

Practical Self-Continuity through Changes of Memory and Commitment in a Generative Relational Account

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Abstract

A person can prepare for a future that they expect to inhabit while expecting changes in memory, commitments, and practical judgment. This paper develops an account of the relations through which such preparation and later response can form practical self-continuity. It separates causal continuation, temporal reference, memory access, historical evidence, current uptake, institutional recognition, and prospective concern. A recurring stipulated archival undertaking provides cases of memory loss, renewed engagement, commitment replacement, constrained participation, and responsible withdrawal. The central proposal locates one form of continuity in actions that anticipate and support later participation while permitting substantive revision. Concern for another person's agency can share this practical organization, so the first-person character of appropriation remains an additional explanatory question. Episodic and implicit temporal orientations constrain any claim that explicit future-self identification is universally necessary. The formal analysis gives limited results concerning historical recovery from present records, feasible revision paths, and conflicts between temporal rankings. Each result retains its assumptions and remains separate from judgments of authenticity, moral standing, and legitimate authority. The discussion examines earlier instructions, later refusal, obligations surviving repudiation, and the ways institutions shape evidence of apparent continuity. The resulting account supports a differentiated analysis of persistence and change while preserving open philosophical, empirical, and normative obligations.

Keywords: practical continuity; memory; commitment; future-directed agency; revision; generative relational inquiry

Note on the Inquiry

This inquiry examines practical relations through which a person continues, revises or ends undertakings amid changing memory and commitment. The discussion combines conceptual distinctions, stipulated cases, limited formal proofs and critical comparison with philosophical arguments and memory research.

The representations identify conditions of evidence and possible action. They leave the explanation of first-person experience and the justification of normative authority open. A person's moral standing is independent of the degree to which a particular continuity relation is present. The case descriptions are philosophical constructions; clinical and jurisdictional applications require their own evidence and expertise.

The manuscript develops a connected argument through definitions, cases, objections and research obligations. Its proposals remain open to criticism and refinement.

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This page records the manuscript’s research status, licence, development disclosure and relation to the broader inquiry.

Research status. The manuscript develops a philosophical proposal with conditional formal constructions and stipulated cases. Broader primary-source review, originality assessment, specialist criticism and empirical development remain open. The philosophical conclusions and new formulations remain subject to author review.

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Statement on the use of language models. Exploratory dialogue and manuscript preparation involved OpenAI’s ChatGPT for conceptual reconstruction, source discovery and verification, formal criticism, and drafting in $\LaTeX$. The research questions and scope were directed by the human author. New arguments and formulations remain proposals for author review. Authorship and responsibility for any adopted and published claims remain with the human author. The accompanying source audits record access levels and attribution limits.

Research-programme relation. The paper develops the question of practical continuity within a generative relational research programme. Its representations of memory, uptake and prospective concern add domain-specific structure to the abstract framework. Numerical identity, subjective experience and the ultimate justification of practical authority remain separately examined questions.

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1 Introduction

A person can prepare for a future that they expect to inhabit while expecting their memories, activities, and commitments to change. This paper examines the practical structure of that preparation. It distinguishes the continuation of a life from the preservation of a particular plan, and asks how present action can support a later person's participation in revising that plan. The argument develops through a recurring undertaking, a representation of temporal relations, and difficult cases concerning repudiation, dependence, and responsibility. Its object is practical self-continuity through change: the relation between acting now and anticipating one's subsequent agency under conditions that may alter what one wants to do.

Consider a stipulated case. Mira undertakes to prepare a community archive over several years. She records interviews, organizes photographs, and promises contributors that their accounts will be represented carefully. At an intermediate point she loses access to portions of her autobiographical memory. She can read the records of her work, but some episodes remain unavailable to recollection. Later she concludes that the planned publication would expose details that contributors reasonably expected to remain private. She abandons the publication plan and proposes a restricted archive with revised permissions. The undertaking contains bodily continuation, documentary continuity, changed memory access, continuing concern for contributors, and replacement of the original end.

The case supports an inquiry before it supports a verdict. An observer could track Mira through the period without knowing whether she currently endorses the project. A contributor could correctly remember her promise while misunderstanding its conditions. Mira could recognize a recorded episode as part of her life while lacking the experience of remembering it. She could retain the original plan through pressure, or revise it through engagement with those affected. The public product alone would leave these differences obscure. A continuing archive can be produced through combinations of agency, dependence, coercion, and repair that matter to an account of practical selfhood.

The generative relational perspective directs attention to how those combinations arise and what they enable next. A practical orientation persists through processes that support its expression, correction, and use. A memory aid can make an earlier reason available for present consideration. Another person's testimony can reconnect a commitment to its original situation. Material support can preserve the possibility of refusing or revising a role. A public identifier can keep records attached to one person while helping others impose an obsolete description upon that person. Relation and persistence therefore receive their significance from the activity, available alternatives, and authority claimed on their basis.

Causal continuation alone leaves practical self-concern unexplained. A person may affect another person, an institution, or a future environment without treating those effects as their own anticipated agency. Stable causal organization also occurs in systems to which this inquiry attributes no first-person perspective. An account that moves directly from persistence to selfhood leaves its central transition unsupported. The present paper develops that transition as a philosophical task with limited constructive results. Its definitions name the phenomena to investigate; their labels supply no proof that those phenomena have been explained.

One contribution concerns prospective appropriation. A future-directed attitude can treat a later situation as a standpoint from which the person expects to experience, deliberate and act. Concern can address anticipated authority and participation alongside welfare. Serious concern for another person's agency can share this practical organization, including protection of refusal and revision. The analysis therefore identifies a practical contrast with concern directed solely toward an outcome while preserving a residual first-person question that the shared organization leaves unresolved.

A second contribution concerns commitment change. Practical continuity can survive replacement of an end when replacement occurs through continued engagement with an undertaking's reasons, consequences, and affected parties. This proposal requires more than a historical chain between decisions. An institution may preserve a project by assigning someone a role they reject. A person may use the vocabulary of revision to conceal avoidance of an obligation. The analysis therefore separates genealogy, current uptake, reasons for revision, and the claims of people who relied on the earlier commitment.

Responsible repudiation becomes a possibility requiring justification.

A third contribution concerns evidence. Present conduct, personal records, and testimony can support continuity claims while remaining compatible with different histories of endorsement. A short formal argument identifies when a historical query can be recovered from a present record. A second construction represents permitted revision paths and distinguishes opportunity from its use. These results clarify local assumptions. They provide neither a numerical measure of selfhood nor a justification for treating the modeler's target as an ideal life.

The paper is a philosophical investigation with conditional models. Its examples are stipulated for analysis, including examples involving memory loss. Their descriptions establish features within a thought experiment. Clinical mechanisms, prevalence, prognosis, and appropriate care remain empirical questions. The discussion of earlier instructions and later refusal concerns practical authority without asserting jurisdictional rules. Numerical identity and phenomenal experience remain additional explanatory obligations. Ontological suspension preserves those questions while allowing analysis of specific practical relations.

Practical continuity and moral standing remain distinct throughout. A person whose memory, planning ability, or public recognition is disrupted can still possess claims upon others. The representations organize capacities and relations supporting continuing undertakings. They supply no scale for basic worth. A highly integrated project can be oppressive, and a fragmented life can contain valuable agency, care, and experience. Any evaluative use of continuity requires a separate account of the good pursued and the people affected.

1.1 The Practical Contrast

The inquiry is motivated by a contrast between continuing an activity and continuing to participate in its direction. Both can produce stable conduct. Their difference becomes visible when memory changes, a commitment is challenged or a person seeks to leave. The paper examines the conditions under which these transitions can be understood without equating persistence with endorsement.

Mira can remain publicly associated with the archive after rejecting its current policy. The association can be historically accurate while its use implies a current stance she denies. A successful practical account should explain how to preserve the history and correct the attribution together.

She can also accept a bounded responsibility without endorsing the wider project. Returning entrusted material can answer a contributor's legitimate claim while bringing Mira's role to an end. An account that recognizes only full continuation or complete release would miss that combination.

The private-composition case provides a complementary contrast. Noor finds a sketch she created earlier and decides whether to resume, transform or leave it unfinished. With external claims to completion absent by stipulation, the inquiry can isolate historical authorship, current engagement and anticipated future activity.

The comparison prevents the archive's interpersonal obligations from becoming a universal model of self-relation. Some practical continuities concern another person's reliance; others concern the person's relation to an unfinished activity. Both can involve memory change and renewed uptake, with different normative consequences.

The underlying reference to one person remains ordinary and explicit. The paper asks how these relations change within a tracked life. Its local results may contribute to a more unified theory of persons, but they supply no complete criterion of numerical identity.

1.2 The Main Conditional Arguments

The central claims have different forms and burdens. This subsection distinguishes the formal results from the philosophical and normative arguments. The distinctions allow the reader to assess each contribution without treating one kind of success as evidence for all the others.

The historical-recovery result concerns a fixed question and a declared space of histories. A present record determines the answer precisely when all histories compatible with that record agree on it. The

proof clarifies the insufficiency of compressed evidence. It leaves the adequacy of the history space and the nature of recollective experience independently open.

The revision construction concerns paths through a bounded action space. It distinguishes an available route from its enactment and, through an information-access countermodel, distinguishes pointwise success from a common guaranteed action based on the information actually available. A usable strategy still requires interpretation of feasibility, comprehension and the legitimacy of its target.

The normative arguments concern particular relations. Legitimate limited entrustment, accepted custody and proportionate feasible response can support a bounded requirement to return or transfer material after repudiation. Controlled materially misleading attribution can support a requirement of correction under an explicit defeasible principle.

Further arguments address provisional preservation during credible uncertainty, responsive interpretation and the organization of a justified pause. Each identifies who bears the relevant responsibility and why the proposed burden falls within its scope. The mere existence of a need or a capable supporter supplies no automatic allocation of work.

The positive account of practical continuity coordinates these arguments. Present uptake can address a history through new judgment, and present preparation can support later participation without fixing its substantive outcome. This coordination can survive lost recall and changed ends. It can also accompany an acknowledged ending.

The proposal remains open to difficult counterexamples. Current rejection can coexist with lingering claims; accurate records can fail to restore experience; good support can shape the preferences it later helps express; and a justified present choice can close future options. These tensions motivate the account's plural structure.

1.3 The Structure of the Investigation

The manuscript develops the argument through foundations, sustained case analysis and comparative assessment. The sequence is designed to keep the reference, evidential, practical and normative questions visible while allowing them to interact. Later sections return to the same cases with stronger objections and revised conditions.

The opening sections locate the generative relational orientation, define the temporal representation and distinguish memory from historical reconstruction. They then examine commitment formation, prospective concern and revision opportunities. Embodiment and institutional records show how participation becomes materially and publicly effective.

The central case discussions address changed memory, replacement and repair, earlier instructions and hypothetical branching. They distinguish implicit temporal continuity from stronger narrative demands, compare opposed temporal evaluations, and examine dissent, gradual change and care for a future that may reject present values.

The later practical analyses develop answerability after disavowal, conceptual change, shared undertakings and action under uncertain histories. They also examine first-person avowal, interruption and resumption. These sections show why continuity cannot be assessed solely through an outcome, a record or an unchanged role.

The comparative assessment then tests the account against one integrated dossier. It asks which specific inference or response changes when the proposed distinctions are used. It includes stronger alternatives and the possibility that an enriched narrative, institutional or unified-life account may converge with the local analysis.

The final inquiry and objection sections state how the framework could be studied, criticized, narrowed or replaced. Their purpose is to make the proposal answerable to evidence and argument. The conclusion distinguishes established conditional results, proposed normative bridges and the wider questions that remain open.

2 Analytical Scope and Philosophical Antecedents

This chapter situates practical self-continuity within a generative relational framework and a selective set of philosophical antecedents. It distinguishes the motivating intuition from the present development, specifies the kinds of claim offered, and explains the use of ontological suspension. The literature comparison identifies direct points of contact that constrain any claim of originality.

2.1 The Inherited Continuity Question

The motivating intuition describes a relatively stable phenomenon continuing to act within a relational system over a specified interval. Its attraction lies in investigating persistence through changing conditions while leaving unchanged intrinsic substance unassumed. Applied to selfhood, it suggests investigating bodily activity, memory, practical projects, and relations with others. It opens a question about continuity; a theory of the subject experiencing that continuity remains to be developed.

The present inquiry distinguishes availability for reidentification from active relation to a future. Reidentification permits an observer to say that a record belongs to Mira. Future orientation concerns what Mira anticipates doing and undergoing, and how that anticipation bears on present action. An archive can connect signatures to one person under a reference criterion while the person later regards the associated decisions differently. Connecting the records and explaining their practical significance are distinct tasks.

This separation preserves the inherited intuition while placing demands upon its explanatory use. Relations can explain retention of capacities, opportunities, and dependencies. They can reveal how an interruption arose. Yet the same general vocabulary can describe an endorsed undertaking and a coerced routine. Explanatory value comes from identifying differences in their formation and present organization. General connectedness supplies a setting for that work.

The motivating formulation opens a question about persistence through relations. Its explanatory value depends on the distinctions and arguments developed here. Resemblance to a broader philosophical tradition would require a separate account of the relevant similarities and differences.

2.2 Selective Primary-Source Comparisons

The abstract framework's carrier, action and congruence are located in Huang's Part I [4, Section 3]. The present representations add memory, practical uptake, and prospective concern as domain-specific structure. Their adequacy receives a separate argument under continued ontological suspension.

The comparisons address practical significance, the organization of desire, and agency over time. Each provides a limited point of confrontation. The broader review of personal identity, memory, embodiment, and social recognition remains open.

Parfit's opening discussion of *Personal Identity* distinguishes identity questions from questions about their importance for survival, memory, and responsibility. His branching discussion challenges an assumption that practical relations must share the logical form of identity [8, pp. 3–12]. This is a direct antecedent for separating practical significance from numerical identification. The present inquiry concentrates on changing commitments, evidential access, and current participation in an undertaking. Its contribution depends on showing how those distinctions improve analysis of revision and reliance. The later branching cases test that analysis and carry no originality claim for the underlying separation.

Frankfurt directs attention to the organization of a person's will, including desires concerning desires, and distinguishes a desire from a desire effectively moving action [3, pp. 6, 8]. This provides a comparison between wanting an outcome, acting toward it, and taking a stance toward one's motivation. The present account keeps those dimensions separate while examining how formation, alternatives, and affected parties bear on practical authority. An effective attitude receives no automatic final authority through its location in a hierarchy.

Bratman's account examines connections among plans and self-governance at relevant times. It distinguishes successful self-management from continuing self-governance and develops a limited com-

parison with shared activity [1, manuscript pp. 1–14]. These are close antecedents for the emphasis on continuing participation. The present inquiry develops changing memory access, repudiated substantive ends, and consequential historical records. Its claims require assessment against that established account of temporal agency. A new vocabulary for connected plans would supply an insufficient contribution by itself.

2.3 Levels of Claim and Interpretive Burdens

The manuscript distinguishes working definitions, conditional mathematical results, philosophical proposals, and empirical hypotheses. A definition declares a use. A result follows from stated assumptions. A proposal argues for the explanatory importance of a distinction. A hypothesis anticipates what inquiry could reveal about actual lives. A formally correct construction can consequently receive a critical assessment of its interpretation.

An arrow between commitment records may represent a documented revision. Its existence follows from the construction. Whether the revision expresses agency requires evidence and an account of such expression. Whether it is justified requires further normative premises. Calling the arrow an authentic revision before supplying those arguments would place a conclusion inside a label.

Practical uptake here means present engagement with an undertaking as a consideration for action. Prospective appropriation means an orientation treating anticipated experience and agency as one's own. Practical self-continuity names relations through which such uptake and orientation persist or develop across time. These formulations identify objects for inquiry. They leave attribution and explanatory adequacy open to subsequent arguments.

A definition should constrain inquiry without settling a disputed case by stipulation. Requiring complete autobiographical recall would decide the memory-change case in advance. Requiring only causal dependence would automatically include coerced continuation. The proposed approach examines the undertaking's role in deliberation, its formation, and what the person can do with it. The analysis can then discover disagreements between external attribution and current stance.

2.4 Suspension and Explanatory Commitment

Ontological suspension permits modest representational commitments. Temporal indices identify occasions; causal relations describe dependencies; records preserve traces and claims. These uses remain compatible with different theories of personal persistence. The analysis nevertheless makes local commitments: an event differs from a present report, an available alternative differs from enacted behavior, and an evaluation requires premises that give it force.

Suspension would become evasive if invoked whenever criticism reached a substantive issue. The paper therefore states where reference, agency, and experience remain background assumptions. Ordinary tracking of Mira supplies a reference practice. Her anticipated standpoint supplies a phenomenon to analyze. Introducing a graph produces neither feature. The question concerns how these features interact with change and how much their organization can be explained without a complete metaphysics.

Adequacy also requires consistency across cases. If a representation treats imposed replacement and thoughtful revision identically because both update a token, it loses a required distinction. If it treats recollection and testimony identically because both convey a proposition, it loses their different modes of access. Comparison reveals where the representation needs enrichment.

The ambition is consequently substantial and local. Practical relations can continue through changes that make simple persistence criteria inadequate. Their organization can be criticized while respecting the person's standing. Whether this account belongs inside a broader theory of personal identity or remains an account of particular activities is preserved as a further architectural question.

2.5 Generation, Reproduction and Practical Change

The generative relational orientation asks how a practical arrangement comes to support the activities and possibilities attributed to it. This subsection distinguishes generating a new relation from reproducing an existing one. The distinction carries explanatory value while leaving ethical evaluation open.

An archival procedure can reproduce an earlier commitment by making its terms repeatedly available and organizing conduct around them. The same procedure can also generate new relations: a participant learns of an affected contributor, a new interpretation becomes intelligible, or a previously unavailable transfer becomes possible.

The two descriptions can apply to different aspects of one process. A revised record may preserve the history of a restriction while creating a new route for current review. Calling the process reproductive or generative without identifying the relation would obscure that combination.

Generation also differs from creation without conditions. A new undertaking can depend on earlier material, learned capacities and another person's response. Its novelty concerns the practical relation or arrangement that becomes available, rather than an origin outside all prior influence.

Reproduction likewise differs from exact copying. Maintaining an undertaking across changing circumstances may require adjustment, interpretation and work. A condition of confidentiality can remain operative through a new storage arrangement whose material form differs substantially from the earlier one.

The distinction should therefore be specified through an explanatory question. What is being sustained? What new possibility or relation arises? Through which interaction does the change occur? These questions make the orientation more precise than a general affirmation that everything is connected.

Neither side has a fixed ethical value. A newly generated arrangement can intensify control, while reproducing a contributor's restriction can protect legitimate agency. A longstanding practice can be oppressive, while a new route of exit can enable a justified change. Evaluation depends on content, formation, authority and consequences.

The practical-selfhood application concerns how a person can remain engaged with a changing history. Mira's new decision to arrange transfer can be generated through present inquiry while responding to an earlier undertaking. The response has a genealogy and a new formation. Its authority requires the separate argument developed later.

This account preserves the original continuity intuition while resisting its overextension. Persistence through relations can explain how resources and possibilities remain available. Explaining first-person perspective or normative authority requires additional work that the vocabulary of generation alone cannot perform.

2.6 Different Explanatory Questions within One Case

The same episode can invite causal, epistemic, practical and normative explanations. This subsection specifies their different targets. The purpose is to make clear why answering one question can contribute to another without completing it.

A causal explanation asks how Mira came to attend a meeting or adopt a position. It can examine documents, relationships, habits and constraints. An epistemic explanation asks what warrants a belief about the earlier undertaking. It can examine the reliability and independence of sources.

A practical explanation asks how a concern enters deliberation and action. It can distinguish a reason Mira takes up from an instruction she merely executes. A normative explanation asks why a response is justified or required, given the legitimate claims and relevant circumstances.

These explanations can interact. A reliable record can cause a new understanding, that understanding can become a reason for action, and a normative argument can assess the action. The interaction does not make the questions interchangeable.

For example, discovering that an institution induced Mira's agreement through selective information helps explain the formation. Whether the selection was misleading requires an epistemic and contextual

assessment. Whether the resulting agreement should govern requires a further argument about authority and affected claims.

An explanation of experienced self-relation adds another target. The paper can record that Mira anticipates acting from a future standpoint and examine how the anticipation organizes preparation. The full character of that anticipation remains incompletely explained by the practical dependencies described.

The distinctions matter to criticism. A reader can accept the causal story while disputing the normative conclusion, or accept the practical benefit of a support while questioning whether it restores recollection. Such disagreement should be preserved rather than treated as inconsistency.

The framework's ambition is to coordinate these questions in a traceable way. It asks what evidence or premise licenses each transition. The coordination has value when it prevents an institution, investigator or participant from using success at one level to claim authority at another.

2.7 Constitution, Enablement and Recognition

A relation can constitute a particular arrangement, enable an activity or provide evidence through which the activity is recognized. This subsection distinguishes those roles. The distinction is especially important when social support is said to be part of practical selfhood.

A shared agreement can constitute a limited role within an undertaking: accepting custody under specified terms can establish the practical arrangement the parties will use. The legitimacy and exact content of that arrangement remain subjects of normative and interpretive assessment.

A memory aid can enable Mira to understand a record. Its role in the activity can be indispensable without establishing that the aid constitutes her first-person experience or numerical identity. Dependence for a task differs from a complete account of what the person is.

A public designation can help others recognize who organized the archive. That evidential and coordinating role does not automatically constitute current endorsement. The designation can remain historically useful while its present implication needs correction.

The same object can perform several roles. A signed agreement can help form an undertaking, later provide evidence about it and serve as a resource for present understanding. The analysis should identify the role relevant to each inference.

An objection is that these categories can overlap in practice. The account accepts overlap. Their distinction concerns explanatory function, not a claim that each object belongs permanently to one exclusive class.

This clarification limits broad claims about social constitution. The paper demonstrates particular dependencies and practical formations. It leaves wider constitutive theories of persons for independent philosophical assessment. A support's importance does not by itself settle that wider question.

The resulting orientation is affirmative and restrained. Relations can make action possible, create legitimate arrangements under suitable conditions and provide evidence for recognition. Their different roles explain why relational analysis can be substantial without becoming a universal reduction of the person to public classification.

2.8 The Role of Stipulated Cases

The archive and composition cases are designed to make particular distinctions assessable. This subsection explains their method and limits. It also specifies how the use of one recurring case can support integration without supplying empirical generality.

The archive case combines changed memory, a recorded undertaking, current rejection and shared resources. Contributors also have claims affected by the arrangement. These features make it possible to examine how several practical relations interact. Later variations change selected conditions to test a particular inference.

The composition case removes some external claims by stipulation. Noor's relation to an unfinished sketch can then be assessed without assuming a promise to complete it. The contrast helps identify which conclusions depend on interpersonal reliance and which concern personal engagement more directly.

The removal of a condition in a thought experiment establishes a conceptual contrast, not a claim that actual creative work is socially isolated. Noor's capacities and materials can still have social histories. The stipulation concerns the absence of a particular outstanding claim relevant to completion.

A recurring case also has risks. It can make a domain-specific arrangement seem universal, especially when archival custody becomes the model for every responsibility. The paper therefore states the premises of each normative argument and limits transfer to cases where they are justified.

The variations should remain coherent with their stated backgrounds. If a later argument changes who controls the material or whether a promise was made, that change needs to be explicit. Otherwise the conclusion can appear to follow from the original dossier while depending on a new premise.

The case method's strongest contribution is inferential. It can reveal that the same outward continuation supports different interpretations under different formation histories, or that a changed present stance leaves one bounded claim intact. Its empirical significance requires further inquiry into actual mechanisms and frequency.

This methodological status gives the reader a clear task. Assess the coherence of the stipulations, the relevance of the distinction and the force of the stated reasons. Acceptance of the example does not require believing that it describes an actual individual or endorsing every broader claim the framework might later develop.

2.9 The Scope of Practical Self-Continuity

The central phrase requires a final scope clarification. This subsection distinguishes continuity of a person, continuity of an undertaking and continuity of a practical relation to that undertaking. The paper concentrates on the third while using the first as an ordinary background in its main cases.

An undertaking can continue after its founder leaves. Its materials and institutional identity may remain stable while the founder's current engagement ends. The project's persistence therefore differs from the person's practical relation to it.

The person can also continue a concern after the public project ends. Mira may preserve a commitment to careful treatment of contributors in a new activity. The old institution's closure leaves that relation open to further development.

Practical self-continuity concerns how earlier activity, present response and anticipated agency are connected within the person's life. The connection can involve renewed uptake, reinterpretation, responsible withdrawal or preparation for a changed future. Its content should be specified rather than inferred from the word continuity.

The account does not require every valuable relation to continue. It can identify a justified ending and preserve a residual historical or normative connection. Some changes may remain discontinuities in every practically relevant respect for the undertaking at issue.

A comprehensive theory of personal unity would address how these changing relations belong to one life and what makes the person continue. The present paper leaves that theory open while offering local arguments that such a theory may need to accommodate.

This scope makes the project both narrower and more demanding than a general metaphor of relational being. It must show what each relation explains, which inference it supports and where its authority ends. The following chapters pursue those tasks through explicit models, reasons and counterexamples.

3 Temporal Reference and Plural Continuity

This chapter introduces a minimal representation distinguishing temporal reference, causal continuation, memory access, and practical uptake. Its purpose is to prevent one relation from acquiring another relation's authority through notation. The construction begins with indexed occasions, examines directed continuation, and applies the distinctions to a changing undertaking. It concludes with the reference presuppositions of the model.

3.1 Indexed Occasions and Typed Relations

Let I be indexed occasions and $\tau : I \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ their temporal indices. An occasion can represent an interview, decision, recorded action, or another position at which a situation is described. Identical records can receive different indices. Discreteness belongs to the representation; it implies no metaphysics of discrete person-stages.

Let $C \subseteq I \times I$ represent causal continuation, with $iCj \Rightarrow \tau(i) < \tau(j)$. An edge records a declared dependence: a diary entry informing a decision, an exercise supporting a capacity, or an institution sustaining a role. Its interpretation specifies which dependence matters. A single untyped arrow joining these examples would conceal differences required for explanation.

Definition 3.1 (Typed continuity record). A typed continuity record comprises indexed occasions, temporal order, a declared causal relation, and separately specified relations for reference reidentification, memory access, practical uptake, and prospective self-concern. Each relation carries its case interpretation and evidential status. An implication between types requires an additional assumption or argument.

Let K be the set of commitment tokens. In the restricted resolved-reference description, $R, M, A \subseteq I \times I$ and $U \subseteq I \times K$. Write $R(i, j)$ for reference reidentification, $M(j, i)$ for reported memory access at j to an earlier episode at i , $U(i, k)$ for present uptake of commitment token k , and $A(i, j)$ for prospective self-concern directed from i toward a later occasion j . The memory and anticipation uses require $\tau(i) < \tau(j)$ in these displayed argument orders. Their directions differ, and neither receives the properties of a reference equivalence by default. Reports may be mistaken, public commitments may lack current uptake, and future concern may survive the loss of a particular memory link. Separate symbols allow these disagreements to remain visible.

The name assigned to A carries the phenomenon into the model as an input. The relation can record an avowal or an investigator's hypothesis. Its inclusion proves no explanation of self-concern. The philosophical argument must explain how that attitude differs from concern for another beneficiary and what supports attribution. Labels should display assumptions rather than conceal explanatory gaps.

3.2 Representation Tokens and Unresolved Targets

The initial relations on $I \times I$ use a restricted case description in which the target occasions have been included and their references resolved by stipulation. That representation is insufficient for a memory-like report about an event that never occurred, an ambiguous reference, or an anticipation of mutually exclusive futures. A report's existence is one fact; the occurrence of its target is another. The present extension separates their domains so that notation cannot turn the first into proof of the second.

Let T be a set of representation tokens. A token can be a particular report, written anticipation, or represented content of a practical exercise. The owner map $o : T \rightarrow I$ identifies the occasion at which it is produced or used. Token individuation follows the inquiry: two expressions with the same content can remain separate tokens because their sources and consequences differ. The construction does not assume that a token exhausts the mental act or experience it represents.

Let H contain admissible histories and E_h the event domain represented in history h . For each history define an interpretation map

$$J_h : T \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(E_h).$$

The value $J_h(t)$ contains events that match token t under the declared interpretation in that history. A singleton supplies a resolved target relative to the history and interpretation. A larger set preserves ambiguity. An empty set records failed reference or absence of a matching event within that representation. It does not establish that the token lacks meaning or that the event is impossible in every admissible history.

Reported remembering and anticipation can now be recorded through $\widehat{M}, \widehat{A} \subseteq I \times T$. These relations connect an occasion to a representation, leaving target resolution to J_h . A past-directed token may have no matching past event in one history. A future-directed token may have a matching event only in

histories where a particular choice is made. The direction of the report or anticipation remains distinct from the direction of causal dependence among events.

Consider a token in which Mira reports recalling an unrestricted-publication promise. In history h_1 the corresponding promise occurred, so the interpretation gives an appropriate target. In history h_2 no such promise occurred, so the same report has an empty target set under the specified matching criterion. The report itself can exist in both histories. Its presence therefore does not identify the promise's occurrence. A claim about occurrence needs evidence distinguishing the histories or a justified restriction of the possibility space.

This counterexample also explains why a memory-like presentation should not be defined as veridical remembering before the inquiry begins. An investigator may eventually justify that description. At the earlier stage, the report and its experiential significance can be preserved while its target remains uncertain. The model thereby respects the phenomenon without granting historical infallibility to its label.

Anticipation presents a related but different case. Mira can consider both a future in which she publishes and a future in which she withdraws. The tokens can be present together while their targets occur in different possible histories. The representation does not require a realized future containing both incompatible actions. Nor does assigning a target within a possible history prove that the history will occur.

This matters to prospective self-concern. A person can care about an unrealized possibility, prepare against it, or seek to make it possible. If the relation $A(i, j)$ is read as connecting present agency to an already established future occasion, those forms of concern are misrepresented. The token-and-history construction keeps concern, possibility, and realization distinct. Whether the imagined standpoint is experienced as one's own remains a further interpretive question.

The history index itself also needs discipline. Events in different histories should not be silently identified because they share a description. A release event in one history and a release event in another can occupy analogous roles while differing in participants or conditions. A cross-history matching relation may be useful, but it requires a declared criterion. The present construction leaves that enrichment optional.

An apparently strong condition can still leave ambiguity. Suppose every admissible history supplies exactly one target for a token. This establishes resolution within each history. It does not establish one common target across them, because the domains are history-indexed. An inference to a particular actual event requires further information about which history or which shared factual feature is supported.

The distinction permits different strengths of conclusion. An inquiry may determine that a promise of some kind occurred in every compatible history while remaining uncertain about its exact content or occasion. It can then report that weaker invariant feature. Such a conclusion is useful precisely because it states what survives the uncertainty without claiming complete recovery.

The extension remains a representation of reference and evidence. It supplies no account of how a memory experience is produced, how imagination becomes self-directed, or how a person recognizes a thought as theirs. Its contribution is logical and methodological: the model now has room for mistaken memory, ambiguous content, and unrealized futures without converting representation into occurrence.

For the central stipulated archive examples, the simpler notation remains available when all relevant references are successfully resolved. The more general notation should be used when unresolved targets perform conceptual work. Choosing the simple representation then becomes a disclosed scope restriction, rather than an unnoticed assumption that every apparent memory and anticipated future has an actual referent.

3.3 Directed Continuation and Identity

The reflexive-transitive relation C^* records causal reachability through zero or more edges. Reflexivity retains the initial occasion; transitivity combines paths. Symmetry generally fails because later events can depend on earlier ones without the converse dependence. An identity relation has different requirements. If an equivalence E identifies i with both j and k , symmetry and transitivity identify j with k .

That consequence matters when j and k are distinct successors. A lineage can preserve common origin while retaining separate branches. It answers a succession question. Treating the lineage as numerical identity requires an argument about the relevant concepts, beyond closing a graph under reachability.

The distinction matters in ordinary cases too. Mira's decision can influence a contributor's later action, connecting occasions belonging to different people. Conversely, ordinary reference can track Mira through a period during which the archive plays no role in her life. The process selected for a project and the reference practice selected for a person have different explanatory domains.

Selecting only identity-preserving mechanisms can be useful after a tracking criterion has been justified. Such selection presupposes the identity judgment encoded in the adjective. The central cases therefore declare their reference basis: bodily and documentary tracking identify Mira across the stipulated period. The question concerns changes of engagement, memory, and authority within that tracked life.

3.4 Continuity Profiles and Evaluation

A profile can record preserved and changed relations. Bodily tracking and records may continue while recall becomes partial. Recall may remain vivid while a project is repudiated. Public identity and outward routine may persist while refusal becomes costly. These cases differ in ways a single assertion of sameness leaves underdescribed.

The profile is not a weighted identity score. Numerical aggregation would require scales for memory, embodiment, recognition, and commitment, plus justification for their tradeoffs. A formula could allow memory to compensate for absent endorsement while the practical argument treats coerced conduct as a separate concern. Compensability is a commitment requiring defense, not an automatic feature of measurement.

Analytical separation permits interaction to be investigated. Memory can influence recognition, recognition can shape roles, and roles can shape subsequent experience. Their distinctions enable a statement of those mechanisms. Collapsing them into one continuity variable would obscure what changed and through which route.

An interval and activity should accompany each claim. Mira may retain an undertaking, suspend it, and later resume it. Calling the whole interval continuous can conceal suspension; calling it discontinuous can conceal supported resumption. The inquiry must identify whether it tracks uninterrupted uptake, retained capacity, genealogy, or renewed participation. These have different evidence and practical significance.

3.5 Reference Presuppositions

A critic can object that selecting occasions belonging to Mira already presupposes personal continuity. That objection defeats a claim to derive all identity from the construction. The present target is narrower: given a person tracked across a period, explain how practical relations persist, change, and become contested. Reference continuity and practical continuity occupy different places in the argument.

Knowing who began the archive does not decide whether its end remains endorsed, whether replacing that end continues concern for contributors, or whether an explanation is owed. The practical questions can have different answers while reference stays fixed. They concern the organization and normative significance of a life through time.

Where reference itself is disputed, several candidate mappings may be retained. The inquiry can report which practical conclusions survive all of them. A conclusion depending on one mapping remains conditional upon that mapping. Robustness across candidates preserves useful results without pretending that practical analysis has resolved the metaphysical dispute.

This strategy also prevents an institution's reference system from acquiring unlimited authority. A stable identifier may organize records efficiently while failing to capture how a person understands a changed commitment. The identifier supports retrieval. Its practical and moral uses require arguments responsive to the content retrieved and the person addressed.

3.6 Formal Independence and Psychological Dependence

Keeping relations separately specified is a modeling decision. It permits the construction to represent different combinations of memory, uptake, recognition, and concern. That permission should be distinguished from a finding that those dimensions vary independently in actual psychological life. A model can leave an implication unassumed even when empirical inquiry might discover a reliable dependence.

The distinction matters for counterexamples. Suppose the model permits the same outward conduct together with either current endorsement or rejection. This demonstrates that endorsement cannot be derived from the model's conduct variables alone. It does not establish that every real case displaying that conduct has both possibilities. The countermodel identifies an unlicensed inference within the representation; its empirical interpretation requires evidence that the rival states are genuinely admissible in the case.

The same caution applies to first-person concern. If the formalism treats prospective appropriation as an independent input, its inability to derive appropriation is partly a consequence of its design. A claim that no possible causal account could ever explain it would exceed that result. The present argument makes the narrower point that the stated structure has yet to supply the needed explanation.

This distinction protects the philosophical inquiry from two opposite errors. One would treat a freely adjustable symbol as proof of a real independence. The other would dismiss every formal separation because the dimensions interact in life. A model can separate interacting dimensions precisely to explain their interaction. The relevant question is whether their definitions and proposed links fit the case.

Consider memory and current uptake. Reliable recollection may help someone sustain an undertaking by making its reasons available. Loss of recollection may alter that route. Neither observation requires a universal implication from memory to endorsement. A person can remember a reason and reject it, or accept testimony and take it up. The account should model the particular dependence through which access affects engagement.

A similar analysis concerns recognition. Being publicly recognized may create opportunities that strengthen a practical concern. It may also expose the person to expectations that distort its expression. The causal effects depend on the arrangement. Treating recognition and uptake separately makes it possible to investigate those different routes without assuming that recognition directly measures endorsement.

The burden of an empirical model is consequently to state its linking hypotheses. It might propose that access to a certain kind of record increases the person's ability to distinguish an old promise from a later interpretation. It might predict that a blocked exit weakens the evidential value of continued attendance. Such hypotheses need operational definitions and appropriate comparisons. Their plausibility is not inherited from the existence of the symbols.

The burden of the philosophical model differs but remains substantial. It must explain why the distinctions matter to the question and show which conclusions depend on combining them. The present account identifies cases in which the combination would conceal a material difference. It also permits future work to show that some dimensions should be reformulated or linked more tightly.

3.7 A Countermodel and the Scope of Its Conclusion

Take a simplified observation record containing Mira's attendance, completion of a task, and use of the archive's official vocabulary. A model can assign that record to a case of current endorsement and to a case of reluctant compliance. The resulting nonidentification claim concerns the limited record. It tells an investigator to seek additional evidence or retain uncertainty.

Suppose further evidence includes a detailed, intelligible account in which Mira explains her reasons and describes available alternatives. That evidence may exclude the compliance interpretation under justified assumptions. The original countermodel does not prohibit such identification. It applies to its specified information, not to every conceivable inquiry.

Alternatively, the explanation may itself be part of a required performance. The model may need to include the circumstances in which it was produced. This does not mean that evidence can never support

endorsement. It means that evidential significance depends on source and context, especially when rival mechanisms are plausible.

A critic might complain that this approach creates endless skepticism: any evidence could be re-described as constrained performance. The response is that a merely imaginable alternative is not automatically a live empirical possibility. The inquiry must justify which alternatives belong in its admissible set. Evidence can make a rival implausible or irrelevant to the decision without proving metaphysical impossibility.

The appropriate level of assurance depends on the claim and its use. A low-stakes interpretation in ordinary collaboration can rely on evidence insufficient for a consequential institutional attribution. This variation should not be mistaken for a change in truth. It concerns what warrant is needed before a particular action is justified on the basis of the claim.

The construction therefore supports disciplined uncertainty rather than universal doubt. It distinguishes a logical possibility admitted by the model, an empirically plausible history, and a sufficiently supported conclusion for a declared purpose. Keeping those levels visible makes the account more useful for both philosophy and practical inquiry.

3.8 Models of a Person and the Person Addressed

The person represented in a model also participates in the practical world in which the model may be used. Mira can read an institutional account of her commitments, object to it, or change her conduct in response. A model about practical continuity can therefore enter the process it describes.

This feedback creates an additional responsibility of interpretation. A classification introduced for analysis can become a reason for others to restrict a role or discount a refusal. The formal definition did not establish those consequences as justified. Their use requires a separate argument about the purpose and authority of the classification.

The model can also become a useful resource. By separating historical acknowledgment from current endorsement, it can give Mira and others a language for discussing change without erasing the record. By distinguishing available revision from enacted revision, it can identify an institutional obstacle. The practical effects of the vocabulary can thus support the inquiry's aims when its limits remain explicit.

This reflexive role is one reason to avoid a universal score of self-continuity. A scalar can travel easily across settings while losing its assumptions. It may then be used to rank persons rather than assess a specific practical relation. The present qualitative and typed approach requires more explanation, but that explanation helps retain the connection between a claim and its grounds.

An adequate model should therefore be answerable both to evidence about its subject and to criticism from those affected by its use. This is a proposed methodological orientation. It follows from the practical significance the model can acquire, not from a theorem about all social inquiry. The account remains open to refinements that preserve its distinctions more economically or make its assumptions easier to assess.

3.9 Granularity and the Individuation of an Occasion

The model's occasions are units of representation chosen for an inquiry. This subsection examines how that choice affects the resulting continuity claim. It separates the individuation of a recorded occasion from a claim about the ultimate structure of a person or process.

An interview can be represented as one occasion when the question concerns whether it occurred before a later agreement. The same interview may need several occasions when the question concerns how a restriction was proposed, misunderstood and clarified during the conversation. The coarser description can be adequate for the first inquiry and inadequate for the second.

The difference matters because a commitment may form within an interaction. If the whole interaction receives one label, an early reservation and a later acceptance can disappear into a single status. A finer description can preserve the sequence without claiming that practical agency consists of discrete atoms.

The temporal index should therefore be interpreted relative to the chosen resolution. Two events assigned the same index may occur within one observational interval. The strict-forward condition on the declared causal relation then represents only dependencies distinguished at that resolution.

If an important dependence occurs within the interval, the model can refine the occasions or use a different temporal description. It should avoid inferring that the dependence is impossible merely because the current index cannot represent it. A limitation of the encoding is a reason to change the encoding when the question requires it.

The same issue applies to simultaneous or reciprocal support. Mira and Arun can sustain a conversation through mutually responsive acts. A simple acyclic event graph may represent successive contributions at a chosen resolution. It may also omit aspects of the interaction that require a richer account. The model carries no metaphysical verdict against reciprocal organization.

Granularity can change what appears continuous. At a coarse scale, Mira remains involved throughout a year. At a finer scale, the record includes withdrawal, negotiation and limited return. The coarse claim can remain useful for a genealogical question while misrepresenting uninterrupted endorsement.

The inquiry should therefore state the unit and interval relevant to its conclusion. A continuity claim about an undertaking across years differs from a claim about active uptake at every meeting. The distinction prevents a broad temporal summary from acquiring a stronger psychological meaning.

This requirement also disciplines comparison across cases. Two profiles built at different resolutions may appear to differ because one records interruptions the other omits. A fair comparison should identify that possibility before interpreting the difference as a substantive contrast in self-continuity.

3.10 Composition of Relations and Transfer of Warrant

Relations can be composed formally while their philosophical meanings remain distinct. This subsection examines why a path through several kinds of relation does not automatically transmit the warrant associated with its endpoints. The point concerns inference across types.

Suppose Mira's earlier decision causes a later meeting, and at the earlier occasion she endorses a publication plan. The causal connection gives the later meeting a place in the undertaking's genealogy. It leaves open whether she endorses the plan at the meeting.

A model can represent the composite pattern: a later occasion is connected to an earlier occasion at which uptake occurred. That pattern may be relevant evidence of continuity. Calling it current uptake would require an additional premise concerning persistence, renewal or the absence of a defeating change.

The memory case has a similar structure. Mira may now remember a later conversation in which she discussed an earlier interview. Her present memory of the conversation can provide information about the interview. It does not automatically become direct recollection of conducting the interview.

The distinction concerns the route of access. Information can travel through a chain while its mode and warrant change. A record of testimony can support a historical belief under suitable conditions, but the presence of the record cannot confer the experiential character of a remembered event.

Practical authority also resists automatic transmission. An earlier instruction may authorize a supporter to clarify a decision. The supporter may then recommend a substantive course. The authorization to assist does not automatically make the recommendation binding. The scope of the original authority matters.

These cases show why the theory uses typed relations. Composition can preserve a documented connection while leaving the resulting interpretation open. A successful path through the model establishes the pattern defined by the path, rather than every richer description associated with its terms.

An objection holds that the account could simply define a composite relation with the desired meaning. Such a definition is mathematically possible. Its practical interpretation would still need warrant. If the definition labels every causally connected later act endorsed, it would build the disputed inference into the name.

The model's discipline is therefore to separate formal construction from transfer of philosophical significance. Each cross-type implication should identify the additional assumption that licenses it. Where

the assumption is absent or contested, the relation can remain a useful trace without becoming a conclusion.

3.11 Partial Knowledge of the Relation Structure

A practical model may contain incomplete evidence about its own edges and classifications. This subsection distinguishes uncertainty within a fixed represented history from uncertainty about which representation is adequate. The difference matters to claims of nonidentification and available revision.

An investigator may know that a diary entry preceded a decision while remaining uncertain whether Mira read it. The entry's presence and temporal order establish some facts. A causal edge from the entry to the decision would require evidence about its role in the process.

The model can preserve several candidate structures. One includes the entry as a reason-bearing influence; another treats it as an unused record. A conclusion that depends on the edge should remain conditional until the evidence supports one interpretation.

Uncertainty can also concern the commitment token itself. Two documents may refer to one undertaking under different descriptions, or to two related undertakings. Treating them as identical can overstate continuity; treating them as unrelated can obscure a deliberate revision. The record should state the criterion used to connect them.

The history space is therefore a substantive modeling choice. A result calculated over a narrow space can appear decisive because relevant alternatives were excluded at the outset. The mathematical proof does not validate the completeness of that space.

The opposite problem arises when the space includes every imaginable alternative without evidential discipline. The resulting uncertainty may be too broad for the practical question. An unsupported possibility should not automatically receive the same standing as a well-supported rival history.

A responsible interpretation distinguishes logical admissibility, evidential plausibility and the threshold appropriate to the contemplated use. These distinctions concern how the model connects to inquiry. They leave the formal consequence relative to a fixed space intact.

The practical benefit is transparency about where confidence comes from. A conclusion can be secure given a well-supported edge structure and fragile under a disputed one. Stating that difference helps direct further inquiry toward the premise that matters.

The account thereby avoids treating a graph as a completed discovery. It is a representation of claims and possibilities whose adequacy can itself be questioned. Formal reasoning begins from that representation; philosophical and empirical work assess whether the starting point is appropriate.

3.12 Model Boundaries and Unrepresented Possibilities

A finite action model closes a space for the sake of analysis. This subsection examines the meaning of an absent action and the danger of treating model closure as practical impossibility. The issue becomes important when a person invents a new way to respond.

Suppose the initial revision graph contains only continued publication or complete abandonment. Mira then proposes returning some materials while preserving a restricted collection. The proposal can fall outside the original action set even though it becomes a real practical possibility.

The model's earlier result remains a result about its declared options. It should not be redescribed as proof that Mira had only two possible futures. The emergence or recognition of a third route changes the represented action space and can alter the practical conclusion.

This point gives the generative perspective a specific role. Interaction can produce new distinctions, arrangements or resources that change what participants can do. A finite model can represent a stage of that process while leaving its own later enlargement open.

An action's absence can have several meanings. It may be physically infeasible, institutionally prohibited, unknown to the participant, excluded by the modeler, or simply irrelevant to the chosen target. These interpretations have different consequences and should be kept separate.

The same applies to a target outside the model. A revised criterion can make a previously ignored outcome satisfactory or reveal that the original target was inappropriate. Enriching the state can record this change while leaving the criterion's legitimacy for argument.

A critic may conclude that finite models are too fragile for practical life. Their value is conditional. They can clarify a bounded question, expose a missing route or distinguish pointwise possibility from information-compatible action. They become misleading when the closure assumptions disappear from their interpretation.

The model should therefore include an account of its boundary. It can identify the time, resources, rules and action descriptions held fixed for the calculation. A newly proposed route then becomes a reason for updating those assumptions, rather than an embarrassment to be forced into an existing category.

The relation between model and practice is consequently revisable. The person represented can contribute to changing the set of possibilities. A practical account that recognizes this contribution can explain some forms of agency more accurately than a model treating the menu as permanently given.

3.13 Domain Discipline and the Limits of a Unified Score

The relations in the construction have different domains and interpretive roles. This final discussion explains why combining them into one score would require more than normalization of numbers. It connects type discipline to the paper's philosophical restraint.

A memory report concerns access to represented content. A current uptake relation concerns how an undertaking enters action. A route of revision concerns available transitions. A normative claim concerns what an agent should do under stated conditions. These objects differ before any attempt at measurement begins.

Assigning each a number would require a separate interpretation of its scale. Counting recalled episodes would not automatically measure experienced ownership. Counting available actions would not automatically measure their intelligibility or legitimacy. Counting expressed reasons would not automatically measure practical authority.

Normalization cannot supply the missing interpretation. Converting several counts to a common numerical range changes their format, while the question of what differences mean remains. A weighted sum would also introduce assumptions about tradeoffs among them.

The practical dossier shows why some tradeoffs are inappropriate to infer. More historical information cannot by itself compensate for an unsupported current attribution. More exit options cannot automatically cancel a legitimate claim concerning entrusted material. The relations require different forms of response.

A composite measure could still be justified for a narrowly defined empirical purpose. It would need validated indicators, a specified target and a reason for the aggregation rule. Its interpretation should remain local to that purpose rather than becoming a scale of personhood.

The present account uses a profile because the differences among questions perform conceptual work. The profile can be simplified where the inquiry permits, but its separate fields preserve the route from evidence to claim. This is a methodological choice supported by the cases, not a universal prohibition on quantitative work.

The final formal lesson is therefore a discipline of scope. Typed domains, explicit assumptions, complete conditional derivations and clear boundaries make the model useful. Their value lies in preventing one kind of continuity from silently becoming another, while leaving the wider theory of a continuing person open to further explanation.

4 Memory Access and Historical Reconstruction

This chapter distinguishes recollection, acceptance of testimony, self-attribution, and practical use of a past episode. It develops a limited result about recovering prior endorsement from present records and

explains why improved evidence differs from restored experiential memory. These distinctions prepare cases where an undertaking continues despite changed autobiographical access.

4.1 Experiential Access and Historical Acceptance

Schechtman's discussion of memory and identity supplies a direct antecedent for the distinction developed here. She argues that equally accurate propositional information can differ in its personal and experiential provenance, including the contrast between one's own experience and another person's report [9, pp. 72–79]. The present recovery model addresses a declared historical query. Its success therefore leaves the character and provenance of recollection independently open.

Mira can read that she promised careful treatment of an interview without recollecting the occasion. A record can support belief that the promise occurred. She can accept it as her promise under the reference criterion. She can then judge that it gives a present reason for action. These are distinct transitions: historical warrant, self-attribution, and practical significance.

Recollection has an additional mode of presentation. In the stipulated case, Mira experiences an episode as something previously undergone. The nature and reliability of that mode remain open. A correct archival proposition can be available without that experience. A model containing only the proposition that a promise occurred loses the difference. Source and mode of access belong in a richer description.

Testimony can support serious historical orientation. It permits engagement with events outside recall and their consequences. A person can repair a recorded mistake without mentally reliving it. Acceptance still leaves open how familiar, alien, distressing, or compelling the history feels. Practical performance and experienced ownership may change differently.

Suppose the archive records unrestricted publication while a contributor recalls restricted use. Mira's absent recollection makes neither source automatically decisive. The inquiry must examine formation, specificity, dependence, and contextual meaning. Present participation requires a way to engage with that dispute, including the possibility of incomplete or misleading records.

4.2 Recovery of Prior Endorsement

Let H be a declared space of possible histories, $\rho : H \rightarrow Z$ a present-record map, and $g : H \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ a query concerning endorsement at a specified past occasion. The history space is a representation of possibilities, with its adequacy open to inquiry. Define

$$\Gamma(z) = \{g(h) : h \in H, \rho(h) = z\}. \quad (1)$$

A singleton determines the query relative to the model. Two compatible values record underdetermination. An observed record outside $\rho(H)$ exposes a mismatch between observation and represented possibilities.

Proposition 4.1 (Historical recovery). *A function $\bar{g} : \rho(H) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ with $g = \bar{g} \circ \rho$ exists precisely when g is constant on every nonempty fibre of ρ . It is then unique on $\rho(H)$.*

Proof. If the factorization exists and $\rho(h_1) = \rho(h_2)$, substitution gives $g(h_1) = \bar{g}(\rho(h_1)) = \bar{g}(\rho(h_2)) = g(h_2)$. Conversely assume fibre constancy. Assign each $z \in \rho(H)$ the query value of any preimage. Constancy ensures independence from the representative. The assignment factorizes g . Every record in the domain has a preimage, so any factorizing function must give that same value, proving uniqueness. $\square$

In history h_+ Mira endorses publication and later produces a progress report. In h_- she objects but produces the same report under pressure. If the current record retains only that report, $\rho(h_+) = \rho(h_-)$ while $g(h_+) = 1$ and $g(h_-) = 0$. Proposition 4.1 defeats recovery from that record alone. Accurate reporting of the document's content leaves the endorsement question unresolved.

The example establishes a logical limit under stipulated possibilities. Whether those possibilities fit a real case requires evidence. A freely recorded discussion could narrow the compatible histories. Standardized institutional language might leave both histories plausible. The construction identifies needed information without asserting that it has been obtained.

4.3 Refinement and Correction

Let a refined record satisfy $\rho = f \circ \rho'$ and define Γ' analogously. Every history compatible with z' is compatible with $f(z')$, hence

$$\Gamma'(z') \subseteq \Gamma(f(z')).$$

The result uses a fixed query and possibility space. Retaining a contemporaneous objection may distinguish histories merged by an outcome report.

New material can also challenge the model itself. It may reveal an excluded possibility or alter the interpretation of an earlier record. In that case simple filtering is insufficient. Conflicting accepted claims can produce empty compatibility. Emptiness is a diagnostic problem requiring reconsideration, rather than an exceptionally certain answer.

Source independence matters as well. Several later accounts may copy one document. Their number enlarges the record without necessarily supplying independent support. A current self-description may depend on an institution's account of the person's past. That dependence neither discredits it automatically nor makes it independent corroboration. Provenance should accompany evidential use wherever it changes the inference.

Correction changes present warrant while leaving the event in the past. If unrestricted permission resulted from a transcription error, the current account should change. The circulation of that error remains historical, with possible effects upon expectations and conduct. Practical repair concerns those effects alongside the corrected description of the undertaking.

4.4 Supports for Practical Ownership

Reliable records can bring earlier reasons into present consideration. A diary can explain the importance of anonymity. Another person can clarify whether a preference became a considered undertaking. These supports restore opportunities for engagement. Current endorsement of the original end remains a further question.

Calling a record a memory support should preserve its external source and the person's role in assessment. An institution may present selective past choices as the definitive statement of who someone is. The person can accept that the acts belong to their history while criticizing the interpretation. Historical ownership can supply something to answer for, learn from, or repair without requiring indefinite reproduction of an old end.

Choosing to consult a record differs from being required to perform its assigned role. Both connect past to present causally. Only the first stipulation establishes a chosen act of consultation; the broader conditions of agency remain to be examined in either case. The inquiry traces who controls access, how the record enters action, and which responses remain feasible.

An accurate and freely consulted archive can restore historical understanding while leaving unfamiliarity. That experiential gap may matter independently of performance. A vivid sense of familiarity can also accompany an inaccurate account. The analysis preserves experiential access and evidential warrant separately so that their interaction remains a substantive question.

4.5 Historical Self-Attribution and Experiential Ownership

A proposition can be accepted as a fact about one's life through ordinary evidence. Mira can recognize her signature, accept a contributor's testimony, and conclude that she made a promise. The conclusion places an event within the history tracked as hers. It can have practical significance even if its experiential familiarity remains weak.

Experiential ownership concerns a different mode in which an episode is presented. The person may encounter it as remembered from within rather than as a fact learned about the person named Mira. This description identifies the contrast without treating either mode as infallible. A complete theory would need to explain what constitutes that mode and how it can be mistaken.

The distinction can appear within a single recollective account. Mira may recall the setting vividly while learning the promise's exact words from a recording. She may remember making a decision while relying on a colleague to identify when it occurred. The episode's present availability then combines several sources and modes.

A model assigning one global label of remembered or known would lose this internal differentiation. The relevant unit can be a particular content or aspect of an episode. An inquiry about the promise's wording may depend on the recording, while an inquiry about how Mira experienced the meeting may depend more heavily on her report. Their evidential roles should follow the question.

This does not imply that experiences are private objects beyond all assessment. Reports can conflict with other evidence, change over time, or reveal uncertainty. The point is that a third-person record may answer a different question even when both concern the same episode. Preserving the distinction makes disagreement more precise.

The practical consequence is that a person can be asked to respond to a warranted historical fact without being required to reproduce a particular feeling of ownership. Mira may accept responsibility for a promise she cannot experientially recover. Conversely, her vivid attachment to an episode cannot settle every public claim about what occurred. The relation between practical answerability and experiential access therefore needs a case-specific argument.

4.6 Remembering a Decision and Recovering Its Reasons

An undertaking includes more than the final decision. The reasons considered, alternatives rejected, and conditions assumed can matter to its current interpretation. Mira may remember agreeing to publication while forgetting that agreement depended on a contributor's later review. The remembered decision alone would then give an incomplete picture of its scope.

A record preserving the decision without its conditions can create a similar problem. The apparent agreement is historically connected to the event but compressed with respect to a relevant query. The historical recovery construction explains the logical form of the limitation: histories with different conditions can share the retained outcome.

The practical task is to recover enough of the reason structure to assess the undertaking now. This does not require exhaustive reconstruction of every thought. It requires the distinctions material to the decision under review. A condition concerning contributor approval may matter more than the exact sequence of casual remarks surrounding it.

Recovered reasons can change current uptake in different ways. They may strengthen Mira's commitment by reminding her of a concern she still accepts. They may show that the original end was conditional on circumstances that have changed. They may reveal a conflict she now judges differently. Historical understanding therefore supports deliberation rather than guaranteeing continuity of conclusion.

There is also a difference between recovering an earlier reason and supplying a better present reason. Mira might discover a contemporary argument for restricted access that she never considered before. It can justify present revision without explaining why the original decision occurred. A retrospective account should avoid projecting the new reason into the old event.

The distinction preserves both learning and historical accuracy. Mira can say that she now has a reason to change the project while acknowledging that the earlier decision arose differently. A continuing practical life need not be narrated as if every present insight had been implicitly guiding it from the beginning.

4.7 Temporal Order and the Interpretation of Memory

The order of remembered events can affect the practical conclusion. A promise followed by a communicated withdrawal has a different history from a withdrawal followed by a renewed promise. The same event descriptions in an unordered list fail to preserve that difference.

This example requires no universal rule that withdrawal extinguishes a promise. The normative effect depends on the undertaking and the relationship. The point is that assessing that effect requires temporal information. The order can determine which conditions were in place, what others knew, and which action they relied upon.

Mira might recall both the assurance and the withdrawal while confusing their sequence. A record can help resolve the order without restoring the corresponding experience. Conversely, the record may itself be dated inaccurately. The inquiry should distinguish confidence in occurrence from confidence in chronology.

Temporal alignment also matters when later testimony describes an earlier stance. A contributor's current report may incorporate a later interpretation of what Mira meant. The report is evidence produced now about a prior event. Its current production and historical target should remain distinct in the representation.

A useful account can record several temporal coordinates: occurrence, recording, communication, and present interpretation. Their differences matter when an action becomes known only later or a correction changes how a prior event is understood. A single timestamp can be inadequate for the practical question.

The broader philosophical consequence is that continuity requires attention to sequence without reducing identity to chronology. Temporal order helps explain how reasons and expectations developed. It does not by itself determine whose experience an episode was or which obligation now governs. It supplies structure needed by those further arguments.

4.8 Selective Recall and the Burden of Explanation

A person can remember the parts of an undertaking that supported one interpretation more readily than the parts supporting another. The stipulated possibility should not become a presumption that every convenient memory is false. It motivates attention to the pattern of evidence and to possible gaps.

Suppose Mira recalls contributors welcoming the archive but lacks access to later reservations. The favorable episodes can be accurate while the overall narrative remains incomplete. An inquiry can acknowledge their truth and ask what additional material bears on the current claim. It need not discredit the remembered experiences as a whole.

The same discipline applies to critics. A contributor may vividly recall a difficult exchange and overlook other occasions of responsiveness. Their report can establish something important without supporting a total characterization of Mira's activity. Evaluative scope should remain proportionate to the evidence.

This gives the burden of explanation a two-sided form. The person making a broad continuity claim should identify what connects the relevant occasions and address material counterevidence. The person challenging it should identify the particular inference that fails, rather than treating every gap as proof of the contrary conclusion.

An absence of evidence can have different meanings. A record may never have been made, may have been lost, or may be inaccessible. The person may lack recall while another source remains available. The inquiry should avoid converting these different conditions into one undifferentiated absence.

A reasonable conclusion can therefore be qualified. It may establish the undertaking's general aim while leaving a particular condition uncertain. It may support current engagement while leaving its historical origin incompletely reconstructed. Such conclusions preserve useful knowledge and make the remaining questions visible.

4.9 Relearning and the Formation of a New Stance

When Mira studies the archive's records, she may learn facts she once knew, discover facts she never knew, and develop a new judgment about their significance. Those processes can occur together. Describing the whole encounter as recovering the old self would conceal the new practical formation.

A renewed undertaking can have an explicit relation to that mixed access. Mira might say that the record gives her sufficient reason to protect confidentiality even though she cannot recall the original discussion. Her current judgment is supported by historical material and present assessment. Its authority need not depend entirely on recreating an earlier attitude.

The case provides a positive account of continuity through changed memory. The person remains able to engage with reasons and consequences associated with the history. The route of access changes, and the current response may be newly formed. Continuity consists partly in this intelligible relation of uptake, with the experiential difference retained.

A critic could argue that the new response is simply a different commitment. That description may be appropriate at the token level. The question is whether the new commitment has a practically significant genealogy and addresses the earlier undertaking's consequences. Calling it new does not decide that relational question.

Conversely, genealogy alone is insufficient. An institution can induce a new commitment through selective records and pressure. The analysis must examine the conditions of relearning, the person's opportunity to assess alternatives, and the effect of their response. The historical connection supplies context for the agency question.

This distinction is especially useful for support. A support arrangement should not promise to restore an exact earlier identity when its actual function is to enable informed current judgment. The latter can be valuable in its own right. Honest description of the function protects both the person's agency and the evidential integrity of the record.

4.10 The Limits of a Complete Record

A hypothetical complete archive of publicly recordable actions would still leave practical questions requiring interpretation. It might establish words spoken, documents produced, and activities performed. The meaning of those acts, the person's current stance, and the first-person character of experience would need further analysis.

The point is not that more evidence is useless. Better records can resolve important disputes and make a practical response possible. The point concerns the scope of what the evidence identifies. Completeness relative to one observational vocabulary need not be completeness relative to every philosophical question.

The vocabulary itself can change. A later inquiry may ask about a form of pressure or a condition of participation that earlier records did not distinguish. The original archive can be extensive while remaining insufficient for that query. Its limitation reflects the relation between record design and research purpose.

A serious account of memory support should therefore preserve both archive and inquiry. The archive retains traces and claims; the inquiry determines what they warrant for a question. The person addressed by the inquiry can contribute new interpretation and current response. Their role is not exhausted by being the object around which records are assembled.

The coordination of memory, evidence and present participation permits continuity through changed access. Their differences remain important when the inquiry turns from a record's existence to its truth, from earlier judgment to present trust, and from recovered facts to a new practical stance.

4.11 Authenticity, Accuracy and the Content of an Undertaking

A genuine record can contain an inaccurate claim, and an accurate record of words can leave their practical significance disputed. This subsection separates these levels of warrant. The distinction refines the

historical-recovery construction's interpretation.

Suppose a document is genuinely Mira's note from the relevant period. Its authenticity establishes its origin under the stipulated evidence. It leaves open whether Mira's description was accurate, complete or sincere. A contemporaneous error remains an error even when the document is unquestionably genuine.

Now suppose an audio recording accurately preserves Mira's words. The record can establish what she said. Whether the words constituted a promise, a tentative proposal or an explanation of someone else's plan may depend on context, audience and the interaction in which they occurred.

The practical inquiry therefore has several possible targets. It may ask whether a document was produced by Mira, whether a sentence was uttered, whether its content was true, or whether an undertaking was formed. These questions require different evidence and interpretation.

The formal historical query should identify which target is at issue. A record map that determines authorship may leave sincerity or commitment underdetermined. Recovering one query cannot be presented as recovering the entire practical history.

An example makes the distinction concrete. Mira writes that all contributors approved publication. The note may accurately record her belief while the belief is false because one contributor's restriction was overlooked. The note can then explain her later action without justifying it or establishing the alleged approval.

The opposite case contains a reliable statement that Mira made a promise she now regrets. The absence of recollection does not by itself defeat the evidence. Historical warrant can survive changed access, with the present consequences assessed through the promise's actual scope and legitimacy.

The inquiry should therefore avoid both automatic deference to authentic records and automatic discounting of records that feel unfamiliar. Their evidential value follows from origin, accuracy, context and the declared question. Felt familiarity may be relevant to experience while leaving those other grounds independently assessable.

This refinement matters to the practical dossier used throughout the paper. Where the case stipulates that a record establishes an undertaking, it stipulates adequate warrant concerning the relevant content, not merely the record's authenticity. In an actual inquiry that warrant would need evidence.

4.12 Trust in an Earlier Judgment

A person can rely on an earlier judgment whose original reasons are now partly inaccessible. This subsection examines whether such reliance gains special authority because the earlier judge was the same person. It distinguishes a practical presumption of continuity from unquestionable temporal authority.

Before an interval away from the archive, Mira carefully decides to restrict one recording. On return she remembers having examined the matter but cannot reconstruct every reason. A reliable note records the decision and some of its basis. She may have a defeasible reason to trust the earlier judgment.

That reason can rest on evidence about the earlier process: adequate information, careful attention and a relevant understanding of the contributor's concern. The ordinary reference relation matters to the practical connection, but it cannot alone establish the quality of the judgment.

Mira could have equally strong evidence that her earlier decision was hurried or based on a mistake. Being her own earlier judgment would not rescue its warrant. The account therefore treats temporal self-trust as responsive to reasons rather than an automatic privilege of identity.

The present person may also know more about the earlier judge's priorities and habits than an outside observer does. That knowledge can be evidentially useful. It remains subject to error, selective recall and later reinterpretation. Special access to some features is compatible with limits concerning others.

A difficult case occurs when the original reasons have been irretrievably lost but the decision remains consequential. Mira may need to choose between preserving the earlier arrangement and reopening it. The appropriate response depends on the costs of change, affected claims and the warrant for trusting the earlier process.

The absence of full reconstruction need not require starting every practical judgment from nothing. Continuing undertakings rely on retained decisions and justified trust. Yet the trust should remain distinguishable from a claim that the earlier content is beyond reconsideration.

This distinction supports continuity through changed memory. Mira can treat an earlier decision as a defeasible resource for present action while acknowledging that she cannot relive or fully reproduce its formation. The practical relation persists through warranted reliance rather than exact psychological restoration.

An objection asks whether this account makes self-trust indistinguishable from trust in another person. Some evidential and practical structures can overlap. The first-person relation to the earlier judgment may have an additional experiential character, but that character cannot by itself supply every epistemic or normative warrant. The overlap reinforces the paper's separation of perspective from authority.

4.13 Testimony and Active Historical Judgment

Accepting another person's account can be an exercise of judgment rather than passive submission. This subsection examines that possibility. It also identifies when testimonial dependence becomes a route through which an institution substitutes its preferred history for the person's assessment.

Arun explains the circumstances of an interview Mira cannot recall. Mira can ask about the source, compare the account with surviving material and assess what follows. Her historical understanding is socially supported, yet her role in the inquiry remains active.

The activity need not include exhaustive independent verification. Ordinary testimony often supplies information a person cannot personally reconstruct. The relevant question is whether reliance is warranted for the purpose, given the source, context and available reasons for doubt.

A support arrangement becomes problematic when disagreement is treated as evidence that Mira has failed to recover the correct self. That framing assigns the institution's interpretation authority before the inquiry. It can make acceptance the only response counted as competent participation.

The alternative is to distinguish the historical claim from Mira's present evaluation. She can accept that a promise was made while disputing the institution's interpretation of its scope. She can accept the record's accuracy while rejecting its current policy. Testimonial trust can coexist with practical criticism.

A further complication arises when Arun remembers the event sincerely but incompletely. His sincerity supports one aspect of the source assessment while leaving accuracy open. Mira's lack of recollection does not require her to treat his account as infallible.

The inquiry can preserve partial agreement. Both may agree that an undertaking occurred while disagreeing about its exact terms. A current practical arrangement can sometimes proceed on the shared part while the historical dispute remains visible.

This form of participation differs from a demand for self-sufficiency. Mira's agency can include choosing to rely on another, asking for help and revising her understanding in response. The important limit concerns how that reliance is interpreted and what authority is claimed on its basis.

The account therefore treats testimony as a possible route of continuity whose value depends on its organization. It can reconnect a person with reasons and consequences outside recall. It should preserve the distinction between learning a history, experiencing a memory and endorsing a current course.

4.14 Unwanted Recall and the Scope of a Present Inquiry

Memory can remain vivid while a person wishes to limit its role in current life. This subsection considers a stipulated case of unwanted recollection without making a clinical claim. It tests whether historical accessibility creates a duty of continued engagement.

Mira clearly remembers a difficult episode in the archive and wishes to stop discussing it publicly. The fact that she can recall the episode does not automatically make repeated retelling necessary for responsible participation. The inquiry should identify the legitimate question that requires an answer.

If the episode concerns a contributor's unresolved claim, Mira may have a bounded reason to provide relevant information or participate in an appropriate response. The scope of that reason follows the claim and the feasible alternatives. It does not entail public exposure of every detail or perpetual availability.

If the request concerns only others' curiosity about her personal change, a different assessment follows. The explanatory interest of the story supplies no automatic authority to demand it. A person can remain connected to a past episode while limiting how it enters present interaction.

The case counters an assumption that more access is always better. Increased availability of memory or records can support understanding, but it can also impose burdens or enable unwanted use. The practical evaluation concerns the purpose, manner and consequences of access.

A supporter may help by organizing a limited response that addresses the relevant claim without requiring a complete narrative. Such assistance can preserve answerability while respecting the person's current limits. Its adequacy remains case-specific.

The opposite concern is avoidance. A person may invoke privacy to evade a legitimate responsibility. The account permits that criticism where its grounds are established. It rejects only the automatic inference from accessible memory to unlimited obligation to recount or resume.

The practical-selfhood implication is that continuity includes some regulation of the past's present role. Remembering an event and deciding how to respond to it are different activities. A theory that treats vivid recall as sufficient endorsement would miss the possibility of principled distance.

The distinction also preserves loss and relief without forcing a simple evaluation. A person can value the ability to remember while wishing that a particular history no longer organize their public role. The account should allow those attitudes to coexist.

4.15 Reinterpretation without Retrospective Substitution

A remembered event can acquire a different significance under changed concepts and values. This subsection examines how reinterpretation can be truthful while leaving the earlier standpoint historically distinct. It connects memory analysis with the later chapter on conceptual change.

Mira may remember regarding a publication request as flattering and later understand it as placing an unfair burden on contributors. The event's current significance has changed. The new evaluation need not imply that she already possessed the later understanding at the time.

An accurate retrospective account can state both positions. Mira welcomed the request under her earlier interpretation; she now criticizes the arrangement for reasons she recognizes more clearly. The continuity lies partly in taking responsibility for that change without rewriting the earlier attitude.

The distinction matters to emotional response. Current regret can be directed toward an act once undertaken confidently. The regret does not show that the earlier confidence was secretly absent. Conversely, an earlier hesitation can matter even if later success makes the episode appear uncomplicated.

A record can constrain the reinterpretation by preserving what was said or done. It cannot determine every later evaluative meaning. The inquiry should distinguish disagreement about occurrence from disagreement about significance.

Reinterpretation can also create a new practical obligation or reveal an existing one more clearly, depending on the underlying normative argument. Learning that a contributor relied on a statement may change Mira's understanding of what is owed. The new awareness and the ground of the claim should remain distinct.

An objection is that every retrospective account inevitably uses present concepts. That fact supports care about attribution rather than abandoning historical distinction. The account can explicitly mark a description as current evaluation and preserve the evidence concerning earlier understanding.

This approach allows practical self-continuity to include self-criticism. A person need not defend every earlier stance to acknowledge it as part of their history. Nor must criticism dissolve the relation to the past into a story about someone wholly unrelated.

The chapter's expanded result is a layered account of historical engagement. Records, testimony and recollection can each support present judgment under different conditions. Trust, privacy and reinterpretation add further practical relations. Their coordination can sustain a life through memory change while preserving the limits of what has been recovered or explained.

5 Commitment Formation and Current Uptake

This chapter analyzes commitment through formation, content, current use, and consequences for other people. It introduces a small record structure, then examines why historical persistence cannot settle present endorsement. The argument distinguishes replacing an end through deliberation from being assigned a substitute role by others. It concludes with obligations continuing after sincere repudiation.

5.1 The Structure of an Undertaking

A commitment organizes action beyond an immediate preference. Mira's undertaking gives her reasons to reserve time, preserve materials, and consider how contributors will be represented. Other people can rely on it. Its structure includes expectations, routes of execution, and conditions requiring reconsideration. Content can remain partly unsettled: careful representation may be a clear end while the access arrangement remains open.

Different events establish different undertakings. Mira might make a public promise, privately adopt a plan, accept a role, or gradually take up an activity through participation. A private intention organizes action without necessarily giving another person the claim created by an assurance. A public role can impose expectations she never endorsed. A practice can become meaningful without a single moment of adoption. Formation should therefore be described before conclusions about persistence or authority are drawn.

Interpretation can also change. An instruction to preserve an interview might concern the recording's integrity, the speaker's protection from distortion, or continued access. These aims can conflict. Revision can concern what an end requires under newly understood conditions even when its verbal formula remains constant. Conversely, changing the words can preserve a concern more accurately than repeating them.

A commitment acquires practical significance through understanding, enactment, contestation, and connections to other considerations. Its wording can support rigid enforcement or thoughtful reconsideration. An inquiry follows those uses without assuming that persistence of wording settles continuity of concern.

5.2 Commitment Records

Let K contain commitment tokens. A token k records content $c(k)$, formation occasion $f(k)$, affected parties $P(k)$, and review specification $J(k)$ where available. A review specification identifies anticipated circumstances for reconsideration. It remains a recorded feature with possible ambiguity, rather than a complete normative rule covering every later circumstance.

At occasion i , let $\sigma(i, k)$ record proposed, adopted, suspended, discharged, or repudiated status. Current uptake $U(i, k)$ and feasible execution $E(i, k)$ remain separate. Someone can endorse a blocked undertaking or perform a required action while rejecting its end. Completion can end an obligation without repudiation.

Definition 5.1 (Revision record). A revision record (i, k, k', r, e) links earlier token k to later token k' at occasion i , with stated reason r and evidence e . It preserves the claimed revision's genealogy. Authenticity, justification, and discharge of associated obligations require separate assessment.

One undertaking may generate several revised tasks. Mira can replace public release with preservation, contributor consultation, and an access procedure. Each task can inherit a different concern. A contributor might accept one change while maintaining that another assurance remains unfulfilled. Token genealogy preserves the transformation and disagreement without forcing them into one unchanged commitment.

Labels themselves remain contestable. A person can dispute that an event constituted adoption or that a discharge fulfilled what was undertaken. Separating an institution's status judgment from current stance

prevents administrative classification from becoming the whole practical description. The representation exposes the distinctions without attempting an exhaustive ledger of a life.

5.3 Evidence of Current Uptake

Present uptake treats an undertaking as a live consideration. It can appear in endorsement, attention, concern about failure, preparation, or willingness to explain a choice. Each indication is fallible. Someone can speak enthusiastically under pressure, act carefully through habit, or struggle to articulate a guiding concern. Attribution requires attention to the case and rival explanations.

A central question concerns what the person can do with the undertaking. Can Mira examine whether publication remains appropriate, consult contributors, or alter a procedure? Can she express disagreement without losing unrelated support? These questions concern the organization of agency. They distinguish participation from occupation of a maintained role.

The questions should preserve the possibility of agency under constraint. Scarcity, dependence, and other people's claims constrain ordinary action. A constrained person can act from accepted reasons. The inquiry identifies how the constraint operates and whether the resulting conduct supports uptake or only compliance. Loss of an alternative can weaken an inference without eliminating every form of agency.

Private endorsement also requires criticism. A deeply held attitude can be shaped by manipulation or misinformation. A further layer of endorsement does not automatically end that problem. This account combines current stance, formation, responsiveness, and feasible engagement while leaving their respective normative importance open to argument. It seeks no single inner act granting permanent authority.

5.4 Revision and Imposed Replacement

Suppose Mira replaces publication with restricted access after learning that circulation would violate contributors' expectations. In one version she investigates, changes her understanding, and explains the result. In another a sponsor dictates the arrangement and requires her to announce it as her decision. Both versions produce the same access rule. Their practical continuities differ in formation and uptake.

Both transitions have causes. Complete independence from others also fails to distinguish them: the first revision depends upon testimony and perhaps advice. The relevant question concerns how another person's contribution enters action. It can offer reasons that Mira assesses, or bypass her assessment while appropriating her public voice.

Mixed cases deserve an explicit description. Mira may accept the proposed access restriction while objecting to the pressure securing it. A binary label of authentic or imposed would obscure accepted content, disputed procedure, and remaining constraints. Practical continuity can be contested in a particular respect rather than globally absent.

The level of revision matters. Altering a publication method may continue a concern for careful representation. Ending the archive can terminate that undertaking while preserving a responsibility to return materials and explain the withdrawal. Broad continuity of a life should allow some projects to end. Ending a project also leaves its consequences available for assessment.

5.5 Repudiation and Continuing Claims

Repudiation changes present stance without altering what was promised or how others relied upon it. Suppose a contributor declined another archival opportunity because Mira undertook preservation. Her rejection of archival work can be sincere and reasonable while that contributor retains a claim concerning return, transfer, or transitional protection of the recording.

Justifying the claim requires more than causal connection. The undertaking, foreseeable reliance, available alternatives, burdens of repair, and surrounding expectations matter. Unlimited causal responsibility would extend through every downstream effect. Automatic release through changed attitude

would permit convenient escape from every consequence. A defensible position explains a boundary responsive to the case.

Responsible exit can consequently be an expression of practical continuity. Mira can cease to organize her future around the archive while acknowledging that its history constrains withdrawal. Continuing answerability can survive ended endorsement. It is weaker than obedience to an old plan forever and stronger than indifference to its effects. The source of its force lies in affected parties and practical reasons, rather than a score of personal sameness.

5.6 Desire, Intention, and Undertaking

The term commitment covers several practical relations in this paper. This subsection clarifies their differences so that continuity of one relation is not silently used to establish another. The distinctions are working analytical choices for the cases under examination, rather than a claim that ordinary language assigns each term one fixed meaning.

Mira can want the exhibition to succeed without taking responsibility for organizing it. She can intend to organize it while recognizing that the intention remains provisional. She can then assure contributors that she will preserve their interviews under specified conditions. The desire, intention, and assurance connect her to the undertaking differently. Their differences concern practical organization and relations with other people, not merely strength of feeling.

An intention can guide preparation before any public undertaking occurs. Mira may reserve time, compare methods, and coordinate her other activities around a proposed exhibition. The intention's practical role appears through these connections. Its existence need not give every person who learns of it the same claim that a directed assurance would create.

An assurance can generate expectations that persist through fluctuating enthusiasm. Mira may lose interest in cataloguing while continuing because contributors reasonably rely on the undertaking. The resulting action can be practically owned even when the activity supplies little immediate satisfaction. A measure of current desire would therefore be an incomplete account of uptake.

Conversely, strong enthusiasm can coexist with a refusal to undertake a responsibility. Mira may care deeply about the exhibition while explaining that she cannot commit to maintaining the collection afterward. Treating care as equivalent to adoption would impose a role through the very concern that leads her to discuss it. The practical distinction permits sincere interest without converting every valued possibility into an obligation.

The broad term commitment is useful only if these differences remain visible. In some passages it concerns an intention that organizes the person's own future activity. In others it concerns an undertaking to which others can have a claim. The latter relation requires a separate account of formation and authority. A formal token should state which kind of relation it records before conclusions about continuation or release are drawn.

5.7 Assurance and the Normative Role of a Practice

A communicated undertaking requires an account of how its practical force differs from a prediction or an announcement of intention. This subsection locates a relevant philosophical antecedent and develops the distinction through the archive case. It leaves the general theory of promising open while clarifying the paper's local commitments.

Kolodny and Wallace argue that an account of promissory obligation needs to explain how promising generates assurance without assuming the obligation whose emergence is at issue. Their proposed hybrid account distinguishes obligations connected with assurance from obligations connected with participation in a social practice [5, pp. 119–123, 148–154]. The comparison identifies an explanatory burden for any appeal to an undertaking. A person's expectation and a socially recognized form of communication cannot simply be inserted into a record and treated as a self-explanatory source of authority.

Suppose Mira says that she intends to work on the catalogue tomorrow. The statement can inform colleagues of a current plan and allow informal coordination. It need not have the same force as an assur-

ance addressed to a contributor who asks whether the recording will be preserved. The communicative setting and what is reasonably understood matter to the relation created.

The distinction cannot be made solely by checking whether a fixed verbal formula appears. Mira could offer a clear undertaking without using the word promise, and she could read a sample promise aloud without adopting it. The relevant inquiry concerns the situated act, its interpretation, and the norms through which participants understand its practical effect.

Nor can the relation be inferred from confidence in performance alone. A colleague may be certain that Mira will catalogue the recording because she enjoys the work. The prediction may become accurate without the colleague having received an assurance. Conversely, a contributor can receive a serious undertaking while remaining uncertain whether Mira will fulfill it. Belief about likely conduct and the normative relation need distinct assessment.

A record of adoption should therefore identify the communicative or practical basis of the attribution. It may report a private plan, a directed assurance, an accepted institutional task, or a disputed interpretation of participation. This information helps determine which further argument is needed. The token's persistence alone supplies none of those distinctions.

The bounded entrustment argument later in the paper begins with a specified legitimate transfer and accepted limits. It reasons about the response owed when the associated role ends. It does not purport to explain every possible promissory obligation from that case. Some obligations may concern performance even where material custody and reliance costs differ from the archive example. A comprehensive account would need to confront those cases directly.

The present distinction remains useful under memory change. Mira may retain evidence that she announced an intention while lacking evidence that she offered a directed assurance. A current wish to help can supply a new reason for action without resolving the old formation question. Conversely, evidence of an earlier assurance can support a historical claim while leaving the appropriate response under changed conditions to be assessed.

Thus the practice surrounding a commitment belongs in the explanation of its formation. It should be specified and criticized, rather than invoked as an automatic answer. A socially maintained practice can make an undertaking intelligible while the reasons for enforcing, revising, or ending it remain a further normative task.

5.8 Gradual Formation and the Point-Event Summary

The commitment record initially assigns a formation occasion to a token. This subsection states the scope of that simplification and develops cases of gradual formation. A single recorded date can be administratively useful while underdescribing how an undertaking entered a person's life.

Mira may first help sort a few interviews, then join planning discussions, then become the person others routinely consult about preservation. The activity can acquire practical significance through these steps without a single unmistakable declaration of adoption. A record that selects the first meeting as the formation event may preserve a useful reference while leaving the extent of the undertaking unsettled.

The absence of a sharp moment does not establish that an obligation exists. Others can gradually rely on Mira without giving her a fair opportunity to understand the role they are assigning. A history of increasing participation supports a question about formation; it does not resolve every dispute concerning consent or responsibility.

Nor does a gradual history establish the absence of uptake. Mira can come to regard the archive as a continuing part of her life and organize other decisions around it. The practical relation can become stable enough for interpretation even when its beginning remains diffuse. The account should therefore distinguish an unclear onset from an unclear present stance.

A more adequate record can preserve a formation trace: relevant occasions of participation, communication, reliance, and clarification, together with uncertainty about their significance. Such a trace offers material for evaluating the undertaking. It should avoid assigning every included event the same normative role. Sorting a box, discussing a policy, and assuring a contributor can each matter differently.

The point-event field remains a shorthand for cases in which a particular occasion has been selected and its role explained. Extending it to gradual formation requires either a trace or an explicit statement that the selected date is a convention. This refinement prevents a convenient identifier from becoming an invented historical fact.

The same discipline applies to endings. Withdrawal can occur through a declaration followed by a transition, or through a gradual cessation whose meaning is disputed. A recorded end date can organize the inquiry while leaving open which obligations ended, which tasks remained, and how the person understood the change. Formation and termination should receive comparable attention.

5.9 Status Attribution and the Object of Disagreement

An undertaking can receive different status judgments from different standpoints. This subsection refines the use of adopted, suspended, discharged, and repudiated labels. It distinguishes disagreement about a fact from differences in the question being answered.

Mira may say that she has discharged her undertaking because every recording has been preserved and returned as requested. A colleague may say that she has repudiated the original aim of a public exhibition. These judgments can both fit the case if they concern different aspects of the undertaking. Treating the labels as exclusive would obscure the scope of each assessment.

A genuine dispute arises when Mira and a contributor disagree about whether the promised preservation has been completed. The label discharged then expresses a contested conclusion. The record should identify the claimant, the relevant undertaking, the scope of the claim, and the evidence offered. Recording the label without its attribution would present an unresolved judgment as settled status.

An institution's label can also have a practical effect. Marking an undertaking completed may close access to resources or release a designated role. That effect should be recorded separately from the truth of the underlying judgment. An administrative act can occur even when the claim supporting it is mistaken or inadequately justified.

The distinction matters for self-continuity because institutional status can shape the possibilities through which the person continues. Mira might still regard contributor communication as unfinished while the institution closes the project. Her continued concern can then coexist with a formally discharged role. The disagreement concerns both what remains to be done and who can decide that question.

For complicated cases, the record should therefore preserve status attributions as situated claims rather than force every undertaking into one universal label. A simple time-indexed status remains appropriate only when the perspective, scope, and evidential standing are fixed for the local analysis. This qualification gives the notation a defensible use without requiring an exhaustive formal representation of every dispute.

The refinement also protects historical genealogy. A later finding that an undertaking was never validly adopted differs from a later repudiation of an adopted undertaking. Both can lead to cessation of activity. Their histories and possible claims of repair differ. A record that stores only the final absence of participation would lose that distinction.

5.10 Partial Uptake and Divisible Content

A person can accept part of an undertaking while rejecting another part. This subsection examines the relation between commitment content and token granularity. The aim is to prevent a binary uptake predicate from deciding in advance how a mixed practical stance should be described.

Mira may accept the responsibility to preserve recordings while rejecting the expectation that they should be publicly searchable. If both requirements are stored in one token, an undifferentiated question about whether she endorses the token becomes ambiguous. The answer depends on which component is at issue.

One response divides the undertaking into separately described components. Preservation, access, attribution, and future consultation can then receive different judgments. This refinement can make the dispute clearer. It also introduces a further question: whether the components were independently

undertaken or formed an interdependent arrangement whose parts cannot be changed separately without affecting others.

Suppose contributors agreed to provide interviews partly because the archive would make them discoverable. Restricting access may then alter a consideration relevant to their agreement. The account should preserve that connection while still allowing a reasoned case for change. Decomposition clarifies which relations need attention; it does not automatically authorize unilateral revision of each component.

The opposite danger is excessive bundling. An institution may insist that rejecting one publication method means rejecting every responsibility to contributors. Such a description can make a limited objection appear to be total abandonment. It can also pressure Mira to accept a disputed component to avoid the appearance of repudiating the whole undertaking.

A defensible representation therefore selects its units according to the practical question. When the issue concerns access, a specific access commitment can be analyzed while recording its relations to preservation and contributor expectations. When the issue concerns ending the entire project, the interdependence of those components becomes central. The units should remain revisable if the inquiry reveals a distinction the initial record concealed.

The philosophical consequence is modest but important. A person can change their relation to an undertaking in a particular respect. Practical continuity need not be measured by a global yes-or-no judgment concerning the entire project. The account gains precision by stating the content accepted, the content disputed, and the relations that remain under negotiation.

5.11 Suspension and the Burden of an Unfinished Undertaking

Suspension differs from both current execution and final repudiation. This subsection examines why that intermediate relation matters to practical self-continuity. It also considers limits on keeping other people indefinitely attached to an unresolved project.

Mira may suspend the exhibition while seeking clarification from contributors. The suspension can preserve an undertaking for reconsideration rather than enact its abandonment. During this period she may continue to protect materials, communicate uncertainty, and gather information. These activities give the suspension a practical structure.

An indefinite announcement of suspension can have a different effect. If others cannot determine whether to seek alternative arrangements, uncertainty itself can impose a burden. Mira's continued concern does not eliminate that burden. A responsible suspension may require review points, provisional responsibilities, or a route through which affected parties can request a decision.

The appropriate arrangement depends on the uncertainty. A short delay for a specific missing record differs from a broad uncertainty about whether the archive should continue. The former may support a focused inquiry. The latter may require a provisional transfer or a more explicit release from expectations. Treating both as the same status would conceal their different practical demands.

Suspension can also preserve room for change without requiring a person to settle a comprehensive self-description. Mira can state that she is presently unable to decide whether the archive remains part of her future. She need not declare the whole undertaking meaningless to justify a bounded pause. The significance of uncertainty belongs in the account alongside adoption and repudiation.

A countercase involves using suspension to avoid acknowledging a decision already effectively made. Mira may have ceased every relevant activity while continuing to describe the project as temporarily paused. Evidence concerning conduct, available routes, and communication can then challenge the label. The point is to examine the relation the label records, rather than assume that the word suspension guarantees continuing uptake.

The account therefore treats suspension as a practical arrangement with conditions and consequences. It can support self-continuity by preserving a space for reconsideration. Its legitimacy depends partly on how the uncertainty affects those connected to the undertaking. That dependence reinforces the distinction between a person's current orientation and the claims the orientation can impose on others.

5.12 Failure, Acknowledgment, and Continuing Uptake

An undertaking can fail while remaining practically significant to the person who adopted it. This subsection examines failure without equating it with absence of commitment. The issue matters because a purely outcome-based account can misdescribe both unsuccessful agency and evasive retrospective claims.

Mira may fail to complete a promised catalogue despite sustained effort. The failure concerns an outcome. Her continuing uptake can appear in attempts to understand the failure, protect contributors from avoidable consequences, and arrange a realistic response. These relations can persist even when the original goal has become unattainable.

The statement that she tried remains open to evidence. A person can invoke intention to avoid scrutiny of inaction. The inquiry should therefore examine what opportunities existed, how the undertaking was organized, and what obstacles arose. Taking effort seriously is compatible with assessing whether it was adequate to the responsibility assumed.

A difficult case involves failure caused partly by an unrealistic undertaking. Mira may have sincerely promised more than she could reasonably deliver. Sincerity can explain her stance while leaving the promise open to criticism. Practical continuity through acknowledgment then includes revising her understanding of what she can responsibly undertake in the future.

Another case concerns an obstruction outside her control. The institution may deny access to the collection after she has prepared the catalogue. Her failure to complete the final task should then be distinguished from a decision to abandon it. Responsibility for the outcome can be distributed across relations that the simple commitment token does not capture.

The account should also distinguish acknowledgment of failure from permanent attachment to it. Mira can accept that the undertaking failed and address justified consequences while ceasing to organize her future around its recovery. Continuing answerability need not require an endless effort to achieve an impossible result. The scope of repair requires practical and normative assessment.

Failure therefore illustrates the paper's central distinction between persistence of an end and continuity of participation. A person can continue to respond to the history of an undertaking after its original end has been lost. The response can involve explanation, repair, learning, and release. Its quality depends on how those activities engage the reasons and people affected, rather than on a retrospective declaration that the self has remained unchanged.

6 Prospective Concern and Future Participation

This chapter develops the bridge between temporal continuation and practical self-concern. It separates a future beneficiary from anticipated experience and agency, while acknowledging that concern for another can also protect their deliberative authority. It then examines evidence, implicit anticipation, expected repudiation, and the limits of appropriation. The result is a philosophical proposal with unresolved experiential and normative obligations.

6.1 A Future Beneficiary and a Future Standpoint

Mira can preserve resources for a contributor who will use the archive, or for work she expects to undertake herself. Both acts can be careful, sustained, and generous. Their difference cannot be seriousness of concern, willingness to sacrifice, or causation of future benefit. Those features can characterize either orientation.

The proposed distinction concerns how the future situation enters practical thought. In self-directed preparation, Mira anticipates occupying a standpoint from which questions remain to be decided. She expects to encounter evidence, respond to uncertainty, and determine a course of action. The later situation appears as one in which today's consequences will be encountered within her continuing practical life.

Concern for another person can also protect agency. Mira might leave a contributor choices and avoid prescribing their use. This defeats an easy distinction between self-concern for agency and other-concern for welfare. Preservation of future choice, even for its own sake, is compatible with both. The residual difference concerns whose anticipated standpoint organizes present thought.

That residual difference requires care. Using the word *own* merely to rename it leaves explanation incomplete. A relational account must identify how anticipation functions and connects with action. The following analysis explains several practical roles. It preserves a remaining question concerning the first-person character of the orientation itself.

6.2 Anticipatory Authority and Practical Address

Mira leaves a note explaining why a group of interviews needs review. She expects to assess the issue later, rather than mechanically enact a command. The note connects an earlier reason to a later decision while preserving that decision as an occasion of agency. It addresses a future capacity for judgment.

Incomplete plans have this structure. They reserve questions for later consideration, protect evidence whose relevance will become clearer, and avoid settling issues before needed information arrives. A person can prepare for change in judgment. Temporal concern then includes trust in later responsiveness alongside uncertainty about what that response will be.

Such preparation explains one way continuity can survive changed ends. Mira expects further experience to alter her views. Present action supports conditions for reconsideration rather than replication of today's conclusion. The later judgment can participate in the same practical process while opposing its earlier result. The connection lies in retained engagement with reasons, consequences, and the person's position within the activity.

This organization remains compatible with concern for another person's future agency. The explanatory gain is therefore limited but substantive: it identifies a practical structure that self-directed anticipation can have. The further distinction is that Mira expects herself to encounter and use the note. That perspectival orientation remains an input phenomenon whose complete explanation exceeds the physical properties of the note and the structure of the plan.

No claim of superior moral weight follows. An action addressing one's future judgment can be selfish, generous, reasonable, or misguided. A similarly organized action addressing another person's judgment can have equal or greater moral importance. The analysis distinguishes practical orientation from the justification of priority.

6.3 Expected Experience and Implicit Anticipation

A future situation can matter as an anticipated experience even where it offers little choice. Mira can prepare for fatigue, confusion, satisfaction, or distress. An exclusively deliberative account would miss this dimension. Practical continuity includes ways in which present action responds to what the person expects to undergo.

The concern can survive expected preference change. Mira may reserve a quiet setting for later reflection while expecting different interests. The arrangement protects a condition of experience and response rather than a particular end. This supplies a broader relation than persistence of one endorsed project.

Explicit imagination is an imperfect indicator. A person can plan responsibly while having little vivid image of a future self. Another can imagine that future vividly while making poor preparations. Intensity of imagery establishes neither the existence of prudent action nor its justification. The inquiry should admit implicit temporal orientation without requiring constant self-description.

A future can also feel alien. Mira may accept that a later condition belongs to her tracked life while struggling to imagine experiencing it. Preparation can still proceed through routines, records, general commitments, or concern about preventable suffering. Weak familiarity need not mean an absence of practical care. The account should explain these alternative routes rather than treating one introspective style as universal.

The possibility places a limit on necessity claims. Prospective appropriation, especially explicit appropriation, should not become a gate through which every adequate form of practical continuity must pass. The paper develops one important structure and a vocabulary for alternatives. A later comparison with episodic temporal experience further tests that restriction.

6.4 Evidence and Underdetermination

Mira's avowal that she is preparing for what she will encounter supplies evidence from her present standpoint. It differs from an observer's inference about motive. It can deserve substantial weight while remaining open to ambiguity, conflicting attitudes, or strategic presentation. Respecting a first-person report is compatible with seeking clarification.

Conduct supplies another source. Mira may retain information specifically useful to work she expects to perform, or reserve a decision for her later review. That conduct supports prospective appropriation, but also fits rival explanations such as duty to colleagues or institutional compliance. A conclusion depends on how the act sits within the wider situation.

Counterfactual contrasts help identify the object's concern. Would Mira prepare similarly if a colleague would perform the work? Would she redirect preparation toward another future activity if the archive ended? Would she protect later opportunities if she expected to reject the present plan? These contrasts distinguish concern for project, beneficiary, and anticipated participation. They are philosophical probes; an empirical design would require further care.

Functional equivalence can remain even after such probes. A person deeply concerned for another's agency might answer in ways closely resembling self-directed preparation. The account should then preserve evidential underdetermination. It cannot establish first-person perspective simply by observing a sufficiently complicated support pattern.

Likewise a common identifier fails to settle the practical interpretation. The same person can treat a future condition with detachment; different people can share unusually close plans. Reference makes the relevant comparisons available. It does not replace the inquiry into how the future matters from the present standpoint.

6.5 Care for a Repudiating Future Self

Suppose Mira expects to abandon the archive later. She could try to ensure execution regardless of later judgment, preserve resources for continuation or exit, or cease preparation because the project is all she values. These responses have different objects and organizations of concern.

The second response is a demanding example of continuity through anticipated disagreement. Mira preserves evidence, prepares a transfer process, and leaves resources for a later decision. She expects that decision to be hers while accepting that it may oppose today's end. Current concern reaches beyond replication of current preference.

One reason is epistemic: later judgment will respond to circumstances unavailable now. Another is a present valuation of ongoing participation: Mira wants later action to proceed through reasons she can then assess. Neither reason establishes that every future preference should prevail. Both explain why present concern can support a structure permitting repudiation.

The hard case involves another person's claim. Mira might expect to lose interest in confidentiality. Safeguards then protect contributors alongside her future agency. A later refusal to honor confidentiality need not dissolve their claim. Several centers of authority and vulnerability are involved. Temporal preference conflict cannot absorb them into a private dispute between two moments.

Even without a third-party claim, disagreement alone fails to settle authority. Present Mira may expect a later preference she regards as mistaken. The current reasons, anticipated conditions of judgment, reversibility, and consequences of intervention matter. Causal continuity establishes why the conflict belongs to this life; it provides no verdict about which standpoint should govern.

6.6 The Scope of the Bridge

The constructive proposal identifies actions that anticipate, address, and support later participation in a life with revisable ends. Earlier action connects reasons and resources to a later situation. Later action can reassess, continue, or responsibly terminate the connection. Continuity resides partly in this organization of engagement.

The explanation exceeds causal persistence because it identifies the role of anticipated participation within the process. It remains incomplete as a theory of selfhood because first-person orientation has yet to receive a full account. A diary can support future reconsideration without generating consciousness merely through its practical function.

The proposal remains permissive concerning forms of life. People can act responsibly without sustained narration, explicit self-appropriation, or a major enduring project. Basic worth and justified claims remain independent of these features. A continuing project can also suppress valuable change. The account therefore investigates forms of continuity without treating continuity itself as an unconditional ideal.

Further development must explain how implicit anticipation differs from indifference, how participation survives limited recall, and how another's support can sustain agency without monopolizing its interpretation. Those questions mark the next explanatory work. They also state conditions under which the proposed account would require revision.

6.7 Descriptions of Future Change

Williams examines future-directed concern through differently presented imagined transformations and distinguishes attitudes toward anticipated experience from attitudes toward the transformation itself [12, pp. 161–170]. His discussion supplies a methodological challenge: a compelling description can organize anticipation without independently settling identity or rational concern. The present analysis develops a different archival case to examine how such framing affects practical judgment. It adopts no clinical proposition from the hypothetical transformations.

Suppose one description tells Mira that she will become free to pursue a different activity after leaving the archive. Another tells her that a continuing undertaking will lose her care and that she will have to encounter the consequences. Both descriptions could concern the same departure. They direct attention toward different practical relations: released capacity and remaining answerability. A changed response may therefore reflect attention to an omitted consideration rather than irrational inconsistency.

An inquiry comparing the responses must first establish what was held constant. If one description includes contributors' reliance and the other omits it, the person has received different practical information. Calling the difference a mere framing effect would conceal that change. If both descriptions communicate all relevant facts but differ in emphasis, the question becomes how salience affects judgment and whether the shift survives reflection.

The self-directed language also matters. Describing a future situation as one Mira will encounter can make its experiential significance vivid. Describing it impersonally can make its institutional features easier to compare. Neither description is automatically privileged for every question. Their adequacy depends on whether they preserve the facts and practical relations under investigation.

A theory should therefore avoid treating the response elicited by its preferred description as direct proof of its metaphysics. A person might feel concern when addressed personally because the description presupposes that the future experience belongs to them. The felt response then cannot independently establish that presupposition. Conversely, emotional distance under an impersonal description does not prove that the future lacks personal significance.

The practical account benefits from presenting both orientations and examining what changes. It can ask whether Mira's concern tracks anticipated experience, unfinished responsibility, lost opportunity, or allegiance to a project. The result may be a combination. That combination is more informative than forcing every response into a single variable of identification.

6.8 Reflective Stability and Legitimate Change of Judgment

One possible test asks whether a judgment remains stable after the person considers alternative descriptions. Stability can indicate that the response reflects an assessed relation rather than a momentary emphasis. It remains evidence of a particular kind, not a universal criterion of truth or rationality.

A judgment can remain stable because relevant alternatives are misunderstood. It can also change because reflection reveals a better reason. Treating stability as the objective would then favor persistence over learning. The appropriate question concerns how the person responds to reasons and what grounds remain after comparison.

In Mira's case, initial enthusiasm for departure may give way to a decision to provide a careful transfer. The change can integrate freedom to leave with answerability to contributors. The later judgment need not mean that the initial concern for freedom was mistaken. It may recognize an additional relation that changes what responsible departure requires.

Another case yields a firmer refusal. After hearing an institution's appeal to continuity, Mira may conclude that the appeal asks for indefinite unpaid work exceeding her undertaking. Reflection can strengthen departure by distinguishing a justified bounded claim from an expansive identity demand. The method should permit this result as readily as renewed commitment.

A third case remains divided. Mira may recognize reasons for both continuation and exit without finding one decisive. The unresolved state can still guide a provisional arrangement. It can support consultation, partial transfer, or delay within justified limits. Practical judgment need not always culminate in a complete ordering of every consideration.

The philosophical consequence is that self-continuity can include revision of the way a future is understood. Present concern is not a fixed quantity waiting to be measured independently of description. It can develop through attention, evidence, and dialogue. The account must distinguish that development from manipulation while acknowledging that both influence understanding.

6.9 The Future Person's Evaluation of Preparation

Present preparation may later be welcomed, resented, or regarded as irrelevant. Mira may appreciate the preserved option to leave, or wish that she had been bound more firmly to finish. The later response supplies information about how the arrangement was experienced. It does not automatically determine whether the earlier decision was justified under its information.

This temporal asymmetry is important. A reasonable choice can have an unfortunate outcome, and an unreasonable choice can turn out well. Evaluating preparation therefore requires attention to what was knowable, foreseeable, and feasible at the earlier occasion. Later judgment can reveal consequences while remaining distinct from retrospective assessment of the earlier reasons.

The same distinction applies to endorsement. Future gratitude does not prove that a present constraint was authorized at the time. Future resentment does not prove that every earlier reason was invalid. The inquiry should preserve the sequence of judgments and their grounds rather than use the final attitude to rewrite the entire history.

Suppose Mira later thanks the institution for preventing her withdrawal. That response may indicate current approval of the outcome. It may also coexist with a justified criticism of the method used. She can value the completed archive while rejecting the institution's appropriation of her voice. Outcome and procedure retain separate practical significance.

Conversely, later Mira may regret a freely chosen departure while accepting that she had good reasons then. Practical self-continuity can include that reflective relation to an unfortunate choice. It does not require the final standpoint to endorse every earlier decision as correct. The history can remain intelligible through explanation and acknowledgment rather than agreement.

These cases support a record that preserves changing evaluations alongside events. A later judgment is a new occurrence with its own position in the practical sequence. Its importance should be recognized without granting it retroactive control over what earlier people knew, intended, or authorized.

6.10 Preparation that Shapes Its Own Beneficiary

Some preparations change the future capacities and concerns they are intended to support. Learning an archival method can alter what Mira finds interesting. Joining a collaborative practice can change her sense of responsibility. An arrangement designed to preserve one project can help produce a person who evaluates that project differently.

The effect complicates a simple distinction between serving a fixed future preference and overriding it. In the case described, the future preference develops partly through the preparation. There may be no independently fixed attitude against which the intervention's success can be measured. The inquiry must examine the process of formation and its consequences.

This observation should not be converted into the conclusion that all influence is equally acceptable. The differences among explanation, opportunity, pressure, and deception remain significant. A practice can expose Mira to reasons and experience while preserving response. Another can systematically prevent alternatives from becoming intelligible. Both shape the future, but their structures differ.

Present authorization can also be partial. Mira may agree to learn a method without endorsing every change in outlook that might follow. Ordinary participation often contains such openness. Treating participation as unlimited consent to all downstream transformation would overstate the undertaking.

A defensible account of future care should therefore examine both the ends pursued and the means through which future evaluation is formed. Protecting later agency can include preserving access to criticism of the very practice that shaped it. That reflexive possibility gives revision a substantive role beyond selecting among options already defined by the original arrangement.

The argument remains a philosophical proposal. It identifies why an assessment of practical continuity needs formation history and feasible response alongside current endorsement. It leaves detailed causal and evaluative judgments to cases in which the mechanisms and stakes can be examined with appropriate evidence.

6.11 An Explanatory Boundary

The expanded discussion clarifies the positive bridge without resolving every question of selfhood. A person can organize present action toward anticipated experience and later participation; that organization can persist through changed evaluation and include care for an unfamiliar future. It explains why preserving one preference is too narrow a model of practical continuity.

The first-person relation remains an additional feature. Other-directed care can share much of the organization, and descriptions can presuppose what they appear to establish. The account should therefore claim an explanation of practical roles and dependencies while retaining the constitution of mineness as an open question.

This boundary constrains the interpretation of the positive proposal. The following analysis examines mixed objects of concern, uncertain future targets and ambivalence. These cases clarify what anticipatory orientation contributes to practical explanation while keeping its first-person character distinct from its ethical authority.

6.12 Mixed Concern within One Preparatory Act

A single act can prepare for one's own future and support another person's agency. This subsection examines that combination. It prevents the distinction between self-directed and other-directed concern from becoming an exclusive classification of outward actions.

Mira writes a careful explanation of the archive's access conditions. She expects to need the explanation herself after an interval away. She also wants Elena and Leila to understand the arrangement. The document can serve all three future uses.

The practical organization of the act therefore contains several objects of concern. Mira's preparation for her own later understanding coexists with concern for others' ability to assess the same history. The act need not be assigned to only one category.

An inquiry interested in motive would need evidence about which concerns entered Mira's deliberation and how. An inquiry interested in practical effect could ask whether the explanation actually became usable by each participant. These questions can yield different answers.

For example, Mira may write solely for Elena while later benefiting unexpectedly from the record. The later benefit establishes a useful consequence, not a previously present self-directed intention. Conversely, a document written primarily for Mira can later support others without having been designed for that purpose.

The distinction matters to the positive bridge. Preparing reasons for later use can explain a practical dependency whether the concern is self-directed, other-directed or mixed. The first-person interpretation requires further evidence concerning Mira's anticipatory orientation.

This qualification improves the account rather than diminishing every explanatory claim. It allows the same material support to enter several lives through different relations. The object can be shared while the practical positions remain distinct.

A critic may ask whether the relation to oneself is dispensable if the support works equally well for others. Its dispensability depends on the explanatory question. For the document's usability, the same design may suffice. For why Mira undertook the preparation or how she anticipates later experience, the first-person orientation may remain relevant.

One shared arrangement can be produced and used through several attitudes. Self-concern is therefore a feature whose attribution requires more than inspection of the artifact. The relation belongs within a broader interpretation of action and anticipated participation.

6.13 An Anticipated Standpoint with Incomplete Content

A person can anticipate a future standpoint without knowing its detailed values, experiences or circumstances. This subsection examines the object of such concern. It connects the philosophical account with the representation of unresolved future targets.

Mira may expect that she will later need to assess the archive while remaining uncertain about the information she will have or the ends she will endorse. Her anticipation can be directed toward a position of later judgment without specifying its conclusion.

The orientation has practical content. It can motivate preserving sources, explaining unresolved questions and avoiding unnecessary foreclosure of options. The content concerns the conditions of later participation, rather than a fully described future preference.

The future target remains conditional. Some anticipated circumstances may never occur. A representation of Mira returning to the archive can exist now even if she later chooses a different activity. The current anticipation and its practical effects are real features of the stipulated present, while realization of the target remains open.

The token-and-history model preserves this distinction. It permits one present representation to receive different targets across possible histories or no matching target in some. The model thereby avoids treating a meaningful anticipation as evidence that a particular future occasion already exists.

An objection asks how concern can be self-directed when its target is so incomplete. A full descriptive portrait is unnecessary for ordinary anticipatory orientation. A person can prepare for later experience and action under a conditional description. The account records that orientation while leaving its constitutive explanation open.

The incompleteness also limits prediction. Preserving a later opportunity for judgment does not guarantee that the opportunity will be used or welcomed. It can still be a reasonable preparation under the current reasons and costs.

This point distinguishes open anticipation from indifference. Mira can care seriously about the conditions under which a later decision will be made while declining to settle its content now. Her concern can be active precisely because the future remains partly unknown.

The practical contribution is therefore a form of preparation suited to uncertainty. It preserves conditions for a later standpoint without treating present imagination as a complete description or rightful governor of that standpoint.

6.14 Ambivalence toward an Anticipated Future

Self-directed concern can coexist with dislike, fear or criticism of the future one anticipates. This subsection examines that ambivalence. It distinguishes caring about a later person from endorsing every preference or activity expected of that person.

Mira may anticipate becoming more willing to publish sensitive material under institutional pressure. She can care about her future agency while judging that possible stance objectionable. Her preparation might include preserving the contributors' restrictions and her present reasons for taking them seriously.

The act can support later judgment by making those reasons available. It can also become an attempt to control the later outcome irrespective of new information. The difference concerns the form and authority of the preparation, not merely the sincerity of present concern.

An anticipated future may likewise reject Mira's present values. Care can then take the form of preserving access to an intelligible history without requiring later gratitude or agreement. The earlier future-care analysis supplies the normative qualifications concerning burden and affected claims.

Ambivalence complicates any attempt to measure self-continuity through liking the anticipated person. A person can be strongly concerned about an unwelcome future precisely because they anticipate undergoing it. Conversely, warm approval of a future project can concern its beneficiaries without a strong first-person orientation.

The practical account therefore separates evaluative approval from anticipatory relation. The distinction can explain why someone prepares for a difficult transition while wishing it could be avoided. It supplies no empirical claim about how often such attitudes occur.

The case also prevents self-concern from becoming a license to impose present values. Caring about a future does not settle which constraints are justified. The relevant reasons include current participation, foreseeable consequences, the quality of information and other people's claims.

A critic may regard this as leaving the hardest choice unresolved. In some cases it does. The account's contribution is to identify the separate questions that a justified answer must address, while the bounded arguments elsewhere resolve particular combinations of conditions.

The resulting description of continuity includes conflict within concern itself. Mira can anticipate a future as practically hers, criticize its possible direction and prepare resources for a later reassessment. That structure exceeds a model of unchanged preference while remaining distinct from a complete theory of identity.

6.15 Temporal Distance and the Specificity of Preparation

Preparation for a near future can differ from preparation for a distant and poorly specified one. This subsection examines the reasons for that difference without deriving a universal temporal discount rate. The focus is the relation between information, feasibility and the scope of a present undertaking.

Mira may know that next week's review will require a particular document. She can also expect that some later stage of her life may involve reconsidering the archive more broadly. The first anticipation supports a specific preparation; the second supports a more general question about what should remain available.

The difference need not reflect a lower moral worth of the distant person. It can arise from differences in information and the cost of preserving flexibility across a longer interval. A detailed arrangement may become inappropriate as circumstances change.

Preserving every resource indefinitely would also affect other people and present undertakings. The practical question is which preparations have sufficient expected relevance and proportionate burden. The paper leaves a general theory of temporal allocation open.

A useful distinction is between preserving a particular outcome and preserving a route to later inquiry. The latter can sometimes remain valuable across a wider range of futures. It can also become costly or irrelevant, so its apparent generality does not exempt it from assessment.

Noor's sketch provides a simple case. Keeping one copy may preserve a meaningful option at little cost. Maintaining every working arrangement, collaborator's availability and performance venue for an

unspecified distant return would be a much larger demand. The same concern for future agency does not justify both automatically.

The account can therefore support selective preparation. The selection should follow reasons concerning likely use, irreversibility, burden and the claims of those whose resources are involved. It should avoid treating distance alone as a sufficient reason for disregard.

The first-person relation remains separate from the selection rule. A person can anticipate a distant standpoint vividly while having little practical knowledge of what will support it. Another can make careful long-term arrangements without an elaborate felt image of the future. The evidence should distinguish these features.

This temporal sensitivity strengthens the practical account by matching preparation to the actual informational and material situation. It leaves both the moral comparison of temporal interests and the experiential character of anticipation independently accountable.

6.16 Prospective Orientation and Explanatory Success

The chapter can now state a more exact standard for the proposed bridge. This final discussion distinguishes explaining the role of anticipation from explaining the existence of a first-person perspective. It also identifies what would count as a failure of the practical proposal.

The practical explanation succeeds when it shows how an anticipated occasion affects present organization: reasons are preserved, resources are prepared, constraints are imposed or review is made possible. The explanation should identify the particular relation and its effect on the available future.

Evidence of that organization can support an interpretation of prospective concern. It may also remain compatible with other motives or with concern directed toward another person. The interpretation should retain those alternatives where the evidence warrants them.

The first-person explanation would require more. It would need to account for the mode in which the future is anticipated as a standpoint from which one expects to experience and act. The present formal relations record that feature where attributed; they do not derive it.

The distinction permits a substantive partial success. The theory can explain why an arrangement preserves later participation more effectively than an arrangement focused only on outward completion. That explanation remains useful in both self-directed and other-directed cases.

The proposal would fail if the added prospective relation never changed an interpretation or practical assessment, or if it merely renamed every future-directed consequence. It should therefore be applied only where the person's orientation toward later experience or agency does identifiable work.

The theory also needs to preserve cases where explicit appropriation is absent. Some local continuities can be sustained through implicit anticipation, habit and responsive engagement. Their existence limits necessity claims while leaving explicit prospective concern important where it occurs.

The final positive claim is consequently bounded. Present action can be organized around a later occasion of participation without requiring unchanged memory or commitment. That organization can support practical self-continuity through transformation. Its first-person character, ethical authority and wider place within a unified life remain distinct philosophical questions.

7 Revision Opportunities and Practical Viability

This chapter uses a finite transition model to distinguish a possible route of reconsideration from an enacted revision. Its role is local: to identify when support arrangements preserve a route from an inherited undertaking to a reconsidered one. It exposes the assumptions behind that conclusion and returns to the difference between opportunity and participation.

7.1 A Finite Construction

Let X be finite practical situations, $B(x)$ the allowed and feasible actions at x , and $T(x, b)$ their successors. Let $G \subseteq X$ be a declared target, such as completion of review with a usable arrangement. The

target's appropriateness requires separate justification. Define

$$V_0 = G, \quad V_{h+1} = G \cup \{x : \exists b \in B(x), T(x, b) \in V_h\}. \quad (2)$$

The horizon counts represented actions, with no automatic interpretation as elapsed time or cognitive effort.

Proposition 7.1 (Revision reachability). *The state x belongs to V_h precisely when an allowed path of length at most h reaches G .*

Proof. At horizon zero, the empty path succeeds exactly in G . Assume the result for h . Membership at $h + 1$ either lies in G or supplies an allowed first action with successor in V_h . Induction supplies a successful suffix within h , proving one direction. Conversely, a successful nonempty path within $h + 1$ has an allowed first step and a successful suffix within h . Induction places the successor in V_h , so the recurrence includes the start. The empty path belongs to the target case. $\square$

The sets increase and stabilize on finite X , because each strict increase adds a state. Consecutive equality persists under the fixed recurrence. These elementary facts diagnose the particular arrangement represented; their correctness alone says nothing about the adequacy of that representation.

7.2 Review Access and Practical Effect

Consider inherited plan, review, revised arrangement, and blocked situations. Mira can enter review by obtaining contributor records, then reach a revised arrangement by selecting an authorized access procedure. The initial state can belong to V_2 while falling outside V_1 .

If the institution permits consultation but withholds authorization for every changed procedure, the final transition disappears. Mira can consider reasons while lacking a route for giving them practical effect. Calling consultation participatory would then omit the blocked continuation.

Conversely, formal permission to revise can coexist with denial of the records needed for understanding. A model containing only the authorization edge overstates practical access. Relevant information and material dependencies belong in the state description. This is where the construction acquires its selfhood-specific significance: an institution can preserve public attachment to a project while severing a route for the attached person's response.

Availability also differs from selection. Mira may retain the plan, suspend judgment, or choose another undertaking despite a feasible revision route. Membership establishes opportunity. It provides no evidence that a particular path was endorsed and no guarantee of freedom from pressure.

7.3 Expansion and Evaluation

Expanding actions while preserving old transitions and the target preserves old successful paths, giving $V_h \subseteq V'_h$. The premise matters. An added option may impose fees or disclosure even when declined. Then the old situation has changed and a mere superset of option names can conceal reduced feasibility.

Under a fixed function on finite nonempty menus, a maximum weakly increases when options expand: the old maximizer remains available. Changing deliberative costs defeats an unrestricted practical conclusion. Gross maxima one and two with respective costs zero and three yield net values one and negative one. The arithmetic exposes a premise; it supplies no universal ranking of autonomy.

An institution consequently cannot infer agency from the presence of a review procedure alone. Accessibility, the practical effect of judgment, and the arrangement's consequences matter. The model identifies a route whose relation to agency must still be explained through evidence and argument.

7.4 Substantive Ends and Conditions of Review

The target set in equation 2 can play several different roles. Separating those roles reveals what the calculation can establish about continuity through change. One target describes a substantive outcome.

Another describes conditions under which a person can assess an undertaking and give the assessment practical effect. A third concerns the adoption of a changed standard of assessment. The same mathematical notation can conceal these different philosophical tasks.

Suppose the target consists of situations in which the archive has published every interview. A path to that target answers a question about completing an initially declared project. If Mira now has well-grounded objections to publication, the path's availability might be part of the difficulty she faces. An institution could make publication easy while making restriction or withdrawal costly. The graph would correctly represent a route to its target and misleadingly support a claim about her opportunity for practical revision if the target were described more generously than its content permits.

Now let the target consist of situations in which Mira has access to the relevant records, can communicate a considered response, and can select among practically effective arrangements. This target concerns a condition of review. Reaching it leaves the substantive decision open. Publication, restriction, suspension, and transfer may follow. A review target therefore serves the argument about practical continuity more directly when the relevant continuity concerns continuing participation in an undertaking whose end has become contestable.

The procedural target carries substantive assumptions of its own. Access to records must mean access in a form that can be used. A channel for communication must allow the response to affect what happens. The options must concern the disputed undertaking rather than an unrelated consolation. Each requirement needs interpretation in the case. Writing them into the definition clarifies the proposed standard; the resulting reachability proof supplies no independent justification for that standard.

A further difficulty concerns the person who rejects the available review procedure. Mira may judge that the institution's demand for a public explanation exposes contributors unnecessarily. Her refusal to enter that procedure can express a reason concerning the undertaking. Treating the procedure as the unique target would classify her refusal as a failure to reach an acceptable condition while concealing her objection to what acceptance requires. The model needs either additional review routes or an explicit admission that its criterion represents a contested institutional choice.

These examples support a disciplined reading of the graph. A substantive target supports claims about a declared outcome. A procedural target supports claims about specified opportunities for assessment and response. A target involving endorsement supports claims only after endorsement has received an independently warranted interpretation. The analyst should identify which task is being performed before discussing the size of a viable set or the addition of a transition.

7.5 Revision of the Evaluative Criterion

A person can revise the standards by which the undertaking is evaluated. This subsection examines how a transition model can represent that change and what remains outside the representation. The issue arises within the archive case when Mira changes her understanding of responsible preservation, rather than merely selecting a different instrument for an unchanged goal.

Initially, Mira may treat public availability as the main sign of successful preservation. Through discussion with contributors, she comes to distinguish preservation from unrestricted circulation. A restricted collection can then count as a successful undertaking under the revised standard even though it fails the original publication target. A model using the initial target throughout would interpret this transition as movement away from success. That interpretation reports the old standard accurately while failing to describe the practical role of the change.

One response enriches a situation with the currently operative criterion. The model can represent an early situation containing a publication standard and a later situation containing an access-sensitive standard. A transition then changes both the arrangement and the standard used to evaluate it. This construction avoids treating evaluation as an immutable background when the inquiry concerns its revision.

State enrichment has a clear limit. If the enlarged target is defined to include every situation endorsed under its own current standard, the target may become too permissive. An imposed standard can make an imposed arrangement count as successful. A person can sincerely adopt a criterion that has been shaped

by exclusion from relevant evidence. Formal consistency between a state and its current criterion leaves the formation and authority of that criterion unresolved.

The difficulty persists when the criterion is called authentic, reflective, or self-authored. These terms name contested evaluative achievements. Placing such a predicate in the target set makes an assumption visible if its interpretation is stated. It becomes circular when the graph's success is then used to establish the very achievement that admission to the target already presupposed. An account of authentic revision must explain why the formation, consideration, and practical use of the criterion warrant that description.

A narrower construction can avoid this circularity by recording particular features of a review. Mira receives previously unavailable contributor statements, understands a specific objection, can reject the proposed response, and gives reasons that remain open to criticism. These features provide evidence relevant to evaluating the revision. Their conjunction still requires a normative argument about adequacy. The advantage is that the argument now concerns identifiable conditions rather than an unexplained positive label.

Revision of a criterion can also be legitimate while leaving some earlier claims in force. Mira's new view of preservation may support restricted access without dissolving a contributor's claim to receive a promised copy. A model that changes the criterion and deletes every inherited obligation would combine two different transitions. The first changes her assessment of the project. The second alters relations with affected parties. Each requires its own representation and justification.

The graph therefore serves best when criterion change appears among the events to be investigated. It can show whether arrangements permit such a change to be considered and enacted. It can also expose a system that permits revisions only when they return the person to the institution's preferred end. The warrant for the revised criterion remains a philosophical and evidential question that the transition notation helps locate.

7.6 Accessible Information and a Usable Route

Using a successful path requires information sufficient for selecting its steps. This subsection makes that practical requirement explicit through a small counterexample. Its purpose is to distinguish an analyst's knowledge of the model from the information available to the person whose opportunities are being assessed.

Let X contain practical situations and let $o : X \rightarrow Y$ record the information accessible for the represented decision. For an observed value y , define the compatible class $K_y = \{x : o(x) = y\}$. Assume this class is nonempty. Let $\mathcal{B}$ be a finite set of action descriptions. At each x , the feasible actions form $B(x) \subseteq \mathcal{B}$, and $T(x, b)$ is defined for $b \in B(x)$. For a fixed target G , let

$$W(x) = \{b \in B(x) : T(x, b) \in G\}.$$

The set $W(x)$ lists actions that succeed in one step at the particular situation. Success here retains the declared, limited meaning of membership in G .

An action selected solely on the basis of y must be the same throughout K_y . A one-step rule that guarantees reaching G across that class exists precisely when $\bigcap_{x \in K_y} W(x)$ is nonempty. If an action belongs to the intersection, it is feasible and successful in every compatible situation and therefore supplies the rule at y . Conversely, any rule that guarantees success must select an action feasible and successful in every situation in the class, so that action belongs to the intersection. The result follows directly from the definitions; its interest concerns the assumption it tests.

Consider two compatible situations x_0 and x_1 with the same accessible information. Both actions a and b are feasible at both situations. At x_0 , only a reaches the target; at x_1 , only b reaches it. Each situation has a successful one-step path, so each belongs to V_1 . Yet the intersection of successful actions is empty. The person lacks a one-step guarantee based on the represented information even though the analyst can point to a successful path from every possible start.

In the archive interpretation, suppose two sets of contributor instructions have been filed under indistinguishable labels. One action releases a particular collection and the other restricts it. The applicable

instructions differ between the compatible situations. A modeler who knows the correct file can identify the appropriate action in each case. Mira, denied that distinction, cannot derive the same guarantee from the information made available to her. This is a constructed evidential problem, not a claim that actual archives always have this structure.

The example also shows why adding an information-gathering action can matter differently from adding another substantive option. An inspection that distinguishes the situations may permit a later action to depend on the result. At a horizon of two steps, a conditional route can succeed even though the one-step common action fails. Whether inspection is feasible, intelligible, timely, and appropriately private belongs in the practical assessment. The mere existence of a record somewhere in the institution leaves these conditions open.

The observation map is itself an idealization. It records which distinctions the model treats as available, rather than proving that the person understands every represented distinction. Two displays can contain the same words while presenting different obstacles to use. Conversely, a person can draw on practical knowledge omitted from the analyst's map. Evidence about comprehension and access is needed before the mathematical information class can represent the person's situation responsibly.

7.7 Guarantees, Reasonable Action, and Uncertainty

The previous result concerns a guarantee across compatible situations. This subsection limits its normative use. Practical judgment frequently proceeds without such a guarantee, and a failure of guaranteed success can coexist with a justified decision. Keeping these ideas separate prevents a formal demand for certainty from becoming an unreasonable standard of agency.

If Mira must act before the records can be checked, she may choose the course that best respects the available evidence and the consequences of error. A model of guaranteed target attainment remains silent about that judgment when every available action fails in some compatible situation. The silence reflects the question posed by the model. It supplies no reason to describe her decision as irrational or to transfer all authority to an institution.

Probabilities would address a different question, provided their interpretation and evidential basis were justified. A high expected success rate differs from success in every admissible situation. A risk-sensitive judgment can also distinguish the severity, distribution, and reversibility of possible failures. Adding numerical probabilities without support would give an appearance of precision while leaving the central uncertainty unchanged.

The relevant standard can depend on the target. For an easily reversible administrative classification, acting on a reasonable provisional interpretation may be appropriate. For release of information that would be difficult to retrieve, a stronger evidential threshold may be defensible. These are proposed considerations, not general legal rules. Their point is that the seriousness of a possible mistake affects the argument for action while the existence of a path remains a structural matter.

A uniform guarantee can also be achieved by an action that is unacceptable for other reasons. Destroying all records might guarantee that none is disclosed without permission. That target would omit preservation, contributors' interests in retention, and Mira's reasons for continuing the project. The availability of a guaranteed action therefore cannot substitute for evaluation of what it guarantees and what it sacrifices.

Similarly, a rule can be implementable through a knowledgeable adviser while leaving Mira unable to understand the basis of the choice. Such delegation can sometimes be a considered part of her undertaking. It can also become substitution disguised as support. The relevant difference concerns her relation to the delegation, opportunities for questioning, the adviser's responsibilities, and the consequences of disagreement. A mathematical strategy specifies dependence on information; these practical relations determine its place in agency.

The analysis accordingly separates four judgments. A route may exist in the stipulated system. A rule may select a route using specified information. A person or supported group may be able to understand and carry out that rule. The resulting activity may warrant description as their considered participation.

Evidence for an earlier judgment does not automatically settle the later ones. The distinctions retain a positive role for formal analysis while keeping its conclusions proportionate.

7.8 Changing Targets across a Review

A review can change the target while also changing the person's information. This subsection combines the preceding distinctions in a single temporal case. It shows why successful revision can require an account of how standards and accessible reasons develop together.

At the outset, Mira wants to complete an exhibition. She enters a review because some contributors express concern. During the review, she learns that public display would frustrate purposes that had motivated their participation. Her revised objective becomes maintaining a restricted collection while giving contributors meaningful control over future uses. The review has succeeded in one sense precisely because it has changed the end against which completion is assessed.

A fixed exhibition target would record the final state as unsuccessful. A target consisting of whatever Mira ultimately endorses would admit too much. A procedural target concerning adequate access, consideration, response, and implementation can describe part of what occurred while leaving the revised substantive arrangement subject to criticism. This division of tasks is more informative than selecting one target and allowing its meaning to shift silently across the derivation.

The process can also fail in a subtler way. Suppose the institution supplies only information favoring restriction because it wishes to avoid the expense of an exhibition. Mira may reach the same final arrangement through a differently structured review. The equality of endpoints leaves the evidential and practical quality of the routes open. A target-state account needs path information when the inquiry concerns how a new commitment was formed.

Including the formation history in the state can preserve this difference formally. Such inclusion is useful if the model states which events and relations are retained. It still leaves the interpretation of those events open. A record that a meeting occurred supplies weaker information than a warranted account of which objections were heard, which responses were possible, and how the person understood the options. The state can become more detailed without becoming epistemically self-authenticating.

A reasonable model can therefore remain deliberately partial. It can record a change of end, a relevant information difference, and an available implementation route while marking the quality of deliberation as unresolved. This is preferable to completing the representation through an assumed label of good revision. A partial model can guide inquiry by showing which additional judgments would matter.

The self-continuity question concerns the relation between the person, the inherited undertaking, and the revised activity across this process. A changed end need not erase that relation. The continuity can lie in answering to newly understood reasons, responding to contributors, and taking responsibility for the practical transition. Whether this description fits a particular case depends on how the process is understood, rather than on preservation of an initial goal set.

7.9 The Boundary of the Formal Contribution

The finite construction adapts an elementary reachability analysis to a particular philosophical problem. This subsection states the boundary of that use and identifies what an adequate application would need to establish. The mathematical facts concerning paths are shared with more general transition models; the present contribution concerns the interpretation of revision opportunities within practical self-continuity.

An application should identify the situations represented, the actions treated as feasible, the information assumed accessible, the target's meaning, and the horizon's practical significance. It should explain whether success concerns an outcome, a review opportunity, or a criterion change. It should also state whose judgment supplies each interpretation. These are conditions of an intelligible model, not a guarantee that all relevant aspects of a life have been captured.

The most important failure exposed by the construction is an equivocation between institutional continuation and participant response. A system can keep a person attached to an undertaking, offer a nominal review, and retain an easy path to its preferred outcome while giving the person's reconsideration

little practical effect. Describing only the successful institutional route would conceal the relation at issue.

The model also helps identify constructive changes. Making relevant records accessible, providing a channel through which objections alter available arrangements, supporting a responsible transfer, and permitting a revised end can each change the practical possibilities represented. Their value requires case-specific evaluation. The analysis explains why these changes matter to the continuity of participation, beyond a count of how many formal options appear in a procedure.

Finally, an available and usable route can remain unchosen. Mira may suspend the undertaking or undertake something else. Respecting the significance of revision opportunities includes taking this possibility seriously. The model records what can be done under its assumptions. A philosophical account of practical self-continuity must then investigate how the person responds, how others are affected, and how the resulting activity relates to the life being continued.

7.10 Distributed Knowledge and Coordinated Action

Relevant information can be available within a group while remaining unavailable to the person who must choose or act. This subsection examines the difference between collective possession of information and an effectively coordinated route. It extends the interpretation of accessible information without adding a new formal theorem.

Mira knows why a contributor requested a restriction. Leila knows how to transfer the recording securely. An administrator knows which permission must be updated. A description that pools all three perspectives can identify a successful sequence.

The sequence may nevertheless be unusable if the participants lack a way to communicate the relevant information or coordinate their actions. The observer's combined description contains a resource that no individual participant currently possesses. Treating it as Mira's knowledge would overstate her access.

The practical response can involve organizing communication and responsibility. Mira need not learn every technical detail herself if a justified arrangement allows Leila to perform a limited task. What matters is that the roles, information and authority fit the required sequence.

Delegation introduces its own conditions. Leila must understand and accept the task, possess the relevant means and have an appropriate scope of authority. The existence of someone who knows how to act does not automatically create an available resource for Mira.

The distinction also affects the interpretation of failure. If the transfer stalls because the administrator never communicates a requirement, the failure should not automatically be attributed to Mira's lack of commitment. The obstacle concerns the organization of the route.

Conversely, complete communication does not establish endorsement of the resulting arrangement. The participants can understand the sequence and still object to its purpose. Knowledge and practical authority retain their separate roles.

This case clarifies why a usable route can be relational in a specific sense. Its success depends on coordinated information and action among participants whose agency remains distinct. The explanation identifies those dependencies rather than attributing a single collective mind to the arrangement.

7.11 The Cost and Authority of an Informative Step

An information-gathering act can make a later choice possible while carrying burdens of its own. This subsection examines why extending the horizon of a strategy is insufficient to justify that act. It connects the formal possibility of learning with the practical conditions under which learning should occur.

Suppose reading a private contributor's file would distinguish which transfer procedure is appropriate. A longer strategy containing that observation may succeed where the original information class supplied no common guaranteed action. The formal improvement concerns access to discriminating information.

The observation can still require authorization or a narrower alternative. The file may contain material unrelated to the transfer question. Its usefulness for selecting an action does not establish an entitlement to inspect everything it contains.

A more appropriate route might ask the contributor a limited question or use a summary that preserves the relevant distinction. Such a route can provide enough information for the practical task while imposing a smaller burden. Its adequacy depends on the question and the reliability of the summary.

The example reveals that informational improvement and normative improvement can diverge. A strategy can become more reliable by acquiring information through an unjustified intrusion. The model should state the action constraints relevant to its use.

The cost can also be borne by the person whose agency is being supported. Repeated reconstruction of a difficult history may make a theoretically informative procedure disproportionate. A bounded practical settlement can sometimes be justified without resolving every uncertainty.

The longer-strategy possibility therefore refines the F-PSC-007 limitation without erasing it. Additional observations can change what is possible from the accessible information. Their feasibility, meaning and authority remain independent premises.

The practical lesson is to seek sufficient information for a justified response. Maximum information is a different target and may be inappropriate. A model becomes more useful when its goal and action conditions reflect that difference explicitly.

7.12 Recognition of a Newly Available Route

A route can become practically available through a new description of the problem. This final discussion distinguishes discovering an existing option from creating an arrangement through agreement. Both can change the person's relation to the undertaking.

Mira initially understands the choice as continued leadership or complete abandonment. A discussion reveals that custody, interpretation and public endorsement can be separated. Some of the resulting options may already have been permitted by the institution's rules.

Recognizing those options changes Mira's accessible practical understanding. The route existed in one formal sense while remaining absent from the choice as she understood it. The analysis should specify that difference rather than say simply that nothing changed.

Other options may require a new agreement. Leila's willingness to accept limited custody can create a possibility that previously depended on an unaccepted role. The route becomes available through a new practical relation among participants.

The difference matters to explanation. Better information addresses the first kind of limitation. Negotiation and new uptake address the second. A support arrangement should identify which task it is performing.

Neither development guarantees a justified outcome. The newly recognized option may remain burdensome, and the new agreement may exclude a contributor's claim. The route's appearance begins an evaluation rather than completing it.

The final contribution of the revision model is therefore an ordered inquiry into possibility: identify the represented route, the information needed to use it, the people whose action it requires, and the reasons supporting its target and means. Practical self-continuity through revision depends on that organization, while the mathematical existence of a path remains one limited part of the account.

8 Embodiment and Material Support

This chapter examines bodily and material conditions of practical continuity. It moves from situated capacity to support arrangements, then considers changed means and dependence. The argument resists reducing a life to a sequence of preferences while keeping particular bodily features separate from universal identity criteria. All cases remain stipulated.

8.1 Situated Capacity

Mira's plans require bodily capacities, a place to work, access to materials, and time for attention. These conditions shape what the future can practically mean. Reviewing interviews has a different role when

communication and records are accessible than when the person is excluded from the archive. Identical expressed intentions can therefore occupy different possibilities of continuation.

Embodiment enters through more than execution. Fatigue can affect an occasion of deliberation, a familiar movement can support activity despite changed explicit recall, and discomfort can make a future situation salient before a plan is articulated. These are possible analytical roles. Their mechanisms and prevalence require empirical investigation.

The philosophical point concerns conditions that matter from within activity. A representation limited to beliefs and preference rankings can omit those conditions. The omission becomes consequential when failure to act is interpreted as absence of concern. A person can remain committed while the route of expression changes.

Capacity and performance consequently require separate assessment. Mira might assess a proposal when given adequate time and accessible presentation while struggling in a rushed meeting. An outcome-only account risks confusing the arrangement's demands with the person's judgment. The stipulation demonstrates why conditions of expression belong in attribution; it supplies no clinical diagnosis.

8.2 Support and Participation

Others can preserve materials, explain options, and help enact decisions. Such involvement can support agency. Mira can depend upon a colleague to read a document and still assess its significance. Independence from every external contribution would make ordinary practical life difficult to describe.

The structure of support matters. A colleague can make options intelligible and transmit Mira's responses, or select an outcome and announce it as her choice. Both involve assistance and may produce successful action. Their relation to her practical uptake differs.

Participation can also be collaborative. Mira and a colleague can exchange reasons and develop a joint response. The question is how her assessment enters that response, whether her disagreement matters, and whether she can revise the arrangement. Solitary decision is one possible form of agency, not the measure of every other form.

Support arrangements create asymmetries. Whoever controls records may influence which history becomes available. Whoever controls transport may influence which meetings can be attended. These dependencies can sustain valued activity while concentrating power. Their ambivalence calls for inquiry into concrete mechanisms.

8.3 Dependence, Refusal, and Exit

Mira may be formally free to leave while relying on the institution for unrelated necessities. That dependence alters the evidential significance of continued participation. It establishes no universal absence of agency, but weakens an inference from persistence to endorsement.

The connection between threatened loss and disputed activity matters. If refusing publication removes access to personal records, one dependency is used to shape another decision. The mechanism directly affects the person's relation to their history. A broad statement about stable participation could hide it.

Exit itself can require support. Responsible withdrawal may involve transfer, notification, and confidentiality protection. Someone lacking resources for those tasks can become trapped between unwanted continuation and harmful abandonment. Revision-path analysis identifies missing routes; normative argument determines how their burdens should be allocated.

The proposed evaluative orientation assesses support through intelligible participation, disagreement, and repair. It remains a proposal requiring attention to scarcity and competing claims. Its advantage is that it treats agency as situated without equating dependence with absence.

8.4 Bodily Continuation and Experience

Bodily tracking can support reference and practical relations while leaving subjective experience incompletely explained. A stable body supplies no deductive proof of experiential mineness. A changed capacity supplies no inference that the life has ceased to matter. Explanatory and normative questions remain distinct.

The account nevertheless identifies settings where anticipated experience becomes significant for action. A future is encountered through capacities, vulnerabilities, and support. A comprehensive extension requires empirical study of particular changes and philosophical work on experience. The present analysis establishes why those conditions belong inside the explanation of practical continuity.

8.5 Acquired Skill and Remembered Learning

A person can continue an acquired activity while having limited access to the occasions through which it was learned. This subsection examines that possibility through a stipulated skill case. It separates the persistence of a capacity, recollection of its formation, and present willingness to use it.

Suppose Mira can still arrange interview materials with considerable practical fluency, although she recalls little of learning the classification method. The capacity connects present activity to an earlier history in one sense. Her present performance depends on learning that the case stipulates occurred. The connection need not include a vivid recollection of the lessons or a complete account of why she adopted the method.

An observer might describe the capacity as a surviving form of memory. Whether that description is appropriate depends on the intended concept of memory. The philosophical point can be stated without settling the terminology: retained competence and recollective access can contribute differently to continuity. Broadening a term to cover both should preserve that difference if the account is to explain the case.

The retained skill can make a former undertaking available without making it presently endorsed. Mira may use the method to understand the archive while rejecting its original classification priorities. The fluency supplies a resource for criticism as well as reproduction. A relation acquired under one practical orientation can enter activity organized by another.

Conversely, Mira can endorse the aim while losing a previously available means of pursuing it. She may remain committed to careful preservation while needing assistance with classification. A criterion that equates practical continuity with unaided retention of the skill would then treat a changed support arrangement as decisive before examining how her concern continues through it.

The history of learning can also carry claims of acknowledgment. A colleague taught Mira the method, or contributors helped revise it. Recognizing these contributions concerns the genealogy of a capacity and the relations through which it became available. It need not imply that those contributors permanently govern every later use. The scope of any continuing claim requires further argument.

These distinctions prevent embodied continuity from becoming a single criterion with several concealed meanings. A capacity can persist, its learning history can be partially forgotten, its use can be revised, and its acquisition can remain socially significant. The case supports a differentiated account of practical continuity while leaving the mechanisms of skill and memory to appropriate empirical and philosophical inquiry.

8.6 Habitual Action and Current Commitment

An established pattern of action can continue after the reasons that once supported it have changed. This subsection examines the resulting evidential problem. The focus is on the interpretation of familiar conduct, with causal and psychological details stipulated only where the argument requires them.

Mira may begin preparing public labels using a familiar format before noticing that the revised access arrangement requires different descriptions. The initial action can arise from an established way of

working. Its occurrence alone provides weak evidence that she has abandoned the revised commitment. She may interrupt the action precisely because the new concern remains practically active.

A complete account should examine the interruption as well as the initial movement. If the record captures only the familiar action, it can make the old undertaking appear more dominant than the full sequence warrants. If it captures only the correction, it can conceal the practical work required to alter an established pattern. Both events matter to an explanation of change.

An observer could reasonably ask whether the correction is stable enough to guide future conduct. Mira herself may ask the same question and change the working arrangement. She might revise a form, place a reminder with the materials, or ask a colleague to review the first few descriptions. These supports can express commitment to the new standard while acknowledging that its enactment remains difficult.

The support does not automatically reduce the action's ownership. A person can deliberately arrange circumstances that help a considered intention govern conduct. The relevant inquiry concerns the relation between the arrangement and the person's judgment. A reminder chosen by Mira has a different practical history from an instruction imposed despite her objection, even when the visible prompt looks the same.

A difficult countercase involves a habit that Mira values and wishes to preserve despite criticism from others. Colleagues may call the pattern automatic to discount her stated reasons. The possibility shows that habitual fluency and reflective endorsement need not exclude each other. The character of a pattern cannot be inferred from the fact that it is easy or familiar to perform.

The relation between habit and commitment therefore requires a temporal account. Established conduct can support an undertaking, resist a revised undertaking, or become an object of deliberate preservation. A model that treats every repeated action as an endorsement would miss these alternatives. A model that treats repetition as evidence against agency would miss them as well.

8.7 The Practical Significance of Pace

Commitments unfold at a pace shaped by bodily and material conditions. This subsection examines how timing affects the interpretation of continuity. Its cases concern the practical role of time available for response, without proposing a general clinical account of attention or fatigue.

Suppose the archive offers Mira an opportunity to review a complex change during a brief meeting. She asks for time to examine the records and discuss the proposal later. The request can express an intention to participate more adequately. Classifying the delay as disengagement would assume that a response given at the institution's pace is the relevant measure of commitment.

Delay can also affect others. Contributors may need to know how their materials will be handled, and colleagues may face decisions that cannot be postponed indefinitely. Recognizing Mira's need for time does not eliminate these claims. The practical issue concerns how to arrange a reasonable interval, provisional protection, and communication of uncertainty.

A single measure of elapsed time would leave this issue underdescribed. Two weeks with usable access to the relevant records differs from two weeks spent waiting for permission to inspect them. The calendar interval is the same; the opportunities for assessment differ. A temporal model should therefore distinguish passage of time from the activities and conditions through which reconsideration can occur.

The person can also experience the undertaking through a changed rhythm. Mira may continue to value the archive while finding that its previous schedule excludes other commitments she now takes seriously. Revision of the schedule can preserve participation by changing its place in her life. Treating the old pace as part of an unalterable identity of the undertaking would require justification beyond historical repetition.

A countervailing consideration concerns the activity's dependence on timing. Some interviews or collective events may lose their point if delayed too far. A slower arrangement might therefore preserve one concern while ending another valued form of participation. The account should describe that loss candidly rather than assume that every change of pace is an equivalent substitute.

Pace matters to practical self-continuity because it shapes how an undertaking can remain responsive to the person's life. The relation involves the person's capacities and concerns, the activity's require-

ments, and the claims of others. Recognizing this structure permits a reasoned comparison of arrangements without converting speed of response into a universal measure of agency.

8.8 Material Arrangement and the Expression of Judgment

A decision can require changes in the material organization through which activity proceeds. This subsection examines the difference between expressing a revised judgment and having the means to make that judgment effective. It connects embodiment with the revision-path analysis while retaining the practical specificity of the archive case.

Mira may decide that certain materials should remain restricted, yet the archive's existing storage system may make them accessible to every visitor. Her judgment then requires more than a verbal announcement. It can require changes to permissions, labels, physical placement, or responsibilities for handling requests. These conditions partly determine whether the revised commitment can guide the undertaking.

An institution may acknowledge the decision while withholding every means of implementation. The resulting gap should be attributed accurately. Mira's inability to enact the arrangement is not, by itself, evidence that she lacks commitment to it. It may reveal that practical authority has been announced without the material relations that would give it effect.

The converse case concerns an effective arrangement introduced without Mira's participation. A colleague can restrict the files in accordance with what the colleague believes she should want. The resulting protection may have independent justification. It should still be distinguished from implementation of Mira's considered judgment. Equal outcomes can have different relations to the person whose agency is under discussion.

Material arrangements can also support continuing reconsideration. A record that preserves the reason for a restriction allows later reviewers to assess whether circumstances have changed. An arrangement that stores only a prohibition can make the earlier decision difficult to interpret. Preserving a trace of reasons can therefore support revision across changes of memory, provided the trace remains appropriately accessible and open to correction.

The record's role remains limited. A written reason can omit hesitation, disagreement, or conditions assumed in conversation. It can be accurate as a partial account while becoming misleading when treated as exhaustive. Material support should be understood through the claims it can warrant and the questions it leaves open.

The practical conclusion concerns the organization of a continuing undertaking. Judgment becomes effective through relations among the person, materials, procedures, and other participants. Describing those relations helps explain both supported action and frustrated action. It leaves the constitution of subjective experience and numerical identity separate from the success of implementation.

8.9 The Supporter's Continuing Agency

A relational account of support should include the person who supplies it. This subsection considers the burdens and authority of supporters. It addresses a potential asymmetry in which one person's self-continuity is protected by treating another person's participation as an unlimited resource.

Suppose a colleague, Arun, helps Mira review the archive's records. His assistance enables her to reconsider the undertaking. He also has commitments and limits of his own. An account that describes the support solely as Mira's resource would obscure the practical relation through which it exists.

Arun can reasonably seek clarity about the task, the time required, and the responsibilities he is assuming. Mira's need for support makes these questions important; it does not settle their answers. A justified arrangement may require institutional resources, a shared division of work, or a narrower undertaking. The analysis should therefore distinguish the value of support from a claim that a particular person must provide it without limit.

The supporter's discretion also requires bounds. Arun may control which documents Mira sees because he is helping organize them. That role can create practical influence over her judgment. His

contribution deserves recognition while remaining open to questions about selection, explanation, and disagreement. Reciprocity of agency includes accountability for power exercised through assistance.

Conflict can arise when Arun judges a proposed course harmful to contributors and declines to help implement it. His refusal need not deny Mira's agency. He can have reasons concerning his own participation and the people affected. The resulting dispute requires an account of each person's authority, rather than an assumption that supported decision-making obliges the supporter to carry out every choice.

Another case concerns withdrawal of assistance after Mira rejects Arun's advice. The meaning of withdrawal depends on the arrangement and the reasons given. A supporter can have legitimate limits; support can also be conditioned so that disagreement becomes prohibitively costly. The inquiry must examine the relation between the disputed judgment and the threatened loss, along with feasible alternatives and responsibilities already undertaken.

A satisfactory arrangement protects opportunities for both participants to understand and revise their involvement. It can include clear responsibilities, ways to raise concerns, and routes for transfer when collaboration ends. These features remain proposed conditions of good support, subject to scarcity and competing claims. Their importance lies in avoiding a picture of practical continuity that preserves one person's participation by obscuring another's.

8.10 Valued Activity and Functional Replacement

Replacing a means of action can preserve an output while changing the activity's significance. This subsection develops the distinction through competing interpretations of the same adaptation. It makes explicit why a practical account needs the person's understanding of the activity as well as an external description of its function.

Suppose Mira originally values interviewing contributors because the encounters allow questions to develop through conversation. A new system collects written responses efficiently and preserves more information. From the archive's perspective, the output can improve. From Mira's perspective, the activity that motivated her participation may have changed substantially.

Her judgment deserves consideration without automatically settling the evaluation. Contributors may prefer written exchanges, and the new method may make participation possible for people excluded by the old format. The practical conflict concerns several valued relations. Recognizing Mira's loss does not require restoring the earlier arrangement regardless of those considerations.

A different Mira could welcome the same change because careful preservation, rather than conversation itself, is central to her concern. The two cases can have identical outputs and different relations to the participant's undertaking. This comparison shows why the significance of a replacement cannot be inferred solely from a functional description supplied by the institution.

The person's interpretation can itself develop through using the new method. Mira may initially expect the written exchange to feel impersonal and later discover forms of reflection she values. The later judgment can support a revised commitment. It need not imply that her earlier concern was imaginary, since the value of an activity can become clearer through experience.

The opposite sequence is also possible. A welcomed adaptation can later reveal a loss that was initially difficult to anticipate. This possibility supports preserving some capacity for reconsideration where feasible. It does not establish a universal obligation to retain every previous method indefinitely. The costs and effects of preserving alternatives belong in the argument.

The account therefore distinguishes substitution of output, continuation of concern, and continuity of participation. An arrangement can preserve one while altering another. This differentiated description helps the participants identify what they are trying to retain, what they are willing to change, and what requires acknowledgment as a loss. Its practical value lies in making those judgments explicit rather than guaranteeing that adaptation will preserve everything that mattered.

8.11 Maintenance and the Duration of Support

A support arrangement exists through continuing work, resources and coordination. This subsection examines why providing an aid once differs from sustaining its practical availability. The issue connects material continuity with the responsibilities and limits of those maintaining it.

Mira may receive an organized set of records that makes the archive intelligible at one occasion. Over time, permissions change, new material arrives and some instructions become outdated. The support's continued usefulness can require revision and maintenance.

An assessment focused only on the initial provision may therefore overstate the arrangement's durability. A route of action can exist when the aid is introduced and become unusable later. The practical claim should specify the interval over which the support remains accessible and appropriate.

Maintenance is itself an undertaking. Someone must notice changes, decide what needs updating and perform the work. Those activities involve judgment and burden. Describing them as background infrastructure should not make their contributors invisible.

The authority to maintain also needs a scope. Updating an address or correcting a transcription differs from changing the account of Mira's commitment. A maintainer who silently revises substantive content can alter the practical history presented to later readers.

A good arrangement can distinguish routine maintenance from changes requiring further assessment. That distinction supports continuity because it permits practical upkeep without allowing every technical intervention to become an unauthorized reinterpretation.

The case also exposes a tension between durability and flexibility. A highly fixed record may preserve an earlier version accurately while becoming difficult to use under changed circumstances. A continually updated summary may remain accessible while losing the genealogy of its revisions. Preserving both an intelligible current account and a traceable history can address the tension where feasible.

The feasibility qualification matters. Maintaining every version and every possible access route can impose disproportionate costs. The relevant preservation task should follow the questions that matter to current action and historical answerability.

The practical conclusion is that support should be understood temporally. Its value lies in a maintained relation among resources, understanding and use. That relation can persist, deteriorate or be responsibly replaced, and each possibility affects the account of practical self-continuity.

8.12 Support Dependence and the Distribution of Influence

Dependence on assistance can give the supporter influence over choices. This subsection distinguishes influence arising from practical coordination from an unjustified demand for agreement. It focuses on the relation between the support provided and the condition attached to it.

Suppose Arun is willing to help Mira review documents but cannot continue the work at its current pace. He asks to reduce the number of sessions. The condition concerns a legitimate limit on his participation. Mira's need for assistance does not automatically make the limit coercive.

Now suppose Arun has ample capacity within an accepted arrangement but threatens to withdraw all assistance unless Mira endorses his preferred publication policy. The connection between the threatened loss and the disputed judgment requires a different assessment. Support is being used to make disagreement costly.

The difference cannot be read from the fact of withdrawal alone. Both cases involve a possible reduction in assistance. The inquiry must examine the reasons, prior undertaking, burden, alternatives and relation between the condition and the support's legitimate purpose.

Arun may also have a principled objection to implementing a course he regards as harmful. His refusal to participate in that course can express his own agency. The appropriate response may involve finding another lawful and justified route, revising the plan or reassessing the substantive dispute. Mira's authority over her judgment does not require Arun's participation in every act.

The strongest concern arises when essential assistance and evaluative agreement are bundled unnecessarily. If access to records needed for any decision is made conditional on accepting one decision, the

arrangement can undermine the participant's ability to assess the question at all.

A practical improvement can separate the tasks. Arun might assist with understanding the record while declining to carry out the disputed publication. Such a separation preserves some support for judgment while respecting the limits of his own participation.

The example shows why relational analysis needs differentiated authority. The supporter can have authority over their labor, the participant can have standing in the direction of their activity, and contributors can possess claims concerning the material. A single relation of dependence does not settle all three.

The account therefore treats dependence as a condition to analyze rather than a defect by definition. Its practical quality depends on how influence is exercised, how limits are justified and whether the people involved retain meaningful ways to respond.

8.13 Continuity through a Change of Supporter

Replacing a supporter can preserve a function while changing trust, interpretation and practical meaning. This subsection examines a transition from Arun to Leila. It asks what must be preserved for the change to support Mira's continuing participation.

Leila may be equally capable of organizing the documents. She may nonetheless interpret Mira's earlier statements differently or lack knowledge of reservations discussed informally with Arun. The transfer of files can therefore preserve information while leaving important context unavailable.

The transition should identify which parts of the support depended on personal familiarity and which can be carried through a record. A written account can preserve some context. It cannot guarantee that Leila understands the interaction in exactly the same way or that Mira experiences the new relationship as interchangeable.

Mira's response to the change matters. She may welcome Leila's different perspective, find it difficult to establish trust or prefer a narrower form of assistance. Those possibilities concern current participation and should not be inferred from the administrative fact that a replacement has been appointed.

Arun's withdrawal also deserves an accurate description. If he has responsibly ended a bounded role, the continuing need for assistance does not automatically make him responsible for every later difficulty. The handover arrangement and the reasons for leaving determine the scope of any remaining claim.

Leila's acceptance should likewise be scoped. Receiving records does not make her the guarantor of every aspect of Mira's practical life. A clear undertaking can identify the tasks she assumes, the questions requiring further agreement and the conditions under which the support can change.

The case reveals a form of continuity that is distributed across changing participants. The practical relation can continue even when the person providing support changes, provided the relevant resources, understanding and opportunities remain adequately organized.

The qualification is important. A formal replacement can fail to preserve those conditions. The institution should assess what the transition actually enables, rather than treat a filled role as proof that the support remains equivalent.

The positive lesson is that continuity need not require personal interchangeability. A new relation can support the same broader undertaking while changing its local character. Acknowledging that change helps the participants identify what has been retained and what requires fresh judgment.

8.14 Capacity, Expression and the Standing of the Person

An observed difficulty in action can arise from several sources, and its interpretation can affect how a person is treated. This subsection separates capacity, conditions of expression and moral standing. It remains a conceptual analysis without a clinical assessment instrument.

Mira may fail to complete a transfer because the procedure is obscure, the material is inaccessible, the task exceeds her present resources or she rejects the proposed arrangement. The outward noncompletion leaves these possibilities open. An account that assigns one explanation automatically would overreach.

Clarifying the conditions can change the practical response. Better instructions may address an informational obstacle. Material assistance may address a resource barrier. A substantive discussion may be needed when the person rejects the arrangement. The same intervention is unlikely to answer every source of difficulty.

The distinction between capacity and expression also matters over time. Mira may possess a skill that she cannot use under the current conditions. Conversely, a highly supportive setting may enable successful performance while leaving some independent task difficult. The assessment should describe the actual relation between person and setting.

These differences can be important without becoming a hierarchy of basic worth. A person's claims to respectful treatment do not depend on achieving a high score in recall, planning or institutional fluency. The present models concern practical relations and particular tasks.

An objection asks whether the account can avoid evaluation while discussing agency. It cannot avoid every evaluation, and it should not try. It can distinguish an assessment of what supports a task from an assessment of a person's fundamental standing. The normative arguments should state their object.

The distinction also protects those who provide support. Their contribution can be valued without treating the supported person as merely an output of their work. Support can enable participation while the person's own response remains a significant part of the relation.

The chapter's expanded result is therefore a material account of practical continuity with plural agency included. Resources require maintenance, supporters possess limits, replacements change relations and observed performance needs contextual interpretation. These considerations deepen the account of continuing participation while preserving the person beyond the model's task-specific descriptions.

9 Recognition and Institutional Records

This chapter examines how other people's recognition and institutional records support, distort, or constrain continuity. It distinguishes recognition of historical action from assignment of present identity and authority. It then analyzes feedback through roles, contested self-description, and procedural responses. The argument treats institutions as settings of practical interaction without attributing a settled legal status to the proposed safeguards.

9.1 Historical Recognition and Current Description

Contributors recognize Mira as the person who began the archive. That recognition can preserve access to a history she partly remembers through testimony. It can connect her with reasons, relationships, and materials needed for present decisions. Social recognition therefore can support practical participation rather than merely describe it from outside.

Recognition can also carry an interpretation that exceeds the historical facts. Calling Mira the archive's founder can suggest that she endorses every later use, owes indefinite labor, or retains authority over all materials. None of those conclusions follows simply from beginning the project. Historical origination, present endorsement, responsibility, and continuing decision authority need separate support.

The same distinction applies to personal characterization. Others may describe Mira as someone devoted to public access because that description fit an earlier period. The description can remain historically accurate while becoming inadequate to her present concerns. An institution retaining it for publicity may convert a useful memory into an imposed identity.

A practical account should therefore ask what recognition enables or requires. Does it open access to the record, establish a platform for explanation, or preserve a contributor's claim? Does it close disagreement by treating a past description as definitive? Recognition's significance lies partly in those consequences.

9.2 Institutional Persistence and Practical Feedback

A role can sustain activity by supplying resources, expectations, and repeated occasions of participation. Those conditions may help Mira continue an undertaking during uncertainty. The persistence is generative in a descriptive sense: the arrangement contributes to subsequent possibilities. Its value depends on how those possibilities relate to the people involved.

The same mechanism can produce rigidity. A role can reward conduct matching an old description and penalize revision. Later observers may then infer stable preference from behavior the arrangement itself selected. The resulting evidence is partly produced by the conditions under which action was possible.

Consider an institution that funds only public-release projects. Mira continues to describe her work in public-access terms to retain resources for preservation. The description now functions within a constraint. Inferring that she remains committed to unrestricted release would require evidence beyond the language itself. Her reasons may include protecting materials during a transition that the funding categories fail to recognize.

This feedback matters to selfhood because institutions can shape available self-interpretations. If every supported path requires affirmation of a role, repudiation becomes practically difficult. The person can retain dissent privately, revise their understanding, or eventually internalize the public category. These are different trajectories requiring evidence; the mere persistence of the category decides none of them.

9.3 Conflicting Self-Descriptions

Mira may say that the project continues through restricted access while the institution says she abandoned it. The dispute concerns a criterion of continuity. If the institution defines the project by public release and Mira defines it by careful preservation of contributors' accounts, both descriptions can follow from their stated criteria. The practical question is which criterion should govern which decision.

The institution can need a clear category for allocating a grant. Contributors can need an account of what happened to their recordings. Mira can need language for her changed relation to the work. One classification may serve the administrative task while failing the historical or personal task. A justified local classification should identify its purpose and limits.

This does not imply that every self-description is equally warranted. Mira could falsely deny a promise, conceal an action, or exaggerate a contribution. Current authority over self-interpretation is compatible with criticism concerning historical accuracy and effects upon others. The account distinguishes a person's privileged position in reporting their stance from infallibility concerning every proposition about their life.

Conversely, historical evidence can establish an act without proving the institution's account of its present meaning. A record of a public-access promise supports inquiry into that promise. It does not prove perpetual endorsement or settle whether changed conditions justify revision. Evidence should be used for the proposition it supports.

9.4 Contestability and Record Design

A record system can preserve an original undertaking, later revisions, disputed descriptions, and current permissions separately. This allows historical integrity and current correction to coexist. Silent replacement can erase a genealogy; freezing the first record can prevent a present correction. A versioned relation between records addresses both concerns in the stipulated design.

Contestability requires more than a field for comments. The person must be able to locate the relevant record, understand how it is used, and submit a response through a route with practical effect. A dispute can remain unresolved while being represented accurately as a dispute. The objective need not be a forced consensus about identity.

A proposed procedure can distinguish several outcomes. It can correct a factual error, retain competing interpretations, mark a claim as unsupported, or explain why an institutional decision uses a particular criterion. These responses have different evidential and practical roles. Treating every disagreement as an error to delete would lose interpretive plurality; treating every error as mere difference would abandon factual accountability.

The proposed design has costs and risks. Excessive recording can expose intimate information or make ordinary change subject to continuous scrutiny. A system preserving every self-description forever can become a tool of control. The appropriate level of preservation depends on the purpose, affected parties, and consequences. Practical continuity does not justify maximal personal documentation.

9.5 Recognition and Continuing Agency

Recognition can help a person reconnect with a past undertaking while preserving room to revise it. It can also keep a person attached to a role they seek to leave. The distinction depends on access, interpretation, practical alternatives, and the authority claimed through the record.

The relational account therefore treats public persistence as one dimension of the case. A stable institutional identity may coexist with transformed practical uptake. A disputed public identity may coexist with strong continuing concern. Their relation requires explanation through the mechanisms connecting records, expectations, resources, and response.

These findings prepare the next cases. Memory change makes recognition especially consequential because testimony can carry history into present deliberation. Commitment change makes it contested because a true account of the past can be used to demand an unjustified future. A theory of practical continuity must explain both possibilities.

9.6 Operational Uses of a Retrospective Description

A historical description can acquire practical force through the way an institution uses it. This subsection examines that transition. It distinguishes a statement's truth about an earlier occasion from the current inferences invited by its placement and function.

Suppose the archive's current exhibition materials describe Mira as the person whose commitment to public access guides the project. An early document may support the claim that public access once mattered greatly to her. The current description goes further by presenting that concern as an operative basis of the exhibition. Its temporal scope therefore requires separate evidence.

The problem can persist even if every quoted word is accurate. An old statement placed beneath a current invitation can suggest continuing endorsement without explicitly asserting it. The practical interpretation depends on context. A responsible account should examine what the presentation predictably communicates, rather than treat accuracy of the extracted sentence as the end of the inquiry.

Mira's changed stance matters to that assessment. If she has clearly explained that she rejects the current access policy, continued use of the old statement can become misleading concerning present support. The historical statement need not be deleted or declared false. The institution can distinguish its earlier occasion from the current position.

The institution may have a legitimate reason to explain the archive's origins. Contributors and visitors can benefit from knowing how the project began. That purpose differs from securing current authority through a founder's name. A description that serves the historical purpose should make its temporal and practical scope intelligible.

The same distinction applies to criticism. A historical account may accurately report that Mira advocated a policy she now rejects. Her changed stance does not entitle her to rewrite the earlier event. It can require care about a further inference that she continues to advocate the policy. The account should preserve both historical accuracy and current attribution.

The practical self-continuity issue arises because these descriptions affect how others address the person. They can shape requests, trust, criticism, and access to new undertakings. Public description

becomes part of the conditions through which a changed life can be lived, rather than a passive mirror of a completed history.

9.7 A Defeasible Case for Correcting Current Attribution

The preceding example supports a limited normative argument about an institution's current use of a record. This subsection states its premises and conclusion. The proposal concerns evidential responsibility and the practical agency affected by publication; it supplies no general legal entitlement.

Assume that the institution controls an ongoing presentation, that the presentation materially suggests Mira's current endorsement, and that the institution has good evidence that the suggestion is inaccurate. Also assume that a proportionate clarification is feasible. Under these conditions, the institution has a defeasible requirement to correct or qualify the attribution.

The first premise concerns responsible assertion. When an institution invites others to rely on a claim within its area of publication, it has a reason to keep the claim's content and scope within the available warrant. This premise extends to a predictable contextual implication when the institution knowingly sustains it. Literal accuracy of a quoted fragment leaves responsibility for its current use open.

The second premise concerns the person represented. A misleading attribution can cause others to treat Mira as endorsing an undertaking she rejects, affecting how she can communicate, withdraw, or begin other work. Her agency supplies an additional reason to avoid that misrepresentation. The reason does not depend on agreement with her new position.

The third premise supplies a normative bridge. An institution that knowingly continues a materially misleading attribution within its control, when a proportionate correction is available and no stronger claim defeats it, should provide that correction. Otherwise it retains the practical benefits of invoking the person while making the person bear the avoidable costs of the false implication. This is a proposed normative requirement whose justification can be contested.

Applying these premises gives the limited conclusion. The institution should mark the statement as historical, clarify the current disagreement, or use a description supported by present evidence. The requirement concerns the misleading attribution. It does not require endorsing Mira's reasons, erasing the project's history, or giving her control over every description of the archive.

The conclusion is defeasible because the facts and implications can be disputed. If the presentation clearly identifies the old statement's date and role, the alleged current attribution may be unwarranted. If Mira's stance remains unclear, the appropriate response may be a qualified description pending clarification. The inquiry should establish the relevant claim before deciding what correction requires.

9.8 Historical Integrity and a Changed Present Position

A correction can preserve history while changing how it is used in the present. This subsection examines the relation between an original record and a later qualification. The aim is to distinguish several forms of revision whose purposes differ.

An original document can remain evidence of what Mira said at an earlier time. A later note can identify her changed position. The two records answer different questions and need not compete for one slot labeled the true account. Their relation can make the change itself historically intelligible.

A factual correction requires a different treatment. If the original document misattributes words to Mira, merely appending her later disagreement can leave the original error insufficiently addressed. The correction should identify what was wrong and the evidence for the revised attribution. A disputed interpretation and an established transcription error have different epistemic statuses.

The institution should also distinguish a change of policy from a change in the history of authorization. It can adopt a new access rule while preserving the record that an earlier rule was authorized under different conditions. Retroactively describing the new rule as what everyone always intended would erase the practical work of revision and conceal earlier disagreement.

A difficult case concerns an accurate record that contains sensitive information irrelevant to the current public purpose. Preserving historical integrity does not automatically require public display of the

complete document. Retention, access, quotation, and current publicity are distinct practices. Their appropriate relation depends on the reasons for keeping the record and the people affected.

This distinction matters to the person's relation to memory. A private record may help Mira understand an earlier undertaking without becoming part of a public account of her character. Conversely, a public institutional record may need to preserve a relevant decision even if she finds it uncomfortable. The practical task is to justify the use, rather than assume that either discomfort or historical truth settles every access question.

A well-designed account of revision therefore states what changed: the event description, the current stance, the operative policy, or the access arrangement. That precision permits historical integrity and practical change to coexist. It also makes disagreement easier to locate and assess.

9.9 Evidence Produced through Institutional Expectation

Institutional descriptions can help produce the conduct later used to confirm them. This subsection examines a feedback case in more detail. Its purpose is to distinguish evidence about a person's stance from evidence about how they respond to the conditions created by a classification.

Suppose the archive repeatedly identifies Mira as its continuing public representative. As a result, contributors direct unresolved requests to her, colleagues defer decisions to her, and outside audiences seek her explanation. She responds because she wants to prevent confusion and protect contributors during departure. Observers then cite her continued activity as proof that she remains committed to the representative role.

The inference overlooks a competing explanation supplied by the sequence itself. The public classification created demands to which Mira responded under a different practical orientation. Her action can be evidence of transitional responsibility rather than renewed identification with the role. The interpretation requires attention to what she was trying to accomplish through the response.

A counterfactual comparison can help clarify the claim. If the institution accurately announced the transfer and routed new requests to the appropriate participants, Mira might cease the representative activity. This possibility identifies a mechanism whose removal could change the observed conduct. It does not establish the counterfactual as fact; evidence about the arrangement would be needed in an actual case.

The institution can also misinterpret her attempt to correct the record. A detailed explanation may be presented as further engagement with the archive, while refusal to explain may be presented as evasion. The resulting classification becomes difficult to challenge through any available response. An inquiry should recognize this pattern as a problem in the conditions of attribution.

The person's conduct can still supply genuine evidence of continuing concern. Mira may discover that she wishes to retain a limited advisory role. The feedback analysis does not predetermine that all continued activity is coerced. It requires the analyst to distinguish newly accepted participation from activity elicited by an inaccurate public attachment.

The broader lesson is about evidential dependence. A stable pattern can result partly from the expectations that make alternative responses difficult. The account should examine those conditions before inferring an unchanged commitment. Practical self-continuity concerns how the person participates within that pattern, including attempts to alter it.

9.10 Public Credit and Residual Association

A former participant can retain public credit for an undertaking while seeking distance from its current direction. This subsection examines the resulting tension. It separates acknowledgment of contribution, endorsement of later activity, and responsibility for consequences within the contributor's role.

Mira's work may have made the archive possible. A historical account can have good reason to acknowledge that contribution. Her later departure does not erase it. The acknowledgment can remain appropriate while her current relation to the project changes.

Credit can nevertheless be used to imply more than contribution. An institution may invoke her reputation to support a policy adopted after she left. A visitor can reasonably understand the presentation as suggesting that she approves. The institution should then distinguish its own current decision from the historical role being honored.

Mira may also wish to retain favorable credit while rejecting scrutiny of an earlier decision she made. The distinction between past and present does not support that asymmetry. If a historical contribution is relevant to acknowledgment, associated acts can remain relevant to a justified inquiry. The proper scope depends on evidence and purpose, rather than on whether the account is flattering.

The institution likewise should avoid treating acknowledgment as a permanent claim on labor. Publicly recognizing a founder can be appropriate without making that person the default solution to every later difficulty. Continuing responsibilities need their own grounds, such as an accepted residual role or a specific unfinished undertaking.

The account can therefore preserve several truths at once. Mira contributed substantially, made some decisions that remain open to criticism, rejects the current policy, and has limited remaining responsibilities. A public description that collapses these propositions into loyalty or abandonment would impoverish the history and the present relation.

The case reveals why practical self-continuity cannot be reduced to reputational consistency. A person can carry credit and answerability from an earlier period while seeking a different future. The challenge is to describe and justify each continuing relation at its proper scope.

9.11 Authority to Amend a Shared Record

A shared record may need correction while participants disagree about who may authorize the amendment. This subsection examines the practical relation between testimony, expertise, institutional authority, and the person described. The aim is to avoid treating any one position as universally decisive.

Mira has a distinctive role in explaining her current stance. A recording technician may have distinctive evidence about a file's provenance. A contributor can clarify what permission they gave. The institution may have responsibility for maintaining an operative record. These positions can support different kinds of amendment.

A process that assigns every correction to the institution alone can make a participant's response ineffective. A process that assigns every historical statement to the person described can prevent correction of mistaken recollection. The allocation of authority should follow the proposition and the grounds of the relevant judgment.

Suppose a transcript attributes a phrase to Mira, but the audio clearly identifies another speaker. The evidential question is relatively specific. A correction can be justified through the recording without requiring a comprehensive agreement about the archive's meaning. The process should make the basis of the amendment visible.

A dispute about whether Mira's withdrawal constitutes abandonment has a different structure. It can involve criteria of project continuity and judgments about obligations. The record may need to preserve the factual sequence and the competing interpretations while an institution makes a bounded operational decision. Declaring one evaluative label a factual correction would overstate the result.

The practical procedure also needs a route for later evidence. An initially reasonable judgment can become mistaken when new material appears. Preserving a trace of the earlier interpretation can explain how the record changed. The trace should serve intelligibility and accountability, rather than become an unlimited demand for personal exposure.

The account thus proposes a differentiated authority over records. People contribute according to their access, role, and stake; evidence constrains historical claims; current response constrains present attribution; and institutional decisions remain within their justified purpose. This organization supports continuity through correction without requiring one complete account to govern every use of the past.

Case	Declared change	Remaining assessment
Renewed uptake	Episodic access becomes partial	Current engagement with the recorded undertaking
Repudiation with recall	The substantive end is rejected	Reliance, explanation, and repair
Selective institutional account	Accurate records are selectively presented	Interpretation, omitted evidence, and alternatives
Inaccurate familiarity	Experienced familiarity conflicts with evidence	Historical correction and present experiential significance
Limited narrative integration	A coherent project story remains absent	Practical responsiveness across occasions

Table 1: Analytical variants of memory and practical continuity

10 Memory Change in Continuing Undertakings

This chapter develops controlled variants of the archive case. Each changes one important relation while retaining others. The method tests whether the account distinguishes recollection, historical warrant, present engagement, and authority. The examples are philosophical stipulations, not descriptions of clinical populations. Their purpose is to identify inferences that require additional premises.

10.1 Lost Recall with Renewed Uptake

Table 1 identifies the relation varied in each case and the question retained for further assessment.

In the first variant, Mira lacks episodic recollection of the initial interviews but has reliable records and contributors willing to explain the context. She examines the material, recognizes the historical undertaking under the stipulated reference practice, and decides to continue careful preservation. Her new decision is informed by the past without reproducing its experiential presentation.

A simple memory criterion would describe a discontinuity and might stop there. The practical account identifies several continuities: records connect reasons, contributors retain relationships, and current deliberation takes up the undertaking. The absence of one mode of access remains real. It need not erase those other relations.

Calling the present uptake renewed acknowledges a distinction from uninterrupted engagement. Mira has reconsidered through a different route of access. That difference can matter for what explanations are needed and which support arrangements help. The account should preserve it rather than stretching the word memory to include every source of historical knowledge.

A further question concerns the content of her renewed undertaking. She may adopt preservation while rejecting publication. If the two ends were originally bundled, the current decision separates them. Continuity then follows one concern through a substantive revision. The earlier commitment's other consequences remain available for independent assessment.

10.2 Retained Recall with Repudiation

In the second variant, Mira recalls the interviews vividly but rejects the original project after reconsideration. Memory gives her detailed access to the undertaking's formation. It does not force present endorsement. Indeed, the remembered circumstances may supply reasons for repudiation.

Suppose she recalls having accepted an unrealistic timetable under pressure. Present rejection can reflect a better understanding of that formation. The historical event persists; its evaluative interpretation changes. A theory equating vivid memory with strong practical continuity would obscure this possibility.

Repudiation can nevertheless preserve answerability. Mira can explain the decision, protect materials during transfer, and address reasonable reliance. These actions continue a practical relation to the history while ending the original end. Memory helps make the relation specific, but its moral force depends on the relevant reasons and people affected.

The case also reveals that discontinuity need not be failure. Ending an undertaking can be a justified response to better evidence or changed circumstances. The account investigates how the ending occurs and what remains, rather than treating persistence as the default good.

10.3 Accurate Records with Imposed Interpretation

In a third variant, the archive's records are accurate, but the institution presents them selectively. Mira is shown evidence of her original enthusiasm and omitted evidence of her reservations. She is told that continuing publication is the only faithful expression of her prior self.

The historical statements shown can all be true while the practical conclusion remains unsupported. Selection shapes the interpretation, and the institution's appeal to fidelity imports a norm. Mira may need access to fuller evidence and a feasible route to challenge the conclusion.

This case distinguishes misinformation from interpretive capture. The latter can operate through accurate fragments arranged to narrow the person's response. A formal record map can represent the informational compression; explaining its institutional significance requires examining who controls selection and what decisions depend on it.

If Mira adopts the institution's account after reflection, the question remains whether reflection had access to relevant alternatives. The answer need not be binary. She may understand some aspects well while being systematically deprived of others. The inquiry should identify the particular evidential and practical constraints.

10.4 Familiarity with an Inaccurate History

In a fourth variant, Mira experiences a strong sense that an event occurred as described, but independent evidence reveals an error. The example stipulates a divergence between experienced familiarity and historical warrant. It tests whether the account can preserve first-person significance without treating it as historical infallibility.

The correction can be difficult because the apparent memory participates in her self-understanding. A respectful response can acknowledge that significance while revising the historical claim. Insisting that the experience is irrelevant would overlook its present effects. Treating the experience as decisive would overlook contrary evidence.

Practical continuity here may involve learning to act with a corrected history. Mira can revise a promise she believed she had made, explain earlier actions based on that belief, and reconsider the relationships affected. The correction itself becomes a new episode in the life, with consequences that deserve analysis.

The case also warns against a simplistic split between inner certainty and outer evidence. Both current experience and records enter an ongoing inquiry. Their roles differ, and conflicts can persist. The account's task is to make those roles intelligible without granting either unlimited jurisdiction.

10.5 Absence of Narrative Integration

A final variant gives Mira effective engagement with particular tasks and concern for later consequences while leaving her without a coherent narrative of the archive period. She remembers some episodes, accepts testimony about others, and acts responsibly within the current situation. She does not experience the undertaking as one integrated story.

The practical account should admit that possibility. Its central question concerns relations supporting action and response across change. Narrative integration can be one support, but making it necessary would add a substantial psychological and normative premise. The case tests whether the account quietly assumes that premise.

The distinction also protects different temporal styles. A person can engage intensely with the present while preparing adequately for later needs. Another can maintain a rich life narrative while avoiding current obligations. The existence of narrative alone settles neither participation nor responsibility.

Together, the variants show why memory should be analyzed through several roles: experiential access, evidence, self-attribution, practical use, and narrative organization. They can converge in ordinary cases and diverge under the stipulated changes. The explanatory value of the account lies in preserving those divergences and identifying what further inquiry each requires.

10.6 Recollection after Withdrawal of Historical Belief

Recollective experience and belief about occurrence can come apart. This subsection introduces a narrowly supported empirical connection and develops its philosophical implications through an explicitly stipulated case. The distinction adds a question to the memory analysis without converting the paper into a clinical account.

The abstract of Mazzoni, Scoboria and Harvey's study reports vivid autobiographical recollections that participants had ceased to believe referred to events that occurred [7]. The reported divergence supports distinguishing recollective experience from current belief in occurrence. The present comparison concerns that distinction; prevalence, causal mechanisms, and independent verification of the events require further examination.

Consider a stipulated version of Mira's history in which she retains a vivid impression of promising immediate public release. She later accepts evidence that the apparent occasion combined features of two different meetings. Her current historical belief changes while the impression remains experientially forceful. The example separates what seems remembered, what she now believes happened, and what the case stipulates actually happened.

A further judgment concerns what she currently endorses. Mira may reject immediate release whether or not she once promised it. Her changed historical belief and her present practical stance can therefore move independently. An inquiry asking only whether she accepts the memory would collapse different questions: whether the experience occurs, whether its apparent content is historically accurate, and whether the undertaking it presents should guide action.

The distinction affects how others should respond. A colleague can acknowledge that the impression remains vivid while helping examine its historical interpretation. Doing so need not validate the apparent event. Equally, correcting the historical belief need not imply that Mira has ceased to undergo the impression. A response that preserves both propositions can be more accurate than one demanding either total endorsement or total dismissal of the experience.

The practical history can remain consequential after correction. Mira may have acted on the apparent promise before discovering the error. Those later actions actually occurred in the stipulated case, even if the original remembered promise did not. Contributors may have received messages, made preparations, or changed expectations on the basis of her statements. The correction of the apparent origin leaves those subsequent relations to be assessed.

This last point prevents a misleading simplification. Establishing that one remembered event failed to occur does not erase every action causally connected with belief in it. Nor does the persistence of those consequences prove that the remembered event occurred. The account needs separate records for the apparent event, the belief, actions based on the belief, and current responses to the corrected history.

10.7 A Private Composition and Its Unfamiliar Origin

The archive cases involve reliance, institutional control, and shared materials. This subsection introduces a contrasting private undertaking to test which parts of the practical-continuity argument depend on those features. Noor's case is stipulated for analysis; it represents no empirical population or clinical condition.

Noor finds a musical sketch that reliable dated records identify as his earlier work. He recalls little of composing it. He can read the sketch, recognize features of the craft, and assess possible continuations. For this case, assume he has made no promise to finish it, accepted no commission, and invited no one to rely on its completion. The absence of those specified relations isolates a question about his own practical engagement.

One possibility is that Noor treats the sketch as an unfinished part of his life. He wants to understand what he was attempting and decides to continue the work. Historical knowledge supplies a route to the earlier undertaking, while present musical judgment supplies reasons for renewed action. The case resembles Mira's renewed uptake through records but removes contributor claims from the immediate explanation.

Another possibility is that Noor finds the sketch interesting in the same way that he might find an unfamiliar piece by someone else interesting. Knowing that he produced it changes a historical belief while leaving its current appeal largely independent of that fact. He may develop the material as a new project. The resulting work can be causally and materially connected to the earlier sketch without reproducing a felt sense of resuming an earlier intention.

A third possibility is that Noor understands the earlier aim and rejects it while preserving parts of the technique. He can use a phrase, abandon the structure, and compose something organized by a different concern. This transition can continue aspects of skill and material genealogy while ending the specific undertaking represented by the sketch.

These alternatives have similar external resources and can produce overlapping outputs. Their differences concern how the earlier work enters present deliberation. A record of authorship alone leaves them open. A record of current composition alone can also underdescribe them. The account gains explanatory precision by identifying which relation is claimed rather than treating all development from the sketch as the same kind of continuation.

The case also exposes the limitation of defining practical self-continuity through duties to others. Noor can have a meaningful practical relation to an earlier undertaking even when the stipulated case gives others no claim to its completion. His relation can concern curiosity, aspiration, regret, or renewed involvement. The archive's normative complexity is therefore one important setting for the inquiry, rather than its entire subject.

10.8 Historical Authorship and Present Appropriation

Noor's case requires a distinction between establishing that he produced the sketch and understanding how he takes it up now. This subsection examines that distinction without treating the language of appropriation as an explanation of subjective ownership. Historical and practical propositions receive different evidential support.

Reliable records can warrant the historical statement that Noor composed the sketch. That statement places the artifact within a stipulated biographical history. It can explain how the material came to be available and why other documents refer to his earlier plans. Its truth need not make the artifact feel familiar.

Present appropriation, in the limited practical sense used here, concerns how Noor lets the earlier work enter current activity as part of an undertaking he is willing to pursue. He can examine its problems, retain some earlier decisions, and prepare for future work. These activities provide evidence of a practical relation. Calling the relation appropriation should summarize those features while leaving their first-person character available for further explanation.

The relation can be established through renewed adoption rather than recovered memory. Noor may decide that the sketch offers a worthwhile beginning even while accepting that its original motivation remains obscure. The current undertaking then has a history that includes both earlier production and a later decision to resume. Describing that genealogy is more informative than insisting on either complete continuity or complete novelty.

A hard comparison concerns discovering that the sketch was actually composed by another person. If Noor's interest and intended development remain unchanged, some practical features of his activity survive the correction. The historical relation changes substantially. Questions of appropriate attribution and permission could then arise, although the present stipulated case leaves their detailed norms open. The correction shows that practical interest alone cannot establish historical authorship.

The comparison also limits an argument for first-person distinctiveness. Taking another person's unfinished work seriously can involve careful interpretation, respect for its open possibilities, and concern

for how later work develops. Those features can resemble Noor's relation to his own earlier sketch. A philosophical explanation must identify any residual significance of taking the earlier activity to belong to one's own life without deriving that significance from care alone.

One possible difference concerns the place of the earlier work in current self-assessment. Noor can ask how his standards changed and what he wants his future practice to become. The earlier sketch may then enter a reflexive inquiry into his own development. The possibility supplies a practical role for historical self-attribution. It remains compatible with the deeper question of why such inquiry has a first-person character.

10.9 Completion, Abandonment, and the Future of a Practice

Noor can continue a practice while abandoning a particular work. This subsection uses that possibility to distinguish levels of practical continuity. It also examines why an earlier intention can matter without receiving permanent authority over the future.

Suppose the sketch was originally intended to become a long composition. Noor now prefers shorter forms and decides to leave the sketch unfinished. The specific plan ends. His engagement with composition can continue through other works, techniques, and questions. An account that identifies his practical self entirely with completion of the sketch would choose too narrow a level without justification.

The opposite description can also become too broad. Saying that Noor remains creative might conceal the loss of a project that mattered greatly to him. A wider continuity can coexist with a particular discontinuity worth acknowledging. The account should preserve the loss at the level where it occurred rather than dissolve it into a general account of ongoing life.

An earlier intention can supply a reason for reconsidering abandonment. Noor may have invested attention in a problem whose value is not immediately visible when he returns to it. Looking again can recover possibilities he would otherwise miss. That reason supports inquiry; it need not establish a duty to finish every earlier project.

The time and resources required for completion matter to the assessment. Continuing the sketch can displace other activities that Noor now values. A demand for fidelity to his earlier intention would need to explain why that intention has the relevant authority over these current possibilities. Causal continuity and historical authorship alone provide an incomplete answer.

A further possibility is deliberate preservation without completion. Noor may keep the sketch so that a later version of his practice can return to it. This act can express prospective concern without a firm prediction that he will resume. It preserves an option and a trace of reasons while accepting the legitimacy of future refusal.

The preserved possibility should be distinguished from an indefinite burden. If Noor experiences every retained sketch as a demand that must eventually be satisfied, preservation may constrain the future in a way he wishes to revise. He can decide to archive, discard, or explicitly release particular intentions. The practical significance of preservation depends on how it enters his activity, rather than on the mere survival of the artifact.

10.10 Private Commitment and Self-Directed Criticism

The absence of a promise to others does not make every judgment about Noor's undertaking arbitrary. This subsection examines forms of self-directed criticism while keeping their normative status explicit. It tests whether the account can discuss seriousness of commitment without importing contributor claims from the archive.

Noor may judge that he abandons work whenever it becomes difficult, preventing the development of abilities he values. That judgment can supply a reason to remain with the sketch for a time. The reason concerns a pattern in his practice and its relation to his considered aspirations. It need not take the form of an obligation owed to an external beneficiary.

The judgment remains open to criticism. What appears to be avoidance may reflect a reasonable recognition that a project has little further value. Noor's current aspirations may also have changed. A

theory that treats persistence as evidence of seriousness would prejudice these possibilities. The practical inquiry should examine what continued effort would serve and how the person understands that purpose.

Another case involves an earlier plan adopted to protect a long-term aspiration from predictable distraction. Noor set aside time to work on the sketch because he wanted to develop a difficult technique. The earlier arrangement can have present authority insofar as he still has reason to endorse the aspiration and the means remain appropriate. The argument depends on those reasons, rather than on a rule that every earlier plan outranks current desire.

If Noor now rejects the aspiration after considered reflection, the authority of the arrangement becomes a different question. He might still value keeping promises to himself, but invoking that phrase requires an account of what it contributes beyond the reasons for the underlying project. The paper leaves open whether a self-directed commitment creates a distinct normative relation in every such case.

The possibility of regret also deserves attention. Noor may later wish he had completed the work. Anticipating that regret can be a present consideration. It cannot guarantee which choice is justified, since he might also regret the opportunities lost through completing it. A single predicted emotion should not be treated as a complete evaluation of the future.

The private case therefore retains practical standards without pretending that their authority follows automatically from a commitment label. Attention to reasons, capacities, opportunity costs, and the person's ongoing practice can support criticism or revision. The first-person relation gives these considerations a particular place in his life while leaving their philosophical grounds open to argument.

10.11 Comparison of Private and Shared Memory Cases

The contrast between Noor and Mira identifies both common structure and differences in normative scope. This subsection draws the comparison at the level of the research question. Its purpose is to assess the portability of the account without treating the two cases as interchangeable.

Both cases distinguish historical knowledge from experiential recall. Both permit present uptake through records. Both allow an earlier undertaking to become unfamiliar while remaining causally and materially connected to present activity. These shared distinctions support a general analytical role for plural continuity relations.

The practical claims of others differ. Mira's handling of the archive can affect contributors who entrusted materials under specified expectations. Noor's private sketch, under the stipulated conditions, gives others no analogous claim to completion. A reason for Mira to arrange transfer therefore cannot be carried into Noor's case merely because both involve an unfinished project.

The difference also clarifies the place of current endorsement. Noor may have broad discretion to stop working on the sketch while retaining reasons for self-assessment. Mira's sincere repudiation can leave specific responsibilities to others. The contrast supports a bounded account of current authority: its scope depends partly on the relations through which the undertaking was formed and continues to affect people.

Neither case turns the degree of remembered familiarity into a measure of moral standing. Noor's unfamiliarity does not diminish the significance of his current life. Mira's incomplete recall does not erase contributors' interests or authorize others to treat her as a passive location of historical duties. The relevant claims require more specific grounds.

The comparison leaves first-person explanation open in both settings. A rich account of Noor's renewed composition can still underdescribe how he experiences the earlier work as his own. A rich account of Mira's responsible transition can still underdescribe how she anticipates a changed future. The practical framework locates these relations and their consequences while acknowledging the philosophical work still required to explain them.

The cases jointly support the paper's limited thesis. Practical self-continuity can proceed through renewed engagement, responsible ending, and changed means even when recollective access or commitment content changes. The thesis concerns particular relations within a life. It does not require every undertaking to persist, every change to be beneficial, or every practical relation to reduce to one criterion.

11 Commitment Replacement and Practical Repair

This chapter examines changes that replace the undertaking's substantive end. It distinguishes revision of means, reinterpretation of ends, abandonment, and repair. The argument develops three demanding variants: justified departure from a harmful undertaking, opportunistic repudiation, and a change that protects current agency while burdening others. Each requires reasons beyond a bare assertion of continuity.

11.1 Levels of Change

Changing a tool, revising an end, and leaving an undertaking are different practical events. Mira might replace recording equipment while retaining the interview method, replace interviews with written accounts while retaining an archival aim, or reject the archive altogether. The changes need descriptions at the level where the relevant concern operates.

A broad description can manufacture continuity. If every activity is grouped under living one's life, any change becomes continuous by definition. Such a description may support ordinary reference but explain little about a particular undertaking. A narrow description can manufacture discontinuity by treating every altered procedure as a new project. The choice of level should be justified by the inquiry's question.

For the archive, the relevant concerns include preservation, careful representation, access, and relationships with contributors. These concerns can conflict or separate. Mira can preserve one through rejecting another. A serious revision account should identify the retained concern, explain the changed circumstances, and show how the new arrangement responds to the conflict.

This requirement prevents continuity from becoming an honorific attached to every favored change. A revision can be causally connected and well justified while ending a particular practical relation. Admitting that ending can make the account more accurate. The continuing life contains both persistence and termination, with different obligations attached to each.

11.2 Departure from a Harmful Undertaking

Suppose Mira learns that the planned archive would expose contributors to serious unwanted scrutiny. The stipulation is that this consequence was previously overlooked and that unrestricted publication is unnecessary to preserve the materials. She decides to end the release plan. The case presents a reason for change grounded in consequences and contributor expectations.

The earlier plan's authority is weakened by the new information. Its formation may have been reasonable under a mistaken assumption, or careless in failing to investigate. Those histories affect retrospective assessment. Both can support a present reason to stop publication. An account requiring unchanged commitment would obstruct the very responsiveness that makes practical agency valuable.

The decision can preserve continuity of concern while altering content. Mira's earlier aim of careful representation can now motivate withholding release. This is a reasoned connection, not merely a similarity found by an observer after the event. Evidence would include her consideration of the issue, engagement with contributors, and the practical design of the new arrangement.

Even this connection leaves open the question of repair. Materials already circulated may remain accessible. Contributors may need notification or an opportunity to respond. The end of the release plan does not undo completed acts. Practical continuity can appear in attention to those remaining consequences while the original end is decisively rejected.

A difficult alternative arises if Mira continues to value unrestricted access and abandons publication only because the institution prohibits it. The outcome may still protect contributors. The explanation of her practical change differs. A favorable consequence should not be used to infer an endorsement the evidence fails to support.

11.3 Opportunistic Repudiation

Consider a case in which Mira abandons the archive because another opportunity becomes more attractive, after encouraging contributors to rely on her undertaking. She sincerely ceases to care about the project. The sincerity of change establishes something about her present stance. It does not settle whether withdrawal is justified.

An account granting automatic authority to present endorsement would let the strongest current preference defeat every earlier assurance. That position needs a defense concerning reliance and fairness. It cannot be obtained from a theory that practical identity changes over time. Even if an important self-relation weakened, other people's claims could remain.

The relevant response may allow exit while requiring repair. Mira can transfer materials, provide an accurate account of unfinished work, or bear a reasonable cost associated with the transition. The appropriate requirement depends on what she undertook and what others reasonably expected. The model contains no universal formula for that judgment.

The possibility of repair also shows why criticism need not demand restored enthusiasm. A person can fulfill a remaining obligation without again endorsing the entire project. Insisting that she recover the former practical identity would confuse satisfaction of a claim with regulation of her inner life. The justified demand can concern conduct, disclosure, or transfer within a bounded relationship.

The case therefore separates sincere change, permissible change, and responsible handling of change. These can come apart. An account of practical continuity should represent their divergence rather than making sincerity sufficient for every evaluative conclusion.

11.4 A Burdensome but Reasonable Exit

Suppose continuing the archive imposes a burden Mira could not reasonably sustain, while exit will inconvenience contributors. The case cannot be resolved by declaring either current agency or past reliance supreme. Both have practical significance. The argument must examine the burden, its distribution, the original expectations, and available alternatives.

A reasonable exit may involve shared responsibility. The institution benefiting from the project might provide a transfer route. Contributors might choose among preservation arrangements. Mira might supply knowledge only she possesses while being relieved of the larger task. These possibilities illustrate how relational analysis can change the problem's apparent form.

If the only modeled options are complete continuation and immediate abandonment, the model may conceal feasible intermediate arrangements. Adding those routes is intellectually useful when their conditions are specified. It is unhelpful if they are merely optimistic labels without resources, authority, or willing participants. Practical repair depends on implementable relations.

The account should also resist demanding maximal explanation from someone whose situation has become difficult. A proportionate response can provide enough information for others to act without requiring an exhaustive autobiographical defense. Continuity does not create a right to inspect every motive or reconstruct an entire life.

11.5 Repair without Reinstating the Old Self

Repair can connect a person to a past undertaking while allowing substantive departure. Mira may acknowledge an error, protect affected people, and move toward a different future. That connection differs from restoration of her former preferences. It demonstrates why continuity should be understood through specific practical relations rather than an all-or-nothing portrait.

A repaired relation can also differ from the original one. Trust may become more cautious, access more limited, and responsibility more explicitly distributed. The aim need not be a return to the old arrangement. A better arrangement can preserve historical legibility while changing the form of participation.

Some damage remains irreversible. An interview already disclosed cannot always be made unknown. In such a case repair concerns responses to a continuing consequence, not an impossible restoration. The account should state that limit plainly. An available path to partial repair is different from recovery of the initial state.

The positive contribution is a conception of continuity compatible with acknowledgment, criticism, and exit. A person can continue to answer for a history without treating every old commitment as a permanent sovereign. This proposal derives its force from the structure of practical relationships and their reasons. It remains open to criticism concerning which claims persist and how burdens should be allocated.

11.6 Stopping a Wrong and Addressing Its Consequences

Ending a harmful undertaking can be justified while leaving consequences that require a further response. This subsection develops that distinction. It examines why cessation, correction, and repair answer different practical questions.

Suppose Mira stops the planned release after discovering a serious problem with the proposed representation. The decision prevents a further act. If earlier versions have already circulated, those acts remain part of the history. A present commitment to stop can therefore be appropriate without completing every response the situation warrants.

The continuing consequences need to be identified specifically. A misleading description may need correction; a contributor may need to know who received a recording; an institution may need to change the process that allowed the problem to recur. These tasks differ in object, authority, and feasibility. Grouping them under repair can be convenient only if the differences remain visible.

A person can sincerely repudiate the earlier undertaking while failing to attend to those tasks. The sincerity explains a change of stance. It supplies incomplete evidence about responsible handling of the consequences. Conversely, a person can help correct a consequence while still privately endorsing the old project. The response can be useful without proving a change of conviction.

The distinction matters to evaluating improvement. An institution may celebrate Mira's decision to stop and present it as a complete resolution. Contributors can reasonably regard the cessation as an important first step while maintaining that their specific claims remain unanswered. Their response need not deny the value of the change.

A contrary case involves demands unrelated to the continuing consequences. An observer may insist that Mira repeatedly affirm her repudiation long after a particular correction has been completed. The claim to further response requires its own ground. Historical involvement and public interest do not automatically establish an indefinite obligation to perform disavowal.

The account therefore asks what each response accomplishes. Cessation changes future activity. Correction improves an account of what occurred. Repair addresses a justified consequence or relation. These functions can support one another, but none should be used as an unexplained substitute for the others.

11.7 Fulfillment and Substitute Outcomes

A favorable substitute can differ from fulfillment of the undertaking that generated a claim. This subsection examines why the difference can matter. The aim is to avoid reducing every obligation to a requirement to produce an independently valued amount of benefit.

Suppose Elena entrusted the only recording of a particular account because she wanted that account preserved. Mira later offers support for a different public project that benefits Elena's community. The offer may be valuable. Its value alone does not establish that it answers the claim concerning the entrusted recording.

The original claim has an object specified by the relation through which it arose. Elena relinquished control over a particular material for a particular purpose. A response that leaves that material unprotected can fail to address the relation even if it produces another benefit. The argument depends on the

legitimacy and scope of the original claim, not on an assumption that every preference for a particular object must be satisfied.

A substitute can be adequate when it protects what the claim legitimately concerns. If preservation at the original institution becomes impossible, transfer to a suitable recipient under justified conditions may maintain the relevant practical interest. The analysis should explain why that response preserves the claim's object or offers an acceptable alternative, rather than merely label it equivalent.

The recipient's participation matters too. A proposed transfer cannot treat another archivist as a passive destination for obligations. Their willingness, capacity, and understanding determine whether the substitute arrangement exists as a practical possibility. An outcome description that omits those conditions would conceal a new undertaking inside the promised repair.

A financial or material contribution may be relevant when the original object cannot be recovered. It can address costs or help provide an alternative. The contribution should still be assessed through the claim it is intended to answer. A payment does not automatically erase an unresolved need for explanation or correct a misleading public account.

The philosophical result is a distinction between benefit and answer. Repair can produce benefits, but its adequacy concerns the particular relation in which a response is owed. This distinction gives practical content to bounded answerability without requiring that every damaged relation return to its earlier form.

11.8 The Claim-Holder's Assessment of a Substitute

A person affected by an undertaking has a significant role in assessing a proposed substitute. This subsection examines that role and its limits. It distinguishes taking the claim-holder's reasons seriously from granting them unlimited control over the responder's future.

Elena can explain why a proposed transfer fails to protect what mattered in the original preservation arrangement. She may identify an access condition, a risk of misrepresentation, or a feature of the material that others overlooked. Her account provides evidence and reasons relevant to the adequacy of the response.

Her satisfaction is not the sole possible standard. A person can demand more than the legitimate claim supports, reject every feasible arrangement, or use the unresolved issue to control unrelated choices. The responder's agency and the interests of others remain relevant. A bounded claim needs a bounded account of what fulfillment or adequate response requires.

The difference becomes clear if Elena insists that Mira continue personally even though a capable recipient can preserve the material under appropriate conditions. There may be a reason the personal relation matters, but it needs explanation. If the initial undertaking concerned preservation by the archive, an expectation of lifelong personal service would exceed the stated ground.

A harder case makes personal involvement part of the original undertaking. Elena may have entrusted the account because Mira's particular understanding was central to its representation. A substitute recipient could then preserve the recording while failing to preserve an important aspect of the agreed activity. The difficulty should be acknowledged; the availability of another person does not automatically establish equivalence.

Even that stronger claim has limits. If continued personal involvement becomes seriously burdensome or impossible, the appropriate response may concern disclosure, explanation, and the best available alternative. An undertaking can create a reason that cannot now be fully satisfied. The existence of the reason does not make an impossible restoration available.

The account therefore gives the claim-holder's assessment an accountable role. It should shape the inquiry into what the response achieves, while remaining open to criticism concerning scope, feasibility, and competing claims. Adequacy is a normative judgment informed by the relationship, rather than a simple measure of either party's satisfaction.

11.9 Acknowledgment and the Demand for a Particular Emotion

Repair can require an acknowledgment without requiring the person to recover a former identity or display a prescribed inner state. This subsection examines the distinction between an accountable statement and an emotional performance. The case concerns the practical role of recognizing what happened.

Mira may need to acknowledge that a contributor's account was presented inaccurately and explain how the correction will be made. Such an acknowledgment can clarify the historical and practical position. It can be assessed through its accuracy, completeness with respect to the issue, and relation to the promised response.

A demand that she feel a particular intensity of remorse has a different object. Emotions can matter to trust and relationships, but their required form and evidential assessment need separate argument. A public performance can be sincere or strategic; a restrained response can coexist with serious concern. Visible expression alone supplies an incomplete measure.

The distinction does not make sincerity irrelevant. An acknowledgment offered only to secure release from criticism can be inadequate if it evades the substance of the claim or predicts no corresponding action. The point is to assess sincerity through the relevant practical relation, rather than require a uniform display as proof.

A contributor can reasonably decide that trust has not been restored even after a specific correction. That judgment concerns the relationship they are willing to continue. It does not necessarily show that the correction failed to answer its bounded object. Repair of a record and restoration of trust can diverge.

Mira likewise cannot demand forgiveness merely because she has performed an appropriate response. The contributor's future relationship to her remains a separate matter. The person who repairs a consequence can fulfill a requirement while accepting that the other person's interpretation or distance persists.

The account therefore separates acknowledgment, practical response, emotional expression, and renewed relationship. Each can matter, but their relations require explanation. This separation permits a responsible departure from an earlier undertaking without converting repair into a requirement to enact one prescribed story of personal transformation.

11.10 Partial Repair and Residual Loss

Some consequences can be addressed only in part. This subsection examines how to assess a response when the original condition cannot be restored. It distinguishes a limitation of available action from a conclusion that further response is meaningless.

Suppose a misleading account has circulated beyond the archive's control. A correction can reach some recipients but not all. The limited reach matters to evaluating what has been achieved. It does not make the correction worthless, nor does it permit the institution to describe the history as fully undone.

A proportionate response can include steps that reduce continuing effects, clarify uncertainty, and avoid repetition. Their justification depends on the claims and practical possibilities at stake. A demand for total restoration may exceed what anyone can provide, while a declaration of impossibility may conceal useful actions still available.

The allocation of effort also requires judgment. Mira may be able to identify early recipients, while the institution controls the platform through which the account circulated. A response that assigns every task to the former participant can obscure the present distribution of capacity and responsibility. Relational analysis helps specify who can do what and why their contribution is called for.

A further question concerns when additional effort ceases to be proportionate. The answer cannot be read from the fact that some residual loss remains. Costs, expected effectiveness, the importance of the unresolved claim, and the burdens on other people matter. The paper offers no universal numerical threshold; it identifies the considerations a defensible judgment should address.

Residual loss can remain part of the person's relation to the past. Mira may continue to recognize that an earlier undertaking caused a consequence she cannot fully repair. That recognition need not require indefinite participation in the archive. It can inform future care and criticism while remaining a bounded historical truth.

The account thus permits an honest description of partial success. A response can be appropriate and incomplete. A practical relation can be repaired in one respect while altered permanently in another. Preserving those distinctions avoids both premature closure and an impossible demand that a continuing life erase every consequence of its history.

11.11 Repair and the Formation of a Different Undertaking

A response to an earlier failure can become a new project with its own reasons and risks. This subsection examines that development. The aim is to distinguish carrying forward a justified responsibility from recreating a role that the person has reason to leave.

Mira may begin by correcting an access procedure and discover an interest in helping other archives handle contributor records more carefully. The new undertaking is connected to the earlier failure through knowledge and motivation. It also has a different object, participants, and formation history.

The connection can support a meaningful practical continuity. She can use what she learned to guide future action without preserving the original exhibition. The new project need not be described as redemption to be intelligible. It can simply be a considered response to reasons made salient by the earlier experience.

A danger arises if others treat the new work as compulsory repayment for the past. A bounded obligation to correct one archive does not automatically require a lifelong reform mission. The new undertaking should be assessed through what Mira actually adopts and what claims it generates.

Another danger concerns using reform to avoid the original claim. A public commitment to improve future practice can leave a particular contributor's unresolved request untouched. The broader project may be valuable while failing to answer the bounded issue that prompted criticism. The record should preserve that distinction.

The new undertaking can also reproduce familiar problems under a more favorable description. Mira may again become indispensable, overpromise, or accept a role whose demands exceed her resources. Learning from the past requires attention to the practical organization of the new project, not merely its changed moral vocabulary.

The positive conclusion is that repair can generate new possibilities without dictating a future identity. A person can respond to a past undertaking, end it, and form another relation to work and others. Practical self-continuity consists in the intelligible and accountable connections among those activities, with room for both continuity and termination.

12 Earlier Instructions and Future Authority

This chapter examines interventions through which a person attempts to shape their later conduct. It distinguishes preparation, precommitment, delegation, and irrevocable control. The central question is how an earlier instruction relates to later judgment when memory, preferences, or commitments change. The cases concern philosophical authority under stipulated conditions and assert no legal rule governing actual directives.

12.1 Forms of Earlier Intervention

Present Mira can prepare resources, establish reminders, ask a colleague to assist, or restrict her later options. These interventions differ in how they treat the future occasion. Preparation can enlarge what is possible. A reminder brings an earlier reason into view. Delegation gives another person a role in implementation or assessment. A restriction can ensure a result even if later judgment changes.

The differences matter to practical continuity. A reminder can support uptake while leaving refusal available. A lock can produce compliant behavior without present uptake. Both can be chosen earlier and both can have beneficial consequences. Their relation to agency over time nevertheless differs.

Earlier authorization should therefore be described by its scope. Did Mira authorize a reminder, a delay, a discussion, or compulsory execution? What circumstances did she anticipate? What uncertainty did she acknowledge? Which people would be affected? The instruction's mere existence leaves these issues unresolved.

An intervention can also exceed its original function. A colleague asked to remind Mira may begin deciding which preferences count as her genuine ones. The move from assistance to interpretive authority requires justification. The fact that the colleague helps maintain a continuing project does not authorize every method of maintenance.

12.2 Expected Temptation and Expected Learning

Consider two reasons for anticipating changed judgment. Mira might expect a passing distraction that would lead her to neglect an undertaking she expects to continue endorsing after reflection. Or she might expect to learn facts that reasonably change her assessment. The practical significance of precommitment differs across these cases.

In the first stipulation, a reminder or cooling-off arrangement can help connect action to a concern whose relevance the person still accepts. In the second, a rigid constraint can prevent response to new reasons. The challenge is that present Mira may be uncertain which kind of change will occur.

Calling a future preference a temptation cannot settle the classification. That label embeds an evaluation from the present standpoint. A future change can appear mistaken to today's perspective because the later person has learned something today cannot appreciate. Conversely, future confidence alone does not establish better judgment. The authority dispute requires evidence about the conditions of each assessment.

A useful earlier arrangement can preserve a procedure of reconsideration. Mira may specify that a later decision should involve review of contributor expectations, consultation, or a waiting period appropriate to the task. Such a procedure can support deliberation without guaranteeing agreement with the earlier conclusion. Its justification depends on whether it addresses a real difficulty proportionately.

12.3 Later Refusal and the Burden of Explanation

Suppose later Mira refuses the release plan. The earlier instruction supports a claim about what she intended then. The refusal supports a claim about her stance now. Neither fact alone supplies a complete rule of authority. The decision concerns the relationship between their reasons and the consequences of acting.

A present refusal ordinarily matters because action will occur through the person's current capacities and experience. Overriding it requires an argument responsive to that fact. The relevance of earlier authorization remains possible, especially where it deliberately addressed a foreseeable difficulty. The paper leaves their balance open to the case rather than deriving it from a general identity relation.

The authority question becomes more difficult when the later refusal is poorly articulated. A theory that recognizes only fluent explanation could undervalue a significant expression of dissent. At the same time, a fleeting response may be ambiguous. The inquiry should seek an intelligible and proportionate way to understand the current stance, with attention to the conditions under which it is expressed.

An earlier document can aid that understanding without dictating it. It can identify concerns, preferred modes of communication, or people trusted for assistance. Used in this way, the document supports engagement with the present person. Used as an exhaustive substitute for present interpretation, it risks treating the living situation as a mechanism for executing a stored preference.

12.4 The Repudiating Future Self

Present Mira may deliberately care for a future she expects to reject her values. She could preserve resources for a different activity, protect later privacy, or arrange an exit from the archive. Such action expresses concern for a continuing life beyond fidelity to a particular end.

This can be rational from the present standpoint without assuming that later values are better. Mira may recognize uncertainty about future circumstances and value the ability to respond. She may also care directly about the later person's experience even if she disapproves of the expected preference. The care and the disapproval can coexist.

A harder case involves anticipated self-destructive choice in an abstract sense: later conduct would undermine a condition present Mira regards as essential. The label alone provides no conclusion. The relevant questions concern evidence, the later person's understanding, alternative interventions, reversibility, and effects upon others. These are practical and normative burdens that a continuity graph cannot discharge.

The manuscript's scope is important here. Real situations involving severe changes of capacity can require clinical and legal assessment. The philosophical case neither provides such assessment nor extrapolates from a simplified description. Its contribution is to distinguish the kinds of reason that would need to be examined, without converting earlier preference into automatic jurisdiction over later experience.

12.5 Interventions that Change the Evidence

Precommitment can shape the behavior later used to assess continuity. If Mira removes every practical possibility of leaving, continued participation ceases to be strong evidence of continued endorsement. An observer sees successful execution, but the route producing it bypasses a current alternative.

This creates a potential circularity. The earlier plan is treated as authoritative because it produced persistent conduct, while the conduct persisted because alternatives were blocked. The resulting evidence can establish effective control. It provides weaker support for a claim that the later person continues to endorse the plan.

An intervention can also shape future preferences or self-understanding. Repeatedly presenting one interpretation of the past may influence what later Mira takes herself to care about. Such influence is not necessarily objectionable: education, explanation, and dialogue also change understanding. The distinction concerns how the influence operates and whether it preserves meaningful assessment and response.

A serious evaluation must therefore consider both the intervention's outcome and its effect on the evidence of uptake. The question is not simply whether the undertaking continued. It is how continuation was produced and what the resulting conduct warrants about agency.

12.6 Authority without Temporal Sovereignty

The proposal developed here rejects a shortcut in either temporal direction. Earlier preference can establish reasons and commitments without acquiring permanent supremacy. Current preference can change uptake without automatically erasing the claims of others. These are indispensable negative limits because the rival shortcuts would determine the difficult cases in advance.

A positive account begins with the practical relation. What was undertaken, why, under what conditions, and with what consequences? What has changed, and how is that change understood now? Which responses remain possible, and who bears their costs? These questions permit a proportionate judgment whose grounds can be criticized.

The account thus treats continuity as a context of responsibility and participation. It supplies reasons to attend to both earlier and later standpoints while leaving the authority of particular instructions to be justified. The continuing person is neither a mere executor of stored plans nor an isolated present preference without a history.

12.7 An Argument from Present Involvement

The claim that current stance matters requires a normative premise. The account proposes that a person who undergoes and participates in an action has a claim to have their present perspective considered in its

justification. This premise expresses a value of participation. It is not a conclusion derived from causal continuity.

Given that premise, an earlier instruction cannot settle every later question merely because it belongs to the same person's history. The later action occurs under current conditions, affects present experience, and may call upon current judgment. A justification that refers only to the earlier record omits a standpoint the premise says is relevant.

The argument does not establish that the present perspective is always decisive. Other people may have justified claims, and earlier authorization may address a foreseeable difficulty. The conclusion is that overriding a current refusal requires reasons responsive to the current situation. The earlier instruction enters that reasoning as evidence of a past undertaking, with its scope and conditions still to be assessed.

A critic may reject the participatory premise in favor of a strong view of prior authority. That disagreement is substantive. The present account can ask how the alternative justifies imposing an action upon a person whose circumstances and understanding have changed. It cannot answer the disagreement by labeling the later person the true self or the earlier person the original self.

The premise also applies to support arrangements. A procedure that mechanically executes an old plan can be successful at producing an outcome while giving the present person little role. If participation matters, success at execution is insufficient for a complete justification. The arrangement needs to explain why its restriction of current agency is appropriate in that case.

This provides a positive reason for preserving occasions of review. Review gives current understanding a route into the decision. Its value follows from the premise together with the possibility of changed circumstances. The specific review method remains open: a conversation, a documented reconsideration, or another process may fit different undertakings.

The argument should also recognize burdens. Requiring repeated elaborate review can interfere with ordinary activity or make commitments ineffective. The appropriate arrangement should make consequential changes answerable without requiring constant reconstruction of every decision. Participation is a reason to design proportionate opportunities for response, not a demand for uninterrupted deliberation.

12.8 An Argument from Reciprocal Reliance

The persistence of some obligations after repudiation requires another premise: people affected by a voluntary undertaking can have claims grounded in reasonable reliance upon it. This is a proposed normative principle whose application depends on what was communicated, how reliance arose, and whether the expectation was justified.

Suppose Mira gives a clear assurance that she will protect an interview, and the contributor entrusts the only copy to her because of that assurance. Later loss of interest changes her stance but leaves the contributor exposed to a consequence produced through their interaction. Under the reliance premise, the contributor has a reason to seek an appropriate response.

The argument concerns the contributor's agency as well as their welfare. They organized their own action around an assurance. Treating Mira's present preference as the only relevant consideration would ignore the practical structure her undertaking helped create. Respect for her current agency can coexist with respect for that reliance.

The premise does not validate every expectation. A contributor may infer more than Mira promised, rely despite an explicit limitation, or make demands unrelated to the undertaking. The grounds of the claim must be examined. Historical connection alone is insufficient.

Nor does a justified claim always require personal completion of the original task. Return of materials, an agreed transfer, or another response may address the relevant dependence while allowing Mira to leave. The claim's object should follow its grounds rather than an indefinite demand that she remain attached to the role.

This is why the account distinguishes obligation from restored endorsement. A person can provide an appropriate response without again valuing the entire project. The contributor's claim concerns the relation created through the undertaking; it need not govern Mira's comprehensive self-understanding.

The argument also has implications for the institution. If the institution benefited from the undertaking and controls feasible transition routes, its role may matter to a fair allocation of burdens. That conclusion needs further premises about responsibility and authority. The relational account makes the relevant dependence visible without assuming that every burden belongs to the individual whose name appears first in the record.

12.9 Unsupported and Coercively Formed Undertakings

An earlier instruction may have been formed under conditions that weaken its claimed authority. Mira could have misunderstood the proposal, lacked access to relevant information, or faced pressure unrelated to the undertaking. The record of assent remains a historical event, while its normative significance requires assessment.

The analysis should distinguish several claims. The statement occurred; it caused expectations; the person endorsed its content; the undertaking was valid under an applicable practice; and enforcement would now be justified. Each claim has different premises. Establishing the first two does not automatically establish the others.

A contributor's reliance can still be understandable even if Mira's assent was constrained. This creates a difficult relation rather than an automatic winner. The contributor's vulnerability and the circumstances of formation both matter. A response may need to address reliance while limiting demands upon Mira, possibly involving other responsible participants.

The case shows why a theory of practical continuity cannot be replaced by a simple authenticity test. An inauthentic or constrained action can have real consequences that require response. Conversely, sincere endorsement can support an unjustified undertaking. Descriptive agency and normative authority need coordinated but separate analysis.

A later freely made commitment can change the situation. Mira may choose to protect materials despite rejecting the authority of the original agreement. That new undertaking has its own formation and reasons. It should be recorded as new uptake, rather than treated as proof that the earlier pressure was legitimate.

The distinction prevents a common retrospective error. A satisfactory later outcome does not cleanse every earlier process. A person can transform a difficult history through a new response while preserving criticism of how the history arose. Practical continuity then contains repair and differentiation rather than a single judgment covering the entire sequence.

12.10 Mutual Limits of Earlier and Later Standpoints

The arguments from present involvement and reciprocal reliance place limits upon one another. Current participation matters, but a present attitude does not automatically erase relations that other people reasonably relied upon. Historical undertakings matter, but their persistence does not establish unlimited authority over later life.

The interaction yields a structured practical question. Which element of the earlier undertaking remains relevant, which present concern bears on its execution, and what response can respect the justified claims without extending them beyond their grounds? The answer can involve continuation, modification, transfer, or exit.

The structure is plural because the grounds are plural. It would be misleading to represent the balance as a simple contest between past and present preferences. Some reasons concern what was promised, some concern current burdens, and some concern another person's ability to act. Their significance need not be captured by a single temporal utility.

A critic may demand a complete ranking rule. Such a rule would be a substantial normative theory. The present paper instead states the premises supporting local conclusions and preserves cases in which their relative weight remains disputed. This is an acknowledged limitation of the proposal.

The limitation does not prevent criticism of clear inferential mistakes. An institution cannot derive lifelong endorsement from a historical signature alone. A person cannot derive release from every claim

solely from a sincere change of interest under the reliance premise. Identifying these errors narrows the field in which a fuller normative judgment must operate.

The account's positive contribution is thus a disciplined relation among standpoints. Earlier and later occasions remain parts of one practical history, while their reasons can differ. The person and those affected can respond to that history without requiring either temporal moment to become sovereign over every subsequent decision.

12.11 The Authority of a Reconsideration Procedure

A procedure can help organize the interaction of reasons, but its existence does not establish its legitimacy. An institution might create a review process that permits only the original plan's continuation. Calling that process reconsideration would conceal its restricted outcome space.

A more credible process identifies the question, admits relevant evidence, allows the person's response to matter, and explains how affected claims enter the decision. These features support assessment of authority. They do not guarantee a correct result or eliminate disagreement about the standards used.

The procedure's own revisability matters. If new evidence reveals that its categories omit a material concern, participants need some route for challenge. Otherwise a mechanism introduced to support revision can become another source of rigidity. The same reasoning that supports reconsideration of an undertaking can apply to the process governing reconsideration.

This creates a risk of regress if every procedure requires another procedure authorizing it. A practical response can rely on justified but revisable arrangements appropriate to the setting, with limits on their scope. The account does not require an infinite series of approvals. It requires that the operative arrangement be defensible and open to material criticism.

A continuing mechanism can produce stable conduct, while a justified practical relation additionally requires reasons concerning participation, history and affected people. The remaining discussion examines earlier arrangements that structure later reconsideration and the authority of people asked to help carry them out.

12.12 Earlier Planning and a Reason to Pause

An earlier plan can give a later person a reason to delay an immediate change without giving another person unlimited authority to enforce the delay. This subsection develops that distinction through a modest self-directed arrangement. The case isolates planning continuity from a contributor's separate claim.

Noor decides that if she becomes dissatisfied with a composition during a tiring session, she will set it aside briefly before deleting the only copy. She records the reason: temporary frustration may obscure features she values, and preserving the copy for a short interval carries little cost. No promise to another person is stipulated.

Later Noor wants to delete the work immediately. The earlier plan gives her a reason to pause because it was designed for this kind of situation and preserves an opportunity for a more informed assessment. The reason depends on the plan's quality, relevance and burden.

The argument can be stated through explicit premises. A person has a reason to sustain a considered procedure that addresses a foreseeable limitation of an immediate judgment, where following it remains proportionate and leaves a meaningful occasion for reconsideration. Noor's short preservation interval meets those conditions under the stipulation.

This premise values the ability to organize action over time. A plan would have little practical role if its only force were to repeat what the person happened to prefer at each later moment. Earlier judgment can retain defeasible relevance precisely when immediate preference changes.

The conclusion is a reason for Noor to follow the pause. It leaves a further question about whether anyone else may compel it. That stronger authority requires an additional ground. The existence of a good reason for a person to act does not automatically give another person permission to force the action.

The case therefore permits a positive account of self-directed constraint without treating the past as sovereign. A brief, proportionate arrangement can support later judgment by preventing an irreversible act during a specifically anticipated difficulty. Its justification remains responsive to changed circumstances.

If preserving the copy now creates a serious risk absent from the earlier situation, the plan may need immediate revision. If Noor has already considered the issue carefully and reached a stable new conclusion, the condition concerning an immediate limitation may fail. The earlier instruction's relevance must be assessed rather than assumed.

12.13 Expected Difficulty and a Newly Relevant Reason

Earlier instructions often attempt to distinguish predictable temptation from legitimate learning. This subsection examines the practical difficulty of making that distinction. The aim is to prevent a plan from classifying every later objection as the very weakness it was designed to overcome.

Mira may anticipate becoming impatient with the archive's review process and ask to be reminded why contributor consultation matters. The reminder can be appropriate when impatience concerns the inconvenience of a still-relevant responsibility.

A later objection may have a different basis. Mira may discover that the procedure exposes information contributors wanted protected, or that the same purpose can be achieved through a less burdensome route. Treating that objection as mere impatience would insulate the procedure from reasons that bear on its legitimacy.

The earlier plan should therefore be interpreted through its purpose and conditions. A request for support in maintaining a justified undertaking differs from a command to disregard every future reason against it. The latter claims a much broader authority.

An objection holds that predictable temptation can present itself in sophisticated language. A person may rationalize an immediate desire by offering apparently principled reasons. The inquiry should take that possibility seriously without assuming it in every case.

Evidence can include the content of the new reason, its relation to facts, the person's opportunity to examine it and the alternatives available. A repeated pattern of immediate reversal may be relevant. It cannot alone establish that every later objection lacks merit.

The supporter's role can be to help distinguish the cases. Arun might restate the earlier reason, identify what appears to have changed and invite a limited review. That response differs from deciding in advance that the earlier plan must prevail.

The practical standard remains defeasible. It seeks a process capable of hearing a new relevant reason while preserving the legitimate role of prior planning. A perfect diagnostic test is unavailable in the present account.

The consequence for self-continuity is that a plan can continue through interpretation of its purpose, including revision when the conditions change. Persistence of wording alone is a weaker guide than a warranted account of what the arrangement was meant to support.

12.14 Delegating Interpretation and Delegating Decision

An earlier instruction can assign another person several different roles. This subsection distinguishes assistance with interpretation from authority to make a substantive decision. The distinction prevents a narrow delegation from expanding through the practical dependence it creates.

Mira asks Arun to help her understand the archive's records if she later has difficulty recalling the relevant events. The request gives Arun a role in explaining sources and context. It does not by itself authorize him to decide whether she should continue the project.

A different arrangement might authorize Arun to make a limited decision under specified conditions. Its scope could concern routine preservation during Mira's absence, while leaving publication and current endorsement outside his authority. The distinction should remain visible in the record.

The authority claimed by the delegate depends on the actual undertaking and its legitimacy. A broad phrase such as help me stay on track can leave substantial ambiguity. The interpretation should consider the purpose, surrounding discussion and foreseeable consequences rather than choose the widest convenient reading.

Current clarification can be important. If Mira can now explain that she wanted assistance with understanding, her statement bears on the present arrangement and may also supply evidence about the earlier intention. It does not automatically settle every historical dispute, but it cannot be ignored merely because Arun possesses the old document.

The delegate's own limits remain relevant. Arun may be willing to explain records while declining responsibility for a decision that affects contributors. Acceptance of one supportive task does not automatically create an obligation to assume every downstream role.

A hard case arises when the earlier instruction explicitly asks Arun to disregard later objections. Even then the normative question remains. The instruction's existence establishes a historical act under suitable evidence; its legitimacy and present scope require an argument concerning the intervention, burden, circumstances and affected claims.

The paper leaves a general theory of irrevocable delegation open. Its local conclusion is that an earlier sentence cannot carry unlimited practical authority merely because it was intended to be resistant to revision. Resistance is a feature to justify, not a justification itself.

This distinction preserves both planning and present participation. Earlier arrangements can distribute responsibility and make later action possible. Their authority remains tied to the particular powers and conditions that were legitimately established.

12.15 The Interpretation of Silence after an Earlier Instruction

Silence can acquire practical meaning within an established arrangement, but its meaning depends on the conditions of communication. This subsection examines a case in which an earlier plan supplies a default. It distinguishes a default's coordination role from evidence of current endorsement.

Mira and the archive agree that routine preservation will continue during her absence unless a specified concern arises. Her later silence can then be compatible with the agreed default. The institution may have a reason to continue the limited routine under that arrangement.

The silence does not establish that Mira actively endorses every current decision. The default concerns a bounded practical permission or expectation. A public claim of present enthusiasm would require different evidence.

The arrangement also depends on the possibility of communicating a relevant objection. If the institution changes contact procedures so that Mira's response cannot reach the people acting, it weakens an assumption on which the default relied. Continued silence under those conditions has a different evidential significance.

Some defaults properly operate without ongoing active communication. Their scope and duration should still be assessed against the undertaking's purpose and the affected claims. A temporary preservation default cannot automatically become permission for a new irreversible publication.

An objection notes that requiring every default to be repeatedly renewed would defeat its purpose. The account agrees. The point is to preserve the conditions that make the default a reasonable coordination device, not to demand constant affirmation.

The distinction is especially important after memory change. Mira may be unaware that others still treat an earlier instruction as operative. The appropriate response can include explanation of the arrangement and a route for current assessment. Her lack of immediate objection before receiving that information provides limited evidence of uptake.

The case therefore separates three questions: whether an earlier default remains legitimately operative, whether the person currently knows about it, and whether they presently endorse its outcome. The answers can differ within one continuing practical relation.

12.16 Continuing Authority and a Change of Practical Setting

An earlier arrangement can move into a setting its author did not anticipate. This final discussion examines how changed context affects the authority of instructions. It connects temporal continuity with the limits of transferring a rule across practical domains.

Suppose Mira's instruction concerned a small collection used by a defined group. The archive later becomes a much larger public institution. Keeping the wording unchanged may now permit consequences far beyond the original practical setting.

The inquiry should distinguish linguistic continuity from continuity of scope. The same phrase can operate differently when the audience, resources and consequences change. A claim that the old instruction settles the new case requires interpretation of that change.

Some purposes can continue across settings. A condition protecting contributors' specified interests may remain relevant even as the archive grows. Other features may require new agreement because the original arrangement did not allocate authority for the expanded activity.

The analysis should avoid two shortcuts. Changed circumstances do not automatically cancel every earlier commitment. Unchanged wording does not automatically authorize every new application. The practical content and legitimacy of the transfer require reasons.

Mira's current judgment can contribute to that interpretation without being its sole authority. Contributors, current custodians and others affected may have legitimate claims. A revised arrangement can coordinate those claims while preserving the historical instruction as part of its genealogy.

The person can then acknowledge a meaningful continuity without pretending the setting is unchanged. She may affirm the earlier concern while rejecting the new application. That stance is intelligible when purpose, wording and authority are kept separate.

The chapter's expanded conclusion is that earlier instructions can genuinely support practical continuity, including reasons to pause, reminders, limited delegations and defaults. Their force remains conditional on purpose, scope, formation and current circumstances. The account gives them a role within a continuing life while retaining the later person's participation and the standing of others.

13 Branching and Incompatible Continuities

This chapter uses hypothetical branching to stress-test the distinctions developed for ordinary change. It first separates genealogy from identity, then examines branch-specific concern and incompatible obligations. The cases carry no assertion that the imagined transformations are physically possible. Their purpose is to expose assumptions that may remain hidden when bodily, psychological, and institutional continuities coincide.

13.1 A Stipulated Branching Case

Suppose one earlier practical history is followed by two distinct later participants, each retaining relevant information and some commitments. The description deliberately leaves numerical identity unresolved. Let i be the earlier occasion and j, k later occasions on different branches. Causal continuation can contain paths from i to each while keeping j and k distinct.

If an equivalence identifies i with both, it also identifies the later occasions with each other. A model intending to preserve their separate agency therefore needs to distinguish identity from the branching relation. This logical issue was already visible in the general continuity construction. The present question concerns its practical implications.

The earlier person might care about both successors. That concern can support preparation for each without settling that either is numerically identical to the predecessor. The point is a conditional distinction between concern and identity, rather than a deduction about survival. The source comparisons already establish that this general distinction has philosophical antecedents.

A theory equating practical concern with a unique identity mapping would face a choice: prohibit concern for both, collapse the successors, or revise the equivalence. None of these moves follows merely from the practical description. The case reveals an extra premise in the proposed mapping.

13.2 Separate Agency and Shared History

The successors may make different judgments about the archive. One endorses publication; the other favors restricted access. Their shared history can explain why both regard the undertaking as significant. It does not make their current judgments one judgment.

The practical account can represent distinct uptake relations linked to a common genealogy. It can also represent each successor's view of the earlier history. A shared record may remain evidence for both while its current meaning diverges. This is structurally similar to ordinary disagreement among people who inherit one institutional undertaking, although the thought experiment retains its separate identity question.

Concern for each branch should not erase their independence. An earlier instruction treating both as interchangeable executors would ignore their different present circumstances. A branch-specific account asks what each can do, understands, and endorses. The same historical source can acquire different practical consequences through those differences.

The case also resists numerical conservation metaphors. Dividing a history into two successors need not divide concern into equal halves or allocate half an obligation to each. Such assignments require a normative rule and information about the undertaking. They cannot be read directly from the number of branches.

13.3 Competing Claims upon a Shared Undertaking

Suppose only one release decision can be made and the successors disagree. Causal genealogy cannot decide authority. A rule based on earlier instructions, current competence, contributor consent, or shared procedure would add different normative premises. The model's value lies in making those premises explicit.

The contributors' position remains important. Their claims concern the recordings and undertakings that affected them. A dispute about the successors' identity should not make those claims vanish from the analysis. Some practical requirements can remain stable across several candidate identity interpretations.

For example, every candidate mapping might imply a need to preserve confidentiality during review. That conclusion could be robust even while final authority remains contested. Robustness should be stated at the level of the particular obligation. It supplies no general solution to numerical identity.

A different obligation may depend on which successor possesses the relevant capacity or resources. Historical connection can identify candidates for responsibility, while allocation requires attention to present feasibility and fair burden. This distinction is already useful in ordinary cases of delegation and transfer; branching intensifies it without creating an entirely new form of inference.

13.4 Merge and Retrospective Ownership

A hypothetical merger raises a related problem. Suppose information and practical concerns from two earlier histories become available within one later participant. Access to both histories does not by itself establish that both were experienced by the current person. Testimony, copied records, and memory-like presentation require separate description.

The later participant can nevertheless recognize practical consequences associated with both histories. They might assume responsibilities through a new undertaking, inherit material conditions, or act to repair harm. Those relations can be analyzed without deciding that every earlier episode is numerically their own.

The case warns against equating informational access with experiential ownership. A complete archive of another person's life would not automatically turn that life into one's own remembered ex-

perience. A model that represents both as a set of accessible propositions needs enrichment to preserve the difference it seeks to explain.

The converse warning also matters. An unresolved experiential classification does not make every practical question unanswerable. The present participant's actions, capacities, and commitments can generate reasons independent of the disputed historical ownership. The analysis can proceed locally while preserving the dispute.

13.5 Lessons for Ordinary Continuity

The ordinary cases seldom contain literal branching of persons. They do contain diverging projects, shared histories, and conflicts among reference, memory, and endorsement. The stress tests show why the account should preserve those relations separately even where they usually coincide.

The tests also constrain the language of inheritance. A history can explain a present concern without conferring unlimited authority, and a present concern can reach beyond a unique identity relation. These are limited structural lessons. Their application to actual persons requires the ordinary evidence and philosophical commitments of the case.

A model passes this initial test when it retains the distinct questions without generating contradictions through its own notation. The following discussion examines the interpretation and practical allocation questions that remain after that logical requirement is met.

13.6 Alternative Futures and Coexisting Successors

The word branching can describe two different constructions. One represents mutually exclusive possible futures; the other stipulates several later participants within one history. This distinction is essential because concern about possibilities and concern for coexisting people have different objects.

In an ordinary choice, Mira may imagine continuing the archive or leaving it. The possible histories contain different anticipated occasions, and the choice may help determine which history is realized. The model should avoid counting both imagined outcomes as two actual later people with simultaneously existing claims.

The representation-token construction serves this purpose. Mira's anticipation is an actual current event, while its possible targets depend on the history under consideration. A token can represent a future that is never realized. Its presence supplies evidence about present anticipation, rather than a guarantee that the anticipated participant will exist.

The stipulated successor case has a different form. Within one imagined history, two later participants coexist and can act independently. Their claims can conflict over one resource. The allocation problem therefore involves simultaneous practical relations, even while their relation to the earlier person remains philosophically disputed.

Confusing the constructions can generate misleading arithmetic. A person who considers ten alternative futures does not thereby create ten current claimants whose welfare must each receive a share of a resource. Equally, a case with two coexisting successors cannot be resolved by treating one as merely an unrealized description of the other.

The distinction also affects preparation. In an ordinary uncertain future, one arrangement may support several possible outcomes because only one will occur. In a coexisting-successor case, supporting both may require additional resources or a division of access. A plan feasible under mutual exclusivity may fail under coexistence.

The paper's practical conclusions depend on which construction is stipulated. Where the purpose is to analyze Mira's uncertainty about her own later values, possible histories suffice. Where the purpose is to test whether genealogy alone determines unique identity or authority, the stronger successor thought experiment makes the disputed premise visible.

Neither construction establishes a physical mechanism of personal division. The ordinary case concerns familiar uncertainty and change. The successor case is a conditional conceptual test. Keeping their

statuses distinct prevents a speculative transformation from being smuggled into the interpretation of ordinary practical continuity.

13.7 Equal Information and Unequal Practical Position

Suppose two stipulated successors receive equally detailed records of Mira's earlier undertaking. Their informational equality still leaves their practical positions open. This subsection examines why a common archive does not settle present authority or responsibility.

One successor may currently possess the recording and the means to protect it. The other may have access only to a copy of the historical record. A contributor's immediate request for return will therefore bear differently on their capacities to respond. Equal knowledge of the history leaves present control unequal.

The successors can also form different current undertakings. One may accept responsibility for arranging a transfer, while the other declines involvement. The acceptance can create a new practical ground within its legitimate scope. It does not prove that the accepting successor has a stronger numerical-identity relation to the predecessor.

A temptation is to treat willingness to continue the project as evidence of being the authentic successor. That move confuses evaluative conformity with identity. A person can change commitments within an ordinarily continuing life; the successor who repudiates the project cannot be excluded merely because the repudiation is inconvenient to the earlier plan.

The opposite temptation treats independence from the earlier project as the only evidence of genuine agency. That move undervalues freely renewed commitment. A successor can critically assess the history and still choose to continue. Agreement with the predecessor and present agency are compatible when the formation supports that interpretation.

The practical account therefore asks about the relation between information, current uptake and available action. It can identify a case in which the same remembered-looking material supports different judgments. It can also identify a case in which differences in control make one participant able to answer a claim the other cannot immediately address.

These descriptions leave the source of any inherited obligation open. The earlier entrustment argument depends on an ordinary continuing custodian and a legitimate relation of control. Transferring it wholesale to a metaphysically disputed successor would require explaining why the relevant responsibility passes. A new undertaking or current control may provide a separate ground, with a different scope.

The distinction matters even when the practical outcome is the same. A successor may return material because of a newly accepted custody role, while another account says the return discharges the predecessor's obligation. Agreement about the act does not establish agreement about historical responsibility. The model should preserve that difference.

13.8 Scarcity and the Allocation of a Shared Resource

A branching case becomes more demanding when two successors seek one indivisible resource. This subsection examines the allocation burden without deriving a rule from genealogy. The example tests equal concern, priority and the claims of people outside the branching relation.

Suppose the archive can support only one of two incompatible projects proposed by the successors. Each proposal makes serious use of the earlier material, and each successor regards it as an important continuation. A shared causal history provides a reason to understand both claims, but it supplies no ranking between them.

One proposed rule gives priority to the successor whose plan most closely resembles Mira's earlier intention. That rule values fidelity to the earlier project. Its justification is stronger where resources were entrusted specifically for that purpose and weaker where the resources were left for future participants to decide how to use.

A second rule gives equal opportunity to the successors. This rule values their current independent standing. It still needs a procedure for an indivisible resource and an account of relevant differences in feasibility, need or affected claims. Equal consideration does not automatically specify equal division.

A third rule asks which project best serves the contributors' justified interests. That rule gives weight to people whose materials and undertakings are involved. Its application may favor one successor, both through a modified plan, or neither. The earlier person's anticipated concern for successors does not erase those contributors' standing.

The case therefore contains several possible grounds of allocation. The paper has no warrant to select one solely from the number or direction of causal edges. A justified answer must identify the purpose and authority of the resource, the participants' claims, and the consequences of the available arrangements.

The same point applies to burden. If a task requires effort, assigning half to each successor assumes divisibility and an appropriate principle of distribution. If one successor has a relevant capacity and the other lacks it, equal nominal shares may impose unequal burdens or fail to achieve the task at all.

A critic may regard the case as too artificial to inform ordinary self-continuity. Its limited usefulness lies in exposing an inference that can also occur in ordinary inheritance and delegation: a historical connection is treated as though it already specifies present allocation. The branching case intensifies the underdetermination by holding much of the genealogy constant.

The ordinary lesson remains conditional. Historical relations can be relevant to claims without being sufficient to settle every allocation. The theory should state the additional normative premises that move from a shared past to a particular present distribution.

13.9 Asymmetric Survival of a Project's Components

A single undertaking can divide into components that continue differently. This ordinary form of branching requires no hypothetical division of persons. It provides a less speculative test of the account's treatment of continuity and replacement.

Mira's archive may contain preservation, public interpretation and contributor access as distinct activities. After her withdrawal, one colleague continues preservation, another develops a new interpretation, and contributors receive their own copies. The original combination ends while several component relations remain.

Calling the whole project preserved would overstate continuity if the integration among its activities was central to Mira's undertaking. Calling it wholly extinguished would overlook the materials, capacities and responsibilities that continue. The appropriate description depends on the question being asked.

For historical attribution, it may matter that later work arose from the original collection. For present endorsement, it may matter that Mira accepts preservation while rejecting the new interpretation. For contributor claims, it may matter that access or return remains available. These answers can differ without contradiction.

The account can describe component continuity while preserving disagreement about the project's overall identity. A stable title may be useful for public reference, yet the title alone does not settle whether the later arrangement fulfills the earlier undertaking. The practical content of the change needs to be specified.

This case also clarifies the difference between lineage and completion. A later project can descend from an earlier one without completing its aim. It can even use the earlier material to criticize the original interpretation. Historical dependence remains while practical opposition develops.

Mira may reasonably recognize that opposition as part of the material's later life while refusing to endorse it. Her acknowledgment of genealogy is distinct from a claim of current authorship or authority. The institution should avoid using her acknowledgment as evidence that she supports the new end.

The component case offers a restrained positive account of continuity. Some relations can survive a reorganization and support further action. The theory should name them and assess their consequences without forcing the whole arrangement into an all-or-nothing category.

13.10 Experiential Ownership and Copied Description

A complete descriptive copy of a person's history would still leave a question about experienced ownership. This subsection revisits that limit in the branching context. Its aim is to prevent a formal representation of information from silently settling the first-person issue.

Suppose a successor can accurately report every recorded detail of Mira's earlier interviews. The successor can use those details to explain decisions, anticipate contributors' concerns and continue the work competently. These abilities establish substantial informational and practical relations within the stipulated case.

They leave open whether the successor remembers conducting the interviews in the experiential sense at issue. A report can be available through testimony, inference, copied description or recollective presentation. Assigning all of these the same proposition in a model would conceal the difference.

Adding a provenance field improves the representation by preserving how access is described. Yet the field cannot independently establish the correct philosophical account of ownership. If the model labels an episode experienced by the successor, that label records an interpretation whose grounds still require argument.

The converse case is equally revealing. A successor might have vivid memory-like presentation while a reliable record shows that a represented event never occurred in the relevant history. The presence of the presentation is then real, while its apparent target remains unwarranted. The representation-token distinction is designed to allow that combination.

A practical relation can nevertheless arise from the presentation. The successor may be moved to inquire, repair an apparent mistake, or form a new commitment. Those consequences need separate assessment. A psychologically effective representation can influence action without making its historical content true.

The account therefore distinguishes causal efficacy, epistemic warrant and experienced mineness. Its success in separating them is a form of conceptual clarity. A complete explanation of their relation remains beyond the elementary models.

This limit is significant for the paper's positive proposal. Prospective concern and retrospective uptake can organize a practical life without their formal representation proving phenomenal continuity. The branching case makes that boundary difficult to overlook. It also prevents practical usefulness from being mistaken for a solution to the entire identity problem.

13.11 The Evidential Role of a Counterfactual Test

Thought experiments contribute by exposing dependencies in an argument, with their evidential role determined by their construction. This final discussion states what the branching tests can support. It also identifies the point at which an additional metaphysical or empirical premise would be needed.

If a definition says that any causal continuation is numerical identity, a stipulated fork reveals tension with the transitivity and uniqueness usually associated with identity. The test examines the compatibility of the definition's own commitments. It can succeed without establishing a real process capable of producing the fork.

If the stronger claim concerns what actual people would experience after a transformation, the thought experiment supplies less. Stipulating shared information and separate agency does not provide empirical evidence about consciousness. A conclusion about experienced survival would require further philosophical or empirical support.

The practical tests occupy an intermediate role. They ask whether a proposed inference from genealogy to obligation or authority contains an unstated normative premise. By specifying the genealogy while varying present control, uptake or affected claims, the case can reveal that the inference needs additional structure.

The variation remains conceptual. It does not show that all represented combinations occur in actual lives, or that the variables are causally independent. A model can separate questions for analytic purposes while actual mechanisms closely connect them.

This qualification supports the paper's ordinary applications. The archive and composition cases do not rely on literal branching of persons. They use familiar kinds of divergence among memory, records, roles and current commitments. The speculative cases explain why an account should avoid definitions that make those distinctions impossible in advance.

The chapter consequently offers a limited success condition. A useful practical account can preserve separate agency in the imagined fork, distinguish possible from actual targets, and explain why allocation needs reasons beyond genealogy. It should then return to ordinary cases with those inferential limits intact.

The resulting clarity is compatible with a more unified theory of persons. Such a theory may explain why many relations normally belong to one life and how exceptional cases should be understood. The present analysis contributes local constraints while leaving that wider explanatory task open.

14 Temporal Experience and Implicit Practical Continuity

This chapter tests the account against forms of temporal experience that lack strong narrative integration or explicit identification with a future self. It begins with a challenge to narrative requirements, then develops independent case comparisons concerning routine preparation, present attention, and implicit anticipation. The aim is to narrow the account's necessity claims while preserving the explanatory role of prospective appropriation where it occurs.

14.1 A Challenge to Universal Appropriation

Strawson distinguishes descriptive and ethical demands for narrative self-understanding and disputes their general applicability. His discussion separates episodic from diachronic self-experience. He reports practical concern for his future alongside a limited sense that the currently apprehended self persists into that future [11, pp. 428–434]. The passage challenges a requirement of explicit future-self appropriation for every adequate form of practical continuity. It is a philosophical distinction and first-person report, not an established population generalization. The present chapter develops its own comparisons in response.

The challenge has two targets. A descriptive theory might incorrectly claim that responsible preparation always includes a particular experience of extended selfhood. A normative theory might claim that everyone ought to cultivate that experience. Neither claim follows from the argument that prospective appropriation can organize some actions. A useful account should identify its positive cases without converting them into a universal psychological or ethical requirement.

14.2 Preparation without a Life Narrative

Suppose Mira stores materials securely each evening because she has learned their vulnerability and expects work to continue. She gives the task little autobiographical interpretation. The preparation can still connect present conduct with later consequences. The case contains practical temporal organization without a narrated unity of the project.

One interpretation calls this implicit self-concern. That may be appropriate if the description identifies an actual role of anticipated future experience or agency. It becomes evasive if the word implicit is used whenever explicit evidence is absent. A theory should specify what warrants the attribution and what alternative explanation remains possible.

Another interpretation emphasizes learned responsiveness to the task. Mira treats secure storage as what the current activity requires, without representing the later benefit through an extended self-conception. This interpretation can explain temporal effectiveness while remaining neutral about a strong future-self relation. The account should permit it when the evidence supports it.

The two interpretations may be compatible in a particular case. Practical activity can carry several forms of concern at once. A record of the action alone may fail to decide between them. Acknowledging that underdetermination is preferable to defining every successful preparation as evidence for the favored account.

14.3 Present Attention and Continuing Reasons

A person can attend closely to a present task while being responsive to consequences extending beyond it. Mira's care in handling an interview may reflect understanding of its significance without a conscious representation of her future life. The relation to time appears through the practical structure of the activity.

This suggests a distinction between temporal reach and temporal self-representation. An act has temporal reach when its reasons or consequences extend across occasions. It has a particular self-representational form when the person experiences or describes that reach through an extended self. The first can occur without strong evidence of the second.

The distinction preserves the value of present-centered activity. Attention to an immediate encounter can be responsible in its own right. Requiring a unifying narrative could distract from the practical reasons present in that encounter. The account should avoid treating reflection about continuity as invariably superior to participation itself.

At the same time, some situations specifically require coordination across occasions. A complicated transfer can need reminders, schedules, and explicit recognition of earlier commitments. Those demands arise from the undertaking, not from a universal ideal of narrative life. A person can adopt temporary planning structures without adopting a comprehensive account of who they are across all time.

14.4 Implicit Orientation and Its Limits

Implicit anticipation can be a useful explanatory concept when supported by specific patterns. A person may organize actions around a later need, preserve information for a subsequent choice, and change preparation when the expected later situation changes. Such responsiveness provides evidence of future orientation even when verbal articulation is limited.

Whether the orientation is specifically self-directed can remain open. The same practical pattern may concern another person's later need. A theory must retain the distinction between orientation toward a future and orientation toward one's own anticipated standpoint. The latter should not be inferred merely because the former has a beneficial effect upon the same tracked person.

A counterfactual comparison can help. If Mira's preparation changes when she learns that she will personally encounter a difficulty, that response may support a self-directed interpretation. Yet the response can also arise from her particular responsibility or knowledge. The evidence is defeasible and should be considered with her own account of the situation.

This limit is philosophically productive. It shows that practical continuity can sometimes be established at a level weaker than full prospective appropriation. An undertaking can have a well-supported temporal structure while its first-person interpretation remains uncertain. The theory gains precision by allowing conclusions at different strengths.

14.5 Normative Plurality

The existence of several temporal styles undermines any immediate inference from one style to a better life. A coherent narrative can support learning and also sustain a rigid or inaccurate identity. Episodic attention can support responsiveness and also coexist with neglected obligations. Evaluation requires the particular activity and its consequences.

Moral standing remains independent of success in any one temporal style. A person should not have to demonstrate a polished account of past and future to have their present experience or refusal taken seriously. The practical account's concepts are tools for understanding relationships, not admission criteria for personhood.

The implication for support is similarly plural. Some people may benefit from narrative reconstruction; others may prefer concrete records, reminders, or assistance with a present task. The manuscript offers no empirical allocation rule. It identifies why support should remain responsive to the person's needs and mode of engagement rather than enforcing one theoretical picture.

The revised thesis is therefore narrower and stronger. Prospective appropriation explains one important organization of practical concern. Other forms of temporal continuity can operate through implicit responsiveness, learned activity, and relations to others. A comprehensive theory should investigate their interactions while preserving differences in experience.

14.6 A Revisable Narrative Account

A challenge to rigid narrative requirements leaves more permissive accounts to be assessed. This subsection introduces a close interlocutor and states the resulting limit on the earlier cases. A person can lack a polished life story while retaining capacities that a richer narrative account considers central.

Mackenzie distinguishes self-determination, self-governance, and self-authorization, with social conditions central to their exercise. Her account of temporal agency gives narrative interpretation a constitutive role while allowing provisional coherence, revision, social coauthorship, and unchosen contingencies [6, Section 2]. This position differs substantially from a demand for one fixed story authored in isolation. It also supplies a close antecedent for separating opportunity, practical governance, and authority. Adding social support to a planning model would therefore be an insufficient contribution by itself.

The earlier case of routine evening storage challenges a specific inference from temporally effective action to an explicit experience of extended selfhood. It does not establish that Mira lacks every capacity for narrative interpretation. She might be able to explain how the archive fits within her life when the question becomes relevant. A theory concerning the conditions of wider self-governance could therefore accept the case without revision.

Incomplete recall has a similarly limited force. Mira can use records to understand an earlier undertaking and connect it to present reasons. A permissive account may treat that activity as narrative interpretation even though the experiential route differs from recollection. The absence of detailed memory alone cannot settle the dispute.

The comparison requires greater precision about the target claim. One question concerns whether every temporally responsible act requires an occurrent self-narrative. Another concerns whether wider self-governance requires some capacity for narrative understanding. A third concerns whether a particular practical relation can continue when that capacity is limited. These questions can receive different answers.

The present paper primarily addresses the third question and parts of the first. It identifies continuities of uptake, evidence, support, and answerability through specified changes. It leaves open whether a more comprehensive theory of autonomous life should place those relations within a narrative account. This scope statement preserves a possible disagreement while avoiding a counterexample that succeeds only by changing the subject.

14.7 Local Interpretation and a Wider Self-Conception

The relation between local practical understanding and a wider self-conception needs its own analysis. This subsection returns to Noor's unfinished composition and asks how much interpretation the case requires. It distinguishes an intelligible connection within one activity from a claim about the organization of a whole life.

Noor can understand that an earlier sketch introduced a musical problem and that his present revision responds to it. This connection has temporal order, reasons, and an interpretation of change. Calling it a local narrative can be useful. The terminology alone leaves open whether Noor relates the episode to a broader conception of himself.

A wider interpretation might connect the sketch with a change in his artistic ambitions, relationships, or sense of what matters. That interpretation can guide choices among projects and explain why one future seems worth pursuing. The case permits such a role. It need not assume that the role is active on every occasion of composition.

The distinction matters when the evidence concerns a narrow task. Successful work on the sketch can support a claim about local engagement while underdetermining a claim about a comprehensive self-conception. Conversely, a coherent account of an artistic life can coexist with failure to understand the particular musical problem. Evidence should remain connected to the level of interpretation being asserted.

A very broad definition of narrative may include every intelligible relation among earlier activity, present reasons, and later possibilities. Under that definition, much of the present account may be compatible with narrative language. The remaining issue would concern what explanatory work the category performs beyond identifying those relations. Compatibility would be a substantive possibility, not a defeat to avoid through a narrower definition chosen for convenience.

A narrower definition may require a person's activity to be organized through a temporally extended conception of their own life. The account would then need evidence of that form of organization in the relevant cases. Some cases could meet the requirement and others remain uncertain. The distinction should be settled through the theory's purposes and claims, rather than through an assumption that one word must cover every mode of continuity.

The analysis therefore permits overlap while preserving a research question. Practical self-continuity can be identified at several levels of organization. A narrative theory may explain how those levels become integrated, while the present distinctions reveal where integration is partial, contested, or unnecessary for the local task. The two contributions need not be mutually exclusive.

14.8 Action during an Unsettled Self-Interpretation

A person can face practical decisions while their wider interpretation of a changed life remains unsettled. This subsection examines that interval. The aim is to distinguish a limitation in self-understanding from an automatic suspension of every capacity to act responsibly.

Suppose Mira has decided that the public archive should end but remains unsure how to understand the years she devoted to it. She can identify a contributor's immediate request, arrange return of a recording, and communicate the limits of her current knowledge. These actions can be warranted through specific reasons even while the larger period remains difficult to interpret.

A critic could respond that these actions already involve enough narrative organization to count as self-governance. Mira understands that an earlier undertaking created a present claim and that a return will alter the future relation. Under a local conception of narrative, the response is plausible. It shows that the case challenges a demand for wider integration more directly than a demand for every form of temporal intelligibility.

The case becomes harder if Mira can follow a specific practical reason while resisting any interpretation of the archive period as part of a coherent life. She may acknowledge that she once made the undertaking and respond to its consequences without knowing what that history now means for her identity. The account should preserve the difference between sufficient understanding for the bounded response and a settled view of the life.

The normative significance of that difference also needs care. Limited self-understanding can affect which decisions a person is well placed to make and what support might help. It does not automatically remove the practical force of a clear response to a particular issue. The object and complexity of the decision matter.

A requirement of complete interpretation before action could become self-defeating. Some understanding develops through attempting a transition, discussing its effects, and discovering what concerns remain. If every such action had to await a finished self-conception, the route through which the person might develop that conception would be blocked. This argument supports room for provisional action, rather than a general rejection of narrative understanding.

The present proposal is that practical continuity can include such intervals. A person can answer to specific reasons while leaving broader meaning unsettled. A comprehensive theory should explain how these local acts and wider interpretation interact, including cases where the latter remains incomplete for a substantial period.

14.9 Coauthorship and Disputed Interpretation

Socially assisted self-understanding can support agency while remaining vulnerable to conflict about authority. This subsection examines who may shape an interpretation and how that contribution should enter the person's practical life. The case concerns an archive review meeting, independently stipulated for the present argument.

Colleagues help Mira reconstruct decisions she cannot recall. They identify tensions, supply overlooked documents, and suggest that her current withdrawal continues an earlier concern for contributor protection. Their interpretation may illuminate a connection Mira had missed. Accepting it can be a form of active self-understanding through assistance.

The same interpretation can be offered as a requirement. Colleagues may insist that Mira must describe her withdrawal as the fulfillment of her true archival purpose. Even if the suggested account is coherent and partly accurate, imposing it can restrict the range of responses through which she understands the history. The practical issue concerns her opportunity to assess the interpretation, including its claim to speak for her.

Mira may accept part of the account and reject another part. She can acknowledge an earlier protective concern while maintaining that she also pursued publicity for reasons she now criticizes. A more flattering coherent story might obscure that acknowledgment. The value of an interpretation therefore depends on accuracy and critical openness as well as its capacity to produce a satisfying continuity.

Others can also have reasons to resist Mira's preferred account. A contributor may object that describing the archive as consistently protective erases an episode of exclusion. Recognizing Mira's standpoint should leave room for that objection. The history belongs to several participants in different ways, and one person's need for integration does not establish control over every public interpretation.

The account consequently distinguishes contributions to understanding from authority to determine understanding. A colleague can supply evidence, a contributor can describe an effect, and Mira can articulate the significance of the undertaking for her current life. Their roles can interact without merging into one final authorial standpoint.

This analysis is compatible with a relational narrative theory that preserves disagreement and revision. Its further contribution is to identify the practical and evidential relations that must remain visible within a shared interpretation. A general appeal to coauthorship would leave those relations underdescribed if it did not distinguish support, correction, pressure, and imposed substitution.

14.10 Conflict, Coherence, and Adequate Response

Coherence can be an achievement in understanding a life while unresolved conflict remains a feature of responsible agency. This subsection examines the relation between explaining conflict and resolving it. The distinction prevents a demand for unity from concealing the practical conditions that make some commitments difficult to reconcile.

Mira can understand why she values both continued preservation and release from the institution's demands. Her account of the conflict may be coherent: it explains the history, the current burdens, and the competing concerns. Yet the available arrangements may still require a loss. Narrative intelligibility therefore differs from practical compatibility among ends.

A transition model can represent that distinction. If the available actions force either continued burdensome custody or an inadequate transfer, the difficulty concerns the action set and target interpretation. A clearer account of Mira's values may help identify the problem without adding a feasible response. The institutional conditions then require attention alongside self-understanding.

The converse is possible. A practical arrangement can resolve an immediate conflict while leaving Mira uncertain about its wider meaning. An institution might provide an acceptable transfer, allowing her to leave, while she still struggles to interpret the end of the archive. Successful transition and settled self-conception can develop at different rates.

These possibilities qualify both excessive confidence in interpretation and an overly narrow focus on options. Interpretation can reveal why an option matters, expose an imposed description, or help form a

new aim. Material and institutional changes can make a response possible. A comprehensive explanation needs their interaction.

The argument should also distinguish a contradictory description from an account of conflicting values. Mira's claim that she both authorized and never authorized the same act under the same description would require clarification. Her claim that she values incompatible ends can be intelligible and accurate. Demanding consistency at the level of factual assertion should not erase conflict at the level of what she has reason to care about.

Practical self-continuity can therefore include an acknowledged conflict that remains unresolved. The person continues to deliberate and respond within conditions that limit what can be achieved. The account should assess the quality of that response without requiring a declaration that every valued aspect of the life has been integrated into a single satisfactory outcome.

14.11 The Residual Disagreement about Necessity

The comparison leaves a more precise disagreement for further philosophical work. This subsection states what the cases establish and what remains open. The goal is an account that can be confronted with a strong narrative theory without treating compatibility as a reason to blur different claims.

The cases establish that particular practical continuities can be described through historical evidence, present uptake, accessible reasons, and bounded response even when detailed recollection or an explicit whole-life narrative is absent. They also show that these continuities can matter to the people involved. Those conclusions concern specified activities and relations.

The cases do not establish that a person could exercise every form of autonomous self-governance while lacking every capacity to interpret their life over time. That stronger proposition would require a more developed account of the capacities and the kind of agency at issue. A local philosophical counterexample should not be promoted to a comprehensive psychological possibility without argument.

A narrative account may incorporate the present distinctions and explain their wider organization. The generative relational account may, in turn, help identify where the evidence for such organization is incomplete or where a narrative category covers several practically different relations. Their relation could be one of partial integration rather than theoretical replacement.

A substantive disagreement would emerge if one account made a particular degree or form of narrative integration necessary for a practical achievement that the other explained without it. The inquiry would then need a carefully specified case, a defensible account of the achievement, and evidence about the person's actual mode of engagement. Merely describing the same case with different labels would be insufficient.

The paper accordingly treats prospective appropriation and narrative integration as forms of organization whose role must be shown. They can explain how some people take up their histories and anticipate their futures. Other practical relations can receive a warranted description at a more local level, with the wider interpretation remaining open.

This result strengthens the account's scope. It preserves the value of temporal understanding while allowing partial, episodic, and unsettled forms of practical continuity to be investigated on their own terms. It also locates the remaining philosophical burden: explaining when the relations become a person's self-governance, and how that achievement connects with the first-person character of experience.

15 Opposed Temporal Rankings and Practical Judgment

This chapter examines disagreements between present and future evaluations without treating either as automatically authoritative. It uses a small formal comparison to expose assumptions behind aggregation, then develops the philosophical questions that remain. The analysis distinguishes preference, reason, authority, and the claims of affected parties.

15.1 Conflict within a Continuing Life

Present Mira prefers public release to restricted access. Later Mira, after changed experience, prefers restricted access. Ordinary reference can identify the person across both occasions while the ranking changes. The change is compatible with learning, altered priorities, adaptation to pressure, or several mechanisms together. A formal pair of rankings records the conflict without selecting its explanation.

Let p denote release and q restricted access. Suppose $p \succ_0 q$ and $q \succ_1 p$. An ordering exactly matching both would require $p \succ q$ and $q \succ p$, violating asymmetry of a strict order. The elementary contradiction establishes that one common ranking requires a rule beyond exact reproduction of both standpoints.

The result is deliberately weak. It proves no impossibility of reasonable temporal choice. It identifies an additional decision burden. The rule might give weight to information, current authority, prior commitments, reversibility, or other considerations. Each option needs argument. Causal continuity itself supplies none of them.

15.2 Aggregation and Scale

One proposed solution assigns utilities at each occasion and adds them. Let $u_0(p) = 3$, $u_0(q) = 0$, $u_1(p) = 0$, and $u_1(q) = 2$. The sum favors p . Multiplying the later utility by ten preserves its internal ranking but makes the sum favor q . Thus the two ordinal rankings alone do not determine the aggregate.

The example exposes a measurement assumption. A defensible addition needs comparable units or another interpretation of relative magnitudes. Calling the utilities degrees of identification would add further assumptions about what is measured and why it should govern. The mathematical notation cannot supply those assumptions.

Weights introduce a related issue. Discounting later evaluations gives the present greater influence; privileging the later ranking gives the future greater influence. Either may be justified for some question, but the justification concerns reasons and authority. A timestamp is not a self-explanatory moral weight.

The analysis also resists treating different occasions as automatically separate persons in a bargaining model. Such a representation may illuminate a specific coordination problem, but its interpersonal interpretation requires argument. The ordinary case involves one tracked person whose standpoints change, alongside actual other people with their own claims.

15.3 Preference and Reason

A preference reports an ordering from a standpoint. A reason offers a consideration supporting action. They can diverge. Mira may prefer release while recognizing confidentiality as a stronger reason for restriction. She may prefer avoiding a difficult conversation while accepting a responsibility to explain the change.

A temporal conflict among preferences therefore leaves a richer normative field open. The inquiry should ask which considerations each standpoint recognizes, what information it possesses, and how the undertaking's consequences bear on the decision. Treating a preference vector as the entire practical situation can omit the grounds on which the person criticizes their own desire.

This distinction also explains why later change can be progress, regression, or neither. More recent preference need not be better informed. Earlier preference need not be more authentic. The comparison turns on the quality and relevance of reasons under changed circumstances, with appropriate uncertainty about their assessment.

The paper offers no complete theory of practical reason. Its contribution is to prevent a formal continuity model from silently replacing such a theory. Where evaluative premises remain disputed, the conclusion should remain conditional upon them.

15.4 Reversibility and Deferred Judgment

Some decisions permit later reconsideration more readily than others. Restricted access may allow later release, while public disclosure may be difficult to reverse. This asymmetry can supply a reason for deferring the irreversible act under uncertainty. It requires a case-specific assessment of benefits, costs, and affected claims.

The argument is not that reversible choices always prevail. Delay can itself cause harm, lose opportunities, or violate an undertaking. The point is that irreversibility belongs among the practical facts relevant to authority across time. A ranking comparison that omits it may misrepresent the actual choice.

Deferral can also preserve an occasion for later judgment. Present Mira may choose a temporary arrangement precisely because she expects to learn more. That decision expresses continuity through an open process rather than a fixed outcome. Its justification can survive uncertainty about which later preference will emerge.

A procedure for review should specify triggers and responsibilities. Otherwise deferral can become indefinite avoidance. The continuing relation includes a way to return to the issue and address those waiting upon the decision. Practical openness needs support and accountability to acquire determinate significance.

15.5 Third-Party Claims and Temporal Disagreement

Contributors' claims can constrain both rankings. If release would breach an assurance, the conflict cannot be treated solely as a tradeoff between present and future satisfaction. The relevant people possess interests and possible claims independent of Mira's changing identification with the project.

The example shows why practical continuity remains embedded in relationships. A person can change an end while retaining responsibilities generated through interaction. The responsibilities need justification, but their existence is not measured by how strongly either temporal standpoint identifies with the earlier plan.

The final judgment may combine respect for current agency, historical accountability, and protection of affected parties. That combination is difficult because its considerations can conflict. Difficulty supplies a reason for explicit argument, rather than a reason to hide the conflict in an unexamined weighted sum.

These initial comparisons establish three limits. Opposed rankings require additional criteria; numerical aggregation requires scale assumptions; and a justified decision requires reasons extending beyond preference persistence. The following analysis develops the deliberative work left by those limits.

15.6 Changed Evidence and Changed Standards

A later evaluation can differ because the person learns a relevant fact, because the person adopts a different standard, or because both changes occur together. Separating these possibilities clarifies the warrant of temporal comparisons. It also prevents a later ranking from acquiring authority merely by being re-described as learning.

Suppose Mira first favors publication because she believes each contributor has approved public access. Later she discovers a clear restriction in Elena's instructions. Her revised judgment can be explained through a new fact under a continuing standard of respecting the conditions of contribution. The practical question concerns the quality of the evidence and the force of that standard. The fact that the correction occurs later supplies its chronological location, while its evidential role supplies a reason to reconsider.

Now suppose the facts remain unchanged. Mira initially thinks contributors should retain extensive control over the use of their recordings, then comes to favor the archive's freedom to publish. This second change concerns the standard itself. The later standpoint may offer good arguments, but the chronology establishes none of them. Calling the change maturation or liberation without explaining its grounds would prejudice the comparison.

The distinction becomes harder when a new experience makes a previously familiar consideration salient. Mira may have known that publicity can be intrusive while understanding its practical weight more fully after an unwelcome disclosure concerning her own life. The experience can improve her understanding without supplying a previously unknown proposition. An account restricted to a list of new facts would miss that possibility.

Experience can also narrow judgment. A painful encounter might lead Mira to treat every form of public access as equally objectionable even when the differences remain relevant. The account should allow experience to illuminate a consideration while leaving the extension of that consideration open to criticism. First-person access to an experience and authority to generalize from it are distinct.

A reasonable comparison therefore asks what changed in the evidential and evaluative situation. It can credit the later standpoint with information or understanding unavailable earlier. It can also preserve an earlier consideration that the later person dismisses without adequate argument. The result need not be one standpoint's complete victory.

This mixed assessment is particularly important for self-continuity. Mira can recognize an earlier judgment as reasonable under its circumstances while now having sufficient reason to act differently. She can also criticize an earlier standard while acknowledging that it guided an authentic earlier undertaking. Continuity of answerability does not require a timeless evaluation of every stage.

An objection holds that such analysis imports an external standard of reasonableness and thereby evades the conflict between temporal selves. The reply accepts the first part. Evaluating reasons requires standards that exceed the fact of preference. That requirement is the point exposed by the ranking model. The analysis makes those standards available for criticism instead of presenting a person's successive preferences as a self-contained source of their own priority.

15.7 The Time of Choice and the Scope of Authority

The occasion on which a decision must be made can matter without making the present standpoint universally superior. This discussion distinguishes having practical authority to decide now from having the best evaluation of every consequence. It develops a domain-sensitive argument about participation in a current action.

Suppose Mira must decide whether to devote the next month to completing a difficult part of the archive. The work will use her present time and effort. A reason for giving her current judgment substantial standing is that the decision directly organizes her current activity. The relevant premise concerns a person's participation in the direction of their own action.

That premise supports a presumption against requiring Mira to perform the work solely because a predicted later version of her would approve. Predictions about later satisfaction can enter present deliberation. They cannot, without an additional argument, replace her involvement in choosing how her present effort will be used.

The presumption has limits. Mira may already have accepted a bounded undertaking upon which another person reasonably relies. The current action may concern material entrusted under a condition that constrains her discretion. Giving present participation standing therefore differs from granting current preference exclusive authority.

The corresponding future-directed case reverses the practical location. Suppose the decision concerns which interpretation of an incomplete recording Mira will endorse next year, after she has had the opportunity to hear a newly available account. Present Mira can express a recommendation and preserve the reasons for it. An instruction requiring later endorsement irrespective of the new account claims authority over an act of judgment whose relevant information is partly unavailable now.

The argument for reserving later judgment is stronger in this case because the later occasion contains both the activity to be governed and information relevant to its assessment. The conclusion remains defeasible. An earlier commitment may legitimately constrain some available actions, and other people's claims remain relevant. What requires justification is the scope of the earlier attempt to settle the later judgment.

These examples support a limited rule: begin with the participant whose current activity is directly being organized, identify the claims that legitimately constrain that activity, and require an explicit reason for substituting another temporal standpoint's decision. The rule supplies an orientation for inquiry. It leaves substantive conflicts to be resolved through their reasons.

A critic may worry that the rule disguises present preference under the language of participation. Its application therefore needs a further distinction. Mira's participation can include hearing objections, acknowledging a duty, and choosing a course she finds unattractive. Respect for participation concerns her standing within the process of practical judgment; it does not require every outcome to satisfy her preferred ranking.

Nor does the rule identify temporal stages as separate moral persons. It concerns the location of activity, knowledge and involvement within an ordinarily continuing life. The same person can acknowledge a binding earlier undertaking and still possess standing to assess how it should now be discharged. The analysis describes that relation without multiplying persons in order to model disagreement.

15.8 Future Approval and Retrospective Permission

A later favorable assessment can inform how an earlier choice is understood. It can also be used too strongly, as if the eventual outcome supplied permission that was missing at the time. This subsection distinguishes evidence about benefit from retrospective validation of the way the choice was made.

Imagine that Mira is pressured into remaining with the archive after clearly asking to leave. Years later she values some relationships that arose during the continued work. Her gratitude concerning those relationships is a real part of the later evaluation. It does not by itself show that the earlier pressure was justified.

The earlier decision must be assessed using the reasons, authority and alternatives available then. A later benefit can be relevant to consequences, including the extent of a harm or the form of a repair. It cannot simply change whether Mira was given a meaningful opportunity to decide at the earlier occasion.

The opposing case deserves equal attention. Mira freely chooses a demanding archival task after considering its likely burdens. Later she regrets the choice because it consumed time she now wishes she had used differently. The regret supplies a reason to reassess future commitments. It does not alone show that the earlier choice lacked authority.

Together the cases separate outcome evaluation from procedural and participatory evaluation. A benefit can follow an unjustified intervention. A cost can follow a justified choice. Temporal self-assessment becomes distorted if either result is treated as decisive evidence concerning the whole formation history.

An objection points out that people sometimes authorize others to act on their behalf precisely because their present judgment is expected to improve. A previously accepted arrangement can change the authority structure. If Mira has knowingly entrusted a limited decision to a colleague under suitable conditions, the colleague's later action must be assessed within that authorization. The source of authority is the arrangement and its justification, rather than a later declaration of satisfaction alone.

Another objection concerns cases in which earlier refusal was based on a serious factual mistake. Correcting the mistake can support a different decision and may justify limited intervention in some circumstances. The present paper leaves a general intervention theory open. Its narrower claim is that eventual approval cannot carry the entire justificatory burden. The earlier mistake, available alternatives, urgency and scope of interference require separate assessment.

This distinction protects the intelligibility of ambivalent retrospective attitudes. Mira can be glad that a friendship developed while remaining critical of the pressure that kept her in the project. She can regard a freely chosen undertaking as a mistake without denying her earlier agency. A model requiring a single positive or negative judgment over the whole episode would erase those combinations.

Practical self-continuity can consist partly in sustaining this mixed assessment. The person relates to the past through acknowledgment, gratitude, criticism and changed intention in different respects. These relations carry more information than a single temporal ranking. Their coexistence is a reason to keep the objects of evaluation explicit.

15.9 Unequal Knowledge and the Burden of Prediction

Predicted future rankings enter present choices through an interpretation made now. The prediction can be well supported or speculative, and its source can have interests of its own. This subsection examines the evidential burden before future approval is assigned practical weight.

Suppose a colleague tells Mira that she will eventually be glad she continued. The statement may rest on careful knowledge of her enduring concerns. It may also express the colleague's wish to retain her labor. The claim's future tense leaves its source and evidential quality unchanged. Those features still require scrutiny.

Mira's own prediction has a distinctive practical role because it can express her present understanding of a desired trajectory. Yet it remains a prediction. She may be uncertain about future experiences or about how a difficult transition will alter what matters to her. The paper's representation of anticipation preserves that uncertainty through possible targets rather than treating the anticipated occasion as already established.

One useful response is to separate confidence about broad conditions from confidence about exact rankings. Mira might be relatively confident that she will value having access to her earlier reasons while remaining unsure whether she will continue the project. Preserving the reasons can then support later participation without pretending to know the later substantive choice.

Even that limited preparation can carry costs. Keeping extensive records may impose a burden, expose sensitive material, or encourage others to continue treating Mira as permanently available. A defensible preparation compares its actual benefits and burdens. The fact that it serves a possible future cannot exempt it from present assessment.

Predictions also risk becoming self-confirming. If Mira is given only one practical route, she may later accommodate herself to it. Her eventual approval can then be evidence about a life formed under the imposed arrangement, rather than independent confirmation that the arrangement was the uniquely appropriate choice beforehand.

The observation does not make every formed preference suspect. All practical development occurs within conditions that shape experience and possibility. The critical question concerns which alternatives were foreclosed, what authority justified doing so, and how the person could later assess the formation. The account should avoid an impossible ideal of preference formation outside all influence.

A prediction-sensitive judgment can therefore remain conditional. It can say that a course is favored if a particular forecast is reliable, while identifying a different response if the forecast is weak. This conditional structure is more informative than treating all future concern as either decisive or irrelevant.

The practical significance for self-continuity is that a person can prepare for an uncertain future without making confidence itself a condition of concern. Mira's uncertainty about future values can motivate a form of care directed toward later access, explanation and choice. That care still leaves the first-person character of anticipation distinct from the accuracy of the prediction.

15.10 Irreversible Commitment and a Meaningful Present

Preserving later choice can conflict with undertaking something valuable now. This subsection gives that objection its strongest form. It tests the temptation to make openness the overriding measure of practical continuity.

Noor has an opportunity to devote a limited period to composing a work. Doing so will consume time that cannot later be returned. It may also close other opportunities. If every irreversible use of time counted against the decision merely because a future standpoint might prefer otherwise, meaningful present undertakings would become difficult to justify.

The value of agency includes acting on considered commitments under uncertainty. Such action often changes the available future. The later absence of an unchosen option can be a consequence of a justified present undertaking, rather than a defect in continuity.

The objection therefore defeats a general rule that always preserves the largest future menu. A practical account needs to compare the reason for acting now with the reason for preserving later discretion.

The comparison concerns substantive values, present participation, affected claims and the reversibility of particular consequences.

A more limited preservation argument survives. Where postponement carries modest cost, later information is materially relevant, and the current choice would irreversibly determine another occasion's judgment, there can be a strong reason to defer that determination. The reason becomes weaker when delay would sacrifice a significant current undertaking that cannot be pursued later.

Consider two versions of Noor's case. In the first, she can preserve a sketch and decide next month whether to develop it, with little loss. In the second, she has a unique opportunity for a collaborative performance that requires preparation now. Treating both as identical option-preservation problems would omit the temporal character of the opportunity.

The collaborator's involvement further changes the comparison. Noor's decision can affect another person's planning and effort. A future change of preference may justify withdrawal, yet the manner and timing of withdrawal require attention to those effects. Preserving Noor's future discretion does not make the collaborator's present contribution dispensable.

The conclusion is a domain-sensitive balance rather than a master ranking. Practical self-continuity can be sustained through deliberate commitment that narrows the future, and through deliberate reservation that leaves a question open. The relevant difference lies in the reasons for each act and the person's participation in it.

An account that treats every narrowing as loss would undervalue commitment. An account that treats every commitment as authority over all later judgment would undervalue revision. Their tension requires ongoing practical assessment. It cannot be resolved by defining continuity to favor one side.

15.11 Unresolved Conflict and Responsible Decision

Some temporal disagreements remain unresolved after the relevant distinctions have been made. This final discussion explains how a decision can still be responsible while its justification remains contestable. It separates practical closure from philosophical unanimity.

Mira and those affected may agree about the facts yet disagree about the weight of public access and contributor control. They may also agree that a decision is needed. A procedure can identify who is entitled to decide within the relevant arrangement, what reasons must be considered, and how the result can later be reviewed.

The procedure's authority needs its own justification. Calling it a review process supplies a description, while fairness, participation, scope and the treatment of affected claims supply possible grounds. The account cannot infer legitimacy from the presence of a sequence of meetings or a recorded vote.

Once a justified decision is made, dissent can remain intelligible. Mira may comply with a bounded obligation while continuing to argue that the arrangement should change. Elena may accept a provisional outcome while preserving a claim concerning a past failure. Such attitudes distinguish operative coordination from full evaluative agreement.

This distinction also applies within one life. Mira can choose a course now while acknowledging that an earlier concern remains reasonable and that a future standpoint may evaluate the choice differently. Acting responsibly need not involve constructing a story in which every temporal perspective converges.

The residual disagreement may generate obligations of explanation, review or repair. Their scope depends on the case. A person who knowingly takes a justified risk can still owe a response to an affected party when an adverse consequence occurs. Justification at the time and later answerability are compatible.

The philosophical gain is a more exact description of continuity under conflict. The continuing person remains related to earlier reasons, current action and anticipated consequences without requiring one unchanging ordering. The practical organization lies in how those relations are acknowledged and acted upon.

The formal ranking example therefore serves a limited but useful role. It blocks an unexamined identification of temporal consistency with practical justification. The substantive work follows through evidence, authority, participation, irreversibility and affected claims. These considerations explain how

changing judgment can belong within a continuing practical life while leaving difficult decisions genuinely difficult.

16 Dissent, Silence, and Supported Interpretation

This chapter examines situations in which a person's current stance is difficult to interpret. It develops distinctions among silence, uncertainty, refusal, and agreement, then analyzes how support can improve interpretation while creating risks of substitution. The argument is philosophical and procedural. It proposes no clinical test of decision-making capacity and no jurisdictional rule of consent.

16.1 Silence within a Continuing Undertaking

Mira attends a meeting about the archive and says little. The institution records her attendance and proceeds with publication. Several interpretations remain possible. She may agree, remain uncertain, feel unable to object, misunderstand the proposal, or regard the decision as someone else's responsibility. Silence alone leaves those alternatives open.

A history of earlier endorsement supplies context but cannot automatically convert silence into current agreement. The question concerns whether the earlier undertaking remains operative under the present conditions and what the meeting was intended to establish. A routine implementation decision differs from a new use with serious consequences. The inference needs a declared object.

Conversely, uncertainty should not be automatically interpreted as repudiation. Mira may wish to continue while needing more information about one procedure. Treating every hesitation as exit could undermine the very participation the inquiry seeks to protect. The response should preserve the possibility of a qualified or provisional stance.

The practical significance of silence also depends on the arrangement. A meeting can provide time, intelligible materials, and recognizable opportunities to object, or it can move rapidly through predetermined decisions. These conditions do not make interpretation infallible. They change what the evidence warrants and what further clarification is reasonable.

16.2 Expression and Its Conditions

A person can have a practical stance whose expression depends on context. Mira may articulate an objection in a private conversation while remaining quiet in a public meeting. The difference can reflect the audience, the stakes, uncertainty about permitted speech, or the form of the question. A comparison should investigate those possibilities without assuming a universal preference for one setting.

Support might consist of presenting the decision more clearly, separating several issues, allowing time, or inviting a response in another form. These interventions can reveal distinctions hidden by the original format. Mira might accept preservation, reject public release, and remain uncertain about transfer. A single yes-or-no question would have compressed those positions.

The intervention must itself remain open to criticism. Repeatedly asking until the preferred answer appears can be pressure disguised as clarification. Simplifying a question can omit a consequence that matters to the person. An interpreter should therefore explain how the supported response relates to the original issue and preserve relevant uncertainty.

The account's evidential discipline is especially important here. A more articulate response after support can improve understanding, but it does not automatically prove that every element was freely formed or fully informed. The conclusion should state what was clarified, through which process, and with what remaining limits.

16.3 Interpreters and Substitution

Suppose a colleague says that Mira's silence means she wants publication because the colleague knows her well. Familiarity can provide relevant evidence. The colleague may understand expressions, prior

concerns, or contextual meanings inaccessible to others. That advantage warrants attention rather than automatic acceptance.

The colleague also has a perspective and possible interests. They may favor completion, identify strongly with the old project, or fear the consequences of delay. Interpretation can then become substitution: the person's current response is replaced by a conclusion others consider consistent with her history.

A useful distinction concerns the role of the interpretive claim. It can be offered as a hypothesis to test with Mira and other evidence. Or it can be treated as a final authority that makes further engagement unnecessary. The first preserves a route for the person's response to matter. The second risks closing that route through an attribution about who she really is.

The possibility of substitution does not discredit all interpretation. Human communication often requires contextual understanding. The proposed discipline asks interpreters to preserve the difference between what was expressed, what they infer, and why the inference is credible. That structure supports correction when later evidence conflicts.

16.4 Refusal and Its Scope

Mira's refusal may concern publication, a particular meeting, the proposed timetable, or the institution's authority. These are different objects. A refusal of one arrangement can coexist with commitment to another. Treating it as global rejection of the archive may exaggerate the change.

A bounded interpretation can improve both agency and accountability. If Mira refuses a meeting format but accepts written consultation, another route remains available. If she rejects public release while accepting preservation, the inquiry can focus on the contested transition. If she rejects every role, the practical question turns toward exit and remaining obligations.

The scope also matters for historical description. A later statement that Mira abandoned the project could obscure a specific dispute about its governance. Conversely, describing a complete withdrawal as a minor procedural concern could conceal the end of current uptake. The record should preserve what the available evidence actually supports.

There may be cases where the refusal's scope remains unclear. The appropriate response can be temporary restraint, further clarification, or a limited decision justified by immediate conditions. Which response is appropriate requires normative argument. The theory supplies a map of the uncertainty rather than a universal instruction.

16.5 Uncertainty without Disqualification

An unresolved stance need not make a person irrelevant to a decision. Mira can remain uncertain while having valuable information, concerns, and claims about how the process proceeds. Participation can include identifying what she has yet to understand and which consequences worry her.

This challenges a binary picture in which a person either supplies a complete authoritative choice or becomes an object of others' management. Practical agency can be distributed across clarification, provisional judgment, and later revision. A theory of continuity should preserve these partial forms.

The same point applies to confidence. A confidently expressed preference can rest on a misunderstanding, while hesitation can show careful attention to competing reasons. Evidential weight should follow the content and conditions of the response, not confidence alone.

The proposed account therefore regards supported interpretation as part of practical continuity's infrastructure. It can connect changed capacities or unfamiliar records with current response. Its quality depends on whether it makes that response more intelligible and effective without appropriating it.

16.6 A Proportionate Interpretation Practice

A proportionate practice would specify the decision, distinguish its components, record the person's expressed stance, identify interpretive additions, and retain a route for correction. The degree of formality

should reflect the stakes. Ordinary low-consequence choices need not become elaborate proceedings.

The practice should also attend to privacy. Making a stance intelligible does not entitle an institution to reconstruct an entire personal history. A limited explanation can suffice for the practical decision. Requiring excessive disclosure can burden participation and turn support into surveillance.

The philosophical result is a qualified criterion for interpretation: a proposed account of current uptake should remain answerable to the person's response and the evidence of its formation. That criterion supplies no guarantee of certainty. It identifies a relation of accountability that helps distinguish understanding someone from managing a role attributed to them.

16.7 The Object of an Uncertain Response

An expression of uncertainty can concern different parts of a decision. This subsection analyzes those objects before assessing the person's practical stance. The distinction helps determine what information or support could make a response more intelligible.

Mira may be uncertain whether a contributor authorized public release. This is a historical question. Further evidence can be relevant even if her evaluative standard is clear: she wants the material used only within the permission legitimately given. Treating her uncertainty as indecision about values would misidentify what the inquiry needs to resolve.

She may instead understand the authorization and remain uncertain whether the proposed use is wise. The question then concerns evaluation under the present circumstances. More historical documentation might help indirectly, but repeating the authorization record would not necessarily answer her concern. The practical issue requires reasons about the proposed use.

A third uncertainty concerns authority. Mira may know what she wants but be unsure whether the decision is hers to make. The response can reflect an accurate recognition of shared control or an imposed belief that she has no standing to object. Those possibilities require different assessments. A demand that she simply state a preference leaves the authority question unresolved.

A fourth uncertainty concerns available action. Mira may reject public release while seeing no feasible way to protect the recording under the institution's current arrangement. Her hesitation then concerns how to act, rather than whether she cares. Revising the action set can matter more than eliciting a stronger declaration.

These uncertainties can occur together. Mira may need historical clarification, discussion of the present use, and a route for making a decision effective. A supported inquiry should identify their interaction rather than assume that one complete answer is waiting to be extracted from the person.

The distinction also protects against unjustified confidence. A clear statement about one object can coexist with uncertainty about another. Mira can firmly reject a meeting format while remaining undecided about publication. The record should preserve that qualified stance, because a global label of agreement or refusal would change the practical meaning of her response.

16.8 Clarifying a Choice and Changing Its Content

Support can make an existing choice easier to understand or introduce a different choice. This subsection examines the distinction through a sequence of questions. Its importance lies in how a later answer is interpreted as evidence about an earlier occasion.

At first, Mira is asked whether she approves publication of the collection. She expresses reservations. Later, a colleague asks whether she approves preservation with access limited to contributors. Mira agrees. The second answer provides evidence about the revised proposal. It does not establish that her earlier reservations about publication were overcome without a substantive change in the object.

The change can be a successful part of deliberation. Her reservations may have helped identify an arrangement that better fits the reasons at stake. The process then supports agency through responsive revision. Its success should be described as finding a different acceptable course, rather than obtaining the correct answer to an unchanged question.

The distinction can be concealed by record design. If both questions are stored under a general heading such as project approval, the final affirmative answer can overwrite the earlier objection. The resulting summary would make a substantial revision disappear. A more adequate record preserves the proposal's content at each relevant stage.

The same issue arises through simplification. A shorter question can omit a condition that made the original proposal objectionable. If Mira agrees to the simplified statement, the inquiry must assess whether she also understood the omitted condition. Clarity achieved by removing the disputed consequence would change the decision while appearing to clarify it.

Conversely, an expanded explanation can reveal a favorable feature that the original description obscured. Mira may then reasonably change her judgment about the same substantive arrangement. The process should preserve which information became available and how it bore on the decision. A changed answer can reflect learning without implying that the original response was irrational.

The analytical requirement is therefore to track the object alongside the answer. Comparison across occasions is meaningful only when changes of proposal, information, and context are identified. This requirement supports a more accurate account of practical continuity through deliberation.

16.9 Repeated Questions and the Interpretation of Agreement

Repeated questioning can provide time for understanding, but it can also alter the conditions under which an answer is given. This subsection develops a stipulated case in which repetition produces an affirmative response. It asks what that response warrants without assuming either pressure or successful clarification in advance.

Suppose a colleague asks Mira several times whether she will continue as the archive's representative. In the first exchange, she says she intends to leave. After further discussion, she agrees to help answer contributor questions for a short period. The later agreement can represent a new bounded undertaking whose scope differs from the original role. A summary stating that she agreed to continue would need to identify that limit.

Now suppose the colleague keeps asking the original question while treating every negative answer as evidence that Mira has misunderstood the importance of the archive. She eventually says yes to end the exchange. The stipulated reason for the answer changes its evidential significance. The word agreement would be an inadequate description if it implied considered adoption of the full role.

A third case gives the repetition a constructive role. Mira initially misunderstands which responsibilities remain. A careful explanation separates a small transition task from indefinite representation. After considering the distinction, she adopts the task and explains why it is acceptable. The process can improve understanding while creating a new commitment.

The visible sequence of several questions followed by yes is compatible with all three cases. Its interpretation depends on content, context, and the person's relation to the response. Counting consultation attempts supplies a poor substitute for that inquiry.

The evaluator should also consider whether a negative response could have practical effect. If the process is designed to continue until an affirmative answer appears, refusal may have no recognized endpoint. The resulting structure creates a reason to question the evidential value of eventual assent. It does not require assuming that every repeated question is coercive.

A proportionate inquiry therefore needs a way to recognize when clarification has reached its limit. The person can remain uncertain or reject the proposal. Further discussion may be appropriate for a changed question or newly available evidence, but the process should state why another attempt is warranted. The aim is understanding and a justified practical response, rather than an affirmative result as such.

16.10 A Proposed Standard of Responsive Support

The cases support a normative proposal about assistance in interpreting a stance. This subsection states the proposal's grounds and limits. It concerns whether the person's response remains able to shape the

inquiry and its practical outcome.

The first premise is that support offered in the name of the person's participation should preserve a meaningful role for their assessment. This premise follows from the stated purpose of the support only when that purpose is justified and actually guides the arrangement. A procedure cannot claim the value of participation while making every possible response serve a predetermined conclusion.

The second premise concerns the relation between means and burdens. Assistance should be proportionate to the difficulty and importance of the decision. A process that imposes extensive questioning for a minor choice can undermine participation through the burden it creates. A complex consequential decision may justify a more careful exchange. The relevant standard requires reasons about the case, rather than a fixed number of steps.

The third premise concerns accountability for interpretation. When an interpreter adds a conclusion beyond what the person expressed, the addition should remain identifiable and open to correction. This condition protects both the person's response and the interpreter's contribution. It permits informed inference while preventing that inference from becoming indistinguishable from the person's own statement.

Together, these premises support a defeasible standard: assistance is better justified as support for participation when it makes the person's relevant assessment more intelligible and capable of affecting the arrangement at a proportionate burden. The standard does not guarantee that the resulting decision is correct. It identifies why some ways of helping have a stronger claim to the description than others.

The comparison concerns the participatory purpose with other relevant conditions held fixed. An overall assessment must also consider independent claims, costs, and harms that differ between processes. A procedure can serve participation better in one respect while being less justified overall because of a separate serious burden.

A critic could object that actual responsiveness is expensive and that an institution sometimes needs a decision. The objection identifies a real constraint. It can justify a bounded decision under uncertainty where the institution has independent authority to act. It should then be described as such, rather than as a decision chosen by the person whose stance remained unresolved.

Another objection concerns a response that would seriously harm others. Taking the response seriously need not require implementing it. The institution can assess and reject a proposed course on independently justified grounds while accurately recording the person's position. Responsiveness concerns the role of assessment within the process, not an unlimited power to determine every outcome.

The proposed standard therefore preserves a practical distinction between supported judgment and justified action taken by others. Both can occur in one case. Confusing them would obscure the sources of authority and responsibility that the account seeks to make explicit.

16.11 Familiar Interpreters and Conflicts of Interest

A familiar interpreter can understand a person's manner of response while also having interests in the decision. This subsection examines how those features should be assessed together. The aim is to avoid both automatic trust and automatic exclusion.

Arun may recognize that Mira uses a particular phrase when she is asking for more time. His familiarity can help others avoid misreading hesitation as agreement. That contribution has an evidential value grounded in their history of communication, subject to the possibility of error.

Arun may also need the archive to continue because his own plans depend on it. His interest does not make his interpretation false. It supplies a reason to ask how the interpretation is supported, whether alternatives were considered, and whether Mira can confirm or challenge it through an accessible route.

A process can distribute these tasks. Arun can explain the contextual interpretation; another participant can clarify the proposal; Mira can respond in a setting that reduces the practical cost of disagreement. Such an arrangement can preserve useful familiarity while reducing reliance on one person's unreviewable judgment.

The distribution itself can become burdensome. Introducing several interpreters may make communication more confusing or intrusive. More participants do not automatically produce a better account.

The arrangement should be justified by the particular evidential difficulty and the person's mode of engagement.

A countercase concerns an unfamiliar evaluator who appears neutral but misunderstands the context. Formal distance from the undertaking supplies no guarantee of interpretive accuracy. The choice between familiar and independent assistance therefore involves different strengths and risks, rather than a universal hierarchy of trustworthy roles.

The account proposes transparency about those roles. An interpreter can state what they observed, what their history suggests, what they infer, and what remains uncertain. The person's response can then enter as a distinct source. This organization keeps support connected to an accountable inquiry instead of treating familiarity or neutrality as a substitute for evidence.

16.12 Deciding while Interpretation Remains Incomplete

Some practical decisions must be made before the person's stance is fully understood. This subsection examines how the account should describe that situation. It preserves uncertainty while distinguishing temporary protection, independently authorized action, and a new undertaking by the person.

Suppose a recording is about to be released under an unclear authorization, and Mira's current response remains unresolved. A temporary pause may protect an opportunity for clarification if the costs of delay are proportionate. The pause would be justified through the claims and consequences at stake, rather than through an invented attribution that Mira chose it.

Another case may require action despite uncertainty. A storage arrangement could be ending, making some transfer necessary. The institution may need to select a bounded provisional course within its legitimate authority. Its decision should identify the uncertainty and the reasons for proceeding. Calling the result Mira's endorsed revision would overstate what the inquiry established.

A later response can then alter the arrangement. If Mira clarifies her stance, the institution should assess its relevance to the provisional decision. The possibility of review gives uncertainty a practical structure. It does not require assuming that every later statement automatically invalidates what was reasonably done earlier.

The person can also participate in identifying a tolerable provisional course without settling the underlying substantive issue. Mira might agree that the recording should remain protected during discussion while continuing to dispute who can authorize eventual access. Such a limited agreement should be preserved at its actual scope.

The case demonstrates that partial participation can matter. An inquiry need not choose between complete endorsement and complete exclusion. It can locate the aspects of the decision on which the person has a clear response and the aspects requiring another justified source of authority.

The account therefore ends with a disciplined relation between interpretation and action. Evidence can remain incomplete, authority can be distributed, and a practical response can still be required. Preserving those distinctions makes it possible to act without manufacturing agreement and to continue inquiry without treating the person's agency as suspended until every uncertainty disappears.

17 Gradual Change and the Authority of an Undertaking

This chapter examines a sequence of individually small changes whose combined effect transforms an undertaking. It distinguishes local continuity from preservation of an original end, then analyzes how gradual change affects authority, self-interpretation, and institutional evidence. The cases show why an uninterrupted chain of transitions can coexist with substantial practical discontinuity.

17.1 Local Adjustment and Global Transformation

Mira begins with a small archive intended for contributors and nearby residents. Each year the project changes slightly: access expands, selection becomes more centralized, sponsors request clearer publicity,

and contributors receive less influence over presentation. Each step can appear manageable in isolation. The final arrangement may differ substantially from the one originally undertaken.

A description of adjacent similarity captures one feature of the sequence. Each later arrangement resembles its predecessor. That relation need not justify treating the endpoints as equivalent for every purpose. A chain of small changes can accumulate a difference relevant to privacy, control, or the meaning of participation.

The point is conceptual before it is mathematical. A tolerance judgment permits some difference under a declared purpose. Treating a chain of tolerated differences as unlimited sameness adds a transitivity assumption that may fail. The practical question concerns which features the tolerance was intended to preserve and whether the sequence continues to preserve them.

A historical account should therefore retain intermediate changes and the reasons given for them. An endpoint comparison reveals the accumulated transformation; a stepwise account explains how it occurred. Either alone can omit something important. The first may conceal reasonable local decisions, while the second may conceal their combined result.

17.2 Endorsement across a Sequence

Suppose Mira endorses each adjustment. Does that establish current endorsement of the final arrangement? It supplies relevant evidence, but the interpretation depends on her understanding of the cumulative change. She may have assessed every step in isolation without recognizing the resulting pattern.

This possibility should not automatically discredit incremental decision-making. People often act reasonably through local judgments under limited information. The question is whether a present review would reveal that the cumulative arrangement conflicts with a concern still significant to Mira. If so, continued agency can include reconsidering the whole.

An institution might resist such review by pointing to the sequence of approvals. Those approvals establish historical acts under their conditions. They do not necessarily establish an undertaking to accept every cumulative consequence indefinitely. The authority attributed to them requires attention to scope and information.

A contrary case is also possible. Mira may recognize the cumulative change and endorse it as a valuable transformation. Contributors who preferred the original arrangement can still object on their own grounds. The analysis should preserve both the fact of her revised stance and the independent claims of others.

17.3 Changing Standards of Evaluation

Gradual change can alter the standards by which the undertaking is assessed. Mira initially values careful relationships with contributors, then increasingly values scale and public visibility. The final plan may appear successful under the later standard while failing the earlier one.

The shift raises several questions. Did new experience reveal a reason to revise the standard? Did institutional incentives selectively reward one concern? Did the original standard become impractical under changed conditions? These explanations can overlap. The mere fact of a changed ranking does not decide among them.

A theory that identifies continuity with stable evaluation would exclude ordinary learning. A theory that regards every evaluative change as equally authoritative would miss manipulation and drift. The proposed approach traces the change's formation and present uptake, then examines the reasons offered for its authority.

Retrospective criticism remains possible without denying historical agency. Mira may conclude that she voluntarily accepted changes she now judges mistaken. That judgment can motivate repair. The ability to criticize one's own sequence of decisions is itself a form of practical relation to the past.

17.4 Institutional Drift and Evidence

An institution can normalize a transformation by changing categories gradually. A contributor initially described as a participant may become a source, then a content provider, then a subject whose permission is treated as a completed administrative event. Each label can affect what responses remain available.

These changes can shape later evidence. If contributors lose opportunities to comment, the absence of objections may appear to confirm acceptance. If Mira's role increasingly rewards publicity, her continued promotional activity may appear to demonstrate an enduring preference for scale. The behavior is partly produced by the evolving arrangement.

A careful account compares the opportunities and constraints at different stages. It asks what could be expressed, what would have happened after an objection, and which records were retained. The aim is to distinguish stable uptake from stability produced through narrowing alternatives.

The analysis remains conditional. Category change does not always diminish participation, and incentives can support worthwhile commitments. The mechanism must be assessed in its actual direction and context. A general suspicion of institutions would be as uninformative as an automatic inference from persistence to consent.

17.5 Thresholds and Deliberative Review

A practical arrangement can specify conditions prompting broader review. Expansion beyond an intended audience, a new type of material, or changed control might require reconsideration of the undertaking's overall purpose. Such triggers can connect local adjustments to a more comprehensive judgment.

The triggers require justification. A numerical threshold chosen for convenience may miss the change that matters. A small change in access could be more consequential than a large change in storage capacity. The relevant criterion concerns the undertaking's practical meaning and affected claims.

Review should also allow disagreement about whether the threshold was crossed. A person might reasonably perceive a transformed relationship before the institution's formal trigger activates. The procedure can preserve that concern as a reason for examination rather than treating the trigger as an exhaustive definition of significance.

A good review does not require restoration of the original arrangement. It may endorse the transformation, revise it, or end the undertaking. Its role is to make cumulative change available for present assessment. Continuity of agency can thus be supported by occasions of discontinuity in routine.

17.6 Historical Continuity and Present Responsibility

The sequence of small decisions remains part of the history whatever the final assessment. Mira can acknowledge her participation while explaining the limitations of her earlier understanding. An institution can recognize cumulative effects without assigning every consequence to a single isolated decision.

Responsibility may be distributed across actors and stages. That distribution needs an argument concerning authority, knowledge, contribution, and feasible alternatives. A simple continuity relation identifies connected events but leaves allocation open. The same caution applies to self-blame: a person need not infer unlimited responsibility from being the tracked participant throughout.

The chapter's result is that local continuation and global preservation are distinct. Gradual change can retain agency while transforming an end, or preserve outward routine while weakening participation. A comprehensive practical account should inspect both the chain and the accumulated arrangement. That dual perspective allows continuity to remain criticizable over time.

17.7 Local Permission and the Resulting Arrangement

An approval of a change can authorize a limited act or the resulting arrangement more broadly. This subsection distinguishes those objects. It addresses a possible overstatement of the cumulative-change argument: a transformed endpoint does not, by itself, show that the sequence lacked valid authorization.

Suppose Mira understands the archive's current arrangement and authorizes a clearly described revision. If she has the relevant authority, the approval can give the revised arrangement a valid practical basis within its scope. A later change can receive a further valid approval. There is no contradiction in a sequence of valid decisions producing an endpoint quite different from the start.

The significance of the sequence depends on what each decision authorized. An approval to add one contributor under existing conditions differs from an approval to alter the conditions for every contributor. A record containing only the word approved would fail to preserve that difference. The inquiry must identify the object and scope of the decision.

A cumulative objection can therefore take several forms. It may show that a local act exceeded the authority available, that the resulting arrangement was misunderstood, that interacting changes produced an unanticipated consequence, or that a new reason now supports revision. These are distinct claims. The mere fact of substantial change establishes none of them.

This clarification matters to Mira's historical acknowledgment. She can regret a sequence she genuinely understood and endorsed. Present criticism need not convert every earlier approval into evidence of manipulation. An accurate account can preserve earlier agency while supporting a different current judgment.

Conversely, a record of individual approvals can overstate understanding when each question concerned only an isolated feature. If participants were never informed that the features interacted, the sequence may fail to support a claim that the combined arrangement was knowingly authorized. The adequacy of the information becomes central.

The account therefore treats local and cumulative assessment as complementary. A valid local sequence can support a transformed undertaking. A cumulative review can reveal consequences or reasons that justify another change. Practical self-continuity can include both the earlier adoption and the later criticism without requiring that one cancel the other.

17.8 Interacting Changes and Unanticipated Effects

Several individually understood changes can interact in a way that becomes significant only in combination. This subsection develops a specific case. Its purpose is to distinguish failure of foresight from failure of endorsement, and both from deliberate acceptance of a known tradeoff.

The archive first makes names searchable within a restricted collection. Later, it allows a separate set of location descriptions to be searched. Each change is presented under an assumption that the relevant information remains difficult to combine. A further technical arrangement then makes the two searches jointly usable, exposing connections that neither earlier description highlighted.

The case stipulates an interaction among features, not a general claim about a particular technology. The practical consequence lies in what the combined arrangement permits. An account that assesses each approval only against its isolated description would miss the changed possibility.

Mira may have reasonably understood each earlier decision while lacking information about the later interaction. Her earlier agency can remain intact. Once the combined consequence becomes clear, she can have a new reason to reconsider the arrangement. The argument for revision then rests on changed understanding of effects, rather than a claim that the earlier approvals were never real.

The assessment differs if Mira understood the interaction and accepted it despite objections. A later reversal can still be justified, but the historical explanation changes. She would be reconsidering a previously accepted tradeoff. Responsibility for the earlier decision should be assessed on that basis.

An institutional explanation also requires a distribution of knowledge. One participant may have understood the technical connection while another understood contributor expectations. The absence of any one person who held both kinds of knowledge can explain a failure of collective assessment. It does not automatically absolve everyone. The undertaking's allocation of responsibilities determines what communication and review were reasonably required.

The case supports a specific role for cumulative review. It can examine relations among changes, not only the number or size of the changes. A single new connection can alter the practical significance

of several existing features. Preserving the reasons and assumptions behind earlier decisions can make that interaction easier to identify.

17.9 A Changed Standard and Retrospective Fairness

Later evaluation can use standards that differ from those guiding earlier decisions. This subsection examines how to criticize the past without attributing current understanding to the earlier person. It distinguishes moral or practical criticism of an arrangement from a judgment about the quality of a past decision.

Mira may come to regard contributor control as more important than she did when the archive expanded. Her later standard can support a strong criticism of the earlier arrangement. That criticism concerns what the arrangement did and whose interests it served. Assessing her earlier decision also requires asking what reasons and information were available then.

The distinction does not make earlier standards immune to criticism. Mira could have had good reason to question a priority she accepted too readily. A historical account should examine the opportunities for criticism and the voices available. Preserving context means assessing those conditions accurately, rather than excusing every earlier judgment by labeling it a product of its time.

A contrary error uses hindsight to erase real uncertainty. If an effect became apparent only after several changes interacted, the fact that Mira now understands it does not establish that she knowingly accepted it earlier. Criticism should identify whether the issue was ignored, misunderstood, unforeseeable within the case, or reasonably judged differently.

The later person can also overstate the unity of the earlier period. Mira may recall herself as consistently devoted to publicity because that description makes her current change easier to explain. Records might reveal sustained reservations and several attempts to limit expansion. A narrative of conversion can be meaningful while oversimplifying the actual sequence.

A more precise account can preserve mixed historical motives and changing degrees of understanding. Mira may have valued publicity, recognized some risks, underestimated others, and accepted a compromise she later rejected. This complexity matters to answerability because different grounds support different criticisms and responses.

The proposed practical continuity consists partly in willingness to engage that mixed history. Accurate self-criticism can guide repair and future judgment without requiring a simple story of either innocence or total responsibility. The relation to the past becomes more accountable when the criteria and evidential limits of the retrospective judgment are explicit.

17.10 Delegation across a Sequence of Revisions

An undertaking can change through decisions delegated to several people. This subsection examines the relation between a person's initial delegation and later developments they did not individually approve. The issue differs from a sequence in which the same person knowingly decides each step.

Mira may authorize colleagues to make routine preservation decisions while reserving changes in public access for wider review. The delegation can support the archive's continuity by reducing the need for her involvement in every task. Its scope determines which later actions can be attributed to the authority she granted.

A colleague's technically routine decision can have an effect on access. The overlap then creates a question about the delegation's boundary. Calling the act routine does not settle whether the reserved issue was implicated. The inquiry needs the purpose and foreseeable consequences of the decision, along with the terms under which authority was assigned.

The case can involve genuine ambiguity. Mira and the colleague may have understood the boundary differently without either intending to overreach. A later clarification can establish a new rule while leaving the earlier disagreement as a historical fact. The record should distinguish correcting an act outside known authority from revising an ambiguous allocation.

Delegation also changes the evidential significance of Mira's silence. If routine decisions properly fall within another person's role, her lack of response can reflect the arrangement rather than current approval of each outcome. Conversely, silence cannot automatically authorize a decision outside the delegated scope merely because she remained associated with the project.

A person can retain a responsibility to review a delegated arrangement if that responsibility was reasonably undertaken. Failure to attend to warning signs can then matter to assessment. The argument should identify the review duty and the available signals, rather than infer unlimited oversight from founding the archive.

Practical self-continuity through delegation therefore involves an evolving relation among authority, information, and response. A person can remain responsible for particular aspects of an undertaking while others govern their own contributions. The continuity is distributed and bounded, with later changes requiring attention to the scope of each role.

17.11 Review Triggers and the Limits of Formal Thresholds

A formal trigger can help make cumulative change visible while failing to capture every practically significant development. This subsection examines the justification of such triggers. It treats them as aids to review rather than exhaustive definitions of when reconsideration matters.

Suppose the archive requires a review whenever the intended audience changes. The trigger reflects a plausible concern: a new audience can alter the meaning and consequences of access. It has an advantage over a rule based only on the number of files because it targets a relation that matters to contributors.

The trigger still requires interpretation. A nominally unchanged audience can gain new ways to combine information, or an apparently new audience may already have access under an earlier arrangement. The practical issue concerns the actual change, not merely the category name. A rule can prompt inquiry while leaving its application contestable.

Numerical thresholds can be useful for organizing limited attention. A growth point may make review administratively manageable. The number should then be explained as a practical scheduling choice, rather than as a natural boundary of agency or consent. A small change can warrant review before the threshold when its consequences are significant.

A trigger can also be exploited. An institution may divide a large change into smaller decisions so that none formally activates the review. If the purpose of the rule concerns the accumulated effect, that strategy would frustrate the reason for the threshold. The argument for broader review follows from the rule's justified purpose and the sequence's effect, rather than from a claim that every incremental change is suspect.

The cost of review remains relevant. Frequent comprehensive reassessment can make an undertaking difficult to sustain. A proportionate arrangement can combine targeted triggers, opportunities for participants to raise concerns, and periodic attention to accumulated effects. Its adequacy depends on the activity and available resources.

The account therefore assigns thresholds a limited role. They can preserve occasions for present judgment across gradual change. They should remain accountable to the concerns that justify them and open to evidence that a significant transformation has occurred outside their formal boundary.

17.12 Continuity through Acknowledged Revision

The gradual-change analysis culminates in a specific account of how a person can remain connected to a sequence they now criticize. This subsection states that account while preserving the possibility of justified departure. The aim is to explain a continuing practical relation without declaring the entire sequence one unchanged project.

Mira can acknowledge the decisions she made, distinguish what she understood at each stage, and recognize how the arrangement changed. She can then identify which concerns remain live and which ends she has abandoned. That activity connects historical agency with present judgment.

The acknowledgment can support a new undertaking, such as correcting a record or arranging a transfer. Its content may differ substantially from the original project. The connection lies in responding to the history's reasons and consequences, rather than preserving the same operational end.

A person may also decide that continued involvement would reproduce the conditions they now criticize. Departure can then be part of an appropriate response, provided particular remaining claims are addressed within justified limits. The account should avoid treating continued proximity to the institution as the measure of responsible continuity.

The historical sequence remains available for criticism by others. Contributors can disagree with Mira's interpretation of what was reasonably foreseeable or adequately authorized. Those disagreements should concern specific claims and evidence. A broad accusation that she has changed too much leaves the normative issue underdescribed.

The positive result is therefore an accountable form of revisability. Local decisions can be valid, accumulated effects can become newly significant, and a later judgment can warrant a different course. Practical self-continuity can include that sequence without converting regret into historical invalidity or historical approval into permanent authority.

18 Future Care under Anticipated Value Reversal

This chapter considers a person who expects later values to conflict with present values and nevertheless seeks to care for that future life. It develops the distinction between preserving welfare, preserving agency, and preserving a particular identity. The analysis then examines irreversible choices, evaluative uncertainty, and concern extending through repudiation. These cases deepen the positive account of continuity beyond persistence of commitment content.

18.1 Different Objects of Preservation

Present Mira expects that she will later leave archival work and prefer a private life. She can preserve the archive, preserve her ability to choose another activity, or preserve conditions supporting later wellbeing. These aims can coincide but need not. A plan maximizing the archive's survival might consume the resources needed for exit.

The choice among aims reveals what present concern is directed toward. If Mira values the project above all else, she may seek execution independent of later participation. If she values a continuing life with room for changed judgment, she may preserve options at some cost to the project. If she values protection against anticipated suffering, she may prioritize material conditions even where agency is limited.

These are distinct practical orientations rather than a ready ranking of virtue. A project can embody obligations to others, so preserving it may be justified. Preserving options can burden people who relied on a specific undertaking. Care requires attention to those relations. The distinction prevents one object of preservation from being smuggled into another.

The case also shows why self-concern need not mean preservation of present identity content. Mira can care about a future she expects to find unfamiliar. She may retain an orientation toward that life while expecting its projects and self-description to differ. The continuity lies in the directed care and practical preparation, not in complete agreement about values.

18.2 Anticipated Disagreement and Present Reasons

Mira may have several reasons to support the expected change. She may believe that future experience will disclose considerations she presently lacks. She may judge that a later decision should respond to the situation then encountered. She may also value the continued possibility of practical growth independently of its direction.

These reasons differ in structure. An epistemic argument favors later judgment because of expected information. An authority argument gives weight to the person situated at the time of action. A developmental argument values continued capacity to change. None follows simply from causal persistence.

The reasons can conflict. Future experience may be richer in one respect while the later situation is more constrained in another. A later preference can reflect both learning and adaptation to limited options. The account therefore should resist treating change as evidence of either progress or corruption without further inquiry.

Present Mira can respond through a provisional arrangement. She can protect materials, reserve resources, and establish an opportunity for later review. Such preparation takes uncertainty seriously while leaving future participation possible. It is an active form of concern, even though it avoids fixing one substantive outcome.

18.3 Disapproval without Abandonment

A more demanding case gives present Mira genuine disapproval of the expected future values. She expects to regard public contribution as less important and private comfort as more important. She can think that change unfortunate while still caring about the later person's experience and ability to choose.

The combination is philosophically significant. Concern need not depend on approving every value held by its object. This is familiar in relations between different people, and it can also structure temporal self-concern. The analogy illuminates the practical organization while leaving the first-person relation distinct.

A person might fear that permitting change betrays a present ideal. That concern deserves analysis, especially where the ideal organizes much of their activity. Yet betrayal is itself an interpretation requiring reasons. It cannot settle whether present action should constrain every later departure.

One response distinguishes the ideal's influence from its sovereignty. Mira can make her reasons available to the future through records and explanations. She can invite later consideration without ensuring obedience. The earlier ideal remains a practical resource whose force can be assessed in the later situation.

This response has limits. If others possess justified claims, preserving only an invitation may be insufficient. Confidentiality may require durable safeguards. The practical relation then includes obligations independent of whether later Mira shares the earlier ideal. The account must state those obligations rather than disguising them as authenticity requirements.

18.4 Irreversibility and the Future's Range

An irreversible present act can determine conditions under which future values operate. Publishing an interview, destroying a record, or surrendering access can close possibilities later judgment would otherwise consider. These acts deserve attention because the later person cannot simply reverse them after changing their mind.

The relevance of irreversibility does not establish a universal preference for delay. Some opportunities disappear through waiting, and preserving every option can impose costs. The comparison needs to consider both forms of loss. A defensible decision identifies which possibilities matter and why.

The case becomes especially difficult when present action changes the future person who evaluates the result. An experience can alter interests, relationships, and standards. The present ranking then concerns a future that may not evaluate itself by the same terms. The opposed-ranking analysis shows why a simple aggregate can conceal that difficulty.

A practical response may focus on preserving a process of response rather than a fixed menu. Mira can retain evidence, trusted connections, and resources for revision. Those supports can remain useful across several possible value changes. Their usefulness is conditional upon the future circumstances and the person's relation to them; they are not guaranteed instruments of a good life.

18.5 Care and Respectful Uncertainty

Caring for an unfamiliar future requires acknowledging limits of present understanding. Mira may know some vulnerabilities and obligations while remaining uncertain about later preferences. She can act on what is warranted without pretending to possess a complete image of the future self.

This differs from indifference. Indifference ignores the later situation's significance; respectful uncertainty treats that significance as a reason to preserve information and response where feasible. The outward actions can sometimes resemble each other, so interpretation requires attention to reasons and context.

The distinction also differs from unlimited deference. A person can preserve future judgment while maintaining safeguards justified by others' claims or by clear features of the undertaking. The challenge is to explain those safeguards through their reasons, not through an assertion that the past self is more genuine.

The proposed continuity therefore contains both care and restraint. Present action takes responsibility for some future conditions while recognizing that later participation has its own situated authority. The balance is practical and normative; it remains open to criticism in particular cases.

18.6 The Positive Account Revisited

These cases strengthen the account by showing how continuity can reach through expected repudiation. A person can preserve reasons without demanding their repetition, support later agency without knowing its conclusions, and care about later experience while disapproving of anticipated values. That is a substantive form of temporal relation.

The account still cannot infer the first-person character from this structure alone, because comparable care can be directed toward another. What it explains is how an acknowledged future-self relation can organize present action beyond replication of current preference. The residual question of mineness remains explicit.

The normative result is similarly bounded. Self-continuity supplies a context in which present and future reasons interact. It does not authorize domination by either temporal standpoint. A continuing life can be supported through arrangements that keep history legible, consequences answerable, and revision possible within justified limits.

18.7 A Case for Reserving a Later Decision

The positive account needs an argument for some forms of preparation that leave future judgment open. This subsection develops a conditional case for reserving a later decision. It uses Noor's private composition to separate the issue from obligations created by promises to contributors.

Noor expects to have a period available for a substantial personal undertaking. He presently hopes to complete the musical sketch, but he also expects that intervening work may change his understanding of what is worth doing. He can commit the period irreversibly to one arrangement now or retain a practicable opportunity to decide later. Assume initially that preserving the opportunity has a modest cost and does not frustrate an independent claim by another person.

The first consideration favors waiting for relevant information. Noor expects to learn something that bears directly on the choice among undertakings. If the later information can be used without losing a crucial opportunity, deciding later can make the action more responsive to the situation in which it will occur. This is an epistemic reason whose strength depends on the expected information and the consequences of delay.

A second consideration concerns participation at the time of action. The undertaking will occupy a later period of Noor's life, with experiences, efforts, and competing concerns situated there. Giving his later judgment a role recognizes that the significance of the activity will partly depend on how he understands and engages it then. This proposed normative reason differs from a prediction that the later choice will maximize an independently fixed benefit.

A third consideration concerns the scope of the present aim. Noor wants his practice to develop, which includes some possibility that later work changes his standards. Reserving a decision can serve that aim without specifying its outcome. The reason is conditional on the character of the aim. A project whose point requires a commitment now may support a different arrangement.

Taken together, these considerations provide a defeasible case for retaining a meaningful later choice in the initial situation. The conclusion is limited: when relevant information is expected, later participation matters, and preservation is proportionate, reserving the decision can be justified. It does not follow that the later standpoint is always wiser or that present commitments should remain indefinitely provisional.

The case also leaves first-person explanation open. Noor can understand the later activity as part of his own anticipated life. The practical reasons show how that understanding can organize present preparation. Comparable reasons can support preparation for another person's agency, so the structure itself does not prove the distinctiveness of temporal self-concern.

18.8 The Normative Role of Later Participation

The appeal to later participation requires justification beyond the statement that preferences may change. This subsection explains why a later stance can matter to a decision about a continuing life. It also states why that stance need not receive unrestricted authority.

An undertaking has a different practical character when the person performing it can understand, assess, and respond to its reasons. Noor's later activity is affected by whether he can take up the work or only execute an arrangement settled in advance. If present concern includes care for that activity as an exercise of agency, this difference supplies a reason to preserve some role for later judgment.

The argument depends on a normative valuation of participation. A person concerned only with producing an artifact might rank arrangements differently. The paper proposes that the person's involvement in shaping a substantial undertaking is itself relevant to its assessment, because the undertaking uses time, capacities, and attention within their life. Treating those conditions as mere instruments for an earlier end would require justification.

This reason also has limits of scale. A previously agreed minor task may reasonably be performed without reopening its entire purpose. Reconsideration can impose costs and disrupt coordination. The importance of later participation does not require continuous reauthorization of every action. It requires an account of when the person's changed judgment is significant enough to affect the arrangement.

The degree of change matters too. A fleeting wish to avoid a difficult passage can differ from a considered rejection of the project's purpose. The difference should be investigated rather than encoded as a rule that only one kind of current feeling is real. Evidence about reasons, duration, alternatives, and the conditions of judgment can support a more specific interpretation.

A critic might argue that the earlier Noor also exercised agency and that later revision defeats his choice. The objection identifies a real temporal conflict. The response is to examine what his earlier choice reasonably sought to govern. A plan for future work can organize a continuing activity while leaving its appropriateness open to changed circumstances. If the earlier choice sought complete control regardless of those circumstances, that stronger claim needs additional justification.

The proposed position therefore assigns later participation a defeasible significance without establishing present sovereignty at every successive moment. Earlier reasons remain available, and legitimate claims of others can persist. The practical judgment concerns how the temporal standpoints should interact within the particular undertaking.

18.9 Present Meaning and Irreversible Commitment

A reason to preserve later choice can conflict with a present undertaking whose value requires commitment now. This subsection examines that countercase. It prevents the account of future care from turning into a universal preference for postponement or option preservation.

Suppose Noor has an opportunity to compose for a small event that will occur only once. Preparing the work now would use the period he might otherwise preserve for later choice. The event's significance depends on participation at this time. Waiting until his future preferences are clearer would lose the opportunity.

The present undertaking can supply a serious reason to commit. Its value need not be reducible to the future person's anticipated evaluation. Noor is already living a life with current relationships, concerns, and opportunities. An account that treated every present activity as merely preparation for a later chooser would indefinitely displace the significance of present participation.

The choice therefore compares different temporal goods. One concerns a meaningful current commitment with foreseeable future costs. Another concerns preserving a later opportunity whose substantive use remains uncertain. A formal count of options cannot rank them adequately. The relevant reasons concern what the options enable, what commitment accomplishes, and what is lost through delay.

Noor can reasonably accept some risk of later regret. An expectation that every later standpoint must endorse a present choice would prohibit many substantial undertakings whose significance becomes clear only through living them. The possibility of regret remains a consideration, but it does not establish that present commitment is irresponsible.

The strength of the commitment case can nevertheless diminish if Noor foresees a severe restriction on later agency without a proportionate reason. A short undertaking differs from an arrangement that forecloses every plausible route of future change. The argument should assess the scope and reversibility of the burden, rather than treating commitment and freedom as mutually exclusive categories.

The resulting position is plural. Care for a future can support reserving a decision, preparing for a particular undertaking, or accepting a justified irreversible commitment. The appropriate response depends on the reasons and relations at stake. Practical self-continuity is the setting in which these choices matter, rather than a rule that predetermines their outcome.

18.10 Preparation that Changes the Later Evaluation

Present preparation can help form the future stance that evaluates it. This subsection examines the resulting difficulty for appeals to later endorsement. It develops an argument about assessment without assuming that all preference formation is either beneficial education or manipulation.

Suppose Noor commits to a period of disciplined composition and expects that the work will deepen his appreciation of the practice. If he later values the resulting abilities, his endorsement can be relevant evidence about the experience. It cannot by itself establish that the earlier decision was justified, because the decision helped create the standards through which he now evaluates it.

The same structural feature can appear in a troubling arrangement. An institution could narrow a person's alternatives until continued participation becomes their only intelligible future. Later endorsement might then partly reflect the environment the institution imposed. The point is a philosophical possibility about formation and evidence, not an empirical generalization about every constrained choice.

A blanket rejection of formed preferences would be equally inadequate. Learning, collaboration, and sustained practice can change what a person understands and values. If only preferences independent of every formative process counted as authoritative, the standard would exclude much of the activity through which practical judgment develops.

The inquiry therefore needs to assess the process as well as the endpoint. Relevant questions include whether the person could understand the commitment's scope, encounter criticism, revise the arrangement, and retain access to concerns that the process might otherwise suppress. These conditions do not mechanically determine authenticity, but they provide specific grounds for evaluating how present preparation shapes later judgment.

Noor's later account can contribute to that assessment without becoming its sole criterion. He may explain that the work opened possibilities he could not previously understand, or that it narrowed his life in ways he now regrets. His report matters alongside the history of choice, the conditions of participation, and the alternatives available at relevant times.

The argument also limits retrospective condemnation. A later preference that differs from what Noor expected does not automatically show that he should have known the result. The earlier decision should be assessed in light of the reasons and information then available, while later evidence can improve understanding of its consequences. Historical justification and current evaluation are related but distinct.

18.11 Caring for a Future that Rejects the Care

The strongest case of temporal disagreement involves a later person who rejects the preparation offered on their behalf. This subsection asks how present care can remain intelligible under that possibility. It distinguishes concern's sincerity from its adequacy.

Present Noor may preserve detailed notes explaining why he wanted to complete the sketch. Later, he might find those notes helpful, irrelevant, or burdensome. He could experience them as an invitation to recover possibilities or as a demand to remain faithful to an aspiration he has left behind. The same preserved object can enter a different practical relation depending on how it is presented and used.

The earlier act can be caring in intention while poorly suited to the later situation. Recognizing that possibility permits criticism without denying the original concern. A theory that defines care by successful future endorsement would exclude unsuccessful care by stipulation and conceal the need to learn from it.

Present care can respond to uncertainty through the design of the preparation. Noor might preserve reasons in a way that the later person can consult or set aside, rather than create an arrangement requiring repeated confrontation with them. The difference concerns the mode of address and practical effect of the record. It is a candidate response where feasible, not a universal rule of archival design.

A later rejection need not defeat every earlier safeguard. If the preparation also protects a legitimate claim of another person, its authority may derive partly from that claim. Mira's future preference for unrestricted release cannot by itself annul a contributor's justified condition. The safeguard should then be explained through that independent ground, rather than as an expression of her more authentic earlier self.

A difficult private case concerns a preparation that preserves something the later Noor wants destroyed. The earlier act may have left him the capacity to decide, in which case rejection can be part of the care's intended openness. If the earlier act made preservation irreversible, the justification needs a stronger reason for denying later control. The structure of temporal self-concern supplies no automatic answer.

The paper therefore treats care as an accountable relation. Its adequacy depends on what it protects, how it addresses the anticipated person, and what room it leaves for a response. Caring about a future does not guarantee that the future will approve the care. A mature practical account should preserve both propositions.

18.12 The Future's Evidence about the Past

Later judgment can change how an earlier decision is understood without rewriting the reasons available when it was made. This subsection examines the evidential role of the future in temporal self-assessment. It avoids treating either earlier intention or later experience as the complete authority.

Suppose Noor later discovers that the reserved period allowed an undertaking he values more than completing the sketch. The result supports the practical usefulness of the earlier flexibility in this case. It does not establish that every similar choice would produce the same benefit. The inference should remain tied to the circumstances and the decision actually considered.

Another future might reveal that the reservation led to a lost opportunity Noor deeply regrets. That result can disclose a cost underestimated earlier. It may justify a different approach to future commitments while leaving the earlier choice reasonable on the information available. Learning from an outcome differs from treating hindsight as evidence that the outcome was predictable.

The later person can also reinterpret what counted as a cost. Noor may cease to regard the unfinished sketch as a failure and instead understand it as part of a developing practice. The interpretation can be

meaningful without proving that the earlier concern about completion lacked force. Reasons can have a place in one period that later understanding changes without erasing.

An observer can contribute evidence the later person lacks. Records may show that preserving the period required burdens others absorbed. Noor's gratitude for his freedom should then be considered with those costs. A first-person account of the resulting life can reveal its significance while remaining incomplete concerning the distribution of its conditions.

The same reasoning applies to condemnation of a former self. Noor may judge his earlier commitment harshly because he now understands its limitations. A historical inquiry can distinguish deliberate disregard, reasonable uncertainty, and circumstances outside his control. Such distinctions can make self-criticism more accurate without demanding forgiveness or restored identification.

The future therefore supplies evidence and a situated evaluation. It does not retrospectively become the only standpoint from which the past can be judged. Practical self-continuity includes the capacity to learn across that difference, retaining both the history of what was understood and the significance of what later became clear.

18.13 Care, Identity, and the Scope of the Proposal

The preceding cases support a positive account of temporal care while preserving its explanatory limits. This subsection states the relation between the practical argument and the deeper question of selfhood. It also distinguishes the account's contribution from a general theory of how to choose a life.

An acknowledged future-self relation can make later experience and agency reasons for present preparation. Noor can reserve time, preserve a sketch, commit to an event, or leave a record of reasons because he anticipates living through the consequences. These actions can remain intelligible when he expects his values to change.

The relation does not require complete agreement across time. It can include disapproval, uncertainty, regret, and a willingness to allow refusal. This feature distinguishes care for a continuing life from a demand to reproduce one present configuration of commitments. The account identifies how such care can organize activity without treating change as either inherently good or inherently corrupting.

Comparable preparation can be directed toward another person. A supporter can preserve resources, respect later refusal, and accept that their care may be misunderstood or rejected. The structural similarities remain a limit on deriving first-person experience from practical organization. The paper's claim concerns the organization of a relation whose self-directed character is acknowledged in the case, while its constitution remains open.

The normative analysis is also conditional. Reasons for later participation, current meaning, legitimate reliance, and proportionate preservation can conflict. A defensible choice states which reasons justify the arrangement and how its burdens are limited. The account supplies distinctions and arguments for particular cases, rather than a universal ordering of temporal standpoints.

Its contribution to practical self-continuity lies in making room for care across changed commitment. A person can take responsibility for some future conditions while accepting that later judgment will have its own significance. Earlier reasons can remain available without becoming sovereign. A future can be anticipated as practically one's own while its eventual interpretation remains unsettled.

This formulation retains the original philosophical difficulty. Describing how a person prepares for later experience is only part of explaining how that experience can be anticipated as theirs. The practical argument makes that difficulty more precise by separating it from the preservation of memories, projects, institutions, or a fixed account of identity.

19 Historical Answerability after Practical Disavowal

This chapter develops the distinction between rejecting an earlier practical identity and remaining answerable for particular actions. It separates acknowledgment, explanation, repair, forgiveness, and renewed endorsement. The central case concerns a person who sincerely repudiates an earlier undertaking while

others continue to experience its consequences. The analysis supplies a proposed account of bounded answerability, with its normative premises made explicit.

19.1 Disavowing an Earlier Practical Identity

Mira can say that the person she was when she began the archive had priorities she now rejects. In ordinary speech this can express a substantial change of practical orientation while accepting that the earlier actions belong to her history. The statement need not be a literal denial of numerical identity. Interpreting it requires attention to the issue she is addressing.

If the issue concerns current endorsement, the disavowal can be decisive evidence of her stance, subject to the ordinary limits of avowal. If the issue concerns whether she produced a document, the same statement may leave the historical fact untouched. If the issue concerns a contributor's claim, further reasoning is required. The meanings of the statement diverge with its object.

A critic might argue that this separation reduces disavowal to rhetoric. The response is that repudiating an earlier orientation can have substantial consequences: it changes what the person now takes as a reason, how they plan, and which future they seek. Those consequences need not include erasure of every historical relation. The distinction preserves the change's seriousness without granting it unlimited scope.

The opposite risk is to treat historical continuity as a reason to deny change. An institution might insist that Mira remains the same public advocate because the archive's early documents still carry her name. That inference moves from authorship of a past act to authority over present self-description. The historical evidence supports the first proposition; the second requires independent justification.

19.2 Acknowledgment and Endorsement

Acknowledging an act can take several forms. Mira might accept that she made a promise, recognize that a contributor relied on it, or concede that an action caused harm. Each acknowledgment concerns a proposition. Endorsing the action now would add an evaluative or practical stance that the acknowledgment need not contain.

This distinction is important for criticism. A person should be able to give an accurate account of an earlier action without being understood to approve it. Otherwise truthful acknowledgment would become evidence of continuing allegiance, discouraging the very historical clarity needed for repair.

The distinction also limits convenient ambiguity. Someone can acknowledge a record's existence while evading the substantive claim it supports. Mira might say that a promise appears in the minutes without addressing whether she made it. A careful inquiry should specify what is acknowledged and what remains disputed.

The philosophical account therefore treats acknowledgment as a potentially continuing relation to history. It can support repair or explanation while leaving the old practical identity behind. Its adequacy depends on the proposition and evidence, not on whether the person resumes the original end.

19.3 Explanation and Excuse

Mira may explain that she acted under pressure, misunderstood a contributor's expectation, or relied on an inaccurate record. An explanation can illuminate formation and thereby alter assessment. It need not excuse every consequence. The relation between explanation and justification requires additional premises.

The distinction matters because a generative account naturally traces causes. Such tracing can be mistaken for a strategy of excusing conduct by showing how it arose. Causal explanation actually leaves several evaluative possibilities open. A cause can reduce responsibility, increase it, redistribute it, or leave it largely unchanged, depending on the norms and evidence.

Suppose an institution concealed relevant information. That fact can support criticism of the institution and qualify what Mira could reasonably have known. It may still leave a present responsibility to

respond once the information becomes available. Past limited knowledge and current informed opportunity occupy different places in the judgment.

Conversely, an explanation can reveal greater responsibility. If Mira knowingly designed a procedure to silence contributors, the mechanism helps establish the character of the act. Relational analysis is therefore compatible with stringent criticism. Its task is to make dependence and authority visible, not to produce a uniformly forgiving verdict.

19.4 The Persistence of a Claim

A proposed claim after disavowal should identify its bearer, object, grounds, and feasible response. A contributor might seek return of a recording, correction of a misleading account, or protection from further disclosure. These are different demands. The fact that one is justified does not establish every possible demand arising from the history.

The grounds can include an undertaking, foreseeable reliance, control over material, or a present opportunity to prevent further harm. Each needs a normative argument appropriate to the case. Merely showing that Mira is causally connected to the archive would make the claim too broad.

The response also has limits. A contributor's justified interest in accurate representation need not entitle them to dictate Mira's future career or personal values. Repair can require bounded acts while respecting departure from the former role. The account should distinguish an obligation to address consequences from an obligation to remain the person others expected.

Feasibility matters without automatically erasing claims. If Mira lacks control over a distributed recording, she may be unable to achieve complete removal. That limit changes what action is possible. It can leave reasons to explain, request correction, or prevent further dissemination within her control. A claim's full satisfaction and an appropriate response can diverge.

19.5 A Bounded Claim concerning Entrusted Material

A concrete case can clarify the normative work left open by the general distinction between endorsement and answerability. This subsection specifies a limited claim concerning entrusted material. The following subsections justify the proposed premises and test their limits. The argument is philosophical and defeasible; it supplies no jurisdictional rule.

Elena gives Mira a recording for a clearly limited archival purpose. Both understand that Elena may request its return if the archive ceases to preserve it under the agreed conditions. Mira accepts custody on that basis. Elena then refrains from making another preservation arrangement because the undertaking gives her a reasonable basis for relying on it. Later, Mira sincerely decides to leave archival work and Elena requests return of the recording.

For the initial case, stipulate that the entrustment was legitimate, the terms were understood, Mira retains control of the recording, and returning it requires a modest feasible effort. Also stipulate that return would violate no independent claim of another person. These assumptions isolate the proposed claim. They will be relaxed in the counterexamples.

Ordinary reference to Mira across the case and the legitimacy of Elena's relevant control remain background assumptions. The argument concerns a bounded requirement within that custody relation. Establishing numerical identity across memory change and justifying authority over a resource are separate philosophical tasks; causal history alone settles neither.

The proposed conclusion is that Mira has a defeasible reason with the force of an obligation to return the recording or arrange an acceptable transfer. Her changed endorsement of archival work does not, by itself, defeat that obligation. The object of the claim is a bounded response concerning the entrusted material. It is not a claim that she continue the archive, regain enthusiasm for it, or organize her future around Elena's expectations.

Several features of the case matter to the conclusion. Elena retains a practical interest in what happens to the material she entrusted. Mira accepted a limited role concerning it. Elena's reasonable reliance increased the importance of an orderly transition. Mira now has the means to provide that transition

at a proportionate cost. The argument would be incomplete if it replaced these features with the bare assertion that Mira remains the same person.

The conclusion also leaves open which response is appropriate. Return can be adequate where it restores Elena's ability to decide what happens next. A mutually acceptable transfer can be preferable when Elena wishes preservation to continue elsewhere. The obligation concerns a justified transition; its precise implementation depends on the available arrangements and the claims they affect.

19.6 Normative Premises of the Entrustment Argument

The argument uses explicit evaluative premises rather than deriving a duty from a historical record alone. This subsection states those premises and shows how they support the bounded conclusion. Their justification remains open to criticism, but their role in the inference should be clear.

The first premise concerns the agency of the person who entrusts a resource for a limited purpose. When that person has a legitimate claim to determine the relevant use, transferring practical custody under specified conditions gives the recipient a defeasible reason to respect those conditions. The premise connects control with the purposes under which it was made available. It treats the transfer as a change in who can act with the resource, while preserving the significance of the stated limits.

The second premise concerns voluntary assumption and reasonable reliance. Accepting the limited undertaking, in circumstances where another person can reasonably organize their affairs around it, gives the recipient an additional reason to avoid imposing the resulting transition burden on that person without an adequate response. This premise does not validate every expectation. Its scope depends on what was communicated, what reliance was reasonably foreseeable, and what the recipient had a fair opportunity to understand.

The third premise concerns termination. Ending a voluntarily assumed role can justify release from its continuing activity while leaving reasons to address resources and dependencies that the role created or sustained. A decision to stop preserving Elena's recording therefore needs to be distinguished from a decision to retain control of it without the agreed preservation. The latter would require a separate justification.

The fourth premise concerns proportionality and competing claims. A demanded response has an obligation-like force only to the extent that its burden, feasibility, and effects on others are justified by the grounds of the claim. The premise prevents the earlier undertaking from becoming an unlimited authority over Mira's life. It also allows a change of response when simple return becomes impossible or conflicts with a stronger claim.

A final bridge gives these reasons the proposed force of a requirement. When a person voluntarily accepts limited control that displaces another person's legitimate practical control, and a proportionate response can restore that position without a defeating claim, the recipient is required, defeasibly, to provide that response. This is a normative premise, not a conclusion obtained by adding unspecified amounts of reason. Its justification concerns the difference between optional assistance and responding to a dependency one knowingly accepted on limited terms. Treating the latter response as wholly optional would let the recipient retain the practical effect of the delegation while discarding the condition that made it legitimate.

Applying the premises to the initial case yields the limited result. Legitimate entrustment supplies a reason to respect the agreed limits. Mira's acceptance and Elena's reasonable reliance strengthen the reason for an orderly transition. Mira's repudiation of archival work changes her relation to the activity but leaves the entrusted material and reliance relation in place. Since a proportionate response is feasible and no competing claim defeats it, return or acceptable transfer is warranted.

The derivation depends on the normative premises. A person who rejects all significance of legitimate entrustment or reasonable reliance will reject the argument at that point. The paper's task is therefore to offer reasons for those premises and show that the conclusion remains within their scope. It would be misleading to present the conclusion as a mathematical consequence of the commitment record.

19.7 Justification through Limited Delegation and Continuing Agency

The entrustment premises require more than an appeal to the fact that people commonly rely on undertakings. This subsection offers a proposed justification grounded in the practical agency of both parties. The argument explains why ending the role can coexist with a bounded duty of transition.

Elena gives Mira a limited capacity to act with the recording so that a purpose Elena has reason to value can be pursued. If Mira could convert that limited capacity into unrestricted retention merely by ceasing to endorse the purpose, Elena's original choice would lose its practical limits. The recipient's later change would determine the resource's fate while the contributor's continuing agency ceased to count. A practice of limited entrustment would then be unable to secure the very limit it purports to offer.

The objection is not simply that such a practice would reduce future cooperation. Even in a case where no later cooperative activity depends on the outcome, Elena has a present claim concerning the material and the terms on which she relinquished control. The reason to respond therefore concerns an existing person's practical position, as well as the broader value of reliable arrangements.

Mira's agency also matters. She should be able to recognize that the archive has become an undertaking she has reason to leave. Requiring indefinite preservation as the only acceptable response would make the initial transfer a means of controlling her future activity. A bounded return or transfer respects the contributor's continuing interest while allowing the recipient to end the role. The argument's limited object is essential to its justification.

The relation is reciprocal in an evaluative sense. Each party has reason to reject an arrangement that lets the other unilaterally convert a limited undertaking into total control. Elena's reliance cannot entitle her to Mira's entire future labor. Mira's withdrawal cannot automatically entitle her to disregard Elena's continuing claim to the entrusted resource. The proposed transition requirement gives practical effect to both limits.

One might argue that Mira received no benefit and therefore owes nothing once she withdraws. The objection identifies a relevant burden but leaves the accepted control unexplained. A responsibility can arise from what one knowingly takes into one's charge even when the activity supplies little personal benefit. The argument concerns the relation created through acceptance and control, rather than a requirement to repay an advantage.

Another objection holds that every change of intention should be fully free because a person cannot be bound by an earlier standpoint. The premise protects a significant capacity for revision, but its unrestricted application would allow the current standpoint to determine the fate of resources and dependencies involving other people. A more defensible freedom of revision permits ending the personal project while requiring proportionate attention to the relations through which it was pursued.

The justification remains defeasible because legitimate control, fair acceptance, and proportionality are themselves contestable. Its strength lies in identifying why the initial case creates a bounded claim and why the same grounds resist unlimited enforcement. The argument does not need a measure of psychological sameness to perform either task.

19.8 Costly Reliance and Excessive Expectations

Reasonable reliance can strengthen a claim without making every cost incurred in expectation of an undertaking the recipient's responsibility. This subsection tests the entrustment argument against excessive and poorly supported reliance. It distinguishes the existence of a practical loss from the justification of assigning that loss to Mira.

Suppose Elena makes an expensive exhibition plan even though Mira undertook only to preserve the recording. Elena's plan fails when Mira leaves. The failure is a real loss in the stipulated case, but its cost exceeds the scope of the assurance. The entrustment argument supports an orderly response concerning preservation and return; it does not automatically support reimbursement for every expectation Elena formed.

The assessment changes if Mira knew that Elena was relying on a broader understanding and encouraged that reliance. The relevant history would then include additional communication or conduct. The case could support a broader claim because its grounds changed, rather than because reliance by itself has unlimited authority.

A further case concerns a risk Elena understood. Mira explained that the archive might close after a short exploratory period, and Elena chose to proceed while retaining an alternative. Later closure realizes the acknowledged possibility. Elena can still have a claim to appropriate handling of the recording, but the force of a demand to preserve the entire original arrangement is weaker. The risk allocation was part of what the parties understood.

Reasonableness should be assessed from the information and practical options available at the time of reliance. A later bad outcome does not establish that the earlier decision was unreasonable. Conversely, a fortunate outcome does not validate an expectation that had little basis. The analysis should therefore preserve the sequence of communication, understanding, reliance, and later discovery.

The recipient's burden can also become disproportionate for reasons neither party anticipated. Returning the recording may require resources Mira no longer has, or the material may be inaccessible for a period. These changes can alter the response she can reasonably be required to provide. They need not erase every reason to communicate, preserve what remains within her control, or cooperate with a feasible alternative.

The argument therefore supports a bounded burden, not a simple transfer of all loss. The scope of the undertaking, the quality of the induced expectation, the alternatives available, and the costs of response matter together. Mira's changed values remain relevant to her future activity, while Elena's reasonable reliance remains relevant to the transition. The case requires a justified accommodation of those relations rather than victory for one temporal standpoint.

19.9 Wrongful Content and Innocent Reliance

An undertaking can have wrongful content even when it was sincerely adopted and others relied on it. This subsection considers the resulting limit on the entrustment argument. The distinction is essential because an account of continuity through commitment should leave room for morally significant repudiation.

Suppose Mira promised to publish a recording in a way that would deliberately misrepresent a contributor. The promise's historical occurrence would not supply a sufficient reason to carry out the misrepresentation. A commitment record can establish that an undertaking was made while leaving its validity subject to criticism. The proposed entrustment argument expressly requires a legitimate object and conditions.

Repudiating the wrongful undertaking can then be part of an appropriate response to the past. Mira may need to correct the proposed account, protect the contributor's material, and explain why the plan changed. These actions can continue historical answerability while reversing the original practical orientation. Persistence of the old end would frustrate the reasons that now warrant response.

The harder case involves an innocent person who relied on the wrongful promise without knowing its character. A colleague may have prepared an exhibition space in reasonable reliance on Mira's assurance that the material could appropriately be shown. Ending the plan can impose a genuine cost on that colleague. The cost gives a reason to examine repair, but it does not make the misrepresentation permissible.

The argument separates two questions. One asks whether the promised act should be performed. The other asks how the burdens created by its assurance should be addressed. A negative answer to the first can coexist with a positive answer to the second. The existence and scope of repair depend on knowledge, inducement, available alternatives, and the effects of different responses.

The source of responsibility also matters. If Mira knowingly misled the colleague, that fact can strengthen the case for her bearing a proportionate transition cost. If both were misled by an institution, responsibility may be distributed differently. A causal account can help identify the formation history, while normative premises determine the significance of the identified roles.

This countercase strengthens the bounded character of the original argument. The authority of a commitment is constrained by the legitimacy of its object and by the claims of affected people. Repudiation can be justified or required while leaving a duty to address consequences. Practical self-continuity can then consist in a critical response to one's history, rather than preservation of the earlier commitment's content.

19.10 Present Control without Original Adoption

A person can have a present responsibility concerning a resource without having adopted the earlier undertaking. This subsection distinguishes such responsibility from succession to a past commitment. The difference matters when records are transferred, roles change, or historical formation remains uncertain.

Suppose Arun discovers Elena's recording in a collection he has been asked to organize. He made no original preservation promise, and the case gives him no role in inducing Elena's reliance. He nevertheless has current control over access to the material and learns that an avoidable disclosure would frustrate the conditions under which it was supplied.

A proposed present-control principle gives Arun a defeasible reason to avoid using that control in a way that foreseeably violates a legitimate claim, where a proportionate alternative is available. The principle concerns what he can now do and how his action would affect another person. Its force does not require attributing Mira's earlier promise to him.

That distinction limits the responsibility. Arun need not automatically compensate for every past failure of preservation or explain intentions he never had. His present role may give him reasons to communicate what he knows, preserve the material provisionally, or help identify an appropriate recipient. The scope follows the control, knowledge, and feasible response actually available to him.

A transfer can create an additional undertaking if Arun knowingly accepts it. He might agree to maintain the recording under specified conditions. That event would establish a new formation history whose relation to the old one should be recorded. The new commitment can carry forward an object or purpose without retroactively making him the author of the earlier assurance.

The case also helps assess Mira's position when her own original adoption is uncertain. If she currently controls the material, uncertainty about the old promise need not prevent every appropriate response. She may have reasons grounded in present control even while disputing the historical account. Acting on those reasons should not be treated as an admission that the disputed promise occurred.

This distinction avoids a practical trap. Requiring complete historical resolution before any response can delay protection or return of a resource. Treating every helpful response as acceptance of historical liability can discourage cooperation. A differentiated account allows present action to proceed on an explicit ground while preserving unresolved questions about the past.

The philosophical implication concerns several forms of continuity. A resource can move through a continuing chain of custody. A purpose can be newly adopted. A particular person can remain answerable for an earlier act. These relations can overlap, but each generates different claims. Responsibility for current control therefore differs from inheriting the entire normative history of an undertaking.

19.11 Competing Claims within the Entrusted Material

The initial case excluded conflicting third-party interests. This subsection removes that assumption. It examines how the proposed return claim changes when the recording concerns several people whose claims cannot all be satisfied by one straightforward act.

Suppose Elena's recording includes another contributor's confidential account, supplied under a separate limitation. Returning an unrestricted copy to Elena could frustrate that contributor's legitimate expectation. Elena's original entrustment remains relevant, but the appropriate response now requires attention to a second person whose agency is affected by the material.

The entrustment argument cannot resolve this case by giving automatic priority to whoever physically delivered the recording. Physical transfer and legitimate authority can diverge. The record may combine

contributions made under different conditions. A responsible response needs to identify the relevant portions, the permissions understood, and the effects of separation, redaction, or restricted transfer.

Some alternatives may preserve more claims than others. A copy containing Elena's contribution alone could restore part of her practical control while protecting the other account. A jointly accepted restricted arrangement could preserve the whole recording. These possibilities require case-specific feasibility and interpretation; their mere description supplies no proof that an adequate arrangement exists.

There can be genuine residual conflict. Separating the material may destroy its meaning, or the parties may disagree about who can authorize a use. The account should preserve that conflict rather than declare every proposed safeguard sufficient. A justified temporary response may be required while the dispute remains open, with attention to the costs and consequences of delay.

Mira's own interests enter as well. She can have reasons to avoid indefinite custody, and the burden of resolving a conflict among contributors may exceed what she fairly undertook. The obligation to provide a proportionate response need not become a duty to solve every underlying disagreement. Institutional assistance or a new arrangement may be required if the relevant claims are to be handled responsibly.

The result qualifies the initial return conclusion without eliminating its grounds. Elena still has a claim that her entrustment receive an adequate response. What counts as adequate changes in light of competing interests and feasible alternatives. The argument's defeasible structure therefore performs real work: it identifies a reason that persists while allowing the final practical judgment to change.

19.12 Answerability and the Right to Leave an Earlier Role

The entrustment cases support a limited relation between historical answerability and present departure. This subsection brings the argument back to practical self-continuity. It explains why a bounded obligation can preserve a connection to the past while supporting release from a former role.

Mira can leave archival work because its place in her life has changed. The proposed transition duty acknowledges that her earlier participation affected resources and expectations involving other people. It asks for a response proportionate to those relations. The duty's bounded object gives content to responsible departure without demanding restoration of a former practical identity.

A claim can be satisfied in a way that makes further involvement unnecessary. Returning the recording may release Mira from custody. A valid transfer may locate future responsibilities in a newly accepted arrangement. A clear explanation may resolve a specific uncertainty. These possibilities distinguish answerability from an indefinite demand to remain available as the person who once held the role.

Some claims can remain open despite an appropriate response. A contributor may retain disappointment, distrust, or disagreement about the past. Those responses can be understandable without creating unlimited authority over Mira's future. The account should distinguish acknowledgment of another person's continuing evaluation from acceptance of every demand that evaluation generates.

The person's changed stance can improve the response. Mira may now understand why the original public-release model was inadequate and arrange a more careful transition. The change then enters a continuing relation of answerability through criticism and repair. A demand that she retain the earlier orientation would obstruct the very improvement the history gives her reason to make.

The argument also preserves justified discontinuity. An undertaking can end, a role can be relinquished, and a future can become organized around different concerns. These changes need not erase the person's capacity to respond to the earlier history. Practical self-continuity in the relevant sense can include a responsible ending.

The claim remains narrower than a complete theory of moral responsibility. It establishes a proposed route from legitimate entrustment, accepted limits, reasonable reliance, present control, and proportionate response to a bounded obligation. Its countercases show why each part matters. The philosophical work lies in those grounds and limits, rather than in a declaration that causal or psychological continuation automatically carries every duty forward.

19.13 Forgiveness and Historical Revision

Forgiveness, where relevant, concerns a relationship between people and their response to an acknowledged wrong. It should be distinguished from correction of the historical record. A forgiven act remains part of the history; an inaccurate allegation should be corrected whether or not anyone offers forgiveness.

The manuscript uses these distinctions as philosophical possibilities, without imposing a universal account of forgiveness. A contributor can accept repair while retaining distance. Mira can acknowledge harm without demanding restored trust. A continuing relation can take a different form after the event.

This matters to practical identity because public narratives often compress repair into redemption. A person may be expected to become a coherent improved version of the former self. That narrative can be meaningful to some participants, but it should not be the only permitted way of describing responsible change.

An account allowing historical acknowledgment without complete narrative reconciliation preserves more possibilities. The person can accept a past action, address its consequences, and pursue another life. The affected party can retain a critical interpretation. Their disagreement need not prevent every practical repair.

19.14 Answerability without Endless Exposure

A demand for answerability can become a demand for permanent visibility. Old statements can be repeatedly used to challenge every later self-description. The fact that history remains true does not establish that every audience has an unlimited claim to continuous disclosure.

The appropriate access to a record depends on its purpose and the people affected. A contributor may have a strong reason to know what happened to their interview, while a remote observer may have little reason to inspect Mira's private reflections. Historical persistence and public availability are distinct relations.

The account should therefore connect answerability with proportionality. A response can be adequate for a specific claim without becoming an exhaustive autobiography. Protecting privacy can coexist with preserving relevant evidence. The tradeoff requires attention to practical consequences and legitimate inquiry.

This limit also guards against identity freezing. If a person must repeatedly perform an old role to satisfy demands for explanation, the process may obstruct justified change. A bounded account specifies what remains to be answered and what an adequate response would achieve.

19.15 The Continuing Relation

Historical answerability can survive a change that ends endorsement and practical identification with an undertaking. Its basis lies in particular acts, relationships, and consequences. The relation can be fulfilled, transformed, or remain partly open; it is not identical with lifelong allegiance to a former project.

This provides a concrete contribution to practical self-continuity. A person can maintain a responsible relation to the past while refusing its authority as a total account of the future. The continuity consists in acknowledgment and response where justified, with room for new commitments and different forms of life.

The account remains vulnerable to disagreement about which obligations persist. That disagreement is properly normative. It should be addressed through the grounds and limits of the particular claim, rather than hidden inside a disputed assertion about whether the present person is sufficiently the same.

20 Reinterpreting Commitments across Changes of Vocabulary

This chapter examines changes in the concepts through which a person understands an undertaking. Memory and commitment can appear stable at the level of words while their practical meaning changes. The analysis distinguishes semantic continuity, historical interpretation, and current adoption, then develops

a case in which Mira revises what public access means. The objective is to prevent the model from treating an unchanged label as an unchanged practical object.

20.1 Words and Practical Commitments

The phrase public archive can guide different arrangements. It might mean access for anyone without restriction, collective stewardship with controlled access, or publicly accountable preservation. A person can use the same phrase across years while changing among these interpretations. Conversely, a changed vocabulary can make an old concern more precise.

A record of the words therefore provides incomplete evidence about the undertaking. Interpretation requires the context of use, relevant practices, and what participants reasonably understood. A formal token can preserve the phrase while attaching different content descriptions at different occasions.

The content descriptions themselves can be contested. Mira may now describe her earlier aim as accountable preservation, while a contributor remembers a clear commitment to open release. Current interpretation can illuminate the past or reshape it conveniently. Historical warrant requires evidence beyond the attractiveness of the later description.

The practical account consequently distinguishes what was said, what it meant in the earlier situation, and what the person now adopts. These questions can have different answers. Their separation permits sincere reinterpretation without automatically rewriting the historical undertaking.

20.2 Learning a New Distinction

Suppose Mira initially treated preservation and publication as one activity. Through experience she learns that keeping materials safe and making them available to everyone can conflict. She introduces a distinction between archival custody and public access. The new vocabulary lets her formulate a problem that was previously difficult to express.

This can be a change in practical understanding rather than merely a change of preference. The available options appear differently because the concepts identifying them become more differentiated. A model retaining the original two choices may miss the newly intelligible arrangement.

The change can also affect memory reports. Mira may now describe an earlier conversation through distinctions she lacked then. That description can help explain the event to a present reader, but it should not imply that the earlier participants consciously used the later concepts. A reconstruction should identify where analytical vocabulary has been added.

The same discipline applies to this manuscript. Terms such as uptake and prospective appropriation are introduced for analysis. They should be distinguished from the terms participants themselves use to formulate their experience. The concepts are proposed tools whose adequacy is tested against the case.

20.3 Continuity of Concern through Reclassification

Mira's concern for contributors can persist while the object classified as responsible access changes. She may come to think that restricted access better realizes the earlier concern. This is a possible continuity of reason across conceptual revision.

The claim requires a demonstrated connection. It should identify the earlier concern, the evidence prompting reinterpretation, and how the new arrangement responds. Merely asserting that every later decision expresses the same deep value would make the account unfalsifiable.

A critic can present an alternative interpretation: Mira has changed her priorities and now uses the old concern to legitimate the new project. The two accounts may predict different explanations, attention to contributors, or willingness to accept inconvenient consequences. Evidence can help distinguish them, though the result may remain mixed.

A second alternative is that both processes occur. Mira may retain concern for contributors while becoming more interested in institutional control. The new vocabulary can express a real distinction and

serve a strategic purpose. The account should preserve such combinations rather than demand one pure motive.

20.4 Historical Warrant under New Concepts

Applying a later concept to an earlier event can be illuminating without establishing that the event was understood that way at the time. A researcher might identify a power asymmetry participants never named. The claim concerns the represented relation, and its evidence differs from evidence that participants recognized it.

This distinction is particularly important for self-interpretation. Mira can learn to describe an earlier pressure she previously regarded as normal. The new account may be warranted by the conditions of the event even if her past avowals were favorable. Changed interpretation does not automatically imply fabrication.

At the same time, later vocabulary can simplify the past. A complex compromise might be re-described as pure coercion, or a tentative interest as a settled identity. The present account should preserve the evidence and competing descriptions needed to evaluate that compression.

The historical recovery model applies locally: if a record erases distinctions relevant to the new query, the answer may remain underdetermined. A new concept can generate a question that an old record cannot settle. This is an epistemic limitation, not a reason to declare the question meaningless.

20.5 Institutions and Conceptual Authority

Institutions often define the categories through which commitments are recorded. A form may permit only support, opposition, or withdrawal, while Mira's stance concerns a conditional proposal. The available vocabulary can shape both action and later evidence.

A person may comply with the form while holding a more complex position. Later observers can mistake the administrative category for a complete account of uptake. The institution's need for a decision does not automatically justify that broader interpretation.

Providing a space for qualifications can help, but only if qualifications affect how the record is used. A free-text field ignored in every decision offers limited practical participation. The issue is the relation between expression, classification, and consequence.

Conceptual authority should therefore remain bounded by purpose. An institution can define a category for allocating a resource while acknowledging that the person's practical stance exceeds it. The account gains precision when it records that limitation instead of treating every administrative label as a fact about selfhood.

20.6 Revision of the Account's Own Vocabulary

The proposed theory should be subject to the same criticism. If practical uptake consistently fails to distinguish tacit engagement from imposed participation, its definition needs refinement. If prospective appropriation excludes important temporal styles, its scope should narrow or its role change.

Such revision can preserve the research question while changing its concepts. The project itself exemplifies a form of practical continuity through reinterpretation: earlier formulations remain historically visible, new distinctions address objections, and the current account becomes responsible for explaining the change.

This reflexive point supplies no special authority to the theory. It is a methodological requirement of consistency. The account should retain the genealogy of its concepts while permitting their replacement when they cease to perform useful explanatory work.

The chapter's result is that continuity of wording, content, concern, and endorsement can diverge. A comprehensive account must examine their relations through context and evidence. This extends the analysis of memory and commitment into the conceptual conditions under which a person understands what has continued and what has changed.

20.7 Historical Content and Current Interpretation

A change in the person's understanding of a commitment can be mistaken for a change in the commitment's original content. This subsection makes the difference explicit. It also clarifies what the formal record should preserve when the same words receive different interpretations over time.

The historical question concerns what Mira undertook in a particular situation. Its answer depends on the words, context, communication, authority, and reasonable understanding relevant to that event. A current interpretation concerns how she now understands that undertaking. A replacement concerns what she presently adopts. These objects can coincide, but their coincidence requires evidence.

Suppose Mira now interprets the original promise of preservation as requiring restricted access. That interpretation may be historically well supported. It may also be a present judgment about what responsible preservation should require, even if the original promise included broader access. The two readings have different implications for acknowledgment and revision.

A record should therefore avoid silently updating an original content field whenever the person changes their view. It can preserve the original wording, competing historical interpretations, the current assessment, and a newly adopted undertaking. The relation among those entries makes the conceptual development intelligible.

This distinction also limits the authority of a historical reconstruction. An analyst may conclude that the original undertaking meant unrestricted access. That finding can support a claim about the past while leaving open whether the original arrangement should now continue. Historical meaning and current normative authority remain separate questions.

The point applies to favorable and unfavorable reinterpretations alike. A later description can reveal a concern that was implicit in the earlier event. It can also project a more convenient purpose backward. The account should assess the evidence without assuming that either continuity or discontinuity is the more authentic result.

The formalism remains a tool for preserving these questions. A token can identify the record under discussion while its content attribution remains contested. Introducing separate interpretation entries prevents identifier stability from masquerading as settled meaning.

20.8 An Apparent Disagreement Produced by Different Questions

Participants can appear to disagree while answering different semantic or practical questions. This subsection develops a case that shows why the object of interpretation should be stated before the dispute is evaluated. The distinction can clarify a conflict without requiring the participants to share one vocabulary.

Mira says that public access was always conditional. Elena responds that she clearly remembers being told that anyone could consult the archive. Mira may be speaking about what she now regards as a justified condition of responsible access, while Elena is describing the earlier communication. If so, the statements concern different objects despite using the same phrase.

Clarifying the objects can reveal a genuine disagreement elsewhere. Mira might accept Elena's memory of the words while disputing how they were reasonably understood in context. Elena might accept that some present restriction is justified while maintaining that the original assurance was broader. The practical dispute then concerns the consequences of revising that assurance.

The clarification can also expose a false claim. If Mira denies that broad access was ever discussed and a reliable record shows otherwise, the historical proposition requires correction. A distinction among questions should not become a method for insulating every self-description from evidence.

A further possibility is that both participants used an ambiguous expression without recognizing their different understandings. The earlier agreement may then have been less determinate than either now assumes. A present arrangement can clarify the terms while preserving uncertainty about the original undertaking's precise scope.

The account should distinguish this case from deliberate equivocation. An institution can exploit a broad phrase to obtain cooperation from participants who understand it differently. The ambiguity's

moral and practical significance depends on what was known and how the communication was used. Semantic uncertainty alone does not establish innocent misunderstanding.

These variants show why an interpretation requires a question. Asking what the words meant, what the person intended, what others reasonably understood, and what should now be done can produce different warranted answers. Practical continuity through conceptual change depends on relating those answers accurately.

20.9 Learning, Renaming, and a Newly Available Option

A new distinction can change which actions a person can meaningfully consider. This subsection examines that constructive role of conceptual revision. It avoids treating every new term as either a mere label or a discovery of an independently complete option already available in practical life.

Mira initially sees two choices: publish the archive or abandon it. Through discussion, she learns to distinguish custody, access, representation, and public accountability. The distinction allows her to consider preserving materials under restricted access while explaining publicly how decisions are made. The revised option has a practical content that the initial binary description obscured.

The option may have been materially feasible before Mira recognized it. If so, the new understanding changes her access to a possibility. But some possibilities require additional institutional arrangements, such as a process for contributors to review uses. In those cases conceptual articulation can help organize a new practical route, rather than merely reveal a ready-made one.

The difference matters to evaluating support. A colleague who supplies a new distinction can make an important contribution without determining the conclusion. Mira may accept the distinction and still reject the proposed arrangement. Treating conceptual assistance as authorization of the helper's preferred outcome would exceed its role.

A new term can also be misleading. An institution might rename public release as preservation without changing the actual access conditions. The vocabulary would then conceal continuity of practice. An inquiry should compare the activities and consequences associated with the terms, rather than infer change from linguistic novelty.

Conversely, retaining an old word can obscure a substantial change in practice. The archive may continue to describe itself as public while adopting forms of accountability that differ from unrestricted access. The appropriateness of that description depends on context and what it communicates. The analysis should state the practical change directly.

The philosophical contribution is a relation between conceptual access and practical opportunity. A person can gain room for revision through distinctions that make alternatives intelligible and actionable. The quality of that development depends on how the terms connect with reasons, resources, and authority, rather than on the number of categories introduced.

20.10 Retrospective Description without Retrospective Attribution

An analyst can use a later concept to describe an earlier relation without claiming that the earlier participants possessed the concept. This subsection explains the distinction and its limits. It matters both to historical interpretation and to a person's reassessment of their own past.

Suppose Mira now identifies a conflict between custody and publication in an early decision. The distinction can clarify why the arrangement produced difficulties. She need not claim that she consciously separated those concepts at the time. The later analysis can describe a structure the earlier activity instantiated without reproducing the participants' self-understanding.

The evidence for the structural description differs from evidence of earlier awareness. Records of access, decisions, and consequences may support the claim that the two functions were combined. A diary or explicit discussion might support a further claim that Mira recognized their tension. The first claim should not be used as a substitute for the second.

This difference affects responsibility. A problem can have existed even when Mira failed to recognize it. Assessing that failure requires asking whether recognition was reasonably available and whether she

had a responsibility to investigate. The later availability of a convenient concept does not itself answer those questions.

A retrospective concept can also distort. If the new category groups together several distinct earlier activities, it may obscure differences that mattered to participants. The analyst should examine whether the classification improves explanation of the particular case or simply replaces its complexity with a familiar label.

The person's current self-interpretation requires the same discipline. Mira can gain a more critical vocabulary while remaining answerable to the details of her history. A powerful new description should clarify the sequence, the available reasons, and the relations involved. Its emotional force or present usefulness does not establish historical adequacy.

The account therefore permits conceptual learning without retroactive invention of awareness. This is a substantive form of practical continuity: the person can understand their history differently while preserving what is known about how it was lived.

20.11 Conceptual Disagreement and an Operative Arrangement

Participants can need to act while disagreeing about the best description of their undertaking. This subsection examines whether practical coordination requires semantic consensus. The answer depends on what must be understood for the particular arrangement to operate responsibly.

Mira and the institution may disagree about whether restricted access continues the public archive. They might nevertheless agree on which materials will be preserved, who can request access, and how contributors can raise concerns. The practical agreement can be specific enough to guide action while the broader label remains contested.

The disagreement should be preserved where it matters to public representation. If the institution presents the arrangement as unanimous endorsement of its original mission, it would exceed the agreement. A record of practical coordination should state the tasks and permissions actually accepted.

Some semantic disputes cannot be deferred so easily. If the participants disagree about what a key condition means, their apparent agreement may fail to coordinate action. A phrase such as appropriate access can conceal the very issue the procedure must settle. The arrangement then requires clearer operational terms or an explicit process for resolving the ambiguity.

The needed precision depends on the task. Every term need not receive a comprehensive philosophical definition before routine work proceeds. Excessive demands for definition can delay useful action without resolving the practical issue. The aim is sufficient shared understanding of the conditions whose interpretation affects the people involved.

A provisional arrangement can also create opportunities for later clarification. Participants can preserve disputed materials while testing whether an access process answers their concerns. Such a trial requires justified limits and should avoid irreversible consequences that would make the unresolved disagreement practically moot.

The case supports a bounded relation between concepts and coordination. Some differences in interpretation can coexist with an adequate practical agreement. Others concern the agreement's operative content and require resolution or a justified provisional response. The account should identify which situation obtains rather than treat consensus as either universally necessary or irrelevant.

20.12 The Scope of Semantic Recovery

The historical-recovery analysis extends to questions about meaning only under a specified interpretation of its variables. This subsection states that extension and its limitations in prose. Repeating the algebra would add little; the conceptual work concerns the historical query.

A present record may preserve the same words across two possible histories in which the communicative circumstances differ. If those circumstances support different contents, the record alone cannot determine the historical content. This is the same structural limitation as the earlier nonidentification result, now applied to a semantic question.

The interpretation requires a defensible set of historical alternatives. Merely imagining another meaning does not establish that it remains compatible with the evidence. Context, established usage in the undertaking, and contemporaneous responses can exclude some alternatives. The analysis should state why the surviving alternatives remain credible.

The result also depends on holding the query fixed. Asking what Mira intended differs from asking what Elena reasonably understood. A record sufficient for one query can be insufficient for another. Treating the two as one content variable would conceal a substantive disagreement about the object of recovery.

Current interpretation can supply evidence about the past, but its role requires assessment. Mira may remember relevant context, infer it from later events, or reinterpret it through present concerns. Those routes differ in warrant. The account should preserve them without treating present self-description as either infallible or irrelevant.

A present agreement can resolve what will govern future activity while leaving historical meaning unsettled. The new agreement changes the practical situation. It need not answer every question about the earlier one. Recognizing that distinction can make revision possible without forcing a retrospective consensus.

The semantic extension therefore reinforces the paper's general discipline. Evidence should answer a declared question, interpretations should retain their sources and limits, and current adoption should remain distinct from historical reconstruction. Practical continuity through changing vocabulary becomes intelligible when those relations are preserved.

21 Shared Undertakings and Distributed Practical Authority

This chapter examines a continuing undertaking involving several people whose commitments change at different times. It distinguishes personal uptake from collective authorization and considers how one person's revision affects others' ability to act. The archive supplies a concrete case of shared resources, reliance, and conflicting judgments. The analysis develops the paper's account of practical continuity without reducing a collective undertaking to one person's temporal history.

21.1 Several Participants and One Project

Mira initiates the archive, two colleagues organize materials, and contributors supply interviews under particular expectations. The project depends on all of them in different ways. A public description may use Mira's name as a convenient reference, but the activity's practical structure exceeds her personal commitment.

Her decision to change the project therefore enters a field of other decisions. She can revise what she endorses and what labor she is willing to supply. Whether she can unilaterally change access to every recording depends on the authority established through the undertaking. Personal continuity and collective governance answer different questions.

The distinction also works in the other direction. A group can authorize continued publication while Mira ceases to endorse it. The project continues institutionally, but the public record should not automatically attribute its current stance to her. Her historical role remains relevant without establishing present agreement.

A practical account needs to preserve these overlapping continuities. The project can persist through replacement of one participant, a person can continue through leaving the project, and a particular promise can remain operative through a transfer. A single identity label obscures the differences among those subjects.

21.2 Commitment Interdependence

One participant's plan can depend on another's expected action. A colleague may organize materials because Mira will conduct a final review. Mira may schedule review because the colleague will prepare the

collection. These expectations can support coordinated activity while remaining vulnerable to change.

If Mira's memory access changes, the coordination may require revised means. The colleague can provide a clearer record of decisions, and Mira can adjust the review process. The undertaking's continuity then depends on mutual adaptation to the changed conditions. It is not merely the persistence of two separate preference states.

The adaptation can also become unequal. The colleague may absorb an unsustainable burden or exclude Mira from decisions for efficiency. Both responses can preserve output while changing participation. The inquiry should examine the distribution of work and authority rather than treating successful completion as sufficient evidence of a continuing shared undertaking.

A responsible change needs communication adequate to the dependency. Mira's private revision can be justified while still leaving a reason to notify the colleague whose plan depends on her. That reason concerns their relationship and foreseeable reliance. It does not require that she retain the original end indefinitely.

21.3 Authority over Shared Materials

The archive contains records whose significance and control are distributed. Mira may hold physical custody, contributors may have expectations about use, and colleagues may possess practical expertise. Custody alone need not settle legitimate decision authority.

The philosophical case can distinguish several powers: preserving a file, making a copy, changing metadata, authorizing release, and representing a contributor's position. These powers may be allocated differently within the undertaking. A model treating control as one undifferentiated variable would lose the relevant structure.

Memory change can make the allocation harder to reconstruct. An earlier arrangement may be incompletely documented. The historical query then concerns what was authorized, not only what Mira endorsed. Current cooperation can create a new arrangement without determining the old one retrospectively.

A practical response can separate preservation from irreversible use while clarification proceeds. That possibility depends on resources and the particular materials. It is a candidate arrangement, not a universal rule. Its justification concerns the claims at stake and the consequences of delay.

21.4 Exit and Transfer

If Mira leaves, continuity may require transfer of knowledge and materials. Her responsible exit can preserve the colleagues' capacity to continue while ending her own practical commitment. The transfer need not be a failure of self-continuity; it can express current judgment and answerability.

The receiving participants also possess agency. They need not accept every task merely because it forms part of the project's history. A transfer becomes feasible only through a new relation of uptake and authority. Writing an arrow between people in a model does not establish consent to the inherited role.

An institution can assist by preserving documentation, clarifying remaining tasks, and providing resources. Those arrangements make exit less dependent on one person's indefinite labor. They can support both personal change and the continuity of justified obligations.

The transfer can remain partial. Mira may be the only person able to explain one decision, while others can manage the remaining materials. A bounded residual role may be appropriate if its burden and purpose are justified. The account should distinguish that role from a demand that she resume the entire project.

21.5 Collective Disagreement about Personal Change

Colleagues may interpret Mira's revision differently. One regards it as responsible learning; another sees abandonment; a contributor sees overdue acknowledgment of a concern. These interpretations can each identify a real aspect of the case while disagreeing about its overall evaluation.

The person has a distinctive position in explaining current stance. Others have distinctive positions concerning how they were affected. A mature account should preserve both without assuming that either supplies a complete view. The disagreement can reveal a practical relation that a purely first-person or institution-centered description overlooks.

A shared discussion can improve understanding, but consensus is not guaranteed. Participants may disagree about the original undertaking or the fairness of current burdens. A justified decision procedure can address the practical issue while preserving dissent in the historical record.

This distinction between decision and agreement matters. A group may need an operative access arrangement even when interpretations remain divided. Treating the operative decision as proof that everyone endorses the resulting identity of the project would overstate its authority. The record should state the decision and its grounds without manufacturing unanimity.

21.6 Responsibility through Different Continuities

Some responsibilities follow the person who performed an act. Others may follow present control over a resource or a newly assumed role. The relations can coincide but need separate justification. A change of participant does not automatically transfer every responsibility, and historical participation does not automatically confer every present power.

For Mira, the relevant question might be whether she should explain a prior decision. For the institution, it might be whether it can prevent further disclosure. For a colleague, it might be whether a new undertaking to preserve materials has been accepted. The same archival history generates different practical questions.

This analysis guards against two simplifications. One attributes everything to the founder; the other treats collective continuation as dissolving individual answerability. The proposed account identifies the actual relation supporting each claim and its temporal scope.

The chapter's positive result is an account of personal continuity within distributed activity. A person can remain practically connected through explanation, transfer, and bounded responsibility while a collective project develops elsewhere. Their histories overlap without becoming identical, and their present agencies remain separately relevant.

21.7 Assigned Roles and Accepted Undertakings

A person's place in a continuing activity can be assigned by others before it is endorsed. This subsection examines the difference between an accepted undertaking and a role attributed through family history, reputation, or practical capacity. The distinction limits an inference from social attachment to current uptake.

Suppose Mira is publicly described as the natural successor to an earlier archivist because she is a family member and understands the collection. The description can shape requests, expectations, and opportunities before she agrees to continue the work. Her relationship to the archive is socially consequential even while her practical commitment remains unsettled.

The assigned role can bring resources as well as burdens. People may offer access to records, recognize relevant knowledge, and provide opportunities for work she values. She can take up some of these possibilities. The fact that the role was initially assigned does not prevent later endorsement, just as the availability of benefits does not prove endorsement.

The inquiry should therefore distinguish formation stages. Public classification can precede consideration; consideration can lead to partial acceptance; acceptance can later be revised. A record that treats the first public label as the adoption event would collapse these transitions. The error becomes especially consequential when the label is used to justify expectations about future labor.

A critic may argue that some responsibilities arise without voluntary acceptance. The point is well taken. A present capacity to prevent an avoidable violation, or current control over entrusted material, can generate reasons independently of a chosen role. The bounded-answerability discussion identifies

that possibility. It requires a ground other than the inference that social assignment is equivalent to historical adoption.

The distinction also leaves room for criticism of a refusal. Mira's decision to reject a role can be assessed in light of the needs and claims actually at stake. Respect for agency does not make every refusal immune to moral discussion. The argument asks that the discussion identify its grounds, rather than treat an inherited description as a complete justification.

Practical self-continuity can therefore include negotiating a role that others regard as obvious. The person may adopt, transform, or reject it while remaining connected to the history through knowledge, relationships, or bounded responsibilities. Social continuity and personal uptake can develop together without being identical.

21.8 Distinctive Capacity and Claims on Participation

A shared undertaking may depend on knowledge or ability that one person happens to possess. This subsection examines whether that dependence establishes a claim to the person's continued participation. It separates a practical need from an unlimited assignment of responsibility.

Suppose Mira is the only available participant who can interpret an old classification system. Her assistance could make transfer much easier. The fact supplies a reason for others to ask for help and a reason for her to consider the request. Whether it creates a stronger requirement depends on the burden, urgency, alternatives, and history of the dependence.

If Mira voluntarily designed a system that only she could use after promising a usable transfer, her present position would be connected to an undertaking she helped make difficult to discharge. That history can strengthen a claim that she provide a proportionate explanation. The relevant ground includes her role in creating the dependency, not merely possession of a useful capacity.

If the system predates her involvement and she has never undertaken to maintain it, the argument differs. Her ability can support a reason for assistance, especially where an important interest can be protected at little cost. It does not automatically make her responsible for every consequence of the institution's poor documentation. The allocation of responsibility should reflect that difference.

An institution can also preserve avoidable dependence. It may decline to train others because Mira has continued to help in the past. Later, the resulting scarcity is invoked as a reason she must remain. The causal history then matters to evaluating the demand. Treating the institution's reliance as self-justifying would reward an arrangement that withholds alternatives.

The supporter's reasons remain relevant. Mira may have limited time, other responsibilities, or a considered need to leave the setting. Those considerations do not mechanically defeat every request. They shape what counts as a proportionate contribution and whether the institution should supply resources for transfer.

The argument therefore supports a differentiated response. Distinctive capacity can create a reason to assist; voluntarily assumed duties can strengthen that reason; avoidable institutional dependence can redistribute the burden; and the person's current circumstances limit what can fairly be demanded. A narrative of indispensability should not replace this assessment.

21.9 A Transfer Negotiation with Divided Judgments

A transfer can preserve justified activities while the participants disagree about what the project should become. This subsection develops a concrete negotiation to show how operative coordination can differ from shared interpretation. The case remains a philosophical construction.

Mira wishes to leave the archive. Arun is willing to organize the material but rejects the original aim of unrestricted publication. Elena wants her recording preserved and prefers some public access. A second contributor, Leila, wants a portion of the collection restricted because it includes material provided under a different understanding. The institution wishes to retain a public exhibition.

The participants initially appear to disagree about one project-wide question: whether the archive should continue. A more precise analysis distinguishes several objects. Preservation, public description,

access to particular recordings, continuing labor, and responsibility for earlier statements need separate consideration. The decomposition does not eliminate conflict, but it identifies which claims depend on which decisions.

Mira can offer a bounded account of what remains unfinished and transfer material she has authority to transfer. Arun can accept responsibility for particular preservation tasks without endorsing the original publication policy. Elena and Leila can clarify the conditions relevant to their contributions. The institution can provide resources or identify limits on what it can support. Each contribution has a distinct practical role.

A provisional arrangement might preserve the collection, restrict disputed portions, and postpone the exhibition pending clarification. The arrangement would require justification concerning delay and access. It would also require an actual acceptance of the new responsibilities. A diagram linking Mira's role to Arun's would leave that acceptance unestablished.

The participants can accept the arrangement for different reasons. Mira may see it as a responsible exit; Arun may see it as a chance to revise the archive; Elena may accept it reluctantly to secure preservation; Leila may regard restriction as overdue. Their coordination can be real even while these interpretations remain divided.

The record should preserve that difference. Agreement on a practical arrangement supports a claim about what participants authorized. It does not establish that they share one account of the archive's meaning or that each identifies with its future. The transfer can therefore produce institutional continuity alongside personal departures and transformed commitments.

21.10 The Significance of a Dissenting Participant

An operative decision can leave a participant in dissent. This subsection examines what the dissent should mean for attribution, authority, and practical continuity. The analysis avoids equating a decision procedure's result with unanimous endorsement.

Suppose the institution adopts a revised access arrangement after a process the participants have reason to regard as legitimate. Mira continues to oppose one element while accepting that the decision can operate within its justified scope. Her compliance with a bounded requirement can coexist with disagreement about the project's direction.

The distinction matters to public representation. The institution should have grounds for describing the arrangement as its decision. Describing it as Mira's current position would require additional evidence. Her earlier association with the archive and participation in the process leave that question open.

Dissent can also contribute to the continuing undertaking. Mira may identify a risk that the institution agrees to monitor, or preserve reasons for revisiting the decision. The project can incorporate the practical significance of her objection without adopting its conclusion. This is a form of responsiveness whose value differs from consensus.

A dissenting participant can nevertheless have obligations arising from an accepted procedure or an independent claim. Whether those obligations require a particular action depends on the procedure's legitimacy, the scope of the undertaking, and the character of the decision. Dissent alone does not answer every question about compliance, just as a majority decision alone does not answer every question about authority.

The hardest case concerns a decision Mira regards as seriously wrongful. The reasons for participation, refusal, disclosure, or exit then require substantive assessment of the alleged wrong and the alternatives available. The present account does not settle such disputes by calling the group continuous. It identifies whose act is at issue and which authority is being claimed.

Personal continuity through dissent can thus include criticism of a project that continues to carry traces of one's work. The person's practical relation to the history remains significant while their current stance differs from the institution's. A precise account should preserve both.

21.11 Inherited Explanations and Newly Assumed Responsibilities

A transfer can transmit records of earlier reasons without transferring the practical stance from which those reasons were first held. This subsection examines the role of historical explanation in a newly assumed responsibility. It connects shared activity with changes of memory and interpretation.

Arun can receive Mira's notes explaining why a contributor's recording was restricted. The notes can help him understand the task he is considering. They can identify an earlier condition, a particular risk, or an unresolved disagreement. Their usefulness does not require Arun to reproduce Mira's experience of making the decision.

His new responsibility may depend on a present judgment that the restriction remains justified. If circumstances have changed, he may need to seek clarification or revise the arrangement within the authority available to him. The historical explanation supplies reasons for consideration, rather than an automatic command issued by the past.

The record can also support accountability for the transfer itself. Arun should be able to distinguish tasks Mira completed, tasks he accepted, and questions that remain unresolved. Otherwise later success or failure may be attributed to a vague continuing archive that conceals individual actions. Distributed activity requires more precise temporal attribution, rather than less.

A danger arises when a new participant adopts the institution's account of history as a condition of belonging. Arun may feel obliged to endorse a favorable story about the archive to gain access to the material he needs to preserve. The resulting public agreement would then be weaker evidence of considered historical judgment. The conditions under which explanations are transmitted matter to their evidential use.

The opposite problem is dismissing every inherited explanation because it comes from a former arrangement now criticized. Some earlier reasons may remain sound, including reasons supplied by contributors. A justified revision should distinguish those reasons from the institutional identity through which they were recorded.

The case therefore supports continuity through critical transmission. Records can preserve reasons across changed participants and changing memory, while new uptake determines how those reasons enter current activity. The relation can sustain an undertaking without requiring one shared consciousness, one unchanged interpretation, or an unbroken chain of identical commitments.

22 Practical Response under Uncertain Formation Histories

This chapter examines action when the history of an undertaking remains uncertain. It distinguishes historical identification from justified present response and develops a case in which several rival histories support the same provisional action. The analysis shows how practical judgment can proceed without pretending that uncertainty has disappeared, while preserving the need for later inquiry.

22.1 Uncertainty about an Earlier Promise

Suppose the archive contains incomplete evidence about whether Mira promised unrestricted publication or only preservation. One record favors the first reading, another favors the second, and Mira lacks recollection sufficient to decide. The inquiry retains both histories as possible.

The historical recovery construction then yields more than one compatible answer to the promise query. That result blocks an unqualified assertion about the earlier undertaking. It does not imply that every present action is equally justified or that the institution must remain inactive.

The practical question is distinct: what should be done with the materials while the history remains unresolved? The answer can draw on present control, foreseeable consequences, contributors' current positions, and the availability of reversible arrangements. These considerations may be relevant across both histories.

A model should preserve the distinction between acting under uncertainty and resolving it. If the institution chooses temporary restricted access, that decision need not establish that restricted access

was the original agreement. The current arrangement can be justified provisionally while the historical record remains contested.

22.2 A Response Shared by Rival Histories

Consider the following stipulated conditions. Further irreversible disclosure can be delayed at modest cost. Contributors request time to clarify the agreement. Existing materials can be preserved securely. In either candidate history, allowing clarification while avoiding new disclosure may be a reasonable provisional response.

The common response does not show that the histories are equivalent. They can imply different later obligations, criticism, or remedies. It shows that one present decision may be supported by reasons surviving their disagreement.

This is a useful form of robustness. A practical conclusion can be stronger than a particular historical conclusion because it relies on premises shared across alternatives. The inference should state those shared premises and the scope of the conclusion. It should not erase the differences that remain relevant later.

The reverse can also occur. Different histories may support incompatible immediate actions. Then a robust common response may be unavailable. The inquiry must examine additional evidence, consequences of error, authority to decide provisionally, and the costs of delay. Robustness is a possibility to test, not a guaranteed solution.

22.3 Provisional Action and Historical Integrity

A provisional decision can influence later evidence. If temporary restriction becomes routine, observers may infer that restriction was always the undertaking's intended form. The institution should therefore preserve the decision's provisional basis and its relation to the unresolved history.

Similarly, a temporary designation of Mira's role can harden into a claim about her original commitment. Recording why the designation was used helps prevent an administrative response from rewriting provenance. The account of action should remain distinct from the account of what previously occurred.

This distinction protects current participants too. Mira can support a provisional arrangement without admitting every historical allegation. A contributor can cooperate with preservation while maintaining a different view of the original promise. Practical agreement can coexist with historical disagreement.

The possibility is valuable because requiring full agreement before every action can make response unnecessarily difficult. At the same time, procedural cooperation should not be treated as a waiver of unresolved claims unless such a waiver is separately established. The present analysis makes no legal assertion; it identifies the conceptual difference between cooperation and historical concession.

22.4 Asymmetric Consequences of Error

The consequences of choosing wrongly can differ across actions. Premature disclosure can be difficult to reverse, while temporary restriction can delay access. Their comparison requires attention to actual stakes. A general preference for caution cannot replace that assessment.

The relevant uncertainty can concern both probability and the nature of the possible consequence. The inquiry may lack a defensible numerical distribution over histories. In that situation a calculated expected value could create precision unsupported by evidence. A qualitative comparison of consequences and available safeguards may be more faithful to the state of knowledge.

Qualitative analysis still needs discipline. It should identify the feared outcome, the grounds for regarding it as possible, and the burden of the proposed safeguard. Vague invocations of risk can justify excessive control if left unexamined. The account asks for proportionate reasoning rather than automatic restriction.

Mira's current stance enters that reasoning alongside affected parties' claims. Her refusal of a particular action may be significant even while the original promise is uncertain. Conversely, her endorsement

of disclosure may fail to settle contributors' concerns. Historical ambiguity does not make one present voice the sole authority by default.

22.5 Inquiry and the Cost of Continued Uncertainty

Maintaining uncertainty can itself impose burdens. Contributors may wait for access, colleagues may lack a usable plan, and Mira may remain subject to unresolved allegations. A responsible provisional arrangement should consider how the inquiry will continue and what would warrant revision of the decision.

The plan can specify evidence to seek, a review occasion, and the kinds of conclusion the material could support. These commitments give uncertainty a practical structure. They should remain open to revision if evidence proves unavailable or the question is less determinate than expected.

The end of an inquiry need not always be one definitive history. Some evidence may be irretrievably lost. A final record can distinguish established events, supported interpretations, and unresolved alternatives. Practical decisions can then explain how they respond to that limited knowledge.

This is different from declaring truth irrelevant. The inquiry continues to distinguish better and worse supported claims. It acknowledges that the available evidence may support a bounded conclusion. Preserving that boundary is part of responsible historical practice.

22.6 Self-Continuity under Uncertainty

Mira can remain practically connected to an undertaking whose formation she cannot fully reconstruct. She can preserve materials, respond to contributors, and make current commitments about future conduct. These actions create new warranted relations without pretending to restore every lost memory.

The case therefore supplies another route through memory change. Continuity can involve responsible engagement with uncertainty itself. The person treats an unresolved history as something requiring attention, while refusing to invent certainty or accept an unsupported identity narrative.

This relation remains compatible with repudiation. Mira may decide to leave archival work while helping establish a provisional arrangement and preserving the disputed record. Her current future can diverge from the original project while her response to its consequences remains intelligible.

This separation between historical recovery and practical response leaves a normative obligation. Shared reasons require an argument explaining their practical force. The following cases develop that argument and test its limits.

22.7 Grounds for a Limited Preservation Interval

A provisional preservation arrangement can be justified under a specific conjunction of conditions. This subsection makes those conditions explicit and explains the proposed normative bridge. The conclusion concerns a bounded interval of inquiry, rather than an indefinite entitlement to control another person's material.

Assume that the archive currently has legitimate custody of Elena's recording, that further public disclosure would be difficult to reverse, and that there is credible unresolved evidence concerning a restriction on disclosure. Assume also that the material can be preserved during a short inquiry at modest cost, that delay creates no comparably serious urgent harm, and that Elena can be consulted.

The first premise concerns the significance of controlled exposure. An actor who controls whether another person's entrusted material is newly disclosed has a reason to attend to a credible doubt about the permitted scope of that disclosure. The reason follows from the relation between the controlled act and the contributor's agency and interests.

The second premise concerns avoidability. Where a proportionate interval can clarify a material uncertainty before an irreversible act, the opportunity for clarification has practical value. Its value depends on the relevance of the information and the burdens of waiting. Mere possibility of learning something supplies a weaker reason than a credible route to information that could change the decision.

The third premise supplies the proposed bridge. Given legitimate temporary custody, credible doubt about authority for a serious irreversible exposure, a feasible proportionate inquiry, and the absence of a stronger urgent claim, the custodian should preserve the material and defer the new exposure for that bounded inquiry. This is an explicit defeasible normative principle. It is supported by the affected contributor's continuing agency and by the avoidability of imposing a potentially unauthorized consequence before a relevant question can be addressed.

Applying the principle supports temporary preservation in the stipulated case. It leaves the original promise unresolved. It also leaves the final access arrangement unresolved. The inference concerns what the present custodian should do while pursuing a particular inquiry under declared conditions.

The justification is stronger than a general instruction to be cautious because it identifies the agent, controlled act, affected relation, kind of uncertainty, available safeguard and countervailing burden. Each condition can be challenged. If custody is illegitimate, if the doubt lacks credible support, or if delay would impose a grave loss, the same argument may yield a different response.

The principle also explains why the preservation interval should be bounded. The reason for delay derives partly from the prospect of resolving a relevant uncertainty at proportionate cost. As time passes, that premise can weaken. Continued restriction then needs renewed assessment, rather than borrowing authority indefinitely from the original doubt.

A critic may reject the bridge while accepting its factual premises. That disagreement is substantive. The present argument does not claim to derive the bridge from a causal description or from the structure of a set of possible histories. It offers reasons concerning affected agency, avoidable exposure and fair burden for accepting the principle within this limited domain.

22.8 A Common Act with Different Grounds

Several candidate histories can support the same present act for different reasons. Distinguishing agreement about action from agreement about its ground makes the practical robustness claim more precise. It also prevents a common response from concealing unresolved historical responsibility.

In the first candidate history, Mira explicitly accepted a restriction on publication. Temporary preservation protects an already established condition of entrustment while the record is clarified. In the second, Mira made no such promise, but Elena's current request and the modest cost of delay still provide a reason for a brief consultation before irreversible disclosure.

The same temporary arrangement may be justified in both cases, while the strength and source of the reason differ. The first history may support a claim concerning a violated undertaking if disclosure has already occurred. The second may support criticism of an avoidable failure to consult without supporting the same allegation about an earlier promise.

Practical agreement therefore does not require collapsing the histories into one normative description. A record can state that preservation is currently justified under either account, while preserving the unresolved difference concerning earlier commitment. That distinction matters to later acknowledgment and repair.

An objection holds that the language of robustness usually suggests one reason surviving every possibility. The present use can be stated more carefully. An action can be stable across a declared range of cases because each case supplies sufficient reasons for it, even where those reasons vary. A separate and stronger claim would identify one shared reason sufficient throughout the range.

The difference is conceptually useful without requiring another theorem. The history space can organize the cases, but the sufficiency of the reasons must be argued within them. An intersection of action labels would record commonality while leaving the reasons and their force unexplained.

The account also permits asymmetry among participants. Mira may support preservation to allow a fair inquiry into what she undertook. Elena may support it to protect the conditions of her contribution. Their cooperation can be sincere despite this difference. It becomes misleading only if one motive is silently treated as an admission of the other party's entire account.

The practical value of the arrangement lies partly in allowing cooperation before complete historical agreement. A carefully scoped response can reduce immediate exposure and create room for later clarifi-

cation. Its usefulness depends on retaining the disagreement visibly enough that temporary coordination does not erase a claim.

22.9 Urgent Access and the Burdens of Delay

The preservation argument can fail when delay has serious consequences of its own. This subsection tests that countercondition through a stipulated time-sensitive request. The purpose is to prevent irreversibility from becoming a universal reason for restriction.

Suppose a contributor needs a private copy of their own recording for an approaching occasion that matters greatly to them. The dispute concerns public release, while the requested access can be limited to that contributor. A blanket restriction during inquiry may impose an avoidable burden unrelated to the uncertain public authority.

The appropriate response can separate types of access. Preserving the public restriction while providing the contributor a secure copy may answer the urgent need without deciding the disputed publication question. This solution depends on the actual feasibility and claims in the case. It illustrates why the action description should be precise.

Now strengthen the case. Suppose the only available access route would expose other contributors' material as well. Providing the requested copy then carries a different set of consequences. The inquiry must assess whether the access can be narrowed, whether a substitute can meet the urgent need, and which claims are implicated by each route.

The example shows that a provisional safeguard can distribute burdens unevenly. An arrangement easy for the archive may be costly for a contributor. Calling the arrangement conservative can obscure whose interests are being conserved and whose are being delayed.

A reasonable preservation rule therefore includes a burden assessment. The custodian should examine the practical effects of waiting and the possibility of a narrower response. The duty to inquire cannot be fulfilled by simply placing every request on hold while protecting the institution's convenience.

The analysis remains qualitative because the stipulated case supplies no warranted numerical probabilities or common scale of loss. Qualitative judgment can still be exact about the relevant differences: scope of disclosure, urgency, feasibility of partial access, affected parties and reversibility. Lack of a number need not imply lack of disciplined comparison.

The temporal dimension also matters. A modest initial delay can become a significant burden if repeated. An inquiry justified for a week may require a new argument after a much longer interval, especially if the expected evidence has become unavailable. Duration changes the factual premise concerning proportionality.

This countercase refines the practical-continuity claim. Continuing responsibility under uncertainty may require active differentiation among requests, not merely maintaining an unchanged state. A person's engagement with the unresolved undertaking can be expressed through such discriminating response even when full historical reconstruction remains impossible.

22.10 Manufactured Doubt and Unequal Control of Evidence

Uncertainty can be a genuine limit of available knowledge, and it can also be sustained by the conduct of a participant. This subsection examines the difference. It develops a case in which invoking unresolved history becomes a way of postponing a response.

Suppose the archive possesses a clearly relevant record but repeatedly declines to make it available to the people involved. It then cites uncertainty about the agreement as its reason for retaining exclusive control. The uncertainty is partly maintained by the institution's own decision about evidence access.

The preservation argument does not automatically justify that conduct. Its inquiry premise concerns a credible effort to clarify the material question at proportionate cost. Deliberately preventing relevant clarification while relying on the resulting doubt weakens the claimed justification.

That conclusion leaves room for legitimate limits on access. The record may contain another contributor's sensitive material or information whose disclosure requires care. The institution can then explain

the constraint and seek a narrower method of clarification. A reason for limited access differs from an unexplained refusal to pursue any feasible inquiry.

The case reveals a relation between epistemic and practical power. Control over the evidence can shape which histories remain publicly plausible, and those histories can affect who is treated as responsible or authorized. The model's record map should therefore be interpreted as a feature of an evidential arrangement, not a neutral window whose accessibility is beyond question.

An objection warns that this analysis may treat every inability to resolve uncertainty as bad faith. The distinction depends on evidence about available records, feasible access, reasons for withholding, and actual inquiry. Lost material, conflicting recollections and legitimate confidentiality can leave uncertainty despite responsible effort.

The critical target is a specific inference: from uncertainty partly sustained by one's avoidable obstruction to an unlimited entitlement to postpone response. That inference requires additional justification. Where the obstructing participant benefits from delay, the need to examine the reasons becomes especially salient.

Mira's own conduct can fall under the same scrutiny. She may lack recollection while possessing a record she finds uncomfortable to read. Her distress can provide a reason for support, pacing or limited inquiry. It does not automatically establish that other people's claims should remain indefinitely unaddressed.

The account therefore avoids assigning epistemic virtue or fault by role. Institutions, contributors, supporters and the person whose history is in question can each improve or obstruct inquiry. The practical assessment concerns the particular control, reasons, burdens and possibilities for response.

22.11 Disputed Custody and the Starting Point of Preservation

The bounded preservation argument assumes legitimate current custody. A different case contests that very starting point. This discussion explains why maintaining the present arrangement cannot be treated as neutral merely because it already exists.

Suppose Elena never entrusted the recording to the archive. A copy was obtained through an unauthorized transfer, and she now asks for its return or deletion. The institution describes continued retention as provisional preservation pending inquiry. Its description leaves the legitimacy of its own control unresolved.

The relevant question includes whether the archive has a defensible reason to keep the material during that inquiry. The fact that it currently holds the file supplies a capacity to act. It does not by itself confer the authority assumed in the earlier entrustment case.

An investigation may still require temporary preservation of some evidence, especially where competing claims concern what occurred. That possibility needs a separate argument about scope, duration, access and burden. It cannot inherit its justification automatically from the fact of possession.

The example illustrates a general methodological risk. A model often begins from an observed state and then studies possible transitions. If the starting state contains an unjustified arrangement, a preference for preserving it can carry that injustice forward while appearing merely cautious.

The remedy is to include the normative status of the starting arrangement among the questions to assess. This inclusion changes the practical interpretation of a transition graph without changing the graph's elementary reachability results. Mathematical continuity and justified preservation remain different.

The same issue can arise with Mira's role. An institution may have continued to identify her as responsible after a clear withdrawal. Maintaining that designation during a new review imposes a present burden. A provisional label can require correction even while some historical duties remain contested.

An opposing concern is that changing the arrangement too quickly can destroy evidence or frustrate legitimate claims. The account accepts that concern. It supports a tailored response that distinguishes retaining evidence of an event from continuing every practical use of the contested material or role.

The result is a more careful account of provisionality. A temporary measure is justified by its reasons and conditions, not by its resemblance to the status quo. Practical self-continuity can require challenging an inherited arrangement while preserving the evidence needed to assess it.

22.12 Closing Inquiry without Inventing Certainty

Some historical questions remain unresolved after a reasonable inquiry. This subsection considers how practical closure can be justified in that situation. It distinguishes closure of a procedure, settlement of an action and determination of historical truth.

Suppose the relevant recording has been lost, the surviving descriptions conflict, and further searching has a low prospect of resolving the disagreement. Continuing the same inquiry indefinitely may impose burdens without a proportionate expected gain. A reason to stop that procedure can arise even while the historical question remains important.

The conclusion should be stated with its exact scope. The inquiry has reached the limits of the presently available evidence. That statement differs from declaring the two histories equally probable, equally plausible, or historically interchangeable. The evidence may favor one account while leaving insufficient warrant for an unqualified conclusion.

A practical settlement can then identify how the parties will proceed despite the remaining uncertainty. They may agree to restricted access, return of certain materials, or a new undertaking governing future use. The authority of this settlement derives from its present formation and justified scope.

The new arrangement should preserve any historical disagreement that the participants have not resolved or waived. This distinction helps avoid a common ambiguity: acceptance of a forward-looking solution can be mistaken for agreement that the past was satisfactory. A participant may reasonably accept the solution while continuing to criticize what occurred.

The uncertainty also affects public description. The institution can distinguish established events from contested interpretations and explain why its present practice follows a new arrangement. This record gives future participants a more accurate basis than a simplified story in which the original dispute disappeared.

An objection holds that preserving disagreement indefinitely obstructs reconciliation. Some forms of practical reconciliation may require a shared account. Others can proceed through acknowledgment of the disagreement and agreement about future conduct. The paper leaves the broader psychology of reconciliation open; its conceptual point concerns the possible difference between these achievements.

For Mira, practical self-continuity can involve accepting this bounded historical position. She can acknowledge what the evidence supports, respond to remaining claims, and make a new commitment without possessing a complete account of her earlier involvement. That stance combines epistemic restraint with practical engagement.

The chapter's expanded result is therefore conditional and constructive. Historical uncertainty limits assertion, while present reasons can sometimes justify action, inquiry or closure. The strongest response identifies the grounds of each step, tests the burdens imposed on affected people, and preserves the difference between a settled action and a settled past.

23 First-Person Avowal and Third-Person Reconstruction

This chapter examines the different positions from which practical continuity is described. It distinguishes a person's avowal of current stance from an observer's historical reconstruction, then asks how those sources should interact. The aim is to preserve first-person significance without granting infallibility and to preserve public evidence without allowing it to replace the person's response.

23.1 Different Objects of Knowledge

Mira can report that she now rejects publication. An observer can report that she previously signed an authorization. The statements may both be true because they concern different occasions and relations. Treating them as contradictory would obscure the change the inquiry is supposed to understand.

A genuine conflict can arise if Mira denies signing and the evidence supports the signature. The historical claim then requires assessment through records, context, and possible error. Her current prac-

tical stance remains a separate proposition. An incorrect historical belief need not imply that she secretly endorses publication now.

The difference in objects gives first-person and third-person accounts distinct roles. Mira occupies the standpoint from which current concern, unfamiliarity, and refusal are expressed. Observers may have evidence concerning events she cannot recall. Neither position supplies an exhaustive account of the life.

This arrangement can be epistemically cooperative. Others can provide historical material; Mira can clarify its present significance; each can discover misunderstandings through the exchange. The cooperation remains compatible with unresolved disagreement. Its success should be measured by clearer claims and better-supported interpretations, not by forced agreement.

23.2 The Authority of an Avowal

An avowal of current rejection has practical significance partly because it is a response by the person whose action is at issue. It is not merely an observation about an internal variable. It can alter the relationship: others now know that proceeding under a presumption of agreement requires further justification.

That significance should not be converted into complete epistemic immunity. A person can be conflicted, use ambiguous language, or misunderstand the proposal. Clarification can therefore be appropriate. The manner of clarification matters because repeated attempts to obtain a preferred answer can undermine the response's practical force.

The account proposes a distinction between taking an avowal seriously and treating it as an unchallengeable report about every related fact. Mira's rejection should enter the decision as a current stance. Her explanation of its history can be assessed separately. This distinction allows respectful criticism.

An observer's theory should likewise remain accountable. If the theory predicts continued endorsement despite repeated, intelligible refusal, the theorist needs a strong case-specific reason for rejecting the avowal. A stable role or an earlier statement alone is insufficient. Otherwise the theory protects itself from evidence by redefining disagreement as hidden agreement.

23.3 Self-Interpretation and Discovery

A person may discover what they care about through engagement with a situation. Mira's stance can become clearer while reviewing an interview or hearing a contributor's concern. The account need not assume that a complete preference existed internally before every occasion of expression.

This possibility complicates the distinction between measurement and influence. A conversation can help articulate a stance and also shape it. Those roles can be compatible with agency when the person participates in assessing reasons. They can become problematic when the process is designed to secure a predetermined result.

The practical question concerns how the emerging response relates to the person's activity and understanding. A newly formed judgment need not be less authentic merely because it developed through dialogue. Equally, a longstanding judgment need not be authoritative merely because it predates the dialogue.

The model should therefore allow formation events within the inquiry itself. A current commitment may originate during supported reconsideration. Its newness should remain visible rather than being retroactively described as the recovered essence of an unchanged self.

23.4 Reconstruction without Appropriation

An observer may reconstruct Mira's history accurately while Mira experiences little connection to it. The accuracy can establish facts and support particular claims. It does not automatically restore familiarity or practical identification.

The case reveals a limit of external explanation. A detailed causal account of how Mira reached her present situation can remain insufficient to explain how that history matters from her standpoint.

The account should preserve the difference rather than assuming that more complete records eventually eliminate it.

At the same time, weak experiential connection need not make the reconstruction irrelevant. It can inform current decisions, clarify consequences, and support appropriate repair. Historical understanding and felt ownership can contribute differently to practical life.

A complete philosophical theory would need to explain their interaction. The present inquiry identifies the questions and some practical mechanisms connecting them. It leaves the constitution of first-person mineness open while resisting its reduction to successful public classification.

23.5 A Reciprocal Critical Relation

The proposed relationship between avowal and reconstruction is reciprocal in criticism, though their sources and objects differ. Historical evidence can challenge a person's account of what happened. Current response can challenge an observer's claim about endorsement or the practical meaning of a role.

Reciprocity does not require equal weight for every statement. Weight depends on the proposition, source access, reliability, and consequences of error. A contemporaneous recording may strongly support words spoken; a current avowal may strongly support present rejection. The inquiry should identify that distribution of warrant.

This method supports continuity through disagreement. Mira can remain connected to a history she criticizes, while others can recognize her change without erasing what occurred. Their accounts need not become one story. They need enough accuracy and practical responsiveness to address the relations that matter.

The chapter strengthens the account by locating first-person and third-person perspectives within the inquiry rather than choosing one as universally decisive. It also preserves the explanatory gap: coordinating their evidence does not yet explain why experience and agency have a first-person character.

23.6 Epistemic Self-Access and Practical Authority

The distinction between avowal and reconstruction requires a more exact account of what first-person access might contribute. This subsection introduces a narrow philosophical comparison and then develops the archive case independently. The aim is to prevent two reductions: treating every avowal as an ordinary historical report, and treating privileged access to a state as unlimited authority over the undertaking it concerns.

Burge distinguishes a special epistemic warrant for some self-knowledge from broader, fallible interpretation of oneself. He connects immunity to a particular form of warranted error with the applicability of norms of critical reason and morality, while explicitly distinguishing that immunity from universal infallibility [2, pp. 187–192]. The comparison presents a stronger explanatory demand than identifying a report's speaker. The present account leaves the adequacy of that constitutive theory open and asks how epistemic access and practical authority differ in the cases under examination.

Mira may be especially well placed to say that she is now considering withdrawal. That proposition concerns an aspect of her current practical activity. A colleague's record of yesterday's enthusiasm can coexist with its truth. An account that simply weighs yesterday's public evidence against today's avowal without identifying their different objects would create a false conflict. The record concerns an earlier expression; the avowal concerns a present stance that may have changed.

A different proposition concerns whether Mira's withdrawal should determine the handling of a contributor's material. Her current intention matters to that judgment, but further relations enter. The contributor's instructions, the resources already entrusted to the archive, and available arrangements for transfer can support claims whose warrant exceeds the fact that Mira understands her current intention. Epistemic access to an intention therefore leaves the scope of practical authority to be argued.

This distinction also works in the other direction. A contributor may have authority to restrict use of a supplied interview while lacking special access to Mira's intentions. The contributor's standing concerns the material and the terms of its use. It need not depend on diagnosing why Mira wishes to publish. The

possibility shows why knowledge and authority should be related through explicit premises rather than treated as interchangeable kinds of privilege.

The first-person question nevertheless remains philosophically significant. Mira's intention enters the undertaking through her activity as a deliberating participant. Others can learn about it, respond to it, and sometimes criticize it. A public reconstruction of that relation may remain incomplete concerning how she understands the intention in forming or sustaining it. The present account preserves that explanatory task while declining to settle the entire normative dispute through a label of privileged access.

23.7 Reports that Participate in Forming a Stance

An inquiry can change the stance it seeks to understand. This subsection examines cases in which speaking contributes to adopting, clarifying, or withdrawing a commitment. Such cases complicate a model that treats every statement as a passive measurement of a complete attitude already present.

Suppose Mira enters a meeting undecided between continuing the exhibition and transferring responsibility. Asked to explain the difficulties, she articulates a reason she had previously considered only vaguely: the current arrangement makes contributors dependent on her interpretation of their interests. In responding to that reason, she decides to propose a different procedure. Her final statement can report a current intention and participate in the process through which it becomes settled enough to guide action.

An observer who asks which answer was already stored before the meeting may misdescribe the practical event. The relevant history can include uncertainty, articulation, assessment, and adoption. These are distinguishable phases even when they occur within one conversation. The observer should investigate their relation rather than infer that every change during questioning reveals unreliability.

The opposite interpretation also deserves attention. A statement formed during questioning can reflect pressure to produce an answer. Mira may agree to a proposal because the meeting treats further uncertainty as unacceptable. The mere fact that speech contributed to formation then supplies weak evidence about the quality of the decision. Formation through discussion can support participation or constrain it, depending on how reasons, alternatives, and refusal enter.

The distinction requires attention to the sequence of the exchange. A participant who introduces an objection, considers a response, and revises a proposal occupies a different role from one who is repeatedly asked to choose an approved answer. Identical final words can occur in both settings. A transcript limited to the final sentence would underdescribe the formation history that matters to practical uptake.

Some utterances also have a recognized practical effect within a particular arrangement. If the archive has an agreed procedure for withdrawing a proposed exhibition, Mira's statement can initiate that withdrawal. Its effect depends on the procedure, the circumstances of use, and the scope of the undertaking. Reading the same sentence aloud from an example form need not have the same effect. The practical significance belongs to the situated act, rather than to the sentence considered in isolation.

A model can represent such an event by allowing the statement to alter the commitment record. It should then distinguish a change made under the applicable procedure from a conclusion about Mira's prior mental state. An effective withdrawal can establish what the undertaking permits from that point onward while leaving unresolved whether she had already decided to withdraw before speaking. Conflating those propositions would turn the effect of an act into invented evidence about its antecedents.

23.8 The Limits of Behavioral Prediction

Successful prediction of conduct can contribute to understanding a person while leaving the character of an avowal unsettled. This subsection uses a disagreement between prediction and present expression to distinguish descriptive expectations from reasons for action. The distinction matters when institutions use reliable forecasts to discount a participant's current response.

Suppose colleagues predict that Mira will eventually return to the archive after announcing withdrawal. Their prediction may be based on a long history of resumed involvement. Even if it proves accurate, it need not show that her present withdrawal was insincere. She can genuinely leave and later change her mind. The interval can alter relationships, release others from expectations, and give her reasons for a different form of participation.

The prediction could also become part of the causal process it describes. Colleagues may refuse to arrange a transfer because they expect her return. Their refusal leaves unresolved tasks that draw her back. The resulting continuation supports a forecast about the arrangement while complicating an inference about an independently persistent desire. An analysis of practical self-continuity should therefore examine how expectations shape the possibilities through which the predicted conduct occurs.

Mira's own prediction of future conduct can differ from her present intention. She may intend to protect time for another undertaking while anticipating that requests from colleagues will be difficult to refuse. The anticipation need not reveal a deeper commitment that invalidates her stated intention. It can identify a conflict between a considered plan and expected pressures. Recognizing the conflict can motivate support for the plan, reconsideration of it, or a revised understanding of the situation.

An external observer might accurately predict which pressure will prevail and still offer a poor interpretation of what Mira is trying to do. Practical explanation includes the role of reasons and attempts, including unsuccessful attempts. If every failed intention were redescribed as absence of intention, the account would lose a central contrast between trying to revise a life and simply reproducing an established pattern.

This argument leaves room for evidence of self-misunderstanding. Repeated divergences between avowal and conduct can prompt clarification. Mira may discover that a stated plan conflicts with concerns she had underestimated. The relevant conclusion depends on the structure of the divergence. Prediction supplies a reason to investigate; it does not by itself determine whether the avowal was mistaken, aspirational, defeated, or later revised.

The distinction has a temporal dimension. A forecast concerns what is likely to happen under some description of continuing conditions. A practical proposal can seek to change those conditions. Treating the forecast as decisive against the proposal would assume the continuation that the proposal challenges. A well-supported prediction should therefore state the conditions on which it depends and remain open to changes in support, opportunity, and deliberation.

23.9 Disagreement about the Meaning of a Refusal

A refusal can be understood differently by the person and by those who rely on their participation. This subsection examines how to investigate that disagreement without interpreting every obstacle as hidden assent or every request for clarification as domination. The archive case makes the rival interpretations concrete.

Mira declines to approve public display of one interview. A colleague interprets the refusal as temporary anxiety about criticism. Mira explains that the contributor's original permission concerned preservation and that the proposed display exceeds it. These interpretations have different evidential and practical implications. The colleague's interpretation directs attention to reassurance; Mira's directs attention to the scope of permission.

The colleague may have a relevant concern. Mira might misunderstand the contributor's later message. Clarifying that message could change the judgment. Taking the refusal seriously remains compatible with presenting this evidence. The relevant standard concerns whether the evidence addresses the reason given and allows Mira to assess it, rather than merely seeking a route around her answer.

An interpretive problem arises when every reason Mira offers is treated as a symptom of the same presumed anxiety. Her response then loses the possibility of counting against the interpretation. The account becomes insulated from the evidence it purports to explain. This is a defect in the inquiry even before the final practical decision is assessed.

The converse problem appears if Mira treats every disagreement as evidence that colleagues refuse to recognize her agency. Colleagues can have independent reasons concerning the contributor's instructions

or the costs of a proposed change. Their reasons deserve assessment on their own terms. Recognition of Mira's standpoint supplies a place for her response within the inquiry, rather than an automatic validation of every inference she makes.

A productive exchange distinguishes the object of refusal. Mira may reject the timing, the audience, the description accompanying the interview, or publication itself. Different objects support different responses. General labels such as resistance or commitment can conceal these differences. Clarification contributes to agency when it improves the precision with which the person's practical concern can affect the arrangement.

The exchange also requires a stopping point appropriate to the decision. Endless clarification can function as delay or exhaustion. A person need not produce an indefinitely expanding account of their entire life before a bounded refusal receives practical weight. The burden of explanation should be connected to the disputed undertaking, the evidence actually available, and the claims of those affected. That proposal requires normative justification in each setting, but it avoids treating comprehensiveness of self-description as a prerequisite for participation.

23.10 Privacy and the Demand for a Complete Explanation

First-person significance includes limits on what a person must disclose to make a practical response intelligible. This subsection considers a refusal supported partly by private reasons. It separates adequate explanation of a shared undertaking from an unrestricted demand for access to the person's inner life.

Suppose Mira wishes to leave the archive partly because another aspect of her life now requires attention. She can state that she has insufficient time to continue, propose a transfer, and explain which responsibilities need coverage. A demand for every underlying personal reason would exceed what is necessarily relevant to arranging the transition. The adequacy of her proposal should be assessed through the affected undertaking and the reasonable claims it generates.

There can be cases where additional information matters. If Mira requests that others absorb substantial costs, they may reasonably need to understand the basis and alternatives of that request. The point is one of scope. A need to assess a particular proposed burden differs from an entitlement to a complete account of her priorities, relationships, or emotional life.

Privacy can also affect the evidence available to an observer. Mira's decision may appear abrupt because she withholds some of its reasons. The observer should distinguish an incomplete public explanation from absence of reasons. This distinction establishes a limit on inference; it supplies no proof that undisclosed reasons are adequate. Both unwarranted suspicion and automatic validation would exceed the evidence.

The person can likewise have reasons to preserve uncertainty in their own account. Mira may know that continued participation has become untenable while remaining unsure how several concerns combine. Requiring a single stable explanation could encourage retrospective simplification. A responsible transition can sometimes proceed with a candid account of limited understanding, provided the relevant practical consequences are addressed.

A model that represents reasons through a finite public record should therefore identify the record's scope. The absence of an entry can mean that a reason is unknown, undisclosed, inarticulate, or absent. These possibilities have different implications. Coding all of them as absence would give the record more authority than its collection conditions warrant.

The analysis preserves a reciprocal limit. Privacy can justify withholding information while leaving others entitled to make decisions under the resulting uncertainty. Others may decline a proposed arrangement when its justification remains insufficient for the burdens it assigns. The practical task is to negotiate a bounded response, rather than assume that either complete transparency or automatic acceptance follows from recognizing first-person authority.

23.11 Revising an Earlier Self-Description

A person's understanding of an earlier commitment can change without a corresponding change in the historical event. This subsection distinguishes correction, reinterpretation, and present disavowal. These differences matter because later self-description can clarify a life while also obscuring its genealogy.

Mira may initially describe joining the archive as a decision motivated by public education. Later she recognizes that attachment to particular colleagues also played a substantial role. This recognition can enrich the account without replacing the earlier reason. A plural motive history differs from a discovery that the stated educational reason was wholly insincere.

Another case involves a genuine correction. Mira had believed that she joined before a restriction was imposed, then discovers a dated letter showing that she knew of the restriction. The new evidence changes a historical proposition. Its implications for responsibility require attention to what she understood and could do at the time. Present surprise at the letter establishes a current response, while the letter supports a more specific claim about the earlier situation.

Reinterpretation can also depend on a changed vocabulary. Mira may now describe a former arrangement as paternalistic even though she previously viewed it as protective. The later judgment can be justified without attributing the current concept to her earlier deliberation. Maintaining that distinction allows criticism of a practice while preserving the history of how she understood it.

A further case concerns strategic redescription. Mira might emphasize external pressure to minimize her role in a decision for which she now regrets responsibility. The possibility provides a reason to compare sources and examine the account. It supplies no warrant for assuming that every revised self-description is self-exculpatory. Critical inquiry requires the same attention to evidence that it asks of the person.

The account should also allow a person to retain historical acknowledgment while refusing present identification. Mira can accept that she enthusiastically pursued unrestricted publication and now judge the undertaking misguided. She need not recover the earlier enthusiasm to acknowledge the event. The practical relation can include regret, repair, and a changed commitment.

These cases show why continuity of self-description is a poor universal proxy for practical continuity. An unchanged story can conceal error; a revised story can improve understanding; a withdrawn identification can support more responsible action. The task is to identify what changed in the description, what warrants the change, and how it enters current conduct.

23.12 The Person Addressed by an Explanation

A third-person account can explain conduct to an audience while also addressing the person whose conduct it describes. This final subsection examines the difference between those uses. The distinction connects the epistemic analysis with the paper's practical concern about continuing participation through change.

An explanation offered only to colleagues may treat Mira's response as an outcome to predict. An explanation addressed to Mira can invite her to consider a pattern, challenge an interpretation, and alter the arrangement. Both uses may draw on the same historical evidence. Their practical roles differ because one makes her a participant in assessing the account.

Participation need not require agreement. Mira may reject an explanation that remains well supported. The value of addressing her lies partly in allowing her response to become evidence and a practical consideration. An institution can recognize that role while reaching a decision with which she disagrees, provided the decision's authority is independently justified and its treatment of her response remains accountable.

An account can fail through excessive personalization as well as exclusion. Colleagues may explain every institutional difficulty through Mira's changing commitments while overlooking inaccessible records, inconsistent procedures, or their own decisions. The person then bears explanatory responsibility for conditions distributed across the undertaking. A relational account should identify those conditions concretely rather than merely repeat that everything is connected.

The reverse error dissolves her activity into conditions so thoroughly that her deliberation disappears. Material support and institutional influence can explain what makes a response possible while leaving a role for her assessment, refusal, and initiative. Preserving that role requires a substantive description of how she engages the conditions. A causal list alone leaves the practical relation underdescribed.

The paper therefore proposes an accountable interaction between explanation and address. Historical claims remain open to evidence; current avowals remain open to clarification; interpretations of agency remain open to the person's response; and practical authority remains answerable to affected parties. The arrangement supports a continuing inquiry through which a person can respond to their history without being confined to its current public reconstruction.

The resulting account remains partial concerning first-person experience. Giving Mira a role in assessing an explanation does not derive the character of her experience from social recognition. It does, however, clarify one practical error that follows from ignoring that experience: treating a publicly stable description as sufficient to determine what the life means to the person living it. The distinction supplies a concrete limit on external reconstruction while leaving the deeper philosophical explanation open.

24 Interrupted Engagement and the Resumption of an Undertaking

This chapter considers continuity across periods when a person is not actively engaged with an undertaking. It distinguishes suspension, retained resources, renewed uptake, and replacement by others. The analysis prevents continuity from requiring uninterrupted attention while also avoiding an inference from an intact record to a living commitment.

24.1 Intervals without Active Uptake

Mira can set the archive aside while attending to another concern. During that interval the materials remain stored, colleagues retain some knowledge, and the undertaking may continue to structure expectations. Her attention is elsewhere. The case separates active uptake from conditions supporting possible resumption.

Requiring continuous attention would exclude many extended undertakings by definition. Practical continuity can depend on retained plans, arrangements, and expectations that become active again when relevant. The account can represent those supports while distinguishing them from current attention.

The opposite inference also needs restraint. An unchanged file and a pending task do not establish that Mira still endorses the project. They may survive after she has abandoned it. Material persistence supplies an opportunity for resumption, with its relation to current agency open.

The question therefore concerns the status of the interval. Was the undertaking suspended under conditions for return, left indefinitely open, or ended while records remained? Evidence can include the person's explanation, communication with others, and subsequent conduct. Some cases remain ambiguous.

24.2 Resumption and Renewed Decision

When Mira returns, she may simply continue a familiar task or undertake a substantial review before proceeding. Both can connect the earlier and later activity. The second includes a new decision that may alter the end or method.

Calling the return a resumption should identify what is resumed. The same materials may support a different project. The same concern may be pursued through different materials. A broad claim of continuity needs the criterion relevant to the inquiry.

A return can also be partly imposed. An institution may reactivate Mira's role without consulting her because her name remains associated with the archive. That event preserves administrative continuity while leaving current uptake uncertain. The record of the role and the person's participation should remain separate.

Conversely, Mira may resume a concern after an institution has closed the original project. Her activity can continue a practical relation despite institutional discontinuity. These cases show why the public project's lifecycle and the person's undertaking need distinct descriptions.

24.3 Supports across an Interval

Records can preserve reasons, material arrangements can protect resources, and other people can retain relevant knowledge. These supports reduce the burden of return. Their value depends on the accuracy and accessibility of what they preserve.

A support can also distort the return. A summary may omit reservations, a colleague may reinterpret the original end, or an institution may present a new arrangement as if it were unchanged. Mira's reengagement then includes a historical and practical inquiry into what she is being asked to resume.

The appropriate response need not be restoration of every earlier detail. A well-supported return can make change intelligible and invite current assessment. The aim is a usable relation to the earlier undertaking, with its genealogy visible and its present form open to judgment.

This differs from preserving maximal information. Some records may be irrelevant, sensitive, or burdensome. The relevant preservation task follows the questions likely to matter for resumption and answerability. The paper's general historical analysis explains why that selection should remain explicit.

24.4 Obligations during Suspension

Others' expectations may persist during Mira's absence. A suspended project can still contain materials requiring protection or commitments requiring communication. The fact that active uptake has paused does not determine the status of every obligation.

A reasonable suspension can include arrangements for those continuing responsibilities. Mira might notify contributors, designate temporary custody, or identify what remains undecided. Such acts support a responsible interval without forcing immediate continuation.

An indefinite suspension can become practically similar to abandonment if others lack a route to act. The classification should depend on consequences and the communicated arrangement, not only the person's preferred label. A claimed pause may require revision when its duration or conditions change.

The account leaves room for justified limits on what someone can provide. Circumstances may prevent orderly transition. That fact should enter the assessment rather than be ignored through an idealized model of perfect planning. Responsibility depends on the relevant reasons, capacities, and alternatives.

24.5 Continuity without Unbroken Presence

The positive result is a distinction between uninterrupted uptake and supported resumption. Practical continuity can cross an interval through records, expectations, capacities, and renewed judgment. The relation remains specific to what is retained and how it enters later activity.

This helps clarify the connection between memory and commitment change. Lost recollection can increase the importance of external supports. Changed values can make renewed judgment more substantive. The return can be continuous in genealogy while transformative in practical meaning.

These initial distinctions establish the possibility of supported resumption. The following analysis examines the status of the interval, the authority of a return, and the practical value of leaving some undertakings behind.

24.6 Dormancy, Reservation and Completed Withdrawal

Several different relations can persist while outward activity ceases. This subsection distinguishes a dormant commitment, a reserved question, and a completed withdrawal. The distinctions concern what the person has undertaken and how others can reasonably respond.

A dormant commitment remains part of Mira's practical arrangement even while it receives little attention. She may have agreed to review the archive at a specified later occasion, with interim custody already assigned. The absence of current work then fits an understood temporal structure.

A reserved question has a different status. Mira may have agreed only to reconsider whether she wishes to return. The future occasion is a decision point, and the outcome remains open. Treating this arrangement as a promise to resume would replace a commitment to review with a commitment to a substantive result.

A completed withdrawal differs from both. Mira may have ended her role, transferred the relevant material and explained the remaining limits of her involvement. A surviving file or memory of the project can make later return possible without making it already owed.

The distinctions can have identical outward appearances during the interval. In each case Mira performs no archival work. A record containing only activity counts would therefore leave the practical status underdetermined. The inquiry needs the formation, content and communicated scope of the arrangement.

An objection holds that ordinary commitments often remain implicit and that requiring exact classification would make practical life excessively formal. The account accepts that much coordination depends on contextual understanding. Its demand is proportionate: where the status becomes contested or consequential, the relevant distinctions should guide interpretation rather than disappear.

Context can support a dormant commitment without a formal document. Mira may have clearly stated a return date and arranged her work accordingly. Context can also support a completed withdrawal without an elaborate ceremony. The decisive issue is the warranted practical interpretation, not the presence of a particular administrative form.

Ambiguity remains possible. Mira may have left in circumstances that prevented explanation, while colleagues made different reasonable assumptions. The appropriate response can begin with clarification and a provisional arrangement. It should avoid treating uncertainty itself as proof of either continuing obligation or complete release.

The account's positive contribution is to identify the different temporal objects. One arrangement preserves an undertaking, another preserves an occasion for judgment, and another preserves only a possibility of new uptake. Practical self-continuity can operate through each, with different implications for later action.

24.7 A Defeasible Argument for a Fair Pause

A pause can respect both the person stepping back and those affected by an undertaking. This subsection develops a limited normative argument about such an interval. It uses the same general values of participation and affected agency that support the earlier account of bounded exit.

Assume Mira has a legitimate reason to suspend active work, that a pause is feasible, and that contributors possess limited claims concerning the material during her absence. Assume further that a proportionate arrangement can protect those claims without requiring Mira to continue the full project.

The first premise gives Mira's current circumstances practical standing. An undertaking organizes part of a person's life, and changing circumstances can justify revising its timing. Treating every accepted task as continuously claimable without regard to burden would overextend the original commitment.

The second premise concerns affected parties. Where a pause predictably leaves entrusted material exposed or others unable to act on reasonable expectations, those consequences supply reasons for a transition arrangement. The reasons arise from the particular relation, rather than from a general demand that Mira remain indefinitely available.

The bridge concerns specified responsibilities. Participants with grounded responsibilities for the interim claims should arrange the interval to accommodate justified suspension and those claims, within their scopes and under proportionate burdens. The grounds can lie in custody, a specified role or accepted coordination duties. This requirement applies existing responsibilities under changed circumstances while avoiding an unnecessary extension of control over Mira's activity. The conclusion can support communication, temporary custody or a bounded review occasion according to the actual responsibility.

Feasibility alone imposes no new task on a merely capable supporter. Reassignment requires agreement or a separately justified ground. Where the existing responsibilities leave a gap, the argument identifies a need for a proposed arrangement while leaving its allocation open. This qualification preserves the agency of people whose assistance might be valuable without already being owed.

This principle rejects two overextensions. The contributors' interests cannot automatically require Mira's uninterrupted work. Mira's legitimate need for a pause cannot automatically make every avoidable consequence for contributors irrelevant. The arrangement should answer the claims within their justified scope.

A difficult countercase arises when even a modest transition exceeds Mira's present capacity. The principle's feasibility condition then matters. A supporter or institution may be able to help, but their responsibility also requires a ground and a proportionate burden. The model should record the unmet need without assigning impossible duties through an idealized plan.

Another countercase concerns a project whose timing is essential. If pausing would defeat the very undertaking accepted, suspension may require replacement, release or repair rather than a simple interval. The legitimacy of the person's need to stop and the consequences for the project remain distinct questions.

The argument therefore supports a fair pause only under its stated conditions. Its value lies in making suspension a practical arrangement that can be assessed, rather than treating inactivity as either moral failure or complete freedom from relation.

24.8 The Return of a Changed Participant

Resumption can involve a person whose memory, skills or values have changed during the interval. This subsection examines what a return requires when familiarity with the old task is incomplete. It distinguishes renewed participation from restoration of an earlier psychological condition.

Mira returns to the archive with little recollection of a particular interview. She can understand the surviving record, discuss the contributor's current concern and decide how to proceed. The return can be practically meaningful even though it does not recreate the earlier experience.

The relevant question is what she can now take up. A task requiring exact recollection may remain unavailable. A task requiring careful comparison of records may be feasible. Describing the return as successful should specify which kind of activity has resumed and which loss remains.

Changed values can make resumption more critical. Mira may wish to continue preservation while declining the earlier aim of broad publication. Her return then contains both continuity and replacement. The retained material and concern connect the activities, while the revised end changes their practical meaning.

The institution may resist this mixed description because its role categories expect either full return or complete departure. A more adequate arrangement can specify limited participation. The practical benefit lies in allowing current uptake to have a determinate scope instead of forcing it into an inherited all-or-nothing role.

The same point applies to Noor's composition. She may return to an old sketch with a different understanding of what she wants to create. The new work can acknowledge the sketch's place in its genealogy while departing substantially from its original direction. A changed end does not make the earlier work irrelevant.

An objection asks whether such cases stretch the word resumption too far. The answer depends on the inquiry. If the question concerns completion of the original plan, substantial change may count as replacement. If it concerns returning to an unresolved creative concern, the same change may be continuous in a relevant respect.

The account should preserve both descriptions when they answer different questions. It can say that Noor resumes engagement with the material while beginning a new composition. That statement carries more exact information than selecting one universal label for the whole event.

The philosophical lesson concerns the relation between temporal continuity and recovery. A return can create a new practical connection with retained conditions. It need not restore every earlier state.

Practical self-continuity can therefore depend on present uptake of a past possibility whose earlier form remains partly inaccessible.

24.9 Changed Circumstances of Other Participants

A person's return occurs within a social setting that may also have changed. This subsection examines why an earlier invitation or role cannot always be resumed on demand. It introduces the agency of people who maintained, revised or left the undertaking during the interval.

While Mira is absent, Leila may assume custody under a new agreement with contributors. She may invest time in repairing records and develop a different access arrangement. Mira's historical role remains relevant, but it does not automatically authorize her to displace the current participants.

The issue is especially clear when the earlier suspension reserved only the possibility of discussion about return. A renewed role then requires a present arrangement. Treating the old title as sufficient would convert a possibility into authority over other people's current work.

Even an understood return can require adjustment when circumstances materially change. The original plan may have assumed resources that are no longer available, or a contributor may have withdrawn a permission within the agreed scope. A responsible return should assess those changes while acknowledging the expectations formed earlier.

The converse risk is unfair exclusion. Colleagues may use Mira's absence to erase a legitimate role or deny access that the suspension arrangement preserved. The fact that others continued working does not automatically cancel every earlier claim. The inquiry must consider the actual arrangement and the reasons for revision.

The case therefore resists a simple priority rule based on either origin or current activity. Historical contribution, accepted interim authority, present effort, affected claims and the conditions of the pause can each matter. A justified decision needs to connect those considerations to the specific role now at issue.

Mira can remain practically continuous with the undertaking while accepting a changed place within it. She may return as a contributor, adviser or reader rather than the original organizer. Such a change can preserve a meaningful relation without preserving the earlier distribution of authority.

An objection worries that this account makes continuity dependent on social permission. Some forms of personal engagement remain possible without institutional recognition. Mira can study her own notes or develop a new project. What requires agreement is participation in a shared arrangement over which others also have legitimate standing.

The distinction protects both personal initiative and shared agency. A person can resume a concern independently while needing renewed terms for access to collective resources. The theory should describe those different practical possibilities rather than infer either total exclusion or unlimited entitlement from one relation.

24.10 Retained Reasons and Retrospective Editing

Records prepared for a future return can preserve reasons, but they can also reshape the past. This subsection examines the design and interpretation of such records. The aim is to make the support useful without treating a prepared summary as complete historical truth.

Before stepping away, Mira writes a note explaining why she accepted restricted access for certain recordings. The note can later help her understand a decision she no longer recalls. It preserves an articulated reason at a particular occasion.

The note may omit hesitation, disagreement or a condition that seemed obvious at the time. Its usefulness therefore depends partly on how it is read. A later interpretation should distinguish the recorded explanation from a complete account of everything that influenced the decision.

A supporter who prepares a summary faces a related responsibility. The summary may make the undertaking intelligible by selecting a few central points. It should identify interpretive additions and preserve material uncertainty where the omitted details could change the practical conclusion.

Maximal preservation is an inadequate general solution. An enormous undifferentiated record can make return burdensome, while sensitive details may require limits. The relevant task is to preserve information suited to the questions of resumption, current authority and answerability.

The selection itself should remain revisable. Mira may later need a detail that the summary treated as peripheral. Where the underlying material survives, a route to deeper inquiry can improve the support. Where it does not, the limitation should be explicit.

The practical benefit of a reason record differs from issuing a command to the future. A note can explain what mattered earlier and invite later assessment. Its author can also attempt to bind a later decision. Those are different acts and require different grounds of authority.

Noor's sketchbook illustrates the distinction outside the archive. A note about a desired musical effect can reopen a creative problem without obliging her to retain the earlier solution. The record supports engagement precisely by making the earlier concern available for transformation.

The account therefore treats retained reasons as resources for later participation. Their presence can connect occasions while their interpretation and authority remain open. That combination explains why a good support can preserve continuity through change rather than merely reproduce an earlier instruction.

24.11 The Value of a Completed Ending

An account of continuity should explain why some undertakings can properly end. This subsection considers the positive value of a completed withdrawal. It guards against treating every surviving possibility of return as a reason that the person should take it up.

Mira may conclude that her archival role has run its course. She can transfer materials, address bounded claims and choose a different direction. The resulting discontinuity in work can be part of a responsible practical life.

The value of ending includes releasing attention, making room for new commitments and allowing others to shape the undertaking independently. These possibilities can be lost if every earlier role continues to demand explanation or availability merely because its records survive.

An ending can also make the past easier to acknowledge. Mira may be able to recognize her earlier contribution more freely once acknowledgment is no longer treated as a promise to return. Separating historical relation from current obligation can therefore support a more accurate relation to the past.

The objection from abandonment remains serious. A declaration that a project is over cannot by itself erase entrusted material, unpaid burdens or a legitimate promise. The earlier answerability argument specifies why some claims can remain. The completed ending concerns the scope of future participation after those claims are addressed or otherwise bounded.

The distinction allows endings with residual regret. Mira may wish she had completed more, or feel sorrow about an opportunity lost. Those attitudes need not create a renewed undertaking. A person can care about an ended project without making it the organizing task of the present.

Noor's private composition makes the point sharply. Under the stipulated absence of external claims, she may decide that the sketch will remain unfinished. Its incompleteness can still have meaning in her creative history. The account has no reason to classify responsible agency solely by completed outputs.

A surviving file may later become an occasion for renewed uptake. That possibility leaves the ending intact at the earlier occasion. New interest can begin a new phase without proving that withdrawal was never real. Temporal descriptions should allow such changes in status.

The chapter's final result is therefore broader than preservation. Practical self-continuity includes supported return, responsible suspension and acknowledged ending. Each relation connects past activity with present judgment in a different way. The theory becomes more adequate when it can explain their differences without treating one form as the universal measure of a continuing life.

25 Comparative Explanatory Assessment

This chapter assesses the proposed account through a common practical dossier and explicit standards of explanatory adequacy. It first identifies several simplified sufficiency claims, then compares their consequences in the integrated case and examines stronger alternatives. The simplified claims are analytical constructions, not summaries attributed to scholars. The assessment treats additional distinctions as useful only when they improve a warranted inference or practical response.

25.1 A Causal-Continuation Account

The first alternative identifies practical self-continuity with a causal path from an earlier undertaking to later conduct. Its attraction is clarity: the later activity arises from the earlier one. It can explain persistence of resources, habits, information, and institutional roles.

The archive cases reveal its limitation. An endorsed revision and an imposed replacement can both be caused by the earlier project. Their difference concerns how current judgment enters the process. A causal relation broad enough to include both leaves that difference unrepresented unless further structure is supplied.

The richer account adds types and interpretations: evidence, uptake, available alternatives, and practical authority. It asks which mechanism connects the occasions and what the connection warrants. The improvement is an expanded explanatory contrast, not an escape from causation.

The causal alternative could respond by enriching its account of the relevant causes. That response may converge with the present proposal. The dispute then concerns the adequacy of the enriched interpretation rather than whether causal explanation is permitted. The paper makes no claim that relational vocabulary alone provides a unique framework.

25.2 A Memory-Access Account

The second alternative identifies practical continuity with access to autobiographical memory. It captures an important source of orientation and can explain how earlier reasons remain vividly available. Its difficulty appears when recollection and practical engagement diverge.

Mira can lose recall while renewing an undertaking through records and testimony. She can retain recall while repudiating it. A memory-only account either excludes the first continuity, misclassifies the second, or broadens memory until it covers every practical link. Each response requires further argument.

The proposed account preserves memory as one dimension and adds historical acceptance, current use, and other supports. It can describe a specific loss without inferring total practical discontinuity. It also avoids treating vivid familiarity as sufficient historical warrant.

The limitation remains that the nature of remembered ownership receives only a partial analysis. Distinguishing recollection from testimony helps preserve the question; it does not constitute a full theory of memory. The account should remain open to revision through specialist philosophical and empirical work.

25.3 A Current-Endorsement Account

A third alternative grants current endorsement decisive authority. It captures the significance of the person who is now acting and experiencing consequences. It resists domination by past documents or institutional roles.

Its difficulty concerns obligations and formation. Sincere repudiation can coexist with justified claims by contributors. Current endorsement can also arise under manipulation or constrained alternatives. Treating the attitude as sufficient would bypass these questions.

The richer account gives current stance a central but bounded role. It combines that stance with historical undertakings, affected parties, available responses, and evidence of formation. The combination allows responsible exit while retaining some answerability.

The normative weights remain unresolved at a general level. The account provides a structure for judgment rather than a universal rule. This is both a strength and a limit: it avoids unjustified supremacy while requiring substantive argument in each difficult class of case.

25.4 An Institutional-Recognition Account

A fourth alternative uses a stable institutional identifier or role as the decisive criterion. It can organize records efficiently and support coordination. It may be appropriate for a narrow administrative purpose.

The archive cases show how it can overreach. A person can remain in the register while rejecting the role. A public category can persist because alternatives are costly. An accurate historical designation can acquire an unjustified implication of continuing endorsement.

The proposed account separates reference and recognition from uptake and authority. It also examines how classification shapes available activity and later evidence. This makes institutional persistence a mechanism to study rather than a universal criterion.

The account still depends on institutional arrangements in many practical applications. Records and procedures can make clarification possible. The criticism is therefore about the scope of authority inferred from recognition, not about the possibility of beneficial institutional support.

25.5 A Narrative-Integration Account

A final simplified alternative makes a coherent personal story the basis of practical continuity. Such a story can connect events, explain change, and organize future action. It can also provide a language of responsibility and learning.

The difficulty concerns a restricted necessity claim. The temporal-style discussion in Section 14 distinguishes local practical engagement from wider autonomous self-governance. Its episodic and incomplete-memory cases challenge a requirement of explicit integrated storytelling for every local continuity. They leave stronger, flexible narrative accounts of a life to be assessed on their own terms.

The proposed account can retain narrative evidence without reducing history to its present telling. A story can be compared with records, affected parties' accounts, and current activity. Its significance lies partly in what it enables and how it remains open to criticism.

The limit is that a plural account can become too permissive. If every practical pattern qualifies, the concept loses explanatory force. The response is to state the particular continuity claimed and the evidence and consequences attached to it. Different claims can then succeed or fail independently.

25.6 Comparative Standards

A useful account should distinguish the central cases without deciding them by labels alone. It should identify what its evidence supports, preserve the difference between opportunity and action, and permit justified change. It should also explain its normative premises and respect the distinction between practical capacities and moral standing.

These standards are proposed criteria for assessment. They reflect the research question and can themselves be contested. Their advantage is that they connect theoretical adequacy with concrete inferential tasks: recovering history, interpreting uptake, identifying blocked response, and allocating bounded responsibility.

Preserving additional distinctions is insufficient by itself to establish comparative success. A theory can add labels indefinitely while leaving its decisions and explanations unchanged. The following dossier therefore asks which inference changes, why it changes, and whether a more economical alternative could reach the same result.

The initial comparisons identify candidate failures of sufficiency. A stronger assessment requires an integrated case, an account of the unity assumed in describing it, and a test of whether the proposed structure earns its complexity.

25.7 Practical Multiplicity and a Unified Life

Plural practical questions can arise concerning one person. Explaining those questions leaves a further task of explaining the unity of the person whose life is involved. This subsection locates the present account in relation to that wider task.

Schechtman's *Staying Alive* begins from diverse practical concerns and develops the ambition of a unified person-life account. Its Introduction explicitly connects biological, psychological and social functions, including social and cultural infrastructure, while allowing different relations to contribute to unity [10, pp. 1–9]. This is a stronger interlocutor than an isolated individual defined by one memory relation. The present paper's narrower inquiry remains conditional on ordinary personal reference.

That conditional scope is substantial. The archive cases describe Mira at different occasions as one ordinarily identified person. The analysis then asks what follows concerning her knowledge, present uptake, capacity to revise and bounded answerability. It does not derive the ordinary reference relation from the answers to those practical questions.

A unified theory could explain why this reference is appropriate and how the different relations belong to one life. The local analysis could then operate within that theory. Compatibility remains possible because plural answers to different questions need not fragment their subject into several unrelated entities.

For example, one person can accurately acknowledge an earlier promise, lack recollection of making it, reject its original end and retain a limited obligation concerning entrusted material. These descriptions concern different relations. Their coexistence supplies no contradiction requiring several persons.

The challenge for the present account is to avoid presenting this compatibility as already proven in every theoretical framework. A unified account may assign different significance to particular forms of memory or social participation. Detailed comparison with its full argument would be needed before claiming complete agreement or conflict.

The present contribution can nevertheless be stated independently. It identifies certain invalid transitions among practical descriptions and offers bounded arguments for particular responses. A unified theory should be able to accommodate those distinctions where their premises are accepted, or explain which premise it rejects.

The issue therefore concerns levels of explanation. Local inferential discipline can improve an account of a continuing life without supplying the whole account. Conversely, a general account of unity does not automatically settle every question about access, endorsement or responsibility within that life.

This relation limits novelty claims based on the word relational. Social support and interaction already play central roles in the stronger antecedent just described. The paper's assessment should focus on the specific work performed by its representations and arguments, rather than claim novelty from acknowledging social conditions in general.

25.8 A Common Dossier and Its Declared Questions

The integrated comparison uses one stipulated dossier with ordinary personal reference held fixed. The aim is to compare consequences under a shared description, rather than give each alternative a different convenient case. The dossier contains historical evidence, present statements, material conditions and affected claims.

Mira is reliably identified as the earlier organizer of the archive. The dossier stipulates both an authentic contemporaneous record and adequate grounds for trusting its account of the relevant exchange. On those grounds it establishes that she accepted Elena's recording for preservation under a limited access arrangement. Mira now lacks episodic recollection of that exchange but accepts the warranted account and understands its stated condition. Authenticity alone would establish the record's origin, leaving the truth of its contents for separate assessment.

Mira presently rejects continued responsibility for the archive's interpretive project. She is willing to arrange return or transfer of the entrusted recording. The institution still publicly lists her as endorsing its current publication policy, although her earlier statement concerned a narrower arrangement.

The file remains under Mira's practical control. A proportionate transfer is possible, but the institution has made access to the relevant procedure difficult. Elena asks for the condition of her contribution to be respected. Leila is willing to receive custody under a clearly limited new arrangement.

The dossier supplies four main questions. What can Mira know about the earlier undertaking? What does she currently take up? What route of exit is effectively available? Which bounded claims remain while she leaves? Each question has a distinct target and evidential basis.

Holding ordinary reference fixed prevents the comparison from gaining its result by changing who counts as Mira. The variations concern practical relations within a continuing life. A theory of literal identity may supply the reference background, while the present assessment concerns what follows once that background is accepted.

The evidence is deliberately sufficient for some questions and incomplete for others. The record warrants a limited historical conclusion under the stipulation. It supplies no direct restoration of episodic experience. Mira's statement gives evidence of present rejection, while the feasibility of transfer depends on material and procedural facts.

This structure allows a demanding test. An account should avoid both overclaiming and underclaiming. It should neither infer current endorsement from the record nor deny historical warrant because recollection is absent. It should recognize a possible route of transfer while examining whether the route is actually accessible.

25.9 Changed Inferences about Knowledge and Uptake

The first comparison concerns the transition from a record to practical self-attribution. This subsection identifies the conclusions supported in the dossier and the errors produced by treating one relation as sufficient. The issue is the warrant of specific inferences, not the number of descriptive categories.

The record, together with the stipulated grounds for trusting its account, supports the claim that Mira accepted a limited undertaking. Under the stipulated ordinary reference, she can acknowledge it as part of her history. The conclusion is historical and practical in a bounded sense: it identifies an undertaking relevant to present questions.

The record does not establish that Mira recollects making the commitment. The dossier explicitly separates her acceptance of evidence from her experiential access. A model that uses one memory-access label for both would be unable to state the difference that matters to her experience and to the form of support she needs.

That distinction changes a response. If Mira requires the terms explained, presenting a clear record may help. If she is distressed by the absence of recollection, repeating the record's contents cannot be assumed to restore what is missing. The account identifies different aims of assistance.

The same record also fails to establish current endorsement of the interpretive project. Mira's present statement concerns that question directly, and its content differs from the earlier commitment. A rule inferring endorsement from historical participation would conflict with the stipulated current evidence.

Again the distinction changes a response. The institution should describe the earlier role accurately while qualifying its claim of present support. It should also discuss the transfer Mira is willing to undertake rather than require her to affirm the current policy before allowing exit.

A more sophisticated memory-centered account could incorporate these differences. It might distinguish episodic recollection, historical belief and practical identification within a broader theory of memory and agency. If it reaches the same warranted conclusions, the present account has no basis for claiming superiority merely because its vocabulary differs.

The comparative gain lies against the sufficiency inference itself. Accurate memory or evidence can support one transition without supporting all the others. Any adequate alternative must either preserve that distinction or explain why the stipulated difference lacks the practical significance claimed.

This standard makes disagreement assessable. A critic can challenge the interpretation of Mira's statement, the relevance of experiential access to the proposed support, or the condition of the original undertaking. The criticism then concerns substantive premises rather than a preference for fewer or more labels.

25.10 Changed Responses to a Formally Available Exit

The second comparison concerns a route that exists in the institution's rules but is difficult to use. This subsection explains how distinguishing formal possibility from effective access changes the practical diagnosis. It also states the limits of that distinction.

Suppose the institution's handbook permits transfer of custody to Leila. A purely administrative account may therefore classify Mira's exit as available. The dossier adds that the required procedure is inaccessible without assistance the institution has withheld.

The graph of permitted transitions can represent a route from current custody to transfer. That route establishes a possibility under its specified transition assumptions. It leaves open whether Mira possesses the information, resources and practical support needed to select and carry out its steps.

The additional analysis changes what assistance is relevant. Repeating that the rules permit exit fails to answer the identified barrier. Providing access to the procedure, clarifying the required steps or arranging proportionate support can make a difference to the actual route.

The F-PSC-007 countermodel supplies a related but narrower point. A successful act in each possible situation need not yield one act guaranteed to succeed from the accessible information. The dossier's procedural barrier may involve more than that formal structure. Its interpretation must be established through the actual stipulated conditions.

The account should also avoid treating every difficulty as coercion. A transfer can require legitimate checks to protect contributors and the new custodian. The practical question concerns whether the burden is proportionate to that purpose and whether the route remains usable, not whether every condition is absent.

Leila's involvement provides a further limit. Making Mira's exit effective cannot mean assigning Leila a role she has not accepted. The new arrangement should specify her authority and responsibilities. One participant's opportunity depends here on a relation involving another participant's uptake.

An enriched institutional account could represent these conditions through accessible procedures, supported decision-making and scoped roles. Such an account could converge with the present proposal. The relevant improvement would be its treatment of actual barriers and participants, rather than the adoption of relational terminology.

The comparison therefore supports a precise claim: the distinction earns its place when it identifies a practical obstacle omitted by formal availability and guides a response suited to that obstacle. Where the route is already fully accessible, adding the same distinction may remain useful for clarity but supplies no additional diagnosis.

25.11 Continuing Claims and the Limits of Present Rejection

The third comparison concerns Mira's rejection of the project and Elena's remaining claim. This subsection tests whether the account can support exit while preserving a bounded obligation. The task is normative and cannot be completed by listing both interests.

Under the dossier's stipulations, Elena entrusted the recording under a limited condition, Mira accepted custody, and a proportionate return or transfer is feasible. The earlier entrustment argument supplies an explicit defeasible bridge from those conditions to a requirement to restore or suitably transfer the material.

Mira's rejection concerns her participation in the broader project. It supports ending the expectation that she will provide indefinite interpretive work. It leaves the condition under which she controls Elena's material independently relevant.

The resulting response is specific. Arrange the bounded transfer, preserve an accurate account of the original undertaking, and end the unsupported attribution of current endorsement. This combination differs from requiring Mira to resume the whole project and from treating her rejection as sufficient reason to retain or discard the material at will.

The conclusion depends on the normative premises of the entrustment argument. If Elena's claimed control were illegitimate, if the return would seriously harm another contributor, or if the burden were

disproportionate, the response would require reassessment. The account's plural description does not preselect the outcome once those premises change.

A current-endorsement account could be enriched by recognizing commitments and affected claims. Once it does so, it may reach the same bounded result. The present comparison then identifies the additional normative structure that makes the result possible.

A historical-duty account could likewise be enriched by distinguishing the scope of an earlier undertaking from unlimited future service. It could support the transfer while releasing Mira from broader work. The practical account should acknowledge that convergence rather than treat every duty-based alternative as a demand for permanent obedience.

The dossier therefore tests a coordinated response, not a competition in which one dimension must dominate. A good account recognizes the force and limit of each relevant ground. Its justification remains open to criticism at those grounds.

This result also clarifies the meaning of practical self-continuity. Mira can remain answerable to a particular relation while ending identification with the project. Her current response connects her to the past through a bounded act whose authority is argued, not inferred from an identity label.

25.12 Narrative Interpretation of the Same Dossier

A narrative account can also address the integrated case. This subsection considers a stronger version that permits incomplete memory, revision and social contribution to self-understanding. The comparison asks whether the present framework adds a distinct task or an unnecessary alternative vocabulary.

Such an account might understand Mira's withdrawal and transfer as a coherent development in her life. Her acceptance of the record, criticism of the current policy and concern for Elena can belong to one revisable interpretation. The absence of episodic recall need not make that interpretation unavailable.

The present account can agree with that description where the evidence supports it. Its limited objection concerns making explicit narrative integration a necessary condition of every relevant local response. Mira may competently arrange transfer before possessing a wider account of what the archive means in her life.

The stronger narrative theorist can reply that this local competence is only part of the larger target of self-governance. That reply identifies a difference of explanatory scope. The paper's local cases then function as constraints on claims about particular acts, rather than a refutation of narrative capacities at the wider level.

The integrated dossier also asks how the narrative is assessed. A story of generous continued service would conflict with Mira's stated rejection if used to justify her ongoing role. A story of complete emancipation might erase Elena's bounded claim. A flexible account can criticize both stories through evidence and reasons.

Once those standards are included, narrative interpretation and plural relational analysis may work together. The story can organize temporal meaning, while the distinctions clarify which historical, experiential and normative claims it contains. The relevant question is whether the combination improves understanding without concealing the differences.

A very thin definition of narrative may cover any intelligible connection between earlier action and current response. On that definition the disagreement can become partly verbal. The paper should then specify its practical targets and avoid claiming a substantive defeat through terminology alone.

A more demanding definition may require a person's capacity to integrate significant parts of a life over time. The local dossier leaves the necessity and value of that capacity for broader self-governance open. It shows only that some present responses can be justified and intelligible before such integration is complete.

The comparative conclusion is therefore restrained. The account offers a way to analyze the claims within a narrative and the actions possible without a comprehensive one. It remains compatible with a richer theory that explains how those local relations contribute to a unified life.

25.13 Complexity, Redundancy and Explanatory Economy

An account that distinguishes many relations carries a burden of economy. This subsection states when a distinction earns its place and when it may be redundant for a given inquiry. It treats simplicity as a practical virtue whose value depends on the question.

A distinction is useful when collapsing it would change a warranted inference, hide a relevant uncertainty or misdirect a response. The dossier supplies examples: evidence versus recollection changes the aim of support; historical involvement versus current endorsement changes public attribution; formal exit versus accessible exit changes procedural assistance.

By contrast, some inquiries can legitimately use a simpler description. If the task is to locate the physical recording, a stable inventory identifier may suffice. Adding a full analysis of Mira's prospective concern would burden that task without improving its answer.

The framework should therefore be selectively applied. Its relations are available for questions that need them. They need not be represented at maximum detail in every practical situation. This selectivity prevents the theory from becoming an obligation to produce a total dossier before ordinary action.

Redundancy can also arise when two fields are defined through the same evidence and never support different inferences. Merely naming one uptake and another endorsement adds little if their intended meanings remain indistinguishable. The paper distinguishes them where taking up a task for a bounded reason differs from endorsing its wider end.

An alternative theory can be better if it captures the same warranted distinctions with a clearer organization or a stronger explanation of their relation. The present account should remain open to that possibility. Its vocabulary has instrumental and philosophical value only insofar as it improves the inquiry.

The complexity burden is especially strong for first-person perspective. Adding an appropriation relation can record a person's anticipatory orientation. It supplies limited explanatory progress if the grounds for identifying that orientation remain the very experience at issue. The paper therefore preserves the residual explanatory gap instead of treating the added field as a solution.

The formal results face the same standard. The factorization proof clarifies when a fixed query can be recovered from a record map. Repeating the theorem under new names for every practical category would create apparent breadth without new mathematical or philosophical content.

Explanatory economy consequently supports a layered use of the account. Begin with the practical question, add the relations needed to assess its inferences, and preserve open issues at the appropriate level. This approach can be comprehensive across a research program while remaining proportionate within a particular case.

25.14 Comparative Results and Conditions of Revision

The integrated comparison supports a bounded assessment of the proposal. This final discussion states the gains, identifies the strongest remaining alternatives, and specifies what would require revision. The result concerns the paper's declared practical task.

The framework succeeds in the stipulated dossier when it yields a coordinated response: acknowledge the warranted historical undertaking, preserve the difference from recollection, respect current rejection of the broader role, make bounded transfer effectively accessible, and correct unsupported present attribution. Each component follows from a distinct evidential or normative argument.

The success is stronger than fitting the dossier with additional labels because the distinctions alter particular inferences and actions. It remains weaker than a complete theory of personal identity or autonomous self-governance. Ordinary reference and several normative premises remain independently justified background commitments.

Enriched causal, memory, institutional or narrative accounts may reach the same results. Where they do, the proper conclusion can be convergence. The present work may offer a useful decomposition or a set of local constraints within those accounts, without constituting a rival at every level.

Revision would be required if a distinction repeatedly failed to affect warranted judgment, if its evidence could not be specified without circularity, or if a stronger theory explained the same cases more coherently. A normative claim would require revision if its premises supported unacceptable burdens under a counterexample the stated defeaters could not address.

The first-person issue remains a particular test. The account can describe anticipatory concern, present uptake and the organization of support. If those features leave experienced mineness undetermined, the theory must retain that limit. Functional usefulness cannot substitute for the missing explanation.

The final comparative claim is consequently conditional. Within the declared practical scope, the proposed distinctions and arguments improve several inferential tasks that single-relation sufficiency claims obscure. Their broader place within a unified account of persons remains a matter for continued philosophical assessment.

26 Practical Evidence and Comparative Inquiry

This chapter develops a research method for assessing the proposed account. It distinguishes observations, interpretations, rival histories, and evaluative judgments. It then outlines comparative inquiry into memory supports and revision arrangements. The method remains a proposal, with empirical instruments and population claims awaiting development.

26.1 Questions before Indicators

An inquiry should begin with the proposition it seeks to assess. Whether Mira recalls an episode, accepts a record, endorses an undertaking, or possesses an accessible revision route are different questions. An indicator useful for one may be weak evidence for another. Attendance can establish presence without establishing agreement. A signature can establish a recorded act while leaving its conditions disputed.

The question also determines the relevant interval. A report at one moment can describe a current stance without representing the entire period. A pattern of conduct may show persistence while concealing episodes of suspension or conflict. Temporal resolution should follow the inquiry's purpose and the practical significance of possible changes.

Epistemic status should accompany each representation. A person's report, an institution's classification, and an investigator's inference are different sources. They can be stored together without merging their authority. Disagreement becomes an object of investigation rather than an error to remove automatically.

The approach avoids constructing a composite continuity index at the outset. Such an index might become useful for a narrowly specified empirical task, but only after its dimensions, scales, and interpretation are justified. Beginning with a score can conceal precisely the disagreements that motivate the inquiry.

26.2 Rival Explanations of Persistent Conduct

Suppose Mira continues archival work after a change of memory access. Possible explanations include renewed endorsement, retained routine, concern for contributors, dependence upon institutional support, and lack of a feasible exit. These explanations can coexist. An inquiry should identify their relative roles through evidence rather than assume one from the observed persistence.

Different observations bear on different explanations. A detailed discussion of reasons may support renewed endorsement. A record of blocked withdrawal may support a constraint explanation. Preparation for a responsible transfer may reveal continuing answerability alongside ended project commitment. The evidence can refine the practical profile.

The historical recovery result clarifies the limit of an outcome-only record. If several formation histories produce the same current conduct, the conduct cannot uniquely recover that history. The researcher

needs discriminating evidence or a qualified conclusion. Confidence should track the information actually available.

An explanation should also specify what would count against it. If the renewed-endorsement interpretation predicts active selection among intelligible alternatives, evidence that alternatives were concealed weakens it. If the constraint interpretation predicts private rejection, evidence of voluntary continuation after the constraint disappears may require refinement. These are qualitative tests whose empirical implementation needs further design.

26.3 Comparative Support Arrangements

A proposed study could compare two ways of making historical records available. One arrangement presents a fixed account and asks for affirmation. Another presents sources, uncertainties, and opportunities for clarification. The question would concern how those arrangements affect understanding, expressed stance, and feasible revision.

The study would need to distinguish support for agency from production of a preferred answer. If the researcher regards continued participation as success, the evaluation could reproduce the institutional pressure being studied. Outcomes should include intelligibility, opportunity to dissent, accuracy of historical understanding, and practical effect of responses, with their normative basis stated.

The intervention might itself alter preferences or relationships. A person learning new information can reasonably change their stance. Treating every changed response as measurement error would miss the intervention's generative role. Conversely, attributing change entirely to improved agency would require evidence about influence and alternatives.

A careful design should preserve the person's ability to decline participation and should avoid using sensitive histories merely to obtain clearer theoretical distinctions. The present text proposes an inquiry architecture rather than a ready research protocol. Ethical review, appropriate expertise, and context-specific methods remain necessary before application.

26.4 Within-Case Comparison

A detailed case can sometimes illuminate mechanisms better than a broad score. The researcher might compare Mira's uptake before and after access to a relevant document, while recording changes in institutional conditions and contributors' responses. The aim would be to reconstruct how the document entered deliberation and action.

Such a comparison does not automatically establish causation. Other conditions may change, the document may have been selectively sought, and later testimony may reinterpret earlier motives. Process reconstruction should retain those alternatives and identify the evidence supporting each inferential step.

A useful case account can still establish limited conclusions. It may show that an explicit route for revision existed, that Mira used it, and that a particular reason appeared in her explanation. It may leave the depth of endorsement or first-person experience unsettled. A limited conclusion can be valuable if its practical implication is clear.

Triangulation should attend to source dependence. A colleague's account and an institutional report may both derive from Mira's statement. Their agreement can document circulation while adding little independent support. The provenance of evidence belongs in the analysis whenever it bears on warrant.

26.5 Interpretation and Normative Assessment

Describing uptake differs from judging whether it should govern. Mira may endorse a course that harms contributors or reject a course required by a justified obligation. An empirical finding about her stance therefore enters, rather than ends, normative deliberation.

Similarly, a procedure can improve access to alternatives while imposing disproportionate burdens. A complete evaluation must consider who bears costs, who receives benefits, and which claims remain

excluded by the chosen outcome categories. The values used in the assessment should be explicit enough to permit disagreement.

The method's central discipline is to retain the route from evidence to claim. A report supports a proposition within specified limits; a proposition combines with other premises to support an interpretation; an interpretation enters an evaluative argument. Skipping those steps can turn institutional convenience or researcher preference into apparent evidence about selfhood.

A mature empirical program would refine these distinctions through particular cases and specialist criticism. The following analysis develops the evidential architecture such a program would need, including the conditions under which its results should revise the proposed theory.

26.6 A Dossier with Separate Evidential Layers

A practical dossier should preserve what was observed, how it was interpreted and what conclusion was drawn. This subsection develops that separation using the archive case. The purpose is to make disagreement traceable without requiring every source to share one interpretation.

An observation might record that Mira attended a meeting, said a particular sentence, received a document and later transferred a file. Each item has a source, occasion and relevant conditions. Even apparently straightforward observations can depend on recording quality or interpretation, but they can still be distinguished from broader conclusions about commitment.

An interpretive layer might classify the sentence as a request for withdrawal, an expression of uncertainty or an agreement to a limited task. That classification should identify the evidence supporting it and any plausible rival reading. The aim is to preserve the inferential step.

A normative layer might conclude that the institution should clarify its public description or facilitate a bounded transfer. Such a conclusion requires premises concerning truthful attribution, legitimate claims and proportionate response. It exceeds the observation that Mira uttered the sentence.

The layers can be linked without being merged. A reader should be able to see how the observed statement supports the interpretation, and how the interpretation enters the normative argument. If a premise changes, the effect on the conclusion becomes easier to assess.

The same discipline applies to a person's self-report. Mira's report that the undertaking feels alien is important evidence concerning her experience. It can also guide inquiry into current uptake and formation. It does not automatically establish every proposed explanation of the alienation.

An institution's record deserves the same treatment. A register entry can establish how the institution currently classifies Mira. It may also be evidence about a past administrative act. Its authority concerning her current endorsement depends on further grounds.

This organization avoids a false opposition between respecting participants and exercising critical judgment. Respect can require preserving the report faithfully and giving its subject matter appropriate standing. Critical assessment concerns what follows from it and which explanations remain open.

The dossier should also preserve changes in interpretation. If later evidence shows that a statement had a narrower scope than first assumed, the earlier interpretation should remain traceable as a revision. Silently replacing it would obscure how the inquiry reached its current conclusion.

26.7 Temporal Sampling and the Shape of a Change

An inquiry can misdescribe continuity by observing at the wrong temporal resolution. This subsection examines the difference between a single report, a repeated pattern and the formation of a transition. It treats the sampling interval as part of the interpretation.

Suppose Mira rejects publication during one difficult meeting and supports a limited form of access several weeks later. A record containing only the two answers may describe a reversal. It leaves open whether the later position followed new evidence, clarification of the question, a change in options or pressure to agree.

The transition matters because the same endpoint can arise through different processes. An inquiry concerned with current stance may focus on the later position. An inquiry concerned with agency in the change needs evidence about how that position formed and what alternatives were available.

More frequent observation can help while also changing the situation. Repeated questions may give Mira opportunities to clarify her reasons. They may also create fatigue or imply that only one answer will end the inquiry. The method should consider its own role in the temporal pattern.

The relevant interval therefore depends on the question. A study of a momentary avowal should avoid claiming an enduring commitment from one occasion. A study of a long undertaking should attend to significant interruptions and revisions rather than smooth them into an average.

The choice of temporal boundaries also affects interpretation of success. If the inquiry stops immediately after a transfer, it may miss whether the new custodian can sustain the arrangement. If it continues indefinitely, it may impose a burden disproportionate to the limited question. Follow-up should have a reason tied to the claimed outcome.

An objection is that comprehensive process evidence is rarely available. The account accepts that constraint. Its response is to match the conclusion to the evidence, not demand complete observation. A limited record can support a limited statement about the observed occasions.

The historical-recovery model clarifies this point at an abstract level. Compressing several possible trajectories into one endpoint can leave a formation query underdetermined. The empirical investigator must then seek discriminating evidence or preserve the ambiguity.

Temporal sensitivity also permits a more accurate account of change. A revised commitment can be stable enough for current action while still provisional in a broader life. The inquiry should avoid treating every provisional stance as merely incomplete or every repeated stance as permanently settled.

26.8 Independent Sources and Repeated Circulation

Agreement among sources can increase confidence, but only under an appropriate account of their dependence. This subsection examines how one interpretation can circulate through a practical setting. The issue is especially important when records later become evidence about the person they describe.

Suppose Mira's statement is summarized by a colleague, entered into an institutional report and quoted in a later review. Three documents now say that she wished to continue. If all derive from the same initial interpretation, their agreement adds less independent support than a count of documents suggests.

The later documents can still establish important facts. They show how the interpretation circulated, how it shaped institutional expectations and what information later participants received. Their value concerns those processes even when they fail to independently verify the original stance.

A contrasting case contains separate accounts from people who heard different conversations, along with a contemporaneous note written by Mira. The sources may then provide partly independent evidence. Their independence remains a matter of provenance and possible communication among them.

The inquiry should distinguish corroboration from repetition. Corroboration requires an account of why the sources offer distinct support. Repetition can be evidence of institutional stability or authority, but it can also amplify an early mistake.

This distinction changes practical response. If the central uncertainty lies in the interpretation of one sentence, collecting more documents that repeat that interpretation may be less useful than examining the original context or inviting a current clarification. The relevant evidence follows the disputed inference.

The same caution applies to first-person reports over time. Mira may repeat an explanation because it remains her considered view, because it has become the accepted public story, or because the question invites that wording. Repetition alone cannot uniquely establish which mechanism is present.

An objection warns against radical skepticism about all socially transmitted evidence. The account requires no such skepticism. Most inquiry necessarily uses testimony and records. The point is to understand their support accurately enough that confidence does not grow simply with the number of copies.

The practical-selfhood relevance is direct. A repeated description can become part of the conditions

under which Mira is addressed and can respond. The research should therefore examine both the description's warrant and its role in shaping later practical possibilities.

26.9 Distinguishing Support from a Preferred Outcome

An inquiry into supported agency needs an account of success that permits disagreement with the institution or researcher. This subsection tests that requirement through two possible evaluations of the same intervention. The aim is to separate improved participation from production of a desired answer.

Suppose Mira receives a clearer explanation of the archive's records and available options. Afterward she decides to leave. If the investigator defines success solely as continued participation, the intervention appears to fail even though it may have improved her understanding and practical access to revision.

Conversely, Mira may continue after an intervention that conceals an inconvenient alternative. If continuation counts as success, the evaluation can reward an arrangement that weakens the very participation it claims to support.

A more adequate assessment identifies the intended practical capacity or condition. Did Mira understand the relevant question? Could she express a disagreement that affected the process? Were the available options accurately presented? Could the chosen course be carried out within the justified arrangement?

Each indicator remains limited. An articulate explanation can coexist with pressure. An opportunity to object can be nominal. A completed action can exceed what was understood. The assessment should therefore examine how the indicators relate to the particular claim.

The normative basis of the evaluation also needs articulation. Giving weight to intelligibility and effective response reflects a concern for participation in the direction of action. Giving weight to contributors' claims reflects their standing within the undertaking. These values can conflict and should not be hidden inside a composite success category.

An objection asks whether this plurality makes evaluation impossible. It can make evaluation less convenient, but the alternative may be a misleadingly simple outcome. A study can report a profile of supported findings and unresolved tensions instead of one overall score.

The profile can still support practical recommendations. An arrangement that improves understanding but leaves the exit procedure unusable has a specific remaining defect. An arrangement that permits exit while misrepresenting historical claims needs a different correction. The distinctions guide targeted response.

The account therefore proposes an evaluative architecture in which participant disagreement can count as a meaningful result. It leaves empirical validation of particular measures open. The theoretical requirement is that the method's success criteria remain connected to the agency and claims it purports to assess.

26.10 Intervention Effects and the Formation of a Stance

An inquiry can help form the stance it later records. This subsection examines why that fact complicates interpretation without making research impossible. The question is how to distinguish a disclosed attitude from a newly developed practical position.

Mira may never have considered whether preservation and publication can be separated until a discussion makes the distinction clear. Her later support for preservation alongside withdrawal from interpretation can then be a newly formed position. It is meaningful even if it was not waiting fully articulated before the inquiry.

Treating the position as merely revealed would misdescribe the process. Treating it as merely manufactured would also overstate the investigator's role. Mira may actively assess the distinction, connect it with her concerns and adopt the result through her own participation.

The inquiry should therefore describe the interaction. What question was introduced? Which alternatives were made visible? How did Mira respond? Could she challenge the framing? What practical

consequences followed? These questions help assess the formation without assuming that influence is either absent or inherently illegitimate.

A difficult case arises when the researcher offers a vocabulary that strongly favors one interpretation. Describing continued work as loyalty and withdrawal as abandonment can shape the response before any explicit recommendation is made. A careful method should examine such framing and its alternatives.

The opposite vocabulary can be equally directive. Describing continuation as submission and withdrawal as liberation can undervalue a freely renewed undertaking. The analysis should avoid building its desired conclusion into the language of the options.

The possibility of influence does not support an ideal of neutral description wholly outside social meaning. It supports explicit attention to the choices through which the inquiry frames the practical situation. Reflexivity here concerns identifiable effects, rather than a general declaration that everything is constructed.

A stance formed during inquiry can provide evidence of current uptake at its eventual occasion. It may provide weaker evidence about what Mira endorsed before the interaction. The temporal target of the inference should remain clear.

This distinction is central to a generative relational account. Support can create new practical possibilities and new forms of understanding. Its generative character should be assessed through participation, evidence and consequences, rather than mistaken for either historical recovery or proof of improved agency by definition.

26.11 Negative Cases and Rival Mechanisms

A useful research program should seek cases that challenge its preferred interpretation. This subsection identifies several kinds of negative case. Their purpose is to distinguish genuine explanatory contribution from a vocabulary that can redescribe every outcome as success.

One negative case contains extensive opportunities for review but little practical benefit. Mira receives repeated explanations and can state reasons, yet the process remains exhausting and leaves her unable to act. Such a case challenges an account that measures agency through the quantity of consultation.

Another case contains minimal explicit reflection but successful, responsive participation. Noor resumes a familiar creative activity, adjusts to a difficulty and later explains only part of the process. The case challenges a requirement of complete verbal articulation for local practical continuity.

A third case contains accurate historical understanding and sincere current endorsement under a severely constrained set of options. It tests whether endorsement alone establishes an acceptable arrangement. The person's agency may remain real while the surrounding conditions remain open to criticism.

A fourth case contains a widely rejected institutional arrangement that nonetheless meets a particular bounded obligation. Mira may dislike returning material to a custodian with whom she disagrees, while the transfer remains justified under the contributors' legitimate agreement. The case tests whether subjective endorsement is necessary for every responsible response.

These negative cases have different targets. They should not be pooled into a general claim that evidence is unreliable. Each identifies a proposed inference and a combination of conditions under which it may fail.

Rival mechanisms should also remain explicit. Continued conduct might reflect commitment, habit, lack of alternatives or a combination. Evidence that one mechanism is present does not automatically exclude the others. A person can act from a valued commitment while also facing a costly exit.

Theoretical revision becomes appropriate when the distinctions fail to predict or explain any relevant difference across such cases. If two proposed categories repeatedly support the same warranted inferences and responses, they may be merged for that inquiry. If a central relation lacks an intelligible evidential basis, its status should be narrowed.

The program's openness to negative cases is therefore substantive. It specifies possible failures of the framework rather than merely inviting criticism in general. That discipline protects the paper from turning practical self-continuity into a concept that succeeds whenever any relation can be found.

26.12 Privacy, Access and the Limits of Research Entitlement

An inquiry can need information that a participant has good reason to keep private. This subsection distinguishes the value of evidence from an entitlement to obtain it. The example concerns the practical burden of explaining a changed commitment.

Mira may reject the archive for reasons involving private experiences unrelated to the contributors' legitimate claims. A researcher might find those reasons useful for a complete account of her change. Their explanatory value does not automatically give the researcher authority to demand disclosure.

The practical question may be answerable at a narrower level. If Mira clearly withdraws from future work and addresses the bounded responsibilities of custody, a detailed public account of every motive may be unnecessary. The inquiry should identify which conclusion actually requires the private information.

Some claims do require explanation. If Mira invokes a particular factual allegation to justify an action affecting others, evidence concerning that allegation can be relevant. The scope of the request should follow the claim and the affected relation, rather than a general expectation of total self-transparency.

The distinction also applies to current attribution. Correcting a false implication that Mira endorses the institution may require a clear statement of her position. It need not require publication of the intimate history through which she arrived at it.

A research program should therefore recognize legitimate incomplete dossiers. Missing information can limit a conclusion without constituting a failure by the participant. The account should preserve that limitation instead of pressuring disclosure to make its categories easier to apply.

An objection points out that privacy can also conceal harm or frustrate accountability. That possibility requires case-specific assessment of the claim, evidence and authority involved. The present argument rejects only an automatic inference from theoretical interest to entitlement.

This boundary matters philosophically because practical agency includes some control over how one participates in an account of one's life. That control remains bounded by others' legitimate claims. It still has standing against a demand that every change become publicly intelligible before it is respected.

The proposed method consequently treats evidential access as part of the practical situation being studied. It asks how information can be obtained and used responsibly, while accepting that a well-conducted inquiry may end with an incomplete explanation.

26.13 From a Local Finding to a Broader Claim

A final methodological issue concerns generalization. This subsection distinguishes a conceptual counterexample, a stipulated case result and an empirical finding. It states what each can contribute to the broader theory.

A conceptual counterexample can show that a proposed implication fails under a coherent set of stated assumptions. The ordinal ranking example has this role: the same internal rankings can support different summed outcomes under changed scales. The result concerns the insufficiency of ordinal information for that aggregation.

A stipulated philosophical case can test a normative argument under declared conditions. The entrustment example asks what follows if legitimate custody, reasonable reliance and proportionate response are accepted. Its conclusion remains conditional on both factual and normative premises.

An empirical finding would require evidence about actual people, practices or mechanisms. The present manuscript's proposed study designs remain at the level of inquiry architecture. They supply questions and possible contrasts, while instruments, recruitment, analysis and application require further specialist work.

Moving among these levels requires care. A coherent example of memory and endorsement diverging shows that a definition equating them needs justification. It does not estimate how frequently the divergence occurs. A verified abstract-level report can constrain a conceptual assumption without supporting broad causal or population claims.

Generalization also depends on domain. A rule suitable for entrusted archival material may require substantial revision for intimate relationships, urgent care or public responsibilities. The relevant authority, burdens and affected claims can differ. The paper should transfer an argument only after identifying those differences.

The inquiry program can nevertheless accumulate knowledge. Repeatedly specifying the question, evidence, interpretation and normative premise makes comparisons possible across cases. The aim is a progressively clearer account of when a distinction matters and how its application changes.

A mature assessment would also compare the framework with alternatives using the same evidence and practical questions. Agreement can reveal convergence, while disagreement can identify a substantive premise for further investigation. The outcome need not be a universal ranking of entire theories.

The chapter's final methodological claim is therefore modest in scope and demanding in execution. Practical self-continuity should be studied through traceable inferences, explicit values, rival explanations and proportionate access to evidence. Those requirements support both the development and the possible revision of the present account.

27 Philosophical Objections and Explanatory Limits

This chapter subjects the account to objections concerning circularity, reduction, normativity, social dependence, and explanatory surplus. It develops the strongest available forms of those criticisms and identifies what the present argument can answer. The remaining gaps are retained as research obligations. The objective is a bounded theory whose claims can be assessed without confusing conceptual organization with proof of selfhood.

27.1 Circularity in Practical Appropriation

The most direct objection concerns the phrase one's own future. If the account explains self-continuity by saying that someone appropriates a future as their own, it appears to repeat the phenomenon. The formal relation *A* does nothing to resolve the objection. Naming a relation supplies a place to record it; it does not explain how it arises or what constitutes its first-person character.

The response has two parts. First, the account analyzes practical roles that accompany some forms of appropriation: preparing for later judgment, preserving reasons, allowing reconsideration, and caring for anticipated experience. These roles explain differences between supported participation and externally ensured conduct. That is a real explanatory gain even if the first-person character remains open.

Second, the account explicitly limits the gain. Another-directed concern can possess similar practical organization. The functional analysis therefore underdetermines perspective in some cases. A complete account of appropriation would need a further explanation connecting that organization with the first-person mode of anticipation. The current paper does not claim to have deduced that connection.

A critic may regard this concession as abandoning the original project. The answer depends on its scope. If the project aimed to derive subjective selfhood entirely from causal structure, the concession is substantial and that ambition remains unfulfilled. If it aimed to explain how practical relations continue through memory and commitment changes, the analysis provides several results while preserving the deeper question. The present manuscript adopts the latter scope openly.

27.2 Reduction to Social Role

A second objection is that the account reduces a person to roles, records, and relationships. Its emphasis on contributors, institutions, and practical support might appear to leave little room for solitude, resistance, or private experience. A person can care about a future that no institution recognizes and can reject every publicly assigned description.

The objection identifies a risk of overextension. The relational account should include relations to one's own activity, material surroundings, anticipated experience, and possible action, alongside inter-

personal relations. Even these descriptions leave subjective experience incompletely explained. Social recognition can support or obstruct a practical relation without constituting all its reality.

Solitude also has practical structure. Mira may reconsider the archive privately, using records and reflection without seeking immediate confirmation. Her judgment can later challenge the public role. The account can represent that sequence without requiring recognition to validate her current stance.

The remaining question is whether the word relational becomes so broad that it loses discriminatory force. To avoid that result, each explanatory use must identify a particular dependence or interaction and what difference it makes. Merely saying that private reflection is relational adds little. Showing how access to a record changes the reasons available for reflection can add something specific.

27.3 An Excessively Demanding Ideal of Agency

The proposed emphasis on intelligible reasons and revision could become an ideal of constantly articulate, reflective self-governance. Ordinary life includes habit, affection, fatigue, spontaneous activity, and attention to tasks without explicit reconsideration. Requiring a reasoned account at each moment would misdescribe those activities and could impose unjust burdens.

The account distinguishes having a practical relation from being able to explain it fully. Uptake can be implicit and expressed through activity. Reflection becomes especially relevant when a commitment is contested or a significant change requires response. Even then the appropriate evidence depends on the person's situation and the question at issue.

A further distinction concerns the availability of reconsideration. A practice can be habitual while embedded in arrangements that permit a person to object or alter course when a concern arises. The absence of constant review differs from the systematic blocking of review. That difference supports the account without making uninterrupted deliberation necessary.

The philosophical standard still needs justification. Why should revisability matter? One reason is that circumstances and understanding change, so an undertaking insulated from response can cease to track the concerns that gave it significance. Another is that a person's current participation matters to the character of the activity. These reasons favor some capacity for response while leaving its form and frequency open.

27.4 Present Authority and the Invention of a New Sovereign

Rejecting automatic authority of earlier commitments can appear to replace the past with the present as a new sovereign. If current uptake determines practical self-continuity, the later person's strongest preference might seem to settle every dispute. The account's treatment of reliance and repair prevents that inference.

Current stance matters because action is now being considered and experienced from that situation. Historical commitments matter because they can have generated reasons and claims. Other people matter as present participants and affected parties. A normative judgment must assess these relations together. None gains universal priority simply through its temporal position.

The opposed-ranking example makes the need for additional criteria explicit. A formal model containing present and future preferences can display conflict. It cannot choose a legitimate ordering merely by giving one preference a later timestamp. Likewise, equal averaging introduces a rule requiring justification and a scale requiring interpretation.

This objection also applies to the researcher's own standards. Labeling a target acceptable in the revision graph does not establish its value. The modeler must explain why reaching it matters and whose interests the definition includes. The formalism supports clarity only when its evaluative inputs remain visible.

27.5 The Regress of Endorsement

If a desire can be rejected through another desire, the authority of the second attitude can itself be questioned. Adding higher levels indefinitely postpones the problem. A person's reflective approval may be manipulated, incoherent, or opposed to their practical conduct. A hierarchy alone cannot guarantee authenticity.

The present account takes this as a limit on locating final authority in one psychological item. It examines how attitudes are formed, how they enter action, what evidence and alternatives are available, and how the person can respond to criticism. These are possible sources of warrant for an attribution of agency. They are not an infallible test.

A critic can ask whether the proposed combination is merely eclectic. The answer requires showing why each dimension matters to a specific alternative explanation. Formation matters when manipulation is a live possibility. Alternatives matter when conduct might reflect blocked refusal. Current assessment matters when an old record is used to override changed judgment. Their relevance follows from the explanatory contrasts, rather than a wish to include every attractive concept.

Some cases remain unresolved after these considerations. A person can understand the alternatives, accept the reasons, and still experience alienation from the resulting action. The account should preserve that report and reconsider its interpretation. Explanatory humility here is a substantive limit, not an excuse to ignore evidence.

27.6 Formalism and Conceptual Return

The finite constructions risk adding notation to familiar distinctions without improving understanding. A maximum over a larger set, a backwards reachability recurrence, and a fibre-constancy argument are elementary. Their inclusion must therefore be justified by the conceptual work they perform.

The historical recovery result identifies a precise failure in inferring endorsement from a compressed record. It requires the investigator to specify rival histories and a discriminating query. The revision construction identifies a missing practical route even where consultation or nominal permission exists. The ranking example exposes the additional scale assumptions behind temporal aggregation.

These uses remain narrow. None is a theorem of consciousness, authenticity, or moral responsibility. Removing a construction would be appropriate if its associated ambiguity could be handled more clearly in prose without loss. The present manuscript retains the constructions because their conditions and counterconditions make the argument reviewable.

A useful measure of formal adequacy is whether the notation helps locate a failed inference. If a model can represent both compelled execution and endorsed participation only by attaching unexplained labels, it has yet to explain their difference. The philosophical chapters must do that work. The equation's role is to preserve the distinct inputs and consequences.

27.7 Continuity and the Value of Discontinuity

An inquiry devoted to continuity can quietly treat disruption as a deficiency. The cases of harmful projects and responsible exit show why that assumption is untenable. Ending an undertaking can protect others, permit learning, and create space for a more appropriate life.

The account consequently distinguishes continuity of a particular end from continuity of answerability or participation. Some relations can end while others continue. The desirability of each change depends on reasons and consequences. There is no requirement that every discontinuity be redescribed as a deeper continuity in order to justify it.

This concession also limits the vocabulary of repair. A person need not reconstruct an old practical identity after every change. Some relationships should remain ended. Repair can concern accurate records, returned materials, or acknowledgment of harm without reconciliation or restored commitment.

These replies establish the account's limited ambitions. Further objections concern whether those limits leave a coherent theoretical contribution, how its normative standards are justified, and what its

treatment of change can preserve when important losses remain.

27.8 The Unity Presupposed by a Plural Account

A powerful objection asks how the paper can speak of practical self-continuity while presupposing the person whose continuity is at issue. This subsection gives the objection its full force. It distinguishes a conditional investigation within a continuing life from an explanation of the unity of that life.

The archive cases use ordinary reference to describe Mira before and after changes of memory and commitment. If the theoretical aim were to derive numerical identity from those changes, that starting point would be circular. The paper would already have assumed the result it purported to establish.

The actual inferential target is narrower. Given the reference background, the inquiry asks whether a record warrants a historical claim, whether Mira currently endorses a project, whether she can revise her involvement and which claims remain after withdrawal. These questions can have substantive answers even when the reference relation is supplied independently.

An analogy within the method helps clarify the scope without proving a theory. An inquiry can study how one institution changes its decision procedures while using a stipulated institutional reference. That inquiry need not settle every question about the institution's identity to explain a particular procedural change. Its conclusions remain conditional on the reference assumptions used.

The critic can still object that practical self-continuity should name a more unified phenomenon than this collection of questions. The reply should accept the challenge as a terminological and theoretical constraint. The paper's central phrase concerns the organization of particular practical relations across change, not a complete criterion for the existence of one person.

That organization has some unity through the questions participants actually confront. Mira needs to understand the earlier undertaking, decide how to respond and prepare a future course. The relations enter one practical situation. This fact supplies a local connection among them while leaving a deeper account of personal unity open.

A stronger theory might explain why those questions are normally directed toward one person and how biological, psychological and social relations sustain that unity. The comparative chapter identifies such a broader ambition. The present analysis can contribute constraints to it without treating the broader question as either solved or dispensable.

The objection therefore narrows the claim rather than defeating every result. The paper should avoid presenting a successful local account as a complete metaphysics of persons. Within its conditional scope, the validity of a historical inference or a bounded normative argument remains assessable.

27.9 An Unrestricted Vocabulary of Relations

Another objection concerns explanatory permissiveness. If every event can be related to some other event, a relational account may be able to describe any outcome. This subsection asks what would distinguish a useful explanation from a redescription that cannot fail.

Calling Mira's reflection relational supplies little information by itself. The useful claim identifies a dependence: access to a particular record changes which historical reasons she can assess, or an institutional rule changes whether she can carry out a transfer. The explanation should specify what difference the relation makes.

The distinction can be tested through a contrast. If the same conclusion follows whether the record is reliable or fabricated, the account is failing to use evidential warrant meaningfully. If the same attribution of participation follows whether refusal can affect the process or is systematically ignored, the account is failing to use uptake meaningfully.

These contrasts do not require a numerical causal estimate in every philosophical case. They require an intelligible account of the relevant alternatives and why the difference matters. The model's structure should remain connected to that account.

Some relations will be irrelevant to a particular task. Mira's earlier choice of filing color may belong to the archive's history without affecting the present question of a contributor's access. Including it in a

total relational description would increase detail without improving the inference.

The paper therefore supports selective explanatory relevance. The inquiry begins with a practical question and identifies the relations needed to answer it. It remains open to broader connections where evidence or argument shows that they matter.

A critic may worry that the selection is itself subjective. The relevance judgment can indeed be contested. Its warrant lies in the inferential task, alternative explanations and practical consequences, all of which should be explicit. This is a burden of argument, not a reason to pretend that a complete unselected description is available.

The vocabulary earns theoretical value when it clarifies a dependence that competing descriptions obscure or when it prevents a specific invalid inference. Where it merely renames the observed outcome, it should be reduced or removed. The framework's openness to such pruning is part of its adequacy.

27.10 Normative Premises within an Apparently Descriptive Model

The account's language of legitimate claims, meaningful participation and proportionate burden introduces values. A critic may argue that these values do all the work while the relational model contributes little. This subsection separates that challenge into a demand for transparency and a demand for explanatory integration.

The transparency demand is correct. A graph of possible actions cannot establish which target ought to be reached. A record of reliance cannot by itself establish that the reliance deserves protection. A current endorsement cannot establish that the endorsed course is justified. Normative premises enter the argument at each transition.

The paper responds by stating bounded bridges, such as the entrustment principle and the principle concerning controlled misleading attribution. These bridges remain proposed normative commitments. Their justification appeals to the agency and claims implicated in the particular relation.

The integration demand asks why the descriptive distinctions matter once those premises are admitted. The answer is that the premises apply to specific conditions. Whether Mira currently controls the recording, whether the contributor's condition was accepted, and whether return is feasible affect the argument's conclusion.

Without those distinctions, the normative principle can be applied to the wrong case. A person with no current control cannot be required to perform the same immediate act as the custodian. A newly appointed custodian may have a control-based reason to respond without having made the earlier promise. The practical description determines which ground is relevant.

Conversely, a complete description still leaves the bridge open to criticism. The account should permit a reader to accept the facts and reject the proposed requirement. That possibility is a sign of explicit normative argument, rather than a failure to make the model sufficiently formal.

An objection asks whether several bounded principles can conflict. They can. Correcting attribution, protecting private information and preserving historical accuracy may point toward different forms of publication. The account then needs an assessment of scope, alternatives and burden. It offers no theorem guaranteeing that every conflict has an easy common solution.

The relation between description and normativity is therefore cooperative. Descriptive distinctions identify the situation to which a principle applies. Normative argument explains what practical force the situation has. Neither level can replace the other without losing part of the inquiry.

27.11 Formation under Influence and the Search for an Unconditioned Self

Criticism of imposed substitution can encourage the idea that a valid commitment must arise from an untouched inner self. This subsection rejects that unnecessary standard while preserving the difference between support and domination. It asks how influence can be assessed without requiring independence from every relation.

Mira's values develop through language, experience, relationships and available opportunities. A commitment formed after discussion can still be hers in the practical sense relevant to participation. The

mere presence of influence cannot establish that another agent has replaced her judgment.

The harder question concerns how the influence operates. Does the interaction make relevant considerations available? Can Mira challenge its framing? Are alternatives concealed or made prohibitively costly for a purpose that lacks justification? Does her response have practical effect within the arrangement?

These questions provide reasons for distinguishing cases. They do not produce an infallible authenticity test. A person can misunderstand a situation despite careful support, or make an objectionable choice under conditions that respect their agency.

The account should also resist a romantic picture of solitary judgment. Private reflection can reproduce a misleading public description, while dialogue can help a person articulate a previously obscured concern. Solitude and interaction have no fixed moral ranking in the theory.

A difficult case involves a person who endorses a strongly formative relationship and values its discipline. The fact that the relationship shapes preferences may be part of what the person seeks. Assessment then concerns the scope of the undertaking, available response to changing circumstances, and the claims of other affected people.

An objection holds that this account merely relocates authenticity into the phrase available response. The reply is that the paper does not use that phrase as a complete definition of authenticity. It identifies one practically relevant condition whose absence can explain a particular constraint. Other questions remain.

The positive claim is therefore limited. Practical continuity can develop through influence that the person participates in and can meaningfully assess. Criticism should target identifiable defects in formation, authority or response, rather than invoke an impossible origin outside all social and material conditions.

27.12 Concern for Another and the Residual First-Person Difference

The account's strongest unresolved objection concerns the similarity between self-directed concern and serious concern for another person's agency. This subsection examines what remains after that similarity is fully admitted. The aim is to avoid treating a useful practical pattern as a proof of first-person perspective.

Mira can prepare resources for Elena's future judgment, protect Elena's opportunity to refuse and preserve reasons Elena may later use. Those acts can have the same broad organization as preparation for Mira's own later judgment. The difference between agency and welfare therefore cannot, by itself, identify self-concern.

The self-directed case may include a distinctive anticipatory orientation toward undergoing the future experience and acting from that future situation. A person's report of that orientation can be important evidence. Yet placing the orientation into a formal relation does not explain its first-person character.

The paper's functional descriptions can still clarify differences within the practical domain. A plan that leaves room for later judgment differs from a plan that merely secures an outward result. That distinction applies to both self-directed and other-directed concern. Its validity does not depend on monopolizing the self-directed case.

A critic may conclude that the paper should abandon the language of self-continuity entirely. That conclusion would be warranted if the only acceptable target were a reductive derivation of experienced mineness. The present target includes the practical organization of an ordinarily continuing person's relation to changing memory and commitment.

Within that target, first-person orientation can remain a described feature whose full explanation is open. Philosophical theories often begin with phenomena they seek partly to explain. The important constraint is to distinguish recording the phenomenon from deriving it.

The account also avoids assigning greater moral weight to a future simply because it is anticipated in a first-person way. The practical significance of that orientation for planning differs from the comparative moral worth of the people affected. Other-directed concern can be equally serious and can constrain self-directed action.

The unresolved difference therefore limits the theory's explanatory reach without erasing its local results. The paper can explain how supports, records and revision routes affect practical participation while accepting that a complete account of first-person anticipation requires further work.

27.13 Loss within a Practically Continuing Life

Emphasizing continuity through memory change can understate the significance of what is lost. This subsection addresses that concern directly. A successful practical response can coexist with an important experiential or relational loss that the response cannot repair.

Mira may competently understand a record and fulfill a bounded obligation while grieving the absence of recollection. Describing her response as practical continuity should preserve that loss. It would be misleading to say that the record has simply replaced the missing memory in every relevant respect.

The same distinction applies to changed embodiment. A supported alternative can permit a valued activity while leaving an earlier mode of experience unavailable. Functional achievement can matter greatly without making the modes interchangeable.

A critic may argue that the language of dimensions makes loss seem administratively manageable. The danger is real if the model becomes a checklist in which preserved categories cancel missing ones. The account rejects such a totalizing score. It describes the particular loss and the particular continuity separately.

The absence of a common scale is philosophically significant. A restored practical opportunity cannot automatically compensate for a lost recollective experience. The person may value both differently, and some losses may remain resistant to compensation even when a future becomes workable.

The practical account can support response without claiming restoration. It can identify ways to preserve access, explain a history or enable a new undertaking. It should also allow the person to decline a proposed substitute or to regard it as useful but incomplete.

Other people can experience related losses. Contributors may miss a shared form of collaboration even after a transfer fully addresses the condition of their materials. Their disappointment can be intelligible without creating an unlimited entitlement to Mira's continued role.

The theory therefore needs a vocabulary of coexistence. Continuity, loss, repair and ending can all be present in different respects. Preserving that complexity prevents the positive account from turning every adaptation into evidence that nothing important has disappeared.

27.14 Historical Explanation and Moral Assessment of a Life

An account of how a commitment continues can be mistaken for an assessment of whether the life organized around it is good. This subsection distinguishes explanatory coherence from ethical merit. It also considers whether practical continuity can support a harmful undertaking.

A person can sustain a project through accurate memory, careful planning, strong uptake and effective revision. Those features can make the project practically coherent while its ends remain objectionable. The model's continuity relations supply no automatic moral endorsement.

The same is true of reflective change. A person can revise a commitment in response to reasons they understand while giving inadequate weight to others' legitimate claims. Reasons-responsive formation is relevant to agency, but its presence does not make every accepted reason sound.

The account's normative arguments therefore require substantive content. The entrustment case includes legitimacy of control and a bounded concern for affected agency. If those premises fail, historical fidelity alone cannot rescue the undertaking.

A critic may ask whether the theory should focus only on morally acceptable continuity. Doing so would simplify some evaluations while obscuring important cases. Harmful practices can persist through sophisticated forms of practical organization. Understanding that persistence can be necessary for criticism.

The generative and reproductive distinction likewise carries no fixed ethical ranking. A newly created arrangement can be harmful, while preserving an established condition can protect a contributor. The evaluation follows the relation's content, formation and consequences.

Mira's withdrawal from an objectionable policy can therefore be justified even if it weakens the institution's continuity. A later person may also have reason to preserve a valuable practice despite its historical association with a flawed project. The practical analysis should allow both possibilities.

The result is a separation among explanation, agency and ethical assessment. The theory examines how a practical relation operates, how the person participates in it and whether particular actions or conditions are justified. Agreement at one level leaves the others open.

27.15 Conditions for Theoretical Retrenchment

A final objection asks whether the paper's many qualifications protect it from decisive criticism. This subsection states conditions under which the account should be narrowed or abandoned. The aim is to make its openness to revision substantive.

The first condition concerns inferential redundancy. If a proposed distinction never changes a warranted conclusion or practical response within its stated domain, retaining it may add complexity without value. The account should merge or remove it for that inquiry.

The second concerns circular interpretation. If current uptake can be identified only by assuming the very normative authority it is meant to help assess, the attribution cannot serve as independent evidence. The model should separate the descriptive attitude from the evaluative conclusion or narrow its claim.

The third concerns explanatory superiority. A competing account may organize the same distinctions more clearly, explain their unity more deeply or resolve a first-person issue the present account leaves open. In that case the relational representation may survive as a useful component rather than a complete alternative.

The fourth concerns counterexamples to normative bridges. A proposed principle should be revised when its premises support an unacceptable result that cannot be addressed without an ad hoc exception. The burden is to identify a principled change in scope or justification.

The fifth concerns empirical application. If attempts to study the proposed distinctions reveal that the evidence cannot support the interpretations claimed, empirical ambitions should be narrowed. Conceptual coherence alone cannot validate an instrument or a population claim.

These conditions leave substantial room for criticism. They also preserve the value of partial results. A failure to explain first-person mineness does not invalidate the factorization proof. A successful proof does not protect a defective normative argument. Each component should stand or fall on its own grounds.

The paper's final stance is therefore one of conditional integration. Its relations and arguments form a coherent practical inquiry while retaining separate evidential and philosophical burdens. Continued development is justified by the work they perform, and retrenchment is justified where that work fails.

28 Research Obligations and Conclusion

This final chapter brings together the account's local results and identifies their remaining burdens. It distinguishes historical warrant, practical participation, bounded normative authority and the wider questions of personal unity and first-person experience. It then states the conditions under which further philosophical and empirical work could strengthen, narrow or replace the proposal.

The paper has examined a continuing person's relation to changing memory and commitment. Its central cases hold ordinary personal reference fixed while varying historical access, present uptake, material support and affected claims. This method permits substantive conclusions about practical relations without presenting those conclusions as a complete theory of numerical identity.

The positive proposal concerns a form of continuity through participation. A person can take up an earlier history through present judgment, prepare conditions for later judgment and revise an undertaking

in response to reasons and consequences. These relations can survive changes in memory and substantive ends. Their survival remains specific to the activity and the grounds identified.

The account also preserves justified endings. A person can leave a project while acknowledging its place in their history and addressing a bounded claim. Some relations continue, others change and others end. The desirability of each transition requires an argument concerning the people, purposes and consequences involved.

28.1 Historical Warrant and Changed Memory Access

The memory analysis establishes a distinction between obtaining warranted historical information and recovering recollective experience. This subsection states the consequence for practical continuity. It also identifies the evidential limits that remain after a record becomes available.

Mira can accept a well-supported account of an earlier undertaking without recollecting its formation. That acceptance can enable present action, including clarification, transfer or repair. The practical achievement does not require pretending that the earlier experience has been restored.

The converse relation is equally important. A recollective presentation can remain vivid while its historical content is uncertain or rejected. The presence of the experience and the occurrence of its apparent target are different questions. The representation-token model preserves that distinction explicitly.

The historical-recovery theorem gives a precise local result. Relative to a declared record map and fixed query, recovery is possible exactly when the query is constant on each nonempty record fibre. The conclusion is unique on the image of the map. The proof applies to the declared query's codomain while leaving its interpretation and evidential adequacy open.

The theorem identifies where a compressed record loses information relevant to a question. It does not establish that the history space contains every relevant possibility, that an authentic record is accurate, or that a recovered proposition has the character of personal memory. Those are independent burdens.

The philosophical account adds the practical role of trust. A person can rely defeasibly on a well-supported earlier judgment or another person's testimony. Such reliance can be an exercise of current agency, especially where the person can assess sources, ask questions and distinguish historical acceptance from present endorsement.

The result is a form of continuity through changed access. Earlier reasons and consequences can remain available by a new route. That route can sustain action while leaving a loss of familiarity, recollection or experiential ownership intact.

Further work should examine how these access routes interact in actual cases and how their differences matter to the person. The present analysis supplies distinctions and conditional consequences. It leaves mechanisms, prevalence and appropriate forms of support to specialist inquiry.

28.2 Revision and Prospective Participation

The commitment and future-concern analyses explain how continuity can include substantial change of end. This subsection states the positive contribution and its limits. It distinguishes a connection through practical participation from mere causal succession.

A later commitment can respond to the reasons, materials and consequences of an earlier undertaking while replacing its substantive aim. Mira's decision to preserve restricted access can have such a relation to the abandoned publication plan. The continuity concerns her engagement with the history, rather than exact preservation of its content.

Genealogy alone is insufficient. An institution can produce a later commitment through selective information or pressure. The account therefore examines formation, current uptake, available alternatives and the practical effect of response. These conditions bear on the interpretation of participation.

Prospective concern provides a complementary direction. Present Mira can prepare reasons and resources for a later occasion of judgment while expecting that later values may differ. The preparation can support agency through change rather than demand the reproduction of one preference.

The first-person relation remains distinct. Serious concern for another person's agency can share the same organization, including protection of refusal and revision. The practical analysis therefore explains a contrast with outcome-only preparation while leaving experienced mineness incompletely explained.

The revision model contributes a bounded analysis of possibility. A path to a supplied target can exist under the declared actions and transitions. A common guaranteed act based on accessible information can still be absent, as the two-state countermodel shows. Additional information or coordination may create a longer usable route.

The target itself requires interpretation. Reaching a substantive end, reaching an effective review and changing the criterion are different achievements. State enrichment can represent those differences while supplying no automatic justification for calling an outcome authentic or satisfactory.

The account's constructive result is consequently conditional. Practical continuity can be sustained through a person's present response to a changing history and preparation for later participation. The quality of that continuity depends on the reasons, information, material conditions and authority involved.

28.3 Bounded Authority and Historical Answerability

The normative arguments explain why current rejection and continuing responsibility can coexist. This subsection states their shared structure without converting them into one unrestricted principle. Each argument remains tied to a particular practical relation.

The entrustment argument begins with legitimate limited control, accepted custody, reasonable reliance and proportionate feasible response. Its explicit bridge supports a defeasible requirement to return or suitably transfer material after repudiation. The requirement protects the contributor's continuing agency while leaving the broader role open to ending.

The conclusion depends on the legitimacy and scope of the original relation. Wrongful promises, unreasonable reliance, changed feasibility and competing third-party claims require reassessment. Current control without original adoption can supply a different ground of response, with a different history and limit.

The attribution argument concerns an actor's continuing use of a materially misleading presentation. Where the actor controls the presentation, has good contrary evidence and can make a proportionate correction without a stronger defeater, the proposed bridge supports clarification. Historical truth can be preserved while an unsupported implication of present endorsement is removed.

The provisional-preservation argument concerns credible uncertainty before an irreversible exposure. Legitimate custody, relevant inquiry, proportionate delay and the absence of a stronger urgent claim can support a bounded interval of preservation. The argument leaves the original undertaking unresolved and requires review when its conditions change.

The pause and suspension arguments distinguish reasons for the person from authority over the person. A considered earlier plan can give Noor a reason to wait before an irreversible act. That reason supplies no automatic power for a supporter to compel compliance. A fair suspension arrangement addresses participants with grounded responsibilities within their scopes, rather than assigning work to anyone capable of helping.

These arguments share a discipline of limited authority. A historical commitment can matter without governing the whole future. A current stance can matter without erasing every affected claim. A need can matter without identifying its bearer as an unlimited resource for another's life.

The normative bridges remain proposals open to criticism. Their force comes from the reasons offered concerning agency, legitimate control, reliance and burden. It is never derived solely from a causal edge, a persistent identifier or the number of available actions.

Further normative development should test each bridge against additional domains and hard conflicts. Transfer should preserve the premise that actually carries the obligation. An archival argument cannot be applied to every relation merely because both contain a past, a present participant and an unresolved claim.

28.4 Material Support and Shared Practical Conditions

The account locates participation within material and interpersonal arrangements. This subsection states what that claim explains and what it leaves open. It also preserves the agency of people who provide support.

A judgment can remain ineffective when the person lacks access to the records, procedures or resources needed to act on it. Conversely, an institution can produce a desired outcome without giving the person's judgment a role. The difference matters to the practical character of the activity.

Support can make a route usable by clarifying information, coordinating tasks or enabling implementation. Its value depends on the actual relation among understanding, uptake and action. Provision of an aid or a nominal permission is insufficient evidence of sustained practical access.

Maintenance and transfer extend the analysis through time. Records become outdated, roles change and supporters leave. Continuing support can require new work and agreement. A replacement may preserve a function while altering trust, interpretation or the experience of participation.

Those who provide support possess commitments and limits of their own. Their contribution cannot be treated as an indefinitely available component of another person's agency. The allocation of work requires accepted roles, legitimate responsibilities or a justified new arrangement.

Dependence can also distribute influence. A supporter may have good reason to limit their participation or decline an objectionable task. Assistance can also be conditioned in ways that make disagreement unnecessarily costly. The assessment must examine the actual reason and scope, rather than classify dependence as either inherently oppressive or inherently beneficial.

The material analysis supports a differentiated interpretation of performance. Failure to complete a task can reflect a barrier, a limited capacity, a substantive refusal or several conditions together. Successful performance can also depend on a particular setting. These descriptions remain distinct from judgments of basic moral standing.

The resulting picture is relational in a specific explanatory sense. Action depends on organized resources, information and participation whose contributions can be identified and criticized. The claim leaves the complete constitution of consciousness and personal identity for further philosophical work.

28.5 Unity, Narrative and First-Person Experience

The strongest theoretical challenges concern the unity of the life being described and the character of its first-person perspective. This subsection states the account's response at its current scope. It also identifies the compatibility that may exist with stronger alternatives.

Separating practical questions does not itself explain why they concern one person. The paper's ordinary reference background makes its local analysis possible while leaving that wider unity to an independent account. A complete theory of persons would need to explain more than the coexistence of memory, uptake and recognized responsibility.

The narrative comparison likewise requires a distinction of targets. Local responsible action can occur before a person has an explicit integrated account of its place in a life. That observation constrains a universal demand for such articulation at every occasion.

It leaves broader narrative capacities and a flexible, socially supported interpretation of a life open to assessment. The stronger antecedents considered in the paper already include revision, interaction and infrastructure. The present proposal gains no general novelty merely by adding those themes.

The comparative dossier shows how an enriched alternative may converge with the account. A narrative or institutional theory can distinguish historical warrant from recollection, present stance from public attribution and formal availability from usable exit. Where it does, the practical result can be shared.

The first-person issue remains more resistant. Preparing for a later standpoint can organize action in an intelligible way, yet comparable organization can appear in care for another. The person's reported anticipatory orientation remains important evidence without becoming a reductive explanation through its label.

The paper therefore preserves a partial achievement. It explains how particular supports and constraints affect practical participation across change. It leaves experienced mineness and the full unity of a person as further explanatory obligations.

This limit should guide future theory rather than function as an exemption from criticism. A stronger account may explain the missing relation or show that some of the present distinctions should be organized differently. The proposal remains open to becoming a component within such an account.

28.6 A Research Program of Traceable Inference

The methodological proposal concerns how the distinctions could be investigated without turning them into an unsupported score of selfhood. This subsection states the main requirements for further inquiry. Their purpose is to connect evidence to the exact claim it can support.

An inquiry should begin with a question. Recollection, historical belief, current uptake, available revision and justified obligation require different evidence. A single indicator such as attendance or a signature cannot automatically answer them all.

The record should preserve the route from observation through interpretation to evaluation. A person's report, another participant's account and an institutional classification have different sources and possible authority. Their agreement can reflect independent support or repeated circulation of one interpretation.

Temporal resolution should follow the target. A current stance may be identified at one occasion while the formation of that stance remains uncertain. A long undertaking may contain pauses and reversals hidden by a coarse summary. More frequent inquiry can also shape the response it records.

Support interventions should be evaluated through their stated practical aims. Continued participation cannot serve as the only success measure when informed withdrawal is a possible exercise of agency. Understanding, effective dissent, usable action and affected claims may need separate assessment.

The researcher's role in formation also requires attention. New vocabulary or options can help create a stance, rather than merely reveal a fully formed prior one. That generative effect can be valuable, while its influence and authority remain subjects of inquiry.

Negative cases should challenge the theory's favored inferences. Extensive consultation with little practical effect, meaningful action with limited articulation, sincere endorsement under constrained options and responsible compliance without enthusiasm each test a different sufficiency claim.

Empirical development would require appropriate instruments, evidence and expertise beyond the present case architecture. The philosophical distinctions can guide such work, but conceptual coherence alone cannot establish a clinical measure or a general population claim.

The research program is therefore one of progressively better specified inference. It should identify which distinctions matter, where they overlap and what evidence would warrant revision. That discipline can strengthen the framework while leaving open the possibility that some parts should be abandoned.

28.7 Formal and Normative Development Obligations

Further development should follow the remaining conceptual work rather than multiply notation for its own sake. This subsection identifies several focused obligations. Each begins from a limit made visible by the present models and arguments.

The formal account could be extended to richer information and transition structures where a practical question requires them. Such work should state the new domains, action conditions and interpretation before claiming a stronger result. A longer strategy or a nondeterministic transition model would answer a different question from the present one-step guarantee.

Model adequacy remains central. The represented history space can omit a relevant alternative, the action menu can exclude a newly created route and the temporal resolution can hide a significant transition. Formal correctness leaves those representational choices open to assessment.

The semantic query also requires discipline. Historical intention, reasonable recipient understanding and present interpretation are different targets. Generalizing the factorization proof to an arbitrary codomain does not erase that difference or authorize retroactive changes of content.

The normative program should deepen the justification of bounded bridges and their interaction. A case may involve competing claims to correction, privacy, access and repair. The paper supplies reasons for several local responses while leaving some comparisons unsettled.

The authority of procedures deserves particular attention. A review mechanism can help coordinate reasons while reproducing an unjustified boundary or excluding a relevant participant. Its legitimacy depends on its purpose, scope, operation and burden, rather than on the existence of a formal sequence.

The theory should also preserve the distinction between a reason, an obligation and an enforcement authority. A good reason for Noor to pause does not give another person a power to compel her. A legitimate claim concerning material can support a bounded response without authorizing control over the rest of Mira's life.

These obligations favor selective refinement. A new formulation should expose an assumption, support a derivation or distinguish a consequential case. Where prose makes the issue clearer, additional mathematics would add little.

28.8 The Resulting Practical Account

The paper's final position is a conditional account of how a continuing person can remain practically related to a changing history. This subsection states that position at its proper scope. It includes both the constructive relation and the limits that make it assessable.

Memory, testimony and records can make earlier activity available through different routes. Present uptake can transform that material into a reason, a new undertaking or a response to an affected claim. Prospective concern can organize preparation for later experience and judgment under conditions that may alter the person's values.

These relations can support continuity without exact reproduction. Mira can remember differently, understand a commitment differently and replace its end while remaining engaged with its consequences. Noor can resume a concern through a new work or leave an old sketch unfinished without losing every intelligible relation to it.

The same outward persistence can also conceal a failure of participation. A stable role, repeated vocabulary or completed product can arise where refusal has little effect. The account therefore asks how the pattern is formed and what the person can do with it.

Normative assessment remains indispensable. Continuity can sustain a harmful undertaking, and discontinuity can permit a justified change. The practical value of a relation follows from its content, authority and consequences, with the standing of affected people preserved.

The integrated comparative result supports the distinctions where they change a warranted inference or response. It leaves room for more economical descriptions in simpler tasks and for convergence with richer theories. Additional categories earn their place through explanatory work.

The account's most important remaining limit concerns first-person unity. Its models and arguments can clarify practical organization while leaving the character of experienced mineness incompletely explained. Acknowledging that limit preserves the difference between a useful analysis and a completed theory of the self.

A continuing practical life can contain lost recall, altered concern, responsible repudiation, lingering answerability, renewed activity and completed endings. Understanding those relations requires attention to present participation and to the histories, materials and other people through which participation becomes possible. The present framework offers a way to conduct that inquiry while keeping its evidence, assumptions and unresolved questions available for criticism.

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