Toward a Just Proposal - Epistemic Injustice Theory and the Practice of Intimate-Relationship Proposals

Posted on 2026-06-07 In Philosophy , Ethics Views: Disqus: Word count in article: 21k Reading time ≈ 1:15

ENGLISH

Philosophy of Intimacy and the Theory of Justice — Paper VI

Toward a Just Proposal: Epistemic Injustice Theory and the Practice of Intimate-Relationship Proposals

On the Marriage Proposal as a High-Stakes Decision, and the Conditions under Which Its Staging Wrongs the One It Asks

Theory-core installment: literature verification and the framework it applies

Wanhong Huang — huangwanhong.g.official@gmail.com

June 7, 2026

To the forest girl,
to whom I would never put a question she had not first been given every means to answer,
and whose yes, if it comes, I would have her free to have weighed.

敬之惧之，匪以为难 — To hold you in awe, to fear doing you wrong, is not to make our love a hardship. (after the 诗经, Book of Songs)

信物者，待也，非约之封也 — A token is a waiting, not the sealing of a bargain. (a line of the author’s own)

Abstract

A marriage proposal is, beneath its romance, a request that one person make a high-stakes, contract-like, life-structuring decision, and one that is, in L. A. Paul’s sense, transformative (Paul 2014): its acceptance reshapes the values and self by whose lights it would be assessed. This paper argues that the conventional staging of the proposal—the engineered emotional peak, the social script that demands an immediate answer, and the asymmetry of information and preparation between the two parties—can, even in the complete absence of ill will and of any identity-based prejudice, compromise the epistemic agency of the person asked.

I do not claim to have discovered a new kind of epistemic injustice. The wrong is better understood with a framework already in hand. I read the proposal through Catala (2025), The Dynamics of Epistemic Injustice: Situating Epistemic Power and Agency, whose pluralist account of epistemic agency and analysis of hermeneutical domination and epistemic empowerment supply exactly the apparatus the case requires. On Catala’s account, epistemic agency is not exhausted by the propositional exchange of testimony; it includes a non-propositional, non-verbal, self-interpretive dimension—the agent’s capacity to make sense of her own experience to herself (self-to-self intelligibility) before and apart from conveying it to others (self-to-others intelligibility). The proposal, I argue, is a site where this self-interpretive agency, at the very threshold of a transformative choice, is placed under conditions—temporal, affective, informational—that impede its exercise.

This installment does not yet write the body. Following the principle that the conceptual core should be secured before the argument is built upon it, it does two things. First, it verifies, against the literature current to 2025, the post-Fricker development of the field—Fricker’s two originals, Dotson on testimonial smothering, Pohlhaus Jr. on willful hermeneutical ignorance, Medina on resistance, and the philosophical work on gaslighting—and then expounds Catala’s framework in detail, since it is the framework the paper will use. Second, it shows precisely how the proposal situation maps onto Catala’s categories: which dimension of epistemic agency is at stake, why the wrong is a form of hermeneutical rather than testimonial difficulty, and why locating it within an existing account is more defensible than minting a new term. The constructive half of the full paper will then derive the normativity of an epistemically just proposal: separation of the affective moment from the decision, full disclosure before the asking, removal of immediate-answer pressure, the ring re-grounded from “seal of a concluded bargain” to “token and waiting,” and a deferred-commitment mechanism, each reconstrued as a condition of epistemic empowerment in Catala’s sense.

Keywords: epistemic injustice; epistemic agency; pluralist account; hermeneutical domination; epistemic empowerment; self-interpretation; transformative experience; marriage proposal; intimate justice; relational autonomy.

1. Orientation: What This Installment Is and Is Not

This is the sixth paper in a series on the philosophy of intimacy and the theory of justice. The preceding papers established a relational ontology of the loving subject, the normativity of self-legislation and its re-grounding as co-legislation, and the standing of the other to contest the terms of a shared life. The present paper turns that apparatus on a single, concrete, and almost universally romanticised act: the marriage proposal.

The full paper will run a familiar two-part arc, a diagnosis followed by a constructive reconstruction. But the central claim—that the conventional proposal can wrong the person asked in her capacity as a knower and chooser, even when the proposer is loving, sincere, and wholly free of prejudice—lives or dies on the precision of one analysis. If that analysis is loosely drawn, the diagnosis collapses into either a familiar complaint (“surprises can be manipulative,” which no one denies and which is not yet a theory) or an overreach (“all surprise proposals are unjust,” which is false). The strategy of this series has been to let a neglected intimate situation illuminate an existing theoretical structure rather than to multiply terminology.

I therefore make a deliberate methodological choice, and state it plainly because an earlier draft of this installment did the opposite. I do not claim to have isolated a new species of epistemic injustice. The temptation to coin one—“situational” or “decisional” epistemic injustice—was real, and an earlier version of this paper yielded to it. On reflection that move is both unnecessary and worse-supported than the alternative: the apparatus required to analyse the proposal already exists, in a precise and recent form, in Catala (2025). Minting a term where an adequate framework is in hand invites two avoidable costs—the suspicion of novelty-for-its-own-sake, and the burden of defending a neologism’s boundaries from scratch. It is more defensible, and more illuminating, to show that Catala’s pluralist account of epistemic agency, when trained on the proposal, already names and explains the wrong. The contribution of this paper is then not a new concept but a new application: bringing a frontier account of epistemic agency to bear on an intimate practice it was not written for, and deriving from that application a normative reconstruction of the practice.

So before any of the body is drafted, two preliminary tasks must be discharged with care. (1) Verification of the field, and exposition of the framework. Section 2 reconstructs the post-Fricker terrain accurately, then expounds Catala’s framework in detail, because it is the framework the paper will use and the reader is owed more than its title. (2) Mapping the case onto the framework. Section 3 shows precisely how the proposal situation instantiates Catala’s categories—which dimension of epistemic agency is engaged, why the difficulty is hermeneutical rather than testimonial, and where the analysis stops—so that the diagnosis is neither a truism nor an overreach.

A methodological note on self-reference, discharged here so that it colours everything that follows. This paper, like its predecessors, is occasioned by the author’s own practice; the constructive proposals it will defend are ones the author intends to enact. There is an obvious reflexive hazard: a paper that argues for the epistemic standing of one’s intended partner, while using the shared relationship as its tacit case, would contradict its own thesis if it treated her as material to be theorised about rather than a person to be consulted. The series has handled this by anonymising and by presenting cases as constructed. The present paper accepts a stricter constraint, internal to its own argument: its constructive claims are not satisfied by being published but only by being enacted with the other, disclosed to her, and held open to her revision, on pain of performative self-contradiction. I flag the hazard now and return to it as a structural feature, not an afterthought, in the full paper.

2. The Field, Verified: Epistemic Injustice after Fricker

The aim of this section is accuracy, not survey for its own sake. Each classical figure is reconstructed only far enough to locate the proposal case relative to it, and the reconstruction is checked against the literature current to 2025 rather than against memory; the section then turns to expound the framework the paper actually uses.

2.1 Fricker’s Two Forms, and Why Neither Fits

Fricker (2007) introduced epistemic injustice as a wrong done to someone specifically in her capacity as a knower, and distinguished two species. Testimonial injustice occurs when a hearer gives a speaker a deflated credibility owing to a prejudice attaching to the speaker’s social identity—the paradigm being an identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a gap in the collective interpretive resources leaves some group unable to render an important region of its experience intelligible—the standard example being the unavailability, before the term existed, of a concept like sexual harassment.

Two features of Fricker’s originals matter here. First, both are tethered, in her formulation, to identity and structural marginalisation: the credibility deficit tracks a prejudice against who the speaker is, and the hermeneutical gap tracks the collective exclusion of a marginalised group from meaning-making. Second, the wrong is located in a credibility or intelligibility deficit—in how a knower’s contributions are received or her experience is conceptualised. The proposal case sits awkwardly with both. The person asked is not disbelieved because of her social identity; she is not, qua proposee, a member of a group excluded from interpretive resources; and the difficulty is not, in the first instance, that her contributions are received with a credibility deficit. What is at stake is closer to her capacity to make sense of her own situation to herself under the conditions of the scene. Fricker’s two originals therefore do not fit the case cleanly—not because the case is sui generis, but because Fricker’s framework predates the pluralist widening of epistemic agency that Catala supplies and that §2.6 sets out. The right response is not a new label but the right framework.

2.2 Dotson: Testimonial Smothering and Contributory Injustice

Dotson (2011) identifies testimonial smothering: a speaker truncates or withholds her own testimony because she anticipates that her audience will fail to receive it competently, so that the silencing is, in a sense, self-administered under structural pressure. Dotson (2012) adds contributory injustice, in which a knower’s contributions are excluded because the audience wilfully relies on a biased set of interpretive resources while alternatives exist.

Dotson is the closest of the classical figures to the proposal case, and the comparison must therefore be made with precision rather than enthusiasm. Testimonial smothering shares with the proposal case the structural shape of a self-administered epistemic shortfall: the proposee, like the smothered testifier, may pre-emptively suppress her own deliberation—here, the doubts and questions a momentous decision warrants—in anticipation of how raising them will be received. But the differences are decisive. In Dotson’s smothering the content suppressed is testimony (the speaker has knowledge she declines to deliver) and the anticipated failure is the audience’s incompetence or hostility as a receiver, rooted in structural marginalisation. In the proposal case what is suppressed is first-personal practical deliberation (not knowledge to be delivered to another but reasoning the agent owes herself), and the pressure that suppresses it is not the proposer’s incompetence as a receiver but the staging of the situation—the public scene, the kneeling, the watching faces, the script that codes hesitation as cruelty. Dotson gives us the form “epistemic shortfall produced under pressure rather than by an external withholder”; she does not give us the proposal’s specific mechanism, which is situational design rather than anticipated mis-reception, and which need not trade on any structural marginalisation of the proposee at all.

2.3 Pohlhaus Jr.: Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance

Pohlhaus (2012) develops willful hermeneutical ignorance: dominantly situated knowers actively refuse to take up the interpretive resources developed by the marginalised, so that the marginalised are met with a wilful failure to understand. This is, again, a concept built on the axis of structural power between social positions and on the fate of interpretive resources. It is a useful marker of an edge, not a home for the case. The proposal difficulty, as analysed below, does not require that the proposer occupy a dominant social position relative to the proposee, nor that any interpretive resource be refused; it can arise between social equals, and indeed between partners where the proposee is in every structural respect the proposer’s equal or superior. Pohlhaus marks one edge of the territory; the home, as the next subsection argues, is Catala’s pluralist account of agency.

2.4 Medina: The Epistemology of Resistance

Medina (2013) shifts the register from individual acts to epistemic character, responsibility, and resistance: he theorises the epistemic vices of the privileged (arrogance, laziness, closed-mindedness), the virtues that resist them, and the way epistemic injustices are sustained or contested across a social ecology. Medina is less a boundary than a resource for the constructive half. The notion of an epistemically just proposal that the full paper will defend is, in Medina’s terms, a structure of epistemic responsibility on the proposer’s side—an active cultivation of the conditions under which the other can exercise full epistemic agency—and of epistemic resistance as something the staging should make available rather than foreclose. I record him here so that the constructive section can draw on him without re-introducing him cold.

2.5 Gaslighting: The Indispensable Contrast

The philosophical literature on gaslighting is the contrast that most sharpens the proposal case, because gaslighting is the canonical wrong to epistemic agency within an intimate relationship, and the force of the present analysis is that the proposal can compromise epistemic agency without the feature that literature treats as central.

The state of that literature, verified, is as follows. Abramson (2014) gives the influential account on which gaslighting is constitutively a matter of the gaslighter’s intention and motive—an attempt to gain control by destroying the target’s standing as an independent locus of judgement—and on which its wrong is primarily moral rather than epistemic. Spear (2019) and the surrounding work argue, against Abramson’s de-emphasis of the epistemic, that gaslighting has ineliminable epistemic dimensions, that it corrodes self-trust and the victim’s conception of herself as an autonomous knower. Stark (2019) extends gaslighting beyond the dyadic and intentional toward the structural, tying it to prior epistemic injustice. Podosky (2021) argues that gaslighting can be understood as a purely epistemic phenomenon, characterised by confronting the victim with a forced choice between rejecting the gaslighter’s testimony and doubting her own basic epistemic competence, and need not depend on a particular set of intentions; Ruíz (2020) theorises cultural gaslighting at the level of colonial and structural epistemic oppression.

Two things follow. First, even on the most deflated, least intention-dependent account (Podosky), gaslighting is defined by an attack on the victim’s self-trust or basic epistemic competence—by getting her to doubt that she knows what she knows. The proposal case leaves the proposee’s self-trust and competence intact: she is not made to doubt her faculties; she is placed in a situation in which those intact faculties cannot be fully exercised before she must answer. This is a difference in the locus of the difficulty—competence undermined versus exercise impeded—and it is what tells us we are not looking at gaslighting and should not analyse the case as a covert or attenuated form of it. Second, every account in the gaslighting literature, even the structural ones, treats the wrong as flowing from something the wronging party does to the victim’s epistemic self-relation, whether by intention (Abramson), by epistemic mechanism (Podosky), or by structural position (Stark, Ruíz). The proposal difficulty can flow from a situation the proposer has innocently inherited and reproduced—the cultural script of the romantic proposal—without his doing anything to the proposee’s self-relation and without his intending or benefiting from any control. Gaslighting is thus the contrast that tells us where not to look: not to malice, not to a damaged self-relation. It does not, by itself, tell us where to look instead. For that we need Catala.

2.6 Catala’s Framework, Expounded

The account this paper uses is Catala (2025), The Dynamics of Epistemic Injustice: Situating Epistemic Power and Agency (Oxford University Press, 2025). Because the paper rests on it, more than a title is owed; this subsection sets out the parts of the framework the argument will use. (The exposition is faithful to the book’s published structure and stated commitments; particular formulations the full paper will source to specific chapters once the page references are settled.)

2.6.1 The two undertheorised notions, and the method. Catala’s animating observation is that the literature on epistemic injustice constantly invokes epistemic power and epistemic agency yet leaves both largely undertheorised. Her project is to give a systematic account of the two by working through the dynamics of epistemic injustice—the many forms it takes, the various sites and mechanisms through which it operates, and the transformations required to cultivate epistemic justice. Methodologically she adopts standpoint theory both as theory and as method: epistemic power and agency are to be understood as situated, indexed to social location, rather than as the properties of an abstract knower. Two of her headline contributions matter here: a systematic account of epistemic power and agency that foregrounds the interaction between individual and structural factors (neither pure individualism nor pure structuralism), and a pluralist account that brings into view the non-propositional and non-verbal dimensions of epistemic agency that earlier, testimony-centred accounts neglected.

2.6.2 The pluralist account of epistemic agency. This is the part the proposal case turns on. For Fricker the paradigm of epistemic agency is testimonial: a speaker conveys a proposition to a hearer who assigns it some credibility. Catala’s pluralism widens the field. Epistemic agency, on her account, is the capacity to be an actor in one’s activity of knowing—to produce, use, or convey knowledge—and this capacity has dimensions that are not propositional and not verbal at all. Centrally for us, it includes a self-interpretive dimension: the agent’s capacity to render her own experience intelligible to herself, prior to and independently of any conveying of it to another. Following the distinction the framework draws, intelligibility runs along two axes—self-to-others (being understood by an interlocutor) and self-to-self (understanding one’s own situation). A deficit on the second axis is a failure or foreclosure of self-interpretation: the agent cannot, in the conditions she is in, make adequate sense of her own experience to herself. This is a genuinely hermeneutical matter, but a hermeneutical matter relocated, at least in part, inside the agent’s relation to her own experience rather than residing wholly in the collective pool of concepts.

2.6.3 Testimonial and hermeneutical domination. Catala reframes the two Frickerian species in terms of domination, the better to capture the interaction of individual and structural factors. Testimonial domination (her Chapter 2) gives a structural explanation of how stereotypes systematically deflate the epistemic agency of the dominated as conveyers of knowledge. Hermeneutical domination (her Chapter 3) concerns the conditions under which the dominated are impeded in making sense, whether to others or to themselves, with phenomena such as “white ignoring” and deliberative impasse as mechanisms. The vocabulary of domination (rather than discrete “injustice events”) is deliberate: it lets the account track the standing structural conditions that bear on the exercise of agency, not only datable acts. For the proposal, the relevant register is hermeneutical: what is at issue is the conditions of sense-making, not the assignment of credibility to testimony.

2.6.4 Becoming who you are: transformative experience and epistemic empowerment. Catala’s Chapter 6, Becoming Who You Are: Hermeneutical Breakthroughs, Transformative Experience, and Epistemic Empowerment, is the hinge between the diagnostic and the constructive use this paper will make of her. It connects epistemic agency to transformative experience in roughly L. A. Paul’s sense—experiences whose undergoing reshapes the values and the self by whose lights one would have deliberated about whether to undergo them—and theorises hermeneutical breakthrough and epistemic empowerment as the positive achievements by which an agent comes to make new sense of herself across such a threshold. Where hermeneutical domination names the impeding of self-interpretation, epistemic empowerment names its enabling and enlargement. This gives the paper its constructive vocabulary: an epistemically just proposal is one structured to empower the proposee’s self-interpretation at the threshold of a transformative choice, rather than to compress or crowd it.

2.6.5 Why this framework, and an honest note on fit. Two honest qualifications. First, Catala’s sustained cases concern non-dominant social groups (academic migrants, intellectually disabled persons, autistic women, divided societies); the proposee in a loving, equal partnership is typically not dominated in that structural sense. The paper therefore uses Catala’s analytic apparatus—the pluralist account of agency, the self-to-self axis of intelligibility, the hermeneutical register, the empowerment/transformation pairing—without claiming the proposee is a member of a structurally marginalised group. This is a legitimate use of a framework: borrowing its machinery while being explicit about which of its motivating conditions do and do not obtain. Second, precisely because the structural-domination reading does not straightforwardly apply, the paper must argue that the situational conditions of the proposal (temporal, affective, informational) can impede self-interpretive agency even absent group-based domination—an extension of the framework that §3 begins and the full paper defends. Naming this honestly is better than smuggling the proposee into a category of marginalisation she does not occupy.

3. The Jurisprudence of the Proposal: A Quasi-Contractual Act under Competing Theories of Justice

The epistemic analysis above asks whether the proposee’s self-interpretive agency is empowered or impeded. A jurisprudential analysis asks a different and complementary question: treating the proposal as what it structurally is—the solicitation of a momentous, quasi-contractual act of consent—is the act just, and what would each major theory of justice say about the conditions under which it is or is not? This section runs that analysis. It is complementary rather than redundant: the epistemic register concerns the knower; the jurisprudential register concerns the legitimacy of the consent and the order it institutes. The series has used this method before (the Hohfeldian and republican analysis of the vow in Paper III); here it is trained on the proposal as a consent-act.

A caveat fixes the scope. To call the proposal “quasi-contractual” is an analytic device, not a reduction of love to bargaining. A marriage proposal is not an offer in contract law, and its acceptance is not consideration. But it shares with consent-acts the features that the theories of justice were built to assess: it solicits, at a moment, a binding answer that institutes an order of mutual claims and obligations and that is costly to revise. That shared structure is what licenses the analysis; the disanalogies are flagged where they bear.

Before the schools diverge, they share a common analytic inheritance from the theory of consent, refined most precisely in the bioethics and research-ethics literatures. On the standard account, valid consent to a serious intervention requires four things: capacity (the ability to engage in reasoned deliberation), disclosure (the sharing of information material to the decision), understanding (an actual appreciation of the nature, risks, and alternatives), and voluntariness (freedom from coercion and undue influence) (Eyal 2019; Beauchamp and Childress 2019). Consent is compromised when any element is lacking.

Two refinements from that literature bear directly on the proposal. First, the standard for voluntariness and understanding is not fixed but scales with the stakes: the graver and less reversible the decision, the greater the clarity, authenticity, coherence, and settled commitment that valid consent requires (Roberts 2002). A binding answer to a life-structuring, transformative question therefore demands more, not less, of the four conditions than a casual agreement does. Second, voluntariness is undermined not only by literal coercion (a threat that would leave one seriously worse off) but by undue influence and by “no choice” framings that constrict the practical space of refusal (Eyal 2019).

Mapped onto the conventional staged proposal, the diagnosis is immediate and theory-neutral, which is its strength. Capacity is intact (this is not gaslighting). But disclosure is impaired by informational asymmetry; understanding is impaired by affective saturation crowding the interpretive room; and voluntariness is impaired by the immediate-answer script, which functions as a soft “no choice” framing, where public refusal carries a staged social cost. By the very standard that scales up with the stakes, the conventional proposal solicits consent under conditions that the consent literature would flag as falling short, even with a loving, sincere, non-coercive proposer. The constructive remedies of the full paper (prior disclosure, decoupled timing, removed immediacy) are, in this register, simply the conditions of valid consent to a high-stakes act. This is the shared floor; the schools below differ on what justice additionally requires.

3.2 Liberalism I: Rawlsian and Procedural Justice

A Rawlsian analysis does not directly govern the intimate dyad (justice as fairness regulates the basic structure, not the proposal), but its method transfers. Ask what procedure for soliciting a momentous commitment the two parties would agree to behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing which role—proposer or proposee—they would occupy. No one ignorant of her position would choose a procedure that loads information, timing, and emotional framing onto one side and demands the other answer cold and at once; each would choose the procedure that protects the asked party, since either might be that party. Procedural justice thus condemns the staged proposal not for its outcome but for its procedure: fair terms of agreement are those the disadvantaged party would accept in advance, and the immediate-answer-under-asymmetry procedure fails that test. The Rawlsian verdict: the conventional proposal is procedurally unjust; the just proposal is the one whose procedure both would choose without knowing who would be asked.

The autonomy-centred liberal (Kantian or Millian) locates justice in respect for the agent’s self-governing choice. Here the consent frame of §3.1 does the work directly: to solicit a binding answer under impaired voluntariness and understanding is to fail to treat the proposee as a fully self-governing end, to take an answer that does not fully express her autonomous will. The Kantian formulation is sharp: staging that uses affect and time-pressure to elicit a “yes” treats the proposee’s emotional response as a means to securing agreement, in tension with the requirement to treat her rational agency as an end. The verdict: the conventional proposal risks using the proposee’s own affect against her autonomy; the just proposal is one to which her yes is the act of a self-governing will, fully informed and unhurried.

3.4 Republicanism: Non-Domination and Relational Autonomy

This is the register of Paper III, carried forward. The republican does not ask whether interference occurred but whether one party holds arbitrary power over the other. The staged proposal, considered alone, is not yet domination—a single act, not a standing power. But it can be the instituting moment of an order in which second-order power (the power to set and revise the terms of the shared life) is unequally distributed, and a proposal whose form already places one party in the position of reactive, time-pressured respondent can inaugurate that asymmetry. The republican adds what consent theory omits: that what matters is not only the validity of this one answer but the standing it institutes—whether the proposee retains live, robust power to contest the terms thereafter. The verdict: the proposal is just only if it institutes a relationship in which the asked party retains undominated standing to revisit and revise; a proposal that secures a “yes” precisely by foreclosing deliberation is a poor omen for, and may be the first act of, an order of benevolent domination.

The Marxian register, also carried from Paper III, reads the proposal as the entry-point to an institution—marriage—historically organised around the appropriation of unwaged relational and reproductive labour. The proposal’s form is then significant: a staging that secures rapid agreement under emotional and social pressure, before the material terms of the shared life (who will carry the domestic and care labour, whose career bends to whose) are disclosed and negotiated, functions ideologically. It recodes the entry into a labour-asymmetric institution as a moment of pure romance, so that the unequal terms are agreed to before they are seen. The verdict: the conventional proposal can be an ideological act that obtains agreement to an exploitative division of labour by ensuring it is never on the table at the moment of consent; justice requires that the material terms of social reproduction be disclosed and open to negotiation before, not after, the binding answer.

3.6 Feminist Justice I: Pateman and the Critique of the Contract Itself

The deepest challenge comes from feminist contract critique, and the paper must meet it rather than evade it, because it threatens the constructive project at its root. Pateman (1988) argues that the contractual frame cannot be reformed into justice: contract, in her analysis, always generates political right in the form of domination and subordination, and the marriage contract specifically rests on a presumed “law of male sex-right” that the language of free agreement masks. Crucially for this paper, Pateman explicitly rejects the move this paper is tempted by—the hope that a contract “between genuinely equal partners” or “entered into without any coercion” could be redeemed. On her view, the feminist who seeks a properly consensual marriage contract is “misleading” herself: the defect is structural, not procedural, and lies in the very figure of the person as proprietor contracting over herself.

The honest response is not to refute Pateman but to locate the paper’s claim precisely against her. Three points. First, the paper does not claim that perfecting the consent-conditions of the proposal achieves justice in marriage; it claims, more modestly, that impaired consent at the threshold is one remediable wrong, whose remedy is necessary though not sufficient. Pateman’s structural critique and this paper’s situational one can both be true. Second, Pateman’s target is “property in the person” as the hidden premise of the contract; the relational reconstruction of Papers III and V already rejects that premise—the vow re-grounded as co-legislation is precisely not a transfer of property in the person but an ongoing shared authorship. To the extent the proposal is reconceived as the opening of co-legislation rather than the sealing of a transfer, it steps off the contractual terrain Pateman condemns, which is also why the ring is re-grounded from “seal of a bargain” to “token and waiting.” Third, where Pateman is right that no staging can dissolve the historical-structural asymmetry of the institution, the paper concedes the residue openly: the just proposal is the most one can do at the threshold, and it neither claims nor pretends to undo what only the transformation of the institution could undo. The verdict: Pateman shows that procedural justice at the proposal is not sufficient for justice in marriage; she does not show it is not necessary, and the relational re-grounding answers her premise of property-in-the-person without claiming to have answered her structural critique whole.

3.7 Feminist Justice II: Relational Autonomy and the Ethics of Care

A second feminist tradition, less sceptical of reform, supplies positive standards. The relational-autonomy theorists hold that autonomy is not the property of an isolated chooser but is constituted and sustained in relationships; a choice is autonomous to the degree the relationship supports the agent’s self-governing capacities rather than undercutting them (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). On this view a proposal is just when its form actively scaffolds the proposee’s reflective agency—by giving time, information, and room for her own interpretation—rather than relying on her competence surviving an unfavourable staging. The ethics of care adds that the relevant moral salience is responsiveness to the concrete other: a proposer attentive to this particular person’s needs at the threshold would not stage a scene optimised for his narrative of the romantic moment, but one optimised for her capacity to answer well. The verdict, convergent with this paper’s constructive half: justice in the proposal is the active, caring construction of the conditions under which the other can exercise full relational autonomy—the proposal as a gift of deliberative room, not a demand for immediate ratification.

3.8 Virtue, Care, and the Confucian 礼义 Register

A final register, drawing the Aristotelian, care-ethical, and Confucian threads together, shifts from the justice of the act to the character it expresses and the ritual propriety (礼, lǐ) through which care is rightly enacted. The Confucian tradition is distinctively apt here: it does not oppose emotion and propriety but holds that right feeling is realised through proper form—“发乎情，止乎礼义,” it rises from feeling and comes to rest in what is right (the line that stands in this series’ dedication). On this view the staged surprise proposal errs not because it is emotional but because its form is self-regarding: it expresses the proposer’s feeling in a manner that subordinates the beloved’s standing to answer, where 礼 would shape the same feeling into a form that honours her—that makes space, gives notice, awaits readiness. The virtue at stake is a species of respect-in-love (敬), the holding of the beloved in a regard that fears to do her wrong (敬之惧之). The verdict: the just proposal is the one whose form is the outward propriety (礼) adequate to the inward love (情), in which awaiting the other’s readiness is not a diminishment of ardour but its disciplined and respectful expression.

3.9 Convergence, Divergence, and What the Body Owes

The schools converge more than they diverge, which is itself a result worth stating: liberal procedural justice, autonomy-based liberalism, republicanism, relational autonomy, the ethics of care, and the Confucian 礼义 register all condemn the conventional staged proposal and all endorse, by different routes, the same family of remedies—disclosure, decoupled timing, removed immediacy, retained standing to revise. The Marxian register adds a condition the others underweight (disclosure of the material terms of social reproduction). And Pateman dissents at the deepest level, denying that any procedural fix redeems the contractual form—a dissent the paper answers only partially and concedes openly. The body of the paper will (i) develop the consent-theoretic diagnosis of §3.1 in full, (ii) carry the republican and Marxian lines from Paper III without simply repeating them, (iii) treat Pateman’s objection as the principal challenge to the constructive project and give §3.6’s three-point reply its full defence, and (iv) show that the convergence of the remaining schools on the same remedies is not coincidence but reflects that those remedies just are the conditions of valid, undominated, caring consent to a transformative commitment.

We can now show how the proposal situation instantiates Catala’s categories, without minting a new term. I proceed in four steps: which dimension of agency is engaged; why the register is hermeneutical and not testimonial; how the situational conditions impede self-interpretation; and where the analysis stops.

3.10 The Proposal as a Transformative Threshold

Marriage is a paradigm of transformative experience in L. A. Paul’s sense: one cannot fully know, in advance, what it will be like to be married to this person, nor who one will become in the marrying, and so the values by which one would assess the choice are partly constituted by undergoing it. Catala’s Chapter 6 is built for exactly this juncture: it theorises how an agent makes new sense of herself, achieves a hermeneutical breakthrough, across such a threshold, and what it is for her to be epistemically empowered rather than impeded in doing so. The proposal is the moment at which a person is asked to commit, by a single binding answer, across precisely such a threshold. The question the framework lets us ask is sharp: under what conditions is the proposee’s self-interpretive agency, at this threshold, empowered, and under what conditions impeded?

3.11 Which Dimension of Agency: The Self-to-Self Axis

The wrong, if there is one, is not that the proposee is disbelieved (no credibility is at issue) and not that she lacks the public concept of marriage (the collective hermeneutical resource is amply available). It is that, in the staged scene, she is impeded in the self-to-self exercise of intelligibility: making adequate sense, to herself, of what this commitment means for her, what she wants, what she fears, who she would become—in the moment she must answer. This is squarely the non-propositional, self-interpretive dimension of epistemic agency that Catala’s pluralist account brings into view and that testimony-centred accounts miss. Naming the dimension precisely is what keeps the diagnosis from collapsing into the truism that “surprises can be manipulative”: the claim is specific—that a particular and theorised capacity, self-to-self intelligibility at a transformative threshold, is the thing the staging bears on.

3.12 Why Hermeneutical, Not Testimonial

Catala’s reframing as domination along testimonial and hermeneutical axes lets us place the case exactly. It is not testimonial: no one is deflating the credibility of the proposee’s word. It belongs to the hermeneutical register—the conditions of sense-making—but with a twist the framework is built to accommodate: the impediment is not (as in Fricker’s original) a gap in the collective conceptual pool, but a situational compression of the agent’s occasion and capacity to interpret her own experience to herself. Catala’s self-to-self axis is what makes this sayable without distortion. The proposal does not deprive the proposee of the concept of marriage; it deprives her, in the scene, of the conditions under which she could bring her own interpretive agency to bear on her own case.

3.13 How the Situational Conditions Impede Self-Interpretation

Three features of the conventional staging bear on self-to-self intelligibility, and it is worth being exact about the mechanism in each, since the constructive half will work by reversing them.

Affective saturation. A staged emotional peak does not merely accompany the decision; it can crowd the cognitive and interpretive room in which the proposee would make sense of her own response, so that what presents itself as clarity may be the affect of the scene rather than a self-interpretation she has had the room to reach. Emotion is not the enemy—it is proper to love—but emotion staged to displace interpretation at the moment interpretation is most needed is an impediment to self-to-self intelligibility.
Temporal compression and the immediate-answer script. The script codes hesitation as rejection or cruelty and demands an answer now, collapsing the interval in which self-interpretation could occur and converting the need to think into a social cost borne in public. This is a direct constriction of the occasion for hermeneutical agency.
Informational asymmetry. One party has had unbounded time to interpret and prepare; the other meets the threshold cold. The asymmetry is not (or not only) about propositional facts withheld; it is about the unequal opportunity for the interpretive work that a transformative choice demands.

Each of these, in Catala’s terms, bears on epistemic empowerment: the conventional staging tends to disempower the proposee’s self-interpretation at the threshold, where the normative ideal would be to empower it.

3.14 Where the Analysis Stops: Two Honest Limits

Two limits keep the application from over-reaching, and both follow from taking Catala seriously rather than from an ad hoc fence. First, the structural-domination gap. Catala’s domination concepts are indexed to non-dominant social groups; the proposee in a loving, equal partnership is not, qua proposee, structurally marginalised. The paper therefore claims only that the situational conditions can impede self-interpretive agency, and does not claim the proposee suffers hermeneutical domination in Catala’s full structural sense. This is the extension the framework needs and the full paper must defend; it is named, not hidden. Where a real power asymmetry does obtain between the parties, the structural reading applies more directly, and the wrong is correspondingly graver. Second, antecedent interpretation dissolves the case. If the couple has, over months, done the interpretive and deliberative work together, then a staged, surprise, immediate-answer proposal compresses no self-interpretation that has not already had its occasion; the answer ratifies a long joint sense-making rather than substituting for it. This is exactly why the constructive remedy is prior disclosure and shared interpretation: dissolve the asymmetry and restore the occasion in advance, and the same staging that would otherwise impede self-to-self intelligibility now impedes nothing. The analysis points directly at its own remedy, which is the mark of a diagnosis that has located the wrong in the right place.

3.15 What the Body Will Build on This

With the framework fixed and the mapping done, the full paper’s arc is set. The diagnosis applies §3 to the conventional proposal: in the sincere, prejudice-free, malice-free case, the staging can still impede the proposee’s self-to-self intelligibility at a transformative threshold—an impediment to epistemic agency in Catala’s pluralist sense—and no appeal to a new category is required to say so. Three objections are then met: the kill-joy objection (refusing to let affect displace interpretation is not refusing affect); the voluntary-participation objection (participation under a compressed occasion for self-interpretation is not the same as having had that occasion); and the scope objection (the target is the structure of soliciting a transformative commitment under asymmetry and immediate-answer pressure, not every surprise). The constructive half then derives the epistemically just proposal as a structure of epistemic empowerment: separation of the affective moment from the decision; full disclosure and shared interpretation before the asking; removal of immediate-answer pressure; the ring re-grounded from seal of a concluded bargain to token and waiting; and a deferred-commitment mechanism. The reflexive constraint of §1 governs throughout: the argument is honoured only if enacted with the other, not merely asserted about her, which is itself an application of empowering, rather than impeding, her self-interpretation.

Acknowledgements

This is the sixth paper in a series on the philosophy of intimacy and the theory of justice. It was occasioned, like its predecessors, by a question the author’s own life put to him; the proposee discussed here is kept deliberately anonymous, and the case is presented as a constructed one, so that the argument may stand on its structure. The reflexive constraint announced in the orientation is meant sincerely: the paper’s claims are not discharged by publication but only by being enacted, disclosed, and held open to revision with the one they concern.

In the interest of transparency, I note that an AI assistant was used in preparing this manuscript, as a tool for verifying the current literature, structuring the analysis, and refining the prose; the ideas, commitments, and final judgements are my own, and I take full responsibility for the content. The literature of this installment was verified against sources current to 2025; any remaining error of attribution is mine to correct in the full draft.

愿天下有情人，问者以诚，答者以宁；相知而后相许，从容而不相负。相许如初见，白首如相知。

References

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Catala, Amandine (2025). The Dynamics of Epistemic Injustice: Situating Epistemic Power and Agency. Studies in Feminist Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
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中文

亲密关系哲学与正义理论 —— 第六篇

走向一场正义的求婚：认知不正义理论与亲密关系求婚的实践

论作为高风险决策的求婚，以及其情境编排在何种条件下会冤屈被求者

理论内核分册：文献核验与所应用的框架

黄万宏 — huangwanhong.g.official@gmail.com

2026年6月7日

致那位林中女孩，
对她，我绝不会抛出一个未曾先给她一切作答之凭借的问题；
而她的”愿意”，若它到来，我愿她是自由地、经过权衡之后才给出的。

敬之惧之，匪以为难 —— 怀着敬意待你，唯恐做了对不起你的事，这并不是要把我们的爱变成一桩苦差。（仿《诗经》）

信物者，待也，非约之封也 —— 信物是一种等待，而非一桩交易的封缄。（作者自撰之句）

摘要

一场求婚，在其浪漫的表象之下，是一个请求：请求某人做出一个高风险的、近乎契约性的、足以重构一生的决定；而这个决定，用 L. A. Paul 的话说，是转化性的（transformative，Paul 2014）：它一旦被接受，便会重塑那套本将用来评估它的价值与自我。本文论证：传统的求婚情境编排——精心营造的情感高峰、要求立即作答的社会脚本、以及双方在信息与准备上的不对称——即便在完全没有恶意、也没有任何基于身份的偏见的情况下，也可能损害被求者的认知能动性（epistemic agency）。

我并不声称发现了一种新的认知不正义。这一冤屈用一个业已在手的框架来理解会更为妥当。我透过 Catala（2025）的《认知不正义的动力学：定位认知权力与能动性》来解读求婚，其关于认知能动性的多元论述，以及对诠释性支配（hermeneutical domination）与认知赋权（epistemic empowerment）的分析，恰恰提供了本案例所需的全套工具。在 Catala 看来，认知能动性并不止于命题性的证言交换；它包含一个非命题的、非言语的、自我诠释的维度——即能动者在向他人传达自己的经验（self-to-others 的可理解性）之前、并独立于此之外，先向自己理解自身经验的能力（self-to-self 的可理解性）。我论证：求婚正是这样一个场所，在转化性抉择的门槛上，这种自我诠释的能动性被置于种种条件——时间的、情感的、信息的——之下，而这些条件妨碍了它的运用。

本分册尚未撰写正文。遵循”在论证建立于其上之前应先确保概念内核”的原则，它做两件事。其一，对照截至2025年的文献，核验 Fricker 之后该领域的发展——Fricker 的两种原型、Dotson 的”证言窒息”、Pohlhaus Jr. 的”故意的诠释性无知”、Medina 的”抵抗”，以及关于”煤气灯操纵”（gaslighting）的哲学工作——然后详细阐述 Catala 的框架，因为这正是本文将要使用的框架。其二，它精确地展示求婚情境如何映射到 Catala 的诸范畴之上：哪一维度的认知能动性受到牵涉，为何这一冤屈是一种诠释性而非证言性的困难，以及为何把它安置于一个既有的论述之内，要比铸造一个新术语更站得住脚。全文的建构性下半部分将由此推导出认知正义的求婚之规范性：将情感时刻与决定相分离、求问之前的充分披露、移除立即作答的压力、把戒指从”一桩已了结之交易的封缄”重新奠基为”信物与等待”，以及一套延迟承诺机制——每一项都被重新诠释为 Catala 意义上认知赋权的条件。

关键词：认知不正义；认知能动性；多元论述；诠释性支配；认知赋权；自我诠释；转化性经验；求婚；亲密正义；关系性自主。

1. 定位：本分册是什么，又不是什么

这是”亲密关系哲学与正义理论”系列的第六篇。在先各篇确立了爱者主体的关系本体论、自我立法的规范性及其重新奠基为”共同立法”，以及他者对共同生活之条款提出异议的资格。本篇把这一套工具转向一个单一的、具体的、几乎被普遍浪漫化的行为：求婚。

全文将沿一条人们熟悉的两段式弧线展开：先诊断，再做建构性的重构。但其核心主张——传统求婚可能在被求者作为知者与抉择者的身份上冤屈她，哪怕求婚者满怀爱意、真诚、且全然没有偏见——之成立或崩塌，系于一项分析的精确性。若这项分析画得松散，诊断便会塌缩为两者之一：要么是一句人尽皆知的抱怨（”惊喜可能带有操纵性”，无人否认，而这还算不上一种理论），要么是一种过度的断言（”一切惊喜求婚都是不正义的”，这是错的）。本系列的策略一贯是：让一个被忽视的亲密情境去照亮一个既有的理论结构，而非去增殖术语。

因此我做出一个审慎的方法论选择，并把它直白说出来，因为本分册的一个早期草稿恰恰反其道而行。我并不声称分离出了一种新的认知不正义物种。铸造一个新词——“情境性”或”决策性”认知不正义——的诱惑是真实的，本文的某个早期版本也确曾屈服于它。再三思量之后，这一步既不必要，也比替代方案更缺乏支撑：分析求婚所需的工具早已存在，并以一种精确而晚近的形式存在于 Catala（2025）之中。在已有充分框架在手时还要铸造新词，会招致两项本可避免的代价——为创新而创新的嫌疑，以及从零开始为一个新造词的边界辩护的负担。更站得住脚、也更具启发性的做法，是去表明：Catala 关于认知能动性的多元论述，一旦对准求婚，便已经命名并解释了这一冤屈。于是本文的贡献不是一个新概念，而是一种新的应用：把一套关于认知能动性的前沿论述，应用于一种它并非为之而写的亲密实践，并从这一应用中推导出对该实践的规范性重构。

所以，在正文动笔之前，有两项预备工作必须谨慎完成。（1）核验该领域，并阐述框架。第2节准确地重建 Fricker 之后的地形，然后详细阐述 Catala 的框架——因为这是本文将要使用的框架，而读者所应得的，不止于它的标题。（2）把案例映射到框架上。第3节精确展示求婚情境如何实例化 Catala 的诸范畴——哪一维度的认知能动性被牵涉、为何困难是诠释性而非证言性的、以及分析在何处止步——以使诊断既不沦为老生常谈，也不流于过度。

一个关于自我指涉的方法论说明，在此先行交代，以便它为随后的一切着色。本文一如其前作，乃由作者自身的实践所引发；它将要辩护的那些建构性主张，正是作者本人意欲付诸实行的。这里有一个显见的自反性风险：一篇为自己意中伴侣的认知资格而辩护、却又把这段共同关系用作其默然案例的论文，倘若把她当作可供理论化的材料、而非一个应被征询的人，便会自相矛盾于其自身的论点。本系列以匿名化、以及把案例呈现为构造性案例来处理这一点。本篇接受一个更严格的、内在于其自身论证的约束：它的建构性主张并不因被发表而得到满足，而只有通过与他者一同践行、向她披露、并对她的修订保持敞开，才算满足——否则便是施行性的自相矛盾。我现在就标举这一风险，并在全文中把它当作一个结构性特征、而非事后补记，再行处理。

2. 经核验的领域：Fricker 之后的认知不正义

本节的目的是准确，而非为综述而综述。每一位经典人物都只被重建到足以相对于其定位求婚案例的程度，且重建是对照截至2025年的文献、而非对照记忆来核查的；随后本节转向阐述本文实际使用的框架。

2.1 Fricker 的两种形态，以及为何二者皆不契合

Fricker（2007）引入认知不正义，作为专门在某人作为知者的身份上对她所施的冤屈，并区分了两个物种。证言性不正义发生于：听者因附着于说者社会身份之上的偏见，而给予说者一种被压低的可信度——其范型是一种身份偏见性的可信度赤字。诠释性不正义发生于：集体诠释资源中的某种空缺，使某个群体无法把其经验的某一重要区域变得可理解——其标准例子是，在”性骚扰”这一术语存在之前，相应概念的阙如。

Fricker 的两种原型有两个特征在此要紧。其一，在她的表述中，二者都系缚于身份与结构性边缘化：可信度赤字追踪的是针对说者是谁的偏见，而诠释性空缺追踪的是某个被边缘化群体被集体地排除于意义生产之外。其二，冤屈被定位在一种可信度或可理解性的赤字之中——在于知者的贡献如何被接收、或她的经验如何被概念化。求婚案例与二者都格格不入。被求者并非因其社会身份而不被相信；她并非（就其作为被求者而言）某个被排除于诠释资源之外的群体的成员；而困难首先也不在于她的贡献遭遇了可信度赤字。这里所牵涉的，更接近于她在该场景的条件下、向自己理解自身处境的能力。因此 Fricker 的两种原型并不干净地契合本案例——这不是因为本案例自成一类，而是因为 Fricker 的框架先于 Catala 所提供、并由 §2.6 所阐述的那种对认知能动性的多元化拓宽。正确的回应不是一个新标签，而是正确的框架。

2.2 Dotson：证言窒息与贡献性不正义

Dotson（2011）指认出证言窒息（testimonial smothering）：说者削减或扣留自己的证言，因为她预料听众无法称职地接收它，于是这种沉默化在某种意义上是在结构性压力下自我施加的。Dotson（2012）又补充了贡献性不正义（contributory injustice）：知者的贡献被排除，是因为听众在尚有替代选项的情况下，故意依赖一套有偏见的诠释资源。

Dotson 是诸经典人物中最接近求婚案例的，因此比较必须以精确、而非热情来进行。证言窒息与求婚案例共享一种自我施加的认知缺额的结构形状：被求者，正如被窒息的证言者，可能会先发制人地压抑自己的审思——在此即一个重大决定本应引发的疑虑与发问——因为她预料提出这些会被如何接收。但差异是决定性的。在 Dotson 的窒息中，被压抑的内容是证言（说者拥有她拒绝交付的知识），而被预料的失败是听众作为接收者的无能或敌意，植根于结构性边缘化。在求婚案例中，被压抑的是第一人称的实践审思（不是要交付给他人的知识，而是能动者亏欠于自己的推理），而压抑它的压力并非求婚者作为接收者的无能，而是情境的编排——公开的场面、单膝跪地、围观的面孔、那把犹豫编码为残忍的脚本。Dotson 给了我们”在压力下、而非由外部扣留者所产生的认知缺额”这一形式；她并未给我们求婚的特定机制，后者是情境设计、而非被预料的误接收，且根本无需借助被求者的任何结构性边缘化。

2.3 Pohlhaus Jr.：故意的诠释性无知

Pohlhaus（2012）发展出故意的诠释性无知（willful hermeneutical ignorance）：处于支配地位的知者主动拒绝采纳被边缘化者所发展出的诠释资源，以致被边缘化者遭遇一种故意的不予理解。这又是一个建立在社会位置之间的结构性权力之轴、以及诠释资源之命运之上的概念。它是标记一条边界的有用记号，而非本案例的归宿。如下文所分析的，求婚困难并不要求求婚者相对于被求者占据支配性的社会位置，也不要求任何诠释资源被拒斥；它可以发生在社会地位平等者之间，甚至发生在被求者于一切结构性方面都与求婚者平等乃至更优越的伴侣之间。Pohlhaus 标记了这片领土的一条边；而归宿，正如下一小节所论证的，是 Catala 关于能动性的多元论述。

2.4 Medina：抵抗的认识论

Medina（2013）把语域从个体行为转向认知品格、责任与抵抗：他对特权者的认知恶习（傲慢、懒惰、封闭心智）、抵抗它们的德性、以及认知不正义如何在一个社会生态中被维系或被抗争，进行了理论化。Medina 与其说是一道边界，不如说是建构性下半部分的一项资源。全文将要辩护的”认知正义之求婚”这一概念，用 Medina 的话说，是求婚者一方的一种认知责任结构——主动培育那些使他者得以运用其完整认知能动性的条件——以及一种认知抵抗，是情境编排本应使之可得、而非予以封堵的东西。我在此把他记录下来，以便建构性章节得以援引他，而不必再冷场地重新介绍。

2.5 煤气灯操纵：不可或缺的对照

关于煤气灯操纵（gaslighting）的哲学文献，是最能磨利求婚案例的对照，因为煤气灯操纵是亲密关系内部对认知能动性的典范性冤屈，而本分析的力量在于：求婚能够损害认知能动性，却没有那一文献视为核心的那个特征。

那一文献的状况，经核验如下。Abramson（2014）给出了那个有影响力的论述：在其中，煤气灯操纵本质上是操纵者的意图与动机之事——一种试图通过摧毁对象作为独立判断之所的资格来获取控制的企图——并且其冤屈主要是道德性的、而非认知性的。Spear（2019）及其周边工作则反对 Abramson 对认知维度的淡化，论证煤气灯操纵具有不可消除的认知维度，它侵蚀自我信任（self-trust）以及受害者把自己设想为一个自主知者的自我观念。Stark（2019）把煤气灯操纵从二元的、意图性的，拓展向结构性的，把它系于先在的认知不正义。Podosky（2021）论证煤气灯操纵可以被理解为一种纯粹认知性的现象，其特征是迫使受害者在”拒绝操纵者的证言”与”怀疑自己基本的认知胜任”之间做出被强加的二选一，且无需依赖某一套特定意图；Ruíz（2020）则在殖民与结构性认知压迫的层面上，对文化性煤气灯操纵进行了理论化。

由此有两点随之而来。其一，即便在最被压低、最不依赖意图的论述（Podosky）上，煤气灯操纵也是由对受害者自我信任或基本认知胜任的攻击来界定的——是让她怀疑自己是否真的知道她所知道的。求婚案例则让被求者的自我信任与胜任完好无损：她并未被弄得怀疑自己的官能；她是被置于一种情境之中，使那些完好无损的官能在她必须作答之前无法被充分运用。这是困难之所在（locus）的差异——胜任被破坏，对运用被妨碍——正是它告诉我们：我们面对的不是煤气灯操纵，也不应把本案例当作它的某种隐蔽或减弱的形式来分析。其二，煤气灯操纵文献中的每一种论述，即便是结构性的，都把冤屈视为源自施害方对受害者认知性自我关系所做之事——无论是通过意图（Abramson）、通过认知机制（Podosky），还是通过结构位置（Stark、Ruíz）。而求婚困难却可以源自一个求婚者无辜地承继并再生产的情境——浪漫求婚的文化脚本——他并未对被求者的自我关系做任何事，也并不意图或从任何控制中获益。于是煤气灯操纵是那个告诉我们不该往何处看的对照：不要往恶意去看，不要往一种受损的自我关系去看。但它本身并不告诉我们应当转而往何处看。为此我们需要 Catala。

2.6 阐述 Catala 的框架

本文所用的论述是 Catala（2025）的《认知不正义的动力学：定位认知权力与能动性》（牛津大学出版社，2025）。由于全文依凭于它，所应交代的便不止于一个标题；本小节陈述论证将要使用的那几部分框架。（此处的阐述忠实于该书已出版的结构与明示的立场承诺；具体表述待页码确定后，全文将溯源至各特定章节。）

2.6.1 两个未被充分理论化的概念，及其方法。Catala 的发动性观察是：认知不正义的文献不断援引认知权力与认知能动性，却把二者大体都留在了未被充分理论化的状态。她的方案是：通过梳理认知不正义的动力学——它所采取的诸多形态、它借以运作的各种场所与机制、以及培育认知正义所需的种种转变——来对二者给出系统性的论述。在方法上她把立场论（standpoint theory）既当作理论又当作方法：认知权力与能动性应被理解为情境化的、索引于社会位置的，而非某个抽象知者的属性。她的两项标志性贡献在此要紧：一项关于认知权力与能动性的系统论述，凸显个体因素与结构因素之间的交互（既非纯粹的个体主义，也非纯粹的结构主义）；以及一项多元论述，使早先以证言为中心的论述所忽视的、认知能动性的非命题与非言语维度进入视野。

2.6.2 认知能动性的多元论述。这正是求婚案例所系于的部分。对 Fricker 而言，认知能动性的范型是证言性的：说者向听者传达一个命题，听者则赋予它某种可信度。Catala 的多元论拓宽了这一领域。在她看来，认知能动性是在自己求知的活动中充当行动者的能力——去生产、使用或传达知识——而这一能力具有根本就非命题、非言语的维度。对我们至关重要的是，它包含一个自我诠释的维度：能动者向自己把自身经验变得可理解的能力，先于、并独立于把它传达给他人。遵循该框架所做的区分，可理解性沿两条轴线运行——自我对他人（被某个对话者所理解）与自我对自我（理解自己的处境）。第二条轴线上的赤字，是自我诠释的失败或被封堵：能动者在她所处的条件下，无法向自己充分理解自身的经验。这是一桩真正诠释性的事情，但却是一桩被重新安置的诠释性事情——至少部分地被安置在能动者与其自身经验的关系之内，而非完全栖居于概念的集体池中。

2.6.3 证言性支配与诠释性支配。Catala 用支配（domination）来重构那两个 Fricker 式物种，以更好地捕捉个体因素与结构因素的交互。证言性支配（其第2章）给出一种结构性解释，说明刻板印象如何系统性地压低被支配者作为知识传达者的认知能动性。诠释性支配（其第3章）关切的是：被支配者在理解（无论向他人还是向自己）方面受到妨碍的种种条件，其机制包括诸如”白人式无视”（white ignoring）与审议僵局之类的现象。采用支配（而非离散的”不正义事件”）这一词汇是审慎的：它让该论述得以追踪那些作用于能动性之运用的、持存的结构性条件，而不仅仅是可标定日期的行为。对于求婚，相关的语域是诠释性的：症结在于意义生成的条件，而非对证言的可信度赋予。

2.6.4 成为你所是：转化性经验与认知赋权。Catala 的第6章《成为你所是：诠释性突破、转化性经验与认知赋权》，是本文将对她做出的诊断性使用与建构性使用之间的枢纽。它把认知能动性联系于大体在 L. A. Paul 意义上的转化性经验——这类经验，其亲历会重塑那套本将用来审议是否要亲历它的价值与自我——并把诠释性突破与认知赋权理论化为：能动者借以在跨越这样一道门槛时重新理解自己的那些正面成就。在诠释性支配命名了自我诠释之被妨碍之处，认知赋权命名了它之被使能与被扩展。这给了本文以建构性的词汇：一场认知正义的求婚，是被这样建构的：在转化性抉择的门槛上去赋权于被求者的自我诠释，而非去压缩或挤占它。

2.6.5 为何选用此框架，以及关于契合度的一句诚实说明。两点诚实的限定。其一，Catala 持续讨论的案例关切的是非支配性社会群体（学术移民、智力障碍者、孤独症女性、分裂的社会）；而处于一段充满爱意、平等的伴侣关系中的被求者，通常并不在那种结构意义上被支配。因此本文使用的是 Catala 的分析工具——能动性的多元论述、可理解性的”自我对自我”之轴、诠释性语域、赋权/转化的配对——而不声称被求者是某个结构性被边缘化群体的成员。这是对一个框架的正当使用：借用它的机件，同时明示其发动性条件中哪些成立、哪些不成立。其二，正因为结构性支配的解读并不直接适用，本文必须论证：求婚的情境性条件（时间的、情感的、信息的）即便在没有基于群体的支配时，也能妨碍自我诠释的能动性——这是对该框架的一项拓展，§3 开其端，而全文为之辩护。诚实地命名这一点，胜过把被求者偷渡进一个她并不占据的边缘化范畴。

3. 求婚的法理学：诸竞争正义理论之下的一桩准契约行为

上文的认知分析所问的是：被求者的自我诠释能动性是被赋权了还是被妨碍了。而一项法理学分析所问的是一个不同却互补的问题：把求婚当作它在结构上之所是——对一桩重大的、准契约性的同意行为的征求——这一行为是否正义，以及每一主要的正义理论会就它在何种条件下正义或不正义说些什么？本节进行这一分析。它是互补的、而非冗余的：认知语域关切知者；法理学语域关切同意的正当性以及它所设立的秩序。本系列此前用过这一方法（第三篇中对誓言的霍菲尔德式与共和主义式分析）；在此，它被对准作为同意行为的求婚。

一句限定来固定其范围。把求婚称作”准契约性的”是一种分析手段，而非把爱还原为讨价还价。一场求婚并不是契约法意义上的要约，其被接受也不是对价（consideration）。但它与诸同意行为共享那些正义理论本就为之而建的特征：它在某一时刻征求一个有约束力的回答，而这个回答设立了一套相互的权利主张与义务的秩序，且其修订代价高昂。正是这一共享的结构使该分析得以成立；其不相似之处则在相关处予以标明。

3.1 同意理论的框架：有效同意的四个条件

在诸学派分道扬镳之前，它们共享一份来自同意理论的共同分析遗产，这份遗产在生命伦理学与研究伦理学文献中被最精确地提炼。在标准论述上，对一项严肃干预的有效同意要求四样东西：胜任（capacity，进行理性审议的能力）、披露（disclosure，分享对决定具有实质意义的信息）、理解（understanding，对其性质、风险与替代方案的实际领会）、以及自愿（voluntariness，免于胁迫与不当影响）（Eyal 2019；Beauchamp and Childress 2019）。任一要素缺失，同意便受损。

那一文献中有两点提炼直接关乎求婚。其一，自愿与理解的标准并非固定，而是随风险高低而伸缩：决定越严重、越不可逆，有效同意所要求的清晰度、本真性、连贯性与已然安定的承诺就越高（Roberts 2002）。因此，对一个足以重构一生、具转化性之问题的有约束力的回答，相比一桩随意的应允，要求那四个条件更多、而非更少。其二，自愿不仅被字面意义上的胁迫（一个会让人处境严重恶化的威胁）所破坏，也被不当影响、以及收缩拒绝之实践空间的”别无选择”式框定所破坏（Eyal 2019）。

映射到传统的、被编排的求婚之上，诊断是即时的、且不依赖于特定理论的——这正是它的力量所在。胜任完好（这不是煤气灯操纵）。但披露因信息不对称而受损；理解因情感饱和挤占了诠释的余地而受损；而自愿则因要求立即作答的脚本而受损，后者起着一种软性的”别无选择”式框定的作用——在那里，公开的拒绝要承担一种被编排出来的社会代价。恰恰按照那个随风险升高而伸缩的标准，传统求婚是在一些条件下征求同意，而这些条件即便面对一位满怀爱意、真诚、非胁迫的求婚者，也会被同意文献标记为不达标。全文的建构性补救（事先披露、时间脱钩、移除即时性）在这一语域里，无非就是对一桩高风险行为之有效同意的条件。这是共享的底线；以下诸学派则在”正义另外还要求什么”上彼此有别。

3.2 自由主义之一：罗尔斯式与程序正义

罗尔斯式的分析并不直接治理亲密二元体（作为公平的正义所规范的是基本结构，而非求婚），但它的方法可以迁移。试问：在无知之幕背后、不知道自己会占据哪一角色（求婚者还是被求者）的双方，会同意一套怎样的、用以征求一项重大承诺的程序？没有谁在不知自己位置时，会去选择一套把信息、时间与情感框定都堆到一方、却要求另一方冷不防地当即作答的程序；每个人都会选择那套保护被求一方的程序，因为自己也可能正是那一方。于是程序正义对被编排的求婚之谴责，不在于其结果，而在于其程序：公平的协议条款就是处于不利地位的一方会事先接受的那些，而”不对称之下要求即时作答”的程序通不过这一检验。罗尔斯式的裁断：传统求婚在程序上是不正义的；正义的求婚则是那套双方在不知谁将被求时都会选择的程序所规定的求婚。

3.3 自由主义之二：基于自主与同意的理论

以自主为中心的自由主义者（康德式或密尔式）把正义定位于对能动者自我治理之抉择的尊重。在此，§3.1 的同意框架直接发挥作用：在自愿与理解受损的情况下征求一个有约束力的回答，就是没能把被求者当作一个完全自我治理的目的来对待，就是取走了一个并不充分表达她自主意志的回答。康德式的表述很锋利：用情感与时间压力来诱出一个”愿意”的情境编排，把被求者的情感反应当作了确保应允的手段，这与”应把她的理性能动性当作目的来对待”的要求相抵触。裁断：传统求婚有以被求者自己的情感来对抗她自主的风险；正义的求婚则是这样一种求婚——她的”愿意”是一个自我治理之意志的行为，充分知情、且不被催促。

3.4 共和主义：非支配与关系性自主

这是第三篇的语域，在此向前推进。共和主义者所问的，不是是否发生了干预，而是一方是否对另一方握有任意的权力。单看被编排的求婚，它还不是支配——它是一个单一行为，而非一种持存的权力。但它可以是某种秩序的设立时刻，在那种秩序中，二阶权力（设定并修订共同生活之条款的权力）被不平等地分配；而一场其形式已然把一方置于被动的、被时间所迫的应答者位置的求婚，可以开启那种不对称。共和主义者补上了同意理论所遗漏的：要紧的不仅是这一个回答的有效性，还有它所设立的资格——被求者此后是否保有鲜活而稳健的、对那些条款提出异议的权力。裁断：唯当一场求婚设立的是这样一种关系——被求一方在其中保有不受支配的、可重新审视与修订的资格——它才是正义的；一场恰恰通过封堵审议来攫取”愿意”的求婚，是一个不祥之兆，并可能正是一种仁慈支配之秩序的第一个行为。

3.5 马克思主义与社会再生产理论

马克思主义的语域，同样承自第三篇，把求婚读作通往一种制度——婚姻——的入口，而这种制度在历史上是围绕对无偿的关系性与再生产性劳动的占有而组织起来的。于是求婚的形式便意味深长：一种在情感与社会压力下、在共同生活的物质条款（谁来承担家务与照料劳动、谁的事业向谁的事业弯折）被披露并协商之前就攫取了快速应允的情境编排，发挥着意识形态的功能。它把进入一种劳动不对称之制度的入口，重新编码为一个纯粹浪漫的时刻，从而使那些不平等的条款在被看见之前就已被同意。裁断：传统求婚可以是一桩意识形态行为，它通过确保某种剥削性的劳动分工在同意之时根本不被摆上台面，来获取对它的应允；正义要求，社会再生产的物质条款应在有约束力的回答之前、而非之后被披露、并对协商保持敞开。

3.6 女性主义正义之一：Pateman 与对契约本身的批判

最深的挑战来自女性主义的契约批判，而本文必须迎击它、而非回避它，因为它从根本上威胁着这一建构性方案。Pateman（1988）论证：契约框架无法被改良为正义；在她的分析中，契约总是以支配与从属的形式生成政治权利，而婚姻契约尤其奠基于一种被预设的”男性性权利之律”，自由协议的语言不过把它掩盖起来。对本文至关重要的是，Pateman 明确拒斥本文所受诱惑的那一步——即希望一份”在真正平等的伴侣之间”或”在没有任何胁迫的情况下订立”的契约可以被救赎。在她看来，寻求一份真正两厢情愿的婚姻契约的女性主义者，是在”误导”自己：缺陷是结构性的、而非程序性的，它就在于”人作为对自身进行缔约之业主”这一形象本身。

诚实的回应不是去驳倒 Pateman，而是相对于她精确地定位本文的主张。三点。其一，本文并不声称：把求婚的同意条件完善化便达成了婚姻中的正义；它更谦逊地声称：门槛处受损的同意是一桩可补救的冤屈，其补救是必要的、尽管并不充分。Pateman 的结构性批判与本文的情境性批判可以同时为真。其二，Pateman 的靶子是作为契约隐秘前提的”对人之中的财产”（property in the person）；而第三篇与第五篇的关系性重构早已拒斥了那一前提——被重新奠基为共同立法的誓言，恰恰不是对人之中财产的转让，而是一种持续的、共同的著述。在求婚被重新设想为共同立法之开启、而非一桩转让之封缄的限度内，它便走出了 Pateman 所谴责的契约地形——这也正是戒指为何被从”一桩交易的封缄”重新奠基为”信物与等待”。其三，在 Pateman 正确地指出”没有任何情境编排能够消解该制度之历史—结构性不对称”之处，本文坦然承认那一残余：正义的求婚是人在门槛处所能做到的至多者，它既不声称、也不假装去消除唯有该制度之转变才能消除的东西。裁断：Pateman 表明，求婚处的程序正义对于婚姻中的正义而言并不充分；她并未表明它并非必要，而关系性的重新奠基回应了她”对人之中的财产”这一前提，却不声称已整体回应了她的结构性批判。

3.7 女性主义正义之二：关系性自主与关怀伦理

第二种女性主义传统，对改良不那么怀疑，提供了正面的标准。关系性自主理论家主张：自主并非一个孤立抉择者的属性，而是在诸关系中被构成并被维系的；一个抉择之为自主，其程度取决于那段关系在多大程度上支撑（而非削弱）能动者自我治理的诸能力（Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000）。在此视角下，一场求婚之为正义，是当其形式主动地为被求者的反思性能动性搭建脚手架——通过给予时间、信息，以及供她自己进行诠释的余地——而非指望她的胜任在一场不利的情境编排中幸存下来。关怀伦理则补充道：相关的道德显著性在于对具体他者的回应：一位在门槛处留意于这个特定之人之需要的求婚者，不会去编排一个为他自己关于浪漫时刻的叙事而优化的场景，而会去编排一个为她善加作答的能力而优化的场景。与本文建构性下半部分相收敛的裁断：求婚中的正义，是对那些使他者得以运用其完整关系性自主的条件的、主动而关怀的建构——求婚作为一份审议余地的馈赠，而非一项立即批准的索求。

3.8 德性、关怀，以及儒家的”礼义”语域

最后一个语域，把亚里士多德式、关怀伦理式与儒家的线索收拢到一起，从行为之正义转向它所表达的品格，以及关怀借以被正当地施行的礼（lǐ）的仪节性恰当。儒家传统在此格外贴切：它并不把情感与礼对立起来，而是主张，正当的情感是通过恰当的形式才得以实现的——“发乎情，止乎礼义”，它从情感升起，并安歇于何为正当之处（这正是立于本系列题献中的那一句）。在此视角下，被编排的惊喜求婚之所以有失，不是因为它富于情感，而是因为它的形式是自顾的：它以一种贬抑了所爱之人作答之资格的方式来表达求婚者的情感，而”礼”本会把同一份情感塑造成一种尊崇她的形式——一种留出空间、予以告知、静候其准备就绪的形式。这里所系的德性，是一种爱中之敬（敬），即把所爱之人持守于一种唯恐有负于她的看重之中（敬之惧之）。裁断：正义的求婚，是其形式构成了与内在之情（情）相称的外在之礼（礼）的求婚——在其中，静候他者之准备就绪并非热忱的减损，而是其有节制、有敬意的表达。

3.9 收敛、分歧，以及正文所亏欠者

诸学派的收敛多于分歧，这本身就是一个值得陈述的结果：自由主义程序正义、基于自主的自由主义、共和主义、关系性自主、关怀伦理，以及儒家的”礼义”语域，全都谴责传统的、被编排的求婚，并全都经由不同路径，赞同同一族补救——披露、时间脱钩、移除即时性、保留修订之资格。马克思主义语域补上了一项其他学派低估的条件（披露社会再生产的物质条款）。而 Pateman 在最深的层面上提出异议，否认任何程序性修补能救赎契约形式——对这一异议，本文仅部分作答，并坦然承认。本文的正文将（i）充分展开 §3.1 的同意理论诊断，（ii）把第三篇的共和主义与马克思主义线索接续下来、而不只是简单重复，（iii）把 Pateman 的反对当作对建构性方案的主要挑战，并给予 §3.6 的三点回应以充分的辩护，（iv）表明其余诸学派在同一套补救上的收敛并非巧合，而是反映出：那些补救恰恰就是对一项转化性承诺之有效的、不受支配的、有关怀的同意的诸条件。

现在我们可以展示求婚情境如何实例化 Catala 的诸范畴，而无需铸造一个新术语。我分四步进行：哪一维度的能动性被牵涉；为何语域是诠释性而非证言性的；情境性条件如何妨碍自我诠释；以及分析在何处止步。

3.10 作为转化性门槛的求婚

婚姻是 L. A. Paul 意义上转化性经验的范型：人无法预先充分知道，与这个人结婚会是怎样的体验，也无法预知自己在结婚之中将成为谁，于是那套本将用来评估这一抉择的价值，部分地恰由亲历它而被构成。Catala 的第6章正是为这一关口而建的：它把”能动者如何重新理解自己、如何在跨越这样一道门槛时实现一次诠释性突破，以及她在此过程中之被认知赋权而非被妨碍意味着什么”加以理论化。求婚正是这样一个时刻：一个人被要求以单一的、有约束力的回答，去跨越恰恰是这样一道门槛而做出承诺。该框架让我们得以提出的问题很锋利：在何种条件下，被求者在这道门槛上的自我诠释能动性被赋权，又在何种条件下被妨碍？

3.11 哪一维度的能动性：自我对自我之轴

冤屈，倘若有的话，不在于被求者不被相信（这里无关可信度），也不在于她缺乏”婚姻”这一公共概念（集体诠释资源充分可得）。它在于：在被编排的场景中，她在可理解性的自我对自我之运用上受到妨碍——即在她必须作答的那一时刻，向自己充分理解这一承诺对她意味着什么、她想要什么、她畏惧什么、她将成为谁。这恰恰落在认知能动性那个非命题的、自我诠释的维度之上——正是 Catala 的多元论述使之进入视野、而以证言为中心的论述所错失的那个维度。精确地命名这一维度，正是使诊断免于塌缩为”惊喜可能带有操纵性”这一老生常谈的关键：该主张是特定的——即一种特定且已被理论化的能力，亦即转化性门槛处的”自我对自我”之可理解性，才是情境编排所作用之物。

3.12 为何是诠释性的，而非证言性的

Catala 沿证言性与诠释性两轴把问题重构为支配，这让我们得以精确地安置本案例。它不是证言性的：没有谁在压低被求者言词的可信度。它属于诠释性语域——意义生成的条件——但带着一个该框架本就为之而建以容纳的转折：那妨碍并非（如 Fricker 的原型那样）集体概念池中的一道空缺，而是对能动者向自己诠释自身经验之时机与能力的一种情境性压缩。Catala 的”自我对自我”之轴，正是使这一点得以无失真地被说出来的东西。求婚并不剥夺被求者关于婚姻的概念；它在那个场景中剥夺她的，是那些使她本可把自己的诠释能动性施加于自己之案例的条件。

3.13 情境性条件如何妨碍自我诠释

传统情境编排有三个特征作用于”自我对自我”的可理解性，而对其中每一个的机制都值得精确道来，因为建构性下半部分正是要通过逆转它们来运作。

情感饱和。一个被编排出来的情感高峰，并不只是伴随着决定；它能够挤占被求者本将用以理解自己反应的认知与诠释余地，以致那呈现为清晰之物，可能其实是场景的情感，而非一种她有余地去抵达的自我诠释。情感不是敌人——它本属于爱——但被编排来在诠释最被需要之时取代诠释的情感，是对”自我对自我”之可理解性的一种妨碍。
时间压缩与立即作答的脚本。该脚本把犹豫编码为拒绝或残忍，并要求当即给出回答，塌缩了那段本可发生自我诠释的间隔，并把”需要思考”这件事转化为一种当众承受的社会代价。这是对诠释性能动性之时机的一种直接收缩。
信息不对称。一方拥有无限的时间去诠释与准备；另一方则冷不防地迎上这道门槛。这种不对称不（或不仅）关乎被扣留的命题性事实；它关乎的是，对一项转化性抉择所要求的那种诠释工作而言，机会的不平等。

用 Catala 的话说，以上每一项都作用于认知赋权：传统情境编排倾向于在门槛处去赋权于被求者的自我诠释，而规范性的理想本应是去赋权于它。

3.14 分析止于何处：两条诚实的界限

两条界限使这一应用免于过度延伸，且二者都源自认真对待 Catala、而非源自一道临时拼凑的栅栏。其一，结构性支配的缺口。Catala 的支配诸概念是索引于非支配性社会群体的；处于一段充满爱意、平等的伴侣关系中的被求者，就其作为被求者而言，并未在结构上被边缘化。因此本文仅声称情境性条件能够妨碍自我诠释的能动性，而不声称被求者遭受 Catala 完整结构意义上的诠释性支配。这是该框架所需要、而全文必须为之辩护的拓展；它被命名，而非被隐藏。在双方之间确实存在真实权力不对称之处，结构性解读更为直接地适用，而冤屈也相应地更为严重。其二，先在的诠释会消解本案例。倘若这对伴侣在数月之间已一同做完了诠释与审议的工作，那么一场被编排的、惊喜的、要求立即作答的求婚，并不压缩任何尚未获得其时机的自我诠释；那个回答批准的是一段漫长的共同意义生成，而非取代它。这恰恰是为何建构性补救是事先披露与共享诠释：预先消解不对称、恢复时机，那么同一套本会妨碍”自我对自我”之可理解性的情境编排，如今便什么也不妨碍了。分析直指它自身的补救——这正是一项诊断把冤屈定位在了正确之处的标志。

3.15 正文将在此之上建造什么

框架既已固定、映射既已做完，全文的弧线便已设定。诊断把 §3 应用于传统求婚：在真诚、无偏见、无恶意的情形中，情境编排仍可能在转化性门槛处妨碍被求者”自我对自我”的可理解性——在 Catala 的多元意义上，这是对认知能动性的一种妨碍——而要这样说，无需诉诸任何新范畴。随后将迎击三项反对：扫兴者（kill-joy）反对（拒绝让情感取代诠释，并不是拒绝情感）；自愿参与反对（在一个被压缩了自我诠释之时机的情形下参与，并不等同于曾拥有过那个时机）；以及范围反对（靶子是”在不对称与立即作答压力下征求一项转化性承诺”这一结构，而非每一场惊喜）。建构性下半部分随后把认知正义的求婚推导为一种认知赋权的结构：将情感时刻与决定相分离；求问之前的充分披露与共享诠释；移除立即作答的压力；把戒指从一桩已了结之交易的封缄重新奠基为信物与等待；以及一套延迟承诺机制。§1 的自反性约束自始至终统辖全篇：唯有当论证是与他者一同被践行、而非仅仅就她而被断言时，它才被尊崇——而这本身就是对”赋权（而非妨碍）于她的自我诠释”的一次应用。

致谢

这是”亲密关系哲学与正义理论”系列的第六篇。它一如其前作，由作者自身生活向他抛出的一个问题所引发；此处所讨论的被求者被刻意保持匿名，案例则被呈现为一个构造性案例，以使论证得以立于其结构之上。定位一节中所宣告的自反性约束是真心实意的：本文的诸主张并不因发表而被了结，而只有通过与它们所关涉的那个人一同践行、向她披露、并对修订保持敞开，才算了结。

为透明起见，我说明：本稿在准备过程中使用了一个 AI 助手，作为核验当前文献、组织分析与润饰文字的工具；其中的思想、立场承诺与最终判断皆出自我本人，我对内容负全部责任。本分册的文献是对照截至2025年的来源核验的；任何残留的归属错误，都由我在全文草稿中负责更正。