

Interpreted Temporal Fields

Anticipation and the Composition of Generative Assessment

Wanhong Huang

huangwanhong@serendip.ngo

Abstract

A previous paper proposed generative obstruction as a primitive explanatory object, defining it over the continuations available to a system in fact and restricting attributions of obstruction to parties within a relation. It deferred a class of cases its resources could not examine: conflict arising from foreclosure a party anticipates in place of foreclosure it undergoes. This paper takes up that case. It argues that the reference models the earlier paper established are temporally composite, assembled from an interpreted past, a present state, and an anticipated future, each entering through interpretation; and that a party's assessment of its own generative prospects is a function of all three. The extension reaches anticipatory conflict and offers a reading of grievance without introducing a further primitive, since both operate through models the earlier framework already required. Two limits are stated. The composition of the estimated space is tense-neutral while its evolution remains temporally ordered, which preserves the path-dependence of the earlier account and forecloses a stronger reading sometimes drawn from arguments of this kind. And the extension sharpens an evidential difficulty already present: where obstruction is assessed over an interpretive field, it becomes inaccessible to observation that lacks access to that field, so the framework grows in causal reach as it contracts in testability.

Keywords: generative obstruction; estimated generative space; anticipation; interpreted past; grievance; generative relational being.

A note on the standing of this paper. This is the second paper in a series, and it depends throughout on the first. Its central move is to substitute, as the object over which obstruction is assessed, a party's model of its available continuations for those continuations themselves. The substitution is defended as an extension of resources the first paper already required in place of a new commitment, and readers who reject the first paper's account of reference models will find little here that stands without it. Several claims are entered as open questions where the resources to settle them were unavailable. Objection, correction, and counter-evidence are welcome at huangwanhong@serendip.ngo.

1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding paper in this series [1] proposed generative obstruction as a primitive explanatory object and defined it by a partial order on the continuations available to a constrained generative system: an interaction obstructs a system when the continuations available to it under the interaction are properly contained in those available otherwise. Conflict was treated as the manifestation of such obstruction, and the mechanisms by which obstruction is produced were arrayed without privilege among them.

That paper also established, in the course of addressing a difficulty in its own definition, that attributions of obstruction require reference models. The definition compares what is available under an interaction with what is available otherwise, and the comparison requires a specification of the otherwise. No such specification is available as a fact about a relationally constituted system, since the counterfactual it requires removes the couplings within which the system was constituted. The earlier paper proposed in place of a fact a working model, held by a party for the purpose of coordination, carrying no ontological standing and answerable to nothing beyond its role. It argued further that a model treated as accurate degrades the channel by which it would be corrected, and that the rigidity with which a model is held accordingly bears on obstruction where the model's content does not.

One class of cases was deferred. A party may act on a foreclosure it anticipates in place of one that has occurred. The colleague has not been promoted, the resource has not been allocated, the position remains open; and the party conducts itself as though its continuations were already closed. Conflict of this kind is common, and the earlier framework assigned it outside its scope, since the criterion there concerned foreclosures that had taken place. The assignment was made on a reading the earlier paper declined to examine, and it left a note to that effect.

This paper examines the reading. Its thesis may be stated compactly. The comparison Definition 1 requires has two terms, and the earlier paper read both as concerning what is available in fact. Read as concerning what a party's working model represents as available, the definition reaches anticipated foreclosure directly, since a model of what is available is what a projection of the future supplies. Write $\hat{G}$ for the space of continuations a party's model represents as available, distinguishing it from the space G of continuations available in fact. The proposal is that obstruction, as parties attribute it and as it conditions their conduct, is assessed over $\hat{G}$.

The thesis carries three consequences, and the paper is organized around them. The first concerns what $\hat{G}$ contains. A model of available continuations is assembled from what a party takes to have happened, what it takes to obtain now, and what it takes to be coming. Each of these enters through interpretation. The past enters as reconstructed in place of as it occurred, and the same event admits reconstructions that support incompatible assessments. The future

enters as projected, and a projection conditions conduct whether or not the projected event occurs. The present enters as construed, since a party's reading of its current constraints is itself a reading. Assessment is accordingly a function of three temporally distinguished arguments, each interpretation-mediated, and the composition of that function is the subject of §3.

The second concerns what this leaves standing. An argument of this shape can be pressed toward a stronger conclusion, that the present enjoys no privileged status in generative assessment. The stronger conclusion is resisted here, and the resistance matters for what the earlier paper established. Assessment occurs at a time, over a field composed at that time, and issues in conduct at that time. The argument dissolves the privileged status of the present as *content*: a party's current circumstances have no special claim to be the argument that matters, and interpreted pasts and projected futures enter alongside them. The present survives as *locus*: the evaluation happens now, and the field evolves from one such evaluation to the next. This distinction preserves the path-dependence the earlier paper derived, and abandoning it would remove that result.

The third concerns what the extension costs. The earlier paper found that reference models are licensed for parties within a relation and unlicensed for observers outside one, which restricted well-formed attributions of obstruction to the parties themselves. The present extension sharpens that restriction. Where obstruction is assessed over an interpretive field, an observer requires access to that field, and access to a party's model of its own prospects is harder to obtain than access to the party's circumstances. The framework accordingly gains in causal reach and loses in testability, and §6 states the trade without softening it.

One clarification belongs at the outset, since a claim in this vicinity is easily overstated. The earlier paper declined to specify a trajectory a system ought to have followed, on the ground that the specification would require a warrant the descriptive facts fail to supply. The move to $\hat{G}$ might appear to answer that difficulty, since a projected trajectory raises no question of what ought to be. It does answer it, and it answers it by abandoning the ground on which any trajectory could be criticized: a model may be arbitrarily mistaken, and the framework retains no resources with which to say so. The difficulty is avoided in place of solved, and §6 declines the stronger claim explicitly.

The remainder proceeds as follows. §2 distinguishes $\hat{G}$ from G and argues for its causal efficacy. §3 sets out the temporal composition of $\hat{G}$ and the functional form of assessment, and establishes what is tense-neutral and what is not. §4 treats three instances: a reinterpreted past, an anticipated future, and grievance. §5 extends the earlier paper's result to the temporal field, and supplies the conditions without which the extension would reach too far. §6 states what the extension costs, and §7 what it leaves open.

2 THE ESTIMATED GENERATIVE SPACE

This section introduces the object over which the remainder of the paper operates, distinguishes it from the object the earlier paper employed, and argues that it bears on conduct in a manner the earlier object does not.

2.1 *The Estimated Space Distinguished from the Available Space*

The earlier paper wrote G for the space of continuations available to a system: what it can go on generating from where it stands, given its history and its constraints. Obstruction was defined by proper containment on this space, $G' \prec G$, and the definition concerned continuations available in fact.

Write $\hat{G}$ for the space of continuations a party's working model represents as available. The circumflex carries the sense the earlier paper assigned it: this is a provisional construct held for coordination, subject to revision, carrying no ontological standing.

The two spaces are related loosely and come apart in both directions. A party may represent as available continuations that are foreclosed in fact. A researcher who takes a line of work to remain open when its premises have failed holds a $\hat{G}$ larger than G in that respect. A party may equally represent as foreclosed continuations that remain available. A candidate who takes a position to be filled when it remains open holds a $\hat{G}$ smaller than G .

The divergence is the normal case in place of a defect. Section 3 argues that $\hat{G}$ is assembled from interpreted materials, and interpretation of a system's own prospects proceeds under conditions that guarantee imperfection: the party's information is partial, its constraints are imperfectly known to it, and its future is underdetermined by what it can observe. A $\hat{G}$ coinciding with G would be an achievement requiring explanation.

The earlier paper's treatment of reference models applies here without amendment. A model that diverges from what it models is not thereby faulty, since it was never held as a representation answerable to correspondence. It is held for coordination and answerable to whether it serves that. The earlier paper added a condition on how such models are held, and §5 extends that condition to the present case.

2.2 *The Space to Which Conduct Answers*

The claim on which this paper turns may now be stated.

Claim 1. *A party's conduct is conditioned by $\hat{G}$. Where $\hat{G}$ and G diverge, conduct answers to the former.*

The argument for it is short. A party acting on its prospects acts on prospects as it takes them to be. The continuations available to it in fact bear on what its actions achieve; they bear on which

actions it selects only through its representation of them. A party unaware that a continuation is foreclosed pursues it; a party persuaded that an available continuation is closed abandons it. This is a general feature of action under a representation and requires no special apparatus.

Two qualifications keep the claim within bounds. It concerns selection of conduct in place of outcome. Conduct selected against a mistaken model meets the world as it is, and what results is determined by G in the ordinary way. A party pursuing a foreclosed continuation fails to reach it. The claim asserts the occurrence of the pursuit, and attributes that occurrence to $\hat{G}$.

The claim leaves the relation between the spaces open. Nothing here holds that $\hat{G}$ is unconstrained by G , and a great deal ordinarily constrains it: a party encounters its constraints, receives correction, and revises. The claim asserts of the divergent case alone that action answers to the model.

2.3 *The Causal Efficacy of Representations*

Claim 1 has a consequence that carries the paper's principal extension. If conduct answers to $\hat{G}$, and if conduct enters the conditions under which systems generate, then a representation bears on generative dynamics whether or not it is accurate.

The structure was described by Merton as the self-fulfilling prophecy [11], and one instance is worth stating because its mechanism is transparent. Where participants in a market take a decline to be coming, they act on the expectation by selling, and the selling produces the decline. No fact about the market's prospects need have obtained beforehand. The expectation was mistaken at the moment it was formed and accurate by the time it was assessed, and what closed the gap was conduct the expectation itself conditioned.

The same structure operates in the cases this paper treats. A party takes a colleague's advancement to foreclose its own prospects. The advancement has not occurred and the foreclosure is a projection. The party conducts itself accordingly: it withholds cooperation, it competes where it would have collaborated, it treats the colleague as an obstacle. The colleague, meeting this conduct, responds in kind. The prospects of both are now diminished in fact, and the diminution was produced by a representation of a diminution that had not occurred.

The argument of §5 depends on three features of this structure. The representation does its work before the represented event. Conduct is conditioned at the moment the representation is held, and the represented event may occur later, or otherwise, or never. This is what places anticipated foreclosure within the framework's reach and is the substance of what the earlier paper deferred.

The representation may be self-confirming. Conduct conditioned by a representation may produce the state the representation asserted, and where it does, the party receives confirmation its own conduct arranged. This is the closure structure the earlier paper described in its treatment of symbolic mechanisms, arising here in the particular case of a model of one's own

prospects.

The mechanism operates without error on either side. Neither party in the case above need be mistaken about anything except the initial projection, and the initial projection need be no more than a reasonable reading of an uncertain situation. This matters for the same reason it mattered in the earlier paper: a mechanism requiring ill intent or gross error would explain a narrower class of cases than the phenomena present.

2.4 *The Status of $\hat{G}$ Within the Series*

A framework proposing a minimal primitive base owes an account of its inventory whenever a new object appears prominently, and the account is due here.

The earlier paper established four things about reference models: that attributions of obstruction require them, that parties hold them, that they are provisional, and that they condition conduct sufficiently for their rigidity to bear on obstruction. The present section names the space such a model represents and asserts that conduct answers to it. Both follow from the earlier arguments and add to them nothing the earlier paper lacked.

The change lies in prominence. The earlier paper introduced reference models to address a difficulty in its definition and treated them thereafter as apparatus, subordinate to the space G over which its primitive was defined. This paper takes them as the object over which assessment is conducted, so that $\hat{G}$ occupies in the present treatment the position G occupied in the earlier one. The shift is substantial and it is a shift of emphasis, leaving the inventory unaltered.

Whether an emphasis of this magnitude preserves the minimality the earlier paper claimed is a fair question. Section 6 takes it up, together with the other costs the extension carries.

3 THE TEMPORAL COMPOSITION OF THE ESTIMATED SPACE

Section 2 established that conduct answers to $\hat{G}$ and left the composition of that space unexamined. This section supplies the composition, states the functional form assessment takes, and fixes the two respects in which the account is temporally ordered and the one in which it is not.

3.1 *Three Horizons*

A party's model of the continuations available to it draws on three sources, distinguished by their temporal position.

The first is the past as the party reconstructs it. A history of foreclosures, achievements, and constraints enters the model as evidence bearing on what remains available, and it enters as reconstructed in place of as it occurred. That recall is reconstructive in place of reproductive is a long-standing finding in the experimental literature on memory [2, 10], and the present

claim is the weaker one that a party's reading of its own history enters $\hat{G}$ as read. It follows also from the earlier paper's account of generation: what a system has produced enters the conditions of its subsequent production, and a party's reading of its own history is one such production, revised as later productions condition it.

The second is the present as the party construes it. Current constraints bear on available continuations directly, and they bear on them through a construal: a party's reading of what presently constrains it is a reading, subject to the same partiality as its reading of anything else. The present enters the model as interpreted material alongside the other two, its immediacy notwithstanding.

The third is the future as the party projects it. Projections of coming states bear on the model with no less force than the other two, and §2 argued that they condition conduct before the projected states obtain or fail to. A projection is interpretive throughout, being assembled from the party's reading of its situation and its expectations about what follows from it.

Each horizon enters through interpretation, and the uniformity is the section's first claim. Work in the memory literature reports substantial overlap between the processes supporting recollection of the past and those supporting simulation of the future [14]. That finding concerns cognitive architecture in place of the compositional claim entered here, and it is noted as consistent with the uniformity in place of evidence for it.

Claim 2. *The estimated generative space $\hat{G}$ is composed from three interpretively mediated sources: a reconstructed past, a construed present, and a projected future. No source enters the composition unmediated.*

The claim's content lies in the uniformity of the mediation. An account admitting the interpretive character of projections while treating the past as fixed material would sort the horizons by their epistemic standing, on the ground that the past has occurred and the future has not. Claim 2 declines the sorting. Occurrence fixes an event; it leaves open what the event contributes to a model of available continuations, and the contribution is what enters $\hat{G}$.

3.2 The Functional Form

Claim 2 licenses a compact statement of the assessment a party performs. Write Π for the reconstructed past, Σ for the construed present, Φ for the projected future, and $\hat{G}$ for the estimated space assembled from them:

$$\hat{G} = F(\Pi, \Sigma, \Phi).$$

The expression is a schema in place of a model, and the distinction should be entered before it is used. It fixes what the arguments of an assessment are and in what manner they stand to the assessment; it specifies no relation among them. Nothing here supplies F , and whether the horizons compose additively, whether they interact, and whether one dominates under

specifiable conditions are open questions entered in §7. No claim of this paper is derived from the expression. Every argument below runs in prose and would survive the notation's removal, which compresses the statement of a dependence in place of establishing one.

The arguments are the party's, and the assessment is the party's. Π , Σ , and Φ are the party's reconstruction, construal, and projection, and $\hat{G}$ is the space its model represents. The earlier paper's restriction of attributions to parties within a relation applies to the whole expression, and §6 states what this leaves an observer able to say.

The form concerns assessment in place of capacity. The space G of continuations available in fact is determined by the system's history and constraints in the manner the earlier paper described, and F says nothing about it. Where the two diverge, Claim 1 holds that conduct answers to $\hat{G}$, and G determines what that conduct achieves.

3.3 Composition and Evolution

An argument of the shape given above can be pressed toward a conclusion this section resists, and the resistance requires statement because the conclusion is attractive and its cost is easily missed.

The attractive conclusion is that generative assessment is temporally unstructured: that since all three horizons enter the same evaluation on the same footing, temporal position is immaterial to the framework, and the present enjoys no privileged status. The first half of this is granted below. The second half would remove a result the earlier paper derived, and it is declined.

The distinction the section proposes is between composition and evolution.

Composition is tense-neutral. The three horizons enter F on the same footing, and their temporal positions do not order their contributions. A foreclosure reconstructed from twenty years ago may bear on $\hat{G}$ more heavily than a constraint obtaining now, and a projection of a foreclosure that may never occur may bear more heavily than either. The horizons are distinguished by their sources and are not ranked by them. This much of the attractive conclusion is granted, and §4 exhibits it.

Evolution is temporally ordered. The assessment $F(\Pi, \Sigma, \Phi)$ occurs at a time. Its arguments are the party's reconstruction, construal, and projection as they stand at that time; its output conditions conduct at that time; and that conduct enters the conditions under which the party reconstructs, construes, and projects at times following. Write $\hat{G}_t$ for the estimated space at t : the sequence $\{\hat{G}_t\}$ is a trajectory, ordered, and each term is conditioned by its predecessors.

Claim 3. *The composition of $\hat{G}$ is tense-neutral: the three horizons enter assessment without ordering by their temporal positions. The evolution of $\hat{G}$ is temporally ordered: assessment occurs at a time, conditions conduct at that time, and conditions subsequent assessment through that conduct.*

The pair carries a consequence the earlier paper's central derivation requires.

That paper derived the path-dependence of obstruction from the historical conditioning of generative capacity: what a system can produce next depends on what it has already produced, so that whether an interaction obstructs depends on the history in which it falls. The derivation requires an ordered sequence of states. An account on which temporal position is immaterial throughout would supply none, and path-dependence would be lost.

Claim 3 preserves the derivation by locating the tense-neutrality where it belongs. The composition of an assessment draws on three horizons without ranking them; the sequence of assessments is ordered, and the earlier paper's argument applies to that sequence unchanged. The estimated space evolves path-dependently over an interpretive field in place of a physical one, and the structure of the argument survives the substitution.

3.4 *The Present as Locus*

One further distinction follows from Claim 3 and is worth drawing explicitly, since the vocabulary of privilege has been used above in two senses.

The present loses its privilege as content. A party's current circumstances have no special claim to determine its assessment of available continuations, and they compete with reconstructions and projections on terms Claim 2 makes uniform. This is a substantive result. Accounts locating a party's prospects in its present situation are, on this reading, attending to one argument of F and treating it as the whole.

The present retains its privilege as locus. Assessment happens now, over a field composed now, issuing in conduct now. The reconstructed past is a present reconstruction; the projected future is a present projection; and the party performing the assessment occupies the present in a sense the horizons it draws on do not. Removing this would leave the framework unable to locate an assessment in time, and with it the ordering Claim 3 requires.

The two senses are compatible and the distinction between them is what permits the section's argument to run. A framework may hold that the present has no special claim to determine what a party takes to be available, while holding that the taking occurs in the present. The first is a claim about the arguments of F ; the second is a claim about where F is evaluated.

4 THREE INSTANCES OF TEMPORAL COMPOSITION

The claims of §3 are exhibited here on three cases, selected to isolate the contribution of each horizon. The first varies the reconstructed past with the other two held fixed; the second varies the projected future likewise; the third exhibits a case in which a reconstruction long past dominates an assessment. The cases are constructed, and the standing of constructed cases within this series is as the earlier paper described: they exhibit an argument in a particular setting, forgoing evidential weight for the control they supply.

4.1 *A Reconstructed Past*

Two parties stand in a close coupling. One failed to mark an occasion the other treated as significant, and the failure lies some months back. The event is settled: it occurred, it occurred as it occurred, and neither party disputes the description.

The reconstructions available to the second party differ, and two are worth setting beside each other.

On the first reconstruction, the failure indicates a disposition: the party who failed attends to the other's concerns weakly, has done so throughout, and will continue. The reconstruction bears on $\hat{G}$ directly. Continuations requiring sustained attention from that party are represented as unavailable, since the disposition the reconstruction attributes forecloses them. The estimated space contracts.

On the second, the failure indicates a circumstance: the party who failed was under load, managed the occasion poorly, and attended as well as the circumstance permitted. This reconstruction leaves the same continuations represented as available, since a circumstance passes where a disposition persists.

The event is identical across the two. Its contribution to $\hat{G}$ differs, and it differs because reconstruction differs. This is Claim 2 exhibited on the first horizon: the past enters the estimated space as reconstructed, and the reconstruction is what the space is composed from.

The reconstructions are not distinguished by accuracy, and the case is constructed so that neither party is positioned to settle which is correct. A disposition and a circumstance are compatible with the same behaviour on a single occasion, and the evidence that would separate them lies in conduct yet to occur. The party reconstructing is choosing under underdetermination, and the choice conditions conduct before the evidence that would inform it arrives.

The conduct so conditioned bears on the evidence. A party representing continuations as foreclosed conducts itself accordingly: it withdraws the attention it takes to be unreciprocated, and the withdrawal alters what the other party does. The reconstruction thereby participates in producing the evidence by which it would be assessed, which is the structure §2 described and §5 takes up.

4.2 *A Projected Future*

A party works within an organization in which a position will be filled. A colleague is a candidate. The position remains open, the decision lies ahead, and no allocation has occurred.

The party projects. On the projection, the colleague is appointed, and the appointment forecloses the party's own advancement for a period it estimates as considerable. The projection enters $\hat{G}$, and the estimated space contracts: continuations requiring the advancement in question are represented as unavailable.

Conduct answers to the contracted space. The party withholds cooperation it would oth-

erwise extend, competes where it would have collaborated, and construes the colleague's conduct through the projection it holds. Note that no continuation available to the party in fact has been foreclosed. The space G stands as it stood; the party acts on $\hat{G}$.

The colleague, meeting this conduct, responds to it. Cooperation withdrawn is cooperation unavailable, and the colleague adjusts its own model accordingly, which conditions its conduct in turn. The prospects of both parties are diminished in fact by the exchange, and the diminution was produced by a projection of a diminution that had not occurred.

This is the case the earlier paper deferred, and the present resources reach it. The earlier framework's scope criterion asked whether satisfying a demand would foreclose continuations, and whether frustration degraded capacity descriptably. Anticipated foreclosure satisfies neither, since no foreclosure has taken place. Read over $\hat{G}$, the case is straightforward: the party's estimated space has contracted, its conduct answers to the contraction, and the obstruction it attributes is one its model represents.

The case establishes less than it might appear to. The projection may be accurate. The colleague may be appointed and the advancement may be foreclosed, in which case the party's conduct was answering to a space that came to coincide with the available one. The mechanism described here operates in both cases, and its operation does not turn on the projection being mistaken. The case exhibits the conditioning of conduct before the projected event resolves, whichever way it resolves.

4.3 *A Reconstruction Long Past*

The third case exhibits the tense-neutrality of composition claimed in §3.3, and it treats a phenomenon the earlier paper listed among the mechanisms it had omitted, one with a substantial literature of its own [7, 3].

A party sustained a foreclosure some years back: an opportunity was closed to it by another party's action, and the closure was real. The conditions that produced it have since passed. The other party's position has changed, the arrangement that permitted the closure has been dissolved, and nothing presently obtaining would produce a comparable foreclosure.

The reconstruction remains. On it, the other party is one that forecloses, the arrangement is one that permits foreclosure, and continuations requiring the other party's cooperation are represented as unavailable. The estimated space is contracted by a reconstruction of conditions that no longer obtain, and conduct answers to the contraction.

The case turns on three features. The reconstruction outweighs the construed present. The party's present circumstances would support an assessment on which the continuations in question are available, and the reconstruction dominates them. This is the tense-neutrality of composition: horizons enter F without ranking by temporal position, and a reconstruction from years back may bear more heavily than a constraint obtaining now.

The reconstruction is accurate as to what occurred. The foreclosure happened, and the

party's account of it is correct. The case exhibits a reconstruction accurate about the past and inaccurate about available continuations, and the two come apart because the conditions producing the foreclosure have passed while the reconstruction has not been revised.

Grievance, so described, requires no new mechanism. The earlier paper listed grievance among the mechanisms it had omitted and offered no argument that it reduces to those it treated. The present account reaches it as a case of temporal composition: an unrevised reconstruction contracting an estimated space, with conduct answering to the contraction. This offers a reading of a mechanism the earlier framework lacked, through resources §2 argued were already present. Whether the reading captures what the grievance literature describes is a question for that literature to settle.

4.4 The Structure Common to the Three Cases

The cases differ in which horizon carries the assessment and agree in three respects. In each, the estimated space diverges from the available one, and conduct answers to the estimated space. In each, the divergence arises through interpretation of material the party possesses in place of through ignorance of material it lacks. And in each, the conduct so conditioned bears on the evidence by which the interpretation would be assessed, so that the interpretation participates in producing its own confirmation.

The third respect is where the paper's extension of the earlier result operates, and §5 takes it up. Absent that treatment, the cases would establish only that interpretation matters, which is common ground and would extend the framework by nothing.

5 RIGIDITY OVER THE TEMPORAL FIELD

The cases of §4 exhibit interpretation entering assessment and conditioning conduct. Taken alone they establish that interpretation matters, which the framework requires no apparatus to say. This section supplies the apparatus, extending the earlier paper's result to the estimated space and fixing the conditions without which the extension would reach further than its argument supports.

5.1 The Extension and Its Necessity

The earlier paper argued that a working model held of another party degrades the channel by which it would be corrected, where the model is treated as accurate in place of provisional. The argument proceeded in three steps. A correction indicating that the model errs is anomalous on a model treated as accurate, which makes available a construal attributing the anomaly to the corrected party in place of the model. Corrections so construed achieve less than the correction intended and cost the correcting party more than they return, so their rate falls. The

model is thereafter held against a thinner correction channel, and the conditions permitting the construal are strengthened.

The estimated space is subject to the same argument, and the extension requires one observation. The terms composing $\hat{G}$ are interpretations: a reconstruction of the past, a construal of the present, a projection of the future. Each is corrigible in principle, and each is corrected in the same manner, by material the interpretation failed to anticipate. A reconstruction is corrected by conduct the disposition it attributes would fail to produce; a projection is corrected by the projected event resolving otherwise; a construal is corrected by constraints proving other than construed.

Where a term is held as accurate, the argument applies to it unchanged, and the correction channel for that term degrades.

Claim 4. *The terms composing $\hat{G}$ are subject to the degradation the earlier paper described. Where a reconstruction, construal, or projection is held as accurate in place of provisional, the channel by which it would be corrected degrades, and the term tends toward unrevisability.*

Claim 4 might be read as an addition to an argument already complete. Without it, the cases of §4 would license a conclusion the framework should decline: that interpretations obstruct. Every party interprets, every interpretation may err, and a framework holding that erroneous interpretation obstructs would find obstruction wherever it looked. This is the difficulty the earlier paper met in the case of unmet demand and declined by the same route: the obstruction-relevant property is the rigidity with which a term is held in place of the content the term asserts.

5.2 The Content Condition

The first condition follows from Claim 4. A reconstruction, construal, or projection carries no obstruction in virtue of its content. A party may reconstruct a past unfavourably, construe present constraints pessimistically, and project a future in which its prospects are foreclosed, holding each of these provisionally and revising as material arrives. Such a party is coordinating, and the account finds no obstruction in its holdings however unfavourable they are.

The corresponding case is a party holding a favourable interpretation rigidly. A reconstruction attributing good will, held as accurate and closed to correction, degrades its own channel by the argument of §5.1, and the degradation proceeds whatever the reconstruction asserts. Favourable content supplies no protection.

The condition applies across the three horizons uniformly, and the uniformity is the paper's second extension of the earlier result. Tense supplies no more protection than content: a

rigid projection and a rigid reconstruction degrade their channels alike, and §4.3 exhibited a reconstruction from years back operating in the manner §4.2's projection operated.

Claim 5. *Obstruction attaches to the rigidity with which a term of $\hat{G}$ is held, leaving aside the term's content and its temporal position. Unfavourable interpretations held provisionally obstruct nothing; favourable interpretations held rigidly obstruct in the manner Claim 4 describes.*

5.3 The Conduct Condition

The second condition concerns which holdings enter the account at all. A term of $\hat{G}$ bears on obstruction through the conduct it conditions. A projection a party holds and acts on enters the relational dynamics by way of the acting; a projection held privately, with no conduct answering to it, remains outside them. The account concerns the estimated space as it conditions conduct, and an interpretation with no conduct answering to it falls outside its reach.

A party's private assessments are its own. A projection of foreclosure that alters nothing in a party's dealings with another produces no obstruction of that other, whatever distress it occasions the party holding it. The account describes relational dynamics and takes an interpretation into account where the dynamics register it.

The condition admits degrees and resists sharp application. Conduct is conditioned in ways ranging from the explicit to the barely marked, and the threshold below which a conditioned conduct fails to register is unspecified here. This is a vagueness of the same kind the earlier paper conceded in its treatment of relational significance, and it is conceded on the same terms: the vagueness attaches to the account's application in place of its central claim.

5.4 The Position of Symbolic Mechanisms

The earlier paper treated symbolic mechanisms as those by which obstruction becomes self-reproducing, on the ground that fixing an interpretation regulates the interactions that would revise it. The present account places that treatment in a wider setting.

The terms of $\hat{G}$ are interpretations, and mechanisms fixing interpretations therefore operate on them directly. Narratives fix reconstructions of the past, a point developed in the literature on collective memory [8]; institutional categories fix construals of present constraints; and expectations transmitted through a community fix projections of what follows. Each is a route by which a term of $\hat{G}$ comes to be held as accurate, and Claim 4 then applies.

This suggests a reading of the earlier paper's treatment. Symbolic closure was described there as a mechanism producing persistence in obstruction; it may be described here as a mechanism producing rigidity in the terms of an estimated space. The two descriptions pick

out the same structure, the second locating it with respect to the object this paper takes as central.

Whether the second description supersedes the first, or whether the two are complementary treatments of one phenomenon at different levels, is left open. The question bears on how the series is organized in place of on what either paper claims, and §7 enters it.

6 THE COSTS OF THE EXTENSION

The extension carries four costs. Two sharpen difficulties the earlier paper already recorded; one concerns the framework's standing as a dynamical account; and one concerns a claim the argument might be taken to establish and does not.

6.1 *Access to the Interpretive Field*

The earlier paper found that attributions of obstruction are licensed for parties within a relation and unlicensed for observers outside one. The ground was that reference models are justified by their role in coordination, and an observer coordinating with neither party has no such role to appeal to. The restriction was a licensing restriction: it concerned what an observer is entitled to assert.

The present extension adds an epistemic restriction alongside it, and the two are distinct.

Where obstruction is assessed over $\hat{G}$, an attribution of obstruction reports on a party's estimated space. That space is composed from the party's reconstruction, construal, and projection, and an observer requires access to these to report on it. Such access is harder to obtain than access to a party's circumstances, and it is harder in a manner the framework's own commitments explain. A party's circumstances are, within limits, publicly available. Its reconstruction of its history is available through report, and report is conduct, which §5.3 holds to be conditioned by the very space the report concerns.

The consequence is that an observer's access to $\hat{G}$ runs through material the framework holds to be conditioned by $\hat{G}$. This is a circularity in the evidential situation in place of the argument, and it admits no resolution the present resources supply.

Two mitigations are available, neither developed here. Conduct other than report bears on $\hat{G}$ and is observable, so that an estimated space may be inferred from what a party does in place of what it says. And divergence between $\hat{G}$ and G becomes observable in its consequences, since conduct answering to a contracted space produces outcomes that conduct answering to the available space would not. Whether either supports the inferences an empirical programme would require is entered in §7.

The cost is accordingly this. The framework's causal reach has been extended to cases the earlier paper could not treat, and its evidential position has been weakened in the same

movement. A reader who valued the earlier account for its comparative testability should regard the present extension as a trade in place of an improvement.

6.2 *The Standing of Constructed Cases*

The earlier paper employed a constructed case and stated its standing: such cases exhibit an argument in a setting, forgoing evidential weight for control. The present paper employs three, and their standing is the same. The point requires restatement because the extension increases the temptation to treat them as more.

The cases of §4 are recognizable. A reader will supply instances from experience, and the supplying is what makes the cases legible. Recognition is not evidence. That a described mechanism is familiar establishes that the description is intelligible and leaves open whether the mechanism operates as described, how frequently, and under what conditions. The cases exhibit Claims 2 through 5 in settings where their operation is visible, and they establish none of them.

6.3 *The Framework as a Dynamical Account*

An argument of this shape can be taken to remove the framework from the class of dynamical theories, on the ground that its objects are interpretations in place of physical configurations. The reading is declined.

The substitution effected here is of the state space. Where the earlier paper's assessments ranged over G , determined by a system's history and constraints, the present assessments range over $\hat{G}$, composed as §3 describes. A system whose states are estimated spaces, evolving as §3.3 holds them to evolve, has the shape a dynamical account requires: states, an ordering on them, and conditioning of later states by earlier.

Neither this paper nor the earlier one supplies such an account, and §3.2 is explicit that its notation establishes nothing. The substitution specifies more precisely what a formalization would formalize, leaving the formal programme of the earlier paper intact with its state space replaced. The reading declined above would have removed that programme; the reading taken here leaves it standing and unexecuted.

6.4 *The Humean Difficulty*

The earlier paper declined to specify a trajectory a system ought to have followed, on the ground that such a specification requires a warrant the descriptive facts fail to supply [9]. The present extension might be taken to answer that difficulty. A projected trajectory raises no question of what ought to be, since a projection claims to represent what is coming in place of what is owed, and a framework operating over projections might appear to have escaped the problem.

It has escaped the problem on terms less favourable than they appear. The difficulty was never that trajectories are unavailable. It was that a trajectory carrying normative weight requires a warrant, and the descriptive resources supply none. Substituting $\hat{\gamma}$ for γ^* dissolves the difficulty by removing the normative claim: a projection makes none, and no warrant is owed. The dissolution is complete and it costs the framework the ground on which any projection could be criticized. A party's reconstruction may be self-serving, its projection may be wildly mistaken, and the account retains no resources with which to fault either. It can say that a term is held rigidly, which §5 establishes to bear on obstruction. It cannot say that a term is wrong in a sense carrying any weight.

The Humean difficulty is accordingly avoided in place of solved, and the avoidance is purchased at the price the earlier paper's declining of normative questions already entailed. A framework wishing to say that some interpretations are better than others would require the normative layer both papers defer, and would face the difficulty there in its original form.

7 QUESTIONS LEFT OPEN

The items below are ordered by their bearing on the account's standing, beginning with those on which it is most exposed.

7.1 *The Structure of the Composition*

Section 3 states that $\hat{G}$ depends on three interpretively mediated horizons and supplies no account of the dependence. Supplying one is the principal formal task the paper leaves undone, and three questions organize it. Whether the horizons compose additively or interact. An additive composition would permit the contribution of each horizon to be assessed independently; an interactive one would make the contribution of a reconstruction depend on the projection accompanying it, which the cases of §4 suggest without establishing.

Whether one horizon dominates under specifiable conditions. Section 4.3 exhibits a reconstruction dominating a construed present, and the conditions under which such domination occurs are unexamined here.

Which structure represents an estimated space. The earlier paper posed the corresponding question for G and noted that a continuation space admits contraction, expansion, and deformation. An estimated space admits these and admits also the divergence from G that this paper treats, and a representation adequate to both is wanted.

7.2 *Testing an Account of Models*

Claims 4 and 5 are falsifiable in the manner the earlier paper's central claim was falsifiable, and the difficulty of testing them is greater.

The prediction is that a term of $\hat{G}$ held as accurate degrades its correction channel, and that obstruction attends the degradation. Testing it requires observing the terms of parties' estimated spaces and the rigidity with which they are held. Section 6.1 records that access to these runs through conduct the terms themselves condition.

Two routes were mentioned there and neither is developed. Inference from conduct other than report may support claims about a party's estimated space, and the inference would require an account of which conduct bears on which terms. Divergence between $\hat{G}$ and G is observable in its consequences, and an account of which consequences distinguish a contracted estimated space from a contracted available one would be required. Whether either supports an empirical programme is open.

7.3 *The Organization of the Series*

Section 5.4 observed that symbolic closure admits two descriptions: as a mechanism producing persistence in obstruction, which the earlier paper gave, and as a mechanism producing rigidity in the terms of an estimated space, which the present account permits. Whether these are one phenomenon described at two levels, or two phenomena related in a manner requiring statement, bears on how the series is organized.

A related question concerns the primitive. The earlier paper defined obstruction over G ; the present paper assesses it over $\hat{G}$; and the relation between the two definitions requires more than the present treatment supplies. Section 2.4 held that the inventory is unaltered and the emphasis has moved. Whether a third paper should define the primitive over $\hat{G}$ directly, treating the earlier definition as the special case in which model and available space coincide, is open.

7.4 *Relation to Predictive Accounts in Cognitive Science*

The apparatus assembled here bears a structural resemblance to apparatus developed in the cognitive sciences under the headings of predictive coding, predictive processing, and active inference [13, 5, 4, 6, 12], and the resemblance was noted in the earlier paper's treatment of reference models without being pursued. No claim of derivation is entered, and the accounts differ in the respects set out below.

The resemblance is structural: a system acting on a generative model of its situation, revising the model against material the model failed to anticipate, and conducting itself so as to bring its situation into accord with what the model represents. Whether the resemblance supports transfer in either direction is open, and two obstacles are visible. The cognitive accounts concern a system modelling an environment that returns no model; the present account concerns parties modelling each other. And the cognitive accounts specify an objective, prediction error, which the present account declines to supply for reasons §6.4 gives.

7.5 The Normative Layer

Section 6.4 found that the account retains no resources with which to fault an interpretation. A framework wishing to supply them would face the Humean difficulty in its original form, and the candidate the earlier paper identified remains the candidate here: unrevisability, as a property of a relation, is what survives after trajectories are deprived of normative standing. Why the openness of a relation to revision by its parties should carry normative weight is unanswered by either paper.

8 CLOSING

The earlier paper in this series defined generative obstruction over the continuations available to a system in fact, and deferred a class of cases its resources could not reach: conflict arising from foreclosure a party anticipates in place of foreclosure it undergoes.

This paper has argued that the reference models the earlier paper required are composed of three interpretively mediated horizons, that assessment of a party's own prospects is a function of all three, and that conduct answers to the space so composed. The extension reaches anticipated foreclosure and offers a reading of grievance, both through resources the earlier account already contained. Its composition is tense-neutral and its evolution is temporally ordered, which preserves the path-dependence the earlier paper derived. And the property bearing on obstruction remains the one the earlier paper identified: the rigidity with which a term is held, leaving aside the term's content and its temporal position.

The costs have been stated at length. The framework's evidential position is weaker than before, since assessment over an interpretive field requires access to that field, and the access runs through conduct the field conditions. The Humean difficulty is avoided in place of solved, at the price of any ground on which an interpretation might be faulted. And whether a framework organized around estimated spaces retains the minimality the series began with is a question the series has yet to settle.

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The author used Claude (Anthropic) for discussion, drafting assistance, and editorial revision. All theoretical claims, arguments, and conclusions are the author's own, and the author takes full responsibility for the content.

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