

Preserving Decision Authorship under Uncertain Interpretation of Will and Preferences in Adult Disability Support

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Abstract

Assistance can make a person's decision possible while leaving the person vulnerable to interpretive substitution and control of the available options. This paper develops a framework for adult disability support when will and preferences admit several warranted interpretations. Decision authorship is distinguished from causal responsiveness, functional performance, legal capacity, the validity of a particular act, and responsibility. A set-valued model separates semantic fidelity from authority over support and menus. Conditional results characterize compatible outcomes under interpretive uncertainty, changes under additional evidence, and the limited relation between menu expansion and compatibility. Counterexamples show that reversing every expressed preference satisfies sensitivity, that a constant outcome can satisfy fidelity, and that accurate selection within a restricted menu can coexist with an objectionable exclusion of alternatives. A temporal extension distinguishes learning about an earlier preference from forming a present preference through support. A finite branchwise result identifies when clarification permits compatible implementation despite an empty initial intersection. The normative discussion confronts CRPD Article 12, the Committee's corrected General Comment No. 1, selected provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and a prior proposal for interpretive support. A fictional community-participation decision demonstrates the audit, including disagreement, refusal, revision and supporter conflict. The resulting framework makes uncertainty and authority answerable without converting mathematical compatibility into permission to decide for another person. Empirical validation and case-specific legal application remain open.

Keywords: supported decision-making; decision authorship; interpretive uncertainty; will and preferences; disability support

Research Note

This paper develops a bounded argument through conceptual distinctions, stated assumptions, conditional derivations, worked examples, and objections. Its length follows the requirements of that argument. Formal statements concern the specified models; the application of those models to persons and institutions requires independent interpretation and evidence. Constructed examples are explicitly identified and carry illustrative status.

The manuscript follows the repository’s paper template for typography, numbered formal statements, section structure, citations, and navigable contents. The associated project files preserve research provenance, source verification, derivation records, unresolved objections, and validation results. Philosophical commitments about the ultimate nature of social facts remain suspended where the descriptive framework is sufficient for the argument.

Authorship and Research Assistance

Wanhong Huang directed the research questions and authorized this paper’s preparation. An AI research assistant helped organize the material, develop explicit formal constructions, check primary sources, and prepare the text. Agent-added arguments and formulations remain subject to the author’s review. Source positions, repository proposals, and model consequences are distinguished throughout the manuscript.

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1 Introduction

This paper examines adult disability support for decisions whose meaning remains partly uncertain to the people providing assistance. Its objective is to distinguish preserving a person's authorship from producing an outcome that responds to that person in some causal way. The argument proceeds through a bounded legal and philosophical setting, a formal account of interpretive uncertainty, an analysis of control over available options, and a fictional decision episode. Conditional propositions establish relations among explicitly defined sets. Normative premises establish the reasons for respecting the person whose decision is at issue.

Consider an adult choosing how to spend an afternoon. A supporter recognizes a gesture, explains transport arrangements, helps compare activities, and communicates the eventual choice to a service provider. Each contribution can enable an act that would otherwise be difficult. Each also provides an opportunity to influence which possibilities receive consideration and how the person's expression is understood. A record stating that the person selected an activity leaves these contributions largely invisible. Its accuracy about the final selection can coexist with uncertainty about the process through which that selection became available.

The initial conceptual temptation is to identify authorship with causal influence: if different preferences would produce different outcomes, the person's input seems to matter. The difficulty emerges immediately in a reversal rule. A supporter who consistently implements the opposite of a clearly understood preference is highly responsive to the person's input. The input explains the output while the output contradicts the preference. A second temptation identifies authorship with accurate execution of the selected option. This overlooks the supporter who accurately executes a selection after unjustifiably excluding the person's favored alternative. These examples concern distinct failures, requiring distinct tests.

Interpretive uncertainty adds a further complication. A gesture may indicate interest in an activity, recognition of its photograph, refusal of the present question, or a request to speak with someone else. The possibilities warrant patient attention to communication history and current context. They also make a single inferred preference an inadequate representation of the evidence. The paper uses a set of candidate interpretations to retain such disagreement. Membership in that set represents a reasoned evidential possibility; it carries no implication that every imagined interpretation deserves equal weight.

The central position is that supported authorship involves three separable achievements: warranted interpretation of the person's will and preferences; semantic fidelity between that interpretation and the proposed action; and justified authority over the arrangements that shape, express and implement the decision. These achievements interact. Better communication can change the available interpretations, a wider menu can make previously inexpressible commitments practicable, and the person's rejection of a supporter can change the conditions of interpretation. Keeping the achievements distinguishable makes those interactions assessable.

The contribution is deliberately local. The paper develops an uncertainty and menu analysis within adult disability support, building on established attention to support, legal capacity and interpretive assistance. Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities supplies a rights framework [5]. The formal construction concerns interpretation and implementation; personhood and case-specific legal assessment require separate arguments. Its purpose is to identify the additional premises needed when an apparently satisfactory outcome is offered as evidence of authorship.

The extended discussion matters because the elementary mathematics can otherwise become misleading. An intersection of compatible outcomes can look like a decision procedure even when the underlying interpretations are biased. A carefully recorded support intervention can look legitimate even when the person lacks a practical way to refuse it. A present preference can look like confirmation of an earlier interpretation even when the support process helped form it. The following sections keep these distinctions explicit and make their consequences available for criticism.

2 Normative and Legal Setting

This section establishes the sources and normative premises that delimit the analysis. It first identifies the relevant rights framework, then distinguishes a statutory comparator and an earlier interpretive-support proposal. The comparison explains why mathematical compatibility and legal authorization require separate treatment.

Article 12 affirms equal legal capacity, access to support and safeguards concerning rights, will, preferences, conflicts, undue influence and review [5]. The Committee's General Comment No. 1 distinguishes legal capacity from decision-making skills. Its paragraphs 21 and 29 address interpretation under persistent uncertainty, access to support and control of the support relationship. Paragraph 22 connects safeguards with the person's freedom to take risks [2]. These are positions of the treaty body interpreting the Convention; they are identified at that level throughout the paper.

The 2018 correction to paragraph 27 is consequential. The corrected description of substitute decision-making uses alternatives: removal of legal capacity, appointment in the specified circumstances against the person's will, or an objective-best-interests basis for the substitute decision [3]. Treating those features as a conjunction would allow a regime exhibiting one feature to escape the description simply because another feature was absent. The manuscript therefore uses the corrected text when locating its normative problem.

For a bounded contrast, sections 1–4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in England and Wales combine a presumption of capacity and practicable assistance with a matter- and time-specific test. They address understanding, retention, use or weighing of information, and communication. The Act also provides a best-interests framework that includes participation and attention to wishes, feelings, beliefs and values [4]. The contrast concerns these provisions, with their respective legal status retained.

The resulting philosophical tension is substantive. A procedure can incorporate careful attention to a person's wishes while retaining a different final basis for deciding. Conversely, a declared commitment to will and preferences can leave the difficult work of interpretation unspecified. These possibilities show why shared vocabulary alone is insufficient to establish shared authority arrangements. The present framework asks what each procedure treats as its target, what supports its interpretation, who may challenge it, and which reasons ultimately control the action.

Bach and Kerzner's commissioned proposal already develops interpretive assistance through personal knowledge, communication and consequential action [1]. That precedent forecloses a novelty claim based merely on recognizing that support can involve understanding unconventional expression. The proposal also raises a question for the present analysis: when a familiar supporter gives an account of what a person intends, which features make that account warranted and revisable? Familiarity can supply evidence while leaving room for error, conflict and changed preferences. The present contribution concerns the structure of that assessment.

Assumption 2.1 (Presumption of decision subjecthood). For the adult whose decision is under consideration, the inquiry begins from recognition of that person's standing to participate in interpreting, expressing, revising and acting on will and preferences. A proposed restriction requires an independently articulated normative and procedural justification.

Assumption 2.1 is a proposed normative starting point. Its role is to direct the distribution of justificatory burdens. It prevents an investigator from treating uncertainty in the investigator's interpretation as sufficient evidence that the person's role may be transferred. The assumption receives support from the rights orientation just described, while its full philosophical defense remains broader than any set-theoretic result below.

This treatment also keeps a legal comparison from becoming a composite legal rule. The paper supplies an analytic argument about ordinary adult support decisions. Applying it to a particular transaction requires the applicable jurisdiction, legal instrument, facts and procedural standards. The distinction permits a clear comparison of normative architectures while preserving uncertainty about applications that have received no case-specific investigation.

3 Decision Authorship and Its Neighboring Concepts

This section defines the research target and separates it from concepts that can be confused with it. The distinctions concern causal contribution, functional performance, legal standing, validity and responsibility. They prepare the formal analysis by identifying what its variables are intended to represent.

Definition 3.1 (Supported decision authorship). Supported decision authorship is a person's maintained role in interpreting, expressing, revising and directing the practical realization of that person's will and preferences through assistance. Assessments of this role distinguish interpretive warrant, semantic fidelity and authority over the supporting process.

This working definition treats assistance as compatible with authorship. It allows someone else to read a document aloud, translate an expression, arrange transport or execute a transaction. The crucial inquiry concerns the relation between that assistance and the person's practical position. Physical execution by another person can faithfully realize a decision. Physical execution by the person can occur within an arrangement whose significant alternatives have been controlled by someone else.

Causal contribution asks whether some change in the person's input would alter an outcome. Authorship asks a richer question about the significance and authority of the contribution. A person's distress can cause a service to cancel an activity even when the person wished to continue with a different form of support. Conversely, the person may deliberately reaffirm an arrangement that would have continued in any case. An unchanged outcome leaves the practical act of reaffirmation unresolved. Assessing authorship therefore requires evidence about the decision episode and its alternatives.

A functional profile records how the person engages with a task under specified conditions. The repository's preliminary profile distinguishes understanding, application of information, reasoning and expression. Such observations can reveal a need for accessible language, a different communication medium, more time or practical demonstrations. The profile is an analytic organizing device. Its coordinates have no validated common scale, universal threshold or direct conversion into a person's standing.

Legal capacity concerns a legally structured position; the validity of a particular act concerns the requirements governing that act. An interpretation of a preference can be well warranted while a transaction remains invalid for a distinct procedural reason. An institution can recognize a transaction while its support arrangements remain open to ethical criticism. These are reasons to specify the question being answered whenever an assessment uses terms such as competent, valid or autonomous.

Responsibility concerns another set of relations. A supporter may have duties of accuracy, disclosure, communication or implementation. A service provider may control whether an option is available. A reviewer may have an obligation to respond to a challenge. Preserving the person's authorship leaves these duties visible. It provides no reason to attribute every consequence of the joint arrangement to the supported person.

Table 1 summarizes the distinctions. The table organizes the inquiry; it offers no diagnostic scoring rule.

The distinctions remain useful when evidence is incomplete. A record may support a narrow conclusion about successful communication while leaving menu construction unresolved. A supporter may act faithfully under one plausible interpretation while another remains viable. These mixed assessments are more informative than a single global authorship label. They locate what has been achieved and what further participation, evidence or justification would improve the arrangement.

Table 1: Assessment targets in a supported decision episode

Target	Relevant question	Additional warrant
Causal responsiveness	Which inputs affect the outcome?	Counterfactual or observational evidence
Semantic fidelity	Which actions accord with a warranted interpretation?	Independent meaning and compatibility account
Process authority	Who controls support and options?	Legitimate scope, participation and challenge
Functional performance	Which task activities are possible with support?	Task, time and access conditions
Legal or act status	Which legal requirements apply?	Jurisdiction and governing instrument
Responsibility	Which actor bears which duty?	Role, knowledge, control and applicable standard

4 Formal Domains and Interpretive Commitments

This section introduces the formal objects in an order that keeps interpretation separate from calculation. A finite decision episode supplies the task, alternatives, evidence and candidate interpretations. Compatibility relations then connect an interpretation to actions. Finiteness supports transparent examples; most elementary inclusion results extend to arbitrary sets.

Fix an adult i , a decision task q and a target time t . Let A be a declared universe of practically described alternatives. An element of A can be attending an activity, remaining at home, postponing a decision, refusing a particular arrangement or requesting another supporter. Those possibilities enter only when they have a determinate meaning for the episode. Writing a refusal option into a model provides no evidence that refusal is practically accessible.

Let $M \subseteq A$ be the menu available under an arrangement r . Here r includes communication resources, the order of presentation, supporter roles, institutional constraints and review routes. Distinguish actual availability from the alternatives the person understands to be available, denoted $\widehat{M}_i$. The sets can differ. A service may have a place available that the supporter has never mentioned, or the person may believe that an unavailable activity remains possible.

Let e collect the evidence used in interpretation. It can include the person’s expressions, their own correction of an earlier account, relevant communication history and records of how the question was presented. Define

$$B(e; q, t) \subseteq W_{q,t}, \quad B(e; q, t) \neq \emptyset, \quad (1)$$

where $W_{q,t}$ is a space of candidate interpretations. A candidate w describes one possible meaning or practical orientation attributed to the person. It is a model of will and preferences for the declared purpose. It is distinct from a direct measurement of an inaccessible inner object.

Definition 4.1 (Compatibility correspondence). For a candidate interpretation w , let $C(w) \subseteq A$ contain the actions compatible with that interpretation under explicitly stated practical conditions. For questions whose meaning depends on a particular menu, use a separate correspondence $C_M(w) \subseteq M$.

The distinction between C and C_M is essential. A fixed correspondence might express willingness to attend either of two activities, with a third incompatible. A menu-dependent correspondence might identify the person’s best-ranked available option. Expanding the menu leaves the first interpretation fixed only under a stability assumption. It can change the second correspondence by introducing a newly preferred option. Confusing these constructions would produce a false monotonicity claim.

Compatibility may be permissive. Someone can regard two activities as acceptable without ranking them. Someone can express an unresolved tension between social contact and rest. A correspondence can preserve those possibilities through several elements. It may also be empty relative to the declared universe. For example, the person may ask for a form of participation absent from every listed option. That emptiness diagnoses the modeled arrangement, not the disappearance of the person’s practical perspective.

Assumption 4.2 (Independent compatibility warrant). The reasons for placing an action in $C(w)$ or $C_M(w)$ are specified independently of the fact that the supporter eventually selected that action. Candidate admissibility and compatibility are open to correction by the person and to appropriate review.

Independence here concerns the warrant for each assessment; statistical dependence may still be present. The same conversation can supply evidence for interpretation and choice. The requirement is that the assessment contain reasons beyond the circular explanation that the outcome must represent the preference because it was recorded as the decision. A reviewer should be able to identify a possible outcome that would count against the interpretation or against its claimed implementation.

Finally, let $F(w, r, q) \in A$ denote a proposed implementation rule in a counterfactual model. Actual practice often observes only F evaluated at a fallible estimate of w . The notation therefore idealizes what a rule would do under candidate meanings; it establishes no experimental access to all such meanings. A separate predicate $\Gamma(r, e, q)$ records whether the authority arrangement has received the required independent justification. Subsequent sections investigate the relation between these objects while retaining their different evidential and normative roles.

5 Responsiveness and Semantic Fidelity

This section evaluates the preliminary causal-input test and derives its limitations through explicit countermodels. It then introduces a conditional fidelity test. The aim is to preserve the useful question about influence while preventing that question from carrying a stronger conclusion than its definition supports.

Definition 5.1 (Sensitivity of an implementation rule). For fixed r and q , a rule F is sensitive on B when there exist $w_1, w_2 \in B$ such that $F(w_1, r, q) \neq F(w_2, r, q)$.

Sensitivity distinguishes a rule that reacts to some difference in interpretation from a rule whose output remains constant across the investigated domain. It can help expose a procedure that solicits input while enforcing a predetermined outcome. Its interpretation nevertheless depends on the selected domain. Restricting B to one candidate makes sensitivity impossible, even when the arrangement accurately executes the person's settled choice. A singleton domain is therefore an immediate reason to resist treating sensitivity as a universal authorship requirement.

Proposition 5.2 (Reversal countermodel). *Sensitivity of an implementation rule is insufficient for semantic fidelity.*

Proof. Let $W = A = \{0, 1\}$, let $C(w) = \{w\}$ and define $F(w, r, q) = 1 - w$. Then $F(0, r, q) = 1$ and $F(1, r, q) = 0$, so the rule is sensitive. For each $w \in W$, however, $F(w, r, q) \notin C(w)$. Thus sensitivity holds while fidelity fails at both admissible interpretations. $\square$

The example stipulates transparent preferences in order to isolate the logical point. It avoids the suggestion that supporters ordinarily possess such transparent access. The argument becomes stronger when uncertainty is restored: an observed correlation between expression and outcome would still require interpretation of what the expressions mean and whether the resulting actions accord with them.

Proposition 5.3 (Constant compatible implementation). *A constant rule can satisfy semantic fidelity throughout a candidate domain containing distinct interpretations.*

Proof. Let $B = \{w_1, w_2\}$ and $A = \{a, b, c\}$. Set $C(w_1) = \{a, b\}$ and $C(w_2) = \{a, c\}$. The constant rule $F(w, r, q) = a$ belongs to $C(w)$ for each $w \in B$. Its fidelity follows from the common compatible option, despite its failure of sensitivity on B . $\square$

One interpretation might allow either a museum visit or a walk, while another allows the museum or a music group. Choosing the museum can accord with both. Whether the supporter has authority to select it remains a further question. Perhaps the person wished to choose between acceptable options

personally. Perhaps a previously authorized arrangement permits the supporter to select among them. The mathematical example leaves that distinction open because the compatibility sets alone contain no representation of delegated authority.

For a stated interpretation, define the fidelity predicate

$$\Phi(w, r, q) = \mathbf{1}\{F(w, r, q) \in C(w)\}. \quad (2)$$

The indicator records satisfaction of a relation under a model. It is useful for auditing an explicit rule or a constructed case. Turning it into a person-level score would erase the interpretive and normative work on which the relation depends. A numerical value of one means only that the stipulated action belongs to the stipulated compatibility set.

Even a conjunction of sensitivity and fidelity can leave authorship unsettled. Suppose a service carefully distinguishes several expressed preferences, reliably selects a compatible activity in each case, and threatens to withdraw essential assistance whenever the person asks for a different supporter. The implementation may pass both formal checks. The authority arrangement remains objectionable under the normative premise because control over support is practically unavailable. The example locates a missing dimension; it supplies no estimate of how often such arrangements occur.

A useful audit therefore reports sensitivity, fidelity and process authority separately. A weak sensitivity result can prompt investigation of predetermined outcomes. A fidelity failure can prompt correction of interpretation or implementation. A failure of authority can require a different support arrangement even when the output appears acceptable. Combining these observations into a single success label would conceal which repair is needed and whose role is at stake.

6 Compatible Outcomes under Interpretive Uncertainty

This section develops the set-valued treatment of uncertainty. It derives robust compatibility and its behavior under evidence refinement, then distinguishes several reasons for an empty result. The construction is a device for exposing disagreement, with an independent normative decision process retained.

Fix the task, time and practical conditions from Section 4. For nonempty $B \subseteq W$ and menu M , define

$$\mathcal{R}(B, M) = M \cap \bigcap_{w \in B} C(w), \quad \mathcal{U}(B, M) = M \cap \bigcup_{w \in B} C(w). \quad (3)$$

The robust set $\mathcal{R}$ contains actions compatible with every admissible interpretation. The union $\mathcal{U}$ contains actions compatible with at least one. An action in $\mathcal{U} \setminus \mathcal{R}$ therefore requires a discriminating interpretive judgment or an explicitly defended way of acting under unresolved disagreement.

Proposition 6.1 (Evidence refinement and robust compatibility). *Suppose C and M are fixed and $\emptyset \neq B_1 \subseteq B_2$. Then*

$$\mathcal{R}(B_2, M) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(B_1, M), \quad \mathcal{U}(B_1, M) \subseteq \mathcal{U}(B_2, M).$$

Proof. An element of $\mathcal{R}(B_2, M)$ belongs to M and to $C(w)$ for every $w \in B_2$. Since every element of B_1 also belongs to B_2 , it belongs to all the required sets for $\mathcal{R}(B_1, M)$. For the union, a witness $w \in B_1$ establishing membership also belongs to B_2 . $\square$

The inclusion says that removing a genuinely excluded interpretation relaxes the requirement of agreement across interpretations. It can enlarge the robust set. It simultaneously removes some actions supported only by discarded interpretations from the union. Thus better evidence can make a particular action more securely compatible while reducing the range of actions that remain even possibly compatible.

The qualification about genuine exclusion carries the empirical burden. Repeated questioning until the person produces the supporter's favored response could create a narrower recorded candidate set through selection or pressure. The proposition remains algebraically true for the resulting sets. Its practical interpretation would fail because the refinement lacks adequate warrant. Mathematics exposes a conditional relation; the evidence audit determines whether the relation describes an improvement.

Example 6.2 (Distinct empty-set diagnoses). Let $A = \{a, b, c\}$. If $C(w_1) = \{a\}$ and $C(w_2) = \{b\}$, their intersection is empty even when $M = A$. If both sets equal $\{a\}$ while $M = \{b, c\}$, their intersection contains a but the menu excludes it. If $C(w_1) = \emptyset$, the modeled alternatives fail to realize that interpretation even before disagreement with another candidate is considered.

The first case locates interpretive disagreement; the second locates unavailable implementation; the third locates an inadequate or incompatible action universe. These diagnoses suggest different next steps. Additional communication may help distinguish interpretations. Resource negotiation may restore an excluded activity. Reformulating the task may reveal that the person was expressing a request missing from the menu. The formal result supplies a location for the difficulty, not a general instruction to defer indefinitely.

An empty B is treated separately. It indicates that the current evidence and modeling assumptions admit no candidate, or that the inquiry has failed to specify candidates. Intersecting an empty family would yield the universe under the usual set convention. Here that convention would produce a dangerously misleading impression of universal compatibility. The model therefore requires nonempty B and reports inconsistency or specification failure explicitly.

Probabilities can supplement this analysis when their basis is defensible. A distribution over B can express degrees of confidence in interpretations, while a loss function can encode the consequences of interpretive error. Yet choosing a loss function introduces evaluative judgments about whose burdens matter and how. A maximizer of expected compatibility inherits those judgments. It gains no authority over the person's decision from the optimization operation alone.

Robust compatibility is consequently an evidential category with practical relevance. A nonempty set can identify actions that leave one specified disagreement immaterial. It can also contain several options among which the person wishes to choose. An empty set can identify a need to reconsider support, resources or interpretation. The response to either case should preserve the person's standing and make the governing reasons explicit.

7 Menu Construction and Process Authority

This section examines control over alternatives. It proves a limited expansion result for a fixed compatibility correspondence, constructs a counterexample for menu-dependent preferences, and uses the distinction to analyze authority. The argument explains why accurate final selection leaves an important upstream question unresolved.

Figure 1 locates the two warrants within the proposed audit. Interpretation and menu specification support a compatibility assessment. The support history and independent normative reasons support an authority assessment. A favorable conclusion about either branch leaves the other branch open until its own reasons have been examined.

Proposition 7.1 (Expansion under fixed compatibility). *For nonempty B , fixed C , and $M_1 \subseteq M_2 \subseteq A$,*

$$\mathcal{R}(B, M_1) \subseteq \mathcal{R}(B, M_2).$$

Proof. Write $K = \bigcap_{w \in B} C(w)$. If $a \in M_1 \cap K$, then $a \in M_2$ by menu inclusion and $a \in K$ by hypothesis. Hence $a \in M_2 \cap K$. $\square$

The result states that providing additional actions can restore ways to implement an already specified interpretation. It applies, for example, when all candidate interpretations permit a museum visit that transport restrictions previously excluded. It establishes a relation among feasible compatible actions. It supplies no ranking of larger menus, and it leaves cognitive burden, meaning changes and the person's wish for assistance with comparison open.

Example 7.2 (Menu-relative fidelity). Suppose one candidate interpretation describes the strict ranking $a \succ b \succ c$. Define $C_M(w)$ to contain the highest-ranked member of M . For $M_1 = \{b, c\}$, $C_{M_1}(w) =$




Figure 1: Separate evidential and authority questions in the proposed support audit. Arrows identify inputs to an assessment; they confer no decision authority by themselves.

$\{b\}$. For $M_2 = \{a, b, c\}$, $C_{M_2}(w) = \{a\}$. Choosing b is faithful to the stipulated best-available rule in the first menu; b loses that status in the expanded menu.

The example separates two questions. The first asks whether the supporter followed the person’s ranking within the presented menu. The second asks whether excluding a was justified. A positive answer to the first provides insufficient evidence for the second. The exclusion might reflect an actual closure, a constraint that could be overcome with reasonable planning, or the supporter’s preference for an easier afternoon. Those reasons have different implications despite producing the same visible menu.

For an audit, distinguish three menu records: the options practically available, the options presented, and the options understood. An accessible list can improve the relation between presentation and understanding. It cannot by itself establish that the original list was complete for the task. Conversely, offering every imaginable option can overwhelm the person or obscure the alternatives they care about. A focused menu can be enabling when its selection is answerable to the person’s purposes and open to revision.

Let $\Gamma(r, e, q)$ indicate that the support arrangement has received an appropriate authority justification. This is a placeholder for a structured assessment, not a numerically calibrated predicate. The assessment includes who defined the task, who selected the menu, who controls communication, how conflicts were addressed, and how the person can refuse or revise the arrangement. Its criteria depend on the relevant normative and institutional setting.

Claim 7.3 (Separate warrants for a supported implementation). Under the proposed authorship framework, a favorable assessment of an implementation requires both a warranted account of compatibility with the person’s will and preferences and a warranted account of authority over the supporting process. Evidence for either component can leave the other unresolved.

Claim 7.3 is a normative-analytic proposal. The reversal and menu examples support the distinction by showing how the components vary independently. They cannot prove every proposed authority criterion. Those criteria require further reasons concerning equal standing, access, conflicts, refusal and the burdens of error.

The philosophical implication concerns the location of agency. A person can remain the author of a decision whose practical realization is distributed among several people. Authorship need not imply isolated production of the entire episode. At the same time, distribution of work can conceal concentration of control. A support network might divide transport, interpretation and paperwork while one member retains effective control over every meaningful alternative. Counting contributors would miss that concentration.

The menu audit therefore follows decisions upstream. It asks how the task and its alternatives acquired their present form, whether the person can contest that form, and whether the available support permits the person’s correction to have consequences. An accurate final expression matters within this wider history. Its value becomes clearer when the record also preserves the conditions under which it was obtained.

8 Preference Formation and Temporal Interpretation

This section extends the static model to support that changes understanding or preference. It distinguishes evidence about an earlier orientation from the formation of a present one. The extension preserves the possibility that assistance can be constitutively valuable while making retrospective attribution more difficult.

Let w_0 denote a candidate interpretation of the person's orientation before a support intervention and w_1 a candidate after it. An intervention u can explain an option, introduce an experience, translate a term, provide a demonstration or invite reflection. Represent its possible effects by a relation

$$T_u \subseteq W_0 \times W_1. \quad (4)$$

This relation records permitted transitions within a model. It allows several later orientations for one earlier candidate and several earlier candidates for one later orientation. Its psychological applicability and the legitimacy of the intervention require separate evidence and reasons.

Let y be the observed response and let $O_u(w_0, w_1, y)$ indicate compatibility of that response with the candidate transition. Given a nonempty initial set B_0 , retain the paired set

$$P_u(y) = \{(w_0, w_1) : w_0 \in B_0, (w_0, w_1) \in T_u, O_u(w_0, w_1, y)\}. \quad (5)$$

Its first projection concerns the earlier target; its second concerns the later target. Keeping the pair makes it possible to avoid projecting present certainty backward.

Proposition 8.1 (Present agreement with historical ambiguity). *A support response can identify a current interpretation while leaving the earlier interpretation unresolved.*

Proof. Let $W_0 = \{x, z\}$, $B_0 = W_0$, $W_1 = \{v\}$ and $T_u = \{(x, v), (z, v)\}$. Suppose the observed response y is compatible with both transitions. Then $P_u(y) = T_u$. Its second projection is $\{v\}$, while its first projection is $\{x, z\}$. Thus current uniqueness coexists with earlier ambiguity. $\square$

For illustration, one initial candidate describes interest in an activity with uncertainty about its noise level; another describes an initial wish to remain at home. An accessible visit or explanation can lead either person to prefer the activity afterward. A later enthusiastic choice can support a present preference. It leaves open which earlier orientation preceded the visit. The construction establishes a possibility, with its frequency and psychological detail remaining empirical.

This distinction has practical significance for disagreements among supporters. Suppose one supporter initially interprets a gesture as assent, another interprets it as hesitation, and an explanation later produces clear assent. The later response cannot automatically vindicate the first interpretation. It can make the immediate planning question easier while leaving the historical question unsettled. Recording the sequence prevents a successful support episode from becoming an inaccurate story about earlier certainty.

Preference formation also raises an authority question. Education, explanation and shared exploration can help people discover what matters to them. Their influence is compatible with authorship when the process remains responsive and answerable to the person. Pressure, deceptive framing or systematic concealment can also change preference. A transition from w_0 to w_1 therefore provides insufficient information to classify the process. The justification concerns how the transition was invited, what alternatives remained available, and whose interests directed it.

Time indexing prevents another mistake: treating earlier preferences as an immutable standard that invalidates later change. A prior statement may have continuing relevance, particularly when the person deliberately planned for a later situation. Its authority depends on the scope of that planning and the present context. The paper leaves the legal operation of specific advance instruments to their governing rules. Analytically, the record should distinguish an earlier commitment, its conditions of application, current expression and uncertainty about their relation.

The resulting temporal audit has two outputs. One concerns what can reasonably be inferred about the person at each time. The other concerns whether the support process respected the person’s role in moving between those times. The outputs can diverge. A carefully conducted intervention can leave earlier meaning uncertain. An apparently clear trajectory can arise through objectionable pressure. Preserving both dimensions makes the account more faithful to the relational and generative insight that motivated the discussion.

8.1 Contingent implementation after clarification

This subsection distinguishes selecting one action before inquiry from selecting an action after an informative response. The comparison is useful because an empty initial intersection can coexist with a workable support process. The following result uses a fixed-target special case in which the inquiry reveals a distinction without changing the compatibility correspondence.

Let a permitted clarification have finitely many attainable responses $y \in Y$. Each response leaves a nonempty candidate set $B_y \subseteq B$ and an available menu M_y . Assume the sets B_y cover B , so the inquiry specification includes every initially admissible candidate. They may overlap if a response remains ambiguous. A contingent implementation rule $\pi : Y \rightarrow A$ chooses an action after observing the response.

Proposition 8.2 (Branchwise compatible implementation). *A rule satisfying $\pi(y) \in C(w) \cap M_y$ for every attainable y and every $w \in B_y$ exists exactly when $\mathcal{R}(B_y, M_y) \neq \emptyset$ for every attainable response.*

Proof. If such a rule exists, its action at y belongs to the corresponding robust set, establishing nonemptiness. Conversely, if each robust set is nonempty, select one element from each of the finitely many sets and assign it to $\pi(y)$. The resulting rule satisfies the required compatibility conditions. $\square$

For a finite witness, let $B = \{w_1, w_2\}$, $C(w_1) = \{a\}$ and $C(w_2) = \{b\}$ with $a \neq b$. The initial robust set is empty. Suppose a clarification yields y_1 only under w_1 and y_2 only under w_2 , with both actions available afterward. The rule $\pi(y_1) = a$, $\pi(y_2) = b$ satisfies the proposition. The initial absence of a common action can therefore identify an opportunity for discriminating support.

The conclusion is conditional on a permitted and adequately interpreted clarification. If the question pressures the person into a response, changes what the alternatives mean or fails to cover an admissible candidate, the fixed-target application needs revision. A question that forms a preference belongs in the paired transition model above. Its later branches can still support present implementation, while the earlier compatibility claim requires separate evaluation.

The rule is also only an existence result for compatible implementation. It leaves open whether the person wishes to choose the action personally, delegate that choice, postpone it or refuse the question. Authority to implement π is a separate requirement. The result’s practical value is to identify a process whose branches can preserve the person’s perspective when a premature global choice would disregard a live interpretation.

The argument clarifies a common ambiguity in the instruction to obtain more information. Additional information is useful for this target when it separates interpretations whose compatible actions conflict, or reveals an option compatible across them. A long conversation that repeats an already shared fact may leave every relevant branch unchanged. A brief accessible comparison may resolve the practical difference. The value of inquiry depends on what it can discriminate and on whether conducting it respects the person’s role.

9 A Community-Participation Decision

This section applies the framework to a fictional afternoon-planning episode. The case is constructed to expose the relations among uncertainty, access, menu formation and review. It describes no identified person, service or observed outcome, and its communication details carry illustrative status.

Table 2: Fictional support episode and the distinct questions at each stage

Stage	Record retained	Assessment task
Initial presentation	Garden/home cards; friend photograph; exact sequence	Interpret the gesture and detect omitted options
Competing accounts	Conditional companionship readings with reasons	Preserve disagreement and test candidate adequacy
Practical change	Friend unavailable at the garden time	Re-specify the action and compatibility conditions
Expanded planning	Museum transport possible with coordination	Assess menu reasons and resource responsibilities
Further support	Accessible explanation and Mira’s present expression	Distinguish current choice from earlier attribution
Implementation	Agreed arrangements and route for revision	Check execution, continuing participation and support control

Mira is an adult who uses speech, pictures and gestures in different combinations. A service offers assistance with activities. The immediate task is to arrange one afternoon. The relevant universe is $A = \{m, g, h, p\}$: a museum visit, a garden visit, time at home, or postponement of the arrangement. Mira’s actual communication practice would require personal investigation; the example stipulates a small evidence record so that each inference can be examined.

At the first meeting, the supporter shows garden and home cards. Mira points to the garden card and then to a photograph of a friend. The supporter records a garden choice. A second person familiar with Mira suggests that the friend photograph might express a condition on participation. The two interpretations are w_1 , willingness to visit either the garden or museum with the friend, and w_2 , willingness to visit the garden with the friend but preference for postponement if that arrangement remains uncertain.

For the first calculation, the alternatives include the stated companionship arrangements. Let

$$C(w_1) = \{g, m\}, \quad C(w_2) = \{g, p\}, \quad B = \{w_1, w_2\}.$$

The notation abbreviates fully specified activity descriptions. A bare label such as garden would otherwise conceal whether the friend attends. With $M = A$, the robust set is $\{g\}$ and the union is $\{g, m, p\}$. This identifies one action compatible with both interpretations under the stipulated conditions. It leaves the evidence for those interpretations and the person’s opportunity to choose open.

The service then reports that the friend cannot attend the garden at the available time. This changes a practical condition, so the previous compatibility calculation cannot simply be reused. A different action, garden without the friend, needs a different description and fresh compatibility assessment. Relabeling the changed activity with the old symbol would manufacture apparent consistency by hiding a material alteration.

Further conversation reveals that a museum visit with the friend is available if transport is rearranged. The original supporter had omitted it because rearrangement required extra coordination. That reason becomes a menu-authority question. The mathematical model can show that adding the museum restores an option compatible with w_1 . It cannot determine whether the additional coordination is owed, how it should be funded, or what Mira now prefers. Those questions need participation and an explicit account of responsibilities.

Table 2 records the stages without collapsing later evidence into earlier certainty.

Suppose an accessible explanation later leads Mira to select the museum. The decision can be presently clear even if the first gesture remains ambiguous. A record stating that Mira wanted the museum all along would exceed the stipulated evidence. A record stating that the museum was selected after additional information preserves both the present choice and the sequence through which it became possible.

Now add a rival branch. Mira asks to continue the conversation with a different supporter. The service offers the museum only if the original supporter remains in charge. Accurate museum booking

would leave the support-control question unresolved. The condition could exert pressure on the person's choice of support. Evaluating it requires the actual reasons, available alternatives and effects on the person's ability to refuse.

The case yields a concrete audit sequence: specify the decision and meaningful action descriptions; record communication and competing interpretations; check omitted options; update practical conditions; preserve the person's correction and revision; and assess who controls implementation. The sequence enables criticism at each point. Its success requires evidence of improved participation and warranted interpretation in actual practice. Completing the table records the audit; evaluating its effects requires further inquiry.

10 Supporter Duties and Review Architecture

This section connects the analytic distinctions to a proposed review arrangement. It separates the duties of interpreters, implementers, services and reviewers. The aim is to make support answerable without turning the person into the object of an endless documentation process.

The interpreter's task is to provide a reasoned account of meaning. That account should identify the expression being interpreted, relevant context, competing readings and the basis for preferring one reading. Personal familiarity can be a significant resource. It can also make an interpretation seem self-evident to the familiar supporter and inaccessible to challenge. A useful record therefore retains concrete grounds: a distinction the person regularly makes, a correction offered during the episode, or an accessible comparison that helped resolve ambiguity.

The implementer's task concerns the relation between the agreed decision and what occurs. Booking the wrong time or changing the companionship arrangement can undermine fidelity even when interpretation was careful. The implementer should identify changes in practical conditions and return material changes for further consideration. An arrangement that silently treats every logistical substitution as equivalent can displace the person's meaning through ordinary administrative convenience.

The service's role includes the architecture of available alternatives. A service may control transport, staffing, scheduling and information access. These controls can determine whether the person's preference becomes practicable. Their significance extends beyond any individual supporter's intentions. In the fictional case, the omitted museum option can be examined through responsibility for presenting choices, arranging transport and explaining resource constraints. The analysis assigns questions to roles before assigning blame to actors.

Represent this dependency structure schematically by

$$\text{Resp}_\ell(j) = \mathcal{J}_\ell(\text{conduct}_j, \text{role}_j, \text{knowledge}_j, \text{control}_j, \text{duties}_j, \text{context}). \quad (6)$$

Here j indexes an actor and ℓ a declared ethical, professional or legal standard. Equation (6) is a checklist-shaped dependency expression. A validated liability function is an open obligation. The notation makes explicit that a favorable outcome alone cannot settle whether an actor fulfilled a duty, and an adverse outcome alone cannot settle whether a duty was breached.

A reviewer should be able to distinguish a disagreement about interpretation from a disagreement about authority. If Mira's present expression clearly supports the museum, a dispute over the service's transport obligation remains possible. If transport is available, uncertainty about the companionship condition can remain. The review process should avoid forcing these different disagreements into a single question about the person's capacity.

Review also has a temporal dimension. A meaningful route for correction needs to operate while correction can still affect the decision. A formal appeal available after the activity has passed may support future reform while offering little control over the present episode. Conversely, repeated review of a settled preference can become intrusive. A proportionate arrangement should specify which changes trigger renewed inquiry, which decisions remain settled, and how the person can reopen a matter.

Claim 10.1 (Answerable support record). A useful support record makes its interpretive and practical choices challengeable by identifying their authors, reasons, limits and routes for revision. Its adequacy depends on whether the person can use those routes with appropriate assistance.

This proposed criterion treats documentation as a support for participation. The quantity of retained information is a poor substitute for accessibility. A short record that accurately preserves a disputed condition can be more useful than a long narrative that repeatedly states the supporter's conclusion. The record should also respect privacy and avoid collecting unrelated personal history simply because it might someday be useful.

The architecture leaves space for trust. Trust can reduce repeated demands for justification in familiar, low-stakes situations. Its practical value depends partly on the availability of correction when expectations fail. A trusted supporter who acknowledges uncertainty and invites a different interpreter can strengthen the person's control. A demand for unquestioning acceptance because of familiarity would convert an evidential resource into an exclusive authority.

10.1 Bounded delegation and process preferences

This subsection develops a further case in which outcome compatibility alone is too coarse. A person may authorize another to choose a transport route while retaining control over destination, timing and companions. Authorship then depends on the scope of delegation as well as the final activity.

Represent a fully specified plan by $a = (d, \tau, c, \rho)$, where the coordinates denote destination, time, companion and route. Suppose the person authorizes the supporter to vary ρ while holding the other coordinates fixed within an agreed description. The delegated set is a subset of A , defined by that authorization. An implemented plan can satisfy the person's broad destination preference while exceeding the delegated set through a changed companion or time.

The example supplies another reason to distinguish compatibility and authority. A destination-level record can accurately state that the museum was chosen while concealing a change in the coordination conditions that mattered to the person. A plan-level record can detect that change, provided the relevant coordinates were identified with adequate participation. The person's practical concern determines the granularity needed to assess this change; administrative convenience is a separate design consideration.

Delegation can itself be revised. If the person later asks to choose the route, an earlier authorization should be interpreted according to its scope and continuing conditions. Conversely, a supporter need not return every insignificant implementation detail for repeated approval when a clear bounded authorization covers it. The aim is meaningful control over the decision, with an appropriate distribution of practical work.

Process preferences can also conflict with an analyst's preferred audit. Someone may wish to discuss a matter only with a familiar supporter or to receive a concise recommendation before considering details. These preferences deserve interpretation alongside the substantive choice. A procedure that always demands independent interviews or exhaustive menus can interfere with authorship if it ignores how the person wishes to receive support.

The unresolved difficulty is how to assess a preference for a support arrangement that may itself be unduly influential. The framework locates the relevant questions: how the preference was expressed, what alternatives are practically available, what consequences follow from dissent, and which independent safeguards apply. It leaves their resolution to evidence and a defended normative account. A person's endorsement of an arrangement is important evidence, while the conditions of that endorsement remain open to appropriate inquiry.

11 Philosophical Objections and Counterconditions

This section tests the framework against objections concerning authenticity, uncertainty, burden, influence and urgent action. The objections refine the meaning of authorship and identify cases in which the

formal constructions require revision. Each response preserves a research obligation where the present argument is incomplete.

11.1 Interpretation and the person's practical perspective

The first objection concerns the candidate set. An analyst may include only interpretations that fit institutional expectations, thereby making the robust set appear reassuringly clear. This is a serious countercondition. The set should be assessed through its evidential coverage and through the person's opportunity to correct the inquiry. A larger set can still be biased if its alternatives all share the same mistaken premise.

The proposal therefore distinguishes uncertainty within a model from uncertainty about the model. The first concerns which $w \in B$ is adequate. The second concerns whether W , the task description, the available evidence or the compatibility relation capture the person's practical perspective. A response that repeatedly resists the offered categories can be a reason to revise the task. Assigning the response to a residual category requires its own warrant.

The framework also leaves room for first-person expression that resists complete public explanation. The person's ability to give a fluent account of a preference need not determine whether the preference deserves attention. The reasons required of a supporter concern the supporter's interpretation and actions. Shifting that entire burden onto the person would reproduce the very asymmetry the audit is intended to examine.

11.2 Authenticity and socially formed preferences

The second objection asks whether a preference influenced by support can remain the person's own. Requiring a preference wholly independent of social relations would make the target difficult to apply even to ordinary assisted decisions. The present account locates authorship in a person's maintained role within a process: access to reasons and alternatives, the possibility of correction, and meaningful influence over practical realization.

This relational treatment creates a difficult boundary between enabling influence and manipulation. The transition relation alone cannot settle it. A supporter can sincerely believe that a particular outcome benefits the person while arranging every explanation toward that outcome. Assessing the process requires attention to concealed interests, selective information and the consequences of dissent. It also requires caution about calling every persuasive explanation manipulative. Evidence about the person's engagement and available alternatives is central.

11.3 Uncertainty, disagreement and practical action

The third objection is that robust compatibility may be too demanding. If one admissible interpretation excludes an otherwise reasonable option, the intersection can be empty. A procedure that waits for unanimity among interpretations could leave a person without timely support.

The objection limits the role of $\mathcal{R}$ appropriately. The robust set is an assessment category, not the only permissible action set. Decisions under persistent uncertainty may need to proceed through an explicitly justified interpretation, with attention to the person's expressions, relevant risks and opportunities for revision. The framework requires those reasons to remain visible. It rejects the inference from an empty intersection to a newly acquired authority to substitute.

An opposite objection concerns permissiveness. If every candidate allows several options, an action in the intersection may be treated as fully authorized. Yet compatibility can express mere acceptability while the person retains a preference about who chooses or how the choice is made. A richer interpretation must represent those process preferences. The action universe can include choosing personally, requesting advice or delegating a bounded selection, provided their meanings are actually warranted.

11.4 Burden and the organization of support

The fourth objection is that a detailed audit could make ordinary life bureaucratic. The framework's variables are analytic distinctions, and they need not become mandatory forms for every activity. A light record can suffice when the meaning, menu and support arrangement are settled. More detailed review is justified by a concrete uncertainty, conflict or restriction whose resolution matters to the person.

The burden should be allocated to the actor who controls the relevant information or decision. A service can explain why transport was unavailable. An interpreter can distinguish observation from inference. A reviewer can state the reason for accepting an interpretation. Requiring the person repeatedly to prove authorship while institutional constraints remain unexamined would invert the proposed distribution of responsibility.

11.5 Urgency and limits of the present scope

The final objection concerns emergencies and irreversible decisions. Those situations alter the available time, consequences and applicable legal rules. The present ordinary-decision case cannot settle them by extrapolation. Its distinctions remain useful: uncertainty, compatibility and authority still ask different questions. A complete emergency argument would additionally need a specific legal setting, a justified account of immediate risk and an analysis of the feasible alternatives.

The unresolved case also clarifies the contribution. A framework can improve the structure of a difficult question while leaving a particular answer open. The paper offers reasons to preserve the person's standing, trace interpretation and inspect control of alternatives. Its mathematical results support those inquiries within declared assumptions; their existence supplies no shortcut through the remaining normative work.

12 Research Design and Further Development

This section identifies how the framework could be investigated and revised. It separates evaluation of the formal distinctions, participatory assessment of the proposed audit, and study of institutional effects. The sequence allows analytic mistakes to be corrected before the framework influences actual support decisions.

A first study could use fictional dossiers whose construction makes selected record facts explicit. Conditions would vary whether the final choice is faithful, whether a meaningful option was excluded, whether a support conflict was disclosed, and whether later preference formation is distinguished from earlier interpretation. Reviewers would identify which conclusions follow and which remain unresolved. The outcome would concern the quality of reasoning about the dossier, with no claim to measuring a real person's hidden preference.

The reversal, constant-compatible and menu-relative cases provide discriminating items. A reviewer who treats every constant outcome as substitution would fail the second case. A reviewer who treats accurate within-menu choice as sufficient would fail the third. A reviewer who uses present clarity to certify an earlier interpretation would fail the temporal case. These errors differ, making separate scores preferable to one aggregate accuracy measure.

Participant-centered development would then examine whether the categories describe what matters to adults receiving support. Questions include whether the distinction between presented and understood options is useful, whether the record captures practical refusal, and whether review is available in a communication form the person can use. People may identify important distinctions absent from the proposed model. Such findings should guide revision of the action universe and audit vocabulary.

Evaluation of an actual support arrangement would require independent evidence about its effects. Relevant outcomes could include opportunities to revise a plan, restoration of omitted options, resolution of communication difficulties and responsiveness to a request for another supporter. These outcomes should be interpreted with the person and in context. Increased numbers of documented choices could

reflect improved access, increased administrative demands or strategic recording. The measure alone cannot distinguish them.

A prospective comparison should also measure burdens. Extra meetings, repeated questioning and delays may reduce practical control even when records become more detailed. A useful protocol would ask whether the person experiences the inquiry as helpful, intrusive or difficult to refuse, and would preserve disagreement among such assessments. These observations require accessible methods and research arrangements appropriate to the participants; the present manuscript specifies a research program whose human-participant protocol remains to be developed.

Research Obligation 12.1 (Independent interpretation and authority assessment). Develop and evaluate procedures that test candidate adequacy and control of support without making fluent self-explanation, agreement with a supporter, or successful task performance a prerequisite for equal standing.

Formal development can proceed in parallel with this conceptual work. One direction replaces the binary authority placeholder with a structured set of reviewable conditions. Another studies partial delegation: the person may authorize a supporter to choose transport while retaining control over the destination and companion. A third models several interacting decisions whose menus depend on earlier arrangements. Each extension should preserve the distinction between descriptive dependencies and justified authority.

The current results already identify useful constraints on such extensions. Sensitivity supplies an incomplete test of fidelity. Fixed-correspondence expansion differs from menu-dependent choice. Evidence refinement changes robust compatibility only under stable targets and warranted exclusion. Present preference formation can coexist with unresolved historical interpretation. These consequences remain valid within their assumptions and provide explicit counterchecks for future models.

The paper's proposed contribution is an account of answerable support under interpretive uncertainty. Its importance lies in making the person's practical perspective, the supporter's interpretation and the institution's control jointly visible while keeping them distinguishable. A satisfactory development would help people obtain effective assistance, preserve meaningful revision and identify the reasons governing difficult decisions. Whether the proposed audit achieves those aims remains an empirical and participatory question.

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