this framework and it is said without qualification.

Proposition 67.4. *The traditionalist encounter reverses each feature by which §66.3.1 showed the observational relation excludes mutual confirmation. Its characteristic occasion satisfies the criterion of §38.2.1, which the measurement occasion cannot, and this is the strongest claim available for the method within this framework.*

67.3 The Limit

67.3.1 The Infallibility of Confirmation by Recognition

The limit is that the method's confirming procedure admits of no disconfirmation, and the framework can state this with unusual precision because it has already described the structure elsewhere.

§67.1.1 established that a description is retained where parties recognise their situation in it. The question is what follows where a party does not.

Three readings are available and each is the institutional form §49.4.1 identified.

The party is not trained, so his failure to recognise is evidence of his not having been formed in the tradition. §16.2.1 established what a reading accounting for every instance is proof against.

The party does not yet understand, with understanding to arrive later, and §43.2.1 recorded that this move is available against most objectors most of the time.

Or the party is resisting, which converts non-recognition into confirmation, since resistance is what the description predicts.

Where all three are available, no encounter can fail to confirm, and §43.2.1 defined closure as the condition in which no objection could fail to be absorbed. The method's verification procedure has that structure.

Two things follow.

The defect is not that practitioners are dogmatic. §16.2.2 established that the moves are applied without being devised and that every party may act in good faith.

And the defect is not remedied by seeking disconfirmation, since the seeking is conducted by the same procedure. §43.4.2 established that closure is invisible where contest has ceased and that a household whose children have stopped objecting is indistinguishable from one whose children endorse its order.

Proposition 67.5. *Non-recognition may be read as the party's not being trained, as his not yet*

understanding, or as resistance, and the third converts non-recognition into confirmation. Where all three are available no encounter can fail to confirm, so the method's verification procedure has the structure §43.2.1 defined as closure.

67.3.2 The Limit as a Division of Labour Again

§66.2.2 refused to treat the first method's limit as a defeat, and the same refusal is owed here.

The method does not claim to falsify. What it claims is to develop terms adequate to what is encountered, and §67.1.2 recorded what this has produced. A criticism holding that it fails to do what it does not undertake is not a criticism.

What the limit establishes is that the method cannot settle disagreements internal to it. Two accounts each confirmed by recognition, and incompatible, cannot be adjudicated by the procedure that confirmed them, and §31.4.2 recorded a live instance: the disagreement between this framework and the psychoanalytic account concerns whether a reserve remains, both accounts have recognition in their favour, and §31.4.2 proposed an empirical test rather than a further encounter.

Proposition 67.6. *The method does not undertake to falsify, so its inability to do so is not a criticism of it. What the limit establishes is that disagreements internal to the method cannot be settled by it, and §31.4.2 recorded a live instance in which this book proposed an empirical test rather than a further encounter.*

67.4 The Consequences

67.4.1 The Debt to the Method and Its Inheritance

This book is written by the method of this chapter, and the criticism of §67.3.1 applies to it without exemption.

The debt is nearly total. Every category this book employs was developed in the manner §67.1.1 described. The asymmetry of ch. 7, the absorption of ch. 10, the readings of ch. 16, the two levels of ch. 30, and the four conditions of §62.2.1 were each arrived at by attending to what a situation seemed to require and were confirmed by whether the description states something a reader recognises.

The inheritance is the limit. §1.26.3 recorded the difficulty in Part I and this chapter states its structure: a reader who does not recognise what this book describes may be read as not having encountered it, as not yet seeing it, or as being in the condition the book describes, and §36.2.1 predicted that retrospective accounts will be produced in the terms a later vocabulary supplies.

Two things this book does about it should be stated, and neither is sufficient.

It states falsifying conditions. §8.3.1 named five findings that would count against it, §62.3.2 named three that would count against Part X, and §31.4.2 named the outcome that would favour the psychoanalytic account over this one.

And it proposes measurement. The remaining chapters of this Part exist because the method of this chapter cannot settle what it has raised, and §65.4.1 recorded that the constructive move-

ment carries the Part's weight.

Proposition 67.7. *This book is written by the method of this chapter and inherits its limit without exemption. It responds by stating falsifying conditions and by proposing measurement, and the remaining chapters of this Part exist because the method cannot settle what it has raised. Neither response is sufficient.*

67.4.2 The Inheritance of the Dialectic

The two chapters have located limits that stand in a definite relation, which **ch. 68** states.

The first method establishes what is the case and cannot establish what should be sought, and its terms are settled before observing, which bounds what it can find.

The second develops terms in the encounter and states what a person is for, and its confirming procedure cannot fail, which leaves it unable to settle its own disagreements.

§65.4.1 anticipated the asymmetry between them, and **ch. 68** must establish it rather than assert it: that the second method's defect is curable by the first and the first's is not curable by the second.

Proposition 67.8. *The first method cannot establish what should be sought and is bounded by terms settled beforehand. The second states what a person is for and cannot fail to confirm. **ch. 68** must establish, rather than assert, that the second defect is curable by the first method and the first is not curable by the second.*

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Chapter 68

The Dialectic of the Two Methods

The Work of This Chapter

§67.4.2 set this chapter a claim to establish rather than assert: that the defect of the second method is curable by the first and the defect of the first is not curable by the second.

§68.1 states what a dialectic between them can be, which is not a synthesis, and what would establish an asymmetry. §68.2 asks whether the first method cures the second's defect and finds that it does so for particular claims and not for the structure.

§68.3 asks whether the second method defeats the first's limit and finds that it does not, supplying content whose warrant is the matter in question. §68.4 states the asymmetry in the qualified form the two findings support, and states what the pairing is for.

The reader should carry forward the qualification, and the account of what holding both methods prevents.

68.1 The Available Form of a Dialectic

68.1.1 The Pairing as a Relation of Constraint

Nothing here proposes a third method combining the virtues of the two, and the reason is that their requirements are contradictory rather than merely different.

§66.1.1 requires that terms be settled before observing. §67.1.1 requires that they be developed in the encounter. A procedure cannot do both at once about the same terms, and a procedure alternating between them is two procedures.

What a pairing can be is a relation of constraint. Each method's limit is visible from the other's position, and §68.4.2 states what follows for a framework holding both.

Two things this rules out.

It rules out treating one method as the standard against which the other is assessed, which §66.2.2 and §67.3.2 each refused for a specific case.

And it rules out a division of labour by subject matter, on which some questions belong to one method and some to the other. §66.4.1 and §67.4.1 recorded that this book uses both methods on the same questions, and the questions are not separable.

Proposition 68.1. *No third method combines the two, since settling terms before observing and developing them in the encounter are contradictory requirements. A pairing can be a relation of constraint, which rules out treating either as the standard and rules out dividing questions between them.*

68.1.2 The Conditions of an Asymmetry

The claim §67.4.2 set is comparative and requires two findings.

It requires that the first method address the second's defect, which is that confirmation by recognition cannot fail, in the sense that applying the first method to a claim of the second produces a result the second could not have produced.

And it requires that the second method fail to address the first's defect, which is that no accumulation of findings establishes what should be sought.

Each is settled separately and neither is settled by the general observation that the methods differ. §67.3.1 and §66.2.1 stated the two defects, and the following sections take them in that order.

Proposition 68.2. *The comparative claim requires two separate findings: that applying the first method to a claim of the second produces a result the second could not produce, and that the second method does not establish what the first cannot. Neither follows from the observation that the methods differ.*

68.2 Does the First Method Cure the Second's Defect

68.2.1 The Reach of the Remedy

For a particular claim, the first method supplies what the second cannot, and this book contains an instance.

§31.4.2 states a disagreement between this framework and the psychoanalytic account concerning whether a reserve remains at the second level. Both accounts have recognition in their favour, and §67.3.2 established that the method confirming them cannot adjudicate between them.

§31.4.2 then specifies an outcome that would favour one over the other: reports gathered under different later vocabularies converging on content favours the reserve, and diverging on content while agreeing on prior unavailability favours this account. That specification is a claim about what would be observed, it was constructed to be capable of coming out either way, and §66.1.1 stated the requirements it meets.

The result is genuine and should not be understated. A disagreement the second method could sustain indefinitely has been given a form in which it could end.

Proposition 68.3. *For a particular claim the first method supplies an adjudication the second cannot, and §31.4.2 is an instance: a disagreement both accounts could sustain indefinitely under confirmation by recognition has been given a form in which an observation could end it.*

68.2.2 The Limits of the Remedy

The cure does not reach the structure, and three considerations establish this.

The test inherits the category. §66.1.1 requires terms settled before observing, and the terms in which the disagreement of §31.4.2 is stated came from the accounts being tested. A test of whether a reserve remains presupposes the notion of a reserve, which §7.1.1 developed by the

second method. The first method adjudicates within a vocabulary and does not assess it.

The choice of what to test is not supplied. §66.3.2 established that what can be found is bounded by what the settled terms individuate, and which claims are put to test is settled by which claims a tradition has produced and found worth testing.

And a null result is absorbable by the same three moves. §67.3.1 identified them, and each has a form addressed to a failed test: the operationalisation did not capture the notion, the instrument was too crude, the conditions were not those under which the phenomenon appears. Each is frequently true, which §16.2.1 established is what makes a reading undefeatable rather than false. Introducing measurement does not by itself break closure, since the readings can absorb what measurement returns.

The third is the decisive one. A method whose results can be absorbed by the procedure it was brought in to correct has not corrected it, and §43.2.1 established that closure consists in the availability of the absorbing moves rather than in their being made.

Proposition 68.4. *The cure does not reach the structure. The test inherits the category it tests, the choice of what to test is supplied by the tradition, and a null result is absorbable by the same three moves in forms addressed to a failed test. Introducing measurement does not by itself break closure.*

68.3 Does the Second Method Defeat the First's Limit

68.3.1 The Apparent Supply

§67.1.2 recorded that the second method delivers a statement of what a person is for, and §66.2.1 recorded that the first establishes what is the case and not what should be sought.

The appearance is that the second supplies exactly what the first lacks. §2.5.1 recorded that the tradition of ch. 2 organises itself around how a person becomes fully a person, which is a normative question answered normatively, and §43.3.1 recorded three of its deliveries this book retains.

Proposition 68.5. *The second method delivers a statement of what a person is for, which is what §66.2.1 established the first does not supply, so the appearance is that the second answers what the first cannot.*

68.3.2 The Insufficiency of the Supply

The gap of §1.27.3 concerns entitlement rather than content, and the second method supplies content.

An answer to what should be sought is a claim requiring warrant, and the second method's warrant is recognition. §67.3.1 established that confirmation by recognition cannot fail, so the warrant offered is one that would have been offered whatever the content. A procedure confirming everything confirms nothing in particular, and §19.3.1 gave the criterion.

The point is not that the second method's normative claims are false. It is that the gap was a gap in entitlement, and a method whose confirming procedure cannot fail is not positioned to supply entitlement. It occupies the far side of the gap without having crossed it.

This book is an instance and the instance is its largest debt. §24.2.1 asserted the priority of recognition over welfare, §42.1.2 established that deriving it from anything further would make it conditional on that thing, and §42.4.2 recorded that the priority is not discharged. §42.4.1 recorded that neither argument of ch. 42 crosses the gap. The present section states why no further work by the method that produced the priority would cross it either.

Proposition 68.6. *The gap concerns entitlement and the second method supplies content. Its warrant is recognition, which §67.3.1 established cannot fail, so the warrant would have been offered whatever the content. The method occupies the far side of the gap without crossing it, and this book's undischarged priority is an instance.*

68.4 The Asymmetry and What It Constrains

68.4.1 The Asymmetry Stated

The claim §67.4.2 set holds in a qualified form, and the qualification should be stated before the claim.

§68.2.1 established that the first method cures the second's defect for particular claims, and §68.2.2 established that it does not reach the structure. The cure is real and partial.

§68.3.2 established that the second method does not address the first's limit at all, since it supplies content where entitlement was wanted.

The asymmetry is therefore between a partial remedy and none, rather than between a remedy and none. §67.4.2 anticipated the stronger form and the chapter does not establish it.

The reason for the asymmetry is stable. A defect of falsification is a defect in a procedure, and a second procedure may be applied to particular products of the first. A defect of entitlement is a defect in a warrant, and a method whose own warrant is of the kind in question cannot supply one.

Proposition 68.7. *The first method cures the second's defect for particular claims and not for the structure, and the second does not address the first's limit at all. The asymmetry is between a partial remedy and none. A defect of procedure admits of a second procedure applied to particular products; a defect of warrant cannot be supplied by a method whose warrant is of the kind in question.*

68.4.2 The Constraints Supplied by the Pairing

If neither method repairs the other, the question is what holding both accomplishes, and the answer is that each prevents an overreach the other cannot see.

The first method's overreach is to issue recommendations. §66.2.1 established that findings do not establish what should be sought, and a literature reporting which practices predict which outcomes has produced no recommendation. Holding the second method makes the missing premise visible as a premise, since a method that states what a person is for makes evident that a statement is required.

The second method's overreach is to treat recognition as establishment. §67.3.1 established that its confirming procedure cannot fail, and holding the first method makes this visible, since

a method that constructs a case in which a claim is false makes evident that no such case was constructed.

Neither constraint is automatic. §68.2.2 established that a null result is absorbable and §50.1.2 established that a party does not register what his position prevents him from registering. What the pairing supplies is availability rather than correction, and §50.2.2 recorded the corresponding point about what extends an observation window.

This is what this Part rests on. §65.1.1 stated the Part's justifying claim and the constructive chapters propose measurements, and §67.4.1 recorded that the categories being measured came from the other method. The Part is an exercise in the pairing rather than a conversion to one side, and ch. 76 is where the pairing is tested on the Part's own proposals.

Proposition 68.8. *Holding both methods makes each overreach available for notice: the first method's issuing of recommendations without a premise, and the second's treating of recognition as establishment. Neither constraint operates automatically, since a null result is absorbable and a party does not register what his position prevents him from registering. The pairing supplies availability rather than correction.*

References

Chapter 69

The Object of Existing Instruments

The Work of This Chapter

§65.4.1 placed this chapter in the Part's diagnostic movement and set it a single question, which is what each instrument locates the property in.

§69.1 states the question and supplies a criterion by which it can be answered from an instrument's procedure rather than from its vocabulary. §69.2 applies the criterion, and finds that most instruments return a property of a child and that a few return one thing and report another.

§69.3 treats the instruments nearest to what this Part proposes, which are those introducing a perturbation and recording what follows. §69.4 states the gap and what passes to the constructive chapters.

The reader should carry forward the criterion of §69.1.1, and the finding that the framework's proposals are not unprecedented.

69.1 The Question

69.1.1 The Single Question and a Criterion for Answering It

The question is what an instrument locates the property it measures in, and it is not answered by asking what the instrument is called.

§58.3.1 established the difficulty. The Strange Situation classifies a pair and its results are reported as classifications of children, and the discrepancy is between a method and its vocabulary rather than between a theory and its evidence. An instrument's name and its literature's phrasing are accordingly poor evidence about what it measures.

A criterion is available from the procedure itself. Ask what the score would be undefined without.

Where a score is undefined without a particular other party, so that the same child assessed with a different partner may receive a different value and both values are correct, the instrument measures something about a relation.

Where the other party is interchangeable by design, so that a competent administrator following the protocol should obtain the same value, the instrument measures something about the child. §66.1.1 established that repeatability by other parties is among the method's requirements, and the requirement therefore settles the answer for most instruments before any question of theory arises.

Proposition 69.1. *What an instrument locates a property in is settled by what its score would be undefined without. Where a different partner may yield a different and equally correct value, the*

instrument measures a relation; where the administrator is interchangeable by design, it measures the child. The requirement of repeatability accordingly settles the answer for most instruments in advance.

69.1.2 The Methodological Origin of the Finding

The criterion is not a criticism, and the point matters for how the survey should be read.

§66.1.1 established that observations must be repeatable by parties other than the one who made them. An instrument built to that requirement is built so that the administrator does not matter, and §66.3.1 established that the inquirer's replaceability is one of the three features by which the observational relation excludes mutual confirmation.

An instrument therefore locates properties in children because it was constructed to, and the construction is the method's discipline rather than an oversight by anyone. §66.3.2 established the general result, that what can be found is bounded by what the settled terms individuate, and the present chapter is that result applied to instruments.

What follows is that the survey below is a description of what the requirement produces, and not a list of failures.

Proposition 69.2. *An instrument built to the requirement of repeatability is built so that the administrator does not matter, so it locates properties in children by construction. The survey is accordingly a description of what the requirement produces rather than a list of failures.*

69.2 The Survey

69.2.1 Instruments Returning a Property of a Child

Most instruments in developmental research return a property of a child by the criterion of §69.1.1, and the following are those this book has engaged.

Tables of developmental norms return a position in a distribution. §64.2.1 established what such an instrument performs and §54.1.1 recorded that the motor schedules descend from an account the field has displaced. The administrator is interchangeable by design.

The operational tasks return an attainment. §56.1.1 recorded what conservation is held to demonstrate, and §56.2.2 established that the task's meaning to the child is a relational matter the account treats as fixed. The experimenter is interchangeable and the finding that performance varies with framing was recorded in §56.1.2 as a difficulty for the account rather than as evidence about the instrument.

Speech discrimination procedures return a capacity. Werker and Tees (2005) established the developmental pattern this book relies on, and §53.1.2 recorded that what the procedure records is whether an infant treats two arrays as different.

Temperament questionnaires return a profile. Rothbart (2007) gives the account, and §59.1.1 recorded that reactivity and regulation are attributed to individuals. The instrument is administered to a parent about a child, which does not make it relational, since what is sought is the child's conduct across situations.

Measures of curiosity and of motivation return a property of a person, and §40.4.1 estab-

lished that such a figure conflates what a child supplies with the rate at which it has been taken up.

School assessment returns a position. §34.2.1 established what it performs and §34.4.1 established that the operations are constitutive of what a school does.

Proposition 69.3. *Tables of norms, operational tasks, speech discrimination procedures, temperament questionnaires, measures of curiosity, and school assessments all return a property of a child by the criterion of §69.1.1, since in each the administrator is interchangeable by design.*

69.2.2 Instruments Whose Method and Vocabulary Diverge

A smaller group measures one thing and reports another, and these are the instructive cases.

The Strange Situation is the clearest. Ainsworth et al. (1978) constructed a procedure in which what is coded is an infant's conduct toward a particular adult on reunion, and §58.3.1 established that the coding is undefined without that adult. By the criterion of §69.1.1 the instrument measures a relation. The literature reports classifications of children, and §58.2.2 recorded that its own finding of relationship-specificity embarrasses the reporting.

The Adult Attachment Interview inverts the case. Main and Solomon (1990) developed an assessment scoring the coherence of an adult's narrative about his childhood, and the interviewer is interchangeable, so the instrument returns a property of the adult. What it is taken to indicate is the quality of relations he had and will form, and §31.3.2 established the defects attaching to retrospective accounts of exactly this kind.

The two cases fail in opposite directions and neither failure is a mistake within its own terms.

Proposition 69.4. *The Strange Situation measures a relation by the criterion of §69.1.1 and is reported as classifying children. The Adult Attachment Interview measures a property of an adult and is taken to indicate the quality of his relations. The two diverge in opposite directions and neither is a mistake within its own terms.*

69.3 The Nearest Cases

69.3.1 Instruments That Perturb

One family of procedures comes close to what this Part proposes, and identifying it prevents the Part from claiming more novelty than it has.

The still-face procedure of Tronick et al. (1978) introduces a perturbation and records what follows. A caregiver interacting normally is instructed to cease responding while remaining present, and what is coded is the infant's conduct in response. Tronick (2007) developed the mutual regulation model on which ordinary interaction consists of mismatch and repair.

By the criterion of §69.1.1 this instrument measures a relation. The score is undefined without the particular caregiver, and what is recorded is a response to that caregiver's alteration of her own conduct.

Its structure is the one §30.2.2 required. That section located the framework's central discriminator in what follows a restored occasion and recorded three costs, and the still-face is

a procedure in which an occasion is altered and the following conduct observed. The Part's proposals are accordingly extensions of an existing form rather than a departure from all of them.

Proposition 69.5. *The still-face procedure measures a relation by the criterion of §69.1.1, since its score is undefined without the particular caregiver and what is recorded is a response to her alteration of her own conduct. Its structure is that of the discriminator §30.2.2 required, so the Part's proposals extend an existing form.*

69.3.2 The Reach of the Procedures

§32.1.2 recorded three limits and they are the terms in which the Part's proposals must differ.

The procedure is brief and experimental, and the conditions this book describes are extended and ordinary. §10.2.1 established that absorption is identifiable across a sequence rather than within an occasion, and §62.1.3 established that every capacity Part X treated is a rate over a period.

The perturbation is arranged, and §28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is producing a result. §39.3.1 identified naturally occurring instances of the discriminator and recorded that they escape the third cost §30.2.2 named.

And what is measured is distress, which §31.1.2 established the second level does not produce. The procedure is evidence about the capacity §31.1.1 named and is not evidence about the condition ch. 30 defined.

Proposition 69.6. *The procedure is brief where the conditions are extended, its perturbation is arranged where §39.3.1 identified naturally occurring instances, and it measures a distress the second level does not produce. These three are the terms in which the Part's proposals must differ from it.*

69.4 The Consequences

69.4.1 The Gap

§65.1.1 stated the Part's justifying claim as something to be argued, and the survey supplies the argument.

The claim was that a framework locating capacities in relations is committed to relational quantities being the things to measure, and that no existing instrument measures one. The second half requires qualification and the qualification strengthens the first.

§69.3.1 established that one family of instruments does measure a relation, and §69.2.2 established that a second measures one and reports otherwise. The claim that no existing instrument measures a relation is accordingly false as stated.

What the survey establishes in its place is narrower and sufficient. No existing instrument measures a relational quantity over a period, and §62.1.3 established that the capacities of Part X are rates over periods. The instruments that measure relations measure them within an episode, and the instruments that accumulate over periods measure properties of children.

Proposition 69.7. *The Part's justifying claim requires qualification, since one family of instruments measures a relation and a second measures one and reports otherwise. What the survey establishes is that no existing instrument measures a relational quantity over a period, the relational instruments measuring within an episode and the longitudinal ones measuring properties of children.*

69.4.2 The Inheritance of the Constructive Chapters

Three requirements follow for what [ch. 70](#) must propose.

A quantity must be defined on a relation, in the sense [§69.1.1](#) made precise: its value must be undefined without the particular other party.

It must be computed over a period rather than within an episode, which [§69.4.1](#) identified as the gap and [§62.1.3](#) established the capacities require.

And it must be obtainable from occasions that were not arranged for the purpose, which [§69.3.2](#) identified as the third respect in which the nearest existing instrument falls short and [§39.3.1](#) established is possible.

The proposals already scattered through the book meet these unevenly, and [ch. 70](#) must state them together and assess them against the three. [§38.4.1](#), [§40.4.1](#), [§44.4.1](#), and [§62.3.1](#) are the four principal ones.

Proposition 69.8. *A proposed quantity must be defined on a relation so that its value is undefined without the particular other party, computed over a period rather than within an episode, and obtainable from occasions not arranged for the purpose. The four proposals scattered through the book meet these unevenly and [ch. 70](#) must assess them together.*

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Chapter 70

Relational Observables

The Work of This Chapter

§65.4.1 placed this chapter in the Part's constructive movement and recorded that it carries the Part's weight.

§70.1 restates the three requirements §69.4.2 derived and states what a failure on each costs, since a proposal failing one is not thereby worthless. §70.2 states five quantities the book's diagnostic Parts imply and §70.3 states four the later Parts generated.

§70.4 assesses the nine against the three requirements and states which survive, which survive with qualification, and which do not. The assessment is the chapter's substance and it is not favourable throughout.

The reader should carry forward the working set of §70.4.1 and the deficiencies of §70.4.2, and should not carry forward the impression that nine quantities have been established.

70.1 The Requirements Applied

70.1.1 The Requirements Restated

§69.4.2 derived three requirements from the survey and they are restated here as tests.

A quantity must be defined on a relation, in the sense §69.1.1 made precise: its value must be undefined without the particular other party, so that the same child assessed with a different partner may receive a different and equally correct value.

It must be computed over a period rather than within an episode, which §69.4.1 identified as what no existing instrument supplies and §62.1.3 established the capacities of Part X require.

And it must be obtainable from occasions that were not arranged for the purpose, which §28.3.2 established is required if the occasions are to be of the kind being measured.

Proposition 70.1. *A proposed quantity must be undefined without the particular other party, computed over a period rather than within an episode, and obtainable from occasions not arranged for the purpose. The three follow from §69.1.1, §69.4.1, and §28.3.2 respectively.*

70.1.2 The Cost of Each Failure

The three failures are not equally serious and a chapter treating them alike would discard proposals worth keeping.

A quantity failing the first is measuring a child. §69.1.2 established that this is what the method's requirements produce, and a quantity of this kind may be useful and is not what this Part exists to supply. The failure is disqualifying for the Part's purpose.

A quantity failing the second is measuring within an episode. §69.3.1 established that the still-face does this and measures a relation, so the failure leaves a relational quantity in hand. The cost is that §62.1.3 established capacities are rates over periods, so an episodic value stands to a capacity as one observation stands to a rate.

A quantity failing the third is obtained from arranged occasions. §28.3.2 established that such an occasion is altered by its purpose, and §69.3.2 recorded this as the third respect in which the still-face falls short. The cost is that what is measured may be the arrangement rather than the relation, and §46.2.2 established that the parties cannot determine which.

Proposition 70.2. *Failure on the first is disqualifying for this Part's purpose, since the quantity measures a child. Failure on the second leaves a relational quantity standing to a capacity as one observation stands to a rate. Failure on the third leaves it uncertain whether what is measured is the relation or the arrangement.*

70.2 The Observables from the Diagnostic Parts

70.2.1 Reversal Rate and Absorption Latency

The first two derive from ch. 10 and ch. 12 and are the closest to formal statement.

The reversal rate is the proportion of occasions on which power generated by the asymmetry is returned to the relation rather than accumulated. §10.2.2 held that what characterises a relation is this rate against the rate of generation, and §10.2.1 established that absorption is identifiable across a sequence rather than within an occasion. The quantity is a ratio over a period by construction.

The absorption latency is the interval between an occasion on which a matter is opened and the occasion on which it is settled otherwise. §10.2.1 defined absorption as the alteration of what the favoured party holds, retained afterward, and §12.2.2 established what accumulated settlements do to the cost of the next settling. A relation in which matters are settled immediately and never reopened has a latency of zero and a reversal rate of zero, and §12.2.1 established that the ordinary vocabulary calls such a relation stable.

Both are defined on the relation, since what is counted is what one party did with what the other supplied. Both are over a period. Neither requires arrangement, since the occasions counted are those that occur.

Proposition 70.3. *The reversal rate is the proportion of occasions on which generated power is returned rather than accumulated, and the absorption latency is the interval between a matter being opened and being settled otherwise. Both are defined on the relation, computed over a period, and obtainable from occasions that occur without arrangement.*

70.2.2 Confirmation Sources, Refutability, and Grammatical Retention

The remaining three derive from ch. 21, ch. 19, and ch. 30.

The confirmation source count is the number of independent parties from whom a child receives confirmation in the sense §20.2.1 defined. §21.2.1 established that the gaze is singular

and §22.1.1 that its scarcity is a property of arrangements. §34.1.2 and §45.2.1 established what a second source supplies, and the quantity is a count over a period.

The refutability of a household symbol is whether a description in force can be defeated by what it describes. §19.3.1 gave the criterion and §16.2.1 the moves by which defeat is prevented. The quantity is the proportion of discrepant occasions that alter the description rather than being absorbed.

Grammatical retention is whether a household's terms retain a distinction that its practice no longer marks. §30.1.1 and §30.1.2 defined the two levels, and the distinction between them is whether the terms in which an alternative could be stated remain available. §55.4.2 established that a report of prior unavailability is a claim about a household's language and is checkable against it.

The first two meet all three requirements. The third does not meet the third, and §70.3.2 states why.

Proposition 70.4. *The confirmation source count is the number of independent parties supplying confirmation, the refutability of a symbol is the proportion of discrepant occasions altering a description rather than being absorbed, and grammatical retention is whether terms for an alternative remain available. The first two meet all three requirements and the third does not meet the third.*

70.3 The Observables from the Later Parts

70.3.1 The Proposals Stated

Parts VII to X generated four further proposals and they are stated here together for the first time.

The sharing proportion is the proportion of a child's contributions to an occasion that are in what the occasion became. §38.2.1 gave the criterion and §38.4.1 identified the shared occasion as the smallest unit in which generation could be observed. §61.3.2 established that aesthetic occasions are the clearest instance, the confounding factor of a settled outcome being absent.

The uptake proportion is the proportion of a child's questions that alter what follows. §40.4.1 proposed it and §39.3.1 established that questions occur for reasons internal to running a household.

The contest proportion is the proportion of a household's operative rules altered by an objection from a party subject to them. §44.4.1 proposed it and §45.4.2 required that it be computed separately by level.

And the co-variation pattern is a relation among the others rather than a quantity in its own right. §62.3.1 predicted that functions sharing a condition co-vary and functions sharing none dissociate, and §62.3.2 stated three findings that would refute it.

Proposition 70.5. *Parts VII to X generated the sharing proportion, the uptake proportion, the contest proportion computed by level, and the co-variation pattern, which is a relation among quantities rather than a quantity.*

70.3.2 Assessment Against the Requirements

The nine proposals do not fare equally and the assessment is the chapter's substance.

Four meet all three requirements: the reversal rate, the absorption latency, the refutability proportion, and the uptake proportion. Each counts what one party did with what another supplied, each is a ratio over a period, and each is computed from occasions arising for reasons internal to the household.

Two meet the first two and are qualified on the third. The confirmation source count is obtainable without arrangement and requires a judgement about what counts as an independent source, which §21.3.2 established is a structural matter and which no procedure here settles. The sharing proportion requires a judgement about whether a contribution is in a product, which §38.2.1 established is counterfactual and §30.2.2 established cannot be settled by observing the occasion.

One fails the third. Grammatical retention concerns whether terms remain available, and §55.3.2 established that a term's availability is established by its being used, so a household not using a term supplies no evidence of whether it retains it. Establishing retention requires an occasion on which the term would be called for, and arranging one is arranging the occasion.

One fails the second. The contest proportion requires the operative rules to be identified, and §44.1.2 established that this cannot be done by asking. The identification requires observation over a period long enough for the rules to be exhibited, which makes the quantity dependent on a prior measurement the chapter does not supply.

And the co-variation pattern inherits every difficulty of the quantities it relates, since §62.3.2 recorded that a test requires all four conditions to be assessed in the same households.

Proposition 70.6. *Four proposals meet all three requirements: the reversal rate, absorption latency, refutability proportion, and uptake proportion. Two are qualified on the third by requiring judgements no procedure here settles. Grammatical retention fails the third, since establishing that a term remains available requires arranging an occasion calling for it. The contest proportion depends on a prior identification of operative rules which cannot be made by asking.*

70.4 The Surviving Proposals

70.4.1 The Working Set

Four quantities survive the assessment and they are what this Part offers.

The reversal rate and the absorption latency characterise a relation's handling of what is opened within it, and §12.2.1 established that they distinguish two mechanisms of persistence the ordinary vocabulary conflates.

The refutability proportion characterises a description's exposure to what it describes, and §39.1.1 established that this is the framework's central form.

The uptake proportion characterises what a party's supply meets, and §39.3.1 established that its occasions escape the third cost §30.2.2 identified.

The four are related. Each counts occasions of one kind against occasions of another, each is a ratio over a period, and each takes as its numerator an occasion on which something supplied by one party altered something held by the other. §62.1.3 established that the capacities of

Part X are rates of exactly this form, and the four are accordingly four applications of one measurement idea rather than four unrelated proposals.

Proposition 70.7. *Four quantities survive: the reversal rate, the absorption latency, the refutability proportion, and the uptake proportion. Each takes as its numerator an occasion on which something supplied by one party altered something held by the other, so the four are applications of one measurement idea rather than unrelated proposals.*

70.4.2 The Deficiencies Remaining

Three deficiencies attach to the working set and none is repaired here.

Each requires a coding procedure and none is specified. What counts as a matter being opened, as a description altering, or as a question altering what follows are judgements a procedure would have to settle, and §66.1.1 established that terms must be settled before observing. Specifying them is where the terms of the second method would enter, and §68.2.2 established that a test inherits the category it tests.

Each is counterfactual at its numerator. Whether an occasion altered what a party held is a question about what would have obtained otherwise, and §30.2.2 established the difficulty this book has not resolved. §10.2.1 established that the question is answerable across a sequence, which is the reason these quantities are computed over periods.

And each is exposed to the reactivity §28.3.2 established. A household knowing that its reversal rate is measured will produce reversals, and §65.4.2 recorded that ch. 76 must face this and that the Part stands or falls there.

ch. 71 and ch. 72 take up whether the four admit formal treatment, and ch. 73 takes up the hardest of the measurements this Part has not yet attempted.

Proposition 70.8. *The working set requires coding procedures none of which is specified, is counterfactual at the numerator of each quantity, and is exposed to the reactivity §28.3.2 established. The first admits the second method's terms into the measurement, the second is why the quantities are computed over periods, and the third is what ch. 76 must face.*

References

Chapter 71

The Graph Model of Relational Structure

The Work of This Chapter

§70.4.1 established four quantities and §70.4.2 recorded that whether they admit formal treatment is not settled. This chapter and the next take that up, at the level of formality §65.4.1 specified, which is definitions and propositions without proof.

§71.1 defines a representation of a household as a directed weighted graph and states what the weights are. §71.2 states the structural difference between a generative and a hierarchical relation in graph terms, which is the presence or absence of a cycle.

§71.3 states which of the book's propositions the representation recovers and what it adds. §71.4 states what it cannot represent, which is the grammar, and the limit is the chapter's principal finding rather than a caveat on it.

The reader should carry forward the identification of hierarchical stability with acyclicity, and the reason the representation cannot reach Part VI.

71.1 The Representation

71.1.1 Definitions

The representation is of a household over a period, and the period is part of the object rather than a qualification on it, since §62.1.3 established that the quantities at issue are rates.

Definition 71.1. *A household over a period is represented by a directed weighted graph. Its vertices are the parties to the household. A directed edge from u to v records that occasions arise in which u holds something that what v supplies could alter. The weight on that edge is the proportion of such occasions on which the alteration occurred.*

Three features of the definition should be stated.

The edges are not symmetric and are not expected to be. §10.1.1 established that an asymmetry generates power continuously in one party's favour, and the edge from an adult to a child and the edge from that child to the adult record different quantities.

An edge exists where the occasions arise, whatever their outcome. A weight of zero records that occasions arose and nothing altered, which is a different condition from no edge, and §15.2.2 established that occasions foreclosed leave no trace and therefore do not appear.

And the weight is the quantity §70.2.1 defined as the reversal rate. The graph is accordingly a representation of the working set rather than a further proposal.

Proposition 71.2. *The representation is of a household over a period, its edges are asymmetric, an edge of weight zero records occasions that arose and altered nothing, and a foreclosed occasion produces no edge. The weights are the reversal rates of §70.2.1.*

71.1.2 The Nature of the Weights

The weight is a ratio over the period and inherits everything §70.4.2 recorded.

It is counterfactual at the numerator, since whether an occasion altered what a party held is a question about what would otherwise have obtained. §10.2.1 established that the question is answerable across a sequence, which is why the representation is of a period.

It requires a coding procedure that is not specified here, and §68.2.2 established that such a specification admits the terms of the other method into the measurement.

And it is exposed to reactivity, since a party who knows the weight is recorded may produce alterations. §28.3.2 established the general result and ch. 76 takes it up.

What the weight is not is a measure of anything's quality. §42.2.2 established that answerability and deference are independent, and a high weight records that what a party supplied altered what another held, which is compatible with the alteration being for the worse.

Proposition 71.3. *The weight is a ratio over a period, counterfactual at its numerator, requiring an unspecified coding procedure, and exposed to reactivity. It is not a measure of quality, since §42.2.2 established that alteration by what another supplies is independent of whether the alteration is an improvement.*

71.2 The Structures Distinguished

71.2.1 Cycles

The structural claim of the chapter concerns cycles.

Definition 71.4. *A relation between u and v is generative over a period where the subgraph on $\{u, v\}$ contains a cycle with positive weight on every edge, so that what each supplies alters what the other holds.*

§10.2.1 established that absorption is the alteration of what the favoured party holds by what the other supplies, retained afterward, and §10.2.2 established that what characterises a relation is the rate of return against the rate of generation. A cycle is that pair of rates being jointly positive.

Two propositions follow and neither is proved here.

Proposition 71.5. *A relation in which one party's supply alters what the other holds, and not conversely, produces an acyclic subgraph on those two vertices whatever the weight on the single edge. Magnitude of influence in one direction does not produce a cycle.*

Proposition 71.6. *The presence of a cycle is independent of the weights on its edges beyond their being positive. A relation in which each party rarely alters what the other holds is generative in the sense of §71.2.1 and differs in degree from one in which each frequently does.*

The second proposition matters for what the representation can and cannot settle, since it separates a structural question from a quantitative one, and §30.1.3 treated a comparable separation without adjudicating it.

Proposition 71.7. *A relation is generative over a period where the subgraph on its two parties contains a cycle with positive weight throughout. Influence in one direction produces no cycle whatever its magnitude, and the presence of a cycle is independent of the weights beyond their positivity.*

71.2.2 Acyclic Structure

The converse case is the one ch. 12 described.

Definition 71.8. *A household is hierarchically stable over a period where its graph is acyclic. Value flows toward vertices of high in-degree and low out-degree, and no path returns.*

§12.2.1 distinguished two mechanisms by which a household's arrangements persist: a pattern may re-form after each disturbance, or disturbances may not reach it. The distinction is the one this section states formally. A cyclic graph re-forms, since what any party supplies reaches what others hold. An acyclic graph does not need to, since nothing reaches.

Two further identifications follow, and they are the chapter's return on the representation.

Proposition 71.9. *The confirmation source count of §70.2.2 is the in-degree of a vertex. §21.2.1 established that the gaze is singular, and a vertex of in-degree one has a single source.*

Proposition 71.10. *The condition §32.1.1 described is a vertex present in the graph with in-degree zero and out-degree zero, and §32.2.1 established that this requires no party to have withheld anything.*

Proposition 71.11. *A household is hierarchically stable where its graph is acyclic, which formalises the distinction §12.2.1 drew between a pattern that re-forms after disturbance and one disturbances do not reach. The confirmation source count is a vertex's in-degree, and the undressed party of ch. 32 is a vertex of in-degree and out-degree zero.*

71.3 The Recoveries of the Representation

71.3.1 The Propositions Recoverable

Several of the book's propositions are statable in the representation, and stating which is how a formal treatment earns its place.

§21.3.2 held that a household's distribution of address is a structure with positions, which is the in-degree distribution over vertices.

§45.2.1 held that two adults ordinarily differ in the rate at which they absorb, which is a difference in the weights on their outgoing edges, and §45.2.2 held that allocation partitions the occasions between them, which is a partition of the edge set by domain.

§34.1.2 held that a second setting supplies a reserve by describing a child differently, which requires the representation to be extended beyond a household and which §71.4.1 shows it cannot be.

And §11.1.2 held that a fall in a rate maintains itself, which is a claim about how weights change over successive periods and is therefore a claim about a sequence of graphs rather than about one.

Proposition 71.12. *The representation states the distribution of address as an in-degree distribution, the difference between adults as a difference in outgoing weights, and allocation as a partition of the edge set. Self-maintenance is a claim about a sequence of graphs rather than about one, and §34.1.2 requires an extension the representation does not admit.*

71.3.2 The Additions of the Representation

Two things follow from the representation that the prose did not supply.

The first is that acyclicity is a global property. §71.2.2 defined hierarchical stability by the absence of any cycle, and a household may contain no generative pair and yet contain a cycle of length three, in which what each of three parties supplies alters what the next holds. Such a household is not hierarchically stable by the definition, and nothing in the prose of ch. 12 anticipated the case.

The second is that in-degree and cycle membership are independent. A vertex may have high in-degree and lie on no cycle, which is a party many others attend to and who alters nothing that any of them holds. §32.3.1 described a party whose position resembles this, and the representation shows it to be a distinct configuration rather than a limiting case of low in-degree.

Proposition 71.13. *Acyclicity is global, so a household with no generative pair may contain a cycle of length three, which the prose did not anticipate. In-degree and cycle membership are independent, so a party many others attend to and who alters nothing any of them holds is a distinct configuration rather than a limiting case.*

71.4 The Limits of the Representation

71.4.1 The Absence of the Grammar

The representation cannot state the central condition of Part VI, and the reason is structural rather than a matter of elaboration.

An edge records that occasions arise in which what one party supplies could alter what another holds. To count such occasions requires that it be settled what counts as an occasion, what counts as the same thing being held across two of them, and what counts as an alteration. §52.2.2 established that such individuations are settled by descriptions, and §37.1.2 established that a household supplies them.

The grammar is accordingly presupposed by the representation. It is what makes the edges countable, and a thing presupposed by a representation does not appear within it.

What follows is that §30.1.2 has no graph-theoretic statement. The second level is the condition in which the readings a description supplies absorb every discrepancy, which is a condition on what counts as a discrepancy, which is what the counting presupposes. Two households with identical graphs may differ in it, and §12.1.1 established the corresponding result without the formalism.

The limit is stated in the same terms §66.3.2 used for measurement generally. A representation is exact about what its terms individuate and silent about what individuates them.

Proposition 71.14. *An edge is countable only where it is settled what counts as an occasion, as the same thing held, and as an alteration, and §37.1.2 established that a household supplies these. The grammar is therefore presupposed by the representation and does not appear in it, so §30.1.2 has no graph-theoretic statement and two households with identical graphs may differ in it.*

71.4.2 The Consequences

Three consequences close the chapter.

The representation covers Parts II to V and does not cover Part VI. §71.3.1 listed what it recovers, and each is a claim about flows rather than about the terms in which flows are individuated.

A formal treatment of Part VI would require a representation of the grammar, which would be a representation of what a household's terms permit rather than of what passes between its parties. Nothing in this Part proposes one, and §65.4.2 recorded where the Part is most exposed.

And the limit is not peculiar to graphs. ch. 72 proposes a second formalism and inherits the same constraint, since §52.2.2 concerns individuation and any formalism individuates its own objects.

Proposition 71.15. *The representation covers Parts II to V and not Part VI, since what it recovers are claims about flows rather than about the terms individuating them. A formal treatment of Part VI would require representing what a household's terms permit, which this Part does not propose, and the limit is not peculiar to graphs.*

References

Chapter 72

The Dynamical Model of Capacity Formation

The Work of This Chapter

§65.4.2 recorded that this Part is most exposed at the point where its models must do something the established dynamical accounts cannot. A model reproducing what those accounts already achieve would be decoration, and this chapter is where the standard is met or is not.

§72.1 states what those accounts supply and identifies what they cannot distinguish.

§72.2 proposes an order parameter defined on a relation rather than on a child, and states the bifurcation that follows from ch. 71.

§72.3 treats the three phenomena §65.4.1 named. §72.4 states the differential prediction and what the model does not reach.

The reader should carry forward the differential prediction of §72.4.1, which is the whole of what this chapter claims beyond the established accounts.

72.1 The Requirements of a Dynamical Account

72.1.1 The Established Accounts

Thelen and Smith (1994) and Thelen et al. (2001) give the fullest developmental statement, Smith and Thelen (1993) its applications, and van Geert (1991) and van Geert (1998) the formal models. Fischer (1980) supplies a related account of levels and their construction. §54.1.1 recorded what this tradition accomplished and §52.3.2 recorded the framework's debt.

Three achievements are granted.

A capacity is an emergent stability rather than a stored competence, arising from the assembly of components none of which contains it, and §52.1.2 adopted this.

Development proceeds through the loss and re-formation of stabilities, so that regression is expected rather than anomalous, and §54.1.2 recorded that variability is the material from which stabilisation selects.

And growth is modelled formally. van Geert (1991) treats a capacity as a grower with a carrying capacity, coupled to others by competition and support, and derives spurts, plateaus, and temporary regressions from the coupling rather than from separate mechanisms.

Proposition 72.1. *The established accounts hold that a capacity is an emergent stability arising from an assembly, that regression is expected rather than anomalous, and that growth admits*

formal treatment in which spurts and plateaus follow from coupling among growers. All three are granted and two are adopted.

72.1.2 The Indistinguishable Cases

The accounts' state variables describe the child, and their environment enters as a set of constraints on his assembly.

§54.1.2 recorded that the relata are a body, a task, and a surface, and §54.2.2 located the premise that follows, which is that a task is given. A relation between persons appears in such a model as a source of task conditions.

What follows is a case the accounts cannot distinguish. Consider two children whose bodies, tasks, and surfaces are alike, and whose relations differ in the respect §71.2.1 defined: in one, what the child supplies alters what the adult holds, and in the other it does not. Every state variable of the established accounts takes the same value in both, since the difference is in what the adult holds and no state variable records that.

The accounts are accordingly complete about the child's assembly and silent about the structure ch. 71 represented. This is a difference in what is modelled rather than a defect in the modelling.

Proposition 72.2. *The established accounts take the child's assembly as their state, so two children alike in body, task, and surface whose relations differ in whether what they supply alters what the adult holds receive identical values on every state variable. The difference is in what is modelled rather than a defect in the modelling.*

72.2 The Order Parameter

72.2.1 The Proposal

The proposal is that the quantity governing a capacity's formation is defined on the relation rather than on the child.

Definition 72.3. *For a party v and a capacity, the relational order parameter over a period is the weight on the edge from the other party to v in the sense of §71.1.1, restricted to occasions on which the capacity is exercised.*

Three features follow from the definition and each connects to what precedes.

The parameter is a rate over a period, which §62.1.3 established every capacity of Part X to be, and §70.4.1 established that the surviving observables share this form.

It is defined on an ordered pair, so a child has as many values as he has relations, and §34.1.2 established that these may differ and both be correct.

And it is restricted to the occasions on which the capacity is exercised, which is what makes it a parameter for that capacity rather than for the relation at large. §62.2.2 established which functions draw on which conditions, and the restriction is how a single graph yields several parameters.

Proposition 72.4. *The relational order parameter for a capacity is the weight on the edge from the other party, restricted to occasions on which the capacity is exercised. It is a rate over a period, it is defined on an ordered pair so that a child has several values, and the restriction is what yields distinct parameters from one graph.*

72.2.2 The Bifurcation

The representation of [ch. 71](#) supplies a discontinuity that a parameter defined on the child cannot exhibit.

[§71.2.1](#) established that a relation is generative where the subgraph contains a cycle with positive weight throughout, and that the presence of a cycle is independent of the weights beyond their positivity. [§71.2.2](#) established that a household is hierarchically stable where its graph is acyclic.

Proposition 72.5. *As the order parameter on an edge falls to zero, the structural property of the subgraph changes discontinuously: a cycle is present at every positive value and absent at zero. A continuous change in a rate accordingly produces a discrete change in structure.*

This is a bifurcation in the ordinary sense and it has three consequences.

It formalises the first construction [§30.1.3](#) offered, which held that a continuous approach may produce a discontinuous crossing. That section declined to adjudicate between three constructions and the present chapter does not adjudicate either; what it supplies is a formal statement of one of them.

It locates the discontinuity precisely, at the point where a rate reaches zero, which [§30.1.3](#) recorded the prose account could not do and named as the cost of that construction.

And it applies to the distinction of [ch. 12](#) and not to the distinction of [ch. 30](#). [§71.4.1](#) established that the grammar is presupposed by the representation and does not appear in it, so the bifurcation formalises the generative and hierarchical distinction of Part II and supplies nothing about the two levels of Part VI.

Proposition 72.6. *A continuous fall in the order parameter produces a discrete change in structure as a cycle disappears at zero. This formalises the first construction of [§30.1.3](#) and locates its threshold, which the prose could not. It applies to the distinction of [ch. 12](#) and supplies nothing about [ch. 30](#).*

72.3 The Phenomena to Be Treated

72.3.1 Bursts and Regression

[§65.4.1](#) named three phenomena the model should treat, and the first two are treated by the established accounts already.

[van Geert \(1991\)](#) derives spurts from coupling among growers, and nothing here improves on that derivation. What the present model adds is a further source of both.

A burst is expected where a relational condition changes discretely. [§34.1.2](#) established that a second setting arrives at a definite time and supplies a divergence, and [§45.2.1](#) that a second

adult may differ in the rate at which he absorbs. Each is a step change in the order parameter for the capacities drawing on that relation.

A regression is expected where the parameter falls with no change in the child or the task. §5.2.2 established what contracts occasions, and §11.1.2 that a fall maintains itself. The established accounts predict regression from reorganisation of the child's assembly and from change in the task, and predict none from this quarter.

Proposition 72.7. *Bursts are expected where a relational condition changes discretely, as when a second setting or a second adult supplies a step change in the parameter. Regressions are expected where the parameter falls with no change in the child or the task, which the established accounts do not predict.*

72.3.2 Behaviour Near the Boundary

The third phenomenon is the one the bifurcation makes precise.

§72.2.2 established that the structural property changes at zero. Near that point the parameter is small and positive, and a relation in that condition has cycles sustained by few occasions.

Three predictions follow and each is stated without proof.

Proposition 72.8. *Near the boundary, small absolute changes in the number of occasions produce large changes in the parameter, since the parameter is a ratio and the denominator is small. Variability between periods should therefore be greatest for relations near the boundary.*

Proposition 72.9. *Capacities drawing on the same condition, in the sense of §62.2.2, should cross the boundary together, since they share the edge whose weight is at issue. Capacities drawing on other conditions should be unaffected.*

Proposition 72.10. *A relation restored from below the boundary does not return to its prior parameter, since §11.1.2 established that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field. The trajectory is accordingly asymmetric about the boundary.*

The third is the strongest of the three and is the one §23.3.1 anticipated without formal statement.

Proposition 72.11. *Near the boundary the parameter is volatile between periods, capacities sharing a condition cross together while others are unaffected, and the trajectory is asymmetric, a relation restored from below not returning to its prior value. The third formalises what §23.3.1 established in prose.*

72.4 The Additions and Their Limits

72.4.1 The Differential Prediction

The standard §65.4.2 set requires that the model do something the established accounts cannot, and this section states the whole of what is claimed.

The established accounts predict that a capacity regresses when the child's assembly reorganises or the task changes. The present model predicts, in addition, that a capacity regresses when the order parameter on the relevant relation falls, with the child, the task, and the surface held constant.

The two diverge in a specifiable case. A child whose circumstances are otherwise unchanged, and one of whose relations alters in the respect §71.2.1 defined, should show regression in the capacities drawing on that relation and not in those drawing on others. §62.2.2 specifies which capacities these are, and §62.3.1 stated the corresponding co-variation prediction in prose.

The case is producible without arrangement, since relations alter for ordinary reasons: an adult's hours change, a second adult becomes available or ceases to be, a household's attention concentrates elsewhere. §39.3.1 established that occasions arising for reasons internal to a household escape the third difficulty §30.2.2 identified.

Proposition 72.12. *The model predicts that a capacity regresses when the order parameter on the relevant relation falls, with child, task, and surface held constant, and that the regression is confined to capacities drawing on that relation. The established accounts predict regression from reorganisation and from task change and predict none from this quarter. The case arises without arrangement.*

72.4.2 The Limits of the Model

Three limits close the chapter and the first is inherited.

The model cannot represent the grammar. §71.4.1 established that an edge is countable only where it is settled what counts as an occasion and as an alteration, and the order parameter of §72.2.1 is defined on those edges. §71.4.2 anticipated that any formalism inherits this, since §52.2.2 concerns individuation and a formalism individuates its own objects. The model therefore treats Parts II to V and not Part VI.

The model supplies no equations. van Geert (1991) specifies growth functions and coupling terms, and nothing here does. What is offered is a parameter, a bifurcation, and three predictions about behaviour near it, which is less than that tradition supplies and is what §65.4.1 specified as the Part's level of formality.

And the parameter inherits every difficulty of §70.4.2. It is counterfactual at its numerator, it requires a coding procedure not specified here, and it is exposed to the reactivity §28.3.2 established. ch. 76 takes the last of these.

Proposition 72.13. *The model cannot represent the grammar, since its parameter is defined on edges whose countability presupposes it, so it treats Parts II to V and not Part VI. It supplies no equations, which is less than the tradition it engages supplies. And its parameter is counterfactual, uncoded, and exposed to reactivity.*

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Chapter 73

The Measurement of Relational Capacity

The Work of This Chapter

§70.4.2 named this the hardest of the measurements the Part had not attempted, and the difficulty has two sources.

§73.1 states what is to be measured and separates it from what an instrument would most readily record, which is a party's social competence. §73.2 finds that two of the capacity's four components are measurable by quantities already in hand and that two are not, and that the two that are not are the ones §58.5.2 identified as bearing the weight.

§73.3 treats the instrument becoming a target, and holds that this case is worse than the others the Part has met, since producing the appearance here destroys the thing rather than inflating it. §73.4 states what remains.

The reader should carry forward the distinction of §73.3.2, which bears on every measure this Part has proposed.

73.1 The Object of Measurement

73.1.1 The Components Restated

§58.1.2 specified the capacity by four operations, and the specification is what prevents it from being a residual category.

Supplying something to an occasion, which §38.2.1 established is what makes an occasion shared.

Taking up what another supplies, which §39.2.2 established for the case of an answer.

Sustaining a relation through a discrepancy, which §58.4.2 established requires an occasion on which something went wrong and the relation continued in an altered form.

And making a move the other party may answer against, which §39.1.1 established is what a question is.

Each is performed within a relation and nowhere else, so §69.1.1's criterion is satisfied for all four: a value obtained with one partner may differ from a value obtained with another and both may be correct.

Proposition 73.1. *The capacity comprises supplying to an occasion, taking up what another supplies, sustaining a relation through a discrepancy, and making a move the other may answer against. Each is performed within a relation, so all four satisfy the criterion of §69.1.1.*

73.1.2 The Separation from Social Competence

An instrument constructed carelessly here would record something else, and the something else has a name.

§58.5.2 established that a party may perform the first two operations well and the last two not at all: he supplies to occasions, takes up what others supply, is agreeable and is liked, and has no practice in sustaining a discrepancy or in making a move that could be answered against.

Social competence as ordinarily measured records the first two. It is assessed by report, by observation of ordinary interaction, and by peer nomination, and each of these samples occasions of the kind the first two operations are exercised on. §69.1.2 established that an instrument built to be administered by an interchangeable party measures the child, and measures of social competence are so built.

The consequence is that the easiest measurement is of the part of the capacity that matters least, and §58.6.2 predicted the dissociation this produces.

Proposition 73.2. *Social competence as ordinarily measured records the first two operations, since it samples ordinary interaction, and §58.5.2 established that a party may perform those two well while having no practice in the other two. The easiest measurement is accordingly of the part of the capacity that matters least.*

73.2 The Measurable Components

73.2.1 The First Two

Quantities already in hand cover the first two operations.

The sharing proportion of §70.3.1 measures supplying: the proportion of a party's contributions to an occasion that are in what the occasion became. §70.3.2 recorded that it meets the first two requirements and is qualified on the third by requiring a counterfactual judgement.

The uptake proportion of §70.3.1 measures taking up, in the direction from the other party inward, and §70.4.1 recorded that it survives all three requirements. Applied to a child as the party who takes up rather than as the party who supplies, it measures the second operation.

Both are ratios over a period, both are computed from occasions arising for ordinary reasons, and §61.3.2 identified aesthetic occasions as supplying the clearest instances of the first, the confounding factor of a settled outcome being absent.

Proposition 73.3. *The sharing proportion measures supplying and the uptake proportion, computed with the child as the party taking up, measures taking up. Both are ratios over a period computed from occasions arising for ordinary reasons, and §61.3.2 identified the clearest instances of the first.*

73.2.2 The Resistance of the Remaining Two

The remaining two operations resist measurement for a reason that is not a want of ingenuity.

Both require a discrepancy. §58.4.2 established that practice in sustaining a relation requires

an occasion on which something went wrong and the relation continued in an altered form, and §39.1.1 established that a move the other may answer against is one whose answer could go against the party making it.

A discrepancy cannot be arranged. §23.2.2 established that the conditions of the reversal cannot be arranged, §58.6.2 recorded that strain cannot be produced for the purpose, and §38.2.2 excluded from the shared any occasion whose outcome a party settled in advance.

What remains is the naturally occurring instance, and §39.3.1 established that such instances exist and escape the third difficulty §30.2.2 identified. The difficulty here is that they cannot be sampled. An instrument requires that the occasions it records be identifiable in advance of their occurring, and §15.2.2 established that occasions foreclosed leave no trace, so a period containing no discrepancy is indistinguishable from a period in which discrepancies were foreclosed.

Proposition 73.4. *The second two operations require a discrepancy, a discrepancy cannot be arranged, and naturally occurring instances cannot be sampled, since an instrument requires its occasions to be identifiable in advance and a period containing no discrepancy is indistinguishable from one in which discrepancies were foreclosed.*

73.3 The Instrument as a Target

73.3.1 The Household's Production Under Assessment

§28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is producing a result, and this section states what the result would be here.

A household informed that the second two operations are assessed would produce discrepancies and survive them. A disagreement would be initiated in order that it be repaired, a child would be permitted an objection in order that it be entertained, and an adult would arrange to be answered against.

§38.2.2 settles what such occasions are. An occasion whose outcome one party has settled in advance excludes the other's supply from the product, and each of the occasions above has its outcome settled: the disagreement will be repaired, the objection will be entertained, the answer will be received.

The household has accordingly produced occasions of the form the instrument records and of a kind the framework excludes, and §35.3.1 recorded a neighbouring case in which a well-meant practice produced the condition it was adopted to prevent.

Proposition 73.5. *A household informed that the second two operations are assessed would initiate disagreements in order to repair them and permit objections in order to entertain them. Each such occasion has its outcome settled in advance, so each is excluded by §38.2.2 while satisfying what the instrument records.*

73.3.2 The Severity of the Case

The Part has met the target problem before and this instance differs in kind, and the difference bears on every measure proposed.

For the quantities of §70.4.1, producing the appearance produces something adjacent to the thing. A household producing reversals in order to be recorded as reversing has returned power to the relation on those occasions, and §10.2.1 established that absorption is the alteration of what the favoured party holds. The measure is inflated and what it measures has occurred.

For the second two operations of §73.1.1, producing the appearance destroys the thing. A manufactured discrepancy is one whose resolution was settled before it arose, and §58.4.2 required an occasion on which something went wrong, which excludes an occasion arranged to go wrong. A household optimising this measure produces exactly what the capacity is not.

The distinction generalises and should be recorded as a property of measures rather than of this one.

Proposition 73.6. *Measures divide according to whether producing the appearance produces the thing or destroys it. A household producing reversals to be recorded has returned power on those occasions and the measure is merely inflated. A household producing discrepancies to be recorded has produced occasions whose outcomes were settled, which is what the capacity excludes.*

73.4 The Available Remainder

73.4.1 The Partial Instrument

What the chapter delivers is partial and its partiality should be stated before its content.

Two of four operations are measurable by §73.2.1, and §73.1.2 established that these are the two an ordinary measure of social competence already approximates. The gain over existing instruments is accordingly that the quantities are defined on the relation rather than on the child, which §69.1.1 established is what this Part exists to supply, and is not that new operations become visible.

The remaining two are not measurable and §73.2.2 gave the reason. What is available in their place is an inference from absence, and it is weak. A period containing no recorded discrepancy is either a period in which the relation met none or one in which discrepancies were foreclosed, and §44.3.2 established that the two produce different appearances in a party's conduct: a party lacking terms is quiet, a party lacking occasions is quiet, and a party whose objections are absorbed argues. The last of these is recordable.

Proposition 73.7. *Two of four operations are measurable and the gain over existing instruments is that the quantities are defined on the relation rather than on the child. The remaining two are not, and what is available is a weak inference from absence, since §44.3.2 established that a party whose objections are absorbed argues, which is recordable.*

73.4.2 The Inheritance of the Critique

Two findings pass to ch. 76 and the second is the more general.

The first is that the capacity this book treats as central is measurable in its lesser half and not in its greater, and that an instrument reporting the measurable half would be reporting

what §58.5.2 established can be present while the rest is absent. An instrument of that kind is worse than none, since it supplies a figure where the framework holds none is available.

The second is the distinction of §73.3.2. Every measure this Part has proposed is exposed to being made a target, and they divide according to whether the exposure inflates the measure or destroys what it measures. ch. 76 must treat the second class separately, and §65.4.2 recorded that the Part stands or falls there.

Proposition 73.8. *An instrument reporting only the measurable half would report what can be present while the rest is absent, and is worse than none, since it supplies a figure where none is available. And the measures divide into those that gaming inflates and those that gaming destroys, which ch. 76 must treat separately.*

References

Chapter 74

The Assessment of Functional Development

The Work of This Chapter

This chapter asks what an assessment of the nine functions of Part X would record, given what [ch. 69](#) found existing instruments to capture and what [ch. 70](#) established the framework can supply.

[§74.1](#) states the organising principle, which is that the assessment proceeds by condition rather than by function, since [§62.2.2](#) established that the four conditions cross the nine.

[§74.2](#) applies the three observables already established and [§74.3](#) proposes one for the condition not yet covered.

[§74.4](#) states what such an assessment would report, which is a profile over conditions for each of a child's relations, and what it would decline to report.

The reader should carry forward the organising principle and the finding of [§74.4.2](#), which is that the assessment yields no developmental level.

74.1 The Organising Principle

74.1.1 By Condition Rather Than By Function

An assessment of nine functions might be expected to comprise nine measurements, and it does not.

[§62.2.1](#) identified four conditions generating the nine, and [§62.2.2](#) established that they cross the functions rather than partitioning them. Differential response conditions perception, self-regulation, and aesthetic capacity. Uptake conditions movement, language, relational capacity, and self-regulation. Exposure to alteration conditions concrete operation and normativity. Substitution licensing conditions perception, concrete operation, and formal operation.

What follows is that four measurements cover nine functions, and that a measurement is of a relation rather than of a function. [§72.2.1](#) defined the order parameter as an edge weight restricted to the occasions on which a capacity is exercised, and the restriction is what yields function-specific values from a smaller set of conditions.

Two consequences follow.

An assessment reporting nine independent scores would be reporting more than the framework holds there is to report, and [§62.3.1](#) predicted that functions sharing a condition co-vary.

And the co-variation is the test rather than a nuisance. [§62.3.2](#) stated that a finding of nine independent variations would refute the coupling claim, so an assessment recording all four

conditions is also a test of the account that organises it.

Proposition 74.1. *Four conditions cover the nine functions, since §62.2.2 established that they cross rather than partition them, and a measurement is of a relation restricted to the occasions on which a capacity is exercised. An assessment reporting nine independent scores would report more than the framework holds there is, and the co-variation among them is a test of the account rather than a nuisance.*

74.1.2 The Capture of Existing Instruments

§69.2.1 established that most instruments return a property of a child, and this section states what each of the nine currently receives.

Perception, movement, and language are assessed by procedures returning a capacity or a position in a distribution, and §64.2.1 established what a table of norms performs.

Concrete and formal operation are assessed by the operational tasks, and §56.2.2 established that the task's meaning to the child is a relational matter the account treats as fixed.

Self-regulation is assessed by report and by laboratory task, and §59.1.1 recorded that reactivity and regulation are attributed to individuals.

Relational capacity is assessed by the procedures of §58.2.1 and by measures of social competence, and §73.1.2 established what the latter record.

Normativity is assessed by justification, and §60.2.2 established that this records the content of an answer and the form of its justification.

Aesthetic capacity is assessed by preference, and §61.2.1 established that a taste is reported as a property of a person which terminates enquiry.

In each case the administrator is interchangeable, so by §69.1.1 each returns a property of the child.

Proposition 74.2. *All nine functions are currently assessed by instruments whose administrator is interchangeable, so by §69.1.1 each returns a property of the child. What is returned is a capacity, a position, an attribution, a classification, a justification, or a preference according to the function.*

74.2 The Observables in Hand

74.2.1 Uptake and Exposure to Alteration

Two of the four conditions are covered by quantities §70.4.1 established.

The uptake proportion covers uptake. §70.3.1 defined it as the proportion of a child's contributions that alter what follows, and restricted to the occasions on which movement, language, relational capacity, or self-regulation is exercised it yields a value for each. §54.5.2 and §55.5.1 stated the function-specific forms.

The refutability proportion covers exposure to alteration. §70.2.2 defined it as the proportion of discrepant occasions that alter a description rather than being absorbed, and restricted to occasions on which a judgement of the child's is at issue it covers concrete operation, and

to occasions on which a requirement is at issue it covers normativity. §56.3.2 established that these are one structure.

Both survive all three requirements of §70.1.1, and §70.4.1 recorded that both take as their numerator an occasion on which something supplied by one party altered something held by the other.

Proposition 74.3. *The uptake proportion covers uptake and yields values for movement, language, relational capacity, and self-regulation when restricted to the relevant occasions. The refutability proportion covers exposure to alteration and yields values for concrete operation and normativity. Both survive all three requirements.*

74.2.2 Differential Response

The third condition requires a quantity the Part has implied and not stated.

Definition 74.4. *The marking proportion over a period is the proportion of distinctions a child produces which are met with distinct responses by the other party.*

§53.3.1 established that a difference is maintained where some party responds to it differently and that frequency of exposure does not substitute for this. §59.3.1 established the same for a child's own states, and §61.3.1 for what is attended to.

Restricted to occasions on which a perceptual discrimination is at issue it covers perception, to occasions on which a state is expressed it covers self-regulation, and to occasions of attending it covers aesthetic capacity.

The quantity meets the first requirement, since its value depends on what the particular other party did, and the second, since it is a proportion over a period. On the third it is qualified in the way §70.3.2 recorded for the sharing proportion: whether two productions of a child were distinct is a judgement, and §53.3.2 established that no array supplies its own equivalence class, so the coder supplies one.

Proposition 74.5. *The marking proportion is the proportion of distinctions a child produces which are met with distinct responses, and it covers perception, self-regulation, and aesthetic capacity when restricted to the relevant occasions. It meets the first two requirements and is qualified on the third, since whether two productions were distinct is a judgement the coder supplies.*

74.3 The Fourth Condition

74.3.1 A Further Observable

The remaining condition is substitution licensing and no quantity in hand covers it.

Definition 74.6. *The extension proportion over a period is the proportion of a child's novel applications of a term which are taken up and used rather than corrected.*

§57.2.2 established that abstracting is substituting one description for another under a licence, and that which substitutions are licensed is settled relationally. §53.3.2 established that

equivalence classes are maintained by treatment, and a novel application of a term is a proposed extension of a class.

Restricted to perceptual classes it covers perception, to judgements of what survives a transformation it covers concrete operation, and to abstractions it covers formal operation.

The quantity has a feature the others lack, which is that its occasions are unusually easy to identify. A child applying a term to a case it has not been applied to before is a recordable event, and §37.3.2 established that such applications are what generation consists in.

Proposition 74.7. *The extension proportion is the proportion of a child's novel applications of a term which are taken up rather than corrected, and it covers perception, concrete operation, and formal operation when restricted to the relevant occasions. Its occasions are unusually easy to identify, since a novel application is a recordable event.*

74.3.2 Assessment Against the Requirements

The extension proportion is assessed here as §70.3.2 assessed the others.

It meets the first requirement, since whether an application is taken up depends on the particular other party, and a child's novel usage may be adopted in one household and corrected in another.

It meets the second, being a proportion over a period.

And it meets the third, since novel applications arise for reasons internal to a child's speaking and require no arrangement. §39.3.1 established the corresponding point for questions.

One difficulty is specific to it. Correction is frequently correct, and §41.1.1 established that absorbing a discrepancy is often the right response. A high extension proportion is accordingly not a good result and a low one is not a bad one, and §71.1.2 recorded the corresponding point about the reversal rate. The quantity records what a relation does with a proposed extension and does not evaluate it.

Proposition 74.8. *The extension proportion meets all three requirements, since its value depends on the particular other party, it is a proportion over a period, and novel applications arise without arrangement. Correction is frequently correct, so a high value is not a good result and a low one is not a bad one, the quantity recording what a relation does rather than evaluating it.*

74.4 The Report of the Assessment

74.4.1 The Profile

An assessment on these lines reports four proportions for each of a child's relations, each restricted to the occasions on which the relevant capacities are exercised.

The unit is a relation over a period. A child in a household with two adults and attending a school has three such units at minimum, and §34.1.2 and §45.2.1 established that the values may differ across them and each be correct.

The profile is compared across relations rather than against a norm. §64.2.1 established what comparison against a distribution performs, and nothing in the four proportions supplies a distribution to compare against, since §69.1.1 established that each value is undefined

without a particular other party.

And the four are expected to co-vary within a relation according to §62.2.2, so a profile in which they vary independently is evidence against the account rather than about the child. §62.3.2 recorded this.

Proposition 74.9. *The assessment reports four proportions for each of a child's relations over a period, compared across relations rather than against a norm, since each value is undefined without a particular other party. Independent variation among the four is evidence against the account rather than about the child.*

74.4.2 The Limits of the Report

Four things such an assessment declines to supply and each declines for a stated reason.

It reports no developmental level. §62.1.3 established that the capacities are rates over periods, and a rate is not a stage. §60.4.1 established the corresponding point about what a closed order supplies where it appears to supply norms.

It supports no ranking of households. §30.5.1 established that the condition of Part VI has no household-level bearer, and §45.1.2 that contestability is level-relative. Four proportions defined on relations do not aggregate to a household.

It attributes nothing to the child. §69.1.1 established the criterion and the four quantities satisfy it, so a low value is a fact about a relation and not about either party in it.

And it does not evaluate. §74.3.2 established this for the extension proportion and §71.1.2 for the reversal rate, and the point holds throughout: a high proportion records that alteration occurred and is compatible with the alteration being for the worse.

One consequence should be stated for ch. 76. All four quantities fall in the class §73.3.2 identified as the safer one, since a party producing the appearance of any of them has done the thing on those occasions. This distinguishes the functional assessment from the measurement ch. 73 found could not be constructed.

Proposition 74.10. *The assessment reports no developmental level, since a rate is not a stage; supports no ranking of households, since values defined on relations do not aggregate; attributes nothing to the child; and does not evaluate. All four quantities fall in the safer class of §73.3.2, which distinguishes this assessment from the measurement ch. 73 found could not be constructed.*

References

Chapter 75

Designs for Empirical Test

The Work of This Chapter

§65.4.1 placed this chapter in the Part's constructive movement and gave it a function beyond stating designs, which is to prevent the Part from becoming a philosophy of measurement. A design specific enough to fail is what performs that function.

§75.1 states what a design must supply and identifies the constraint that governs all of them, which is that the framework's occasions cannot be arranged. §75.2 states four designs, each attached to a prediction made earlier in the book and each with its falsifying outcome.

§75.3 states three predictions for which no design is available and why. §75.4 states the order in which the designs should be attempted and what each would settle.

The reader should carry forward the falsifying outcomes, since a prediction whose failure is not specified is not a prediction.

75.1 The Requirements on a Design

75.1.1 The Governing Constraint

One constraint governs every design in this chapter and it has been established at four points.

§28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is producing a result. §23.2.2 established that the conditions of reversal cannot be arranged. §38.2.2 excluded from the shared any occasion whose outcome a party settled in advance. And §38.4.2 established the general form.

What follows is that the framework's designs are observational rather than experimental with respect to the conditions at issue. A design manipulating a relational condition in order to observe its effect has produced an occasion of the kind the framework excludes, and §35.3.1 recorded a case in which this was done in good faith.

What is available is the naturally occurring variation. §39.3.1 established that questions occur for reasons internal to running a household and escape the third difficulty §30.2.2 identified, and §72.4.1 established that relations alter for ordinary reasons an investigator does not supply.

Proposition 75.1. *The designs are observational with respect to the conditions at issue, since a design manipulating a relational condition produces an occasion of the kind the framework excludes. What is available is naturally occurring variation, which §39.3.1 and §72.4.1 established is not rare.*

75.1.2 The Statement of Each Design

Each design below states four things and the fourth is what §8.3.1 requires.

The quantity to be recorded, drawn from §70.4.1 or from §74.2 and §74.3.

The variation to be exploited, which must arise for reasons internal to the households observed.

The prediction, stated where it was first made in this book.

And the outcome that would falsify it, which §65.4.2 recorded is what prevents a research programme from accommodating whatever it finds.

Proposition 75.2. *Each design states the quantity recorded, the naturally occurring variation exploited, the prediction and where it was first made, and the outcome that would falsify it. The fourth is what §8.3.1 requires and what prevents accommodation of any result.*

75.2 The Designs Proposed

75.2.1 Convergence Across Vocabularies

The first design addresses the disagreement §31.4.2 identified and §68.2.1 recorded as the instance in which the first method supplies what the second cannot.

The quantity is the content of retrospective reports, classified by whether subjects agree about which terms their households lacked and by whether they agree about what was thereby unavailable. §55.4.2 established that the first is a claim about a determinate object.

The variation is the vocabulary in which subjects acquired their later terms, which differs across therapeutic traditions, across literatures, and across the ordinary case of acquiring terms in a subsequent relation.

The prediction, from §31.4.2, is that subjects will agree about which terms were absent and will differ in how they characterise what was unavailable.

The falsifying outcome is convergence on content. §31.4.2 established that this would favour the psychoanalytic account, on which a true self is held in reserve and recovered, over the account of §31.3.2, and §7.1.2 established that the founding asymmetry is what would then be in question.

Proposition 75.3. *The design records whether subjects who acquired later terms from different vocabularies agree about which terms their households lacked and differ about what was unavailable. Convergence on content would falsify the account of §31.3.2 and favour the psychoanalytic account, which §7.1.2 established would put the founding asymmetry in question.*

75.2.2 Anticipatory Completion and Initiation

The second design is the most tractable in this chapter, since both quantities are directly observable.

The quantities are the rate at which an adult completes a child's movements or utterances before the child does, and the rate at which the child initiates them. §54.3.2 and §55.5.1 defined the first for the motor and linguistic cases.

The variation is between adults within a household and across households, and §45.2.1 established that two adults ordinarily differ for reasons requiring no fault.

The prediction, from §54.5.2, is that initiation rate varies with completion rate independently of competence, so that a competent child whose movements are habitually anticipated initiates little.

The falsifying outcome is that initiation tracks competence and is independent of completion rate. §54.1.2 established that the dynamic account predicts initiation from the stability of the child's own patterns, and this outcome would support it against the present account.

Proposition 75.4. *The design records completion rate and initiation rate, exploiting the variation between adults that §45.2.1 established is ordinary. The prediction is that initiation varies with completion independently of competence. The falsifying outcome is that initiation tracks competence alone, which would support the dynamic account.*

75.2.3 Marking and Discrimination

The third design tests the divergence §53.5.2 identified, and it is the design most directly opposed to an established finding.

The quantity is the marking proportion of §74.2.2, recorded for a specific contrast, together with whether the child retains discrimination of that contrast.

The variation is between households in whether a contrast frequent in the ambient environment is ever treated as making a difference. §53.1.2 established that narrowing is driven by the distribution of encounters.

The prediction, from §53.3.1, is that a contrast frequent in the input and never acted upon differentially by any party will not be maintained.

The falsifying outcome is that frequency alone predicts retention. §53.1.2 recorded that the established account attributes narrowing to the distribution of input, and this outcome would establish that differential response adds nothing, which would remove the first of the four conditions of §62.2.1 and with it the coupling of perception, self-regulation, and aesthetic capacity.

Proposition 75.5. *The design records the marking proportion for a contrast together with whether discrimination is retained, exploiting variation in whether a frequent contrast is ever acted upon differentially. The falsifying outcome is that frequency alone predicts retention, which would remove the first of the four conditions and the couplings drawing on it.*

75.2.4 Regression Without Reorganisation

The fourth design tests the differential prediction of §72.4.1, which §65.4.2 identified as where the Part meets its standard.

The quantities are the order parameter of §72.2.1 on each of a child's relations, and performance on the capacities §62.2.2 assigns to each condition.

The variation is the ordinary alteration of a relation: an adult's hours change, a second adult becomes available or ceases to be, a household's attention concentrates on a member in

difficulty. §5.2.2 established what contracts occasions and §32.4.1 that such arrangements are ordinary.

The prediction is that capacities drawing on the altered relation regress while capacities drawing on others do not, with the child, the task, and the surface unchanged.

Two falsifying outcomes attach and they differ in what they would establish.

That no regression follows a fall in the parameter would falsify the differential prediction and would leave the established dynamical accounts complete, which §65.4.2 recorded would make this Part decoration.

That regression follows and is general across capacities rather than confined to those drawing on the altered relation would falsify §62.2.2 while supporting the parameter, and §62.3.2 recorded that general co-variation would indicate the four conditions are not distinct.

Proposition 75.6. *The design records the order parameter on each relation together with performance on the capacities assigned to each condition, exploiting ordinary alterations of a relation. No regression following a fall would leave the established accounts complete and this Part decoration. General rather than confined regression would falsify §62.2.2 while supporting the parameter.*

75.3 The Undesignable Predictions

75.3.1 The Predictions Lacking Designs

Three of the book's predictions have no design and the reasons differ.

The discriminator between the two levels has none. §30.2.2 located it in what follows a restored occasion and recorded three costs, §46.2.2 established that the parties cannot apply the criterion, and §71.4.1 established that no formalism in this Part reaches the grammar. §39.3.1 identified naturally occurring instances of the discriminator, which is the nearest approach available and does not amount to a design, since §73.2.2 established that such instances cannot be sampled.

The second two operations of relational capacity have none, and ch. 73 gave the reason: both require a discrepancy, a discrepancy cannot be arranged, and naturally occurring discrepancies cannot be sampled.

And the generative case has none. §37.3.2 claimed that a household may generate a grammar its inheritance did not supply, and §41.4.2 recorded that the claim is argued and not exhibited. A design would require establishing what a household's inheritance did not contain, and §31.2.2 established that a household's record of its own past is assembled by the arrangement in question.

Proposition 75.7. *No design is available for the discriminator between the two levels, since its instances cannot be sampled and no formalism here reaches the grammar; for the second two operations of relational capacity, since they require discrepancies that can neither be arranged nor sampled; or for the generative case, since establishing what an inheritance did not contain requires a record §31.2.2 established is unavailable.*

75.3.2 The Bearing on the Programme

The three without designs are not peripheral, and the position should be stated plainly.

The discriminator is the central claim of Part VI, and §36.4.2 recorded that the demonstration is owed and not supplied. The second two operations are what §58.5.2 established bear the weight of relational capacity. And the generative case is what §1.16.9 held distinguishes this framework from the reproduction traditions.

What the four designs of §75.2 test is accordingly the framework's mechanisms and not its central claims. The mechanisms are what the claims rest on, so a failure among the four would count against the claims, and success among them would not establish the claims.

§66.2.2 established that a method's failure to do what it does not undertake is not a criticism, and the present section records what this Part does not undertake rather than conceding a failure.

Proposition 75.8. *The three predictions without designs are the central claim of Part VI, the operations bearing the weight of relational capacity, and the case distinguishing this framework from the reproduction traditions. The four designs test the mechanisms these rest on, so failure among them would count against the claims and success would not establish them.*

75.4 The Order of Attempt

75.4.1 The Order of Attempt and Its Ground

The four should be attempted in an order determined by what each would settle and by what each requires.

The second design should be attempted first. Both quantities are directly observable, §75.2.2 established that neither requires a counterfactual judgement at the point of recording, and the variation is available within single households. It is the cheapest and it tests the mechanism §54.3.2 identified, on which §55.5.1, §59.3.2, and §58.6.1 each draw.

The third should follow. It is opposed to an established finding, which §75.2.3 recorded, so its result is informative in either direction, and §62.3.2 established that removing the first condition would remove three couplings with it.

The fourth is the most important and the most demanding, requiring the order parameter on several relations and performance across capacities over a period spanning an ordinary alteration. §65.4.2 recorded that the Part's standard is met here or is not met.

The first is the least tractable, requiring subjects who have left, classified by the vocabulary of their exit, and §31.3.2 recorded the defects attaching to the reports it collects.

Proposition 75.9. *The completion design should be attempted first, being cheapest and testing a mechanism four later sections draw on. The marking design should follow, being informative in either direction. The regression design is most important and most demanding, and the convergence design is least tractable, requiring subjects who have left and inheriting the defects of retrospective reports.*

75.4.2 The Residue Beyond the Programme

Two things would remain open however the four came out, and [ch. 76](#) takes the second.

The priority on which Part VI's conclusion rests would remain underived. [§68.3.2](#) established that the gap concerns entitlement and that no accumulation of findings supplies one, and [§42.4.2](#) recorded that [ch. 42](#) did not discharge it. A programme establishing every mechanism in this book would leave it exactly where it stands.

And the measures would remain exposed to being made targets. [§73.3.2](#) distinguished measures that gaming inflates from measures that gaming destroys, [§74.4.2](#) established that the functional assessment falls in the safer class, and [§73.4.2](#) recorded that the Part stands or falls on whether an instrument can escape the difficulty at all.

Proposition 75.10. *However the designs came out, the priority on which Part VI's conclusion rests would remain underived, since [§68.3.2](#) established that no accumulation of findings supplies entitlement; and the measures would remain exposed to being made targets, which [ch. 76](#) must face.*

References

Chapter 76

The Measuring Instrument as an Object of Its Own Critique

The Work of This Chapter

§65.4.2 recorded that this chapter must face a difficulty the book has not resolved elsewhere, and required that it state the tension fully, consider the responses available, and indicate a resolution rather than declining to reach one.

§76.1 states the tension as a derivation from three results the book has established, so that it appears as a consequence rather than as a worry. §76.2 considers three responses and finds each insufficient, stating what each supplies before stating what it lacks.

§76.3 indicates a resolution, which follows from §51.3.2 and locates the matter in the order an instrument enters rather than in the instrument's design. §76.4 closes the Part. The reader should carry forward the resolution and its limit, and §76.3.3 states the limit as plainly as the resolution.

76.1 The Tension Stated

76.1.1 The Derivation

The difficulty follows from three results and is not an objection brought from outside.

§28.3.2 established that an occasion whose point is producing a result is altered by that point, and §38.2.2 excluded from the shared any occasion whose outcome a party settled in advance.

§51.3.2 established that a protection is a symbol in the sense of ch. 15, that it survives as a protection where what happens within it can refute it, and that whether it can be held answerably is settled by the order it sits within.

§46.3.2 established that the parties cannot determine which operation a given arrangement performs, since §46.2.2 established that a boundary leaves no trace and a household's account of why one exists is poor evidence about what it does.

An instrument is an intentional arrangement of exactly this kind. It is adopted for a purpose, it produces a description of what it measures, and §64.3.1 established for the case of a developmental reading that a description of this kind enters the conditions generating what it reports.

The consequence is specific rather than general. A household that knows its reversal rate is recorded will produce reversals, and §73.3.2 established that in this case the measure is inflated and the thing has occurred. A household that knows its discrepancies are recorded

will produce discrepancies, and §73.3.2 established that in this case the thing is destroyed, since a manufactured discrepancy is one whose resolution was settled before it arose.

Proposition 76.1. *An instrument is an intentional arrangement adopted for a purpose which produces a description entering the conditions it reports. The consequence divides as §73.3.2 established: for some measures the appearance produced is the thing inflated, and for others producing the appearance destroys what was to be measured.*

76.1.2 The Separation from Ordinary Reactivity

Reactivity is a familiar difficulty and the present one differs from it in two respects.

The familiar difficulty is that measurement disturbs what is measured, and it is addressed by unobtrusive measurement, by concealment, or by accepting a known bias. Each supposes that the thing measured exists independently and is perturbed.

The first difference is that this framework's quantities are constituted by the absence of a settled purpose. §38.2.1 defined a shared occasion by whether what each party supplied is in what it became, and §38.2.2 established that an occasion whose outcome was settled in advance fails this in the respect the settling concerned. A measurement that establishes a purpose has not perturbed the quantity, and has produced occasions of a kind the quantity does not range over.

The second is that concealment does not help. An instrument concealed from the parties is not known to them and is known to whoever deployed it, and §46.2.2 established that a household cannot determine what its arrangements do. Where an investigator's presence is what alters the occasions, concealing the recording does not conceal the presence, and §66.3.1 established that the observational relation is arranged so that mutual confirmation cannot obtain.

Proposition 76.2. *The familiar difficulty supposes that what is measured exists independently and is perturbed. Here the quantities are constituted by the absence of a settled purpose, so a measurement establishing one produces occasions the quantity does not range over rather than perturbing it, and concealment does not help, since concealing the recording does not conceal the presence.*

76.2 The Available Responses

76.2.1 Measure Only the Safer Class

The first response restricts the programme to the measures §73.3.2 identified as those gaming inflates rather than destroys.

What it supplies is substantial. §74.4.2 established that all four quantities of the functional assessment fall in the safer class, since a party producing the appearance of any of them has responded differently, taken up, altered a description, or adopted an extension on those occasions. §70.4.1 established that the four surviving observables share the form that makes this so, each taking as its numerator an occasion on which something supplied by one party altered something held by the other.

What it lacks is the rest of the framework. §73.2.2 established that the two operations bearing the weight of relational capacity fall in the destructive class, and §73.4.2 recorded that an instrument reporting only the measurable half is worse than none, since it supplies a figure where the framework holds none is available.

The response accordingly secures a programme and secures it around the framework's periphery.

Proposition 76.3. *Restricting the programme to the safer class secures all four quantities of the functional assessment, since producing their appearance produces the thing on those occasions. It abandons the two operations §58.5.2 established bear the weight of relational capacity, and §73.4.2 established that reporting only the measurable half is worse than reporting nothing.*

76.2.2 Measure Without the Parties Knowing, and Measure Rarely

The second and third responses may be treated together, since each fails at the same point.

Concealment supplies what §76.1.2 denied it, which is a reduction in the parties' orientation toward the measure. A household unaware of what is recorded does not orient toward it, and this is a real reduction even if it is not elimination.

What it lacks is stated in §76.1.2 and in a further place. §64.3.1 established that a reading enters the conditions generating what it reads because the reading alters what adults do, and a concealed measurement is reported to someone. §64.2.1 and §64.2.2 established what a reading reported to parents performs, and concealment from the parties during recording does not extend to what follows.

Rare measurement supplies a reduction in the occasions on which orientation could occur. What it lacks is that §62.1.3 established the quantities are rates over periods, so infrequent measurement is not measurement of a rate. A single recording of a ratio is one observation, and §70.1.2 established that this stands to a capacity as one observation stands to a rate.

Proposition 76.4. *Concealment reduces the parties' orientation toward the measure and does not extend to what follows the reporting, which §64.3.1 established is where a description enters the conditions. Rare measurement reduces the occasions of orientation and is not measurement of a rate, since §62.1.3 established the quantities are rates over periods.*

76.3 The Resolution Indicated

76.3.1 The Instrument Is a Protection

The resolution follows from a result already established and requires no new apparatus.

§51.3.1 established that a protection is a symbol in the sense of ch. 15: it governs how the protected occasions are approached, realises itself in them, and supplies readings of occasions that go badly. §51.3.2 then applied §19.3.1 and found that a protection survives as a protection where what happens within it can refute it.

An instrument is a symbol in exactly this sense. It governs how the recorded occasions are approached, it produces occasions conforming to what it records, and §68.2.2 established the readings by which a null result is absorbed: the operationalisation did not capture the notion,

the instrument was too crude, the conditions were not those under which the phenomenon appears.

The criterion therefore applies to it. An instrument survives as an instrument where what it records can refute it.

What this means concretely is that the question to ask of an instrument is whether a household using it would abandon it. An instrument whose null results are absorbed by the three readings is one nothing reaches, and §30.1.2 defined that condition. An instrument that has been abandoned in a case is one that could be.

Proposition 76.5. *An instrument is a symbol in the sense of ch. 15, governing how the recorded occasions are approached and supplying readings by which a null result is absorbed. The criterion of §19.3.1 therefore applies to it: an instrument survives as an instrument where what it records can refute it.*

76.3.2 The Locus of Settlement

§51.3.2 established the consequential half of the result and it transfers unchanged.

Whether a protection can be held answerably is settled by the order it sits within rather than by the protection's design. A household whose order demands that everything justify itself in one currency converts thin protections into thick ones, and thick protections supply the criterion that forecloses refutation.

An instrument is in the same position. Whether it can be held answerably is settled by the order deploying it. An arrangement in which a recorded value is required to justify a practice will produce the value, and §26.3.1 established that an adult who must justify has a justification only in the currency that counts. An arrangement in which a recorded value informs a judgement that could go otherwise is one in which the value can be found unhelpful and the instrument set aside.

This is the resolution and its shape should be stated exactly. The tension is not dissolved and is relocated. It is not a property of the instruments this Part proposed, which is why no redesign addresses it, and it is a property of the arrangement any instrument is deployed within.

Two consequences follow.

The question to put to a proposed programme is not whether its measures are gameable, since §76.1.1 established that all measures of this kind are. It is whether the arrangement deploying them could conclude that they are unhelpful.

And this is a question about a normative order, which ch. 43 and ch. 44 treated and §43.2.1 defined. §43.4.1 established that closure of an order and unanswerability of a description are the same structure at different levels, and the present result places an instrument's standing at the first of these.

Proposition 76.6. *Whether an instrument can be held answerably is settled by the order deploying it rather than by its design, since an arrangement requiring a value to justify a practice will produce the value. The tension is relocated rather than dissolved, and the question to put to a programme is whether the arrangement deploying it could conclude that its measures are unhelpful.*

76.3.3 The Limit of the Resolution

The resolution is partial and its limit should be stated as plainly as itself.

It supplies a criterion and no procedure. §46.2.2 established that the parties cannot determine which operation an arrangement performs, and an order cannot determine whether it is one that could set an instrument aside, since §43.4.2 established that closure is invisible in the absence of contest.

It relocates a difficulty into a domain where the book has already recorded a difficulty. §46.4.2 recorded that Part VIII left the priority of recognition asserted, and the present resolution makes an instrument's standing depend on the answerability of an order, which §60.3.1 established is what distinguishes a norm from a regularity and §60.4.1 established a closed order does not supply.

And it does not restore what §76.2.1 abandoned. The two operations bearing the weight of relational capacity remain unmeasurable, and §75.3.1 recorded that three of the book's predictions have no design.

§51.1.2 established that the difficulty of which this is an instance follows from any account holding that an activity is damaged by being performed for an external purpose, and that a general solution would not be this book's to supply. The present chapter has supplied a criterion for one case and has not supplied that solution.

Proposition 76.7. *The resolution supplies a criterion and no procedure, since an order cannot determine whether it could set an instrument aside. It relocates the difficulty into the answerability of an order, which Part VIII left underived. And it does not restore the operations §76.2.1 abandoned.*

76.4 The Findings of Part XI

76.4.1 The Part's Findings

The Part's justifying claim required qualification and the qualified form was established.

§69.4.1 found that the claim as §65.1.1 stated it is false, since one family of instruments measures a relation and a second measures one and reports otherwise, and established the sufficient form: no existing instrument measures a relational quantity over a period.

§70.4.1 established four observables surviving the three requirements, and §74.2.2 and §74.3.1 added two more in the course of covering the four conditions.

§72.2.2 supplied a formal statement of the first construction of §30.1.3 and located its threshold, and §72.4.1 stated the divergence from the established dynamical accounts on which §65.4.2 said the Part's standard is met.

§73.3.2 distinguished measures that gaming inflates from measures that gaming destroys, which bears on every proposal in the Part.

And §76.3.2 located an instrument's standing in the order deploying it rather than in its design.

Proposition 76.8. *The Part qualifies its own justifying claim and establishes the sufficient form, supplies six observables assessed against three requirements, formalises one construction*

of §30.1.3 and states a divergence from the established dynamical accounts, distinguishes measures gaming inflates from those it destroys, and locates an instrument's standing in the order deploying it.

76.4.2 The Residue Left by the Part

Three deficiencies stand at its close and the third is the largest.

No formalism here reaches the grammar. §71.4.1 established that an edge is countable only where what counts as an occasion and as an alteration is settled, so the grammar is presupposed and does not appear, and §72.4.2 established that the dynamical model inherits this. The Part treats Parts II to V and does not treat Part VI.

No coding procedures are specified. §70.4.2 recorded this and §68.2.2 established that specifying them admits the second method's terms into the measurement, which is the pairing of ch. 68 operating rather than a defect.

And the central claims have no designs. §75.3.1 established that the discriminator between the two levels, the two operations bearing relational capacity, and the generative case are each without one, and §75.3.2 established that the four designs test the mechanisms these rest on, so that success among them would not establish the claims.

ch. 77 takes up what may be said practically, and ch. 89 records what remains.

Proposition 76.9. *No formalism here reaches the grammar, so the Part treats Parts II to V and not Part VI. No coding procedures are specified, which admits the second method's terms. And the central claims have no designs, so the four designs test mechanisms and success among them would not establish the claims.*

References

Part XII

The Practice of Relation

Chapter 77

The Position of Practical Norms

The Work of This Chapter

Six chapters have reached the same result about what this framework can recommend, and §40.4.2 recorded that the recurrence follows from one proposition rather than from reticence. This chapter states the position that recurrence implies and says why any of it matters, which §6.3.2 recorded is the promise the practical Parts depend on most.

§77.1 states the argument in its general form and identifies what it does and does not exclude. §77.2 states what a description of what an act does supplies in place of an instruction, and holds that it changes what a party can be answerable for.

§77.3 treats the component §10.2.3 required, which is that a description of an act includes what it costs the party performing it. §77.4 states the Part's programme.

The reader should carry forward the argument of §77.1.1 and the account of what a permission changes, which is the whole of this Part's claim to matter.

77.1 The Failure of Recommendation

77.1.1 One Proposition, Six Times

The result has been reached in six chapters and each time by the same route.

§38.4.2 held that sharing cannot be arranged. §40.4.2 held that curiosity cannot be cultivated by cultivating it. §44.4.2 held that neither reducing requirements nor inviting objection follows. §46.3.2 held that no recommendation about boundaries follows. §54.5.1 held that withholding completion is not recommended. And §64.3.3 held that assistance is not to be withheld.

The proposition producing each is §38.2.2: an occasion whose outcome one party has settled in advance is not an occasion in which the other's supply is in the product.

A recommendation is an instruction to perform an act in order to produce a result. Where the result is a condition of the kind this framework describes, performing the act for that reason settles the occasion's outcome in advance, and the condition is thereby excluded. §28.3.2 established the general form and §35.3.1 recorded a case in which the proposal was made in good faith and produced the condition it was adopted to prevent.

Proposition 77.1. *Six chapters reach the same result by one route. A recommendation is an instruction to perform an act in order to produce a result, and where the result is a condition of the kind described here, performing the act for that reason settles the occasion's outcome in advance and excludes the condition.*

77.1.2 The Classes Surviving the Argument

The argument is narrower than it appears and three classes of recommendation survive it.

Recommendations about arrangements survive. §25.2.2 recorded that a household setting aside an hour has arranged an hour, and §38.4.2 established that the occurrence of occasions is arrangeable and their character is not. An arrangement making occasions available is not an occasion whose outcome has been settled.

Recommendations about what to stop survive, and this is the class §77.4.1 develops. An act foreclosing a condition may be ceased without the ceasing constituting an occasion with a settled outcome, since ceasing is not an act performed within an occasion. §11.2.2 established that a cessation has no moment at which it is performed, and the proposition cuts favourably here.

And recommendations outside the framework's subject matter survive entirely. §52.3.1 established that maturation is untouched by anything here, and nothing in this argument bears on nutrition, sleep, safety, or medical care. §64.3.3 stated this for the case that most needed it.

The argument accordingly excludes recommendations to perform an act in order to produce a relational condition, and excludes nothing else.

Proposition 77.2. *The argument excludes recommendations to perform an act in order to produce a relational condition. Recommendations about arrangements survive, since making occasions available does not settle their outcome; recommendations to cease survive, since a cessation is not performed within an occasion; and recommendations outside the framework's subject matter are untouched.*

77.2 The Nature of a Permission

77.2.1 A Description Made Available

§6.3.2 held that the practical Parts trade in permissions, that a permission is a description made available, and that a description of what an act does under conditions that hold is not an instruction to perform it.

The distinction is not one of tone. An instruction and a description may be uttered in the same words, and what differs is what each supplies.

An instruction supplies a reason for acting. It says that the act should be performed, and a party accepting it has acquired a purpose, which §77.1.1 established is what excludes the condition.

A description supplies terms. It says what an act amounts to, and a party accepting it has acquired a way of describing what he does, which §37.1.2 established is what a grammar consists in and §55.3.1 established a household supplies.

The difference bears directly on the framework's own machinery. §52.2.2 held that what a capacity is a capacity for is settled by a description, and §41.1.1 held that a manner of handling what does not fit governs what a party registers as requiring handling. A description supplied to an adult alters what he registers, and §64.3.1 established that a reading alters what adults do.

Proposition 77.3. *An instruction supplies a reason for acting and a description supplies terms. A party accepting an instruction acquires a purpose, which §77.1.1 established excludes the condition. A party accepting a description acquires a way of describing what he does, which alters what he registers.*

77.2.2 The Effect of a Permission

The question §6.3.2 left is why this matters, and the answer is that a description changes what a party can be answerable for.

§42.3.1 established that an adult holding an account of his child is committed, by what a description requires, to holding it answerable to what the child does. §42.2.2 established that answerability concerns the account rather than the decision.

An adult who does not know what an act does cannot hold an account of it. §44.3.2 established that an objection requires terms, and the same holds of a party's objection to his own practice: without a description of what completing a child's movement does, there is nothing to be answerable about, and §41.2.1 established that a manner not available for report cannot be deliberately revised.

An adult who has the description is differently placed. He may perform the act, and §54.5.1 established that no recommendation follows either way. What has changed is that the act is now the kind of thing about which he could be wrong, and §19.3.1 established that exposure to being wrong is what distinguishes a good description.

This is the whole of the Part's claim to matter and it should not be inflated. A description does not tell anyone what to do, does not make anyone better at anything, and does not spare anyone a decision, which §8.2.1 recorded at the outset. What it does is bring a class of acts within the scope of a question that could not previously be asked about them.

Proposition 77.4. *A description changes what a party can be answerable for. An adult without a description of what an act does has nothing to be answerable about, and one who has it may perform the act and has made it the kind of thing about which he could be wrong. This is the Part's whole claim to matter and it does not amount to advice.*

77.3 The Cost to the Performer

77.3.1 The Place of the Cost in a Description

§10.2.3 established what absorption costs the party who performs it, and required that a description of an act include what it costs the performer. This section states why.

A description omitting the cost is incomplete as a description. §10.2.2 established that what characterises a relation is a rate against a rate, and §46.3.1 established that a party without boundaries around his own capacity has fewer occasions to give. An act whose cost is unstated is presented as though it could be performed indefinitely.

A description omitting the cost also converts into an instruction by omission. Where an act is described as producing a condition and nothing is said about what it takes, a reader supplies the missing premise that it should be performed, and §3.3.1 established what becomes of a

commitment conveyed without the premise that generated it.

And the cost falls on a party this book has repeatedly declined to blame. §35.1.1 removed every bearer of fault, §47.3.2 established that constraint reduces occasions without reducing answerability, and §5.2.2 established what governs whether occasions are available at all. A practical Part that described acts without their costs would be addressing an adult the rest of the book has described as under conditions he did not choose.

Proposition 77.5. *A description omitting what an act costs the performer is incomplete, presents the act as performable indefinitely, and converts into an instruction by omission, since a reader supplies the missing premise. The cost falls on a party the book has declined to blame and has described as under conditions he did not choose.*

77.3.2 The Costs Enumerated

Three costs recur and each has been established.

Absorption costs the party who performs it, and §10.2.3 established what. §10.2.2 established that the rate at issue is a ratio, so nothing here holds that more is better without limit.

Answerability costs certainty. §42.3.1 established that an adult holding an account answerable to what a child does holds an account that may be altered, and §56.3.2 established that a judgement nothing returns to is the closure form. A party whose accounts remain open holds fewer settled matters, and §41.1.1 established that absorbing a discrepancy is frequently correct and cheaper.

And withholding completion costs the accomplishment. §54.3.2 established that a movement completed by an adult accomplishes the thing, and an adult who does not complete has not accomplished it. §64.3.3 established that the cost of not identifying a child who needs help is borne by him, and the corresponding point holds throughout: the accomplishment forgone is real.

Proposition 77.6. *Absorption costs the party performing it and the rate at issue is a ratio, so more is not better without limit. Answerability costs certainty, since a party whose accounts remain open holds fewer settled matters. And withholding completion costs the accomplishment, which is real and is forgone.*

77.4 The Part's Programme

77.4.1 The Sayable Content

§77.1.2 identified three classes surviving the argument, and the Part's chapters occupy them.

Chapter 78 treats what a response does, which is a description of the first kind.

Chapter 79 treats the arrangement in which parties attend to something together, which §61.3.1 established is the condition of generation for aesthetic capacity and §61.3.2 established is the purest instance of a shared occasion. This is an arrangement in the sense §77.1.2 permitted.

Chapter 80 treats what maintains the conditions under which an account can be altered, and §44.3.2 supplied the three conditions.

Chapter 81 treats what follows a rupture, and §23.2.2 established that repair is not restoration.

Chapter 82 treats conflict, and holds that it is the occasion on which difference is returned, which makes its avoidance a mechanism of degradation. Chapter 83 treats mediation and management, the second of which is an arrangement in the sense §77.1.2 permitted. Chapter 84 distinguishes the household case from the case of conflict between formed parties, and treats the passage by which a constitutive dependence becomes a negotiable one.

Chapter 85 treats the operative forms of governance, and §45.1.1 supplied the levels.

Chapter 88 treats the case in which nothing is available, which §65.4.1 recorded is what keeps the book honest.

Proposition 77.7. *The Part treats what a response does, the arrangement of attending together, what maintains channels of revision, what follows a rupture, the operative forms of governance, and the case in which nothing is available. Each occupies one of the three classes §77.1.2 identified as surviving the argument.*

77.4.2 The Limits of the Part

Three things, and the third has been owed since Part I.

It will not rank. §30.5.1 established that the condition of Part VI has no household-level bearer and §74.4.2 that the functional assessment supports no ranking, and the practical Part inherits both.

It will not supply procedures. §76.3.3 recorded that ch. 76 supplied a criterion and no procedure, and the same holds here for the same reason: §46.2.2 established that the parties cannot determine which operation an arrangement performs.

And it will not remedy the thinness §35.4.1 described. A subject who accepts this account exchanges an address for his complaint for a mechanism, and §46.4.2 recorded that the priority making the loss a loss remains asserted. Nothing this Part says repairs that, and ch. 89 carries it.

Proposition 77.8. *The Part will not rank, will not supply procedures, since the parties cannot determine which operation an arrangement performs, and will not remedy the thinness §35.4.1 described, which ch. 89 carries.*

References

Chapter 78

Response and the Restoration of the Gaze

The Work of This Chapter

This is the first chapter to treat a single act at length, and §77.2.2 established the form the treatment takes, which is a description of what the act does rather than a reason for performing it.

§78.1 states what a response is in the framework's terms and distinguishes it from three things it is confused with. §78.2 states what it does, drawing on the four conditions of §62.2.1, and holds that a response is where three of them are met at once.

§78.3 treats the title's second term and holds that restoration is the wrong word for what is available, which §23.2.2 established and this chapter specifies. §78.4 states the costs and what cannot be said.

The reader should carry forward the distinction of §78.1.2, and the finding that what is restorable is a rate and not an occasion.

78.1 The Nature of a Response

78.1.1 The Specification

A response is an act by one party on an occasion, occasioned by what another supplied, whose content is altered by what he supplied.

Three elements are specified and the third does the work.

It is occasioned by what the other supplied, which distinguishes it from an act performed on the same occasion for other reasons. §32.1.1 established that an occasion may proceed with a party present and nothing bearing on him.

Its content is altered by what he supplied, which is §38.2.1 applied to a single act. §39.2.2 established the case of an answer, in which what the child supplied is the question's particular shape, and established that two answers conveying the same content differ relationally.

And it is performed by a party rather than issued by a procedure. §21.2.1 established that the gaze is singular, and §66.3.1 established that a relation in which the responding party is replaceable is one from which mutual confirmation is excluded by construction.

Proposition 78.1. *A response is an act occasioned by what another party supplied, whose content is altered by what he supplied, performed by a party rather than issued by a procedure. The second element is §38.2.1 applied to a single act.*

78.1.2 The Boundaries of a Response

Three things are confused with it and the confusions are consequential.

A response is not attention. §32.1.1 established that a party may be present at an occasion within which nothing bears on who he is taken to be, and attention supplies presence without supplying alteration. An adult watching a child closely and responding in a manner the child's conduct does not alter has attended and has not responded.

A response is not approval. §18.3.1 established what recognition extended on terms does, and §18.1.1 established that admitting labels operate by the mechanism depriving ones do. A response whose content is that the child did well is a response, and so is one whose content is disagreement, and §42.2.2 established the independence.

And a response is not completion. §54.3.2 established that an adult completing a child's movement produces the accomplishment while the child's operation does not complete, and §55.5.1 established the linguistic case. A completion is occasioned by what the child supplied and its content is not altered by it, since what was supplied was an incomplete attempt and what the adult produced was the completed thing.

The third is the sharpest and it separates this chapter from the natural reading of its title. Responsiveness in the ordinary sense includes completion, and this framework's specification excludes it.

Proposition 78.2. *A response is not attention, which supplies presence without alteration; not approval, since disagreement responds and §42.2.2 established the independence; and not completion, since a completion's content is not altered by what was supplied. The third separates the framework's specification from responsiveness in the ordinary sense.*

78.2 The Operation of a Response

78.2.1 The Conditions Met Together

§62.2.1 identified four conditions generating the nine functions, and a response meets three of them in a single act.

It meets differential response by construction, since §53.3.1 defined that condition as a difference being responded to differently, and a response whose content is altered by what was supplied differs according to what was supplied.

It meets uptake, since §38.2.1 defined an occasion as shared to the extent that what each party supplied is in what it became, and a response is the case of that in a single act.

It meets exposure to alteration where the response is to something the child did that bears on the account held of him, and §42.3.1 established that an account answerable to what a child does is a condition on its being an account of him.

It does not meet substitution licensing, which §74.3.1 established concerns novel applications of a term taken up rather than corrected. That condition requires something the child produced to be adopted, which a response need not do.

Proposition 78.3. *A response meets differential response by construction, meets uptake, and meets exposure to alteration where what it responds to bears on the account held of the child. It*

does not meet substitution licensing, which requires that something the child produced be adopted.

78.2.2 The Consequences for the Nine Functions

§62.2.2 assigned the functions to conditions, and the assignment states which functions a response bears on.

Through differential response it bears on perception, self-regulation, and aesthetic capacity. §59.3.1 established the self-regulation case, in which what is distinguished is between a child's own states, and §59.5.1 established what an adult responding by consequences for the household does in its place.

Through uptake it bears on movement, language, relational capacity, and self-regulation. §54.3.1 established that a movement is stabilised by what it meets and §58.4.1 that each operation of relational capacity requires occasions on which it is exercised and met.

Through exposure to alteration it bears on concrete operation and normativity, and §56.3.2 established that these are one structure.

Self-regulation appears twice, and §62.2.2 recorded that it draws on both the first and second conditions. A response to a child's state is accordingly the case in which a single act meets two conditions for one function, which is the strongest form the present claim takes.

Proposition 78.4. *A response bears on perception, self-regulation, and aesthetic capacity through differential response; on movement, language, relational capacity, and self-regulation through uptake; and on concrete operation and normativity through exposure to alteration. Self-regulation draws on both of the first two, so a response to a child's state meets two conditions for one function.*

78.3 The Question of Restoration

78.3.1 The Limits of Restoration

The title's second term requires qualification and the qualification is the chapter's principal negative finding.

§23.2.2 established that mutual confirmation cannot be arranged and §23.3.1 that most of its conditions are properties of arrangements rather than of intentions. §11.1.2 established that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field and does not restore the prior rate at once.

Three things are accordingly not available.

A particular occasion cannot be restored. §15.2.2 established that a foreclosed occasion leaves no trace, so there is nothing to return to, and §33.4.2 established that what did not happen cannot be recovered by anyone.

An account that has ceased to be answerable is not restored by a response. §16.2.2 established that where the readings are undefeatable no occasion reaches the description, and a response is an occasion. §33.3.2 established that repair cannot proceed by supplying counter-evidence.

And a response performed in order to restore something fails as a response. §77.1.1 established the general form, and the particular form here is that an act whose content is settled by the intention to restore is not altered by what the child supplied.

Proposition 78.5. *A particular occasion cannot be restored, since foreclosed occasions leave no trace; an unanswerable account is not restored by a response, since no occasion reaches it; and a response performed in order to restore fails as a response, since its content is settled by the intention rather than by what was supplied.*

78.3.2 The Nature of a Rate

What is available is stated by §62.1.3 and is different in kind from what §78.3.1 excluded.

Every capacity Part X treated is a rate characterising a relation over a period, and §70.4.1 established that the surviving observables share this form. A rate is not an occasion and is not restored on one.

What follows is that the question of restoration is badly posed. There is no state to which a relation returns, and §43.1.1 established that a normative order is what its parties have been doing rather than something adopted. A rate rises where the occasions constituting it occur, and §40.2.2 established that the mechanism runs in both directions and that neither direction requires anyone to decide anything.

Two consequences follow and the second is what the chapter can offer.

Nothing is repaired by an occasion, so an adult who has responded once has altered a rate by one occasion's worth. §11.1.2 established that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field.

And nothing is beyond a rate's alteration except where the conditions producing the occasions have gone. §5.2.2 established what contracts them, and §47.3.2 established that constraint reduces occasions without reducing answerability. A relation whose occasions still occur has a rate that still moves.

Proposition 78.6. *What is available is a rate rather than a state, so the question of restoration is badly posed. An adult who has responded once has altered a rate by one occasion's worth, and a relation whose occasions still occur has a rate that still moves.*

78.4 The Costs and the Limits of Statement

78.4.1 The Cost of Responding

§77.3.1 required that a description include what the act costs the performer, and three costs attach.

A response requires that the adult have registered what the child supplied, and §10.2.3 established what this costs. §5.2.2 established what governs whether the occasions are available, and an adult under contraction has fewer.

A response whose content is altered by what was supplied cannot be prepared, and §39.2.2 established that an account settled before the asking cannot have been shaped by it. The cost is that a prepared account is cheaper and frequently better as information.

And a response meeting the third condition costs certainty, since §77.3.2 established that a party whose accounts remain open holds fewer settled matters. §41.1.1 established that absorbing a discrepancy is frequently correct and is cheaper than the alternative.

Proposition 78.7. *A response requires that the adult have registered what was supplied, which §10.2.3 established costs him; it cannot be prepared, and a prepared account is cheaper and frequently better as information; and where it meets the third condition it costs certainty.*

78.4.2 The Limits of the Chapter's Claim

Three things, and the first is the one a reader will supply if it is not refused.

It does not say that adults should respond more. §77.1.1 established why no such recommendation follows, and §10.2.2 established that the rate at issue is a ratio rather than a total. An adult responding to everything has not thereby produced a higher ratio, and §46.3.1 established that boundaries sustaining the adults are required by the framework's own commitments.

It does not say that completion is a failure. §64.3.3 established this for the case of assistance and the point holds generally: completion accomplishes the thing, the accomplishment is real, and §54.5.1 established that withholding it in order to produce stabilisation settles the occasion in advance.

And it does not supply a way of telling whether one has responded. §38.2.1 established that the criterion is counterfactual and §10.2.1 that the question is answerable across a sequence rather than within an occasion. An adult cannot determine on an occasion whether his content was altered by what the child supplied, and §46.2.2 established the general form of this limit.

Proposition 78.8. *The chapter withholds saying that adults should respond more, since the rate at issue is a ratio and boundaries sustaining adults are required; does not say that completion is a failure, since the accomplishment is real; and does not supply a way of telling whether one has responded, since the criterion is counterfactual and answerable only across a sequence.*

References

Chapter 79

The Shared Third

The Work of This Chapter

§77.1.2 identified arrangements as one of the three classes surviving the argument against recommendation, and this chapter treats the arrangement in which two parties attend to something that is neither of them.

§79.1 states what a shared third is and why the third term does work that a dyad cannot do alone. §79.2 states what the arrangement supplies, and holds that it removes the asymmetry from the position where ch. 10 located it without removing the asymmetry.

§79.3 states the conditions on a third serving this office and finds that most candidates fail one of them. §79.4 states what the arrangement does not do and the respect in which this chapter can recommend where its predecessors could not.

The reader should carry forward the finding of §79.2.1, and the condition of §79.3.1, which excludes most of what is ordinarily proposed.

79.1 The Nature of a Shared Third

79.1.1 The Specification

A shared third is an object of joint attention which is neither party and which neither party controls.

Three elements are specified and the third is the operative one.

It is an object of joint attention, which §61.3.1 established is the condition of generation for aesthetic capacity and §38.1.2 recorded is treated by an existing literature.

It is neither party. §20.2.1 established what confirmation consists in on an occasion between two parties, and an occasion directed at a third term is not directed at either.

And neither party controls it. A thing one party may settle is a thing about which the other's contribution is subject to that party's disposal, and §38.2.2 excluded from the shared any occasion whose outcome a party settled in advance. §79.3.1 develops this and finds it the most restrictive of the three.

Proposition 79.1. *A shared third is an object of joint attention which is neither party and which neither party controls. The third element is operative, since a thing one party may settle is one about which the other's contribution is subject to his disposal.*

79.1.2 The Ground of the Third Term

The framework has treated dyads throughout and this chapter introduces a third term, which requires justification.

§10.1.1 established that an asymmetry generates power continuously in one party's favour, and §10.2.2 that what characterises a relation is the rate at which it is returned. In a dyadic occasion, the favoured party is the one to whom the other's contribution is addressed, and §42.2.1 established that authority is the standing occupancy of that position.

What a third term alters is where the contribution is addressed. Where two parties attend to something neither controls, what each supplies is addressed to the third term and is assessed against it. §19.3.1 established that a symbol is good where what it describes can refute it, and a claim about a third term is refutable by the third term.

This is the chapter's central mechanism and it should be stated exactly. The asymmetry is not removed. §10.1.1 established that it is constitutive, and §7.1.1 established that the child holds no standpoint outside the relation. What is removed is the requirement that the child's contribution be assessed by the favoured party, since it may in its place be assessed against something neither of them is.

Proposition 79.2. *In a dyadic occasion the child's contribution is addressed to the favoured party and assessed by him. Where a third term is present, what each supplies is addressed to it and assessed against it. The asymmetry is not removed, since it is constitutive; what is removed is the requirement that the child's contribution be assessed by the favoured party.*

79.2 The Supply of the Arrangement

79.2.1 The Displacement

The consequence of §79.1.2 is that several results of the diagnostic Parts do not obtain within such an occasion.

§16.2.1 established that a name supplies readings by which a discrepant occasion is absorbed, and §16.2.2 that where the readings are undefeatable no occasion reaches the description. A claim about a third term is not a claim about the child, so the readings governing the household's account of him are not the readings that apply.

§28.3.2 established what becomes of an occasion whose point is producing a result. An occasion directed at a third term has a point external to both parties, and §61.3.2 established that where the third term is attended to for its own sake there is no outcome to be settled at all.

And §18.3.1 established what recognition extended on terms does. In an occasion directed at a third term, a child's contribution may be wrong about the third term without bearing on whether he is recognised, and §42.2.2 established the corresponding independence.

The displacement is partial and its limit should be stated with it. Chapter 17 established that a symbol realises itself in what it describes, and an adult holding a settled account of a child brings it to an occasion of any kind. What the third term supplies is an occasion on which the account is not what the exchange is about, and §39.3.1 established that occasions on which an account could be altered are what the discriminator requires.

Proposition 79.3. *In an occasion directed at a third term, the readings governing a household's account of a child do not apply, since a claim about the third term is not a claim about him; the occasion's point is external to both parties; and a contribution may be wrong without bearing on recognition. The displacement is partial, since an adult brings a settled account to an occasion of any kind.*

79.2.2 The Registration of the Conditions

§62.2.1 identified four conditions and this arrangement bears on all four, which no other act or arrangement in this Part does.

Differential response is available, since the third term supplies distinctions to be responded to and §61.3.1 established that what a child comes to attend to is settled by what has been attended to with him.

Uptake is available, since what either party notices alters what the other sees, and §38.2.1 established that an occasion is shared to the extent that what each supplied is in what it became.

Exposure to alteration is available in an unusually clean form. §56.3.2 established that a judgement is reversible where the making of it did not settle the matter, and a judgement about a third term may be returned to without any party's account of any party being at issue.

And substitution licensing is available, which §78.2.1 established a response alone does not supply. §74.3.1 defined it as a novel application of a term taken up rather than corrected, and a third term is what novel applications are applied to.

Proposition 79.4. *The arrangement bears on all four conditions, which no other act or arrangement in this Part does. Exposure to alteration takes an unusually clean form, since a judgement about a third term may be returned to without any party's account being at issue, and substitution licensing is available where §78.2.1 established a response alone does not supply it.*

79.3 The Conditions on a Third

79.3.1 It Must Resist Both Parties

The third element of §79.1.1 excludes most of what is ordinarily proposed, and the exclusions are the chapter's practical content.

A third term controlled by the adult fails. An activity whose outcome the adult settles, whose rules he adjudicates, or whose success he judges is one about which the child's contribution is subject to his disposal, and §38.2.2 excluded such occasions. Much of what is proposed as shared activity is of this kind, and §61.5.1 established what asking a child what his drawing is supplies.

A third term controlled by the child fails equally, and this is less often noticed. An activity in which the adult defers to whatever the child says is one in which the child's contribution is not assessed against anything, and §42.2.2 established that deference may be the mechanism by which an account is protected from correction.

A third term with no purchase fails. Something about which nothing could be got wrong supplies no assessment, and §19.3.1 established that a symbol is good where what it describes

can refute it. A third term must be capable of showing a party to be mistaken.

What survives is a class this chapter can name. A physical process, a text, a piece of music, a game with fixed rules, a problem with an answer, a garden, an animal. Each resists both parties, each admits of a party being wrong about it, and none is disposed of by either party's authority.

Proposition 79.5. *A third term controlled by the adult fails, since the child's contribution is subject to his disposal; one controlled by the child fails, since nothing assesses his contribution; and one with no purchase fails, since it cannot show a party to be mistaken. What survives is a class of things that resist both parties and admit of a party being wrong.*

79.3.2 The Adult Must Be Answerable to It

A second condition follows from the first and is more demanding.

The third term serves the office of §79.1.2 only where the adult is himself assessed against it. Where an adult's judgement about the third term is treated as settling what the third term is, the third term has become an extension of his authority and §79.3.1 excluded that case.

Two consequences follow.

The adult must be capable of being wrong about it in the child's presence, and §42.3.1 established that an account absorbing every discrepancy has no purchase on what it describes. An adult who is never shown to be mistaken about the third term has supplied a third term that does not resist him.

And the adult must not select a third term about which he cannot be wrong. §12.2.2 established what continuous occupancy of a position produces, and a domain in which the adult is expert supplies a third term that resists the child alone.

The second is a real constraint on ordinary practice and it should be stated as one. An adult's competence in a domain is precisely what makes the domain unsuitable, and §79.4.1 records what follows.

Proposition 79.6. *The third term serves its office only where the adult is himself assessed against it, so he must be capable of being shown wrong about it in the child's presence and must not select a domain in which he cannot be. An adult's competence in a domain is what makes that domain unsuitable.*

79.4 Limits and What Can Be Said

79.4.1 The Limits of the Arrangement

Three limits and the second is inherited from Part VI.

The arrangement does not supply a second setting. §34.1.2 established that a reserve is supplied where a child is described differently in two settings, and a third term is not a party and holds no account of anyone. §45.2.1 established that a second adult performs that office and this arrangement does not.

The arrangement does not reach an unanswerable account. §16.2.2 established that where the readings are undefeatable no occasion reaches the description, and §79.2.1 established only

that the readings do not apply within the occasion. An adult whose account of a child is unanswerable holds it during and after.

And the arrangement is subject to the conditions Part IX described. §5.2.2 established what contracts the occasions, §47.2.2 established that a household's position governs what is available, and a third term of the kind §79.3.1 named requires time in which nothing else is required.

Proposition 79.7. *The arrangement does not supply a second setting, since a third term holds no account of anyone; does not reach an unanswerable account, since it establishes only that the readings do not apply within the occasion; and is subject to the conditions contracting occasions generally.*

79.4.2 The Sayable Content Here

This chapter can say more than its predecessors and the reason is stated in §77.1.2.

Recommendations about arrangements survive the argument of §77.1.1, since making occasions available does not settle their outcome. A third term is an arrangement rather than an act performed within an occasion, and §25.2.2 recorded the limit of that licence, which is that a household setting aside an hour has arranged an hour.

What can accordingly be said is this. A household in which parties attend together to things that resist both of them has made available occasions on which all four conditions of §62.2.1 may be met, and §79.2.2 established that no other arrangement in this Part does so. Whether they are met on any occasion is not arrangeable, and §38.4.2 established the general form.

Two things are still excluded and should be stated with the permission.

Selecting a third term in order to produce the conditions settles the occasion's outcome, and §35.3.1 recorded what became of a proposal that ignored this. What is available is the selection of a third term for its own sake, and §61.3.2 established that occasions of that kind are the purest instances of a shared occasion and the least defensible.

And the arrangement supplies no way of telling whether it worked, since §78.4.2 established that the criterion is counterfactual and answerable only across a sequence.

Proposition 79.8. *A household in which parties attend together to things that resist both of them has made available occasions on which all four conditions may be met, which no other arrangement in this Part supplies. Selecting a third term in order to produce the conditions settles the occasion's outcome, and the arrangement supplies no way of telling whether it worked.*

References

Chapter 80

The Maintenance of Channels of Revision

The Work of This Chapter

§42.3.1 derived the one obligation ch. 42 was able to derive, which is that an adult holding an account of a child is committed to holding it answerable to what the child does. This chapter treats what maintains the conditions under which that is possible.

§80.1 states what a channel of revision is and holds that it is a rate rather than a facility.

§80.2 treats the three conditions §44.3.2 identified and states what maintains each.

§80.3 faces a difficulty peculiar to this chapter, which is that a channel maintained deliberately is a protection in the sense ch. 51 treated and inherits its difficulty. §80.4 states what survives.

The reader should carry forward the finding of §80.3.1, which is that this chapter's subject falls under the difficulty the book has been least able to resolve.

80.1 The Nature of a Channel

80.1.1 A Rate Rather Than a Facility

A channel of revision is the standing possibility that an account held of a party may be altered by what he does.

The natural picture is of a facility: a procedure, an occasion set aside, an invitation standing open. §43.1.1 refused the corresponding picture for a normative order, holding that an order is what its parties have been doing rather than something adopted, and the refusal holds here.

§62.1.3 established that every capacity Part X treated is a rate characterising a relation over a period, and §70.2.2 defined the refutability proportion as the proportion of discrepant occasions that alter a description rather than being absorbed. A channel is that proportion being non-zero.

Two consequences follow.

A household may possess every facility and have no channel. §44.3.1 established that the criterion does not require objections to be invited, and §44.1.2 established that a household's stated arrangements are poor evidence about its operative ones. An invitation issued and never taken up leaves the proportion at zero.

And a household may have no facility and a high proportion. §39.3.1 established that questions occur for reasons internal to running a household and that they test whether the account held of a child can be altered by what he supplies. Nothing need be set aside for this to occur.

Proposition 80.1. *A channel of revision is the standing possibility that an account may be altered by what a party does, which is the refutability proportion being non-zero. It is a rate rather than a facility, so a household may possess every facility and have no channel, and may have no facility and a high proportion.*

80.1.2 The Office of a Channel

The chapter's subject is the condition on which the book's one derived obligation depends, and stating this prevents the chapter from being read as advice about family communication.

§42.3.1 established that an account of a child whose readings absorb every discrepancy stands in no relation to the child that would make it an account of him. An adult who wishes to know what his child is like is committed to holding the account answerable, and the commitment is internal to his own position rather than imported.

A channel is what that commitment requires in practice. §42.2.2 established that answerability concerns the account rather than the decision, so a channel is not a mechanism by which children get their way, and §60.3.1 established that what distinguishes a norm from a regularity is that a reason is owed.

Proposition 80.2. *A channel is what the obligation of §42.3.1 requires in practice, and that obligation is internal to the adult's own position rather than imported. A channel is not a mechanism by which children get their way, since §42.2.2 established that answerability concerns the account rather than the decision.*

80.2 The Conditions on Contest

80.2.1 Terms and Occasions

§44.3.2 established that contest requires terms in which an objection can be stated, an occasion on which it can be raised, and a grammar in which it could reach. The first two are treated here.

Terms are supplied by the household, and §55.3.1 established what a household's language comprises. §55.3.2 established that a thing is sayable where terms exist, an occasion exists, and the saying can reach, and §55.4.1 established that a language whose terms cannot be extended is closed in that function's idiom.

What maintains terms is their use. §38.3.2 established that what a household holds in common is maintained by continued sharing rather than stored, and §55.5.1 distinguished supplying a term for something a child has encountered from supplying the word he is reaching for. The first adds to the terms available.

Occasions are governed by the conditions Part IX described. §5.2.2 established what contracts them and §47.1.2 that constraints operate on rates rather than on any particular occasion.

What maintains occasions is not stated here as a practice, and §77.1.2 gave the reason: arrangements survive the argument and §25.2.2 recorded the limit, which is that a household setting aside an hour has arranged an hour and not what occupies it.

Proposition 80.3. *Terms are maintained by their use, and supplying a term for something a child has encountered adds to those available. Occasions are governed by the conditions Part IX described and are arrangeable in the limited sense §25.2.2 recorded, which is that their occurrence is arrangeable and their character is not.*

80.2.2 The Third Condition and What Governs It

The third condition is that the objection could reach, and it is the one this book has treated most.

§16.2.2 established that where the readings a name supplies are undefeatable, no occasion reaches the description, and §16.2.1 identified the moves. §43.2.1 established the corresponding condition for an order and §67.3.1 for a method of inquiry.

What governs the third condition is not a practice and is a property of a grammar. §41.1.1 established that a manner of handling what does not fit is what an epistemic habit consists in, §41.2.1 that it is not available to the party for report, and §48.3.1 that it is the part of a grammar surviving a generation's passage best.

Two consequences follow and both are unfavourable.

The third condition is not maintainable by deciding to maintain it. §48.3.2 established that a resolution to rear differently operates on what can be stated and does not reach the manner of handling what does not fit, and a household may differ from its predecessor in every stated respect and be closed as its predecessor was.

And the third condition is the one on which the other two depend for their point. Terms and occasions supply an objection that can be raised, and §44.3.2 established that a child whose objections are absorbed argues and appears difficult. A household maintaining the first two without the third produces frequent objection and no revision, which §44.3.2 established is evidence of terms and occasions rather than of contestability.

Proposition 80.4. *The third condition is a property of a grammar rather than a practice, is not available to the party for report, and is not maintainable by deciding to maintain it. A household maintaining terms and occasions without it produces frequent objection and no revision.*

80.3 The Difficulty Peculiar to This Chapter

80.3.1 A Channel Maintained Deliberately Is a Protection

The chapter's subject falls under the difficulty ch. 51 treated, and the fall should be stated rather than left for a reader to notice.

§46.1.1 defined a boundary as a settled arrangement under which a class of occasion does not arise, and §51.3.1 established that a protection is a symbol in the sense of ch. 15, governing how the protected occasions are approached and supplying readings of occasions that go badly.

A household that maintains a channel deliberately has adopted an arrangement of this kind. The arrangement governs how the occasions within it are approached, it produces a description of what is being protected, and §26.3.1 established that an adult who must justify

an arrangement has a justification only in the currency that counts.

The specific form here is worth stating. A household that has adopted the practice of hearing objections has a description of itself as a household that hears objections, and §16.2.1 supplies the readings by which an objection that was not heard is absorbed: it was not the moment, he was not really objecting, it was addressed later. §60.4.1 established that a closed order supplies facts where it appears to supply norms, and a channel held in this way supplies a fact about the household.

Proposition 80.5. *A household maintaining a channel deliberately has adopted a protection in the sense of §51.3.1, which governs how the occasions are approached and produces a description of the household. The readings of §16.2.1 then absorb the occasions on which an objection was not heard.*

80.3.2 The Consequences of the Resolution

§51.3.2 located what distinguishes protections that survive, and §76.3.2 transferred the result to instruments. It transfers here unchanged.

A protection survives as a protection where what happens within it can refute it. Applied here, a channel survives where the household's description of itself as one that revises can be defeated by occasions on which it did not.

And whether it can be so defeated is settled by the order the household holds rather than by the channel's design. §76.3.2 established this for an instrument and §51.3.2 for a protection generally, and the reason transfers: a household whose order requires that its arrangements justify themselves will produce the appearances that justify them.

The recursion here should be marked rather than concealed. Whether a household's channel of revision survives depends on whether its account of its own channel is answerable, which is a channel of revision at a second level. §45.1.2 established that contestability is level-relative and that closure above the level where contest is visible leaves no trace.

The recursion does not continue indefinitely in practice, since §45.1.1 established that households are least articulate at the constitutional level and §45.4.1 established that the child is not a party there. What it establishes is that the chapter's subject has no self-sufficient statement.

Proposition 80.6. *A channel survives where the household's description of itself as one that revises can be defeated by occasions on which it did not, and whether it can be is settled by the order rather than by the channel's design. Whether a channel survives accordingly depends on a channel at a second level, so the chapter's subject has no self-sufficient statement.*

80.4 The Surviving Proposals

80.4.1 The Describable Content

Three descriptions survive the difficulty and each is a description in the sense §77.2.1 defined.

An objection met with a reason is an occasion on which the third condition may be met, and one met with a statement that the matter is settled is not. §60.5.1 established that a reason

offered is offered to a party who may find it insufficient, and §60.3.1 that a reason owed is what distinguishes a norm.

A question asked whose answer the asker does not hold tests whether his account can be altered, and §39.3.1 established that such questions occur for reasons internal to running a household and escape the difficulty §30.2.2 identified.

And a correction supplied without a question closes the matter, which §56.4.2 established, and a household that corrects and does not question exercises the closing operation continuously.

None of these is an instruction and §77.1.1 established why. What each supplies is a term in which an adult may describe what he did, and §77.2.2 established that this changes what he can be answerable for.

Proposition 80.7. *An objection met with a reason is an occasion on which the third condition may be met; a question whose answer the asker does not hold tests whether his account can be altered; and a correction supplied without a question closes the matter. Each is a description supplying terms rather than an instruction.*

80.4.2 The Limits of the Chapter

Three things and the second is the chapter's principal limitation.

It cannot supply a practice that maintains the third condition. §80.2.2 established that the condition is a property of a grammar, is not available for report, and is not reached by a resolution.

It cannot supply a household with a way of determining whether its channel is open. §80.3.2 established the recursion, and §43.4.2 established that closure is invisible in the absence of contest and that a household whose children have stopped objecting is indistinguishable from one whose children endorse its order.

And it cannot make the difficulty of §80.3.1 go away. §51.1.2 established that the difficulty follows from any account holding that an activity is damaged by being performed for an external purpose and that a general solution would not be this book's to supply. §76.3.3 recorded that ch. 76 supplied a criterion and no procedure, and this chapter is in the same position.

Proposition 80.8. *The chapter leaves unsupplied a practice maintaining the third condition, cannot supply a household with a way of determining whether its channel is open, and cannot dissolve the difficulty of §80.3.1, which §51.1.2 established a general solution to would not be this book's to supply.*

References

Chapter 81

Rupture and Repair

The Work of This Chapter

Two promises converge here. §23.2.2 established that repair is not restoration and did not say what it is. §19.4.1 recorded that escape in this account comes from arrangements changing, and required this chapter to say whether anything follows that a household could act on.

§81.1 states what a rupture is and distinguishes it from a disagreement and from degradation. §81.2 states what repair is, holding that it is the resumption of a rate on altered terms and that the alteration is what makes it repair rather than a return.

§81.3 treats the question §19.4.1 set, and finds that what a household can act on is narrower than it hoped and is not nothing. §81.4 states the costs and the constraint §7.2.1 imposes.

The reader should carry forward the account of §81.2.2 and the answer of §81.3.2.

81.1 The Nature of a Rupture

81.1.1 The Specification

A rupture is an occasion after which the rate at which a relation returns what it generates falls sharply and does not recover of itself.

Three elements are specified.

It is an occasion, which distinguishes it from the contraction *ch. 11* described. §11.1.1 established that absorption ceases through routes requiring no decision and no moment, and §11.2.2 that a cessation has no moment at which it is performed. A rupture has one.

What falls is a rate, which §10.2.2 established is what characterises a relation and §62.1.3 established every capacity of Part X to be.

And the fall does not recover of itself, which §11.1.2 established is the ordinary case, since a fall maintains itself by mechanisms outlasting the conditions that began it.

Proposition 81.1. *A rupture is an occasion after which the rate at which a relation returns what it generates falls sharply and does not recover of itself. It differs from the contraction of *ch. 11* in having a moment, and the fall's persistence is what §11.1.2 established of falls generally.*

81.1.2 The Boundaries of a Rupture

Two things are confused with it and the second confusion is the one this book has most reason to prevent.

A rupture is not a disagreement, and [ch. 82](#) states the relation between them: a conflict is the occasion on which difference is returned, and a rupture is what follows a conflict in which the conditions of [§82.4.1](#) failed. [§38.2.2](#) established that the criterion of sharing admits occasions of disagreement, since what matters is whether each party's supply is in what the occasion became. [§58.4.2](#) established that practice in sustaining a relation through a discrepancy requires an occasion on which something went wrong and the relation continued, and a disagreement that alters what a party holds is that occasion rather than a rupture.

A rupture is not the condition of [ch. 30](#). [§30.1.2](#) defined the second level as the condition in which the readings a description supplies absorb every discrepancy, and [§30.1.3](#) established that the loss at issue is of answerability rather than of opportunity. A rupture is a fall in a rate and leaves the grammar as it was, which [§30.1.1](#) established of the first level generally.

The second distinction has a consequence worth stating. A relation may rupture without degrading, and a relation may degrade without rupturing, and [§35.1.1](#) established that the second occurs without any occasion at which anything happened. The visible event and the consequential condition are independent.

Proposition 81.2. *A rupture is not a disagreement, since a disagreement altering what a party holds is the occasion [§58.4.2](#) required. It is not the condition of [ch. 30](#), since it is a fall in a rate and leaves the grammar as it was. A relation may rupture without degrading and degrade without rupturing.*

81.2 The Nature of Repair

81.2.1 The Unavailability of Restoration

[§23.2.2](#) established that mutual confirmation cannot be arranged, and three further results establish that nothing is returned to.

[§11.1.2](#) established that a restored occasion arrives into a changed field and does not restore the prior rate at once. The field differs because the interval occurred.

[§15.2.2](#) established that occasions foreclosed leave no trace, so the occasions that did not occur during the interval are not recoverable and [§33.4.2](#) established that what did not happen cannot be recovered by anyone.

And [§78.3.2](#) established that what is at issue is a rate rather than a state, so there is no state to which a relation returns. [§43.1.1](#) established the corresponding point for a normative order.

Proposition 81.3. *Nothing is returned to. A restored occasion arrives into a changed field, the occasions foreclosed during the interval leave no trace, and what is at issue is a rate rather than a state, so no state exists to be restored.*

81.2.2 The Nature of Repair

Repair is the resumption of a rate on terms altered by the rupture, and the alteration is what distinguishes repair from a return.

Two components are specified.

The rate resumes, which §40.2.2 established requires occasions and that the mechanism runs in both directions. §78.3.2 established that an adult who has responded once has altered a rate by one occasion's worth, and repair is that repeated.

The terms are altered, and this is where the account differs from the ordinary picture. §34.1.2 established that a description varying with setting is visibly attached to an arrangement, and a relation that has ruptured and resumed is one in which both parties have encountered it under two conditions. What was a standing feature has been shown to be a rate that can fall, and §50.1.2 established that what never varies is registered as background.

What follows is a result the chapter should state plainly, since it inverts the natural reading. A repaired relation contains something an unruptured relation does not, which is the parties' acquaintance with its variability. §58.4.2 established that practice in sustaining a relation through a discrepancy requires an occasion on which something went wrong and the relation continued in an altered form, and a rupture repaired is that occasion at a larger scale.

The claim should be bounded at once. Nothing here holds that ruptures are beneficial, that they should be sought, or that a relation is improved by having one. §81.1.1 established that what falls is a rate and §77.1.1 established why a rupture produced in order to be repaired would fail, since the occasion's outcome would have been settled in advance.

Proposition 81.4. *Repair is the resumption of a rate on terms altered by the rupture. The alteration is that both parties have encountered the relation under two conditions, so what was a standing feature has been shown to be a rate that can fall. A repaired relation contains the parties' acquaintance with its variability, which nothing here holds to be a reason to seek a rupture.*

81.3 The Arrangement Side

81.3.1 The Question Inherited

§19.4.1 recorded that the structure this book describes is closed from within and that what is not closed is the arrangement, and required this chapter to say whether anything follows that a household could act on.

The question is sharp because the two halves pull against each other. §16.2.2 established that every route by which evidence might reach a governed name is itself governed, and §16.3.1 that the child cannot supply what would reach it. §23.3.1 established that most of the conditions on a reversal are properties of arrangements, and §17.3.1 that the conditions of closure vary with how many adults hold accounts and how many settings a child has.

What the question asks is whether a household stands to its own arrangements as it stands to its own descriptions, which is to say as something it cannot reach, or otherwise.

Proposition 81.5. *The structure is closed from within and the arrangement is not closed, and the question is whether a household stands to its own arrangements as it stands to its own descriptions. Arrangements change for reasons having nothing to do with any household's descriptions, which is where §19.4.1 located escape.*

81.3.2 The Household's Field of Action

The answer is narrower than the question hoped and is not nothing, and it has three parts.

A household cannot alter the conditions §47.2.2 identified. Its position in the field governs the occasions available, the settings its children encounter, and which second households are nearby, and §47.4.2 recorded that this book takes a household's position as given. §50.3.2 established that a household is structurally unable to register its position as a position.

A household can act on which of the arrangements available to it are taken. §45.2.2 established that a difference between two adults may be absorbed as character, settled by allocation, or contested, and that allocation is commonest and organises away the divergence that would have supplied a reserve. The choice among the three is made at the collective level in the sense of §45.1.1, and §77.1.2 established that recommendations about arrangements survive the argument against recommendation.

And a household can decline to organise a divergence away. This is the practical content of §45.2.2 and it is a description of the kind §77.1.2 identified as surviving: an act foreclosing a condition may be ceased, and §11.2.2 established that a cessation is not an act performed within an occasion, so ceasing does not settle an occasion's outcome in advance.

The three together supply the answer. What a household can act on is not the conditions of its own closure, which it cannot see, and is the disposal of the divergences its arrangements happen to contain.

Proposition 81.6. *A household cannot alter its position in the field, which it is structurally unable to register as a position. It can act on which available arrangements are taken, and it can decline to organise away a divergence, which is a cessation rather than an act performed within an occasion. What it can act on is the disposal of the divergences its arrangements happen to contain.*

81.4 Costs and Constraints

81.4.1 The Requirements of the Constraint

§7.2.1 constrains what this chapter may say, and the constraint should be applied explicitly.

That section established that four operations available to a subject with reserves are unavailable to a young child, and that advice to a child to refuse a description misdescribes what is happening to him. §7.1.1 established the founding asymmetry and §33.1.2 established that the faculty by which such an operation would be performed is constituted within the relation.

What follows is that nothing in this chapter is addressed to the child. A child cannot initiate repair, cannot recognise a rupture as a rupture, and cannot hold the relation's variability as something he has observed, since §50.1.2 established that a party registers what varies within his window and §7.1.2 established that the asymmetry is a matter of degree that changes.

The adult case differs, and §32.3.2 established the divergence. An adult holds an account of himself that a rupture supplies material to, and §32.3.1 established that the accommodation available to him is where the operation does its work.

Proposition 81.7. *Nothing in this chapter is addressed to the child, since §7.2.1 established*

that the operations at issue are unavailable to him and §33.1.2 that the faculty performing them is constituted within the relation. He cannot initiate repair or hold the relation's variability as something observed.

81.4.2 The Cost of Repair and the Limits of Statement

§77.3.1 required that the cost to the performer be stated.

Repair costs occasions, and §5.2.2 established what governs whether they are available. A household under constraint has fewer, and §47.3.2 established that this reduces occasions without reducing answerability.

Repair costs the certainty §77.3.2 identified. A relation whose variability both parties have encountered is one whose future is less settled for them, and §41.1.1 established that absorbing a discrepancy is frequently correct and cheaper.

And repair costs the account. §36.3.1 established that in a confrontation both parties may hold accurate accounts experienced as contradictory, and that the encounter produces estrangement because each is heard as a claim about fault. A household resuming after a rupture has not thereby reconciled its accounts of what occurred.

Three things cannot be said and the first is the one a reader will supply.

It cannot be said that repair should be attempted, and §77.1.1 established why. An occasion whose point is repairing has its outcome settled in advance.

It cannot be said that a repaired relation is better than one that did not rupture, and §81.2.2 bounded the claim it makes.

And it cannot be said whether a given relation has been repaired, since §81.2.2 defined repair by a rate and §10.2.1 established that a rate is identifiable across a sequence rather than within an occasion.

Proposition 81.8. *Repair costs occasions, costs the certainty a settled relation supplies, and does not reconcile the parties' accounts of what occurred. It cannot be said that repair should be attempted, that a repaired relation is better than one that did not rupture, or whether a given relation has been repaired, since a rate is identifiable only across a sequence.*

References

Chapter 82

Conflict as Relational Regeneration

The Work of This Chapter

Chapter 81 treated what follows a fall in a rate, and left untreated the occasions on which parties within a relation come into opposition without the relation falling. This chapter treats those.

§82.1 states what a conflict is in the framework's terms and separates it from three conditions with which it is run together. §82.2 states the chapter's central claim, that a conflict is an occasion of returned difference and is accordingly the operation by which a relation is regenerated.

§82.3 draws the consequence, which is that the avoidance of conflict is among the mechanisms of degradation this book has described, and connects it to the lock Huang (2026) identifies. §82.4 states when a conflict degenerates and what distinguishes the degenerate case.

The reader should carry forward §82.2.1 and the finding of §82.3.1, which together hold that a relation without conflict is a relation without the occasions on which its constraint is revised.

82.1 The Nature of a Conflict

82.1.1 The Specification

A conflict obtains where two parties to a relation hold incompatible positions on a matter the relation must settle, and each position is put to the other.

Three elements are specified and the third does the work.

The positions are incompatible, which distinguishes a conflict from a disagreement that costs nothing to sustain. §44.3.1 held that a rule is contestable where an objection could alter it, and a conflict is the case in which the objection has been made and the matter awaits settling.

The matter must be settled by the relation, which distinguishes a conflict from a divergence of opinion the parties may carry indefinitely. §44.1.1 established that a rule's content is fixed by where it is applied and where waived, and a conflict arises at the application.

And each position is put to the other. This is the element that makes a conflict a relational event, and §39.1.1 supplies its form: a position put to another party is one the other may answer against.

Proposition 82.1. *A conflict obtains where two parties hold incompatible positions on a matter the relation must settle, and each position is put to the other. The third element makes it a relational event, since a position put to another party is one the other may answer against.*

82.1.2 The Boundaries of a Conflict

Three conditions are run together with conflict and the confusions are consequential for what follows.

A conflict differs from a rupture. §81.1.1 defined a rupture as an occasion after which the rate at which a relation returns what it generates falls sharply, and §81.1.2 established that a disagreement altering what a party holds is the occasion §58.4.2 required. A conflict is that occasion, and a rupture is what follows a conflict that went otherwise.

A conflict differs from domination. §42.2.1 established that authority is the standing occupancy of the position an asymmetry favours, and a conflict between parties standing in an asymmetric relation remains a conflict, since §82.1.1 requires only that each position be put. *Simmel* (1955) treats conflict as a form of sociation and holds that parties in conflict stand in a relation and no absence of one, and *Coser* (1956) develops the account.

And a conflict differs from strategic withholding. *Huang* (2026) distinguishes the coldness withheld as an instrument from the coldness of depletion, and holds that the first is a deed and no degradation. A party who declines to put his position, in order that the other be unable to answer, has declined the conflict, and §32.1.1 described what such an occasion assigns.

Proposition 82.2. *A conflict differs from a rupture, which follows a conflict that went otherwise; from domination, since *Simmel* (1955) establishes that parties in conflict stand in a relation; and from strategic withholding, in which a party declines to put his position so that the other cannot answer.*

82.2 Conflict as the Occasion of Return

82.2.1 A Conflict Returns Difference

The chapter's central claim follows from two results the book has established separately.

§6.1.3 defined a relation as the constraint through which generation unfolds in history, and held that the constraint is revised by the succession it constrains. A relation whose constraint is no longer revised by what passes within it satisfies the first clause and fails the second, and §6.1.4 identified this as the condition of §30.1.2.

Huang (2026) names the mechanism of that failure at the site this chapter concerns. Where a relation of chronic giving ceases to have its direction returned, the difference between the positions, once posited afresh each time the direction reversed, is posited once and held. The account calls this a lock, and holds that a locked direction supplies its occupant a uniform experience which is then misread as a property of him.

A conflict is the occasion on which the direction reverses. A party who puts a position to another has supplied something the other must accommodate, and §10.1.1 established that an asymmetry generates power continuously in one party's favour. In a conflict the disfavoured party requires something of the favoured one, which §39.2.1 identified as what a child's question does and which §10.2.2 identified as the occasion on which generated power may be returned.

What follows is the claim.

Proposition 82.3. *A conflict is an occasion of returned difference. The disfavoured party puts a position the favoured party must accommodate, which reverses, for the duration of the occasion, the direction in which the relation runs. A conflict is accordingly the operation by which the constraint of §6.1.3 is revised by the succession it governs.*

82.2.2 The Regeneration Claim

The consequence of §82.2.1 is stronger than the observation that conflicts are sometimes useful, and it should be stated at its strength.

Three of the book's conditions are met by a conflict and by few other occasions.

§58.4.2 established that practice in sustaining a relation through a discrepancy requires an occasion on which something went wrong and the relation continued in an altered form. A conflict is that occasion, and §73.2.2 established that such occasions cannot be arranged and cannot be sampled.

§44.3.2 established that contest requires terms, an occasion, and a grammar in which the objection could reach. A conflict is the exercise of all three, and §44.4.1 defined the proportion of a household's rules altered by objection as an observable.

And §39.3.1 established that an adult's question tests whether the account he holds of a child can be altered by what the child supplies. A conflict tests the same thing under load, since what the child supplies in a conflict is a position the adult would prefer to refuse.

What follows is that a relation without conflict is a relation without the occasions on which its constraint is revised. Coser (1956) states the sociological version, holding that conflict within a group is among the processes by which the group's arrangements are adjusted, and Simmel (1955) that a relation entirely without opposition would be a relation without a history.

Proposition 82.4. *A conflict meets three conditions few other occasions meet: it supplies the discrepancy §58.4.2 requires, it exercises the three conditions of §44.3.2, and it tests answerability under load, since what is put is a position the other party would prefer to refuse. A relation without conflict lacks the occasions on which its constraint is revised.*

82.2.3 The Established Support and Its Reach

A body of work holds that conflict may be productive, and this section states what it supports and where it stops short of the present claim.

Deutsch (1973) holds that the question is how to make conflict productive and no question of how to prevent it, and distinguishes the conditions under which a conflict runs constructively from those under which it runs otherwise. Coser (1956) states the sociological form.

Doise and Mugny (1984) establish the developmental case most directly. The confrontation of divergent positions between children produces cognitive advance that neither party's position contained, and Shantz (1987) surveys the corresponding literature on conflicts between children. §37.3.2 refused to classify the arising of what no party brought as incomplete transmission or as noise, and this literature reports that arising within a conflict.

Davies and Cummings (1994) and Cummings and Davies (2010) establish the finding that bears most directly on §82.3.1. Children who witness conflict between adults are affected by its

properties and no mere occurrence: conflict that is resolved and followed by visible repair is associated with outcomes that unresolved and withdrawing conflict is not. Grych and Fincham (1990) supplies the account through the child's appraisal of what a conflict portends.

The reach of this support should be stated exactly, since a chapter assimilating it would overclaim. Each of these accounts holds that a conflict may be productive under conditions. The present chapter holds that a conflict is the operation by which a relation's constraint is revised, which is a claim about what a conflict is and no claim about what it may achieve. §82.2.1 derived the stronger claim from §6.1.3, and the literature surveyed here supports the weaker one and is consistent with the stronger.

Proposition 82.5. *Deutsch (1973), Doise and Mugny (1984), and Cummings and Davies (2010) establish that a conflict may be productive under conditions and that its properties rather than its occurrence determine what follows. The present chapter holds the stronger claim that a conflict is the operation by which a constraint is revised, which the literature is consistent with and does not state.*

82.3 The Degradation Worked by Avoidance

82.3.1 The Avoidance of Conflict Degrades a Relation

The claim of §82.2.2 has a converse and the converse is this chapter's practical finding.

A household in which conflicts do not arise has, by §82.2.1, no occasions of returned difference on the matters conflicts would concern. §11.1.2 established that a fall in a rate maintains itself, and §15.2.2 that a foreclosed occasion leaves no trace.

Three routes lead there and none requires a decision, which §11.1.1 established of the general case.

A conflict may be foreclosed by cost. §39.2.1 established that a move from the disfavoured party carries a cost, and a conflict carries more, since what is put is a position the other party would prefer to refuse.

A conflict may be foreclosed by futility. §39.4.1 established that where a move is met and not taken up, the rate of the move falls. A child whose positions have been heard and have altered nothing has less reason to put the next one.

And a conflict may be foreclosed by settlement in advance. §38.2.2 excluded from the shared any occasion whose outcome a party settled beforehand, and a household in which the answer to a conflict is known before it is raised has foreclosed the occasion while appearing to permit it.

Two bodies of work bear on the finding and neither was available to §82.1.1. Gottman (1994) reports that what distinguishes relations between adults that persist from those that end is the conduct of conflict and no measure of its frequency, and that withdrawal from an exchange in progress is among the conditions predicting dissolution. Minuchin (1974) describes a household in which conflict between two adults is conducted through a third party, generally a child, so that the conflict between the adults is never put and the child carries what was never returned. §45.2.2 described the disposal of a difference between two adults and §85.2.1 what an allocation makes unavailable, and the present case is a third disposal those

sections did not name.

The finding follows. Conflict avoidance is among the mechanisms of degradation this book has described, and it operates in households that are mild, affectionate, and in which nobody has withheld anything. §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity, and a household without conflict is the case in which that independence is most visible.

Proposition 82.6. *A household in which conflicts do not arise lacks occasions of returned difference on the matters they would concern. Conflicts are foreclosed by cost, by futility, and by settlement in advance, none requiring a decision. Conflict avoidance is accordingly a mechanism of degradation, operative in households that are mild and affectionate and in which nobody has withheld anything.*

82.3.2 The Guarding of a Position

Huang (2026) identifies a second route to the same foreclosure and it differs from those of §82.3.1 in a respect this book must mark.

The account distinguishes a withdrawal that protects a depleted party from a withdrawal that protects an authority. The second refuses the return itself, since to be questioned by the party one gives to, and to be asked to justify a judgement to a subordinate, is felt as a threat to the standing from which the judgement issues. The account holds that where the posture has already set, this guarding maintains it, since any genuine return would loosen the fixity the posture depends on.

Two features of the case bear on this book.

The order of causation reverses. §82.3.1 described conflicts foreclosed by conditions no party selected, and §35.1.1 removed the bearers of fault for such cases. Here a party may foreclose the return deliberately, and the degradation is the product of the guarding. §32.2.2 drew the corresponding distinction for silence, and held that the deliberate case admits a vocabulary of answerability the structural case does not.

And the guarding has a ground the account states. An authority conferred by a position must be enacted to persist, and a return calls the enactment to account, so that an authority obliged to justify itself has passed from a party whose word is taken to one whose word is weighed. §42.3.3 recorded that Raz (1986) grounds legitimacy in a party's better conforming to reason by deferring, and the guarding described here is what such a ground invites when the deference is questioned.

The distinction the account draws at this point is the one this book has drawn throughout. Authority is always maintained, and maintenance is no degradation. What separates the healthy case is whether the maintenance proceeds by admitting the return or by closing it, and §42.3.1 derived the corresponding condition on an account.

Proposition 82.7. *A party may foreclose the return in order to guard an authority, in which case the degradation is the product of the guarding and the order of causation reverses. Authority is always maintained, so maintenance is no degradation, and what separates the cases is whether the maintenance proceeds by admitting the return or by closing it.*

82.4 The Degeneration of a Conflict

82.4.1 The Conditions of Degeneration

A conflict regenerates a relation under conditions, and the conditions fail in ways worth naming, since a chapter holding that conflict regenerates would otherwise recommend conflict without qualification.

A conflict degenerates where its outcome was settled in advance, which §38.2.2 excluded and §82.3.1 named as the third route to foreclosure. A conflict whose result is known is an occasion of the form and no occasion of the operation.

A conflict degenerates where what is at issue passes from the matter to the parties. §19.2.1 distinguished a name stating a position from one stating an essence, and a conflict in which each party's conduct is taken as evidence about what he is has become the occasion on which such descriptions are formed. Huang (2026) names the passage from a constant position to a supposed property of its occupant, and a conflict conducted in those terms performs it.

And a conflict degenerates where it cannot conclude. §81.2.2 held that repair is the resumption of a rate on altered terms, and a conflict that recurs without the terms altering is a conflict from which the relation has learned nothing. §16.2.2 supplies the mechanism, since a conflict whose readings absorb whatever is put is one no position reaches.

Proposition 82.8. *A conflict degenerates where its outcome was settled in advance, where what is at issue passes from the matter to the parties, so that conduct becomes evidence about what each is, and where it recurs without the terms altering, which is the case in which the readings absorb whatever is put.*

82.4.2 The Consequences for the Part

Two things pass forward and the first is a correction to how ch. 81 may be read.

That chapter held that a rupture is an occasion after which a rate falls, and §81.2.2 held that repair is the resumption of a rate on altered terms. The present chapter adds that the occasion is generally a conflict, and that whether it becomes a rupture is settled by the conditions of §82.4.1. A relation is regenerated and ruptured by occasions of one kind, and the difference lies in what is done within them.

The second is the material ch. 83 treats. §82.4.1 named three conditions under which a conflict degenerates, and each is a condition a third party or an arrangement may bear on. What such bearing amounts to, and what it costs, is that chapter's subject.

Proposition 82.9. *A relation is regenerated and ruptured by occasions of one kind, and the difference lies in what is done within them, so ch. 81 treats the case in which the conditions of §82.4.1 failed. Each of those conditions is one a third party or an arrangement may bear on, which ch. 83 treats.*

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Chapter 83

The Mediation and Management of Conflict

The Work of This Chapter

§82.4.2 passed this chapter the three conditions under which a conflict degenerates, and the question of what a third party or an arrangement may do about them.

§83.1 states what a mediator does in the framework's terms and holds that the office is the supply of a third term. §83.2 states the difficulty peculiar to mediation, which is that a party who settles a conflict has settled its outcome and thereby excluded the operation ch. 82 located in it.

§83.3 treats management, distinguishes it from mediation, and holds that what may be managed is the conditions under which conflicts arise. §83.4 states what follows for a household and for the asymmetric case, where the party who would mediate is generally a party to the conflict.

The reader should carry forward §83.1.1 and the finding of §83.3.2, which holds that the arrangeable object is the occasion and no part of what occurs within it.

83.1 The Office of a Mediator

83.1.1 The Mediator as a Third Term

A mediator is a party present to a conflict who is party to neither position, and the framework states his office in terms already established.

§79.1.1 defined a shared third as an object of joint attention which is neither party and which neither party controls, and §79.1.2 established what a third term alters. In a dyadic occasion the disfavoured party's contribution is addressed to the favoured party and assessed by him. Where a third term is present, what each supplies is addressed to it and assessed against it.

A mediator supplies that structure to a conflict. What each party puts is put to the mediator as well as to the other, and §82.4.1 named as the second condition of degeneration the passage from the matter to the parties. A third term supplies a place for the matter to stand, and §79.3.1 established that a third term serves its office only where it resists both parties.

Two consequences follow and the second is the demanding one.

A mediator who takes a position has ceased to be a third term, and §79.3.1 established that a third term controlled by one party fails, since the other's contribution is subject to that party's disposal.

And a mediator must be answerable to what the parties put. §79.3.2 established that a third term serves its office only where the party in the favoured position is himself assessed against it, and a mediator whose reading of the matter no party's contribution alters has supplied a third term that resists nobody.

Proposition 83.1. *A mediator supplies to a conflict the structure §79.1.2 identified, so that what each party puts is addressed to a term neither controls, which supplies a place for the matter to stand. A mediator who takes a position has ceased to be a third term, and a mediator whose reading no contribution alters has supplied a term that resists nobody.*

83.1.2 The Operations a Mediator Performs

Four operations follow from the office and each bears on a condition named elsewhere in this book.

A mediator holds the occasion open. §82.4.1 named as the third condition of degeneration a conflict that recurs without the terms altering, and §5.2.2 established what contracts the occasions on which anything is worked through. Holding an occasion open supplies duration, which §62.1.3 established is what a rate requires.

A mediator supplies terms. §44.3.2 established that contest requires terms in which an objection can be stated, and §55.3.2 that a thing is sayable where terms exist. A party lacking a term for what he objects to is in the position §31.4.1 described, and a mediator who supplies one has extended the language in which the conflict may be conducted.

A mediator returns what was put. §39.2.2 established that an answer is shared to the extent that the question's particular shape is in what the answer became, and a mediator who states back what a party put, in terms that party can recognise, has performed the operation §74.2.1 named.

And a mediator holds the matter distinct from the parties. This is the second condition of §82.4.1, and §16.2.1 established the moves by which a party's conduct is taken as evidence about him.

Proposition 83.2. *A mediator holds the occasion open, supplies terms in which an objection may be stated, returns what each party put in terms he can recognise, and holds the matter distinct from the parties. Each bears on a condition of degeneration named in §82.4.1 or a condition of contest named in §44.3.2.*

83.2 The Difficulty Peculiar to Mediation

83.2.1 A Settled Conflict Has a Settled Outcome

The difficulty is internal to the office and it should be stated before anything mediation can achieve.

§38.2.2 excluded from the shared any occasion whose outcome a party settled in advance, and §82.4.1 named this as the first condition of degeneration. A mediator who settles a conflict has settled its outcome, and §82.2.1 established that what a conflict supplies is the occasion on which each party must accommodate what the other put.

The consequence is exact. Where a mediator resolves a conflict, the parties have been supplied with a resolution and have not performed the accommodation, and §54.3.2 established the general form: an operation completed by another party does not complete in the one whose operation it was. §58.6.1 stated the case of an adult who prevents difficulty between a child and another party, and mediation conducted to resolution is that act performed by an office.

Two qualifications hold the finding within bounds.

Resolution is frequently necessary. §46.3.1 established that boundaries protecting a party from what he cannot assess are required by the framework's own commitments, and a conflict a party is unable to sustain is one from which he requires protection.

And the cost falls on a condition and no party. §35.1.1 removed the bearers of fault, and a mediator who resolves a conflict has done what the office is generally understood to require.

Proposition 83.3. *A mediator who settles a conflict has settled its outcome, so the parties are supplied with a resolution and do not perform the accommodation, which is §54.3.2 performed by an office. Resolution is frequently necessary, and the cost falls on a condition and no party.*

83.2.2 The Available Office

What survives §83.2.1 is narrower than resolution and is stated here as the framework's account of the office.

A mediator may hold the conditions under which the parties settle the matter, and may decline to settle it. §83.1.2 named four operations and none of them settles anything: holding an occasion open, supplying terms, returning what was put, and holding the matter distinct from the parties are each conditions on an accommodation the parties perform.

The distinction is the one §38.4.2 drew for the general case. The occurrence of an occasion is arrangeable and its character is not, and a mediator arranges the occurrence.

Follett (1942) states a related distinction from within the practical literature, separating a settlement that suppresses one position, a settlement that divides the difference, and a settlement in which the parties arrive at a position neither brought. §37.3.2 refused to classify the arising of what no party brought as incomplete transmission or as noise, and the third of these is that arising within a conflict. Deutsch (1973) distinguishes the conditions under which a conflict runs constructively from those under which it runs otherwise, and the present account states which conditions those are in the framework's terms.

Proposition 83.4. *A mediator may hold the conditions under which the parties settle the matter and may decline to settle it, since the four operations of §83.1.2 are conditions on an accommodation the parties perform. Follett (1942) distinguishes a settlement in which the parties arrive at a position neither brought, which §37.3.2 would classify as generation within a conflict.*

83.2.3 The Rival Accounts of What a Conflict Is For

Two accounts of conflict management stand against the present one at the point where it is strongest, and §8.3.1 requires that they be stated.

Zartman (1989) holds that parties come to settle a conflict when each perceives that neither can prevail and that continuation is costly, so that a settlement becomes available at a

moment the account identifies. On that account a conflict is a condition parties seek to leave, and management consists in recognising when they are ready to leave it.

Fisher et al. (1991) holds that a party's position in a negotiation is measured by what he could obtain without agreement, so that management consists in separating positions from interests and in inventing settlements that serve both. On that account a conflict is a problem to be solved and the measure of a party is what he may do elsewhere.

Both are rivals to ch. 82 and no variants of it. That chapter holds that a conflict is the occasion on which difference is returned and is accordingly the operation by which a relation is revised, and both accounts hold that a conflict is a cost from which the parties seek release. Where the present account holds that a household without conflicts lacks the occasions on which its constraint is revised, these accounts hold that such a household has succeeded.

§84.1.2 states what separates them and it is no disagreement about conflict. Each rival presupposes parties formed before the conflict and capable of exit, and Fisher et al. (1991) makes the second presupposition the measure of the first. §7.1.1 established that a young child has neither. The accounts are accordingly correct within their domain and inapplicable within this one, which §45.3.2 established of a neighbouring case.

One thing the rivals supply should be recorded. Zartman (1989) holds that a moment arrives at which a settlement becomes available, and §82.4.1 named three conditions under which a conflict degenerates without naming any condition under which it concludes. The rival account is doing work the present one has not attempted.

Proposition 83.5. *Zartman (1989) and Fisher et al. (1991) hold that a conflict is a cost from which parties seek release, which is a rival to ch. 82 and no variant of it. Both presuppose parties formed before the conflict and capable of exit, which §84.1.2 establishes a young child lacks, so the accounts are correct within their domain and inapplicable within this one.*

83.3 The Management of Conflict

83.3.1 Management Distinguished from Mediation

Management concerns the conditions under which conflicts arise and are conducted, where mediation concerns an occasion in progress. The distinction matters because the two are subject to different results of this book.

§85.1.2 established that governance acts are constitutively about arrangements, since an act of governance settles what will be required and leaves unsettled what occurs within a particular occasion. Management in the present sense is such an act, and §77.1.2 established that recommendations about arrangements survive the argument against recommendation.

Mediation is an act performed within an occasion, and §83.2.1 established what a mediator who settles has done. The two therefore stand differently to this book's central refusal, and management is the term under which more may be said.

Proposition 83.6. *Management concerns the conditions under which conflicts arise and are conducted, and mediation concerns an occasion in progress. Management is an act about arrangements in the sense §85.1.2 defined, so more may be said of it than of mediation.*

83.3.2 The Manageable Object

Four conditions are manageable and each has been established elsewhere in this book.

The occasions are manageable. §5.2.2 established what contracts them and §25.2.2 the limit of the licence, which is that a household setting aside an hour has arranged an hour. A household in which conflicts have nowhere to be conducted conducts them in passing or defers them, and §39.4.1 established what a move repeatedly met without uptake does to its own rate.

The terms are manageable in the sense §80.2.1 allowed. Terms are maintained by their use, and §55.5.1 distinguished supplying a term for something a party has encountered from supplying the word he is reaching for.

The cost is manageable. §39.2.1 established that a move from the disfavoured party carries a cost, and §45.3.1 recorded the finding from the governance literature that durable arrangements are distinguished by the cheapness of access to their grievance procedures and no mere formal availability. An arrangement may permit a conflict and place it out of reach.

And the levels are manageable. §45.1.2 established that contestability applies separately at each level, and §85.2.2 that raising a matter to the level above makes contestable what was not. A household that treats a recurring conflict as raising the question of what the rule is has moved it to a level at which it may be settled once.

What is unmanageable is what occurs within a conflict. §38.4.2 established the general form and §83.2.1 the particular one, and the arrangeable object is accordingly the occasion and no part of what passes in it.

Proposition 83.7. *The occasions, the terms, the cost of raising a position, and the level at which a matter is settled are manageable. What occurs within a conflict is unmanageable, so the arrangeable object is the occasion and no part of what passes within it.*

83.4 The Household and the Asymmetric Case

83.4.1 The Party Who Would Mediate

A household differs from the cases the mediation literature ordinarily treats, and the difference is the founding asymmetry.

In a conflict between a child and an adult, the party positioned to mediate is generally the adult, who is party to the conflict. §79.3.1 established that a third term controlled by one party fails, since the other's contribution is subject to that party's disposal, and an adult mediating a conflict to which he is party supplies a third term he controls. Grillo (1991) states the corresponding finding from within the practice, holding that where the parties to a mediated conflict are unequal, the mediator's neutrality operates to confirm the position of the stronger.

Three consequences follow.

The office is unavailable in its ordinary form, and a household that supposes otherwise has supplied the appearance. §45.4.1 established the corresponding result for a household extending a vote to a young child.

A second adult may perform it, and §45.2.1 established that two adults ordinarily differ in the rate at which they absorb. Where the second adult is party to the household's account of the child, §34.3.1 established what convergence consumes.

And the operations of §83.1.2 remain available to a party in the conflict, which is the finding worth marking. An adult may hold an occasion open, may supply a term, may state back what the child put, and may hold the matter distinct from the child, while holding a position of his own on the matter. §42.2.2 established that answerability concerns the account and no decision, and the four operations are exercises of the account.

Proposition 83.8. *In a household the party positioned to mediate is generally party to the conflict, so the office is unavailable in its ordinary form. A second adult may perform it, and the four operations of §83.1.2 remain available to a party holding a position of his own, since §42.2.2 established that answerability concerns the account and no decision.*

83.4.2 The Limits of the Chapter

Three limits close the chapter.

The chapter withholds a procedure. §46.2.2 established that the parties cannot determine which operation an arrangement performs, and a household cannot determine whether a given management of conflict has supplied occasions or has organised the conflicts away. §46.3.2 stated the selection effect, which is that arrangements resolving friction are experienced as working and are least examined.

The chapter withholds a criterion applicable in the occasion. §82.4.1 named three conditions of degeneration, and each is counterfactual: whether an outcome was settled in advance, whether what was at issue passed to the parties, and whether the terms altered are questions about a sequence, which §10.2.1 established is where such questions are answerable.

And the chapter withholds the ground on which any of it matters. §42.4.2 recorded that the priority of recognition over welfare remains asserted, and ch. 89 carries it.

What the chapter supplies is the description §77.2.2 identified as the Part's whole claim. A party who knows that settling a conflict supplies a resolution and forgoes an accommodation is differently placed from one who does not, and the act has become the kind of thing about which he could be wrong.

Proposition 83.9. *The chapter withholds a procedure, since a household cannot determine whether its management supplied occasions or organised the conflicts away; withholds a criterion applicable in the occasion, since the three conditions of degeneration are answerable across a sequence; and withholds the ground on which any of it matters. What it supplies is the description of what settling a conflict does.*

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Draft

Chapter 84

Conflict and the Formation of Dependence

The Work of This Chapter

Chapter 82 held that a conflict is an occasion of returned difference, and ch. 83 treated what a third party and an arrangement may do about one. Both were stated for a household without asking what distinguishes a household from the other settings in which conflict is managed.

§84.1 states the distinction, using the companion volume (Huang, 2026) as the comparison, and holds that the assumptions of the conflict literature fail in the parent and child case and hold partly in the case of two adults. §84.2 separates two senses of dependence, one a distribution of alternatives between formed parties and the other the condition under which a party is formed.

§84.3 treats the passage between them, which is this chapter's principal subject and which §84.3.1 holds is untheorised. §84.4 states what conflict does to that passage.

The reader should carry forward §84.1.1, §84.2.1, and the claim of §84.4.1, which holds that conflict is the operation by which a constitutive dependence becomes a negotiable one.

84.1 The Comparison with Conflict Between Formed Parties

84.1.1 The Assumptions of the Received Accounts

The literature on conflict between collectivities rests on four assumptions about the parties, and each may be stated as a question a household must answer differently.

The parties are formed before the conflict. Zartman (1989) treats parties as capable of assessing a stalemate and of preferring settlement to continuation, which requires that each have interests it held beforehand. Azar (1990) is the partial exception, holding that identity groups harden through the conflict they conduct.

The parties may exit. Fisher et al. (1991) makes the alternative to a negotiated agreement the measure of a party's position, so that what a party may obtain elsewhere sets what he may obtain here. Hirschman (1970) states the general form, distinguishing exit from voice and holding that the availability of the first conditions the use of the second.

The parties are symmetric enough to bargain. Asymmetry is treated as a variable within the models rather than as the condition of the relation, and Keohane and Nye (1977) makes asymmetric interdependence a source of power held by the party with the better alternatives.

And a third party may be external. Beardsley (2011) examines what such a party does and records that intervention may secure a settlement at the cost of the parties' own capacity,

which [de Coning \(2018\)](#) states as the finding that intervention interfering too much prevents the self-organisation it was to assist.

Proposition 84.1. *The literature on conflict between collectivities assumes parties formed before the conflict, capable of exit, symmetric enough to bargain, and joinable by an external third. Each assumption is a condition on the parties and no claim about the conflict.*

84.1.2 The Failure of the Assumptions in a Household

Each assumption fails for the relation between a parent and a child, and the failures are not matters of degree.

The child is not formed before the relation. [§52.2.2](#) held that what it is for a child to be able to do something is settled by descriptions relations supply, and [§33.1.2](#) that the faculty by which he would assess the relation is constituted within it. [§58.1.1](#) established that this holds while he can enter no relation as a party.

The child cannot exit. [§43.2.2](#) distinguished closure from the availability of exit and established that exit is unavailable to a young child in every case, so that an account making openness depend on exit would find no open households containing young children.

The asymmetry is constitutive. [§10.1.1](#) established that an asymmetry generates power continuously in one party's favour and that this is constitutive rather than a stage to be passed, and [§7.1.1](#) that the child holds no standpoint outside the relation.

And no third party is external. [§83.4.1](#) established that the party positioned to mediate is generally party to the conflict, and [Grillo \(1991\)](#) states the corresponding finding from within the practice of family mediation, that where parties are unequal the neutrality of a mediator ratifies the position of the stronger.

Proposition 84.2. *Each of the four assumptions fails for the relation between a parent and a child. The child is not formed before the relation, cannot exit it, stands in an asymmetry that is constitutive, and has no external third available. The failures are not matters of degree.*

84.1.3 The Intermediate Case

The relation between two adults sharing a household stands differently, and treating the family as one case would obscure the difference.

Two adults are formed before the relation, may exit it, and are symmetric enough to bargain. Three of the four assumptions accordingly hold, and only the fourth fails in the way [§83.4.1](#) described.

The consequence is that findings about conflict between adults transfer to the case between collectivities more readily than to the case between a parent and a child, and this book should state the limit. [Gottman \(1994\)](#) reports that what distinguishes couples whose relations persist from those whose relations end is the conduct of conflict and no measure of its frequency, and that withdrawal is among the conditions predicting dissolution. The finding bears on [§82.3.1](#) and it bears on the case of two adults.

[§32.3.2](#) established the corresponding divergence for the case of silence, holding that an adult is damaged by a revision he performs on an account he holds while a child is damaged

by a formation occurring with no competitor. The present section states the same divergence for conflict, and §84.4.1 states what the child's case has that the adult's does not.

Proposition 84.3. *Two adults sharing a household are formed before the relation, may exit it, and are symmetric enough to bargain, so three of the four assumptions hold and only the fourth fails. Findings about conflict between adults accordingly transfer to conflict between collectivities more readily than to the case between a parent and a child, and the family is no single case.*

84.2 The Senses of Dependence

84.2.1 Dependence as a Distribution of Alternatives

A substantial literature treats dependence and treats it in one sense, and separating that sense from a second is what this section performs.

Emerson (1962) states the first canonically. The dependence of one party upon another is proportional to what the first seeks through the second and inversely proportional to the availability of the same elsewhere. Power is on that account a property of the relation and no property of a person, which this framework holds also.

Blau (1964) develops the account through unilateral exchange, Keohane and Nye (1977) states it between collectivities, and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) between organisations and their environments. In each the structure is one: two parties exist, each has what it seeks, and dependence is the distribution of alternatives between them.

The sense is coherent and this book adopts it for the cases it fits. What it presupposes is a party with alternatives, and §84.1.2 established that the child in the first years has none, which places him outside the account rather than at its limit.

Pierson (2000) supplies a third position worth recording, on which a history constrains what is subsequently reachable and the constraint is produced by the course it constrains. §6.1.3 defined a relation in terms close to this, and the affinity is real and concerns the structure of constraint rather than the formation of a party.

Proposition 84.4. *Emerson (1962) and the accounts developing it treat dependence as the distribution of alternatives between two parties who exist and have what they seek. The sense is coherent and presupposes a party with alternatives, which places the child in the first years outside the account.*

84.2.2 Dependence as the Condition of Formation

A second literature treats a dependence that no distribution of alternatives describes, since one party does not yet exist as a party.

Kittay (1999) holds that liberal accounts of equality proceed as though the dependencies of infancy, illness and age were exceptions, and that a party who cares for one wholly vulnerable to his action stands in a relation the vocabulary of exchange cannot state. Fineman (2004) states the legal form, holding that dependence is inevitable and that its concealment is what an account of autonomy generally performs.

MacIntyre (1999) supplies the account nearest to this book's purposes. Human rationality emerges from a prior condition of vulnerability, so that the virtues of independent practical reasoning and the virtues of acknowledged dependence are two halves of one account and neither is available without the other.

This second sense is the one §7.1.1 presupposed and never named. A child's dependence in the first years is the condition under which he becomes a party, and §52.2.2 established that what he can do is settled by descriptions the relation supplies.

One qualification belongs here and Kittay (1999) presses it. Some dependence is permanent, and an account treating dependence as a condition to be outgrown misdescribes the cases of severe disability and of deep age. This book's subject is the case in which the dependence is constituted so as to change, and the qualification marks its boundary and no defect in the account of what lies outside it.

Proposition 84.5. *A second sense of dependence describes the condition under which a party is formed, which Kittay (1999) and MacIntyre (1999) develop and which §7.1.1 presupposed without naming. Some dependence is permanent, and this book's subject is the case constituted so as to change, which marks its boundary.*

84.3 The Passage Between the Two

84.3.1 The Passage as an Unclaimed Question

Between the two senses stands a passage, and the passage is what this book is finally about.

An infant's dependence is constitutive in the sense of §84.2.2. An adult's dependence on those he lives among is a distribution of alternatives in the sense of §84.2.1. Between the two something occurs by which the first becomes the second, and §7.1.2 recorded that the founding asymmetry is a matter of degree that changes without stating what changes it.

Three accounts bracket the passage and none states it.

Winnicott (1965) supplies the developmental map, describing a movement from absolute dependence through relative dependence toward independence, and holding that the last term is never absolute, since a party and his surroundings remain interdependent throughout. The map names the stages and leaves the mechanism of passage between them to a general account of a facilitating environment.

Smetana (2011) and Smetana and Asquith (1994) supply the empirical continuation. Adolescents and parents disagree principally about the boundary of what the adolescent may settle for himself, and the boundary moves through the disagreeing. This is the passage occurring, observed and recorded, and the account states it as a finding about a period and no general mechanism.

Nedelsky (2011) supplies the philosophical formula, holding that a party becomes autonomous with others rather than apart from them, so that autonomy is a capacity relations sustain or undermine. The formula states what the passage arrives at and leaves open what performs it.

Proposition 84.6. *An infant's dependence is constitutive and an adult's is a distribution of alternatives, and a passage stands between them. Winnicott (1965) maps its stages, Smetana*

(2011) observes it occurring in adolescence, and Nedelsky (2011) states what it arrives at. None states the mechanism, and §7.1.2 recorded that this book had not stated it either.

84.3.2 The Passage Stated in the Framework's Terms

The framework states the passage as a change in what a party may put and what may be answered.

§58.1.2 specified the capacity to enter a relation by four operations, of which the fourth is making a move the other party may answer against. §82.1.1 defined a conflict as an occasion on which incompatible positions are each put to the other, and §82.2.1 established that a conflict reverses, for its duration, the direction in which a relation runs.

A party whose positions may be put and answered is a party with something the other must accommodate, which §84.2.1 identified as what a distribution of alternatives presupposes. A party whose positions cannot be put has no such standing, and §44.3.2 established the three conditions under which a position may be put at all.

The passage is accordingly the acquisition of the third of §44.3.2's conditions across an increasing range of matters. A child acquires terms, occasions become available to him, and what he puts comes to reach the descriptions and the requirements in force. §45.4.1 established that which levels he can reach varies with the terms available to him, and the passage is that variation occurring over a rearing.

Proposition 84.7. *The passage is the acquisition, across an increasing range of matters, of the conditions under which a party's position may be put and may reach what it is put against. A party whose positions may be answered has something the other must accommodate, which is what a distribution of alternatives presupposes.*

84.4 The Bearing of Conflict on the Passage

84.4.1 Conflict Transforms a Dependence

The chapter's central claim follows from §84.3.2 and from ch. 82.

A conflict is the occasion on which a party's position is put and must be accommodated. It is accordingly the occasion on which the standing §84.3.2 described is exercised, and §82.2.2 established that a conflict tests answerability under load, since what is put is a position the other party would prefer to refuse.

What follows is that conflict is the operation by which a constitutive dependence becomes a negotiable one. A child who has put a position and had it accommodated has been, for that occasion, a party with something the other must take into account, and §62.1.3 established that what is at issue is a rate over a period and no state reached on an occasion.

Two consequences follow and the second is the chapter's practical finding.

The passage requires conflicts and no substitute performs it. §86.6.1 established that offering a choice between alternatives an adult selected supplies a standing without extending the set, and the corresponding point holds here: a child granted a say on matters an adult has selected has been granted a say and has put no position the adult would refuse.

And a household that forecloses conflict forecloses the passage. §82.3.1 established that conflicts are foreclosed by cost, by futility, and by settlement in advance, and the present section adds what the foreclosure costs. A child in such a household remains in the dependence of §84.2.2 on the matters conflicts would have concerned, and §15.2.2 established that the occasions leave no trace.

Proposition 84.8. *A conflict is the occasion on which a party's position is put and must be accommodated, and is accordingly the operation by which a constitutive dependence becomes a negotiable one. No substitute performs it, since a say granted on matters an adult selected puts no position the adult would refuse, and a household foreclosing conflict leaves the child in constitutive dependence on the matters conflicts would have concerned.*

84.4.2 The Limits of the Chapter

Four limits close the chapter and the third is the one a reader should weigh most.

The chapter withholds a claim that the passage is completed. Winnicott (1965) holds that independence is never absolute and MacIntyre (1999) that the virtues of acknowledged dependence are required throughout a life, and nothing here holds that a party arrives at a condition in which he depends on nobody.

The chapter withholds an account of the cases Kittay (1999) presses. Where a dependence is permanent, the passage of §84.3.2 does not occur, and the framework's account of what such a relation requires is the account of §42.3.1 and no part of this chapter.

The claim of §84.3.1, that the passage is untheorised, is a negative claim and is provisional. It rests on the accounts this book has surveyed, and §90.1.2 recorded that a test conducted by the author of a framework is subject to §67.3.1. A reader who identifies an account stating the mechanism has shown the claim false, and the chapter's positive content survives the showing.

And the chapter withholds a measure. §44.4.1 defined the proportion of a household's operative rules altered by objection, and §83.3.2 established that what occurs within a conflict is unmanageable. Whether a given conflict performed the passage is a question about a sequence, which §10.2.1 established is where such questions are answerable.

Proposition 84.9. *The chapter withholds a claim that the passage is completed, an account of permanent dependence, and a measure of whether a given conflict performed the passage. The claim that the passage is untheorised is negative and provisional, and the chapter's positive content survives its falsification.*

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Chapter 85

The Operative Forms of Household Governance

The Work of This Chapter

Chapter 45 treated governance analytically and this chapter treats it operatively, which requires saying what the analytical results amount to in what a household does without converting them into instructions.

§85.1 states what distinguishes an operative treatment and identifies the one class of governance act that survives the argument of §77.1.1 without qualification. §85.2 treats four forms and states what each does.

§85.3 states the relation between a household's governance and the obligation §42.3.1 derived, which is that governance is where answerability is exercised or is not. §85.4 states what cannot be supplied.

The reader should carry forward the finding of §85.1.2 and the account of §85.3.1.

85.1 The Nature of an Operative Treatment

85.1.1 The Difference from Part VIII

Chapter 45 established the levels, ch. 44 the criterion of contestability, and ch. 43 the definition of closure. Each was analytical, stating what a thing is and what follows.

An operative treatment states what a household does in the terms those results supply. §77.2.1 established that a description supplies terms rather than a reason for acting, and §77.2.2 that a party who has the description may perform the act and has made it the kind of thing about which he could be wrong.

The difference is accordingly not that this chapter recommends where Part VIII described. It is that Part VIII described structures and this chapter describes acts within them, and §77.3.1 required that a description of an act include what it costs the performer.

Proposition 85.1. *Part VIII described structures and this chapter describes acts within them. The difference is not that this chapter recommends, since §77.2.1 established that a description supplies terms rather than a reason for acting.*

85.1.2 The One Class That Survives

§77.1.2 identified three classes surviving the argument against recommendation, and governance occupies the first more securely than any other subject in this Part.

The reason is that governance acts are constitutively about arrangements. §43.1.1 established that a normative order is what its parties have been doing, §45.1.1 that a household settles matters at three levels, and §44.1.1 that a rule is a settled expectation. An act of governance settles what will be required, which is an arrangement, and does not settle what occurs within any particular occasion.

The distinction is exact and matters. Deciding that objections will be heard is an arrangement. Hearing a particular objection in order to demonstrate that objections are heard is an occasion whose outcome has been settled, and §80.3.1 established what a household maintaining a channel deliberately has adopted.

What follows is that this chapter can state more than its predecessors and cannot state what ch. 80 could not. §79.4.2 recorded the corresponding position for the shared third.

Proposition 85.2. *Governance acts are constitutively about arrangements, since an act of governance settles what will be required and does not settle what occurs within a particular occasion. Deciding that objections will be heard is an arrangement, and hearing one in order to demonstrate that they are heard is an occasion whose outcome has been settled.*

85.2 The Operative Forms

85.2.1 Allocation and Its Cost

The first form is the one §45.2.2 identified as commonest, and §45.4.2 passed its operative treatment here.

Allocation assigns domains between adults, and §45.2.2 established that it resolves recurring friction efficiently. §45.1.1 placed it at the collective level.

What it does is stated by §45.2.1 and §34.3.1 together. A second adult holding a different account performs within the household the office §34.1.2 assigned to a second setting. Allocation reduces the domains in which a child encounters two accounts of himself, since each adult governs separate matters, so the child meets one account per matter.

§46.2.1 supplies the criterion that classifies this. A boundary protects where what it makes unavailable are occasions that could not have supplied the conditions, and removes where what it makes unavailable are occasions that would have. Allocation makes unavailable the encounter with two accounts, which §45.2.1 established is what a second adult supplies, so allocation removes.

The cost of not allocating is real and is the reason allocation is adopted. §10.2.3 established what absorption costs, and two adults contesting every domain have less available for anything else. §46.3.1 established that boundaries sustaining the adults are required by the framework's own commitments.

Proposition 85.3. *Allocation assigns domains between adults, resolves friction, and makes unavailable the encounter with two accounts, which §46.2.1 classifies as a boundary that removes.*

The cost of not allocating is real, since two adults contesting every domain have less available, and §46.3.1 established that boundaries sustaining the adults are required.

85.2.2 The Remaining Forms

Three forms complete the treatment and each is stated with what it does.

Stating a rule makes the divergence of §44.1.2 available for notice. A household with un-stated rules has rules, and §44.1.1 established that most household rules are never formulated. Stating one supplies a description against which the practice may be compared, and §44.1.2 established that what distinguishes households is whether a party's observation of the divergence reaches the household's account of its practice. Stating a rule does not close the divergence and makes it statable.

Sanctioning by consequence rather than by contraction of address alters what the occasion assigns. §44.2.1 established that a sanction is an occasion assigning a position by proceeding as it does, and §44.2.2 established that the contraction of address is unadministered, unproportioned, and traceless. A consequence attached to an act is administered, proportioned, and leaves a record, and §45.3.1 recorded that durable self-governing arrangements met failures with proportioned and escalating responses.

Raising a matter to the level above it makes contestable what was not. §45.1.2 established that contestability applies separately at each level and that the common configuration is operational contestability with closure above it. A household treating a particular case as raising the question of what the rule is has moved the matter to a level at which §45.1.1 established households have fewer terms, and the move is what supplies them.

Proposition 85.4. *Stating a rule makes the divergence of §44.1.2 statable without closing it. Sanctioning by consequence rather than by contraction of address supplies an administered, proportioned, and recorded response where §44.2.2 established the ordinary sanction is none of these. Raising a matter to the level above makes contestable what was not, and supplies the terms a household lacks at that level.*

85.3 Governance and Answerability

85.3.1 The Locus of Answerability

The chapter's central claim connects governance to the one obligation the book derived.

§42.3.1 established that an adult holding an account of a child is committed to holding it answerable to what the child does, and §42.2.2 that answerability concerns the account rather than the decision.

Governance is where the account is exercised. An adult applies a rule to a case, and the application requires a judgement about the child: whether this is the kind of thing he does, whether he understood, whether the case is like the last. §44.1.1 established that a rule's content is fixed by where it is applied and where waived, and each application is an occasion on which the adult's account of the child is used.

What follows is that governance occasions are the occasions on which the account is most

often tested. §39.3.1 identified questions as the naturally occurring instance of the discriminator, and governance supplies a second class: an occasion on which a child's conduct fails to fit the account that governed the application is a discrepancy in the sense §16.2.1 defined.

The claim should be stated with its consequence. A household with few rules has fewer such occasions, and §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity. Nothing here holds that more rules are better, and what is claimed is that governance is where the account meets what the child does, so a household with fewer governance occasions has fewer of the occasions on which its account could be corrected.

Proposition 85.5. *Governance is where an adult's account of a child is exercised, since applying a rule requires a judgement about him. Governance occasions are accordingly among those on which the account is most often tested, and a household with fewer of them has fewer occasions on which its account could be corrected. Nothing here holds that more rules are better.*

85.3.2 The Constitutional Level in Practice

§45.4.1 established that a child cannot be a party at the constitutional level and that it does not follow that the level is beyond assessment. This section states what that amounts to operatively.

An arrangement may be altered because of what a child does without his being a party to the alteration. §42.2.2 established that answerability does not require participation, and a household that reallocates a domain because a child's conduct showed the allocation to be doing something has been answerable at the constitutional level.

Two things follow.

The occasions on which this occurs are rare and are not created by inviting the child to comment on the household's arrangements, which §45.4.1 established would be a ceremony and §38.4.2 established what an occasion arranged to secure something becomes.

And what makes such an alteration possible is that the adults hold their own arrangements as things that could be otherwise. §50.1.2 established that a variable which never moves is registered as background, and §50.3.2 that a household is structurally unable to register its position as a position. An arrangement a household has never altered is one it may not register as an arrangement.

Proposition 85.6. *An arrangement may be altered because of what a child does without his being a party to the alteration, since answerability does not require participation. Such occasions are not created by inviting comment, and what makes them possible is that the adults hold their arrangements as things that could be otherwise, which §50.1.2 established is not the default.*

85.4 The Limits of Supply

85.4.1 The Limits Enumerated

Three things this chapter does not supply.

It does not supply a form of governance to adopt. §43.2.1 established that closure is independent of severity, §45.1.2 that it is level-relative, and §44.4.2 that neither reducing requirements nor inviting objection follows. A household adopting any of the four forms of §85.2 may

be closed, and §43.4.2 established that closure requires no severity and no decision.

It does not supply a way of determining whether a household's order is closed. §43.4.2 established that closure is invisible in the absence of contest and that a household whose children have stopped objecting is indistinguishable from one whose children endorse its order, and §80.3.2 established the recursion that follows.

And it does not supply the ground on which any of this matters. §42.4.2 recorded that the priority of recognition over welfare remains asserted, §68.3.2 established why no further work by the method that produced it would supply entitlement, and ch. 89 carries it.

Proposition 85.7. *The chapter withholds a form of governance to adopt, since a household adopting any of the four forms may be closed; does not supply a way of determining whether an order is closed, since closure is invisible where contest has ceased; and does not supply the ground on which any of it matters, which ch. 89 carries.*

85.4.2 The Chapter's Residue

What remains is what §77.2.2 identified as the Part's whole claim.

An adult who knows what allocation does may allocate, and has made the allocation the kind of thing about which he could be wrong. §46.2.2 established that the parties cannot determine which operation a boundary performs, so he cannot determine whether this allocation removes a condition, and §46.3.2 stated the selection effect that follows: arrangements resolving friction are experienced as working and are least examined.

The same holds of the other three forms. §19.3.1 established that a symbol is good where what it describes can refute it, and an arrangement held as something that could be otherwise is one occasions within it could show to be doing something else.

ch. 88 treats the case in which none of this is available, and §65.4.1 recorded that it is what keeps the book honest.

Proposition 85.8. *An adult who knows what allocation does may allocate and has made it the kind of thing about which he could be wrong, though §46.2.2 established he cannot determine which operation it performs and §46.3.2 that arrangements resolving friction are least examined.*

References

Chapter 86

Decision and the Formation of a Chooser

The Work of This Chapter

The nine functions of Part X do not include choosing, and the omission requires either a justification or a chapter. This chapter supplies the second, and §86.1 states why it is placed here rather than among the nine.

§86.2 gives the established account of choice and §86.3 locates its premise, which is that a set of options is given and a chooser ranks it.

§86.4 states the conditions under which a party comes to be one who chooses, and holds that what is generated is the standing of a choice rather than a capacity to rank. §86.5 states the forms of closure and §86.6 what particular acts do.

The reader should carry forward the account of §86.4.1, which holds that a choice is constituted by what follows it rather than by what preceded it.

86.1 The Ground of the Placement

86.1.1 The Placement

§52.4.2 named nine functions and §62.2.1 identified four conditions generating them. Choosing is not among the nine and the placement of this chapter requires an argument rather than a preference.

Two considerations place it here.

Choosing is not individuated independently of the other nine. §52.2.2 established that a capacity is picked out only under a description, and a choice is a description applied to a movement, an utterance, or a withholding. §54.2.2 established that a movement is individuated by what it accomplishes, and a movement individuated as a choice is one met as a choice. There is accordingly no separate performance to be assigned a fifth condition.

And what a chapter on choosing has to say is about relations rather than about development. §58.1.2 specified relational capacity by four operations and kept it distinct from the ground, and this chapter's subject is what a party's choices are treated as within a relation, which §85.1.2 established is the material Part XII treats.

The consequence for Part X should be stated. §62.4.2 recorded that the four conditions are what the nine chapters produced rather than what the domain contains, and this chapter does not add a fifth. What it adds is a description of a class of occasions the nine functions are exercised within.

Proposition 86.1. *Choosing is not a tenth function, since a choice is a description applied to a movement, an utterance, or a withholding, and is individuated as a choice by being met as*

one. The chapter's subject is what a party's choices are treated as within a relation, which is the material Part XII treats, and it adds no fifth condition.

86.1.2 The Commitments Left Untouched

A framework holding that a choice is constituted by what follows it invites a misreading that should be closed at once.

Children choose. §17.1.2 established that a child brings capacities, dispositions, and a history and that what he does is his, and nothing here holds that a child's choosing is done by anyone else or that his preferences are supplied.

Deliberation occurs. A party who weighs alternatives has performed something, and the psychological literature on how such weighing proceeds describes a real process which this chapter does not dispute.

And choices have consequences that do not depend on anyone's treatment. §52.3.1 established that maturation constrains what is available in ways no relation alters, and the same holds of the world: a child who chooses to climb a wall falls or does not, whatever anyone treats the climbing as.

What is claimed is narrower and concerns individuation, in the manner §52.2.1 distinguished from the weaker claims with which it is confused.

Proposition 86.2. *Children choose, deliberation occurs, and choices have consequences independent of anyone's treatment. What is claimed concerns individuation in the sense §52.2.1 distinguished, and not the existence or the efficacy of choosing.*

86.2 The Established Account

86.2.1 Choice as Ranking

The account organising most work on decision holds that a chooser confronts a set of options, holds preferences over them, and selects the one his preferences rank highest.

The account is formal in its economic statement and psychological in its developmental one, and both are granted. Children improve at foreseeing consequences, at resisting an immediate option in favour of a delayed one, and at holding several considerations at once, and §59.1.1 recorded the account within which such findings are organised.

Two features bear on this chapter.

The set of options is given. What a chooser confronts is treated as antecedent to the choosing, and the developmental question concerns what he does with it.

And the choice is complete at selection. What follows the selection is a consequence of the choice rather than a constituent of it, and §86.4.1 takes this up.

Proposition 86.3. *The established account holds that a chooser confronts a given set of options and selects by ranking. Children's improvement at foreseeing consequences and at holding several considerations is granted. The set of options is treated as antecedent to the choosing, and the choice is treated as complete at selection.*

86.2.2 The Developmental and Formal Literatures

Two bodies of work bear on the account and each supplies something the chapter uses.

The formal literature supplies a result the chapter's premise-location depends on. Sen (1993) argues that the internal consistency of a choice function cannot be assessed without reference to something outside the choices themselves, since whether a pattern of selections is consistent depends on what the chooser was doing and on the values under which the alternatives were framed. Sen (2004) develops the position. The bearing is direct: a criterion of rationality defined over a set presupposes that the set was constituted, and §86.3.2 states what constitutes it in the case of a child.

Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the subsequent literature establish that choosers depart systematically from the formal account, and Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) that some departures are adapted to the environments in which choosing occurs. Both are granted and neither bears on the individuation question, since each concerns what is done with a set rather than how the set arose.

The developmental literature supplies two findings and the second is the more useful.

Mischel et al. (1989) established the delay paradigm and the associated predictive findings. Watts et al. (2018) reports a conceptual replication in which the association with later outcomes was substantially smaller than in the original studies and was reduced further under controls for family background and early cognitive ability. §59.5.2 recorded that this book had not surveyed the literature, and the present section records that the framework should not lean on the original findings.

Kidd et al. (2013) is the finding this chapter uses. Children who had experienced an unreliable adult in the same session waited substantially less than children who had experienced a reliable one, and the difference was large. The interpretation offered there is that delay is in part a rational response to whether the environment can be relied on to deliver what was promised. §86.4.1 holds that a choice is constituted by what follows it, and the finding is the developmental case: what a child does with an alternative depends on what has followed alternatives before.

Kushnir et al. (2015) and Kushnir (2018) report that children between four and six infer from context whether an agent was free to act otherwise, and that they treat desires and social constraints as limiting freedom in ways adults do not. §86.3.2 holds that an option is one where it has been made one, and this literature establishes that children read from their surroundings which alternatives were available, which is what the framework requires them to be doing.

Frankfurt (1969) supplies the philosophical treatment of whether alternatives are required for responsibility, and the framework takes no position on it, since §86.4.1 concerns what constitutes an act as a choice rather than what grounds responsibility for it.

Proposition 86.4. *Sen (1993) establishes that consistency of choice cannot be assessed without reference to what lies outside the choices, which is the framework's premise-location in the formal case. Kidd et al. (2013) establishes that delay varies with whether an adult has proved reliable, and Kushnir et al. (2015) that children read from context which alternatives were available. Watts et al. (2018) establishes that the original delay findings should not be leaned on.*

86.3 Its Ontological Premises

86.3.1 The Requirements of the Verbs

The verbs are that a party chooses, prefers, ranks, weighs, and selects. Each takes the party as subject and an option or a set as object.

The premise carried is that the set exists to be operated on. To rank is to rank something, and the something must be constituted before the ranking begins, which §59.2.2 found in the regulation literature and §54.2.1 in the motor literature, each in its own idiom.

The premise makes the measurement possible, as it did in those cases. A task measuring choice must specify the options, and the specification is the experimenter's.

Proposition 86.5. *The verbs take the party as subject and an option or set as object, and carry the premise that the set is constituted before the ranking begins. The premise makes measurement possible, since a task must specify the options and the specification is the experimenter's.*

86.3.2 The Locus of the Omission

The condition drops out at the constitution of the option set.

No child confronts the alternatives an experimenter constructs. He confronts a situation in which some things are done and others are not done, and §37.1.2 established that the terms in which a situation can be described are what a household supplies. §55.3.2 established the three conditions under which a thing is sayable, and an alternative that cannot be stated is not among those a party is choosing between.

Three things follow.

An option is an option where it has been made one, and §15.2.2 established that an occasion foreclosed leaves no trace. A child does not decline the alternatives his household's terms do not contain; they do not present as declined.

The set is not observable from the conduct. What is observed is what the child did, and §30.2.2 established that what he would have done under conditions that did not obtain is not settled by anything observed.

And the boundary of the set is where this framework's central condition applies. §57.2.2 established that abstracting is substituting one description under a licence, and an alternative comes to be available where a description under which it could be stated becomes available. §74.3.1 defined the extension proportion for this operation.

Proposition 86.6. *The condition drops out at the constitution of the option set. An option is one where it has been made one, and foreclosed alternatives do not present as declined. The set is not observable from conduct, and an alternative becomes available where a description under which it could be stated becomes available.*

86.4 The Conditions of Generation

86.4.1 A Choice Is Constituted by What Follows It

The chapter's central claim is that what makes an act a choice is what is done with it afterward.

§54.2.2 established that a movement is individuated by what it accomplishes and that outside an experiment the individuation is supplied by what the movement is met with. A child reaches for one of two things, and what he did is a choice where it is met as one: where the thing he reached for is what follows, where he is subsequently treated as having chosen it, and where an alternative would have followed had he reached otherwise.

Three treatments are available for the same act and each produces something different.

The act may be met as a choice, in which case what followed is attributable to him and §60.3.1 established that a party to whom something is attributable is one from whom a reason may be owed.

It may be met as a preference to be accommodated, in which case what followed is attributable to the adult who accommodated it. §42.2.2 established that deference concerns the settling of outcomes, and a household deferring to a child's reaching has settled the outcome by reference to it without treating him as having chosen.

Or it may be met as a symptom, in which case what he reached for is evidence about him rather than an act of his, and §28.3.2 established what becomes of conduct treated as an index.

What is generated across occasions of the first kind is a party whose acts stand as choices, and §62.1.3 established that what is at issue is a rate over a period rather than a state reached.

Proposition 86.7. *An act is a choice where it is met as one, so that what followed is attributable to the party. The same act may be met as a preference to be accommodated, in which case the outcome is attributable to the party accommodating it, or as a symptom, in which case it is evidence rather than an act. What is generated across occasions of the first kind is a party whose acts stand as choices.*

86.4.2 The Conditions Applied

§62.2.1 identified four conditions and each bears on what §86.4.1 described.

Differential response constitutes the option set. §53.3.1 established that a difference is maintained where some party responds to it differently, and two things between which no party ever responds differently are not two options.

Uptake constitutes the choice's standing. §38.2.1 established that an occasion is shared to the extent that what each supplied is in what it became, and an act met as a choice is one whose performer's supply is in what followed.

Exposure to alteration constitutes the reasoning. §60.3.1 established that what distinguishes a norm from a regularity is that a reason is owed, and a party whose reasons for choosing may be found insufficient is one whose choosing is answerable. §60.5.1 established what giving a reason supplies.

And substitution licensing constitutes the set's boundary, which §86.3.2 established.

The chapter's placement is confirmed by this. All four conditions bear, no fifth is required, and §86.1.1 held that what is added is a description of a class of occasions rather than a further function.

Proposition 86.8. *Differential response constitutes the option set, uptake constitutes the choice's standing, exposure to alteration constitutes the reasoning, and substitution licensing constitutes the set's boundary. All four bear and no fifth is required, which confirms the placement of §86.1.1.*

86.5 The Forms of Closure

86.5.1 The Party Whose Acts Are Met Otherwise

Closure in this idiom is a party whose acts are systematically met otherwise.

§86.4.1 identified two alternatives to being met as a choice. A party whose acts are met as preferences to be accommodated has outcomes attributable to others, and a party whose acts are met as symptoms has evidence rather than acts.

The second is the one this book has most to say about. Chapter 17 established that a symbol realises itself in what it describes, and an act treated as evidence for a description of the party is an act absorbed by §16.2.1. A child described as impulsive who chooses is a child whose choosing is read as impulsiveness, and §54.4.2 established the corresponding case for movement.

The form is compatible with a party who chooses constantly, and §54.4.1 recorded the corresponding point about competence within a repertoire. What is absent is not the choosing.

Proposition 86.9. *Closure in this idiom is a party whose acts are systematically met as preferences to be accommodated or as symptoms. An act treated as evidence for a description is absorbed by §16.2.1, so a child described as impulsive who chooses is read as impulsive. The form is compatible with a party who chooses constantly.*

86.5.2 The Unrevisable Option Set

The second form concerns the boundary rather than the standing.

§86.3.2 established that an alternative becomes available where a description under which it could be stated becomes available, and §55.4.1 established that a language whose terms cannot be extended by what its speakers encounter is closed in that function's idiom.

A party whose option set no encounter extends confronts, at each occasion, the alternatives his terms supply. He is not choosing badly and is not failing to consider anything, since §41.1.1 established that material fitting what a party holds requires no handling and an alternative that cannot be formulated presents nothing to be handled.

§57.4.1 established the corresponding form for what can be entertained, and §57.2.2 that the two are one operation. The present form is that operation applied to what may be done rather than to what may be thought.

Proposition 86.10. *The second form is an option set no encounter extends, in which a party confronts at each occasion the alternatives his terms supply. He is not choosing badly and is not failing to consider anything, since an alternative that cannot be formulated presents nothing to be handled.*

86.6 The Implications for Practice

86.6.1 The Operation of Offering a Choice

Two acts share a description and differ in what they do.

Offering a choice between alternatives the adult has selected supplies an option set and a standing. The child's act will be met as a choice, and §86.4.1 established what that constitutes. §39.1.2 established that a question with a required answer offers a choice one branch of which is unacceptable, and an offer of that form supplies the standing without the set.

Accepting an alternative the child produced supplies the set's extension, which §74.3.1 defined as the extension proportion and §86.3.2 identified as where the boundary moves. This is the operation the first act does not perform, since a set the adult constructed is not extended by a selection within it.

Neither is a recommendation, for the reason §77.1.1 established. An adult who offers a choice in order that the child shall be one who chooses has settled the occasion's outcome, and §35.3.1 recorded a neighbouring case.

Proposition 86.11. *Offering a choice between selected alternatives supplies an option set and a standing, and accepting an alternative the child produced extends the set, which the first act does not do, since a set the adult constructed is not extended by a selection within it. Neither is recommended.*

86.6.2 The Conditions of Test

The chapter yields a prediction and it separates the account from the established one.

§86.4.1 predicts that the rate at which a party's acts are met as choices, rather than as preferences or symptoms, varies independently of any measure of his deliberative competence. A child who foresees consequences well and whose acts are met as symptoms should be recorded as competent and should be a party whose acts do not stand as choices.

The established account predicts that the standing of a party's choices tracks his competence at choosing, since on that account a choice is complete at selection and what follows is a consequence rather than a constituent.

The design difficulty is the familiar one. §30.2.2 established that whether an act was met as a choice is a question about what would have followed otherwise, and §28.3.2 that an occasion arranged to test this is altered by the arranging. §39.3.1 identified the naturally occurring instances that escape the third cost, and choices occur for reasons internal to running a household.

Proposition 86.12. *The chapter predicts that the rate at which a party's acts are met as choices varies independently of his deliberative competence, so a child who foresees consequences well and whose acts are met as symptoms is competent and is not a party whose acts stand as choices. The established account predicts that standing tracks competence.*

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Chapter 87

Interpretive and Participative Justice

The Work of This Chapter

§31.5.2 located the loss of Part VI in a standing, and §42.4.2 recorded that what makes a loss of standing a loss remains asserted. This chapter treats two bodies of work on standing that the book has not engaged and states what each supplies.

§87.1 treats epistemic injustice and holds that the framework's central condition is a form of it for which the existing vocabulary has no name. §87.2 treats participation rights and holds that the strongest statement in that literature is a procedural entitlement where the framework requires a property of a relation.

§87.3 treats the difficulty peculiar to a party not yet within the order in which value is stated. §87.4 states what the chapter does not supply.

The reader should carry forward §87.2.2, which states where the participation literature comes nearest and what separates it.

87.1 Interpretive Justice

87.1.1 The Supply of the Existing Vocabulary

Fricker (2007) distinguishes two wrongs done to a person in his capacity as a knower. In testimonial injustice a prejudice deflates the credibility a hearer accords a speaker. In hermeneutical injustice a gap in the interpretive resources a society makes available leaves a person unable to render his own situation intelligible.

§30.3.1 treated the second at length and established three differences. The deficit Fricker describes is collective and the framework's is local to a relation; hers is prior to the subject's encounter with it and the framework's is produced within the relation it then governs; and her subject has an experience seeking articulation where §7.1.1 denies the child a prior account.

Two developments of that literature bear here and neither was engaged.

Dotson (2011) describes testimonial smothering, in which a speaker truncates his own testimony because the audience is unable or unwilling to receive it, and Dotson (2011) elsewhere describes contributory injustice, in which a hearer's persistence in a defective interpretive resource wrongs a speaker who has an adequate one. Pohlhaus (2012) describes wilful hermeneutical ignorance, in which a dominant party maintains an interpretive resource that fails to accommodate what a subordinate party knows.

The bearing is that these describe failures of uptake rather than absences of resource, and §39.2.2 defined uptake as the framework's second condition. A hearer who possesses the terms and does not use them is nearer the framework's case than a society that lacks them.

Proposition 87.1. *Fricker (2007) distinguishes testimonial from hermeneutical injustice, and Dotson (2011) and Pohlhaus (2012) describe failures of uptake by hearers who possess the terms rather than absences of resource. These are nearer the framework's case than a collective gap, since §39.2.2 defined uptake as a condition and a hearer who does not use terms he has fails it.*

87.1.2 The Unnamed Wrong

The framework's condition is a wrong of this family and is not among the ones named, and stating the difference is what §8.1.1 requires.

Each of the wrongs named concerns what a hearer does with what a speaker says. Testimonial injustice concerns the credibility accorded, hermeneutical injustice the resources available for saying it, smothering what the speaker withholds anticipating the reception, and wilful ignorance what the hearer declines to accommodate.

§30.1.2 defines a condition upstream of all four. Where the readings a description supplies absorb every discrepancy, the question of what is accorded to what the child says does not arise, because nothing he says or does registers as bearing on the description. He is not disbelieved, he is not without terms, he is not withholding, and the adult is not declining. The occasion on which credibility would be accorded does not occur, and §15.2.2 established that it leaves no trace.

This is a wrong of standing in the sense the family concerns, and §31.5.2 located the loss in a standing. What the existing vocabulary lacks is a name for the case in which a party's capacity to bear on an account of himself has been removed rather than his credibility discounted.

Two qualifications. §89.4.2 recorded that the book's own assessment of its exposure does not rest on this chapter, and a reader who holds that the case is hermeneutical injustice within a household has made the objection §30.3.1 answered rather than a new one. And Fricker (2007) holds that the wrongs she names admit of degrees and of mixed cases, so nothing here holds that the framework's case and hers are disjoint.

Proposition 87.2. *Each named wrong concerns what a hearer does with what a speaker says, and §30.1.2 defines a condition upstream of all four, in which the occasion on which credibility would be accorded does not occur. The existing vocabulary lacks a name for the removal of a party's capacity to bear on an account of himself, as distinct from the discounting of his credibility.*

87.2 Participative Justice

87.2.1 The Findings of the Participation Literature

A substantial literature treats children's participation in decisions affecting them, and its results bear on §45.4.1.

Hart (1992) distinguishes degrees of participation and identifies three that are not participation at all: manipulation, decoration, and tokenism, in which a child is present at a decision and has no bearing on it. §32.1.1 described the corresponding relational case and §38.4.2 what an occasion arranged to secure something becomes.

James and Prout (1997) established the tradition treating children as social actors rather

than as incomplete adults, and §17.1.2 states the framework's version.

Lundy (2007) supplies the strongest statement and it comes nearest to this framework of anything in the literature. Article 12 of the Convention, on that account, requires four things and not one: a space in which a view may be formed, a voice with which to express it, an audience that listens, and influence, in that the view must be acted upon as appropriate. The fourth is the one this framework must engage.

Proposition 87.3. *Hart (1992) identifies manipulation, decoration, and tokenism as conditions in which a child is present at a decision and has no bearing on it. Lundy (2007) holds that participation requires space, voice, audience, and influence, and the fourth comes nearest to this framework of anything in the literature.*

87.2.2 Influence and Answerability

The proximity of Lundy's fourth element to §42.3.1 is close and the separation is exact.

Both hold that being heard is insufficient and that what matters is whether what a party expresses alters what follows. §44.3.2 identified the three conditions on contest and §44.3.1 held that a rule is contestable where an objection could alter it, which is influence stated as a property of a rule.

Three differences hold them apart.

Influence is a duty owed by a decision-maker and answerability is a property of an account. A party may discharge the duty on every occasion on which a child expresses a view and hold an account of the child that nothing alters, since §42.2.2 established that answerability concerns the account rather than the decision and §44.3.2 that a child whose objections are absorbed argues.

Influence attaches to expressed views and answerability to conduct. §39.3.1 established that an adult's question tests whether his account can be altered by what the child supplies, and what the child supplies on such occasions is generally not a view about a decision. A child too young to express a view is outside the participation framework and inside this one.

And influence is assessable by a party and answerability is not. §30.2.2 established that whether an account was altered is a question about what would otherwise have obtained, and §43.4.2 that closure is invisible where contest has ceased. A decision-maker can say whether he acted on a view and cannot say whether his account of the child could have been altered.

The third difference is the one that matters for what each is for. Lundy's model is a standard against which an institution may be held, which requires that compliance be assessable. This framework's condition is not assessable in that way, and §76.3.2 established the corresponding result for instruments. Neither displaces the other.

Proposition 87.4. *Influence is a duty owed by a decision-maker and answerability a property of an account, so a party may discharge the duty on every occasion and hold an account nothing alters. Influence attaches to expressed views and answerability to conduct, so a child too young to express a view is outside the first and inside the second. And influence is assessable where answerability is not, which is what makes the first a standard for institutions.*

87.3 The Co-Creation of Value

87.3.1 The Difficulty

A child is not yet within the order in which value is stated, and the difficulty this raises is not answered by according him a voice.

§37.1.2 established that the terms in which a situation can be described are what a household supplies, and §55.3.2 that a thing is sayable where terms exist, an occasion exists, and the saying can reach. §33.1.2 established that the faculty by which a child would assess the household's terms is constituted within them.

What follows is that a child asked what he values answers in terms supplied to him, and §39.1.2 established that a question with a required answer is not a question. §45.4.1 established the corresponding result for a household extending a vote to a young child.

The difficulty is accordingly not that children's values are immature. It is that the operation by which a party's values enter a common account presupposes that he holds them in terms the account can receive, and §57.2.2 established that which substitutions are available is settled relationally.

Proposition 87.5. *A child asked what he values answers in terms supplied to him, so the operation by which a party's values enter a common account presupposes that he holds them in terms the account can receive. The difficulty is that the terms are supplied rather than that children's values are immature.*

87.3.2 The Requirements of Co-Creation

§37.3.2 held that a household may generate a grammar its inheritance did not supply, and this section states what that amounts to for value.

Three conditions follow from the framework's own results.

The terms must be extendable by what the child produces, which §74.3.1 defined as the extension proportion and §86.3.2 identified as where an option set's boundary moves. A household adopting a child's word for something has extended its terms, and §55.5.1 distinguished this from supplying a term.

The extension must be retained, which §38.3.2 established of what a household holds in common and §38.3.1 identified as the residue of shared occasions.

And what the child produced must be in what the household's account became, which §38.2.1 defined and §61.3.2 established is clearest where the occasion has no outcome settled in advance.

The three together state what co-creation of value consists in on this framework, and it is narrower than the phrase suggests. It is not that a child's preferences are given weight. It is that a household's terms for what is worth doing come to contain something no party brought, which §37.3.2 refused to classify as incomplete transmission or as noise.

Proposition 87.6. *Co-creation of value requires that a household's terms be extendable by what the child produces, that the extension be retained, and that what he produced be in what the household's account became. It is not that a child's preferences are given weight, and is that the household's terms come to contain something no party brought.*

87.4 The Limits of the Chapter

87.4.1 The Limits Enumerated

Three things, and the first is inherited.

The chapter withholds the ground on which a loss of standing counts as a loss. §42.4.2 recorded that the priority of recognition over welfare remains asserted, and the wrong §87.1.2 named is a wrong on that priority and on no other stated here. Fricker (2007) grounds her account in the value of a person's capacity as a knower, which is a ground the framework has not adopted and which ch. 89 might be answered by.

The chapter withholds a standard institutions could be held to. §87.2.2 established that assessability is what distinguishes Lundy's model, and that this framework's condition is not assessable in that way. A reader wanting a standard should take Lundy's, and §73.4.2 recorded the corresponding position about instruments.

And the chapter does not supply a procedure for co-creation. §77.1.1 established why, and §87.3.2 states conditions rather than steps. A household adopting a child's terms in order to have adopted them has settled the occasion's outcome, and §35.3.1 recorded a neighbouring case.

Proposition 87.7. *The chapter withholds the ground on which a loss of standing counts as a loss, does not supply a standard institutions could be held to, since the framework's condition is not assessable in the way Lundy's is, and does not supply a procedure for co-creation, since a household adopting a child's terms in order to have adopted them settles the occasion in advance.*

87.4.2 The Findings Placed on Record

Two findings pass forward.

§87.1.2 holds that the framework's central condition is a wrong of the family Fricker (2007) named and is not among the ones named, which is a claim ch. 90 must test as it tested the others.

And §87.2.2 holds that the strongest statement in the participation literature is a procedural entitlement where this framework states a property of a relation, so that the two are complementary. §42.3.3 recorded the corresponding position with respect to two grounds of legitimate authority, and ch. 89 carries both.

Proposition 87.8. *The framework's condition is a wrong of the family Fricker (2007) named and is not among those named, which ch. 90 must test. And the strongest statement in the participation literature is a procedural entitlement where this framework states a property of a relation, so the two are complementary.*

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Chapter 88

The Irreparable Case

The Work of This Chapter

Two chapters have recorded that this one is what keeps the book honest. A practical Part treating only cases in which something is available would misdescribe the range of cases, and §4.3.1 undertook that the book would state the costs of its positions.

§88.1 states what makes a case irreparable in this framework's terms and distinguishes it from three conditions it would otherwise be confused with. §88.2 states the four routes by which a case becomes one, each of which has been established.

§88.3 states what remains true of such a case, which is less than a reader would want and is not nothing. §88.4 states what the case costs the framework.

The reader should carry forward §88.3.1, which holds that no party is positioned to determine that a case is irreparable, and that this is a limit on the framework rather than a comfort.

88.1 The Constituents of Irreparability

88.1.1 The Specification

A case is irreparable where the occasions on which a relation's rate could rise no longer occur and the conditions producing them have gone.

Two elements are specified and the second does the work.

The occasions no longer occur, which §78.3.2 established is what would otherwise remain available. That section held that a relation whose occasions still occur has a rate that still moves, and the present specification is its complement.

And the conditions producing them have gone. §5.2.2 established what governs whether occasions are available, §47.2.2 that a household's position governs the occasions available and which settings its children encounter, and §47.1.1 that a constraint alters what is available without selecting among what remains. Where the conditions are absent, no selection among remaining occasions is possible, since there are none.

Proposition 88.1. *A case is irreparable where the occasions on which a relation's rate could rise no longer occur and the conditions producing them have gone. This is the complement of §78.3.2, which held that a relation whose occasions still occur has a rate that still moves.*

88.1.2 The Boundaries of the Condition

Three conditions would be confused with this and the distinctions matter for who the chapter concerns.

It is not the second level. §30.1.2 defined that as the condition in which the readings a description supplies absorb every discrepancy, and §30.1.3 established that the loss at issue is of answerability. A relation at the second level may have abundant occasions, and §30.2.1 established that the two levels are indiscernible under observation at rest.

It is not a rupture. §81.1.1 defined a rupture as an occasion after which a rate falls sharply and does not recover of itself, and §81.2.2 established that repair is the resumption of a rate on altered terms. A rupture leaves the conditions in place.

And it is not a relation that has ended. A relation may end and the parties be alive, in contact, and answerable to each other in the sense §42.3.1 defined, and §32.3.2 established that the adult and child cases differ in what a relation's alteration does to each.

Proposition 88.2. *The irreparable case is not the second level, which may obtain where occasions are abundant; not a rupture, which leaves the conditions in place; and not a relation that has ended, since parties to an ended relation may remain answerable to each other.*

88.2 The Routes to Irreparability

88.2.1 The Routes Through Conditions

The first two routes concern the conditions of §88.1.1 and neither involves anything anyone did.

The first is that a party is gone. Death, separation, distance, and the ordinary passage by which a child leaves a household each remove the occasions absolutely, and §21.2.1 established that the gaze is singular, so no other party supplies what that party supplied.

The second is that the conditions have contracted past recovery. §5.2.2 established what contracts occasions, §11.1.2 that a fall maintains itself by mechanisms outlasting the conditions that began it, and §47.1.2 that constraints operate on rates and that their effects accumulate without a threshold. A household whose position in the field of ch. 47 supplies no occasions has no rate to raise, and §50.3.2 established that it is structurally unable to register its position as a position.

§35.1.1 applies to both without modification. No party acted, no party withheld, and §47.3.1 established that what occupies the place a perpetrator would occupy is a position in a field that no party selected.

Proposition 88.3. *A party may be gone, and §21.2.1 established that no other party supplies what he supplied. Or the conditions may have contracted past recovery, which §47.1.2 established accumulates without a threshold. Neither involves anything anyone did.*

88.2.2 The Routes Through Conduct

The remaining two involve conduct, and the book has said little about them because its subject has been elsewhere.

The third route is that a party has done something the other cannot be in a relation with him after. §32.2.2 distinguished the case in which a party withholds from the structural case and recorded that the deliberate case admits a vocabulary of answerability the structural case does not. §35.2.1 recorded that the category of neglect is an achievement and that children are protected now who would not have been, and §35.2.2 established only that this book's cases are a different structure, which is not a claim that the category is empty.

The framework has little to say about this route and should say so. §8.2.1 recorded that the book does not adjudicate, and a case of this kind is adjudicated by the law, by the parties, and by others positioned to assess it. What the framework adds is nothing that bears on whether the relation should continue.

The fourth route is that a party will not. §42.2.2 established that answerability concerns the account rather than the decision, and a party may hold an account answerable and decline the relation. §35.4.1 established what a subject who accepts this account is left with, and declining is among the things available to a party with the reserves §7.1.2 described.

Proposition 88.4. *A party may have done something the other cannot be in a relation with him after, and the framework has little to say about such a case and does not adjudicate it. Or a party may decline the relation, which is available to one with the reserves §7.1.2 described, and §42.2.2 established that answerability concerns the account rather than the decision.*

88.3 The Residue of Truth

88.3.1 No Party Can Determine That a Case Is Irreparable

The chapter's central finding is negative and should be stated before anything that might console.

§88.1.1 defined the condition by the absence of occasions and of the conditions producing them. Neither is determinable by a party.

§15.2.2 established that a foreclosed occasion leaves no trace, so a period in which no occasion occurred is indistinguishable from a period in which occasions were foreclosed, and §73.2.2 established the corresponding point for measurement.

§50.3.2 established that a household is structurally unable to register its position as a position, and §50.1.2 that a variable slower than an observation window is registered as background rather than as a quantity that has a value.

And §46.2.2 established that the parties cannot determine which operation an arrangement performs, and §43.4.2 that closure is invisible in the absence of contest.

What follows is that no party is positioned to determine that a case is irreparable. This is a limit on the framework and should not be received as a comfort. It does not establish that any particular case is reparable, and §33.4.2 established that the framework is reliable about structure and unreliable about magnitude. It establishes that the framework supplies no verdict, and §8.2.1 recorded that supplying verdicts was never among its undertakings.

Proposition 88.5. *No party is positioned to determine that a case is irreparable, since foreclosed occasions leave no trace, a household cannot register its position as a position, and closure is invisible where contest has ceased. This is a limit on the framework rather than a comfort, and it does not establish that any particular case is reparable.*

88.3.2 The Invariant Holdings

Three things remain true of an irreparable case and each is less than a reader would want.

The account of what occurred remains available. §31.4.1 established that a report of prior unavailability is the reliable residue of a retrospective account, §55.4.2 that it is a claim about a determinate object, and §33.4.1 that a subject after exit has terms his earlier position lacked. Nothing about a relation's being past removes this.

Other relations are not governed by it. §34.1.2 established that a second setting supplies a reserve, §45.2.1 that a second adult performs the same office, and §58.5.1 established the closure form in which an account of what relations are is carried into new ones. The last is a condition that may obtain and is not entailed by a relation having been irreparable.

And the obligation §42.3.1 derived does not lapse. It was derived from what a description requires, makes no reference to how many occasions obtain, and §47.3.2 established that constraint reduces occasions without reducing answerability. A party who holds an account of another holds it answerably or does not, and the relation's being past does not settle which.

Proposition 88.6. *The account of what occurred remains available and is reliable in the respect §31.4.1 identified. Other relations are not governed by it, though §58.5.1 described a condition under which an account of relations is carried into new ones. And the obligation of §42.3.1 does not lapse, since it makes no reference to how many occasions obtain.*

88.4 The Cost of the Case to the Framework

88.4.1 The Limits of the Framework's Offer

Three things and the third is the largest.

It offers no account on which the loss was not a loss. §31.5.1 established that no hedonic argument is available and §31.5.2 located the loss in a standing rather than in an experience. A framework locating loss in a standing cannot hold that a loss of standing was compensated.

It offers no party to hold responsible in the cases of §88.2.1. §35.4.1 established that a subject accepting this account exchanges an address for his complaint for a mechanism, that he cannot be angry at a mechanism, and that the framework declines the consolations that understanding remedies the loss or that the absence of fault makes it smaller.

And it offers no ground on which the loss counts as a loss. §42.4.2 recorded that the priority of recognition over welfare remains asserted, §31.5.2 that Part VI's conclusion is conditional on it, and §68.3.2 that no further work by the method that produced it would supply entitlement. A reader in an irreparable case who asks why what he lost was worth having is asking the question the book has not answered.

Proposition 88.7. *The framework offers no account on which the loss was not a loss, no party to hold responsible in the cases arising through conditions, and no ground on which the loss counts as a loss, the priority on which that depends remaining asserted. A reader asking why what he lost was worth having is asking the question the book has not answered.*

88.4.2 The Ground of the Part's Ending

The Part ends here because a practical Part ending elsewhere would misrepresent its range.

§77.1.1 established why the framework issues no recommendations, §77.2.2 that what it supplies is a description changing what a party can be answerable for, and §77.4.2 that the Part would not remedy the thinness §35.4.1 described.

The chapters preceding treated cases in which occasions occur. Chapter 78 treated an act performed on one, ch. 79 an arrangement making them available, ch. 80 what maintains the conditions on which they bear, ch. 81 what follows when a rate falls, and ch. 85 the acts by which a household settles what will be required.

Each presupposes that something is available. §4.3.1 undertook that the book would state the costs of its positions, and the cost of a Part built on that presupposition is that it addresses the cases in which it holds and is silent about the rest. Stating the silence is what this chapter does.

ch. 89 carries what the framework has not answered, and §88.4.1 named the largest of these.

Proposition 88.8. *Each preceding chapter of the Part presupposes that occasions are available, so a Part ending elsewhere would misrepresent its range. The cost of the Part's positions is that it addresses the cases in which the presupposition holds, and stating that silence is what this chapter does.*

References

Part XIII

Limits and Programme

Chapter 89

The Questions This Book Leaves Open

The Work of This Chapter

Twenty-two passages have passed a matter to this chapter, and its function is to state what the book has not answered rather than to answer it.

§89.1 treats the one on which most of the book depends, which is the priority of recognition over welfare, and states what its remaining underived costs each Part that relies on it. §89.2 treats the questions a person in the cases described would ask and which the framework does not answer.

§89.3 treats questions internal to the framework, including the audit §7.2.1 required of whether the book met its own re-derivation requirement. §89.4 states which of the open questions the book regards as likely to become tractable and which not.

The reader should carry forward §89.1.2 and §89.3.1, the second of which is the book's assessment of its own compliance.

89.1 The Largest Question

89.1.1 The Underived Priority

The priority of recognition over welfare is asserted in this book and derived in none of it.

§24.2.1 asserted it. §24.1.2 refuted the grounding of recognition in yield and §24.4.1 recorded that the refutation of a rival grounding is not a grounding. §42.1.2 established that a derivation of the usual form would make the obligation conditional on whatever it derived from, which is the structure the framework exists to refuse. §42.4.1 established that neither argument of ch. 42 crosses the gap §1.27.3 recorded. And §68.3.2 established why no further work by the method that produced the priority would supply entitlement, since that method's warrant is recognition and §67.3.1 established that confirmation by recognition cannot fail.

The position is therefore not that a derivation has not yet been found. It is that the book has established why the derivations available to it would not be derivations, and has not established that no derivation exists.

Proposition 89.1. *The priority of recognition over welfare is asserted and not derived. The book has established that a derivation of the usual form would make the obligation conditional, that neither argument of ch. 42 crosses the gap, and that no further work by the method producing the priority would supply entitlement. It has not established that no derivation exists.*

89.1.2 The Cost of the Gap to Each Part

The cost is not uniform and stating it Part by Part is more useful than stating it once.

Part VI's conclusion is conditional on it. §31.5.2 located the loss in a standing and held that this counts as a loss on the priority, and §36.4.2 recorded that if the priority fails the Part has described a structure without showing anything wrong with it.

Part VIII discharges two of three debts and not this one. §42.4.2 recorded that answerability without act is discharged and that the conditional is discharged in part, a ground having been supplied for calling unanswerability a defect and none for calling it a wrong done to the child.

Part XI is unaffected. §66.2.2 established that a method establishing what is the case does not undertake to establish what should be sought, and the observables of §70.4.1 would record what they record whatever is true of the priority.

Part XII is affected at its close. §88.4.1 established that a reader in an irreparable case asking why what he lost was worth having is asking the question the book has not answered.

And Parts I to V are unaffected, since §8.1.1 required the diagnostic Parts to show that something is lost and the mechanisms of those Parts are descriptions of what occurs.

Proposition 89.2. *Part VI's conclusion is conditional on the priority and Part XII is affected at its close. Part VIII discharges two of three debts and not this one. Part XI is unaffected, since its observables record what they record whatever is true of the priority, and Parts I to V are unaffected, being descriptions of what occurs.*

89.2 The Questions Left to a Person

89.2.1 The Questions Enumerated

Three questions are asked by people in the cases this book describes and the framework answers none.

How much of what I became is owed to this. §36.2.2 recorded the question and established that the framework is reliable about structure and unreliable about magnitude, and §33.4.2 established that the counterfactual is unavailable, since no restored occasion occurred at the time and what a person would otherwise have become is not a fact a reconstruction can reach.

Whom may I hold responsible. §35.4.1 established that a subject accepting this account exchanges an address for his complaint for a mechanism, that he cannot be angry at a mechanism, and that the framework declines the two consolations available. §35.4.2 named what would reconcile the absence of a perpetrator with a party who owes him something, and §42.3.1 derived it, which supplies a ground and does not supply an addressee.

And is this case still open. §88.3.1 established that no party is positioned to determine that a case is irreparable, and recorded that this is a limit on the framework rather than a comfort, since it establishes no case to be reparable either.

Proposition 89.3. *The framework does not answer how much of what a person became is owed to what he describes, since it is unreliable about magnitude and the counterfactual is unavailable; whom he may hold responsible, since it supplies a ground and not an addressee; or whether a case is still open, since no party is positioned to determine that it is not.*

89.2.2 The Defect These Constitute

§11.2.2 recorded that a framework whose descriptions are accurate and useless to the people they describe has a defect that its accuracy does not repair, and the three questions of §89.2.1 are what that defect consists in.

The defect should be characterised exactly. It is not that the descriptions are wrong, and §33.2.1 established that the subjects this book describes reason soundly. It is not that the framework withholds answers it possesses, and §8.2.1 recorded at the outset what the book does not undertake.

It is that a person may accept the whole of this account, find it accurate about his case, and have nothing to do with it. §33.3.2 established that repair cannot proceed by correcting an inference or supplying counter-evidence, and that what remains is alteration of the material the interpreter operates on, which §23.2.2 established cannot be arranged.

The book does not repair this and records it as the cost §4.3.1 undertook to state.

Proposition 89.4. *The defect is that a person may accept the whole account, find it accurate about his case, and have nothing to do with it. It is not that the descriptions are wrong or that answers are withheld, and the book does not repair it.*

89.3 Questions Internal to the Framework

89.3.1 The Re-Derivation Audit

§7.2.1 stated the re-derivation requirement and stated the test: whether later chapters state new propositions where old ones do not transfer, or state old ones with a qualification attached. The first is re-derivation and the second is not. This section records where the requirement has been met least well.

Three chapters met it well and are recorded for the comparison. §33.1.2 stated a new proposition about the child's faculty rather than qualifying §7.1.1. §32.3.2 stated separately what silence does to an adult and to a child. And §32.3.1 derived that a reserve is the instrument of the damage rather than qualifying the adult case.

Three met it less well.

§59.3.1 applies §53.3.1 to a child's own states, and the application is argued in two paragraphs where the child's case differs in that he has no independent access. This is closer to a qualification than to a re-derivation.

§79.2.2 establishes that a shared third bears on all four conditions, and the child's position with respect to a third term is not separately derived. §7.1.1 would bear on whether a child can hold a third term as resisting both parties, and the chapter does not ask.

And §81.2.2 holds that a repaired relation contains the parties' acquaintance with its variability. §81.4.1 states that nothing in the chapter is addressed to the child, which is a statement that the proposition does not transfer rather than a derivation of what holds in his case in its place.

Proposition 89.5. *The requirement was met least well at §59.3.1, which argues the child's case in two paragraphs; at §79.2.2, which does not ask whether a child can hold a third term as resisting*

both parties; and at §81.2.2, where §81.4.1 states that the proposition does not transfer without deriving what holds in its place.

89.3.2 The Remaining Internal Questions

Four questions internal to the framework remain and each was raised where it arose.

Whether the survival asymmetry holds. §48.3.1 argued that the parts of a grammar governing what counts as evidence survive a generation better than the parts governing what is required, and §48.4.2 recorded that this is argued and not demonstrated. §49.4.2 recorded that ch. 49 rests on it, so a reader rejecting it has grounds to reject two chapters.

Whether the generative case occurs. §37.3.2 refused three readings of the phenomena and §41.4.2 recorded that no case is exhibited. §75.3.1 recorded that no design is available, since establishing what a household's inheritance did not contain requires a record §31.2.2 established is unavailable.

Whether the four conditions are exhaustive. §62.4.2 recorded that they are what the nine chapters produced rather than what the domain contains, and that three of those chapters surveyed their traditions incompletely.

And whether an instrument can escape being made a target. §76.3.2 located the matter in the order deploying an instrument rather than in its design, and §76.3.3 recorded that this supplies a criterion and no procedure and relocates the difficulty into the answerability of an order, which Part VIII left underived.

A fifth is recorded here, since §84.3.1 entered it after this section was drafted. Whether any existing account states the mechanism by which a constitutive dependence becomes a negotiable one is a negative claim resting on the accounts surveyed, and §84.4.2 recorded that a reader identifying such an account has shown the claim false while leaving the chapter's positive content standing.

Proposition 89.6. *Four questions remain: whether the survival asymmetry holds, on which two chapters rest; whether the generative case occurs, for which no design is available; whether the four conditions are exhaustive, three chapters having surveyed incompletely; and whether an instrument can escape being made a target, which §76.3.2 relocated into a matter Part VIII left underived.*

89.4 The Conditions of Settlement

89.4.1 The Tractable Questions

The open questions divide by what would settle each, and the division is more useful than a list.

Three are empirical and have designs. §75.2.2, §75.2.3, and §75.2.4 state them, and §75.4.1 ordered them by tractability. Each would settle a mechanism rather than a claim, and §75.3.2 established that failure among them would count against the claims while success would not establish them.

Two are empirical and lack designs. The generative case and the discriminator of ch. 30 are

both without one, and §75.3.1 gave the reasons, which are that the required record is unavailable in the first case and that instances cannot be sampled in the second.

Two are questions about the book rather than about the world. §89.3.1 recorded where the re-derivation requirement was met least well, and repairing those three sections is editorial work rather than research.

And one is not settled by anything the framework can do. §89.1.1 established that the derivations available to the book would not be derivations, and §68.3.2 that the method producing the priority cannot supply entitlement. §51.1.2 established that a general solution to the difficulty of which this is an instance would not be this book's to supply.

Proposition 89.7. *Three questions are empirical and have designs, which would settle mechanisms rather than claims. Two are empirical and lack designs. Two are editorial. And one is not settled by anything the framework can do, since the derivations available to the book would not be derivations.*

89.4.2 The Book's Principal Exposure

§6.2.2 recorded that ch. 89 would state which of the framework's commitments the book regards as most exposed, and the answer is not the priority.

The priority is undischarged and its status is stated. §89.1.1 established that the book has argued why the available derivations would fail, which is a position rather than an omission, and a reader may reject it knowing exactly what he rejects.

What is most exposed is the survival asymmetry of §48.3.1. It is argued from how each part of a grammar is acquired, it is not demonstrated, no design tests it directly, and two chapters rest on it. §48.3.2 draws from it the result that a household may differ from its predecessor in every stated respect and be closed as its predecessor was, which is among the book's more consequential claims and among its least supported.

Second is the assignment of §62.2.2. §62.4.2 recorded that it rests on the arguments of the chapters that made it and is not independently supported, and §62.3.1 derived from it the pattern that constitutes Part X's principal empirical content.

ch. 90 tests whether existing accounts can be read as projections of this structure, and ch. 91 states what would be required to settle what remains.

Proposition 89.8. *The framework is most exposed at the survival asymmetry, which is argued from how each part of a grammar is acquired, is not demonstrated, has no direct design, and supports two chapters and the result that a household may differ in every stated respect and be closed as its predecessor was. Second is the coupling assignment, which supports Part X's principal empirical content and is not independently supported.*

References

Chapter 90

Existing Theories as Projections

The Work of This Chapter

Twenty-one passages have referred a question here, and most ask the same thing: whether some description this book supplies was already available in a vocabulary that does not require the framework.

§90.1 states the test formally, in the form §6.3.2 specified, and states what a projection is and what it would mean for one to fail. §90.2 conducts the test on five accounts.

§90.3 collects the failure points, which §8.1.1 recorded are the book's exposure to refutation rather than its defence. §90.4 states what the test returns and where it returns least favourably.

The reader should carry forward §90.2.5, which is the nearest case and the one the book is least able to distinguish.

90.1 The Test

90.1.1 The Test Stated

§6.3.2 established that the practical Parts trade in permissions, that a permission is a description made available, and that a permission is refuted by showing that the description is incoherent, that it applies to nothing, or that whatever it picks out was already available in a vocabulary that does not require the framework.

The third is the test this chapter conducts and it is stated as follows.

Definition 90.1. *An existing account is a projection of this framework where its descriptions can be recovered from the framework's, and the framework's cannot be recovered from its. Where each can be recovered from the other, the framework is a renaming of the account with respect to that material.*

Three features of the test should be stated.

It is conducted with respect to particular material rather than globally. An account may be a projection with respect to one class of case and coincide with the framework on another, and §31.4.2 conducted the test in this form for two accounts.

It is asymmetric, and the asymmetry is what makes it a test. If the framework can state what an account states and the account can state what the framework states, nothing has been added, and §8.3.1 ranked this as the most damaging finding available against the book.

And a failure point is a case in which the recovery runs the wrong way, which is to say a case the existing account describes and the framework cannot. §8.1.1 recorded that such points

are the book's exposure to refutation.

Proposition 90.2. *An existing account is a projection of this framework where its descriptions can be recovered from the framework's and not conversely. Where each recovers the other, the framework is a renaming with respect to that material. The test is conducted per class of case, is asymmetric, and its failure points are cases the existing account describes and the framework cannot.*

90.1.2 The Conditions of an Answerable Test

A test of this kind is easily conducted so that it cannot fail, and §67.3.1 established the structure by which a confirming procedure absorbs whatever it meets.

Two disciplines are imposed here.

The recovery must be exhibited rather than asserted. Where the chapter claims that an account's description can be recovered from the framework's, it states which proposition of the framework supplies it.

And the failure points must be stated whether or not they are answered. §66.2.2 refused to treat a method's limit as a defeat, and the corresponding refusal here is that a failure point is recorded as one and not converted into a demonstration of the framework's greater generality.

Proposition 90.3. *The recovery must be exhibited by stating which proposition supplies it, and failure points must be recorded whether or not they are answered, since a test conducted so that it cannot fail has the structure §67.3.1 identified.*

90.2 The Projections Tested

90.2.1 Attachment Theory

§58.2.1 recorded that this is the tradition nearest in subject matter, and §8.1.1 required the test.

The recovery runs as follows. An infant's history with a caregiver is a sequence of occasions, and §71.1.1 represents the pair as an edge whose weight is the proportion of occasions on which what the infant supplied altered what the caregiver held. §70.2.1 supplies the reversal rate and §70.2.2 the confirmation source count. A secure classification corresponds to a positive weight on a cycle in the sense §71.2.1 defined, and §58.3.1 established that the procedure classifies a dyad, which the framework's representation does also.

Two things the framework recovers that the tradition states less well. §58.2.2 recorded the finding that classifications are relationship-specific, which is difficult for an account whose object is carried by the infant and which §45.2.1 predicts. And §58.3.2 established that the internal working model is a representation available for report, which §48.3.1 predicts is the part of what is carried surviving least reliably.

The failure point is this. Attachment theory predicts the ordering of outcomes across classifications, and the framework predicts no ordering, since §71.1.2 established that a weight is not a measure of quality and §74.4.2 that the functional assessment supports no ranking. The tradition states something the framework cannot.

Proposition 90.4. *Attachment theory's classifications are recoverable as edge weights in the representation of §71.1.1, and the framework additionally predicts the relationship-specificity the tradition found anomalous. The failure point is that the tradition predicts an ordering of outcomes across classifications and the framework predicts no ordering, since a weight is not a measure of quality.*

90.2.2 Vygotsky and Bourdieu

Two accounts are treated together, since each fails the test in the same direction.

Vygotsky (1978) holds that higher functions appear between people before they appear within the individual. §52.3.2 established that this is the middle claim of §52.2.1 and that the framework's difference concerns individuation rather than origin. The recovery is direct: what appears between people is an occasion in the sense §38.2.1 defined, and internalisation names the case in which a rate has stabilised, which §62.1.3 established is what a capacity is.

What the framework states and Vygotsky cannot is that the relational condition does not drop out. §52.2.2 concerns what individuates a capacity, and an account terminating in a function located in the individual has no term for a capacity's continuing dependence on the terms that pick it out.

Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) and Bourdieu (1990) hold that habitus reproduces a structure of positions and that misrecognition takes an imposed order as natural. §30.3.1 established the proximity and the difference: the mechanism requires a dominant order doing the imposing, and §35.1.1 established that the framework requires no such order and no party who imposes.

The failure point for both is scale. Bourdieu explains why households occupy the positions they occupy, and §47.4.2 recorded that this book takes a household's position as given and retains the reproduction traditions for that question. Vygotsky's account of mediation by cultural tools states something about what is available to a household that §47.2.2 presupposes and does not supply.

Proposition 90.5. *Vygotsky's internalisation is recoverable as a rate that has stabilised, and the framework adds that the relational condition does not drop out. Bourdieu's misrecognition is recoverable and requires an imposing order the framework does not. The failure point for both is scale, since each explains what a household's position is and §47.4.2 recorded that this book takes it as given.*

90.2.3 Winnicott and the Family-of-Origin Literature

Two accounts are treated together, since §30.3.2 established that each presupposes something the framework denies.

Winnicott (1965) holds that a false self forms in compliance and conceals a true self which persists. §30.3.2 established that the relation is one of incompatibility rather than restatement, since if a reserve always remained the second level would be impossible, and §31.4.2 established that the two accounts predict differently about retrospective reports.

This is accordingly not a projection and is a rival, which §75.2.1 states a design to adjudicate. Recording it here prevents the chapter from claiming a projection where a disagreement

stands.

The family-of-origin literature requires a party whose conduct did the damage, and §11.2.1 granted its achievement and located its premise. The recovery is partial: cases in which a party did act are describable in the framework as the deliberate case §32.2.2 distinguished, and §35.1.1 established that the framework additionally describes cases the literature cannot reach.

The failure point is that the literature supplies an addressee and the framework does not. §35.4.1 established that a subject accepting this account exchanges an address for his complaint for a mechanism, and §89.2.2 recorded this as a defect the book does not repair. The literature states something to a person that the framework cannot.

Proposition 90.6. *Winnicott is a rival rather than a projection, since the accounts predict differently about retrospective reports and §75.2.1 states a design to adjudicate. The family-of-origin literature is recoverable in part and its failure point is that it supplies an addressee where the framework supplies a mechanism, which §89.2.2 recorded as a defect.*

90.2.4 Bakhtin, Lindemann, and Wartenberg

Three accounts bear on the framework's central term and none was examined when §31.4.2 conducted the test for Part VI. The omission is recorded here as a defect in that section rather than repaired silently.

§42.2.3 conducted the comparison for the first two and §42.3.4 for the third, and this section states what the test returns.

For Bakhtin (1990) the recovery runs in one direction and not the other. The framework can state what his account states of a relation, since an unfinalisable subject is one of whom no description absorbs every discrepancy, which §30.1.2 defines. His account cannot state the framework's structural results, since it supplies no mechanism by which a description becomes unreachable and §16.2.1 is not derivable from an ethics of the act. The relation is that of a precursor supplying a term and a motif rather than of an account the framework renames.

For Lindemann (2014) the recovery runs both ways for a substantial part of Part III. §14.1.2 states that a description of a child is a constituent of what he is forming, and holding states this. §31.3.2 states what a subject who has acquired later terms produces, and narrative repair states this. What the framework states and holding does not is the condition of §30.1.2, since a story may be held with fidelity and be unrevisable, and §42.2.3 gave the case in which the two norms diverge.

For Wartenberg (1990) the recovery runs both ways for the normative claim and not for the diagnostic. That an asymmetric relation may be legitimate in virtue of aiming at its own dissolution is his and is not this book's, and §42.3.4 acknowledged it. What the framework adds is a criterion applicable to an occasion rather than to an aim, which his account does not contain.

Proposition 90.7. *Bakhtin is a precursor supplying the term and the motif of unfinalisability, and the recovery runs one way. Lindemann's holding recovers a substantial part of Part III and does not state the condition of §30.1.2, since a story may be held with fidelity and be unrevisable. Wartenberg states the normative claim and not the diagnostic criterion.*

90.2.5 Dewey

§41.4.2 recorded that this is the book's principal exposure and that the resemblance is closer than anywhere else, and the test returns least favourably here.

Dewey (1922) holds that habits are ways of incorporating and using an environment rather than possessions of individuals, that they form in interaction rather than by instruction, and that character is a set of them. Dewey (1934) holds that the aesthetic is a phase ordinary experience may reach, which §61.1.1 adopted, and Dewey (1938) makes inquiry the transformation of an indeterminate situation.

The difficulty is that the recovery runs both ways for most of the material. §41.1.1 defines an epistemic habit as a settled manner of handling what does not fit, and this is statable in Dewey's terms without loss. §38.2.1 defines a shared occasion, and an experience in Dewey's sense that ran its course is close enough that the difference requires argument. §61.3.1 states the condition of generation for aesthetic capacity, and §61.1.1 recorded that the account is retained without qualification.

§41.1.2 named three additions and each should be assessed here.

The narrow specification of the object survives. Dewey's habits are ways of dealing with situations generally, and the framework concerns one thing done within them, which is a restriction rather than an addition and does not by itself establish anything.

The founding asymmetry survives and is the strongest of the three. §7.1.1 holds that a child acquiring his first manner of handling misfit has no competitor, and §33.1.2 that the faculty performing the assessment is constituted within the relation. Dewey's inquirer is equipped, and the case of a party whose equipment is being formed is not one his account distinguishes.

The condition in which nothing can fail to fit survives. §30.1.2 defines it and an account for which inquiry transforms indeterminacy has no name for a situation that cannot become indeterminate.

The verdict is that two of three additions hold and that the material they bear on is a minority of what Part VII contains. §41.4.1 listed the Part's findings, and the criterion of sharing, the criterion of a question, and the account of curiosity as a rate are each closer to Dewey than the two surviving additions reach.

Proposition 90.8. *The recovery runs both ways for most of Part VII's material. Two of the three additions §41.1.2 named hold, which are the founding asymmetry and the condition in which nothing can fail to fit. The material they bear on is a minority of the Part, and the criterion of sharing, the criterion of a question, and curiosity as a rate are each closer to Dewey than those additions reach.*

90.3 The Failure Points Collected

90.3.1 The Failure Points Collected

Five failure points have been recorded and collecting them states the book's exposure in one place.

Attachment theory predicts an ordering of outcomes and the framework predicts none.

Bourdieu explains a household's position and the framework takes it as given.

Vygotsky supplies an account of what cultural tools make available and the framework presupposes it.

The family-of-origin literature supplies an addressee and the framework supplies a mechanism.

And Dewey states most of Part VII's material in his own terms, two additions surviving.

Four of the five are cases in which an existing account states something the framework does not undertake, and §66.2.2 established that failing to do what one does not undertake is not a criticism. The fifth is different in kind and §90.4.1 treats it.

Proposition 90.9. *Four failure points are cases in which an account states something the framework does not undertake, which §66.2.2 established is not a criticism. The fifth, that Dewey states most of Part VII's material in his own terms, is different in kind.*

90.3.2 The Conditions of Refutation

§90.1.1 established that the framework is a renaming with respect to material each vocabulary can recover from the other, and this section states what would follow.

A renaming with respect to Part VII would remove that Part. §90.2.5 found the recovery running both ways for a majority of its material, and the finding stands whether or not the two additions hold.

A renaming with respect to Part VI would remove the book. §31.4.2 and §32.4.2 conducted the test for that Part and found that the transactional vocabulary lacks a term for a description ceasing to answer and that the vocabulary of non-obstruction cannot state the case at all. §30.3.2 found the psychoanalytic account to be a rival. These findings are the book's principal defence and §75.2.1 states the design that would test one of them.

And a renaming with respect to Parts II to V would remove the mechanisms the rest depends on. No account has been identified that states the asymmetry of ch. 7, the absorption of ch. 10, and the readings of ch. 16 together, and §6.2.2 recorded the discipline by which the framework's claims are located.

Proposition 90.10. *A renaming with respect to Part VII would remove that Part, and §90.2.5 found the recovery running both ways for a majority of its material. A renaming with respect to Part VI would remove the book, and §31.4.2 and §32.4.2 found otherwise for that Part, which is the book's principal defence.*

90.4 The Verdict

90.4.1 The Verdict of the Test

The test returns unevenly and the unevenness is the chapter's finding.

Part VI survives and survives less comfortably than §31.4.2 supposed. That section established that the transactional vocabulary has no term for a description ceasing to answer, §32.4.2 that the vocabulary of non-obstruction cannot state the case, and §30.3.2 that the psychoanalytic account presupposes a reserve the framework denies. §90.2.4 adds that the section examined none of the three accounts nearest the framework's central term, and that one of them

recovers a substantial part of Part III. §73.1.2 and §58.3.1 established corresponding results for the measurement literature.

Parts II to V survive on the ground of §90.3.2, which is weaker: no account has been identified that states their mechanisms together, and the absence of an identified account is not a demonstration.

Part VII does not survive well. §90.2.5 found the recovery running both ways for a majority of its material, and §41.4.2 anticipated this. The two surviving additions bear on a minority of the Part.

Part III is now in a position §19.4.1 did not anticipate. §90.2.4 found that Lindemann (2014) recovers a substantial part of it, and what the Part states that holding does not is the condition of §30.1.2, which belongs to Part VI. A reader may conclude that Part III's contribution is the mechanism of §16.2.1 and that its account of what a description does to a child was available already.

Part X's status turns on §62.2.2, which §89.4.2 recorded is not independently supported. The four conditions are each recoverable from existing accounts taken singly, and what is not recoverable is the claim that they cross the nine functions in the pattern stated.

Proposition 90.11. *Part VI survives the test, Parts II to V survive on the weaker ground that no account has been identified stating their mechanisms together, Part VII does not survive well, and Part X's status turns on the coupling assignment, which is not independently supported. The four conditions are each recoverable singly and the pattern of their crossing is not.*

90.4.2 The Limits of the Chapter

Three limits close the chapter.

The test was conducted by the author of the framework, and §67.3.1 established that a confirming procedure whose readings absorb every discrepancy cannot fail. §90.1.2 imposed two disciplines against this and neither is a guarantee, and a reader who finds the recoveries in §90.2 too generous to the framework is making the objection the chapter cannot answer on its own behalf.

The accounts surveyed are those this book engaged, and §61.1.2, §56.5.2, and §59.5.2 recorded three literatures not surveyed. An account not engaged cannot be tested, and §89.4.2 recorded what the book regards as most exposed independently of this chapter.

And the test bears on whether the framework adds anything, and not on whether what it adds is true. §8.3.1 named five findings that would count against the book and §89.4.1 divided the open questions by what would settle each. A framework may add a description and the description may be false.

Proposition 90.12. *The test was conducted by the framework's author and §90.1.2's disciplines are not a guarantee. The accounts surveyed are those the book engaged, and three literatures were not. And the test bears on whether the framework adds anything rather than on whether what it adds is true.*

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Chapter 91

The Research Programme

The Work of This Chapter

§89.4.1 divided the open questions by what would settle each, and this chapter states what would be required to settle those that can be settled.

§91.1 states the programme's shape, which follows from the circuit §1.26.4 described rather than from a list of studies. §91.2 treats each stage and states what the book has supplied and what is owed.

§91.3 states the order of work and what would be learned early. §91.4 states what would be true if the programme failed, and closes the book.

The reader should carry forward §91.4.1, which states what survives the programme's failure, since a programme whose failure would leave nothing is not one this book is entitled to propose.

91.1 The Shape of the Programme

91.1.1 A Circuit Rather Than a Sequence

§1.26.4 described the response this book proposes as a circuit rather than a bridge: an ontology states what is taken to exist, an epistemology states how it could be known, a practice acts on what is known, and what happens in practice returns as pressure on the ontology.

The programme takes that form and the form has a consequence.

A sequence would be completed. A circuit is not, and §50.4.1 established that this book's own terms were formed under conditions it registers as background and that only measurement across generations would identify them. The fourth stage is what would supply that, and §50.2.2 established that it is the only route to variables slower than a window.

Each stage is answerable to the next and the last is answerable to the first, which is the structure §19.3.1 identified as distinguishing a good symbol and §39.1.1 as the framework's central form. A programme whose stages did not answer to each other would have the structure §43.2.1 defined.

Proposition 91.1. *The programme is a circuit rather than a sequence, so it is not completed. Each stage is answerable to the next and the last to the first, which is the structure §39.1.1 identified as the framework's central form, and a programme whose stages did not answer to each other would be closed in the sense §43.2.1 defined.*

91.1.2 The Boundaries of the Programme

Three things, and the third distinguishes this from what a book of this kind usually proposes.

It is not a programme of intervention studies. §75.1.1 established that the designs are observational with respect to the conditions at issue, since a design manipulating a relational condition produces an occasion the framework excludes, and §77.1.1 established the general form.

It is not a programme of instrument development in the ordinary sense. §76.3.2 established that whether an instrument can be held answerably is settled by the order deploying it rather than by its design, so refinement of instruments does not address the difficulty §76.1.1 derived.

And it is not a programme whose success would establish the framework. §75.3.2 established that the four designs test mechanisms rather than central claims, that failure among them would count against the claims, and that success would not establish them. §75.3.1 recorded that three of the book's claims have no design at all.

Proposition 91.2. *The programme is not one of intervention studies, since the designs are observational; not one of instrument development, since §76.3.2 located an instrument's standing in the order deploying it; and not one whose success would establish the framework, since the designs test mechanisms and three central claims have no design.*

91.2 The Stages of the Circuit

91.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology

The first stage is supplied and its principal debt is stated.

§6.2.2 imposed the discipline by which a claim belongs to the ontological statement or to a component, §1.27.10 stated the second keynote, and §52.2.2 stated the ground of Part X. What is owed is the priority of §89.1.1, and §89.4.1 established that it is not settled by anything the framework can do.

The second stage is supplied in part. §70.4.1 established four observables surviving three requirements, §74.2.2 and §74.3.1 added two, and §69.4.1 established the sufficient form of the Part's justifying claim.

Three things are owed at this stage and each is specifiable.

Coding procedures for the six observables, which §70.4.2 recorded are not specified and §68.2.2 established will admit the second method's terms into the measurement.

A representation reaching the grammar, which §71.4.1 established no formalism here supplies and §71.4.2 established is inherited by any formalism, since a formalism individuates its own objects.

And an instrument for the two operations §73.2.2 established are not measurable, or a demonstration that none is possible.

Proposition 91.3. *The first stage is supplied and owes the priority, which §89.4.1 established the framework cannot settle. The second is supplied in part and owes coding procedures for six observables, a representation reaching the grammar, and either an instrument for the two unmeasurable operations or a demonstration that none is possible.*

91.2.2 Practice and Return

The third stage is supplied thinly and the thinness is stated rather than repaired.

§77.2.2 established that what the practice Parts supply is a description changing what a party can be answerable for, and §77.4.2 that the Part would not rank, would not supply procedures, and would not remedy the thinness §35.4.1 described.

What is owed at this stage is not more practice. §77.1.1 established why recommendations do not follow, and a programme proposing to supply them would have misunderstood the argument. What is owed is the description of acts the book has not described, and §77.1.2 identified the three classes within which such descriptions are possible.

The fourth stage has returned little and what it has returned is recorded here.

§50.4.1 established that this book's terms were formed under conditions it registers as background, and that only measurement across generations would identify them. No such series exists, and §50.2.2 established that records extend a window only where made for another purpose.

What the fourth stage has so far returned is accordingly one thing: the finding of §49.3.2, that a tradition is least likely to renew where it fits the households it serves most closely. That finding was reached by the method of ch. 67 and is subject to §67.3.1.

Proposition 91.4. *The third stage is supplied thinly and what is owed is the description of acts the book has not described rather than recommendations. The fourth has returned one finding, that a tradition is least likely to renew where it fits its constituency best, and no series of the kind §50.2.2 established is required exists.*

91.3 The Order of Work

91.3.1 The Early Yield

§75.4.1 ordered the four designs by tractability, and this section states what each would settle and how early.

The completion design of §75.2.2 would settle whether the mechanism of §54.3.2 operates, and four sections draw on it. Both quantities are directly observable, and a negative result would remove §55.5.1, §59.3.2, and §58.6.1 with it.

The marking design of §75.2.3 would settle whether differential response adds anything to frequency of exposure, and §62.3.2 established that a negative result would remove the first of the four conditions and three couplings.

These two are the programme's early information and they are unusual in a respect worth noting. Each would remove a substantial part of the framework if it failed, and §8.3.1 required that the book state what would count against it. A programme whose early studies could not embarrass it would be one §67.3.1 described.

The regression design of §75.2.4 is where §65.4.2 said the standard is met, and it requires a period spanning an ordinary alteration of a relation. It cannot be early.

And the convergence design of §75.2.1 would adjudicate between this account and the psychoanalytic one, which §90.2.3 established is a rival rather than a projection. It requires subjects who have left, classified by the vocabulary of their exit.

Proposition 91.5. *The completion and marking designs are the programme's early information, and each would remove a substantial part of the framework if it failed. The regression design cannot be early, requiring a period spanning an alteration, and the convergence design requires subjects who have left, classified by the vocabulary of their exit.*

91.3.2 The Work Requiring a Generation

Two matters cannot be settled within a research career and stating this is more honest than proposing a timetable.

The survival asymmetry of §48.3.1, which §89.4.2 recorded is where the framework is most exposed, concerns what survives the passage from a childhood to a household formed later. §48.2.2 identified the principal alteration occasion as the meeting of two grammars in a newly formed household, and a design would require observation across that interval.

And the slow variables of §50.1.1 require a series longer than a childhood by construction. §50.1.2 established that a variable slower than an observation window is registered as background, §50.2.2 that only measurement across generations reaches such variables, and §50.4.1 that this book's own position is subject to the result.

What follows is that the programme's most consequential questions are answerable by a successor and not by anyone now working. §50.4.1 recorded that the shape of the correction can be indicated and that the limitation is stated rather than repaired, and the present section is that statement in its programmatic form.

Proposition 91.6. *The survival asymmetry requires observation across the interval between a childhood and a household formed later, and the slow variables require a series longer than a childhood by construction. The programme's most consequential questions are accordingly answerable by a successor and not by anyone now working.*

91.4 The Position Under Failure

91.4.1 The Survivals Under Failure

A programme whose failure would leave nothing is not one this book is entitled to propose, and this section states what survives each way of failing.

If the designs return negative results, the mechanisms fail and the descriptions remain. §77.2.2 established that a description changes what a party can be answerable for, and a description of what completing a child's movement does is available to an adult whether or not the rate it predicts is found. §6.3.2 established that the practical Parts trade in permissions and §90.1.1 that a permission is refuted by showing it incoherent, empty, or already available.

If the projection test of ch. 90 is decided against the book, the framework is a renaming and the descriptions remain available under other names. §90.4.1 found that Part VII does not survive the test well and that Part VI does, and §90.3.2 established what a renaming with respect to each would remove.

If the priority of §89.1.1 is rejected, Part VI describes a structure and does not show anything wrong with it. §89.1.2 stated what this costs each Part and recorded that Parts I to V and Part

XI are unaffected.

And if the programme is not conducted at all, which §91.3.2 established is likely for its most consequential questions, the book stands as §90.4.1 left it: a set of descriptions, some tested against existing accounts and found to add something, others not.

Proposition 91.7. *If the designs fail the mechanisms fail and the descriptions remain, since a permission is refuted by being shown incoherent, empty, or already available. If the projection test decides against the book the descriptions remain under other names. If the priority is rejected Part VI describes a structure without showing anything wrong with it. And if the programme is not conducted the book stands as §90.4.1 left it.*

91.4.2 The Book's Position

Three statements close the book and each has been established rather than asserted here.

The framework supplies descriptions and not instructions, and §8.2.1 recorded this at the outset and §77.1.1 established why it follows from the framework's own commitments rather than from the author's reticence. §77.2.2 stated what a description changes, which is what a party can be answerable for, and §89.2.2 recorded the defect this leaves.

The framework's central claim is conditional. §31.5.2 located the loss of Part VI in a child's standing as a party to whom an account of him is answerable, and §89.1.2 established that this counts as a loss on a priority the book asserts and does not derive. A reader who rejects the priority has rejected the book's conclusion and not its descriptions, and §91.4.1 established that the descriptions survive.

And the framework is answerable in the sense it requires of others. §19.3.1 held that a symbol is good where what it describes can refute it, §8.3.1 named five findings that would count against the book, §62.3.2 three that would count against Part X, §89.3.1 recorded where the book failed its own requirement, and §89.4.2 named where it is most exposed. Whether these are enough is a judgement a reader is entitled to make, and §90.1.1 states the test by which it can be made rather than merely felt.

Proposition 91.8. *The framework supplies descriptions rather than instructions, for reasons following from its own commitments. Its central claim is conditional on a priority it asserts and does not derive, so a reader rejecting the priority rejects the conclusion and not the descriptions. And it is answerable in the sense it requires of others, having named what would count against it and where it has failed its own requirements.*

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