

Assessing Factual Warrant in Repeated Institutional Recognition of Research Contributions

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Abstract

Repeated institutional recognition can increase the visibility and practical effects of a research-contribution claim while deriving its historical content from one evidential source. This paper examines that distinction in a fictional chain of project statements, institutional profiles, repository descriptions, and an award decision. It separates the scoped historical proposition, its evidential warrant, recognition occurrences, attribution preferences, and constituted institutional status. A limited probability model proves that later recognition adds no posterior information about a historical proposition when it is conditionally independent of that proposition given already available evidence and background. An explicit likelihood derivation compares exact copies with conditionally independent fresh reports. The numerical values are stipulated illustrations. The institutional analysis explains how an operative award can coexist with uncertain historical grounds under declared rules, and how correction can separately affect warrant, display, status, and uptake. Verified antecedents in institutional philosophy, claim-specific citation research, contribution-role guidance, conditional independence, and the author's earlier social-facts account establish the comparisons. The present inquiry retains ontological suspension and makes no claim of conceptual priority. A conditional argument for public answerability is followed by objections and open questions concerning independent reanalysis, undisclosed evidence, and correction across dependent records.

Keywords: institutional recognition; factual warrant; research contributions; source dependence; attribution; public correction

Research Purpose and Scope

This note states the purpose of circulation, the status of the argument, and the role of research assistance. The paper presents current insights for criticism and wider discussion in public and scholarly settings. It makes no claim to conceptual priority. Similar concepts and arguments may already exist in other disciplines, languages, and intellectual traditions; further comparison may alter the terminology, scope, or contribution.

Definitions organize a bounded inquiry. Conditional formal results carry their stated assumptions, and illustrative cases support conceptual analysis. Empirical validation, wider applicability, and the adequacy of proposed normative premises remain open where the main text identifies those obligations. Relational analysis supplies a method of investigation while stronger ontological questions remain suspended.

AI assistance contributed to source discovery and pre-use verification, argumentative development, formal checking, organization, and drafting. The accompanying project records distinguish retained research insights, newly proposed analysis, and verified literature. The manuscript is prepared for the author's review; circulation and submission decisions remain with the author. Critical responses concerning antecedents, assumptions, counterexamples, and alternative formulations are welcome.

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1 Introduction

This paper examines factual warrant when a research contribution receives repeated institutional recognition. It distinguishes the historical proposition being endorsed, the evidence available for that proposition, the occurrence of recognition, and statuses created through institutional acts. The discussion develops a fictional contribution dossier, a limited conditional-probability model, and a conceptual account of correction and public answerability. Its purpose is to clarify a specific dependency in public knowledge records while keeping broader ontological questions suspended.

A research contribution can appear in a project statement, an institutional profile, a repository description, and an award announcement. The multiplication of records can make the contribution more visible and can change the opportunities available to its attributed contributor. The same records may nevertheless derive their historical assertion from one source. Their number then measures something about circulation or recognition without automatically measuring the number of evidentially independent grounds for the contribution claim.

An award adds another distinction. Under the operative rules of an institution, a duly performed award act can establish that a person holds an award. The historical claim cited in its justification can remain uncertain or later be corrected. A public record should be able to describe the award accurately while qualifying the historical grounds on which it was conferred. Treating these propositions separately permits criticism of the grounds without erasing the institutional event.

The central question is therefore precise: how should a contribution record assess historical warrant when several recognitions depend on a shared assertion, while some of those recognitions create additional institutional facts? The answer requires both evidential and conceptual work. An evidential analysis traces what each later record adds to the available grounds. A conceptual analysis identifies the proposition for which that addition matters. A new record can be redundant for one historical query and indispensable for an account of recognition, responsibility, or institutional status.

The paper advances a conditional position. When later recognition records depend on a historical proposition only through evidence already available to an investigator, their observation adds no further information about that proposition within the declared probability model. This result follows from conditional independence and is proved directly. The condition can fail: an institution may possess additional evidence, perform a new analysis, or reveal information through a selective decision. The argument consequently calls for claim-specific examination of dependence.

A small numerical comparison illustrates the distinction. One positive report and several exact copies of that report share the same historical evidential contribution under the specified copying mechanism. Several fresh reports can accumulate different warrant when their conditional independence and reliability are justified. The numerical parameters are stipulated for the example. They provide a transparent counterexample to counting public records as independent reports, while supplying no estimate of the reliability of actual institutions or contributors.

The account also preserves the practical efficacy of recognition. Repetition can produce familiarity, accessibility, and an institutional response even when it adds little historical evidence. These effects can themselves become objects of factual inquiry. Their existence gives a reason to preserve recognition records and their provenance. It leaves the warrant of the accepted historical content to the evidence relevant to that content. A claim's social efficacy and its evidential support can develop through connected but different processes.

Existing work already supplies substantial parts of this architecture. Accounts of institutional reality examine statuses constituted through accepted rules. Citation research studies the amplification of claims through chains of reference. Contribution taxonomies distinguish recorded roles from authorship criteria. The author's earlier social-facts paper investigates situated representations and their divergence. This manuscript brings those comparisons to one bounded problem: evidential dependence in repeated recognition of a specified research contribution. It presents an analytic proposal for criticism without claiming conceptual priority.

The argument proceeds in a continuous order. The next section establishes the verified antecedents.

A comparison with the earlier social-factuality account then fixes the present scope. The contribution targets and fictional dossier identify the objects being followed. Two formal sections derive the limited probability results and their illustrative values. Subsequent sections examine constituted status, correction, accountability, objections, and open research questions. The ordering keeps the assumptions of each conclusion available before its institutional interpretation is discussed.

2 Antecedents in Institutional Status and Evidential Dependence

This section identifies the literature relevant to the distinction between historical warrant and repeated recognition. It considers institutional constitution, claim-specific citation analysis, contribution-role guidance, and conditional independence. The following section addresses the author's earlier social-facts formulation separately because that comparison concerns the continuity and limits of the present research programme.

Searle's discussion of human social reality explains status functions through collective acceptance and constitutive rules. The account distinguishes functions dependent on an accepted status from functions an object performs through its physical structure alone. This provides a philosophical antecedent for analyzing an award or appointment through its institutional conditions. The present paper uses that comparison at a limited strength: an operative practice can give a performed act a status that differs from the truth of a historical assertion cited in its justification. Searle's broader ontology remains a subject for separate assessment.[5]

Greenberg studies a claim-specific citation network in a bounded biomedical literature and analyzes citation bias, amplification without new primary data, and changes in the status of claims through citation. His discussion distinguishes the examination of belief and its transmission from experiments testing the target claim's truth. The study supplies an empirical and methodological antecedent for tracing what a cited source actually contributes to a particular assertion. Its findings are not used here as a prevalence estimate for research-contribution records or as a current medical conclusion.[1]

The importance of claim-specific analysis follows from the diversity of relations a citation can express. A source may provide primary evidence, formulate a question, describe a method, supply an interpretation, or merely document that another institution made a statement. The existence of a citation link leaves its role to be examined. The present dossier therefore records the operation performed at each link, including reproduction, interpretation, evaluation, and institutional action.

NISO's CRediT guidance describes contribution roles while keeping role description distinct from determining authorship. It allows several roles for one person and several contributors in one role, and recommends that contributors have an opportunity to review and confirm assigned roles. This supplies a relevant practical comparison for specifying a contribution claim. A role label can improve the precision of a record, while its assignment still requires grounds and an interpretation appropriate to the research output.[3]

The formal section uses conditional independence in its ordinary probabilistic sense. Penn State's statistics materials express the concept through factorization of a conditional joint distribution and distinguish conditional from marginal relationships. The present proof applies that elementary structure to a historical proposition, available evidence, and later recognition records. The probability model is illustrative and explicitly conditional; it does not convert a contribution record into a calibrated measure of historical truth.[4]

These comparisons address different questions. Institutional analysis concerns the conditions under which an act gives rise to a status. Citation analysis concerns the transmission and transformation of support for a claim. Contribution guidance concerns the content and review of role descriptions. Probability theory supplies a precise relation under which an observation adds no information beyond an already observed variable. The distinctions allow the same public record to be evaluated for several purposes without collapsing their standards.

The paper's proposed addition is an integrated audit of a repeated recognition chain. It follows a role-specific historical assertion through several public records and an institutional decision, then separates

evidential redundancy from new institutional effects. The formal derivation shows one sufficient condition for redundancy and supplies counterconditions. The normative discussion later states an explicit premise for public answerability. Each component remains open to criticism on its own grounds.

3 Social Factuality and the Scope of Representational Reconstruction

This section clarifies the relationship between the present inquiry and the author's earlier account of social facts. It identifies the relevant commitments in that account, states the present ontological suspension, and distinguishes historical, representational, and recognition targets. The aim is to preserve intellectual continuity while keeping disagreements and changes of scope explicit.

The earlier journalism manuscript makes a strong claim about socially categorized facts being present through relations among situated representations. Section 4.1 explicitly affirms event occurrences while locating the further issue in their social characterization. Section 4.5 allows readers to use later constructions without accepting that ontological interpretation. Sections 5.3–6.2 define an ensemble through its attributed distinction structures and examine information lost in passage to a common coarsening. These qualifications matter when comparing that work with a historical contribution inquiry.[2]

The present paper takes the optional methodological route. It follows representations, their provenance, and their effects while leaving the stronger ontological interpretation open. A historical proposition receives a declared interpretation and an evidential assessment. The occurrence of an inscription, the acceptance of its content, and the creation of a status receive separate descriptions. These distinctions do not require a general account of the ultimate form of every social fact.

The word “fact” can otherwise conceal a change of target. One sentence may concern an event, another the truth of a proposition about it, another the occurrence of a judgment, and another a socially maintained status. A committee can accept an inaccurate account. The acceptance then provides the subject of a potentially true proposition even while the accepted content remains false or insufficiently supported. Describing the acceptance precisely avoids transferring its factual character to a different proposition.

The target of a reconstruction also matters for evaluating compression. An account of which institution said what and on which grounds needs information about issuers, relations, and times. A fixed historical query may require only a selected part of that record. A summary can preserve the latter while losing the former. The same operation therefore has different adequacy conditions relative to the two purposes. This is a query-relative observation, not a claim that one purpose should govern every public record.

For example, exact copies of a report can carry the same evidential content concerning a contribution under a specified copying model. Retaining one report together with the fact that the others were exact copies can suffice for the limited posterior calculation developed below. An account of institutional recognition still needs to know which institutions published those copies. An inquiry into the timing of opportunities may also need their publication dates. A historical evidential reduction should consequently be distinguished from deletion of the public provenance record.

Conversely, a rich ensemble can preserve substantial information about disagreement while leaving a historical proposition unresolved. Participants can have different interpretations, incomplete access, or shared mistaken premises. Preserving those differences improves the description of the evidential situation. It does not guarantee that the historical target has become uniquely determined. The inquiry should be able to state both achievements: the record may accurately preserve a field of disagreement while leaving the underlying claim open.

The distinction also applies to common errors. Several institutions can repeat one mistaken source. Their agreement may be well documented and socially consequential. The common origin of their statements remains relevant to historical warrant. Counting the number of accepting institutions answers a question about recognition, while tracing their dependence answers another question about evidence. Both can be legitimate inquiries within a relational approach.

The present terminology therefore remains deliberately local. A focal social stabilization is a recognizable practice, role, distinction, or transition whose formation or maintenance depends materially on social relations and can matter for subsequent interaction. That definition selects a concern of dynamic governance. Brief acts, obsolete statuses, and true but currently unrecognized historical relations can still deserve factual inquiry even when they fall outside a particular stabilization model. The definition supplies a focus for the present governance inquiry.

This scope leaves several philosophical questions open. The relation between social categorization and the identity of its object remains contested. The extent to which a description constitutes a status depends on the practice involved. The warrant of a historical interpretation may require both material traces and situated understanding. The current manuscript advances the inquiry by separating those obligations within a contribution record. It avoids treating the resolution of all of them as a prerequisite for examining a particular evidential dependence.

4 Historical Contribution Claims and Recognition Targets

This section specifies the propositions and records used in the analysis. It introduces a role-specific contribution claim, distinguishes it from attribution preference and institutional recognition, and describes the information needed to interpret a recognition record. The definitions prepare the fictional dossier and prevent a later probability calculation from silently changing its target.

Definition 4.1 (Scoped historical contribution claim). A historical contribution claim identifies a contributor, a specified research output or version, a role or activity under a declared criterion, and a relevant time or interval. Its content concerns whether that contribution occurred under the stated interpretation.

The scope should be sufficiently precise to expose competing interpretations. A claim that a person implemented a normalization procedure differs from a claim that the person proposed its mathematical form, entered an existing procedure into software, supervised its development, or deposited the resulting file. A role label can abbreviate the description after those distinctions are understood. The label by itself may leave the criterion too broad for evidential evaluation.

The fixed proposition in the dossier concerns a fictional researcher, Mara, a fictional dataset release, version 1, and the implementation of its documented normalization step before the deposit date. The exact criterion concerns performing the implementation work represented by specified code and development records. It leaves global priority, ownership, sole authorship, and the value of the contribution outside the target. Other contributors may have supplied the method, reviewed the implementation, or performed related work.

Definition 4.2 (Recognition occurrence). A recognition occurrence is a specified act through which an actor publicly or institutionally attributes a contribution, qualification, or standing to someone. Its record identifies the issuer, target, content, time, and medium of the act.

A recognition occurrence can be established independently of the truth of its expressed historical content. A preserved announcement can warrant that an institution published a claim, subject to the authenticity and dating of the record. The announcement's role in supporting the underlying contribution claim depends on its sources and production process. A finding about publication and a finding about contribution therefore require different inference steps.

Definition 4.3 (Attribution preference). An attribution preference records how a contributor or another relevant participant wishes a contribution to be named, described, or publicly associated with persons or groups. Its normative force and practical effect depend on the context.

A contributor can prefer collective credit while having performed a particular activity. A preference for removing a personal name can affect current display without changing the earlier activity's historical occurrence. Conversely, a desired label can exceed what the available evidence supports. An institution should distinguish a request about presentation from evidence about what happened, while recognizing that both can bear on a responsible public account.

Definition 4.4 (Institutionally constituted status). An institutionally constituted status is a position within an operative practice that arises when its relevant constitutive conditions are fulfilled. An award-holder status is the selected example; its formation depends on the institution's rules and the occurrence of the requisite act.

The definition leaves validity conditions explicit. Some rules may require that a particular historical condition actually hold. Others may make an authorized decision operative while providing for later review of mistakes. The difference cannot be resolved by a generic statement that institutions create facts. The relevant rules, their interpretation, and the status of the act must be examined in each case. The fictional dossier stipulates its conditions and makes no claim about legal validity in an actual institution.

An auditable recognition record should connect these targets without merging them. It should indicate the historical proposition expressed, the evidence or earlier statements relied upon, the operation performed on those materials, and any institutional consequence. Recording the operation is important because quotation, independent verification, interpretive criticism, and a formal award can all produce a new document with very different evidential significance.

The record's times also differ. The contribution has an alleged occurrence time. A source has a creation or publication time. A recognition has a performance time. An investigator acquires evidence at a later inquiry time. A correction can then change the currently warranted description of an earlier event. Preserving these indices permits a reader to distinguish a historical development from a change in what became known or publicly accepted.

The formal model will assign a binary variable to the scoped historical proposition solely to isolate a dependence relation. That simplification presupposes a sufficiently fixed interpretation for the proposition to be true or false in the modeled situations. Disagreement about what qualifies as implementation is a different uncertainty. It can be represented by several candidate interpretations, but their probabilities and normative suitability cannot be read directly from the binary model.

5 A Fictional Contribution-Recognition Dossier

This section follows one historical contribution assertion through a sequence of public records and an institutional act. The dossier is constructed to distinguish repeated publication from new evidence and from new status. A later evidential discovery supplies a correction case. Every person, project, and institution in the example is fictional.

The sequence begins with a project coordinator's contribution statement about dataset version 1. The statement attributes implementation of the documented normalization step to Mara. Its attached source is an internal activity summary. The summary's author may be reliable or mistaken; the dossier initially leaves that assessment open. The public statement is therefore a historical assertion whose warrant requires assessment of its source.

A university profile then reproduces the attribution. Its editor checks the spelling of Mara's name and the dataset identifier and copies the substantive description from the project statement. Those editorial checks can establish useful matters about the reproduction. Under the stipulated process, the editor undertakes no additional investigation of who performed the implementation. The profile adds a recognition occurrence and a new publication context while inheriting the historical source dependence.

A repository description later cites the university profile and repeats the same attribution. The repository verifies that the deposited file exists and that its identifier matches the profile. It treats the institutional profile as the source for the contribution role. The repository's verification of the file's identity has an appropriate target. It should not be confused with verification of the separate historical claim about the implementation work.

An award committee encounters the project statement, university profile, and repository description. The committee's procedure is stipulated to require three public institutional records of the contribution before it schedules a decision. The committee meets that record-count condition and performs a duly authorized award act. In the fictional rules, a properly performed act creates award-holder status and

leaves mistaken historical grounds subject to a later review procedure. The rules' desirability remains open.

At this stage, the dossier contains several genuine developments. Three public records attribute the implementation to Mara. Different institutions have participated in circulating the attribution. The award has been conferred under the stipulated procedure. These developments can affect Mara's visibility and opportunities. Their existence does not settle whether the three records supply three independent grounds for the implementation claim. Under the stated source chain, their historical content traces to one activity summary.

The significance of the dossier lies in that precise dependence. Organizational separation gives different actors responsibility for their publications. It does not automatically separate the evidence on which they rely. The committee can accurately report that several institutions have repeated the attribution while overstating its historical warrant if it treats their repetitions as independent verification. A correction to that inference need not deny that recognition occurred or that the award act had an institutional effect.

Now introduce a further record: a development archive contains code revisions and contemporaneous correspondence bearing directly on the implementation. A competent investigator examines the materials and concludes that another contributor performed a substantial part of the relevant work. The strength of the conclusion depends on the authenticity, completeness, interpretation, and scope of those materials. The dossier stipulates that they warrant reopening the earlier attribution, while leaving the final allocation of roles to review.

This development differs from another repetition of the original claim. The archive and its analysis contribute information bearing on the historical target that was absent from the public chain. They can justify a change in current warrant. The review may produce a shared-role description, a narrower description of Mara's contribution, or a finding that the initial claim was substantially correct under a clarified criterion. The case does not assume that every challenge succeeds.

The institutional responses can then diverge. The repository can correct its current description and link the earlier assertion to a review record. The university can revise its profile. The award committee can apply its review rules to the changed grounds. An audience may continue to repeat the original attribution despite those corrections. Each response has a different target and time. The correction of evidence, revision of status, and change in public uptake are related developments that require separate observation.

The dossier also permits a more favorable branch. Suppose the archive independently confirms Mara's implementation and the review explains how the evidence supports the role criterion. The historical claim then receives additional support, while the earlier source dependence remains a fact about the public record's formation. A proper dependence audit is symmetrical: it clarifies the grounds of confirmation as well as those of correction. Its purpose is a warranted account, not a presumption that institutional recognition is mistaken.

The following sections formalize only the limited issue of evidential accumulation. They ask how an investigator's belief about the historical proposition changes under a declared source model. The number of publications, the existence of award status, and the normative assessment of the committee's rule remain separate variables or interpretive questions. This separation keeps the example's mathematical result proportionate to the broader institutional discussion.

6 Conditional Dependence of Recognition on Available Evidence

This section gives a limited formal account of evidential redundancy in the recognition chain. It introduces the historical target, available evidence, background assumptions, and later recognition records, then derives the consequence of a specified conditional-independence assumption. The final discussion identifies the conditions under which the result can fail in an actual inquiry.

Let $\Theta \in \{0, 1\}$ represent the truth value of the scoped historical contribution proposition under a fixed interpretation. Let E represent the historical evidence available to the investigator and let Y repre-

sent the vector of later recognition records. Let $B = b$ specify a background that includes the relevant source convention and institutional production rules. All variables have finite domains in the present construction, and the background event has positive probability. Write $\mathbb{P}_b$ for probabilities conditional on that background.

The model assigns probabilities to possible situations for purposes of illustrating an inference. It does not supply a probability for the truth of an actual contributor's claim. The choice of prior, likelihoods, evidence representation, and background requires justification in any empirical use. The result below concerns a relation among these declared quantities, and its logical validity leaves their application open.

Assumption 6.1 (Recognition generated from available evidence). For each evidence value e , the conditional distribution of Y is the same under either historical truth value whenever the relevant conditioning event has positive probability. Equivalently, the joint model can be generated by first selecting Θ , then E conditional on Θ , and then Y from a kernel depending only on E and the fixed background.

The assumption states conditional independence of Y and Θ given E under the background. It permits the recognition records to depend on one another and permits their distribution to vary substantially with the observed evidence. It also permits recognition to correlate with the historical proposition before the evidence is taken into account. Its restriction concerns additional information about that proposition once the specified evidence and background are known.

For clarity, let $K_b(y | e)$ be the kernel generating later recognition from the available evidence. The joint probability of a truth value, evidence value, and recognition vector then factors into the probability of the truth value, the evidence likelihood conditional on it, and $K_b(y | e)$. The last factor has no remaining dependence on Θ . This factorization is a substantive assumption about the information used in generating recognition; its justification requires examining the represented process.

Proposition 6.2 (Posterior redundancy of conditionally dependent recognition). *Under the recognition-generation assumption, every evidence and recognition pair with positive joint probability satisfies*

$$\mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 1 | E = e, Y = y) = \mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 1 | E = e). \quad (6.1)$$

Equation 6.1 concerns the historical proposition. It leaves the recognition vector's own occurrence and institutional effects available as separate targets of inquiry.

Proof. By the definition of conditional probability, the left side is the joint probability of $\Theta = 1, E = e, Y = y$ divided by the joint probability of $E = e, Y = y$. Under the assumed factorization, the numerator is $K_b(y | e)\mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 1, E = e)$. Summing the same factorization over the two possible truth values gives denominator $K_b(y | e)\mathbb{P}_b(E = e)$. Positive probability of the observed pair ensures that both the kernel factor and $\mathbb{P}_b(E = e)$ are positive. Cancelling the common kernel factor leaves $\mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 1, E = e)/\mathbb{P}_b(E = e)$, which is the right side by the definition of conditional probability. $\square$

The proof reveals the relevant restriction more clearly than a count of sources. It is the common conditional factor that cancels. If the production of recognition uses information about the historical proposition beyond E , the factor can differ between truth values and the cancellation no longer applies. Organizational names, document identifiers, and publication dates alone establish none of these likelihood relations.

Exact reproduction provides a simple case. If the later records are fully determined copies of a report already included in E , then their conditional kernel places probability one on the corresponding copy vector. Once the report is known, the copies supply no further information about the proposition within that construction. They still establish that particular records were produced and can reveal a pattern of circulation when those occurrences are observed.

The result changes when the investigator has not observed the underlying evidence. A later profile can transmit information from a source that the reader has never seen. Its historical evidential significance then depends on the reliability of both the source and the transmission. The theorem compares

recognition with evidence already included in the conditioning set. It cannot be used to dismiss an informative report merely because the report itself relies on an earlier source.

A recognition decision can also reveal additional investigation. An institution may inspect an archive unavailable to the reader, obtain testimony, identify an inconsistency, or perform a technical analysis that the reader cannot yet reproduce. Its decision may then carry information beyond the reader's current E . The appropriate question is whether the additional process and its reliability support that interpretation. Assuming redundancy from a shared citation would be as unwarranted as assuming independence from different institutional addresses.

The evidence variable must therefore be specified carefully. A file's bytes, an interpretation of those bytes, and a verified inference from them can be different evidential resources for an investigator. Two analysts using the same file can contribute distinct error checks or explanatory work. Conversely, two different files can merely restate one conclusion. The probability model abstracts from these distinctions only after their relevance to the selected historical question has been assessed.

Finally, the background can hide selection. Institutions may preferentially repeat claims about already prominent persons, or publication may occur only after an unrecorded review. Such mechanisms can make recognition informative in ways omitted from a simple copying model. A responsible application records the assumed selection process and tests plausible alternatives. Equation 6.1 is a conditional result whose value lies partly in exposing precisely what must be established before treating repetition as evidentially redundant.

7 Likelihood Accumulation under Shared and Independent Reports

This section derives a numerical comparison between exact copies and fresh reports. It begins with the probability of one positive report, derives the posterior-odds identity, and then evaluates shared-source and conditionally independent cases. The numbers are stipulated to illustrate the dependence issue and remain separate from any empirical assessment of research institutions.

Let $Z \in \{0, 1\}$ be a report about the historical proposition. A positive report has value one. Fix a prior $\pi = \mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 1)$ strictly between zero and one. Let $\alpha = \mathbb{P}_b(Z = 1 \mid \Theta = 1)$ and $\beta = \mathbb{P}_b(Z = 1 \mid \Theta = 0)$, both strictly positive. The parameter α describes positive reporting when the proposition holds; β describes positive reporting when it fails. These definitions refer to the modeled source under the fixed background.

Proposition 7.1 (Posterior odds for one positive report). *For the declared positive likelihoods, observing a positive report multiplies the prior odds by its positive-report likelihood ratio:*

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 1 \mid Z = 1)}{\mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 0 \mid Z = 1)} = \frac{\pi}{1 - \pi} \frac{\alpha}{\beta}. \quad (7.1)$$

Equation 7.1 gives the familiar odds form of a conditional-probability update. The following derivation states the cancellation explicitly because the repeated-report comparison depends on applying the likelihood at the correct level.

Proof. The joint probability of a true proposition and a positive report is $\pi\alpha$. The joint probability of a false proposition and a positive report is $(1 - \pi)\beta$. Summing these two disjoint cases gives the positive-report probability $\pi\alpha + (1 - \pi)\beta$, which is positive under the assumptions. Dividing each joint probability by this common denominator gives the two conditional probabilities in the left side. Their ratio cancels the common denominator and leaves $\pi\alpha / [(1 - \pi)\beta]$. Rearranging yields the right side. $\square$

Now take $n \geq 1$ public reports that are exact copies of the same report Z under a known fixed copying convention. Their joint vector is $(Z, \dots, Z)$. The event that all are positive is exactly the event $Z = 1$. Its likelihood conditional on $\Theta = 1$ is therefore α , and its likelihood conditional on $\Theta = 0$ is β . The ratio enters once in Equation 7.1, regardless of the number of copies.

Table 1: Constructed likelihood comparison for a prior of 0.1 and positive-report likelihoods 0.9 and 0.1

Observed report structure	Public reports	Independent report roots	Posterior probability
One positive report	1	1	0.5
Three exact positive copies	3	1	0.5
Three conditionally independent positive reports	3	3	81/82
One positive report, its copy, and another independent positive report	3	2	0.9

Claim 7.2 (Exact-copy likelihood). For any positive number of exact copies of one modeled report, observing that all copies are positive has the same posterior effect on the historical proposition as observing the one original positive report.

The claim follows from equality of the two observed events. It does not require that the original report be unreliable. Even a highly reliable report remains one evidential observation under this construction. Nor does it imply that the copies lack communicative value. They can make the report available to additional readers and can document wider recognition. Their number is simply absent from the historical likelihood once the copy relation is known.

For comparison, suppose $Z_1, \dots, Z_n$ are fresh reports that are conditionally independent given each truth value under the background. Let their positive likelihoods be α_i when the proposition holds and β_i when it fails, with all values positive. Conditional independence supplies the product likelihoods for an all-positive vector. Applying the same odds derivation gives

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 1 \mid Z_1 = \dots = Z_n = 1)}{\mathbb{P}_b(\Theta = 0 \mid Z_1 = \dots = Z_n = 1)} = \frac{\pi}{1 - \pi} \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{\alpha_i}{\beta_i}. \quad (7.2)$$

Equation 7.2 follows because the probability of the all-positive event is $\prod_i \alpha_i$ in the true case and $\prod_i \beta_i$ in the false case. The joint probabilities with the truth value are obtained by multiplying these likelihoods by the respective prior probabilities. Their common evidence denominator again cancels when posterior odds are formed.

Conditional independence is required in both truth-value cases. Separate witnesses, separate organizations, or separate documents can still share training, an earlier report, a misleading artifact, or a common interpretation. Those features can couple their errors. Treating reports as fresh therefore requires a substantive case for the relevant likelihood factorization. The numerical comparison demonstrates the consequence of that assumption; it does not establish the assumption from the appearance of multiple sources.

Set $\pi = 0.1$, $\alpha = 0.9$, and $\beta = 0.1$ for the illustrative calculation. The prior odds are one to nine, and one positive report has likelihood ratio nine. The resulting posterior odds are one to one, giving posterior probability 0.5. Three exact positive copies give the same result because their joint positive event has the same likelihood ratio.

Three conditionally independent positive reports with those same likelihoods give odds $(1/9)9^3 = 81$, which converts to probability $81/82$. One positive report, one exact copy of it, and a second conditionally independent positive report give odds $(1/9)9^2 = 9$, corresponding to probability 0.9. The public record count is three in the last two cases and in the three-copy case, while the historical inference differs because the dependence structures differ.

Table 1 summarizes the constructed comparison. Its report roots refer to the stipulated independent evidential channels in this model. They are not obtained by mechanically counting URLs or institutions.

The values show how an unjustified independence assumption can substantially overstate warrant in this example. Applying the three-independent-report calculation to three exact copies would produce $81/82$ where the stipulated source model yields 0.5. The error occurs in the likelihood model before any

ethical conclusion is drawn. Correcting it still leaves open the adequacy of the original report, the prior, and the criterion defining the historical proposition.

Several extensions require care. Imperfect copies can provide additional information about an unseen original through agreement among transmission channels. A later institution can independently reanalyze shared material. Source reliability can itself be uncertain or dependent on context. Contradictory reports can have different likelihood structures from the all-positive case. Each extension requires its own assumptions. The exact-copy calculation is a transparent limiting case that exposes the importance of tracing evidential dependence, while the general posterior result states the broader conditional principle.

8 Constituted Status and the Historical Grounds of Recognition

This section examines the institutional effect that the probability model deliberately keeps separate. It distinguishes a historical contribution proposition from the conditions of an award-holder status and compares several possible rule structures. The discussion explains how a real institutional consequence can coexist with limited historical warrant, while retaining the need to establish the institution's operative rules.

An award announcement can express at least two propositions. One concerns the contribution attributed to the recipient. Another concerns the fact that an institution conferred an award. The first can be evaluated through evidence of research activity. The second can be evaluated through evidence of the institution's rules, the relevant act, and its performance conditions. An announcement may support both, but it supports them through different inference routes.

Definition 8.1 (Award-status condition in the dossier). Within the fictional institution, award-holder status arises when an authorized body performs the prescribed award act after satisfying the procedure's operative conditions. The rules provide a separate review process for a challenge to the historical grounds. The status remains operative until a review changes it under those rules.

This is a stipulated institutional arrangement. It is sufficiently clear to test the conceptual distinction, while its appropriateness and transfer to actual institutions remain open. The definition does not imply that every institution treats an erroneous decision this way. A different practice may make the truth of a specified qualification a constitutive condition, or may treat a particular defect as invalidating the act from the outset. The difference must be determined from the actual rule structure and its interpretation.

Under the stipulated arrangement, Mara can truthfully be described as holding the award even while the implementation claim is under evidential review. The probability assigned to the historical proposition is not the probability that a known duly performed act occurred. The award status can also have definite practical effects, such as appearing in the institution's register, while the earlier assertion's warrant remains uncertain. Those effects become further subjects of factual inquiry.

Claim 8.2 (Distinct truth conditions for status and historical contribution). In the fictional rule system, fulfillment of the award-act conditions determines the award-holder predicate, while historical role performance determines the contribution predicate. The two predicates can differ in truth value because the stipulated award conditions do not require the historical assertion to be correct before the act becomes operative.

The claim follows by constructing two modeled situations. In both, the prescribed body receives the same public records and performs the same valid act. In one, the historical contribution occurred; in the other, the original activity summary was mistaken. The award conditions hold in both situations, while the historical predicate differs. This establishes the independence needed for the example. It also identifies the assumption whose removal would change the conclusion: a truth-sensitive constitutive condition would connect the predicates differently.

Institutional creation should also be separated from normative justification. A rule can be operative while its use of repeated public records is poorly designed. The existence of the award then gives a participant a status within the practice without settling whether the institution acted fairly or with adequate evidential care. The conceptual account can describe the operative relation and still support criticism of its grounds and consequences.

The same distinction applies to administrative recognition of contribution roles. A repository may have a procedure authorizing an editor to publish a contributor label. Successful performance establishes that the label is the repository's current attribution. Whether the person performed the associated historical work remains a separate target. A well-designed procedure can make the current attribution more reliable, but reliability requires an argument about its evidence and operation.

Recognition can nevertheless contribute to the reality of a role in some cases. An appointment can establish an institutional position, and an accepted allocation of responsibilities can shape subsequent work. The present argument accommodates such constitution by specifying the target's conditions. A claim about who implemented a past procedure differs from a claim about who currently holds authority to maintain it. An institution may have power to allocate the latter while having limited power to determine the former's historical truth.

The analysis therefore avoids a simple opposition between discovery and creation. A single institutional process can investigate historical performance, evaluate its significance, confer a status, and alter future opportunities. The transitions are connected, but their validity conditions differ. A record that identifies these transitions permits the reader to recognize both the institution's actual effects and the limits of its evidential authority.

This distinction is especially useful during correction. A revised historical account can supply a reason to review the award without making the earlier award announcement a fiction. A rescission can change current status while leaving the original conferral as a historical event. A decision to retain the award can coexist with a corrected account of its grounds. The next section follows these possibilities through their different temporal and evidential requirements.

9 Correction of Warrant and the Persistence of Recognition Records

This section distinguishes changes in historical warrant, current public attribution, institutional status, and later uptake. It uses the dossier's review branch to identify what a correction should preserve and what it can legitimately revise. The discussion also considers the evidential dependence of correction messages themselves.

A correction begins by identifying the target of the earlier error or uncertainty. The project statement may have attributed an implementation to the wrong person, described shared work as individual work, used an ambiguous role label, or relied on an incomplete activity summary. Each possibility calls for a different change. A corrected record should state the revised proposition, the grounds for the revision, and the status of any remaining disagreement.

The earlier assertion remains a historical object. It can matter that a coordinator published a particular attribution and that other institutions relied upon it. Preserving that fact does not require displaying the superseded assertion as current. A versioned account can present the revised finding prominently and retain the earlier record with an explicit relation to the correction. Access conditions can be adjusted where privacy or other justified concerns apply.

The effect on warrant depends on the new material. An independent archive can supply previously unavailable evidence. A careful reinterpretation can reveal that existing evidence supported a narrower claim than had been stated. A contributor's testimony can introduce another account whose reliability and scope need assessment. A changed naming preference can affect presentation without resolving historical role performance. The correction process should identify which of these distinct reasons supports each requested edit.

Institutional status requires its own review. Under the fictional rules, the award committee can reconsider the historical grounds through the prescribed process. It may correct the citation, recognize shared

contributions, retain the award for a narrower achievement, or rescind it. The appropriate choice depends on the institution's purposes and rules, the revised evidence, and the interests at stake. The dependence theorem supplies none of these decisions by itself.

Public uptake can follow another trajectory. A repository correction can be immediate while third-party profiles remain unchanged. An audience may learn the revised account through one channel and continue to encounter the old account through another. The result can be a period of heterogeneous recognition. A statement that a record has been corrected should therefore specify the record and date; it should not imply that public understanding has already changed everywhere.

Definition 9.1 (Correction reach). For a specified correction and audience or record set, correction reach concerns which relevant recipients or records have received, incorporated, or otherwise responded to it under declared criteria. Reception, incorporation, and agreement are distinct possible targets.

The definition supports a bounded empirical inquiry without prescribing a universal metric. A copied correction can demonstrate distribution to another site while adding little independent evidence about the revised historical claim. Several institutions repeating a correction may therefore be informative about its reach and still depend on one review for their historical content. The same evidential discipline applies symmetrically to affirmations and corrections.

An effective correction can also improve the representation of uncertainty. The original record may have presented a conjecture as settled. The revised version may restore an unresolved status even before a definitive alternative is available. Such a correction can be epistemically substantive despite leaving the historical question open. The achievement is to align the current claim with its warrant and to retain the evidence needed for further inquiry.

The possibility of institutional resistance remains an empirical and normative question. An institution may face reputational costs, limited archival access, ambiguous rules, or disagreement about the contribution criterion. Those conditions can affect its response. The model should record such mechanisms where evidence supports them, while avoiding an assumption that every delay expresses bad faith. A study of correction needs to distinguish refusal, inability, ongoing review, and reasonable disagreement.

Preserving the genealogy of a correction also helps avoid retrospective reconstruction of a cleaner history. A final accurate label can conceal the path through earlier claims, doubts, and institutional effects. That path can matter for understanding how opportunities were distributed or how trust was damaged and repaired. A record can therefore combine a clear current account with a carefully governed history of assertions and decisions.

The resulting temporal discipline is straightforward. Past contribution, past recognition, current warrant, current status, and current public uptake should each be indexed and described at their own level. Their relations can then be investigated, including the possibility that a correction changes future practice. The distinctions permit serious institutional learning while preserving what is known, what changed, and what remains unresolved.

10 Public Answerability for Contribution Recognition

This section states the normative bridge between the evidential analysis and public contribution practice. It identifies the interests affected by recognition, proposes a defeasible standing to an intelligible account, and derives limited responsibilities for institutions using dependent records. The discussion keeps those responsibilities distinct from the mathematical identity and considers privacy, burden, and disagreement.

Contribution recognition can affect access to employment, collaboration, funding, reputation, and the ability to participate in a research community. It can also shape whose work later readers encounter and which histories become available for teaching. These possibilities provide reasons to examine consequential attribution carefully. The extent of actual effects in a particular institution requires evidence; the present normative argument concerns cases where such effects are established or reasonably anticipated.

Assumption 10.1 (Standing in consequential attribution). People materially affected by a public contribution attribution, together with relevant publics under a justified scope, have a defeasible standing

to seek an accurate and appropriately qualified account of the attribution’s target, evidential basis, and correction process. The institution’s responsibilities depend on its role, capacities, and the competing interests at stake.

The premise requires defense independent of the probability model. One possible defense begins with the institution’s role in distributing opportunities through representations of others’ work. A person whose contribution is diminished or misdescribed bears a cost that the institution can sometimes investigate and remedy. Readers relying on the record also have an interest in understanding the grounds for its claims. These considerations support a qualified demand for answerability, while leaving its precise scope open to criticism.

Claim 10.2 (Disclosure of material evidential dependence). Under the standing premise, an institution that presents repeated recognitions as corroboration for a consequential historical contribution claim should give an intelligible account of any known shared dependence that materially changes the strength of that corroboration.

The argument has three steps. First, the public inference concerns a historical proposition, so the relevant question is the support the records provide for that proposition. Second, a shared source can materially alter that support, as the exact-copy comparison demonstrates under its stated assumptions. Third, the standing premise makes a materially consequential omission about those grounds a matter for explanation or correction. The conclusion concerns a relevant account of dependence; it supplies no universal duty to disclose every internal document.

A useful account can be expressed in ordinary language. An institution might state that its attribution follows the project’s contribution statement and that it has verified the dataset’s identity without independently reconstructing the work history. Another might explain that it examined development records and invited contributors to review the proposed role descriptions. Such statements identify the operation performed and allow readers to assess its relevance. Their truth and completeness remain subject to evidence.

The requirement should also be sensitive to uncertainty about dependence. Sometimes the institution can trace a direct copying chain. Sometimes it only suspects a common source. The report should preserve that distinction. Declaring several accounts dependent without adequate investigation can discount legitimate corroboration and unfairly undermine contributors. A responsible audit therefore records both established dependencies and unresolved possibilities, with reasons for any decision made under that uncertainty.

The institution’s own authority is another target of answerability. A repository may have standing to maintain a metadata record while lacking authority to determine legal ownership or settle a global priority dispute. An award committee may establish an award status under its rules while relying on fallible historical evidence. Public descriptions should identify the scope of those acts. Institutional competence can be real and bounded at the same time.

Privacy and confidentiality can constrain the form of disclosure. Historical verification may involve unpublished correspondence, personal information, or records governed by an access agreement. An intelligible public account can sometimes report the nature of the evidence, the review procedure, and the resulting scope of the finding without publishing the underlying material. Independent review or protected appeal may provide additional scrutiny. The appropriate arrangement requires contextual judgment and any applicable legal assessment.

Burden also matters. A small repository may lack the resources to reconstruct every contribution independently. It can still distinguish a depositor-supplied assertion from a verified finding and provide a proportionate correction route. The normative proposal is therefore compatible with a range of institutional capacities. Its concern is the relationship between the strength of the public claim and the work actually performed to support it.

The account preserves room for reasonable disagreement about the contribution criterion. Participants may agree on the code history while disagreeing about what counts as implementation, design, or leadership. That disagreement is conceptually different from uncertainty about who edited a file. A

review can clarify both without pretending that a numerical posterior resolves the meaning or value of the role. Where a criterion is institutionally selected, its rationale and revision process remain relevant.

Public answerability consequently involves more than attaching additional references. It requires identifying the target, assessing what the references establish, acknowledging dependence and limits, and explaining the institution's own decision. The proposed responsibilities remain conditional and revisable. Their purpose is to support a public account in which recognition's practical effects can coexist with disciplined historical inquiry.

11 Objections and Counterconditions to the Dependence Model

This section examines objections that could limit or overturn the proposed application. It considers the value of repeated communication, independent analysis of shared material, uncertain source structure, probabilistic interpretation, and the scope of institutional constitution. Each objection identifies a condition requiring closer investigation or a revision of the model.

The first objection is that repetition often improves knowledge. A report can reach a reader who would otherwise never encounter it, and repeated exposure can help the reader remember an important qualification. The dependence result permits these effects. It conditions on the relevant evidence already being available in the modeled form. Communication to new audiences and improvements in practical accessibility answer different questions. Their benefits should be assessed without treating every new appearance as an independent historical observation.

A second objection concerns independent reasoning from shared material. Two experts can inspect the same artifact and discover different implications, identify errors, or validate different inferential steps. Counting them as one evidential source simply because they used one file would be too crude. The model's evidence variable should include the information and analysis actually available to the investigator. A new argument can add to that state even when the underlying bytes remain fixed. The conditional-independence assumption must be examined at the level relevant to the claim.

A third objection concerns epistemic limitations. Real investigators may fail to draw consequences already implicit in their evidence. An institutional review can make those consequences accessible through explanation or testimony. The formal probability model treats the declared evidence state as sufficiently interpreted for its conditional distribution to be specified. Applying the model to bounded human reasoners requires care about that idealization. A result that is redundant for an ideal evidential representation can be valuable for an actual reader's understanding.

A fourth objection concerns selective recognition. An institution can investigate many contributions and recognize only some. The fact of selection may reveal information about its private evidence, competence, or assessment. A mere copying model can omit those features. The posterior-redundancy proposition applies only if the recognition distribution, conditional on available evidence and background, has no remaining dependence on the historical target. Selection that uses additional relevant information can violate that condition and justify an update.

A fifth objection concerns accountability commitments. A public endorsement can expose an institution to reputational or other costs, potentially making it informative even when its text resembles an earlier statement. That possibility requires a model of the institution's decision process and incentives. The costs might encourage careful verification, encourage conformity, or operate differently in different contexts. The present paper treats such mechanisms as possible counterconditions whose evidential significance requires investigation.

A sixth objection concerns uncertain copying relations. Source provenance can be incomplete, and apparently independent records may share an undisclosed origin. Conversely, a citation to an earlier statement may coexist with independent investigation. An audit should record uncertainty about the source mechanism and qualify its conclusions about the number of evidential roots. A mixture over plausible dependence models is one formal possibility, but its weights require justification and can be sensitive to omitted alternatives.

A seventh objection targets the prior and likelihoods. The numerical example uses values chosen for

transparency. Historical contribution inquiries rarely supply repeated, well-calibrated source trials from which such parameters can be read directly. The example therefore establishes a model consequence and a contrast between assumptions. It cannot justify presenting a precise probability for an actual attribution without further methodological work. Qualitative statements about shared dependence may often be more defensible than numerical estimates.

An eighth objection concerns the institution's constitutive rules. Some statuses depend on the actual truth of a qualification, and an apparently authorized act may fail because the relevant condition was absent. The fictional rule system explicitly allows an operative status pending review; other systems can differ. An actual analysis must establish the rule, its interpretation, and the evidence of performance. The paper's distinction between status and historical grounds supplies a way to ask those questions, while leaving their answers context dependent.

A ninth objection concerns the fixed historical proposition. Contribution roles can be contested or change their meaning across fields and time. A binary truth variable presupposes a sufficiently specified criterion and target. If participants dispute that interpretation, the inquiry should retain several candidate propositions or first clarify the role. The posterior theorem remains a result within each declared interpretation; it cannot select the interpretation that best serves an institution or a public.

A final objection concerns originality and scale. The formal result is an elementary conditional-independence identity, and the distinction between institutional status and historical evidence has substantial antecedents. The paper's value lies in organizing their interaction within repeated contribution recognition and a correction process. It presents that organization for scrutiny without a priority claim. Empirical usefulness, broader philosophical adequacy, and the appropriate level of institutional burden remain open.

12 Open Questions and a Prospective Recognition Audit

This section identifies unresolved questions and proposes a bounded method for investigating them. It separates claim interpretation, source dependence, correction, and institutional effects, then outlines a prospective audit of public contribution records. The design aims to test the usefulness of the distinctions while preserving the evidential limits of the audit itself.

Open Problem 12.1 (Dependence under independent reanalysis). Determine when several analyses of a shared research artifact contribute distinct warrant for a specified historical role claim, and identify which parts of the dependence can be assessed from public records.

The question requires a more precise account than source counting. Relevant differences can include access to different versions, independent reconstruction of a workflow, separate interviews, or checks of distinct inferential steps. Shared background assumptions can still connect the resulting errors. A useful method should describe the work performed and the dependencies that remain, while allowing a qualified conclusion where the actual process cannot be established.

Open Problem 12.2 (Recognition with undisclosed evidence). Assess the circumstances under which an institutional decision provides warranted information about a contribution when its supporting evidence is partly unavailable to the public, and specify proportionate forms of review and explanation.

This problem joins epistemology with governance. An institution can have legitimate reasons to protect information while making a consequential attribution. The public may need evidence of the review's competence and scope without access to every source. Possible arrangements include limited procedural disclosure, independent confidential scrutiny, and correction channels for affected contributors. Their adequacy depends on the institution and the risks of error, exclusion, and exposure.

Open Problem 12.3 (Correction across dependent recognition records). Identify the conditions under which a warranted correction of a contribution claim reaches dependent public records and alters the institutional decisions or opportunities connected to them.

The target includes several outcomes: delivery of a correction, revision of a record, changes in audience understanding, and changes in institutional action. These outcomes can diverge. A study should distinguish delays caused by unavailable contact routes, technical limitations, ongoing review, disagreement, and refusal. It should also examine whether correction practices impose disproportionate burdens on contributors whose work was originally misdescribed.

A prospective audit could begin with a consenting repository and a limited set of completed research outputs. Researchers would identify role-specific public claims, record the criterion and version each claim concerns, and trace the sources actually cited for those claims. The unit of analysis would be the claim and its supporting passage, with the evidential role assessed separately for each claim. The initial coding would retain uncertain relations for later review.

The next phase would distinguish reproduction, independent historical investigation, technical verification of an artifact, interpretive analysis, and institutional action. These categories would be working coding distinctions with examples and known ambiguities. Reviewers would examine source passages and, where appropriately authorized, obtain accounts of the process used to produce the public record. An institution's self-description would be recorded as testimony about that process, with its evidential status explicit.

The audit could then compare two displays of selected cases. One would show the public record chain in its existing form. Another would add a concise explanation of the target claim, verified source dependencies, and the operation performed at each major step. A study could assess whether readers distinguish historical corroboration from repeated recognition, understand the limits of a role label, and identify an appropriate correction route. Comprehension, trust, and willingness to use the record should be measured separately.

Several rival explanations should remain visible. Improved comprehension may follow from simpler prose or additional attention. A dependence display may encourage excessive skepticism even where institutions performed useful independent work. Readers may already understand a record's derivative nature. Some institutions may have little need for an elaborate source map because the stakes and source chain are simple. The evaluation should therefore compare the added explanation with proportionate alternatives.

The reference judgment in such a study also needs scrutiny. Establishing that a record copied another record can be easier than establishing who performed the historical contribution. The audit should avoid calling its own role attribution definitive merely because its source tracing is thorough. A review may establish the limits of the public evidence while leaving the contribution claim unresolved. That is a legitimate result if reported at the correct scope.

Longer-term work could investigate the relation between corrected records and opportunities. Such an inquiry would need evidence about the institutions using the records, the timing of relevant decisions, and alternative explanations of any observed change. The current analytic framework supplies candidate distinctions and mechanisms. It leaves causal identification, representative sampling, and the normative assessment of opportunity allocation to further research.

The philosophical programme remains open as well. A richer account can examine the relationship between social categorization and historical description, the conditions under which institutional authority supplies epistemic reasons, and the role of affected contributors in revising public concepts of contribution. These questions extend the present distinction without requiring it to become a general theory of all social facts.

13 Conclusion

This section states the completed argument and its practical limits. The paper has examined repeated institutional recognition through separate historical, evidential, representational, and status targets. A fictional contribution dossier and a small probability model make their interaction explicit. The resulting account is a scoped proposal for public and scholarly discussion, with broader empirical and philosophical questions left open.

A new recognition record can document an additional act of attribution while deriving its historical content from an earlier assertion. Under the stated conditional-independence assumption, observing that recognition adds no posterior information about the historical proposition once the relevant evidence and background are already known. Exact copies supply a transparent special case. Conditionally independent fresh reports yield a different likelihood calculation, and the worked example shows the consequence of confusing the two structures.

The result is limited in ways essential to its interpretation. Institutions can possess additional evidence, perform independent analysis, communicate useful information to new readers, or reveal relevant selection through their decisions. Those processes can alter warrant and may violate the redundancy assumption. A dependence audit must therefore examine claim-specific sources and operations. Counting institutions, files, or citations alone leaves the relevant structure unresolved.

Recognition can also create an institutional status under an operative practice. The fictional award case distinguishes that status from the historical truth of the contribution cited in its grounds. A later correction can change current warrant, public attribution, or award status through different procedures while leaving earlier recognition occurrences available to historical inquiry. Public uptake of the correction is a further empirical question.

The normative discussion adds an explicit premise of defeasible standing in consequential attribution. Under that premise, institutions should give an intelligible account of material evidential dependence and the scope of their own acts, with proportionate correction routes and attention to privacy and burden. These responsibilities arise through a normative argument; they are not encoded in the probability identity.

The comparison with the author's earlier social-facts work preserves both its affirmation of occurrences and its stronger interpretation of socially categorized reality. The present inquiry takes the methodological route permitted by that work and keeps ontological discussion suspended. Its contribution is to clarify how historical warrant, repeated recognition, and institutional effects can be represented together while remaining answerable to different grounds. Further criticism can refine the targets, the dependence model, and the institutional responsibilities developed here.

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