The Field of Travel - Spaciousness, Contingency, and the Generation of the Relational Subject 【（Preliminary）Draft】
ENGLISH
Philosophy of Intimacy and the Theory of Justice · Paper XXI
The Field of “Travel”
Spaciousness, Contingency, and the Generation of the Relational Subject
[ Working Draft ]
当其无，有器之用。 — It is in its emptiness that the use of the vessel lies.
Wanhong
Working draft — not for citation or circulation
凿户牖以为室，当其无，有室之用。
故有之以为利，无之以为用。
Cut out doors and windows to make a room;
it is in its emptiness that the use of the room lies.
Thus what is there gives advantage, but what is not there gives use.— Laozi, Daodejing, ch. 11
χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά.
Beautiful things are difficult.— Plato, Hippias Major, 304e
For
the girl who belongs to the forest,
who loves to travel —
with whom I long, one day, to fare together,
for that will be a world we build together.
Abstract
This paper develops a philosophy of shared travel and uses it to establish a general theory of relational production. The method treats a single fully unfolded case, a journey undertaken together, as a concrete universal, on the wager that a structure becomes visible through deep entry into one particular rather than through abstraction from many. Travel is selected because it assembles, with unusual efficiency, the conditions under which the structure of a relation comes to presence.
The argument proceeds in four movements. The phenomenological movement analyses travel as a special field constituted by spaciousness (虚), in the sense of the eleventh chapter of the Daodejing, and identifies its deepest effect as the self-presence of relational dynamics, the emergence into felt experience of the relation’s own movement as something the relational subject senses as a whole. The political-economic movement argues that the experience a journey generates is relational wealth, that shared retelling reproduces it, and that beauty, perceived by a subject and reproduced through retelling, sustains a cycle of value with the structure of relational production. The aesthetic movement resolves the antinomy of taste through the three Lacanian registers and the relational constitution of the judging subject, identifies creation as co-creation and co-creation as relational production, and argues that ethical judgement at its limit operates aesthetically, so that the cultivation of the good consummates in aesthetic education. The ethical movement establishes the theory of relational production proper: its keystone, the principle of subject-preservation, holds that no good relation may purchase its unity at the cost of annihilating the other; four operative criteria and the method of seeking common ground while preserving difference govern its conduct; and the just reproduction of suffering, the ethics of aesthetic disagreement, and the dialectical sublation of inherited tradition follow as its applications.
The paper closes by generalising travel into a functional concept, identifying generative openness as a general resource, and locating the deepest purpose of travel in the cultivation of a capacity to recreate, within everyday life, the field in which relational subjects continue to come into being. A concluding set of directed openings marks the questions the argument frames without resolving.
Keywords: relational production; the relational subject; spaciousness; aesthetic judgement; the reproduction of experience.
§1 Introduction - Travel as a Special Field
There is a kind of happiness that two people find only by leaving. They leave not each other but the rooms and routines in which their life is ordinarily held, going out into somewhere neither of them belongs. The previous paper of this series ended on a virtue learned from water, and on a person who is to others as water is (Paper XX); this one begins where water naturally goes, which is away. Water is, by temperament, a figure of the journey, the passage, the thing that keeps to no single place. To ask what it is for two people to fare well into the unfamiliar, together, follows the series’ guiding figure to where it leads.
This paper concerns travel undertaken together. Its subject is the shared journey, two people who go out into the strange as a pair and who are changed, as a pair, by the going, and not the solitary journey of the philosopher-wanderer, which has its own long and noble literature. The claim it defends is large, and stating it plainly at the outset lets the reader gauge the size of the wager. A shared journey is a special field: a structured condition, deliberately entered, within which the relation between two people is at once exposed and generated, and within which the movement of the relation itself, otherwise submerged, rises into felt experience. From this field the paper draws, in turn, a phenomenology of how the relational subject comes to be, a political economy of how shared experience is reproduced or squandered, an aesthetics of how such a field is built and perceived, and an ethics of how all of this can be done well or badly. The journey is the entry; the destination is a claim about the relation between the good and the beautiful that holds, in its most radical form, that the two cannot finally be told apart.
§1.1 From the fixed background to its deliberate exchange
The point of departure is a result this series has already established. Shared happiness, it was argued, consists in the resonance of two meaning-worlds against a common background rather than in the fusion of two people into one: two distinct centres of sense, coupled into a shared state that is irreducible to either yet merges neither, sustained on a background manifold that supplies the common ground against which their coupling is defined (Paper XIX). In the ordinary conduct of a life together, that background is fixed. It is the same apartment, the same commute, the same division of the week into its labouring and resting parts, the same circle of obligations and roles. The fixity does its work, for it is what makes a shared life liveable, since a background that had to be continually rebuilt would leave no surplus of attention for anything else. Yet fixity carries a cost, and the cost is the subject of this paper. A background that never changes becomes, in time, invisible; and a relation conducted entirely against an invisible background can run for years on the mere interlocking of habits, its two parties coupled at the level of routine while the question of whether they still resonate at any deeper level goes quietly unasked. The fixed background is hospitable to a certain hollowing: two well-fitted sets of habits can pass, for a long time, as a living relation.
Travel is the deliberate exchange of that background. To travel together is to take two people out of the meaning-world in which their resonance has been habitually defined and to set them down in one that is strange to both. This is the simplest possible description of what a shared journey does, and everything else in this paper unfolds its consequences. The exchange does two opposite things at once, and the doubleness is the first thing any honest account must explain. On one side, stripped of the familiar scaffolding, a relation can be exposed in its poverty: the couple who had nothing to say to one another once the television was off discover, in a foreign city with the evening before them, exactly how little they share, and the journey meant to renew them instead lays bare a vacancy that the routine had been mercifully concealing. The commonplace that couples quarrel on holiday is no triviality about logistics and tiredness; it is a phenomenological datum of the first importance, and a theory of shared travel that could not explain it would be worthless. On the other side, by the same exchange and not a different one, the stripping away of the scaffolding can force a purer resonance than the routine ever permitted: with nothing familiar to lean on, the two have only each other to rely upon, and in that mutual reliance a depth can be reached that the furnished, scheduled, role-bound life at home structurally forecloses. The same act exposes and generates. Why one act should hold these opposite powers, and what decides which it exercises, is the question from which this paper grows.
§1.2 What kind of field - spaciousness rather than novelty
The temptation is to locate the power of travel in novelty: in the new sights, the fresh stimulation, the broadening of the mind that the tourist brochures promise. That reading is the precise inversion of the truth, and identifying why will fix the thesis of the whole paper. Novelty is a kind of filling: it loads the senses with new content, new objects to consume, new items for the itinerary and the photograph album. But the relation between two people is generated by no loading of shared stimuli, any more than a vessel is made useful by filling it to the brim. What travel offers, when it offers anything of worth, is an emptying: a clearing-away of the dense web of functions, roles, obligations, and predetermined uses that the everyday lays over every hour and every space, leaving a room in which something can happen that the crowded everyday left no room for. The deepest name for what a journey provides is spaciousness: 虚, in the sense the eleventh chapter of the Daodejing gives it, where clay is worked into a vessel but the use of the vessel is in the emptiness within; where doors and windows are cut to make a room, but the use of the room is in the empty space; so that what is there gives advantage, while what is not there gives use. A journey, at its best, is a worked emptiness, a vessel whose value lies in the room it opens rather than the contents it carries.
This is why a quiet hour in an unfamiliar café, with nothing on the schedule and nothing to do but be there together, can hold more of the good this paper is after than a packed day of monuments; and why the mountain vista and the empty temple and the long train window do their work through the spaciousness they open rather than through what they show, the temporary lifting of the everyday’s demand that every moment be for something. The traveller who fills the journey as densely as the life left behind, every hour booked, every site checked off, every meal photographed, has carried the fixed background along and merely changed its scenery; the field never opens, because it was never emptied. Spaciousness is the medium of the special field, and the central argument of this paper’s phenomenology (§2) is that the various features which make travel powerful are, one and all, ways of opening or depending upon that emptiness.
§1.3 Presence, being, and the field they presuppose
One distinction must be fixed before the argument can proceed, because the whole account turns on it. To say that travel brings the relation’s own movement into experience is to claim something other than that travel brings the relation into being. The relation exists already; two people who have shared a life have a relational dynamics whether or not they ever feel it, just as one is always already existing whether or not one ever notices that one exists. What the everyday’s repetition conceals is presence rather than being, since being cannot be cancelled by inattention: presence is the manner in which something emerges into felt, illuminated experience, comes forward from the background and is undergone as present. The difference is the difference between a thing’s obtaining and a thing’s being present to someone. Repetition is an anaesthetic; it lets the relation go on existing while rendering its existence imperceptible, dissolving the fact of the “we” into the automatic functioning of two interlocking routines. What travel can do, and what the everyday ordinarily cannot, is to make the relation present rather than to make it exist: to bring its dynamics forward out of the submerged automatism into something the two can actually feel themselves living. When the paper speaks, later, of the self-presence of relational dynamics (§3), it means presence in exactly this sense, and not being.
Presence, so understood, presupposes a field. Nothing comes to presence in the abstract; it comes to presence somewhere, within some opened region in which appearing is possible. This is a structural point that the whole paper depends upon, and it is the reason the two pillars of the argument, the field and what comes to presence within it, stand in a relation of ground and grounded rather than as two parallel claims. The journey’s spaciousness is the field; the self-presence of the relation’s dynamics is the event that the field makes possible. There is no presence without an opened field for it, just as there is no use of the vessel without the emptiness within. This is why the same presence cannot, in general, be had in the living room at home: the living room is a closed field, a space whose every coordinate has already been assigned a function, leaving no opened region within which the unscheduled can appear, and the obstacle is the closure rather than any want of novelty. Presence requires openness; openness comes from emptiness; emptiness comes from the lifting of the everyday’s total assignment of function, and that lifting is what a journey, at its best, performs.
§1.4 A note on method - the journey as concrete universal
Before the argument begins, its method must be made honest, because a reader is entitled to ask by what right a paper moves from the shared journeys of particular people to claims about the relational subject, the reproduction of experience, and the relation of ethics to the beautiful. The worry is real and deserves a real answer in place of a tacit evasion. This paper offers no empirical study; it rests on no survey of travellers, and a survey would not refute it. Neither is it a treatise that uses travel as a mere illustration, a decorative example of theses established independently. Its method is the one this series has used throughout and which its formal companion made explicit in its own register: it takes a single, fully unfolded particular and reads its structure, on the wager, ancient and central to the dialectical tradition, that a structure shows itself most clearly through deep entry into one particular rather than through abstraction that strips away everything concrete. This is the method of the concrete universal: the universal not as the thin residue left after all particularity is boiled off, but as the structure that a sufficiently deep particular makes manifest precisely in its concreteness. A shared journey, attended to closely enough, widens into a showing of what the generation of a relational subject is, rather than narrowing into private anecdote, because the journey is one place where that generation happens slowly and visibly enough to be described.
Two consequences follow, and the paper accepts them. First, its evidence is phenomenological: it appeals to structures of shared experience that the reader is invited to recognise from within their own life, in place of data that settle the matter from outside. The test of its claims is whether, once stated, they illuminate, whether the reader who has travelled with someone they love finds their own experience newly legible in them, rather than whether they have been measured. This is the appropriate test for a phenomenology, and the paper pretends to no other. Second, the particularity is the very organ of the showing rather than an embarrassment to be apologised for. That the journeys behind this paper are particular journeys, with a particular person, is the concreteness through which the universal becomes visible at all, in place of noise to be filtered out on the way to the universal; and the paper will argue, when it reaches the question of the beloved’s irreplaceability, that this marks a truth about the matter itself rather than an accident of method: the universal structure of intimate generativity can only ever be instanced in a particularity that no universal exhausts. The method and the subject matter here say the same thing: one reaches what is common to all love only by going all the way into one. The journey is the concrete; the universal is what the journey, fully entered, shows.
§1.5 The plan of the paper
The paper proceeds in four movements and a generalisation, bound by a single methodological commitment to descend from theory into practice. The first movement is phenomenological. It analyses the special field of travel into its constitutive features, namely co-creation, reshaped time, suspension, contingency, liminality, symmetric unfamiliarity, and forced co-presence, together with the spaciousness that underlies them all (§2); and it argues that the field both reveals the relation and generates the “we,” bringing the relation’s dynamics to self-presence (§3). The second movement is political-economic: it shows that the experience a journey generates is a form of relational wealth, that its retelling is the reproduction of that wealth, and that this reproduction has a healthy form, living shared retelling, and a degraded one, the reification of experience into a consumed and displayed object (§4). The third movement is ethical and then aesthetic. It draws from the field an ethics of shared travel, including its failures and its relation to the third-party other (§5), develops the theory of relational production these problems share (§6), and then argues that the construction of such a field is an aesthetic rather than an engineering problem (§7); that creation is co-creation and co-creation is relational production (§8); that the classical problems of beauty are resolved by the three registers and the relational subject (§9); that aesthetic judgement evolves through the reproduction cycle (§10); that the perception of contingent beauty is a cultivable capacity (§11); and, in the paper’s most exposed chapter, that ethical judgement at its limit is aesthetic, so that the deepest ethical education is an aesthetic education (§12), a thesis set within the long debate over the continuity of ethics and aesthetics (§13). A chapter on the political economy of beauty (§14) tests these claims against a concrete case from the world of capital. The closing movement generalises “travel” into a functional concept, the construction of the special field even within the alienated everyday, and offers it as an opening in place of a conclusion (§15, §16). Where the formal apparatus of the series’ companion paper is needed, it is invoked lightly and in a serving role, never rebuilt. The governing spirit throughout is practical: the paper means not only to understand the field of travel but to say how two people might actually build one, and keep building it, in the midst of an everyday that is forever closing it back down.
§2 The Field of Travel and Its Constitutive Features
If travel creates a special field, the field can be analysed. This section does so, decomposing the field into the features that constitute it and arguing, for each, both what it is phenomenologically and how it bears on the relation between two people. The features fall into three groups. The first concerns the field’s temporal arch, the structure of the journey in time, which begins before departure and continues after return. The second concerns the field’s openness, what lifts the everyday’s closure and makes the field a field at all. The third concerns the conditions of being-together, what makes the field’s openness specifically shared in place of the openness two solitary travellers might each enjoy. Underlying all three groups is a condition that the section treats last and separately, since it is the ground of their possibility in place of one feature among the others: spaciousness. The section closes by examining how the features interact, reinforce, and conflict, so that the field is understood as a dynamic system whose internal tensions are themselves a source of what travel does to a relation, in place of a static list of properties.
§2.1 The temporal arch I - co-creation
A journey does not begin at the airport. It begins when two people first imagine it together, when the idea is floated, the map opened, the possibilities argued over, the expectations aligned, the shared anticipation built. This phase of co-creation is already the field itself, and indeed in one respect its purest stretch, in place of the preparatory labour that precedes the journey proper, on which the consumerist understanding takes planning to be merely the front-loaded work of arranging a product to be later consumed. In co-creation the two people jointly build a shared world that does not yet exist, and the building of a shared world is the foundational act by which a “we” is constituted.
The point is worth dwelling on, because it locates the generativity of travel earlier than the usual account places it. To plan a journey together is to negotiate a shared intention: where to go, why, what to seek, what to refuse, how to weigh the one’s wish to see against the other’s wish to rest. A shared intention is a single intentionality borne by two rather than the sum of two private intentions, and its construction is the forging of the relational subject in one of its most legible forms. The everyday offers surprisingly few occasions for this kind of pure joint construction, since routine consists largely in the discharge of intentions already given, the roles, the duties, the standing arrangements, in place of the building of new ones together. Travel planning forces it. Two people imagining a place they have not yet been, aligning what they each hope to find there, are doing in miniature exactly what it is to be a “we”: they are jointly intending a world. And because what they jointly intend is a future background, the manifold against which their resonance will, in a few weeks, be redefined, co-creation is, quite precisely, the anticipatory and conspiratorial rehearsal of the background-exchange that the journey will enact. Before the manifold is exchanged in fact, the two have already begun, in imagination, to build it together. Co-creation is the first opening of the field, and because it recurs, in the re-planning of each day en route and, as the paper will argue, in the shared retelling afterward (§4), it forms the axis along which the whole temporal arch is strung more than a single phase.
§2.2 The temporal arch II - reshaped time
Travel reshapes time. The everyday’s time is, in the strict sense, told off into units assigned to functions: the hour for the commute, the hour for the meeting, the evening portioned among its obligations, a temporality whose every interval is already spoken for. The time of a journey has a different texture, and the difference exceeds its being leisure in place of labour. It is, first, framed: a journey has a beginning and an end, a definite span lifted out of the indefinite flow of ordinary time and bounded as a whole. This framing gives the time of travel something of the quality of an exception, a parenthesis in the run of the year, and the exceptional, bounded character contributes to its value. Precisely because the journey will end, because its time is finite and counted, each moment within it is held more closely; the knowledge that one is in a span that will not last presses one into a fuller presence within it than the seemingly endless, because unframed, time of the everyday ever compels.
It is, second, continuous and shared. The everyday distributes two people’s time into largely separate channels that intersect at the day’s margins, the breakfast, the evening, the weekend’s negotiated overlap, so that much of a shared life is in fact lived in parallel more than together. The time of a journey is unbroken joint time: hour upon hour side by side, with no separate offices to disperse into, no independent circles to absorb the day. This continuity is one of the conditions that makes the field’s other effects possible, since many of them, the forcing of co-presence, the reaching of depth, require a sustained, uninterrupted being-together that the channelled time of the everyday structurally prevents. Reshaped time, framed and continuous, is the temporal medium within which the rest of the field can do its work; and together with co-creation it completes the field’s temporal structure, the arch that runs from the first imagining, through the bounded continuous span of the journey itself, to the retelling that will reopen the span in memory.
§2.3 The openness I - suspension
The everyday’s closure is lifted, first, by suspension: the bracketing, for the duration of the journey, of the dense network of roles and obligations that ordinarily defines each person. At home one is the one who must go to work, the one who owes the mortgage, the one who must manage the relatives, the one assigned this place in this set of standing arrangements; and these assignments are, in large part, constitutive of how one shows up day to day, more than external decorations upon a self that would be the same without them. To travel is to bracket them, suspending their operation in place of abolishing them, since they wait at home, so that for a span one is, more nearly, simply oneself and simply with the other in place of the discharger of those functions. The structure is close to what phenomenology calls the epoché: the methodical bracketing of the natural attitude so that what was hidden by its automatic operation can be seen. Here the bracketing is performed by a plane ticket in place of a philosopher’s resolve, and what it makes visible is the two people underneath their roles, who they are, and who they are to each other, when the scaffolding of function is set aside.
This is among the reasons travel is at once a touchstone and a danger. The roles that suspension brackets are, for many couples, a good part of what has been holding the relation in working order; bracket them, and the relation must stand, for a while, on whatever lies beneath. If beneath the roles there is a living mutuality, suspension liberates it, and the couple discover a freedom in being together that the role-bound everyday had cramped. If beneath the roles there is little, suspension exposes the little, and the couple discover, sometimes with a vertigo they would rather not have had, how much of their togetherness was the interlocking of functions and how little was anything else. Suspension removes what was concealing what it reveals in place of creating it. That is the precise sense in which the field is a touchstone: it assays the relation by taking away the supports and seeing what stands.
§2.4 The openness II - contingency
The second source of the field’s openness is contingency: the lifting of the everyday’s predetermination, the restoration to each moment of the quality of being genuinely undecided. The everyday is, in its essence, repetition, and repetition is the predetermined: one knows, in the ordinary run of a day, more or less what each hour will hold, because each hour has been held a thousand times before. This predetermination is what the existential tradition has taught us to recognise as the great anaesthetic of selfhood. In Heidegger’s analysis, the everyday is the reign of das Man, the anonymous “they” in whose averaged, levelled-down understanding existence is absorbed: one does what one does, as “one” does it, and in this absorption the fact of one’s own existence as a question to be lived is covered over, fallen into the smooth automatism of the familiar. Travel breaks the repetition, and the breaking is principally a restoration of the undecided more than a matter of fresh stimulation. In an unfamiliar place nothing is settled in advance: one does not know whether the train will come, where the lane leads, whether one will be understood, whether the food will be good. Each moment becomes, again, a genuine present, undetermined, open, to be undergone in place of discharged.
And in this restored contingency the subject is pressed back into appearing. When the familiar scaffolding is removed, the fact that I am here, undergoing this, having to choose becomes visible again, no longer dissolved into the automatism of the predetermined. This is the existential core of travel, and it has a long and serious philosophical lineage, which the field’s contingency reactivates in place of inventing. The lineage is summarised in the table below. The point common to its members, however they differ, is that the rupture of the predetermined returns the subject to itself, to its existence, its freedom, its finitude, by stripping away the everyday’s concealment. What this paper adds to that lineage is the move from the solitary to the shared, taken up in the next section; here it is enough to establish that contingency is one of the two great openers of the field, and that its opening is, in the first instance, existential, the return of existence to presence.
| Thinker | Concept | Bearing on the contingency of the field |
|---|---|---|
| Heidegger | das Man, fallenness, authenticity; anxiety (Angst) as disclosive | The everyday’s repetition is absorption in the “they”; contingency lifts the concealment, a bearable anxiety in which existence is disclosed. The paper’s principal mast. |
| Sartre | Contingency; the nausea before the gratuitousness of being; freedom | Travel restores the felt gratuitousness of things, their lack of necessary reason, and with it the exposure of freedom: in the undetermined moment, one must choose. |
| Kierkegaard | Repetition vs. recollection; genuine “repetition” as renewed receiving | Sharpens the paper’s own wording: the aim is the renewed winning of existence out of contingency rather than mechanical re-enactment. |
| Jaspers | Boundary situations (Grenzsituationen) | The journey’s mishaps, getting lost, stranded, stuck, are minor boundary situations in which ordinary self-understanding fails and the subject meets its finitude and possibility. |
| Merleau-Ponty | The lived body; perception as bodily engagement with a world | The unfamiliar place is met first in the body, disoriented, alert, re-learning its surroundings, so that contingency is undergone perceptually before it is understood. |
§2.5 The conditions of being-together I - liminality
The features so far would each be available to a solitary traveller. The next three are what make the field’s openness specifically shared. The first is liminality. The concept is anthropological: in van Gennep’s analysis of rites of passage, and Turner’s development of it, the rite has a threshold phase, the limen, in which the initiate has left the old status without yet entering the new, and is for a time betwixt and between, outside the ordinary structure of roles and ranks. Two things characterise this liminal phase. The first is the temporary dissolution of structure: in the threshold, the ordinary hierarchies and classifications are suspended, and the initiates stand outside the grid that ordinarily places them. The second is what Turner called communitas: the intense, levelling, immediate bond that arises among those who pass through the liminal together, a being-with stripped of the mediations of status, an undifferentiated mutuality possible only in the threshold.
Travel is a liminal condition, and shared travel generates a communitas of two. To be on a journey is to be betwixt and between, to have left the structure of home without having arrived at any new structure, suspended in a passage between two settled states. And two people who enter this threshold together are, for its duration, released from the structure that ordinarily mediates them, the division of household labour, the standing roles, the accreted positions of a shared life, into a more immediate and levelling mutuality. The couple on the road are not, for a while, the one-who-manages-the-finances and the one-who-handles-the-relatives; they are two people in the threshold together, met more nearly as such. This dyadic communitas is one of the deepest goods of shared travel, and it is also why return can be so deflating: communitas is, by its nature, a threshold phenomenon, and the re-entry into structure that homecoming requires (§4.5) dissolves it unless deliberate labour preserves what it generated.
§2.6 The conditions of being-together II - symmetric unfamiliarity
The second condition of shared openness is symmetric unfamiliarity, and though it is easily overlooked it may be the most important of the three, because it is the condition under which genuine shared witnessing becomes possible. In the everyday, familiarity is almost never symmetric. The home is the home of someone first; the city is one partner’s native ground and the other’s adopted one; the circle of friends originates with one and is acquired by the other; the domains of competence are divided, so that in each there is a host and a guest, one who knows and one who is shown. This asymmetry is not malign, but it is pervasive, and it means that in the ordinary run of a shared life the two are rarely, if ever, set before the same unknown on equal terms. Travel to a place strange to both removes the asymmetry. The foreign city is equally foreign to the two of them; neither is the host, neither holds the home advantage, neither knows the way. For once they stand before the same unknown as equals.
The significance of this is that it is the condition of co-witnessing, as against the asymmetric witnessing of host and guest. When one partner shows the other their home city, the other witnesses the city, and also witnesses the partner-as-host, and is witnessed as guest; the structure has a giver and a receiver of the unfamiliar. When both are equally strangers, neither hosts and neither is hosted; they undergo the unknown together, side by side, each seeing it freshly and each seeing the other see it freshly, and, the decisive addition, each knowing that the other is in the same condition. This symmetric co-undergoing is the ground of the field’s deepest generativity, because it is the condition under which the relation’s dynamics can become present to both at once as something they are equally inside of, in place of something one is showing and the other receiving. The next section’s central concept, the self-presence of relational dynamics, depends upon this symmetry: it is hard to feel the “we” as a whole when one of the two is the host of the occasion; it becomes possible when both are equally in the threshold, equally before the same strangeness, equally without a script.
§2.7 The conditions of being-together III - forced co-presence
The third condition is the most prosaic and the most double-edged: forced co-presence. Travel puts two people together continuously, with the everyday’s escape valves removed. At home there are always exits, the separate job, the independent friendships, the room one can withdraw to, the errand that takes one out, and these exits, though they look like mere logistics, perform a real function: they release the pressure that continuous proximity generates, and they let a relation run without ever having to test how much undiluted togetherness it can bear. Travel removes the exits. For the span of the journey the two are thrown together without reprieve, and this enforced, unrelieved proximity is at once the field’s chief stressor and one of its chief engines of depth.
As stressor, it amplifies. The small frictions that the everyday’s exits would have dispersed, the differing rhythms, the divergent wants, the accumulated irritations, have, on the road, nowhere to go; they cannot be walked off into the separate channels of a normal day, and so they concentrate, which forms a second part of the explanation, beyond suspension and contingency, of why couples quarrel on holiday. Yet the same removal of exits that amplifies friction also forecloses the easy avoidances by which a relation evades its own depths, and so forces a genuine co-presence that the exit-rich everyday permits one perpetually to defer. With nowhere to escape to, the two must actually be with each other, meeting whatever is between them in place of managing it, and in that enforced meeting a depth becomes reachable that the avoidant comforts of home keep forever at arm’s length. Forced co-presence is, like suspension, a feature whose value is inseparable from its danger: it is the same pressure that cracks a brittle relation and tempers a sound one.
§2.8 The underlying condition - spaciousness
The seven features so far do not, however, sit as seven coordinate items on a list. One condition underlies them all, and it is the ground that makes the rest possible in place of one feature among them: spaciousness, the worked emptiness introduced in §1.2. Each of the seven, examined closely, turns out to require an opened, unfilled room in order to operate. Contingency cannot enter a filled field: a journey whose every hour is booked, whose every space is crowded with planned content, leaves no gap through which the undetermined can arrive, and the wildflower at the roadside cannot be seen when the eyes are fixed on the itinerary. Suspension is itself a kind of emptying, since the bracketing of roles is the clearing-away of the functions that fill the everyday. The liminal threshold is structurally an emptiness, the cleared interval between two structures. Forced co-presence does its generative work only where there is unfilled time for the two to actually occupy together; pack the journey densely enough and the co-presence becomes mere joint logistics, two people processing an itinerary side by side. Even co-creation and reshaped time are, at bottom, ways of opening and bounding a space that is to be left partly empty, a vessel whose use is in the room within.
This is why spaciousness is named as the field’s underlying condition in place of its eighth feature. It is the emptiness in the vessel; the others are the walls that shape and hold it. The eleventh chapter of the Daodejing states the structure exactly: what is there, the walls, the features, the bounded span, gives advantage, while what is not there, the emptiness they enclose, gives use. The advantage of the field lies in its constructed features; its use, the actual generation of presence and of the “we,” lies in the emptiness those features enclose and protect. And this is the deepest reason the power of travel is misunderstood as novelty. Novelty fills; spaciousness empties; and the emptying, in place of the filling, opens the room in which a relation can come to itself. The phrase the previous paper used for the highest form of this, the fullness of doing nothing, two people before a window with the rain (Paper XIX), was already a description of spaciousness, here given its name and its place as the condition of the whole field. To travel well is, before all the particular features, to know how to keep the vessel empty enough to be of use.
§2.9 The features in tension - the field as a dynamic system
It would falsify the field to leave its features as a static inventory, for they do not sit side by side in placid coexistence; they pull on one another, reinforce one another, and, crucially, conflict, and the field’s actual character in any given journey is the resultant of these tensions rather than the sum of the features taken singly. Three of the tensions are worth drawing out, both because they are phenomenologically real and because they will matter to the ethics and the practice that follow.
The first is the tension between co-creation and contingency, which forms the deep structure of a familiar quarrel. Co-creation, carried to excess, is the enemy of contingency: the more completely a journey is planned, every hour assigned, every site booked, every meal chosen in advance, the less room remains for the undetermined to enter, until the journey becomes a fixed background in motion, the everyday’s predetermination carried abroad under the costume of travel. Yet contingency without any co-creation is a drift, and an anxious one, in place of a journey; some shared intending is the condition of there being a “we” that travels at all. The over-planner and the under-planner, the one who would book the journey to the minute and the one who would simply set out, are pulling on two genuinely constitutive features of the field rather than merely standing temperamentally at odds, each feature of which, alone and to excess, would destroy it. The resolution this paper will eventually offer (§7) is that the right object of planning is the frame in place of the content: that co-creation should build and protect a bounded, emptied space and then leave the interior open to contingency, intention exercised on the vessel’s walls, the emptiness within left for what will come.
The second is the tension between forced co-presence and spaciousness. Forced co-presence supplies the continuous joint occupation the field requires; but spaciousness requires that the joint time remain not wholly filled, including not wholly filled with each other. A togetherness with no interior emptiness, no room for either to be quietly alone within the shared field, no unfilled silence, becomes a suffocation, and the relentless proximity that tempers a sound relation can, without spaciousness, smother it. The field needs both the removal of the exits and an internal room; co-presence without spaciousness is confinement, and spaciousness without co-presence is two people merely near one another.
The third is the tension between liminality and the temporal arch, which is the structural seed of the problem of return. The communitas of the threshold is, by its nature, anti-structural and impermanent; the temporal arch, by its nature, ends, depositing the two back into the structure of the everyday. The very feature that makes the field’s mutuality so intense, its liminal release from structure, is the feature that guarantees its dissolution upon return, since one cannot remain forever in the threshold. This tension is the condition that makes the labour of reproduction necessary, in place of a defect to be removed (§4): because the liminal cannot be prolonged, what it generated must be reproduced into a form that can survive the return to structure, or it is lost. The field, then, is a dynamic and self-undermining condition rather than a stable possession, intense and impermanent, whose goods must be actively carried across the threshold of return or surrendered at it. It is to that carrying, and to the wealth it conserves or squanders, that the paper now turns, after first attending to what the field, while it lasts, brings to presence.
§3 From Revelation to Generation - The Self-Presence of Relational Dynamics
The field of travel does two things, and they must be carefully distinguished, because conflating them has obscured what is most distinctive in the shared journey. The field reveals, and the field generates. To reveal is to bring into view something that was already there; to generate is to bring into being something that was not. The previous section’s features were described as performing both functions, suspension reveals what lay beneath the roles, but forced co-presence and the liminal threshold generate a communitas that did not previously exist, and the doubleness was left standing. This section separates the two functions, argues that the generative function is the deeper and the more distinctive, and gives its product a name: the self-presence of relational dynamics, the central concept of the paper’s phenomenology. It then secures the concept against two misunderstandings, that it is merely the existential self-discovery of the solitary traveller doubled, and that it is the mutual recognition already described by Hegel, by setting it against each.
§3.1 The field as touchstone - revelation
The revelatory function is the one the touchstone metaphor names, and it is the easier of the two to describe because it brings nothing new. When the field’s features strip away the familiar scaffolding, the roles bracketed by suspension, the predetermination lifted by contingency, the exits removed by forced co-presence, what was beneath the scaffolding is exposed. If beneath it there was a living mutuality, the exposure is a liberation; if beneath it there was a vacancy, the exposure is a reckoning. Either way the field has added nothing; it has subtracted the concealment and left the two facing what was already the case. This is the function that explains the holiday quarrel, and it explains it in a way that does justice to its seriousness. The quarrel is not, at root, about the missed train or the disagreement over the restaurant; these are the occasions, not the cause. The cause is that the field has removed the everyday’s concealments and presented the two with the truth of their relation, and where that truth is thinner than the routine had allowed them to believe, the encounter with it is painful, and the pain discharges itself upon whatever occasion is nearest. To call travel a touchstone is to say that it assays the relation, tests what it is made of by taking away the supports and seeing what stands unsupported. The assay is valuable precisely because it is hard to perform at home, where the supports are always present to be leaned on; and it is dangerous for the same reason, since a relation may be assayed and found wanting, and the finding cannot be unfound.
Revelation, however, leaves the two as two. On the touchstone account, there are two separate subjects, each of whom may see, in the cleared field, the truth of the relation and the truth of the other; and even when each sees that the other sees, and they confirm to one another what the field has shown, the structure remains that of two witnesses comparing notes. Something real and important happens, but it happens to two. The deeper thing the field can do is to generate, out of the two, a third thing that is neither rather than to reveal a relation to two separate witnesses.
§3.2 The field as catalyst - generation of the “we”
The generative function brings something into being. In the shared undergoing of the field, the symmetric standing-before the same unknown, the communitas of the threshold, the continuous forced co-presence, the joint building of a shared world in co-creation, there emerges a subject that is not either of the two and not their sum: a “we” that is a relational subject in its own right, with its own movement and its own life. This is not a metaphor and not a façon de parler. It is the central ontological commitment of this series, established at its foundation: that relations are prior to the entities they relate, and that what we call a subject is a secondary condensation of relational activity rather than a premise standing before it. On that commitment, the “we” is not a convenient name for two “I”s in proximity; it is a genuine relational subject, generated by relational activity, as real as, on the deepest version of the commitment, more fundamental than, the two it relates.
What the field of travel does, that the everyday ordinarily does not, is generate this “we” vividly and visibly. The previous paper described shared happiness as the resonance of two meaning-worlds, coupled into a joint state irreducible to either yet merging neither (Paper XIX); the field of travel is the condition under which that coupling is intensified to the point of becoming a felt event rather than merely achieved. The two drops do not merely resonate; the resonance becomes strong enough, and the conditions clear enough, that the “we” it constitutes comes forward as something undergone. The generation is real in the everyday too, any living relation is continually generating its “we”, but in the everyday the generation is submerged, dissolved into the automatic functioning of routine, proceeding without ever rising into experience. The field of travel raises it. And the raising of the generated “we” into experience is the phenomenon this section now names.
§3.3 The self-presence of relational dynamics
In the field of travel, at certain moments, two people do not merely feel each other, and do not merely each feel themselves; they feel the relation itself, its movement, its current, the way the “we” is flowing and shifting and becoming, as something the two of them sense together, as a whole. This is the self-presence of relational dynamics: the emergence, into felt experience, of the relation’s own dynamics as a phenomenon that the relational subject undergoes about itself. It is to be defined with care, and three points fix it. (It will be shown, when the philosophy of beauty is developed, that this felt accord of the relational subject with its own movement is structurally an accord of the three registers, the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary, achieved together rather than within one subject; see §9.2.)
First, what comes to presence is the dynamics, not either relatum and not the relation as a static fact. One can be aware of one’s partner (awareness of the other); one can be aware of oneself (individual self-awareness); the phenomenon named here is neither. It is awareness of the movement between, of how the relation is going, of the live current of the “we” as it flows, advances, tightens, eases, turns. In the field, the relation’s dynamics, ordinarily a submerged undercurrent operating below all notice, rises to the surface of experience and is felt as a moving whole. Two people in an unfamiliar place may suddenly sense, with great clarity, that this, right now, is what our relationship is becoming, and that sensing, of the relation’s own movement as a felt present, is the self-presence of its dynamics.
Second, what comes to presence is the dynamics’ presence, not its being, in exactly the sense fixed in the introduction (§1.3). The relation’s dynamics did not begin in the field; they run continuously, in the everyday as much as on the journey. What the field supplies is their presence rather than their existence, their emergence from the submerged automatism into felt experience. The everyday’s repetition is the anaesthetic that holds the dynamics below the threshold of feeling; the field’s spaciousness is the clearing in which they can rise into it. To speak of self-presence rather than self-being is therefore exact: the field does not make the relation’s dynamics be; it makes them present.
Third, the phenomenon is a self-presence because it is the relational subject, the “we”, to which its own dynamics become present. This is its strangest and most important feature. It is not that each of the two separately observes the relation, as an external object held between them; it is that the “we,” as a single relational subject, undergoes its own movement as felt experience. The relation becomes present to itself. This is a relational self-awareness, distinct in kind from individual self-awareness: not “I am aware that I exist” but “we are aware of ourselves as a dynamic whole in motion.” And it requires, as its condition, the symmetric co-undergoing established in the previous section (§2.6): only when neither of the two is the host of the occasion, when both are equally inside the same unfolding, can the relation’s dynamics become present to the “we” as a whole rather than to one partner observing and another observed.
A light formal anchor. The series’ formal companion gives this phenomenon a structural location, which is recorded here lightly and in a serving role, not rebuilt. There the joint state of two coupled subjects is a vector in a fusion space, and the relation’s evolution is the action of braiding upon that state, a dynamics that is, in the ordinary case, an implicit operator, a background structure governing how the joint state changes without itself being an object of the system’s experience. The self-presence of relational dynamics is, in these terms, the becoming-phenomenologically-present of the fusion-space dynamics: the moment at which the operator that ordinarily runs in the background rises into the foreground and is undergone. What is otherwise merely the mathematics of how the joint state evolves becomes, in the field, a felt event, the “we” sensing its own braiding. The formal apparatus is not required for the phenomenological claim, which stands on its own description; it is noted only to mark that the phenomenon has a precise place in the structure the series has elsewhere built, and that the continuity between the felt and the formal is, here as throughout this work, deliberate.
§3.4 Two contrasts - the solitary traveller and Hegelian recognition
The concept is best secured by setting it against two neighbours with which it might be confused, for in each case the difference marks what is distinctive in it.
The solitary traveller. Almost the entire philosophical literature of travel is a literature of the solitary journey. The wanderer who finds himself by losing the familiar, the pilgrim whose road is a road into his own depths, the lone traveller of the Romantic and existential imagination, from the solitary walker of the philosophical tradition to the Japanese figure of the hitori tabi, the journey taken alone, all describe a real and valuable phenomenon: the return of the self to itself in the cleared field of the unfamiliar. This is the existential function of contingency (§2.4), and it is available to one. But it is revelation, not generation, and it is the revelation of a single subject to itself. What the solitary traveller cannot have, by the very condition of solitude, is the self-presence of relational dynamics, because there is no relational subject present whose dynamics could come to presence. The solitary journey can bring me to presence; only the shared journey can bring us to presence as a moving whole. This is the precise sense in which the present account is not the existential philosophy of travel doubled or summed. Two solitary self-presences, even side by side, even simultaneous, do not constitute the self-presence of a relational dynamics; that requires the generation of a “we” whose own movement is what becomes present, and the generation of the “we” is exactly what the solitary journey, however profound, structurally lacks. The originality of the claim lies here: not in adding existential depth to travel, which the tradition already did, but in locating a phenomenon, relational, not individual, that the tradition’s solitary framing made invisible.
Hegelian recognition. The nearest philosophical neighbour to a relational self-awareness is Hegel’s account of mutual recognition: the dialectic in which self-consciousness attains itself only through being recognised by another self-consciousness, so that selfhood is from the outset mediated by the other. The resemblance is real, and the account offered here owes the recognition tradition a debt. But the difference is precise and it is the difference that the concept turns on. Hegelian recognition is, in its classical form, a relation between two self-consciousnesses: each attains itself through the other, but what is attained is, in the end, the self-consciousness of each, the “I” that has won itself by passing through the other’s recognition. The terminus is two recognised “I”s. The self-presence of relational dynamics is not the recognition of two “I”s through each other but the coming-to-presence of the “we” to itself: it is that the relational subject attains awareness of its own dynamics as a whole rather than that each partner attains individual self-consciousness via the other. The unit of the phenomenon is the relation, not the relatum; what becomes present is the movement of the “we,” not the secured selfhood of either “I.” Where recognition issues in two selves who have won themselves through each other, self-presence issues in a relation that has become present to itself, a different terminus, requiring the prior ontological commitment that the relation is a subject in its own right and not merely a medium through which two subjects constitute themselves. The recognition tradition, lacking that commitment, could see the two-through-each-other but not the third that is neither; this account, resting on the relational ontology of the series’ foundation, takes the third, the “we” as a subject whose dynamics can become present to it, as the phenomenon to be described. It is to the fate of that “we” after the journey ends, and to the wealth it generates or squanders, that the argument now turns.
§4 The Political Economy of Experience - Reproduction and the Circulation of Relational Wealth
The field of travel generates something; the previous section described what. But generation is only half of any complete account, and on its own it is the half that dissipates. A value generated and not reproduced is a value squandered, present once and then gone, leaving no deposit. This section turns from the generation of relational experience to its reproduction: the process by which what the field generates is made to persist, circulate, and accumulate rather than vanish with the journey’s end. The turn is also the turn from phenomenology to political economy, for reproduction is a category of political economy before it is anything else, and the claim of this section is that the afterlife of a shared journey is best understood through it. The section argues that the experience a journey generates is a form of relational wealth; that its retelling is the labour that reproduces that wealth; that reproduction is the establishment of a good circulation; that this living labour is distinct from, and not to be confused with, the dead material (the photograph, the souvenir) that is merely its raw stuff; that the moment of return is the critical juncture at which reproduction either begins or fails; and that reproduction, like all reproduction, can be just or unjust in its distribution.
§4.1 The experience of the journey is relational wealth
This series has already established the category of generative relational wealth: the value that a relation generates and holds not as a stock divided between two parties but as a genuinely common surplus, the wealth of the “we” rather than the summed possessions of the two “I”s (Paper XV). The experience a shared journey generates is wealth of exactly this kind, and the point need not be argued at length because it follows directly: the self-presence of the relational dynamics, the communitas of the threshold, the depth reached in the cleared field, these are not goods that either partner possesses privately and could carry off alone, but goods of the relation, generated by and belonging to the “we.” What the two bring home from a journey that went well is a common deposit in the wealth of their relation rather than two private stores of pleasant memory. This is why the loss of it, when it is lost, is felt as a loss to the relation and not merely to two individuals; and it is why its conservation is a matter for the relation’s political economy, the question of how the “we” manages the wealth it generates.
But relational wealth, like any wealth, is subject to a basic political-economic fact: it is not automatically conserved. Generated, it may be reproduced, in which case it persists and accumulates; or it may be left unreproduced, in which case it dissipates. The journey’s experience does not deposit itself permanently into the relation’s wealth merely by having occurred. It must be reproduced into the relation’s ongoing life, or it fades, and the couple who return from a journey that genuinely generated something, and then do nothing to reproduce it, will find within months that it has thinned to a few photographs they no longer look at and a fact they can state but no longer feel. Generation without reproduction is a one-time expenditure. The wealth is real, but it is perishable, and its conservation is a labour.
§4.2 Retelling as the reproduction of subjective experience
What is that labour? It is, principally, retelling: the shared, spoken, mutual re-narration of the journey, by which the two return to what they generated and weave it, again and again, into the fabric of the “we.” Do you remember that time we got lost, the small phrase is the beginning of a great deal, for in the shared retelling the generated experience is not merely recalled but re-produced: brought back into the relation’s living present, re-felt, re-woven, and thereby kept from dissipating. This is the reproduction of subjective experience, and the name is chosen with its full political-economic weight. In the political economy of labour, reproduction is the process by which what production has generated is made to persist, circulate, and serve as the precondition of the next round of production; it is the condition of production’s being more than a single, dissipating event rather than an appendage to production. Reproduction, here, is the same category applied to a different object: not the reproduction of labour-power but the reproduction of the relational subject’s experience, the labour by which a generated experience is kept in circulation and thereby conserved as wealth.
The application is exact in each of its parts. Production, the generation of the experience in the field, is, on its own, a one-time event; the journey ends, the field closes, and what was generated would dissipate were it not reproduced. Reproduction, the shared retelling, is what keeps it: by returning the experience to the relation’s present, the retelling makes it persist beyond its moment, circulate through the relation’s ongoing life, and become available as the precondition of further generation, the deposited wealth on which the relation can draw. And reproduction is, like all reproduction, labour, living activity, expended by the two, without which the conservation does not happen. This last point is the one most easily missed and most important, and the next subsection is devoted to it; for the great temptation of the age is to imagine that the reproduction of experience has been automated, outsourced to a device, when in truth it cannot be performed by anything but the living labour of the two who shared the experience.
§4.3 Reproduction is the establishment of a good cycle
The retelling does not merely preserve; it circulates, and in circulating it can do something that mere preservation cannot, it can establish a good cycle, in the exact sense this series has given the term. A good cycle, as developed in the foundational treatment of sustainable intimacy, is a circulation that returns more than it took: a loop along which positive surplus accumulates, so that the relation comes back to itself not depleted but enriched, the circulation generating rather than merely conserving (Paper IX). The shared retelling, when it is alive, is such a cycle. Each return to the journey in retelling is not a static replay of a fixed content but a re-generation: the experience is re-felt, and in the re-feeling it is added to, inflected by all that has happened since, enriched by the very act of being retold, so that the couple who return often to a shared journey do not wear it out but deepen it, the story growing in meaning each time it is told. The retelling is a loop that returns more than it took, the holonomy of the relation accumulating positive phase along the path of re-narration, to put it in the terms of the series’ formal companion, where the surplus of a relation is exactly what a closed circulation generates over its inputs. Reproduction, then, is the establishment of a circulation rather than the mere maintenance of a stock, and a circulation that, when healthy, is generative: the good cycle by which a journey’s wealth not only persists but grows.
This is the deep reason the reproduction of experience matters as much as its generation, and perhaps more. Generation gives the relation a wealth; reproduction establishes the circulation by which that wealth becomes self-augmenting, by which a single journey, retold and re-felt over years, becomes an ever-deepening common possession rather than a fading memory. A relation rich in such circulations, many shared experiences, each kept in living retelling, is rich in the most durable way, for its wealth is a set of good cycles each of which returns more than it took rather than a fixed store that can only be spent down. The political economy of the relation is, in large part, the management of these cycles: their establishment, their maintenance, and the subject of the next subsections, their two characteristic failures, reification and unjust distribution.
§4.4 Dead material and living labour - the photograph
The reproduction of experience is living labour, and it cannot be performed by anything else. This must be insisted upon, because the most pervasive error in the modern conduct of travel is the belief that the reproduction has been accomplished by the recording, that to have photographed the journey is to have preserved it. The photograph, the video, the souvenir, the geotagged log: these are not the reproduction of the experience. They are, at most, its material, the dead stuff from which a reproduction might later be made, but which is not itself a reproduction and accomplishes nothing on its own. The distinction is precisely Marx’s distinction between dead and living labour. Dead labour is labour congealed in a thing, past activity solidified into an object; living labour is present activity, and only living labour can set dead labour back into motion and make it yield. The photograph is dead labour: the congealed residue of a past seeing, a thing in which an experience has been deposited and frozen. It can become material for reproduction, a prompt, a prop, a trigger for the living retelling, but only if living labour takes it up and works it. A photograph never returned to in shared retelling reproduces nothing; it is dead labour that stays dead, a stock of congealed seeing accumulating on a drive, untouched by the living activity that alone could make it yield.
The consequences of confusing the material with the reproduction are severe, and they are visible everywhere in the contemporary conduct of travel. The couple who photograph everything and retell nothing have mistaken the accumulation of dead material for the conservation of wealth, and they will find their wealth dissipating beneath a growing pile of unviewed images, the perfect emblem of dead labour accumulating while the living labour that alone could redeem it is never performed. Worse, the labour of recording can actively displace the labour of reproduction: the energy that goes into capturing the moment for later is energy not spent undergoing the moment now or retelling it after, and the camera interposed between the two and their experience can prevent the very generation it was meant to preserve. The journey lived through a lens, photographed rather than undergone, may generate little to reproduce; and the journey whose afterlife is a folder of images never reopened reproduces little of what it generated. The recording is not the reproduction. Only the living labour of shared retelling reproduces the experience, and the dead material is worth exactly as much as the living labour that returns to work it, and not one bit more.
§4.5 The return - the critical juncture
There is a moment at which reproduction either begins or fails, and it has been underweighted in every account of travel that treats the journey as ending at the homecoming. That moment is the return itself, the descent from the field back into the everyday, the crossing of the threshold in the homeward direction. The return is not the journey’s conclusion; it is the journey’s most delicate phase, the juncture at which everything the field generated must be carried across into a structure that is hostile to it, or be left behind at the threshold. The hostility is structural, established already in the analysis of the field’s tensions (§2.9): the communitas of the journey is a liminal phenomenon, anti-structural by nature, and the everyday into which one returns is precisely structure, the reimposition of the roles that suspension had bracketed, the predetermination that contingency had lifted, the channelled time that reshaped time had opened. To return is to step from the threshold back into the grid, and the grid does not preserve what the threshold generated; left to itself, it dissolves it. This is the structural truth behind the most common lament of travellers, it was so good there, and within a week of being home we were back to how we always are. The lament is not a failure of feeling but a failure of reproduction at the critical juncture: the field’s wealth was generated and then surrendered at the threshold, because nothing was done to carry it across.
The return therefore is its beginning rather than the end of the labour. To carry the field’s wealth across the threshold is to begin, immediately and deliberately, the reproduction that will let it survive in the structured everyday: to retell while the experience is fresh, to deposit it into the relation’s living present before the grid can dissolve it, to begin the good cycle while the wealth is still warm. And, this is the hinge on which the paper’s final movement will turn, the labour of carrying the field’s wealth across the threshold into the everyday is continuous with the labour of constructing the field within the everyday. To reproduce a journey’s wealth at home is already to begin building, in the everyday, a small continuation of the field that generated it; the return is where the literal journey begins to become the generalised one (§15). The couple who reproduce well do not simply remember their journey; they let it seed the construction of fields in the everyday, so that the homecoming is the carrying of the field’s capacity home rather than a fall from the field. The return is the juncture where this either happens or does not, where the journey either deposits its wealth and seeds its own continuation, or is surrendered at the threshold and mourned.
§4.6 The justice of reproduction
Reproduction, finally, has a politics, because the retelling that reproduces the experience is never neutral, and the question of whose version becomes the reproduced experience is a question of justice. Two people do not undergo the same journey identically: what one felt as a romantic adventure of getting lost, the other may have felt as a frightening consequence of the first’s carelessness; what one remembers as a glorious meal, the other remembers as the evening they were ignored. The shared retelling weaves these divergent undergoings into a single shared narrative, and the weaving has a distribution of power. If one partner’s version systematically dominates the retelling, if the official memory of the “we” is consistently the experience of one and not the other, then the reproduced experience is the product of an unequal reproduction, a narrative appropriation in which one party’s subjective experience is taken up as the relation’s memory while the other’s is overwritten or silenced. This is, in the register of memory, an exact instance of the bad cycle this series has analysed throughout: one party rendered the mere material of a circulation whose surplus accrues to the other, fuel for a wealth not jointly held (Paper IX, Paper XVII). The unjustly reproduced journey enriches the “we” in name while in fact enriching one of the two at the other’s expense, the silenced partner’s experience consumed to feed a common memory that is not truly common.
The just form of reproduction is, correspondingly, the one this series has described under the name of mutual translation: the retelling in which both undergoings are admitted, in which the two versions move toward each other and generate a shared narrative that neither alone possessed, the memory of the “we” built from both rather than imposed by one (Paper XIII). Just reproduction is harder than unjust, as mutual translation is harder than imposition; it requires that each partner’s experience be given standing in the common memory, that the divergences be acknowledged rather than smoothed over by the dominant version, that the retelling generate a genuinely shared narrative rather than ratify one party’s. But only just reproduction conserves the wealth as relational wealth, the wealth of the “we”; unjust reproduction converts it into the private wealth of one, dressed in the first-person plural. The justice of reproduction is thus not a separate ethical overlay upon a politically-economic process but internal to the process itself: only the just retelling reproduces the relation’s wealth as the relation’s, and the unjust retelling, whatever it preserves, has already begun to dissolve the “we” whose wealth it claims to keep. It is to the ethics implicit in this and the other operations of the field that the argument now turns.
§5 The Ethics of Shared Travel
The field generates, the retelling reproduces; both can be done well or badly, and the difference is ethical. This section draws out the ethics implicit in the field of travel. It does not derive that ethics from the water-virtue of the previous paper, though the two are consonant; the field of travel raises its own ethical questions, and they are best answered from within its own structure and from the resources the series has built, the good cycle, mutual translation, generative wealth, the resonance of meaning-worlds, rather than imported from elsewhere. Four questions organise the section. How are two people to face, together, the contingency the field restores? What makes the reproduction of their experience just? Under what conditions does the good cycle a journey establishes endure rather than collapse? And, the question no previous paper in this series has had to face, because the dyad was its horizon, how are two people to treat, together, the third party the journey inevitably involves: the inhabitants and the cultures of the places they pass through? A fifth subsection, which an honest ethics cannot omit, asks what it is for a shared journey to fail.
§5.1 Facing contingency together
The field restores contingency, and contingency, undergone together, is the field’s first ethical situation. For contingency is not comfortable. The undetermined moment, the missed connection, the wrong turning, the meal that disappoints, the day that does not go as hoped, is a small adversity, and small adversity, met by two, immediately poses the ethical question of the field: will the contingency be borne together, or will it be converted into an occasion for one to blame the other? This is the precise ethical fork of shared travel, and it is encountered many times a day. When the train is missed, there is a “we” that missed the train, jointly thrown into an undetermined situation to be jointly met, and there is a possibility, always available and always tempting, of dissolving that “we” into an “I” who is blameless and a “you” who is at fault. The ethics of facing contingency together is the ethics of holding the “we” against that dissolution: of meeting the undetermined as a joint situation jointly to be navigated, rather than seizing it as material for the apportionment of blame.
The temptation to blame is strong precisely because contingency is anxious. The undetermined moment exposes the subject (§2.4), and the exposure can be uncomfortable; blame is a way of discharging the discomfort by locating its cause in the other, converting one’s own anxiety before the undetermined into a grievance against a person. But blame, whatever its relief, dissolves the “we” at exactly the moment the “we” is most needed, and it converts a situation the field offered as an occasion for shared navigation, and so for the generation of the very communitas and self-presence the field exists to produce, into an occasion for the relation’s depletion. The ethically central capacity of shared travel is therefore the capacity to receive contingency as a joint gift rather than a private grievance: to meet the missed train as ours to solve, the wrong turning as ours to laugh at or to bear, so that the undetermined becomes the material of the “we”‘s generativity rather than the occasion of its fracture. The couple who can do this find in the field’s contingencies an endless supply of generative occasions; the couple who cannot find in them an endless supply of quarrels, and the difference is in whether the contingency is met as a “we” or seized as an “I.”
§5.2 The ethics of reproduction
The justice of reproduction, established in the previous section (§4.6), is the field’s second ethical situation, and it can be stated here as an ethical demand rather than a political-economic description. The demand is that the retelling which reproduces the journey be just, that it admit both undergoings, give standing to each partner’s experience in the common memory, and generate a shared narrative from both rather than imposing one. The ethical work is the work of mutual translation (Paper XIII): the harder labour, against the easier path of letting the more articulate, more insistent, or more confident partner’s version become by default the memory of the “we.” The ease of the unjust path is what makes the demand a genuine ethical one and not a mere description; unjust reproduction does not require malice, only the failure to do the harder work of admitting the other’s experience, and it accomplishes itself through nothing more than the inertia by which one voice, slightly louder or slightly surer, becomes the record. To reproduce justly is to resist that inertia: to ask, and to mean it, how was it for you, and to let the answer alter the common memory even when one’s own version was more flattering or more convenient. The ethics of reproduction is, in this sense, an ethics of memory, a vigilance over the justice of what the “we” comes to remember, exercised in the ordinary act of retelling, where the relation’s history is continually being written and the question of whose experience that history records is continually being decided.
§5.3 Sustaining the good cycle
The third ethical situation concerns endurance: under what conditions does the good cycle a journey establishes continue to generate rather than collapse? The question is the field’s version of the general problem of sustainable intimacy, and the series’ foundational answer applies (Paper IX). A good cycle endures so long as it continues to return more than it took, so long as each return to the journey in retelling re-generates rather than merely replays, so long as the circulation stays open and does not close into a fixed, repeated, exhausted form. Its collapse is the collapse of that openness: the moment the retelling ceases to re-generate and becomes mere rote repetition, the same story told the same way to no further effect, the cycle has closed into a stock, the wealth no longer circulating and growing but frozen into a fixed and dwindling possession. The ethics of sustaining the good cycle is therefore an ethics against premature closure: against letting the shared journey harden into a fixed anecdote, a set-piece performed rather than re-felt, a possession held rather than a circulation kept open. It is, in the vocabulary of the previous paper, the ethics of non-fullness applied to memory (Paper XX): not to fill the journey’s meaning to completion, not to settle it into a final and fixed account, but to leave it open to re-generation, so that it can keep returning more than it took. A journey kept thus open can nourish a relation for a lifetime; a journey closed into a fixed anecdote is spent in a few tellings and thereafter merely repeated. The difference, again, is ethical: it lies in whether the two keep the cycle open or let it close.
§5.4 Facing the third-party other
The fourth ethical situation is new to this series, and it is the one that begins to carry the dyadic ethics of intimacy toward the wider ethics of the many. Every previous paper could take the dyad as its horizon, because intimacy is, in the first instance, a relation of two. But travel breaks the horizon, for travel necessarily involves a third party: the inhabitants of the places passed through, the cultures encountered, the people who are not the couple and whose home the couple is visiting. And this poses a question the dyad alone never had to face: how are the two, together, to treat the third-party other? The question is genuinely a question for the “we” and not merely for each “I,” because the couple faces the other jointly, and their joint stance toward the people and places they visit is itself a feature of their relation, a thing the “we” does, well or badly, and a thing that shapes what the “we” becomes.
The characteristic ethical failure here is well known, and the literature of travel and tourism has named it: the reduction of the inhabited place to a spectacle for the visitor’s consumption, the other’s home and life converted into scenery, the inhabitants into picturesque features of a landscape arranged for the tourist’s gaze. This is the tourist’s version of the reification analysed in the previous section: the living reality of a place and its people reduced to a consumable object, photographed rather than encountered, gazed at rather than met. And it has a specifically relational danger for the couple, beyond the injustice to the other: a “we” that constitutes itself through the joint consumption of others as spectacle is a “we” built on a shared extraction, and the bad cycle it practises toward the third party tends to be the bad cycle it will practise within. The couple who together reduce every place to a backdrop for their own experience, who consume the inhabited world as scenery for the “we,” are practising a mode of relating, extraction, reification, the reduction of the living to the consumable, that does not stay outside the dyad. How one treats the third party is continuous with how one treats the second.
The generative alternative is the joint practice of what the series has called epistemic hospitality, here directed outward (Paper XIII): the meeting of the visited place and its people as a genuine other to be encountered rather than a spectacle to be consumed, with the openness that lets the other’s reality alter one’s own rather than merely furnish it. To travel well, ethically, is for the two together to be guests rather than consumers, to receive the place as hosts receive a gift, with the humility that knows oneself to be in another’s home, rather than to extract it as scenery for the “we.” And this joint ethical practice toward the third party is, the paper suggests, a school for the wider ethics the series will eventually need: the ethics of the many, of the relational commons, of the “we” that is larger than two. The couple who learn to face the third-party other generatively, to widen the circle of non-extractive relation beyond the dyad, are taking the first step from the ethics of intimacy toward the ethics of the basin, the watershed, the commons that the previous paper marked as the horizon beyond the dyad (Paper XX, Paper XV). The third-party other of travel is where the dyadic ethics first meets its own enlargement, and the manner of that meeting is a genuine ethical question for the “we.”
§5.5 The failure and collapse of shared travel
An ethics that could describe only the success of shared travel would be worthless, a romance rather than an ethics, and the field of travel fails often enough that its failures demand a full and unflinching account. Travel does not always generate; it frequently depletes. There are journeys that leave a relation worse than they found it, and an honest theory must be able to say what they are, not merely to acknowledge that they occur.
The first and most basic failure is the failure of revelation without anything to reveal: the field strips away the scaffolding and finds nothing beneath it. This is the journey on which suspension brackets the roles and discloses that the roles were all there was, that the two, met without their functions, have nothing to say to each other; that the resonance the routine had let them assume was the mere interlocking of habits. Here the field does exactly what it does in the successful case, it removes the concealment and presents the truth, but the truth it presents is a vacancy. This failure is not a malfunction of the field; it is the field working correctly upon a relation that was hollow, and the pain it produces is the pain of a true assay with a poor result. It is genuinely a failure of the journey to generate, but its cause lies before the journey, in a relation that had less beneath its routines than the routines had concealed.
The second failure is the failure of reproduction degenerating into extraction: the retelling that should reproduce the wealth justly instead becomes the instrument of one partner’s appropriation of the common memory, the unjust reproduction of the previous section made into a settled practice (§4.6). Here something was generated, but its afterlife is corrupt: the journey’s wealth, instead of circulating as the relation’s, is captured by one and the other silenced, and the bad cycle of narrative extraction sets in. This failure is more insidious than the first, because it can coexist with the appearance of a rich shared history, the couple who tell, often and warmly, a shared story that is in truth one partner’s story, the other’s experience long since overwritten and forgotten, including by the one whose experience it was.
The third failure is the failure of contingency overwhelming rather than nourishing: the field’s restored contingency, instead of providing generative occasions met as a “we,” becomes a flood of stressors that the relation cannot metabolise, each undetermined moment converted into blame, the journey degenerating into a running quarrel in which every contingency is an occasion for the dissolution of the “we” into accusing “I” and accused “you.” This is the failure the holiday quarrel becomes when it is the journey’s settled mode rather than an isolated discharge, when forced co-presence amplifies friction faster than the relation can disperse it, and the cleared field, which offered itself as the site of the “we”‘s generation, becomes the arena of its fracture.
What unifies the three failures is instructive, and it returns the ethics to its single principle. In each, the field has done its work, removed the concealment, restored the contingency, opened the space for reproduction, and the relation has failed to meet what the field offered: had nothing to be revealed, or extracted rather than reproduced, or fractured rather than navigated. The field is neutral; it opens the conditions, and the relation generates good or ill within them. This is why the same journey, the same set of contingencies, the same cleared field, can be for one couple the deepening of a lifetime and for another the beginning of an end. The field does not determine the outcome; it presents the occasion, and what the “we” makes of the occasion is the ethical substance of shared travel. The failures are of what was brought to it and done within it rather than failures of the field, which is precisely why they are ethical failures, matters of how the two met what the field offered, and not mere misfortunes that befell them. And it is because the field only ever offers the occasion, never the outcome, that the question of how to meet it well, the question of constructing and inhabiting the field rightly, becomes the central practical question to which the paper now turns.
§5.6 Conflict as positive wealth - the ethics of transfiguration
The account of failure just given is true but, taken alone, it is one-sided, and the one-sidedness must now be corrected, for it would leave the impression that conflict in shared travel is simply a danger, a thing to be survived at best, a thing that destroys at worst. The philosophy of beauty has shown that this is not the whole truth: suffering can be beautiful, and conflict, transfigured in the labour of reproduction, can become not the depletion of a relation’s wealth but among its richest deposits (§9.7, §9.8). The ethics of conflict is therefore not exhausted by the ethics of avoiding or surviving it; it includes, and culminates in, the ethics of transfiguring it, of doing the reproductive labour that converts a shared difficulty into a shared beauty and a common wealth.
This reframes the ethical situation of conflict entirely. The earlier discussion of facing contingency together (§5.1) presented the ethical fork as lying between meeting the contingency as a “we” and seizing it as material for blame, between navigation and fracture. That fork is real, but it concerns the conflict in the moment. There is a second ethical moment, which the analysis of reproduction now makes visible: the moment after, in which the conflict, having occurred, is either transfigured in shared retelling into a treasured part of the relation’s history, or left as a raw wound, or weaponised as a grievance to be reopened. The ethics of conflict spans both moments. In the moment, the demand is to meet the difficulty as a “we” rather than dissolving into blame. After the moment, the demand is to reproduce the conflict well, to return to it together in a way that transfigures it, that gives the shared difficulty a form and a meaning, that lets the two find, in what was hard, a beauty and a closeness that the difficulty itself made possible. The couple who can do both, meet the conflict together in the moment, and transfigure it together afterward, do not merely survive their conflicts; they convert them into wealth, and into a wealth, moreover, of a uniquely durable and precious kind, because it is the wealth of a difficulty come through together and made beautiful.
This is why a relationship that has weathered and transfigured real conflict is often deeper than one that has never been seriously tested. The transfigured conflict yields what unbroken harmony cannot: the proof, held in shared memory, that the “we” can survive difficulty and make beauty of it; the hard-won common accord of two perceptions that genuinely diverged and were reconciled; the unique and unrepeatable shared experience of a storm weathered together. The deepest intimacies are very often those that have transfigured the most difficulty, and the reason is now clear: difficulty, well reproduced, is a richer material for relational wealth than ease, because its transfiguration generates a beauty and a bond that ease never demands and so never produces. The ethical counsel is not, of course, to seek out conflict, the raw difficulty is real, and badly met or badly reproduced it is pure loss. The counsel is that conflict, when it comes, is not simply to be survived but to be transfigured: met as a “we” in the moment and reproduced into beauty afterward, so that the hardest passages of a shared life become, through the loving labour of their reproduction, not the wounds the relation carries but the treasures it holds. What distinguishes the transfiguration that succeeds from the one that fails is not left to metaphor: the good reproduction of suffering must meet four criteria, it must preserve the possibility of the relation’s continued generation, be conducted relationally rather than unilaterally, refuse the exploitation of either party’s pain, and accompany the power it inevitably generates with the restraint of that power (§9.9). These four mark the direction of the good, though, as that discussion concedes, they do not supply the method, which remains among the hardest of the arts. The ethics of shared travel is incomplete until it includes this, the recognition that the difficult, and even the painful, is not the enemy of the relation’s flourishing but, rightly transfigured, among its deepest sources. Beauty does not exclude conflict; the ethics of intimacy, at its most mature, makes conflict a part of the relation’s common generation.
§5.7 The common good - the capacity to face the world together
The ethics of shared travel has analysed the failures to be avoided and the conflicts to be transfigured, but it would close on too low a note if it ended with prohibitions and repairs, with what must not be done and what must be mended. For the ethical substance of shared travel is finally not negative but positive: the journeys met well, the contingencies faced together, the conflicts transfigured, accumulate into something that is the relation’s deepest ethical achievement, and the paper should name it before it leaves the ethical movement. That achievement is a capacity, the capacity, grown between two people over a life of shared faring, to face the world together.
Consider what is built across many journeys well undergone. Each time the two meet an unfamiliar place as a “we,” navigate its contingencies together, weather its difficulties without dissolving into blame, and reproduce the experience into shared wealth, they are not only generating a particular good; they are cultivating a general one, a tested, deepened, increasingly reliable capacity to meet whatever comes as a “we” rather than as two isolated “I”s. The couple who have travelled long and well are not merely richer in shared memories; they are better, together, at facing the unfamiliar, the contingent, the difficult, more able to enter the unknown without fracturing, to meet the unplanned without panic, to hold together under the strain that scatters less practised relations. This grown capacity is the relation’s common good in the most exact sense: not a good possessed by one and shared with the other, nor a good external to the two, but a good that is the strengthened “we” itself, the relational subject’s developed power to face the world as one. It is the ethical fruit of the whole practice, the thing that all the well-met journeys were, without anyone intending it, building.
This common good is the ethical correlate of everything the paper has analysed, gathered into a single capacity. It is the self-presence of relational dynamics (§3) become durable, a “we” that knows itself well enough to act as one under pressure. It is the relational wealth of reproduced experience (§4) become capability, the accumulated shared history sedimented into a present power to face what comes. It is the good cycle of relational production (§6) seen in its fruit, a relation that, having generated and reproduced well, is now more able to generate and reproduce, its generativity compounding into a tested capacity for shared life. And it is the deepest answer to the question of why shared travel matters ethically: not because it affords pleasant experiences, nor even because it generates wealth, but because, undergone well, it builds the capacity of two people to face the world together, which is, in the end, what an intimate relation is for, and what its ethical flourishing consists in. The couple who can face anything together, because they have faced so much together well, have achieved the common good that the whole ethics of shared travel was, beneath all its particular concerns, about. This is where the ethical movement comes to rest: not in the avoidance of failure, but in the positive achievement of a shared capacity to meet the world, the common good of a “we” grown able, through a life of faring together, to face whatever comes as one.
§6 Relational Production and Its Ethical Principles
The paper has arrived, by several routes, at the same kind of problem. The reproduction of a shared experience can be just or unjust (§4.6); the reproduction of suffering can preserve or destroy a relation (§9.9); the practice of aesthetic judgement across two differing sensibilities can sustain or annihilate the two who differ (§10.4). These have been treated as separate problems, each with its own analysis. They are not separate. They are instances of one underlying activity, which this section names and theorises for the first time: relational production, the activity by which a relational subject generates and reproduces the value that is proper to it. This section establishes relational production as a category, formulates the ethical principles that govern it, and shows that the previously separate problems are its applications, sharing a single set of principles. It is, in the architecture of this paper and arguably of the series, a theoretical event: the first statement of relational production as a domain with its own constitutive ethics.
§6.1 The category of relational production
By relational production the paper means any activity by which a relational subject, a “we”, generates or reproduces the value proper to a relation: shared experience, common memory, joint meaning, the aesthetic judgement of the “we,” the significance of what the relation has undergone together. The category is broad by design, for its point is to gather under one concept activities that have been treated separately but share a structure. The generation of experience in the field of travel (§2), its reproduction in shared retelling (§4), the reproduction of suffering (§9.9), the production and evolution of a shared aesthetic judgement (§10), all are relational production: in each, a relational subject is at work generating or reproducing a value that belongs to the relation rather than to either of its members.
What unifies these activities, and what makes relational production a single category rather than a list, is a structural feature they all share: each is a production conducted by two who must remain two, generating a value that belongs to neither alone. This is what distinguishes relational production from production simply. In ordinary production, a subject produces a value; the subject is given, and the question is only the value. In relational production, the producing subject is itself a relation, a “we” constituted by two who remain distinct, and this changes everything, because the activity can be conducted in ways that damage or destroy the very relational subject that conducts it. A relation can produce its shared memory in a way that dissolves the “we” into one member’s narrative; can reproduce its suffering in a way that converts the relation into an instrument of domination; can produce its aesthetic judgement in a way that annihilates the difference of the two. Relational production is production that can consume its own producer, can damage, in the producing, the relational subject whose value it produces, and it is exactly this possibility that makes relational production a domain requiring its own ethics. The ethics of relational production is the set of principles under which the activity generates the relation’s value without damaging the relational subject that generates it.
§6.2 The keystone - the principle of subject-preservation
At the head of the ethics of relational production stands a single principle, which governs all the others and from which, in a sense, they unfold. It addresses the deepest danger of relational production, that the production of the relation’s unity might be purchased by the destruction of one of the subjects it unites, and it forbids exactly this.
The Principle of Subject-Preservation. No good relation may purchase its unity at the cost of annihilating the other. Any relational production that achieves the unity, accord, or shared value of the “we” by eliminating, silencing, dissolving, or overriding either of the subjects it relates has, in that very achievement, failed, for the unity of a relation is the unity of two who remain two, and a unity bought by the destruction of one of them is its abolition rather than the relation’s fulfilment. The “we” that survives the annihilation of an “I” is a single subject wearing the costume of a relation rather than a relational subject.
The principle rests directly on the relational ontology of the series and on the account of resonance as distinct from fusion (§3.2). A relation is a coupling of two who remain two; its unity is the resonance of distinct meaning-worlds, not their merger. To annihilate one of the two in the name of unity is therefore not to perfect the relation but to destroy its condition, collapsing the two-that-resonate into a one-that-is-alone. The principle of subject-preservation is the ethical statement of this ontological truth: because the relation is the resonance of two distinct subjects, any production that eliminates a subject destroys the relation, however much “unity” it appears to achieve. And it is the ethical correlate of the dynamical result of the dialectic of the general and the particular (§10.5): there it was shown that the suppression of the particular, the homogenisation of the two into one, is a dynamical catastrophe, extinguishing the diversity on which the relation’s continued generativity depends; here the same truth appears as an ethical prohibition, that the relation may not annihilate the particular subject even for the sake of unity, on pain of extinguishing itself. The dynamical “the particular is required for generativity” and the ethical “the other may not be annihilated for unity” are one truth in two registers.
The principle’s power is that it diagnoses, at a single stroke, the characteristic corruption of every form of relational production. Each form has a way of purchasing unity by annihilating a subject, and the principle forbids each: the reproduction of memory that achieves a shared story by silencing one party’s experience; the reproduction of suffering that achieves the relation’s continuance by subordinating one party to the other’s wound; the production of aesthetic accord that achieves agreement by dissolving one party’s judgement into the other’s. In every case the corruption has the same form, unity purchased by the annihilation of a subject, and the principle of subject-preservation is the single prohibition that names it. This is why it is the keystone: not one principle among others, but the principle from which the specific criteria derive their force, each of them a determinate way of forbidding the annihilation of the subject in a particular dimension of relational production.
§6.3 The four operative criteria
Beneath the keystone stand four operative criteria, which specify, in the four dimensions corresponding to the series’ theoretical pillars, what the preservation of the subject requires in the conduct of relational production. These were first stated for the particular case of suffering (§9.9); they are now seen to be not specific to suffering but general to relational production as such, and are stated here in their general form.
The teleological criterion: relational production must preserve the possibility of the relation’s continued generativity (Paper IX). It must not, in producing the relation’s value, foreclose the relation’s generative future, must not produce a dead end, a frozen verdict, a terminus from which nothing further can be generated. This criterion forbids the annihilation of the subject in the dimension of time: a production that ends the relation’s capacity to go on generating has annihilated the relation as a living subject, leaving only a dead structure.
The ontological criterion: relational production must be conducted relationally, jointly, by the two together, not unilaterally by one. What is produced is the value of the relational subject, and the value of a relational subject can be produced only by the relational subject, not by one member acting in its name. This criterion forbids the annihilation of the subject in the dimension of agency: a production conducted by one member alone has annihilated the other as a co-producer, converting the “we”‘s production into an “I”‘s.
The political-economic criterion: relational production must not be exploitative, must not convert one party’s contribution, experience, or suffering into material for the other’s gain (Paper XV, Paper XVII). This criterion forbids the annihilation of the subject in the dimension of value: a production that extracts one party’s contribution as the other’s surplus has annihilated the first as an equal participant, rendering them the mere fuel of the other’s enrichment.
The power criterion: relational production inevitably generates a structure of power, and must, in generating it, generate also the force that restrains its abuse (Paper XVII). It must not let the asymmetry it creates become a standing instrument of domination, but must accompany the power it generates with the power that checks it. This criterion forbids the annihilation of the subject in the dimension of power: a production whose generated asymmetry becomes unchecked domination has annihilated the subordinated party as a free subject, reducing them to the object of another’s power.
Each criterion, then, is a determinate form of the keystone: each forbids the annihilation of the subject in one dimension, time, agency, value, power, and together they specify what the preservation of the subject requires across the whole of relational production. The keystone forbids the annihilation of the other; the four criteria say what annihilation is, in each dimension, and so what its avoidance requires.
§6.4 The method - seeking common ground while preserving difference
The principles state what good relational production must achieve and avoid; they do not state how it proceeds. Its method, the practical form of its conduct, is given by a maxim that the materialist dialectic and the diplomatic tradition that drew on it have named with precision: seeking common ground while preserving difference (求同存异, qiu tong cun yi). The maxim is the operative form of the dialectic of the general and the particular (§10.4), and it is the practical method by which the principle of subject-preservation is honoured in the conduct of relational production.
The maxim has two moments, held together. Seeking common ground is the pursuit of the general, the shared accord, the common value, the unity of the “we”, which relational production must genuinely seek, for without it there is no relation, only two strangers in parallel. Preserving difference is the conservation of the particular, the irreducible distinctness of the two, their divergent experiences, judgements, and perspectives, which relational production must genuinely conserve, for without it there are not two to relate, and the unity sought would be the annihilating unity the keystone forbids. The maxim holds the two together: it seeks unity through the preservation of difference, not at its expense, and so it is precisely the method that honours subject-preservation, achieving the common ground that relational production needs without annihilating the difference that relational production must keep. Where a naive pursuit of unity would drive toward the homogenisation that annihilates the subject, and a naive insistence on difference would drive toward the atomisation that dissolves the relation, seeking-common-ground-while-preserving-difference holds the dialectical middle: the unity that preserves the two, the common ground that conserves the difference. It is the materialist dialectic’s own resolution of the general and the particular (§10.4), raised into a maxim of conduct: not the victory of unity over difference or difference over unity, but their held tension, the common ground sought always through and never against the preserved difference of the two.
This maxim, drawn from the dialectical and diplomatic tradition, is the practical heart of the ethics of relational production. The principle of subject-preservation forbids the annihilating unity; the four criteria specify the dimensions of preservation; and seeking-common-ground-while-preserving-difference is the method by which, in practice, a relation produces its common value while preserving the two whose value it is. Together they constitute the ethics of relational production, which the paper now states in summary before turning to its applications.
§6.5 Recapitulation - the ethics of relational production
The Theory of Relational Production — Summary.
Relational production is any activity by which a relational subject (a “we”) generates or reproduces the value proper to a relation, shared experience, common memory, joint meaning, the aesthetic judgement of the “we,” the significance of what is undergone together. It is distinguished from production simply by the fact that its producing subject is itself a relation of two who must remain two, so that the activity can damage or destroy the very relational subject that conducts it. It therefore requires its own ethics.
Keystone — the Principle of Subject-Preservation. No good relation may purchase its unity at the cost of annihilating the other. Unity bought by the elimination of a subject is its abolition rather than the relation’s fulfilment.
Four operative criteria (each forbidding the annihilation of the subject in one dimension):
- Teleological (time): preserve the possibility of continued generativity; do not produce a dead end.
- Ontological (agency): produce relationally, jointly, not unilaterally.
- Political-economic (value): do not exploit; do not convert one party’s contribution into the other’s surplus.
- Power: generate, with the power that production creates, the force that restrains its abuse.
Method — Seeking Common Ground While Preserving Difference (求同存异). The operative form of the dialectic of the general and the particular: seek the unity of the “we” always through the preservation of the two’s difference, never at its expense.
Applications. The just reproduction of suffering (§9.9); the ethics of aesthetic disagreement (§6.7); relational production within historical structure, the dialectical sublation (Aufhebung) of society, culture, and tradition in shared praxis (§6.8); and, in principle, every activity by which a “we” produces its common value.
§6.6 First application - the just reproduction of suffering
The reproduction of suffering (§9.9) is now seen as the first application of the general theory, and its four criteria as the four operative criteria of relational production specified to the case of pain. The teleological criterion requires that suffering be reproduced so as to preserve the relation’s generative future rather than freezing it into a sealed wound; the ontological, that suffering be reproduced jointly rather than by one party’s unilateral narrative; the political-economic, that neither party’s pain be converted into the other’s moral surplus; the power criterion, that the asymmetry suffering’s reproduction generates be accompanied by the restraint of its abuse. And over all four stands the keystone: the reproduction of suffering must not achieve the relation’s unity, its continuance, its healing, its shared story, by annihilating one of the two, whether by silencing the one whose pain is inconvenient, or by subordinating one wholly to the other’s wound, or by dissolving one party’s experience of the suffering into the other’s. The just reproduction of suffering is the reproduction that heals the relation while preserving both who are healed; and seeking-common-ground-while-preserving-difference is its method, the building of a shared account of the suffering that preserves the difference of the two who suffered it. What the earlier section stated as four criteria specific to suffering is thus revealed as the general ethics of relational production, applied to its hardest case.
§6.7 Second application - the ethics of aesthetic disagreement
The second application is new, and it is the one that most sharply tests the principle of subject-preservation, because it concerns a case in which the very value to be produced, a shared aesthetic judgement, seems to require the annihilation of a difference. The case is universal and daily: what the other finds beautiful, I cannot find beautiful. She is moved to stillness before the painting; I feel little. He weeps at the music; I am untouched. She says look, how beautiful, and I do not see it. The dialectic of the general and the particular guaranteed that this would happen, that two distinct sensibilities would diverge in their aesthetic judgements (§10.4), and the relational structure of aesthetic judgement (§9.4) made it a problem, for if the aesthetic judgement of a relational subject is completed in being shared, in the mutual look, then a judgement the other cannot share is a judgement whose completion is blocked: the look is offered and cannot be answered. How is the good to be practised here?
Two responses present themselves, and both, the principle of subject-preservation reveals, are corruptions, and corruptions of exactly the form the keystone forbids, the purchase of unity by the annihilation of a subject. The first is false communion: I pretend to find beautiful what I do not, feign the shared judgement, say yes, beautiful against my actual perception. This purchases the unity of the “we” by annihilating my truth, by eliminating my real aesthetic judgement in favour of a feigned agreement. It is the subject-annihilation of the self, and it is doubly corrupt: it violates the principle of subject-preservation (the unity is bought by the elimination of a subject, here myself), and it is a falsehood, a symbolic affirmation hollowed of its real ground, the very structure of inauthenticity the series has analysed as the retention of the symbolic form emptied of the real coupling (Paper XIII). False communion produces a counterfeit accord by annihilating the difference that the genuine accord would have had to preserve.
The second response is subtler, more tempting, and more insidious precisely because it wears the face of virtue: total empathy. Here I do not pretend; I genuinely strive to dissolve my own judgement into the other’s, to make myself find beautiful what they find beautiful, to overcome my divergent perception as though it were an error to be corrected, to achieve real communion by the real surrender of my own aesthetic judgement. This looks like the height of love, the complete giving-over of my perception to the beloved’s. But it, too, purchases unity by annihilating a subject, and this time the annihilation is the more complete for being sincere: I eliminate my own aesthetic judgement as a valid standpoint, treat my “I do not find this beautiful” as a defect to be overcome rather than a perception to be honoured, and so commit upon myself an epistemic injustice, the wrong done to one in their capacity as a knower, here the wrong of refusing one’s own aesthetic perception the standing of a valid judgement. And it is, in the terms of the dialectic, the homogenisation that the dynamical analysis showed to be catastrophic (§10.5): the dissolution of the particular into the general, which annihilates the diversity on which the relation’s continued generativity depends, and so, by the teleological criterion, fails. Total empathy is subject-annihilation disguised as devotion: it destroys the difference that the relation needs, commits epistemic injustice against the self, and because it removes one of the two divergent judgements whose tension is the relation’s aesthetic life, extinguishes the very generativity it meant to serve. The more sincerely it is pursued, the more thoroughly it annihilates; and the principle of subject-preservation forbids it as surely as it forbids the false communion, for both buy unity with a subject’s life.
The good practice lies between, and it is reached by seeking-common-ground-while-preserving-difference, which here takes a precise and beautiful form. The common ground is not sought at the level of the object, where it cannot honestly be had: I do not pretend, and I do not force myself, to find the painting beautiful. It is sought at a higher level, where it can be had without annihilating either subject: I find beautiful the other’s being-moved, not the painting, but her absorption before it; not the music, but his tears; not the object of her aesthetic judgement, but the living presence of her aesthetic life, the showing-forth of her particular sensibility in her being-moved. I do not find the painting beautiful, but I love to watch you looking at it. This is not a consolation prize or an evasion; it is the genuine resolution, and it honours every principle at once. It preserves the difference (I keep my own judgement of the object; I do not pretend or dissolve), honouring subject-preservation and committing no epistemic injustice against myself. It preserves the other’s judgement as theirs (I do not require her to justify her perception or bring it into line with mine), committing no epistemic injustice against her. And it genuinely achieves the common ground, a real shared accord, a real answering of the look, but at the meta-level: the relational subject reaches its aesthetic accord not in a shared judgement of the object but in each one’s appreciation of the other’s aesthetic life, a shared valuing of the very difference that divides their object-level judgements. The look she offers, which I could not answer at the level of the object, I answer at the level of the relation: I see you seeing it, and that I find beautiful. The aesthetic judgement is completed after all, not by my coming to share her judgement of the painting, but by my judgement of her judging, the enactive beauty (§12.2) of her sensibility in its exercise, which I can find beautiful without in the least pretending to find the painting so.
This is the ethics of aesthetic disagreement, and it is the second application of the theory of relational production: a case where the principle of subject-preservation forbids both the false unity of feigned agreement and the annihilating unity of total empathy, and where seeking-common-ground-while-preserving-difference finds the genuine accord at the meta-level of mutual appreciation, preserving both subjects and their difference while achieving a real and answering unity. It is, moreover, the practice that the series’ analysis of epistemic hospitality anticipated (Paper XIII): the making of room for the other’s aesthetic reality, including the parts of it one does not share, without either pretending to share them or demanding that the other surrender them. The deepest love, in matters of beauty, is not the achievement of identical taste; it is the cherishing of the other’s different taste as the showing of their irreplaceable particularity, the finding-beautiful of the very difference that one’s own taste cannot bridge. To love another’s way of finding the world beautiful, precisely where it is not one’s own, is to honour the principle of subject-preservation in the most intimate dimension of relational production, and to complete, at the level of the relation, the aesthetic judgement that could not be completed at the level of the object.
§6.8 Relational production within historical structure - dialectical sublation in shared praxis
The first two applications concerned relational production within the dyad, between the two who constitute the “we,” in the synchronic present of their relation. The third opens a dimension the first two did not touch, and it is different enough in kind to be marked not as one more application but as a distinct subtheme of the theory: the diachronic dimension, relational production as it takes place within an inherited historical structure. For the “we” is not an isolated system, and it is not a system without a past; it is embedded in a larger one, and that larger one precedes it, exceeds it, and presses upon it with the accumulated weight of history. Around every relation stand society, culture, and tradition, each bearing its own universal judgements, of what is fitting, proper, beautiful, owed, and these universal judgements are historical sediments rather than contemporary inventions, deposited by generations, bearing upon the “we” with a force that is often coercive, backed by the weight of custom, the pressure of family, the authority of the long-established. The dyad’s relational production therefore never takes place in a void; it takes place within a field of inherited universal judgements not its own, a historical structure that is at once the condition of its production (supplying the language, the forms, the very materials of value) and the constraint upon it (binding it with inherited norms and their coercive force). This is the situation Marx named in its general form: human beings make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, not under circumstances of their own choosing, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and inherited from the past. Relational production is making one’s own relation, but under inherited conditions; and the reconciliation of the “we” with the historical structure it is thrown into is the subject of this subtheme, relational production in history, governed, like all relational production, by the principle of subject-preservation, but facing the distinctive problem of how to produce freely within a structure one did not choose.
Two examples make the situation concrete, and the paper treats them lightly, as illustrations of a structure rather than as occasions for practical counsel. Consider the institution of bride-price or betrothal gifts (彩礼), which many traditions invest with an aesthetic and moral aura, rendering it a sign of seriousness, of respect, of the proper weight of a marriage, so that to refuse or reduce it can be made to appear not a choice but a failure of feeling. Consider filial piety (孝道), aestheticised and moralised across a great tradition as a beauty of human relation, a harmony of the generations, so that to depart from its received forms can be made to appear not a difference of judgement but an ugliness, an impiety. These are universal judgements of the social order, and they are, crucially, aestheticised, made to carry the force of the fitting and the beautiful, so that the social order enforces them not only as rules but as perceptions of beauty and propriety, in exactly the continuity of ethics and aesthetics the paper has analysed (§13), here operating as an instrument of social regulation. The “we” that judges differently, that does not find the prescribed bride-price a fitting expression of its love, that does not find the received forms of filial piety the true shape of its care, faces the universal judgement as a pressure to conform, an aesthetic-moral force urging it to surrender its own relational judgement to the social one.
The decisive move is to recognise that the universal judgement of society is itself a product of relational production, the sedimented outcome of countless relations, across many generations, producing and reproducing a shared value at the historical and collective scale. Tradition is not an alien force external to relational production; it is relational production at the scale of the collective and the historical, the accumulated reproduction of value by a vast “we” extended through time. This recognition brings the encounter of the dyad with the social judgement within the theory: it is the meeting of two relational productions at different scales, the micro-production of the dyad and the macro-production of the historical collective, and it is governed, like all relational production, by the principle of subject-preservation and its criteria.
That principle now reveals two opposite errors, exactly parallel to the errors of the second application, but at the larger scale. The first is capitulation: the “we” surrenders its own relational judgement entirely to the social one, adopts the prescribed forms against its own perception, dissolves its particular judgement into the universal because the tradition is powerful and conformity is easier. This is the annihilation of the dyadic subject by the larger system, the homogenisation, at macro scale, that §10.5 showed to be catastrophic: the “we” collapses into the great attractor of tradition, surrenders the particularity that is the condition of its generativity, and is, as a distinct relational subject, annihilated in the name of unity with the social order. The principle of subject-preservation forbids it: the “we” may not purchase its unity with society at the cost of annihilating itself. The second error is total opposition: the “we” rejects the social judgement wholesale, isolates itself from tradition, declares that it answers to nothing but itself. This appears to honour subject-preservation but in fact violates it in the other direction, for it commits the atomisation that §10.4 identified, severing the coupling to the larger system that is itself a genuine good, since tradition carries real sedimented wisdom and culture is a constitutive dimension of human life, and more gravely, it tends to annihilate the other in the form of those who bear the tradition: the parents, the elders, the community, whose aesthetic and moral world total opposition must dismiss as mere oppression. To reject the tradition wholesale is often to refuse the bearers of the tradition the epistemic hospitality the paper has required toward the third party (§5.4), to annihilate their world in the name of the dyad’s autonomy. Both errors buy a unity, with the social order, or of the defiant dyad, by annihilating a subject, and the principle of subject-preservation forbids both.
The good practice lies, once more, in seeking common ground while preserving difference (§6.4), and at this historical scale it takes its proper dialectical name: the sublation (Aufhebung) of the tradition, in shared praxis. The term is exact, and more exact than “critical reproduction,” because Aufhebung names precisely the threefold movement the situation requires, to negate, to preserve, and to raise, which neither capitulation (mere preservation, uncritical affirmation) nor total opposition (mere negation, abstract rejection) can perform, and which only the dialectical practice can. The “we” negates the tradition’s alienated form: it cancels the dead letter, refuses the prescribed bride-price as the measure of love, declines the received forms of filial piety as the true shape of care. It preserves the tradition’s living substance: it conserves the genuine value the form once carried, the real gravity of a marriage, the real love and responsibility owed between generations, rather than discarding it with the form. And it raises that preserved substance into a new form of its own production: it reproduces the substance in a shape the “we” genuinely finds fitting, elevating the inherited value into the dyad’s own living reproduction of it, where it lives again in a form the two can honestly affirm. Negation of the form, preservation of the substance, elevation into a new reproduction, this is the threefold movement of sublation, and it is exactly what the good practice toward tradition is. The distinction between the tradition’s form (the dead, congealed letter, the prescribed bride-price, the received rites) and its substance (the living value, the gravity, the love, the responsibility) is the distinction on which the sublation turns: the form is negated, the substance preserved and raised, in the manner the series has analysed as the difference between dead material and living labour (§4.4), the dead form of the tradition reanimated by the living labour of the dyad’s own reproduction.
And the sublation is accomplished not in thought but in shared praxis, this is the second part of its proper name, and it is essential. The dyad does not sublate its tradition by privately understanding it, criticising it in reflection, arriving intellectually at the right view of it; it sublates the tradition by actually living differently within it, by the concrete practice of how the marriage is actually made, how the parents are actually cared for, how the inherited forms are actually revised in the conduct of a shared life. The point is to change it rather than to interpret the tradition, and to change it in the only way a tradition is changed, by being lived otherwise, in practice, by those who inherit it. This is why the sublation is a matter of relational production and not of relational cognition: it is produced, made, enacted in the shared praxis of the two, and it is for that reason also necessarily joint (the ontological criterion, §6.3), accomplished by the “we” in its common life and not by either member’s private judgement of the tradition. The sublation of tradition is a praxis of the relational subject, and it is in this lived, joint, dialectical practice, negating the dead form, preserving and raising the living substance, in the actual conduct of a shared life, that the good reconciliation of the “we” with its historical structure consists. It is neither capitulation (the substance is reproduced in the dyad’s own judgement and praxis, not surrendered to the social form) nor opposition (the tradition’s real value is preserved and raised, its bearers met with hospitality, the coupling kept), but the dialectical sublation that preserves every subject: the dyad, the bearers of the tradition, and the living value of the tradition itself.
This dialectical sublation honours the criteria of relational production at the macro scale, and it closes on a teleological point that joins the dyad’s flourishing to the tradition’s own, and finally to the dynamics of history itself. The teleological criterion (§6.3) requires that relational production preserve the possibility of continued generativity, and sublation preserves it twice over, for it sustains not only the generativity of the dyad (which capitulation would extinguish by homogenisation) but the generativity of the tradition itself. A tradition that is only obeyed, reproduced in its dead forms without sublation, ossifies and dies, frozen at its received attractor, losing the living substance the forms once carried, exactly the solidification that §10.3 analysed. A tradition that is sublated, its substance preserved and raised, its forms negated and revised by the living praxis of the dyads that inherit it, stays alive, continues to generate, evolves rather than fossilising. The dyad that sublates its tradition is therefore, like the particular field whose divergence saves the coupled system from its dead attractor (§10.5), the micro-mechanism by which the tradition escapes its own ossification and continues to live: the particularity of the dyad’s sublating praxis is what allows the macro-tradition to evolve rather than freeze.
This last point opens onto a claim about history that the subtheme can state though not develop, and that marks its connection to historical materialism. If the sublation of a tradition is accomplished by the lived praxis of the dyads that inherit it, and if this lived praxis is the mechanism by which a tradition evolves rather than ossifies, then the historical evolution of traditions is itself driven, in part, by relational production at the micro scale, by the countless dyads who, sublating their inherited forms in the praxis of their shared lives, incrementally revise the macro-tradition they pass on. The great sediment of tradition is not changed only from above, by decree or upheaval; it is changed also, and continually, from below, by the accumulated sublations of innumerable relations living their inheritance otherwise. Relational production is, in this light, not merely conducted within history but is one of history’s own engines: the micro-praxis by which the inherited structure is, generation by generation, dyad by dyad, negated in its dead forms and renewed in its living substance, and so carried forward as a living rather than a dead inheritance. This is historical materialism at the scale of intimacy, the recognition that the historical structure which conditions relational production is itself, reciprocally, reproduced and transformed by that production, in the dialectic of inherited condition and living praxis that the eleventh thesis demands and the Eighteenth Brumaire describes. And it is generative justice at the scale of culture and of history: the value of a tradition returns to and is renewed by the living relations that reproduce it, rather than being extracted from them as mere conformity to a dead form, and the tradition lives precisely insofar as the relations that inherit it are free to sublate it. The good practice serves, at once, the generativity of the “we,” the generativity of the tradition, and the living evolution of history, and in doing so it honours the deepest demand of relational production, that the production of value preserve, rather than annihilate, every subject whose value it is: here the dyad, the bearers of the tradition, and the living tradition itself, none sacrificed to the unity of the others.
§7 The Construction of the Field - An Aesthetic, Not an Engineering, Problem
The field offers the occasion; what the two make of it is theirs. But the field itself can be made, and the question of how to make it, how to construct and inhabit a field in which the relation can come to presence, is the central practical question of this paper. It is here that the work descends from theory into practice, in fidelity to the dialectical-materialist commitment that has framed the series: the point is to know how to build one rather than only to interpret the field of travel, and to keep building one, in a life. This section poses the practical question and arrives, through a dialectic, at an unexpected answer: that the construction of the field is not, in the end, an engineering problem at all, but an aesthetic one. The answer reframes everything that follows, for it makes the aesthetic chapters (§11, §12) not an appendix to the practice but its foundation.
§7.1 Praxis - theory descending into practice
The commitment that governs this section should be made explicit, since it determines the section’s necessity. In the tradition of dialectical and historical materialism, theory is not complete in itself and then optionally applied; practice is the moment in which theory is realised and tested, and a theory that did not descend into practice would for that reason be deficient as theory. The eleventh of the theses on Feuerbach states the principle in its sharpest form: the point is to change it rather than only to interpret the world. Applied here, the principle requires that an account of the field of travel which stopped at understanding, which described the field, its features, its phenomenology, its political economy, and its ethics, but never asked how two people might actually build and sustain such a field, would be incomplete on its own terms. The preceding sections interpreted; this one and those that follow must turn to the changing, to the practice by which the understanding is realised in a life. And the first thing practice discovers, when it tries to build a field deliberately, is a paradox that nearly defeats it.
§7.2 The paradox of deliberate spontaneity
The features that constitute the field, above all contingency, but also suspension and the rest, have a character that resists deliberate production. Contingency is the quality of the undetermined; but the moment I decide to produce contingency, I have determined it, and what I have produced is no longer the undetermined but a determined imitation of it, a spontaneity that is scheduled and therefore not spontaneous. To resolve to “do something unplanned today” is already to have planned it; to set out to “be spontaneous” is to occupy oneself with a self-conscious project whose very self-consciousness forecloses the spontaneity it pursues. The same self-defeat afflicts the deliberate production of suspension and of the openness generally: an effort to bracket one’s roles by an act of will is itself a role one is performing, and the strenuous attempt to be open is a kind of closure, an anxious self-monitoring that fills with effort the very space it meant to empty.
This is the paradox of deliberate spontaneity, and it is the rock on which a naive practice founders. A couple who, having understood that contingency is generative, set out to manufacture contingencies, to insert unplanned adventures into the schedule, to make themselves be spontaneous on cue, produce not the field but a strained performance of it, and the performance is, if anything, further from the field than ordinary routine, because it is routine plus the additional burden of self-conscious effort. The harder one tries to produce the openness directly, the more determinedly one fills it with the trying. If the field is to be constructed at all, it cannot be by the direct production of its features, for its features are of a kind that direct production destroys. The construction must work otherwise.
§7.3 Intention on the boundary, not the content
The resolution is to recognise that intention can act at two different levels, and that it is generative at one and self-defeating at the other. Intention directed at the content of the field, at what happens within it, at the production of this contingency or that openness, is self-defeating, for the reasons just given: it determines what must remain undetermined. But intention directed at the boundary of the field, at the construction and protection of the bounded, emptied space within which the undetermined can then occur, is not self-defeating at all, and is in fact exactly what the construction of a field requires. One does not produce contingency; one constructs and guards a frame within which contingency is free to arise, and then one refrains from filling the frame. The intention builds the vessel’s walls and protects its emptiness; what happens in the emptiness is precisely what intention does not determine.
This is the key that unlocks the whole practice, and it can be stated as a principle: in the construction of the field, intention operates on the container, not on the contents. To make a field is to clear and bound a space, to frame off a stretch of time, to suspend a set of roles, to protect an emptiness from the everyday’s demand that it be filled, and then to leave the interior open, declining to determine what will occur within it. The literal journey illustrates the structure perfectly: in buying the ticket and taking the leave, one constructs a powerful frame (a bounded time, a suspension of roles, a removal to elsewhere) all at once, and within that frame one need not, and should not, determine the content, for the frame itself opens the space in which contingency, suspension, and the rest arise of their own accord. The mistake of the over-planner is precisely to carry intention past the boundary and into the content, booking not only the frame but every hour within it, until the emptiness the frame opened is filled back in and the field is closed. The construction of the field is the construction of a protected emptiness, intention lavished on the walls, withheld from the room.
§7.4 Controlled contingency - the dialectic
This yields a dialectical structure that deserves to be stated precisely, because it governs not only the construction of the field but, as the later sections will show, the whole relation between freedom and form that the paper is tracing. The structure is that of controlled contingency, and its two moments are a dialectical unity in which each makes the other possible rather than a compromise between control and openness.
Thesis — Controlled contingency. The generative field requires that its boundary be controlled and its content uncontrolled. The control of the boundary is not the enemy of the content’s openness but its condition: it is precisely because the frame is firmly held, bounded, safe, protected, that the interior can be released into a genuine and unanxious openness. A controlled boundary with an open interior is the structure of the generative field; and the two moments are dialectically united, the control of the one being what frees the other.
The unity is not a balance struck between two opposed quantities, as though one wanted “some” control and “some” openness and sought a midpoint. It is a relation of mutual constitution. A boundary that is firmly controlled, a time genuinely bounded, a space genuinely protected, a frame within which one is genuinely safe, is what permits the interior to be released without anxiety into the undetermined; one can let go of the content precisely because the container holds. Conversely, an interior that is genuinely open, left undetermined, not filled by intention, is what gives the controlled boundary its point, for a boundary that enclosed a fully determined content would enclose no field at all, merely a smaller everyday. The control and the openness are not in competition for a fixed quantity of the field; they are the two moments of one structure, the walls and the emptiness of one vessel, each of which is what it is only in relation to the other. This is the deep form of what the previous paper approached through the figure of the vessel and the water (Paper XX), and what the series’ treatment of the binding-but-unenforced vow approached through the form that holds without constraining (Paper XIII): a controlled form whose control is in the service of an interior freedom, the frame that liberates by bounding.
§7.5 The two failure poles
The dialectic of controlled contingency has, like every genuine dialectic, two characteristic ways of collapsing, and naming them gives the practice its discriminating power and saves it from being a mere slogan. The field can fail by too little control of the boundary, or by too much control extended into the content; and the two failures are opposite in form and equally destructive.
The first failure is the boundary too weak, the content uncontrolled to the point of chaos. Here there is openness without a holding frame: contingency unbounded by any protected space, a letting-go with nothing to hold the letting-go safe. This is its dangerous parody rather than the generative field, the throwing of oneself, or of the relation, into genuine uncontrol, the confusion of the generative undetermined with mere recklessness. A couple who mistake the field for the abandonment of all structure, who plunge into an unbounded contingency with no protected frame, do not generate the field; they generate danger, and the anxiety that danger brings forecloses the very openness they sought. Openness without a held boundary is exposure rather than freedom.
The second failure is the boundary too strong, the control extended into the content until the openness is foreclosed. This is the over-planner’s failure, and it is the more common in the anxious and the controlling: the frame is built and then filled, intention carried past the boundary until every hour within is determined and the emptiness the frame opened is packed back in. Here the result is the pseudo-field, a spontaneity entirely scheduled, an openness wholly determined, the performance of the field with none of its substance. The couple who plan every minute, who cannot leave an hour undetermined, who must control not only the frame but everything within it, have built a vessel and filled it solid; there is no emptiness left to be of use. This is the failure that produces the unnatural, effortful quality that the paradox of deliberate spontaneity first identified: the field manufactured as content rather than opened as a frame.
Between the two poles lies the generative field: the boundary controlled enough that the letting-go is safe, the content open enough that the undetermined is real. Controlled contingency lives in this narrow band, and the practice of constructing a field is the practice of finding and holding it, which brings the section to its central and reframing claim.
§7.6 Thesis One - construction is aesthetic, not engineering
What kind of capacity is it that finds and holds the narrow band of controlled contingency? It is tempting to think it an engineering capacity, a matter of getting the design right, of calculating the correct degree of control, of building the field to specification. The reframing claim of this section is that it is nothing of the kind. The judgement of how much to bound and how much to leave open, when to hold the frame and when to let the content run, how empty to keep the vessel and how much to shape it, this judgement is not calculable, not reducible to a rule or a specification, not an engineering matter at all. It is a matter of proportion, of measure, of a felt sense of the right amount, the right restraint, the right emptiness, and a felt sense of right proportion that cannot be reduced to a rule is exactly what we mean by an aesthetic sense.
Thesis One. The construction of the generative field is an aesthetic one rather than an engineering problem. What determines whether a field is well or badly made is a sense of proportion rather than the correctness of a design, measure, and restraint, of how much to bound and how much to leave open, how much to shape and how much to empty, that is irreducible to any rule and is, in its structure, an aesthetic judgement. Building a field well is more akin to composing a poem or a painting well than to solving an engineering problem: it is the exercise of taste, of measure, of a felt rightness that no procedure can supply.
The claim is not metaphorical. The “goodness” of a well-made field and the “goodness” of a well-made poem are goodnesses of the same kind: both consist in a rightness of proportion, of what is included and what is left out, what is determined and what is left open, how full and how empty, that is grasped by a reflective, holistic judgement rather than derived from a rule, in exactly the structure that the analysis of aesthetic judgement will later make precise (§12.3). A poem over-determined, with every space filled and nothing left to the reader, is a bad poem in the same way that a journey over-planned, with every hour filled and nothing left to contingency, is a badly made field; and the capacity to feel that the poem needs more air, that the journey needs more emptiness, is one capacity, an aesthetic capacity, in both cases. This is why the aesthetic chapters that follow are not an ornament upon the practice but its foundation: if the construction of the field is an aesthetic matter, then learning to construct fields is, at bottom, an aesthetic education, and the perception that knows how empty to keep the vessel is an aesthetic perception. The practice of building the conditions for a relation to come to presence turns out to require, before any technique, the cultivation of taste.
There is, finally, a virtue specific to this aesthetic practice, and it is the hardest of all: the virtue of letting go of the content once the boundary is held. Having built and protected the frame, one must release the interior, must refrain from the anxious impulse to control what happens within it, to make the journey “meaningful,” to ensure the evening “goes well,” to direct the emptiness toward a determined end. This releasing is difficult because the impulse to control the content is strong, especially in those who care most; the lover most anxious that the journey go well is the most tempted to plan it solid, and so to foreclose the very openness in which the good they want could arise. The virtue of letting go is the aesthetic virtue of trusting the emptiness, of building the vessel and then leaving it empty enough to be of use, declining to fill the room one has gone to such trouble to clear. It is, in the spatial and temporal register, the same restraint that the aesthetic sense exercises throughout: the knowing of when to stop, when to leave open, when what is not there will give more use than anything one could put there. And it is the bridge to the next question, which is no longer how to construct the field but how to perceive what arises within it, how, in the emptiness one has had the taste to keep, to catch what comes.
§8 Creation and Co-Creation - The Unity of Aesthetics and Production
The previous section argued that the construction of the field is an aesthetic and not an engineering problem, and in doing so it used a word, “construction”, that must now be examined and replaced, for it carries an engineering residue the argument has been straining against. To build, to construct, suggests a making from a plan: the prior design, the executed assembly, the poiesis that brings forth according to a blueprint. But what the field’s maker does is not this. It is closer to what an artist does than to what a builder does, and the proper word for it is creation rather than construction, the bringing-into-being of something that did not exist and was not specified in advance, the opening of a world rather than the assembly of a structure. And once the word is corrected, a concept enters that the paper, having reduced travel to a field and the field to an aesthetic matter, can no longer avoid: for the central act of the aesthetic is creation, and a philosophy that has made the aesthetic its centre must give an account of what creation is. This section gives that account, and the account has a consequence that reorganises the whole paper: under the relational ontology, creation is co-creation, and co-creation is the same activity the paper has called, in its political economy, relational production. The aesthetic concept (creation) and the political-economic concept (production) are revealed as one, and their unity is the keystone that joins the paper’s two great lines.
§8.1 From construction to creation
The reasons for preferring “creation” to “construction” are not merely terminological; they track a real difference in the kind of act involved. Construction, in its proper sense, is the realisation of a design: one knows what is to be built, and builds it; the end precedes the making as a plan precedes its execution, and the maker’s skill is the faithful translation of the plan into the thing. This is exactly the engineering model the previous section rejected (§7.2): if the field were constructed, it would be specified in advance and assembled to specification, and the contingency, spontaneity, and openness that the field requires would be designed out of it. Creation is the other thing. To create is to bring forth what was not specified in advance, to open a space in which something genuinely new can appear, something the creator did not and could not fully foresee, since if it were foreseen in full it would be executed rather than created. The artist does not execute the poem from a complete prior specification of it; the poem comes to be in the making, its final form discovered rather than implemented, the creation being precisely the bringing-forth of what exceeds any prior plan. This is why the construction of the field is better called its creation: what the field’s maker does is open a space in which a genuinely new relational reality, the lived “we” of the journey, with all its unforeseen contingency, can come to be, and this opening of space for the unforeseen is creation, not construction.
The correction matters because it brings the field’s making under the concept that the aesthetic tradition has most deeply theorised. The making of beauty is creation: the work of art is created, not constructed; and if the construction of the field is an aesthetic matter, then it is a matter of creation, and the field’s maker is, in the relevant sense, an artist, one who creates a space for beauty rather than one who builds a structure to specification. Everything the paper has said about the field’s making being aesthetic (§7) is thus gathered into the single claim that the field is created; and the philosophy of beauty, which the next sections develop, is therefore also, at its root, a philosophy of creation, for the beautiful is the created, and the question of beauty is inseparable from the question of how the beautiful comes to be.
§8.2 Under the relational ontology, creation is co-creation
The concept of creation enters the paper already inflected by the tradition that theorised it, and that tradition’s default must be confronted, for it is at odds with everything the paper has established. The Western theory of creation is, characteristically, a theory of the single creator. The paradigm is the solitary artist: the genius who, in Kant’s account, is the one through whom nature gives the rule to art, the singular individual whose originality is the source of the new; the Romantic creative imagination, the lone author from whom the work issues. Creation, on this paradigm, is the act of one subject who, facing the material, brings forth from within (or from the muse, or the unconscious) an object that did not exist. It is solitary: the creator confronts the world and produces the work, and the work is the creator’s.
But under the relational ontology this paradigm is, if not simply false, then derivative, a special and impoverished case of something whose full form is relational. For if the subject is itself relational, constituted in and by relation (§9.4), then creation, as an act of the subject, is no more originally solitary than judgement or perception were. Just as the paper showed that aesthetic judgement is originally relational, completed in the shared “look” and merely truncated in the solitary aesthete (§9.4), so creation is originally co-creation, the joint bringing-forth by a relational subject, and merely truncated in the solitary creator. The solitary artist is not the paradigm of creation from which joint creation is a derivative complication; the solitary artist is the deficient case, creation arrested at one pole of a relation, and the full form of creation is the co-creation in which two (or more) bring forth together what neither could bring forth alone. This is not a romantic exaggeration of collaboration but a consequence of the relational ontology: if the creating subject is relational, then creation is the act of a relational subject, which is to say it is co-creation, and the lone genius is the limiting case in which the relational structure of creation has been narrowed to a single pole.
The field of travel makes this vivid, for the field is unmistakably co-created (§2.1): it is not created by one traveller for the other, as an artist makes a work for an audience, but brought forth by the two together, each contributing to the opening of a space that becomes the “we”‘s and neither’s alone. The journey co-imagined before departure, the field co-opened in the travelling, the experience co-generated in the living, all are co-creation, the joint bringing-forth of a relational reality by the relational subject whose reality it is. And what is vivid in travel is, the paper claims, the truth of creation as such: creation is co-creation, the bringing-forth of the new by a relational subject, of which the solitary artist’s making is the narrowed, single-poled case. The deepest creation, as the deepest aesthetic judgement, the deepest love, is the one conducted together.
§8.3 Co-creation is relational production - the unity of the two lines
The recognition that creation is co-creation yields the section’s central result, which is one of the most important in the paper: that co-creation, the aesthetic concept, and relational production, the political-economic concept, are the same activity under two names. The paper has run, throughout, on two parallel lines. One is aesthetic: the creation of the field, the perception of beauty, the making of the beautiful. The other is political-economic: the production of experience, the reproduction of relational wealth, the generation of value by the “we” (§4, §6). These have seemed distinct vocabularies for distinct aspects. They are not. Co-creation and relational production name one activity, the bringing-forth of the new by a relational subject, seen from two sides.
Seen from the aesthetic side, the activity is co-creation: two relational subjects bringing forth together something that did not exist, a field, an experience, a meaning, a beauty. Seen from the political-economic side, the same activity is relational production: a relational subject generating and reproducing the value proper to the relation. The aesthetic emphasis falls on the novelty, the bringing-forth of what did not exist, the creative opening; the political-economic emphasis falls on the value generated, its reproduction and circulation, its justice. But the activity is one: in both, a relational subject brings forth, together, what neither member could bring forth alone, and what it brings forth is at once a new thing (the aesthetic accent) and a value (the political-economic accent). This is why the paper’s two lines have converged again and again, why the reproduction of experience turned out to be the evolution of aesthetic judgement (§10), why the good cycle of value and the good cycle of beauty were the same cycle: because the aesthetic and the political-economic were never two activities but one, co-creation and relational production being two names for the bringing-forth of the new and valuable by a relational subject.
This unity is anchored in the deepest stratum of the materialist tradition, which the paper here makes explicit. For Marx, production was never merely economic: in its root sense it is the human being’s objectification of itself in a world it creates, the activity by which the human, as a “species-being,” produces an objective world and in producing it produces itself, creates its own life and its own nature through the creative transformation of the material world. Production, in this foundational sense, is creation, the creative objectification of the human in a world of its own making, and the later, narrower, economic sense of production is a specification of this creative root. So the convergence of creation and production is not the forcing-together of two alien concepts; it is the recovery of their original unity, which the materialist tradition had grasped at its foundation: production is the materialist and social name for creation, and creation is the aesthetic name for production, and both name the bringing-forth by which a subject objectifies itself in a world. Under the relational ontology, where the subject is relational, this bringing-forth is co-creation is relational production: the relational subject objectifies itself in the world it brings forth together, creating, in creating its shared world, itself as a “we.” The two lines of the paper are one line, and creation is the name of their unity.
A nuance preserves the accents while affirming the unity. Creation and production are the same activity, but the words carry different emphases worth keeping: “creation” foregrounds the bringing-forth of the genuinely new, the unforeseen, the opening of what did not exist; “production” foregrounds the generation and reproduction of value, its circulation and justice. The same act of a relational subject is creation under the first emphasis and production under the second, and the paper will use whichever word foregrounds the aspect in view, but the reader should hold that they name one activity, the relational subject’s joint bringing-forth, which is at once creative (it makes the new) and productive (it generates value), aesthetic (it makes beauty) and political-economic (it makes wealth). It is on this unified concept, co-creation as relational production, the bringing-forth of the new and valuable by a relational subject, that the ethics of creation now builds.
§8.4 The ethics of creation - co-created works and the question of destruction
If creation is co-creation and co-creation is relational production, then the ethics of creation falls under the ethics of relational production already established (§6), but it adds something the earlier treatment did not make explicit: that relational production has a negative as well as a positive moment. The positive moment is creation, the bringing-forth of the new; the negative moment is destruction, the unmaking of what was brought forth. The ethics of relational production must govern both, and the question of destruction, of when, and by whom, a created thing may rightly be destroyed, is the sharp test of the whole framework, for it is where the principle of subject-preservation is most concretely at stake.
The question has a familiar answer under the solitary paradigm of creation, and the answer is wrong here for an instructive reason. Under the solitary paradigm, the creator owns the creation and may destroy it: Kafka may will his manuscripts burned; the painter may slash the canvas; the maker, having made, may unmake, for the work is the maker’s and the maker’s alone. This treats creation on the model of production-as-possession: I made it, therefore I own it, therefore I may destroy it. And for genuinely solitary creation the intuition has some force. But the works of relational production are not solitary creations; they are co-created, and for a co-created thing the destruction-right dissolves. Consider the sharp and ordinary case: in a relationship, in a fit of anger, one partner deletes the shared photographs, the images of a shared life, co-created, the very wealth of the “we” (§4). The act is a wrong, and the framework says precisely why. The photographs are the co-created wealth of the relational subject rather than one partner’s possession; to destroy them unilaterally is to annihilate, single-handedly, a creation of the “we,” rather than to dispose of one’s own creation. It violates every criterion of relational production at once: the ontological (it is unilateral, where what belongs to the “we” may be unmade only by the “we”, destruction, the negative of reproduction, must like reproduction be joint); the teleological (it forecloses the future in which that shared experience might have been reproduced, deepened, transfigured, slamming shut a path of the relation’s continued generativity); the political-economic and the power criterion together (in anger, the destruction is wielded as a weapon, the shared wealth converted into an instrument of harm and domination). And over all of these stands the keystone (§6.2): the unilateral destruction of a co-created thing annihilates the other’s part in it, the other’s memory, investment, presence in the shared creation, and so purchases one partner’s momentary unity-with-their-rage at the cost of annihilating the other’s share in the “we.” There is, the framework concludes, no unilateral right to destroy a co-created thing; destruction, like creation, must be relational, conducted by the “we” whose creation it is, on pain of violating the principle of subject-preservation.
Three tensions must be addressed, for the matter is not as simple as a flat prohibition. The first: what if the partners contributed unequally, if the photographs were mostly one partner’s making, cherished by one and ignored by the other? This grants no unilateral destruction-right, and the reason discloses something deep about relational production: the value of a co-created thing does not belong to the partners severally, in proportion to their contributions, but to the “we” as such, for to parcel out the relation’s wealth by individual contribution is already to dissolve the relational subject into two calculating individuals, which is itself the corruption the theory forbids (§6.1). Unequal contribution does not convert co-created wealth into private property; it remains the “we”‘s, and unmakeable only by the “we.” The second tension: the Kafka case, of genuinely solitary creation. Here the framework gives a graded rather than an absolute answer. Even “one’s own” creation is rarely purely solitary under the relational ontology, for it stands in relation to others, readers, inheritors, the culture it enters (§6.8), and once it has entered those relations it is no longer purely private to destroy. But this relational claim on a solitary creation is weaker than the claim a co-created thing carries: the destruction of a purely personal creation is a tension between a real (if not absolute) personal right of disposal and a responsibility to the relations the creation has entered, whereas the destruction of a co-created thing is a clear prohibition, no unilateral right existing at all. The framework yields a gradient: the more a creation is co-created, or has entered into relations, the weaker any unilateral right to destroy it; the more purely solitary and unentered, the stronger the personal right of disposal, but since purely solitary, unentered creation is a limiting case that the relational ontology makes nearly empty, an absolute unilateral destruction-right is nearly never established. The third tension: destruction is not always a wrong, for destruction can itself be creative, the artist who paints over a failed canvas to free the next, the Daoist diminishing (为道日损), the clearing-away that makes room for new growth, even in a relationship the letting-go of what must be released to begin again. The framework distinguishes good from bad destruction by the same criteria: good destruction preserves the possibility of continued generativity (it unmakes in order that something new may be made), is joint where the destroyed thing is co-created, and is neither exploitative nor wielded as domination; bad destruction forecloses generativity (it ends rather than renews), is unilateral over a co-created thing, and is wielded as a weapon. Destruction as such is not the wrong; the wrong is the unilateral, generativity-foreclosing, weaponised destruction of a co-created thing. The deletion in anger is wrong on every count; the mutual decision to let some painful relic go, freeing the relation for new creation, may be entirely good. The criteria discriminate, as throughout, not by the act’s surface but by whether it preserves or annihilates the relational subject and its generativity.
The ethics of creation is therefore symmetrical, governing a positive moment (co-creation, the bringing-forth of the new) and a negative moment (destruction, the unmaking of what was brought forth), and the principle of subject-preservation reigns over both: as the relation may not create its unity by annihilating a subject, so it may not destroy a co-creation by the unilateral act of one, for the unmaking of what the “we” made, like its making, belongs to the “we.” Destruction, like creation, is relational; and the lone hand that unmakes the shared work has, in the unmaking, annihilated the other’s share in it.
§8.5 Creation, the public sphere, and the limit of the theory
There is a further case that presses beyond the relational frame, and it must be met not by extending the theory to cover it but by marking, honestly, where the theory ends. A created work does not only enter into particular relations; it may enter the public sphere, may become public culture, and once it has, it belongs no longer to its author alone, nor, the paper must concede, to any determinate “we” at all. Kafka’s manuscripts, once they have become The Castle, once they are world literature, are no longer his to burn without remainder, for a public has a claim on them; but the public that has this claim is not a relation, not a particular “we” of nameable others, but an anonymous, indefinite, open-ended domain, including readers not yet born, a “public” that is precisely not a relational subject. This case raises, in an acute form, a question about the reach of the theory of relational production, and the question must be faced directly, for there is a temptation to which the theory must not yield.
The temptation is to interpret the public sphere as a relational domain, to say that the public is simply a larger “we,” that public culture is a vast co-creation, and so to bring the public sphere under the theory of relational production whole. This would be a mistake, and naming it is important, for it is the characteristic over-reach of a successful theory: the imperialism by which a concept that illuminates one domain claims to illuminate all. The public sphere is not a magnified relation, and to interpret it as one would diminish rather than extend the analysis, for it would erase exactly the features that constitute the public sphere as public. The public sphere is anonymous where relation is particular: it is addressed to indefinite, unnameable others, including the unborn, not to the specific other of a relation. It is non-reciprocal where relation is mutual: one may owe something to posterity, but posterity cannot answer, and the reciprocal structure of the relational subject (§9.4), the mutual “look,” has no purchase on a public that cannot look back. It is institutional and durable where relation is intimate: the public realm has its own logic of appearance, permanence, and the common world, its own institutions of law, heritage, and publicity, which are not the logic of intimate relation enlarged. And it is the contested field of political economy (§14), traversed by power and capital in ways that are not reducible to the good and bad cycles of relational subjects. To treat the public sphere as a big relation would abolish all of this, would shrink the public to the intimate, the anonymous to the particular, the non-reciprocal to the mutual, and so would not enlarge the theory’s explanatory reach but contract its object, dissolving the public sphere’s own reality into a relational image that misses what is essential to it.
The right course is therefore to mark a limit, and in marking it to say precisely what the theory of relational production does and does not explain about a work that has entered the public. What it explains is the work’s persisting relational-productive dimension: even in the public sphere, the work remains a created thing, a product of co-creation or solitary creation, bearing relational value, and its destruction still touches the question of subject-preservation insofar as it remains anyone’s creation. This dimension the theory illuminates, and it does not vanish when the work goes public; a co-created work that enters public culture still carries the prohibition on its unilateral destruction by one of its co-creators, now reinforced by the public’s claim. But the public sphere as public, its anonymity, its non-reciprocity, its institutionality, its distinctive politics, its mode of belonging to the unborn, is not explained by the theory of relational production and must not be pretended to be. It belongs to other theories: to the theory of the public sphere and the space of appearance, to the theory of cultural heritage and the commons, to a theory of intergenerational justice, to the political economy the paper has only touched (§14). The relation between the relational-productive dimension of a work and its public dimension, the way a created thing is at once the product of a relational subject and a member of a public world, lying in the overlap of two domains governed by different logics, is a real and important problem, but it is one the theory of relational production opens rather than closes.
This honest marking of the limit is a condition of its rigour rather than a weakness of the theory, and it is worth stating as a principle of method. A theory that knew no limit, that claimed to explain the public sphere and the intimate relation and all between by the single logic of relational production, would for that very reason explain none of them well, for it would have dissolved the differences that make each what it is. The power of the theory of relational production in its own domain, the domain of the particular relation, the “we” of nameable others, the co-creation and reproduction of shared value, depends on its not being stretched to a domain with a different logic. The theory illuminates the relational, and the relational dimension of what enters the public; it reaches its limit where the public sphere’s own, non-relational features begin, and it points, there, beyond itself. The full ethics of a work’s life in the public sphere, the overlap and the difference of the relational-productive and the public, the destruction and preservation of public creations, the claims of the anonymous and the unborn, is accordingly named here not as a result but as a directed opening (§16.3), a problem the theory of relational production frames and hands on to a theory of the public it does not itself contain. To know this limit is to know what relational production is, and what it is not, which is the beginning of using it well.
§9 The Core Problems of the Classical Philosophy of Beauty
The argument has reached the aesthetic, and before it can build upon the beautiful it must reckon with what philosophy has discovered about the beautiful, not borrow the conclusions of aesthetics as convenient supports, as the foregoing has so far done, but enter the discipline’s own constitutive problems and take a position within them. For the claims this paper will rest on beauty, that the construction of the field is aesthetic, that the perception of contingency is aesthetic, that ethical judgement at its limit is aesthetic, presuppose answers to questions the philosophy of beauty has debated for two and a half millennia without consensus: what beauty is, whether it is objective or subjective, how it relates to the sublime, what its metaphysical standing is. This section confronts these questions directly. Its centre of gravity is the second of them, the antinomy of the subjectivity and objectivity of aesthetic judgement, to which the paper offers a two-stage resolution, drawn from the registers of Lacanian theory and from the relational ontology of this series, that is the keystone not only of this section but of the paper’s entire aesthetics. The section then treats the sublime, the metaphysics of beauty, and the parallel and equally deep tradition of East Asian aesthetics, which it takes not as an appendix to the Western discussion but as an independent pillar.
§9.1 The problem of definition - the Hippias Major
The philosophy of beauty begins, in the West, with a failure, and the failure is instructive enough to be worth reconstructing in full. In Plato’s Hippias Major, Socrates presses the sophist Hippias to say not what is beautiful but what the beautiful itself is, the auto to kalon, that by which all beautiful things are beautiful. Hippias, confident and fluent, offers a succession of answers, and the dialogue is the methodical demolition of each. His first answer is a category mistake dressed as an answer: the beautiful is a beautiful maiden. Socrates corrects the form of the question, he asked not for an instance but for the eidos, the form by which maiden and lyre and pot and just law are all alike beautiful, and Hippias, grasping the demand for something common, offers gold: the beautiful is what, added to anything, makes it appear beautiful. But gold does not beautify the appropriate fig-wood spoon that stirs the pot better than a golden one would, and so the answer yields to a deeper one that seems to capture what gold was reaching for: the beautiful is the appropriate, to prepon, that which is fitting to its thing. This is the answer that comes nearest, and its failure is the most illuminating moment of the dialogue. For Socrates asks whether the appropriate is what makes things beautiful or only what makes them appear so, and the question splits the answer: if the appropriate is what makes things beautiful, then since the fitting and the genuinely beautiful sometimes diverge it cannot be beauty itself; if it is only what makes them appear beautiful, then it is the principle of beautiful seeming, not of beauty. The appropriate captures something essential, the paper will return to it, for to prepon, the fitting, is precisely the structure that the later identification of aesthetic and practical judgement will exploit (§12.3), but it cannot, Socrates shows, be the definition of beauty, because it hovers undecidably between being and seeming.
Two further answers fall in turn. The beautiful is the useful, to chrēsimon, but the useful is the useful for some end, and what is useful for a bad end serves to produce evil, so that beauty would be the cause of evil, which is absurd; the useful collapses into the beneficial, and the beneficial, being the cause of good, would make beauty the cause of good and so distinct from the good as cause from effect, which offends the deep intuition that the beautiful and the good are not so cleanly separable. The last and most modern answer is that the beautiful is what pleases through the senses of sight and hearing, the aesthetic in the narrow sense, beauty as a species of pleasure. But this founders too: why these two senses and not the pleasures of taste or touch, which are also pleasures? And what is the common character by which the pleasures of sight and the pleasures of hearing are both beautiful pleasures, when sight and hearing have nothing perceptual in common, a common character that would be the very thing sought, beauty itself, now presupposed rather than defined? The dialogue ends with every answer destroyed and none to replace it, and Socrates offering, in place of a definition, the proverb that the paper has taken as one of its epigraphs: χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά, beautiful things are difficult.
The aporia is a discovery about the object rather than a failure of the interlocutors, and the discovery is the starting point of everything that follows. Beauty resists definition, resists capture by a specifying formula, a rule, a property-list, and it resists in a particular way: every proposed definition either is too narrow (gold, the senses of sight and hearing), or collapses into a neighbouring concept (the useful into the good, the appropriate into mere seeming), or presupposes the very beauty it would define (the common character of beautiful pleasures). This triple pattern of failure is the signature of something that is not a property specifiable by a concept at all. The Hippias Major is the first and still the clearest demonstration that beauty is not the kind of thing a definition can capture, which is exactly the claim that the paper’s thesis of un-programmability requires (§12.8), here established not by assertion but by the exhaustive failure of the attempt. The beautiful is difficult because it is not a concept; and that it is not a concept is the first thing the philosophy of beauty learned.
§9.2 The antinomy of taste - the subjective and the objective
If beauty is not a definable property, where does it reside? Here the philosophy of beauty meets its deepest and most persistent problem, the one on which this paper must take a position because its whole aesthetics depends on the answer. The problem is the antinomy of taste, and it can be stated as a collision of two equally compelling intuitions.
The first intuition is that beauty is objective, that it is in the object, a real feature of the beautiful thing, such that one who fails to find the sunset or the symphony beautiful has missed something that is there. This intuition is why we argue about beauty, why we say someone has poor taste, why we hold that some judgements of beauty are better than others; none of this would make sense if beauty were merely a private reaction, for there is no arguing about, and no improving, a mere reaction. The second intuition is that beauty is subjective, that it exists only in the response of the perceiver, that the beauty of the thing is nothing apart from the pleasure it occasions, so that to call a thing beautiful is to report an effect it has on me, and de gustibus non est disputandum, there is no disputing taste. This intuition is why beauty cannot be proved, why no demonstration compels aesthetic assent, why one cannot argue a person into finding beautiful what leaves them cold; beauty lives in the response, and responses cannot be commanded.
Each intuition is compelling and each refutes the other, and the history of aesthetics is in large part the history of attempts to hold both. Hume, pressing the subjective horn, located beauty in sentiment, “beauty is no quality in things themselves; it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them”, yet could not rest there, for he saw that some critics are better than others, and so was driven to seek a standard of taste in the joint verdict of qualified judges, the true critics whose refined and practised sentiment sets the norm. But this is unstable: if beauty is mere sentiment, why should one sentiment be more authoritative than another? Hume’s standard smuggles back an objectivity his premise denied. Kant gave the antinomy its canonical and most penetrating formulation. The judgement of taste, he saw, makes a peculiar and seemingly impossible claim: it is grounded in a feeling of pleasure, and so is subjective, it asserts no property of the object, applies no concept, proves nothing, and yet it claims universal validity, demanding the assent of all, speaking with a “universal voice,” as though the beauty it feels were binding on everyone. This is the antinomy in its exact form: the judgement of taste is subjective (it rests on feeling, not concept) yet claims universality (it demands agreement), and these seem flatly to contradict. Kant’s resolution was to argue that the judgement of taste, while based on no determinate concept, rests on the free harmony of the cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding in free play, which, being the same in all rational beings, grounds a subjective universality: the judgement is universal because it expresses, rather than because it tracks an objective property, a free harmony of the faculties that all share, communicated through a sensus communis, a common sense or shared sensibility presupposed as the condition of taste’s communicability. This is the most penetrating answer the subject-centred tradition produced, and it is also where that tradition reached its limit, for the sensus communis is precisely what Kant could not derive but had only to presuppose, a shared sensibility posited as the condition of the universality of taste, but left as a postulate, a common sense assumed because without it the universal voice of taste would be inexplicable. The antinomy is less resolved than relocated into a presupposition: given a sensus communis, subjective universality is possible; but the sensus communis itself, the sharedness that would ground the demand for agreement, remains a posit the subject-centred framework cannot ground.
This is the impasse the paper inherits, and the place where its own resources allow it to move. The antinomy and Kant’s near-resolution both operate within an assumption so deep it is rarely noticed: that aesthetic judgement is the judgement of one subject about one object, so that beauty must lie either in the object (objectivism), or in the subject (subjectivism), or in some faculty-structure of the single subject that all subjects happen to share (Kant’s subjective universality, requiring the posited sensus communis to bridge from the one to the all). The paper’s resolution proceeds by questioning this assumption at two levels, first the structure of the aesthetic experience, then the structure of the judging subject, and it is to these two stages that the argument now turns. They are the keystone of the paper’s aesthetics.
§9.3 First stage of the resolution - aesthetic judgement across the three registers
The first stage dissolves the bare opposition of subjective and objective by showing that it is too crude, that the terms “subjective” and “objective” each conflate distinct moments of the aesthetic experience that a finer analysis separates. The finer analysis the paper employs is the Lacanian distinction of three registers, the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary, which this series has used throughout and which here proves to be exactly the instrument the antinomy requires. The claim is that a complete aesthetic judgement is less a relation between a subject-pole and an object-pole than a reconciliation across all three registers, and that the apparent antinomy of subjective and objective arises from collapsing this three-fold structure into a two-fold one.
Consider what is present in a full experience of beauty, the wildflower caught at the roadside, the vista that stops the traveller. There is, first, a moment that resists all capture: the sheer thereness of the thing, its singular presence, the surplus in it that no description exhausts and no concept subsumes, that which remains when everything sayable about it has been said. This is the register of the Real: the beautiful thing’s irreducible, unsymbolisable core, the “it” that is there before and beneath all that can be said of it. The objectivist intuition, that beauty is in the thing, that one who misses it has missed something real, is the truth of this register: there is something in the object, but it is no specifiable property (which the Hippias Major refuted); it is the Real surplus, the unsymbolisable thereness, which is exactly why objectivism is both right (there is something in the thing) and unable to say what it is (the Real cannot be symbolised). The objectivist feels the Real of the beautiful object and mistakes it for an objective property.
There is, second, a moment of address and demand: the experience of beauty reaches beyond itself, asks to be communicated, claims a validity that would bind others, speaks, in Kant’s phrase, with a universal voice. This is the register of the Symbolic: the dimension in which the beautiful is taken up into the order of the shareable, the communicable, the inter-subjectively valid, the dimension that demands “you too must see this.” Kant’s “subjective universality,” the claim to universal assent, is the operation of the Symbolic register in the aesthetic: the demand that the experience be ratified in the order of shared meaning, that it be more than private, that it bind. The Symbolic is the register of the sensus communis; as the second stage will show, it is the dimension of the shareable as such, in place of a mysterious posit.
There is, third, a moment of captivation and pleasure: the experience of being caught, drawn, held; the pleasure the beautiful affords; the absorbed fascination in which the perceiver is bound to the object in a relation of attraction. This is the register of the Imaginary: the dimension of the captivating image, the specular fascination, the pleasurable investment in which the perceiver is held. The subjectivist intuition, that beauty is a pleasure, an effect in the perceiver, is the truth of this register: there is pleasure, there is captivation, beauty does live in part in the perceiver’s investment; but this Imaginary captivation is one moment of the experience, not its whole, and the subjectivist errs by taking the part for the whole, the Imaginary pleasure for the entirety of beauty.
The resolution of the first stage is now visible. The antinomy of subjective and objective is the collapse of a three-register structure into two poles: the “objective” pole crushes together the Real surplus of the thing (which is genuinely there) with the false notion of a specifiable property (which is not); the “subjective” pole crushes together the Imaginary captivation (which is genuinely in the perceiver) with the whole of beauty (which it is not). A full aesthetic experience is neither simply subjective nor simply objective; it is the reconciliation of all three registers at once, the Real surplus of the thing, taken up into the Symbolic demand for shared validity, through the Imaginary investment of the captivated perceiver. Beauty is what happens when these three are reconciled: when the unsymbolisable thereness of the thing (Real) is invested with captivated pleasure (Imaginary) and raised into the claim to be shared (Symbolic). The antinomy dissolves because its two terms were never the right two terms; there were always three registers, and “subjective” and “objective” were crude names that each fused a genuine register with a false addition. And this is why beauty is difficult, χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά, in a sense now made precise: it requires the reconciliation of three registers that are, by their nature, in tension and never perfectly reconcilable, so that the achieved beauty is always a fragile and momentary accord among registers that pull apart. The difficulty of the beautiful is the difficulty of three-register reconciliation.
§9.4 Second stage of the resolution - the relational subject and the dissolution of the antinomy
The first stage refined the structure of the aesthetic experience; the second refines the structure of the judging subject, and it is here that the antinomy is shown never to have been a genuine problem at all rather than merely dissolved, an artefact of a false premise about who judges. For the three-register analysis, powerful as it is, could still be misread as occurring within a single isolated subject: one subject in whom Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary are reconciled. The deepest difficulty, Kant’s, would then remain: how can a judgement grounded in my reconciliation demand your assent? Why should the accord of registers in me bind you? The sensus communis would still be needed, as the posited bridge from my reconciliation to its universal validity, and still be ungrounded.
The second stage removes the difficulty by removing its premise. The premise is that the judging subject is a single, self-standing individual, prior to others, who must then somehow reach beyond itself to claim universality. But this premise is exactly what the relational ontology of this series denies. The subject is not a self-standing individual prior to relation; it is a relational subject, constituted in and by relation, internally constituted by its orientation toward others. And for such a subject, the demand for shared validity that so puzzled Kant, the “universal voice,” the claim that you too must see, is not a mysterious leap from a private judgement to a universal claim, requiring a posited common sense to bridge it. It is the native structure of the subject’s judging as such. A relational subject, being constituted by its orientation toward others, does not first judge privately and then face the problem of how to demand agreement; its judging is, from the first, oriented toward the other, intrinsically addressed, already a judging-with. The “subjective universality” that Kant could establish only by positing a sensus communis is, for a relational subject, simply what subjective judgement is: the judgement of a subject that is internally relational is intrinsically a claim upon the other, because the subject that judges is intrinsically oriented toward the other. There is no gap to bridge, because the subject was never the isolated monad across whose boundary the demand for assent had to leap. The sensus communis is not a posit added to the subject; it is the subject’s own relational constitution, seen from the side of taste. Kant’s antinomy was the artefact of an individualist premise; on a relational ontology, the universality of the aesthetic judgement is a corollary of what the judging subject is rather than a puzzle.
This is the keystone, and its consequences run through the whole paper. It means that aesthetic judgement is, in its very structure, relational and shared, not a private response that then faces the problem of communication, but an intrinsically addressed, intrinsically with-the-other judgement, whose demand for shared validity is the expression of the relational constitution of the one who judges. It means that the “subjective universality” of taste is real and is no antinomy: the judgement is subjective (it is a relational subject’s) and universal (because that subject is intrinsically relational, its judgement intrinsically a claim upon others), and the two are identical rather than in tension, the subjectivity of a relational subject being already a reaching-toward-the-shared. And it means, the point that binds this section to the paper’s named concepts, that the completion of an aesthetic judgement is its being-shared. For if the judging subject is relational, then a private aesthetic judgement, one never turned toward the other, is a truncated one rather than a complete aesthetic judgement, arrested before the reaching-toward-the-other that its own structure demands. The aesthetic judgement of a relational subject is completed only when it is turned toward the other, when the Real surplus of the beautiful thing, invested with Imaginary captivation, is raised into the Symbolic as a claim addressed to the beloved: look. “Look” is not an optional addendum to a perception already complete in private; it is the completion of the aesthetic judgement, the moment at which the relational subject’s intrinsically-addressed judging reaches the other it was always already oriented toward. This is why the aesthetic perception of contingency culminates in the turning-toward-the-other (§11.2): not because sharing is a pleasant addition to private aesthetic experience, but because the aesthetic judgement of a relational subject is structurally incomplete until it is shared. The solitary aesthete’s experience is no longer the paradigm of aesthetic judgement from which sharing is a derivative; it is a deficient case, an aesthetic judgement arrested before its completion. The complete form of aesthetic judgement is the shared one, and this is the deepest reason the paper reaches the philosophy of beauty by way of two people travelling rather than one aesthete contemplating.
§9.5 Travel as the field of the shared aesthetic accord
The two stages together yield the section’s culminating claim, which returns the abstract resolution to the paper’s concrete object. If a complete aesthetic judgement is the three-register reconciliation achieved by a relational subject and completed in being shared, then there must be conditions under which this full structure is most fully realised, conditions of heightened Real, suspended and renegotiated Symbolic, and intensified shared Imaginary investment, and these conditions are precisely those of the field of travel.
Consider how travel, literal or generalised, bears on each register. Travel maximises the Real: the unfamiliar place, dense with the unsymbolised, presents a surplus of the not-yet-captured, the strange thing that no familiar concept has domesticated, the raw thereness that the over-symbolised everyday has covered over. Where the everyday is a world so thoroughly symbolised that the Real rarely surfaces, everything already named, classified, assigned, the unfamiliar restores the Real’s pressure, the encounter with what exceeds one’s symbolic net. Travel suspends and renegotiates the Symbolic: it brackets the established symbolic order (the roles, the classifications, the settled meanings of home), so that the aesthetic judgement must be freshly made and freshly shared rather than pre-decided by the inherited symbolic grid, the symbolic accord between the two re-created rather than assumed. And travel intensifies the shared Imaginary: two people captivated together by the same strange beauty, each invested in it and each seeing the other invested, form a shared Imaginary bond, a communitas of captivation, that the dispersed everyday rarely permits. Travel is thus the field in which the three-register reconciliation of the aesthetic judgement is heightened in every register at once, and in which, because two people undergo it together, in the symmetric unfamiliarity that lets neither host the occasion (§2.6), the reconciliation is achieved as a shared accord, the relational subject’s intrinsically-addressed aesthetic judgement reaching its completion in the mutual “look.”
This is the deepest sense in which the field of travel is the field of the aesthetic: not merely that travel affords beautiful sights, but that travel is the condition under which the full structure of aesthetic judgement, three-register reconciliation, achieved by a relational subject, completed in sharing, is most fully realised. The mutual “look” of two travellers caught by the same contingent beauty is not a lesser, applied instance of aesthetic judgement; it is aesthetic judgement in its complete form, the form the solitary tradition could never reach because it began from the wrong subject. Travel reconciles the aesthetic judgement across the three registers and across the relation, and in doing so it shows what aesthetic judgement most fully is. The antinomy of taste, which the subject-centred tradition could only relocate into a posit, is here dissolved in the relational ontology and the three registers, and its dissolution is enacted, concretely, every time two people turn to each other before something beautiful and say: look. It is on this resolved foundation, aesthetic judgement as the shared, three-register accord of relational subjects, that the rest of the paper’s aesthetics is built.
§9.6 The sublime - when the Real predominates
Beauty has a great neighbour that the analysis so far has set aside and must now admit, for it is central to the experience of travel and to the existential themes of the paper’s first half: the sublime. The distinction between the beautiful and the sublime is one of the deepest in aesthetics, and the three-register analysis illuminates it precisely. Burke drew the distinction in terms of the feelings: the beautiful is founded on pleasure, on what is small, smooth, delicate, and well-formed, and it relaxes and draws; the sublime is founded on a kind of delightful terror, on what is vast, powerful, obscure, and formless, and it overwhelms and astonishes, a pleasure mingled with dread that arises when we confront, from a position of safety, what could destroy us. Kant deepened the distinction: the beautiful concerns form, the bounded, and occasions a restful contemplation; the sublime concerns the formless and the boundless, the magnitude or might that exceeds the imagination’s power to comprehend it, and it occasions not rest but a movement of the mind, a momentary check to our vital powers followed by a stronger outpouring, as reason, confronted with what overwhelms sense, discovers in itself an idea of the infinite that the overwhelming object cannot match. The sublime, for Kant, is the feeling of reason’s supersensible vocation, awakened by the failure of sense before the boundless; it is, paradoxically, in the very overwhelming of our perceptual powers that we feel our supersensible elevation.
In the three-register terms the paper has developed, the sublime is the experience in which the Real predominates, in which the unsymbolisable, the formless surplus that exceeds all symbolic capture, comes forward in its full force and overwhelms the Symbolic and Imaginary rather than being reconciled with them. Where beauty is the achieved reconciliation of the three registers, the sublime is the encounter with the Real in its excess over reconciliation: the vast, the boundless, the overwhelming, which cannot be taken up into form (Symbolic) or captured in a pleasing image (Imaginary), but presses upon the subject as the sheer unsymbolisable magnitude that breaks the frame. Lyotard made exactly this the centre of his reading: the sublime is the presentation of the fact that the unpresentable exists, the feeling occasioned by that which exceeds all presentation, the Real’s irruption past the limits of form. And this connects the sublime directly to the paper’s existential first half. The contingency that the field of travel restores (§2.4), the encounter with the undetermined that returns the subject to its existence, is closely akin to the sublime: the mountain vista that overwhelms, the vast indifferent landscape, the boundless sea, the strangeness of the wholly unfamiliar place, these are sublime encounters, irruptions of the Real that exceed the traveller’s symbolic net and return them, through the overwhelming, to the bare fact of their existence. The existential disclosure that the paper located in contingency is, in aesthetic terms, the sublime: the Real’s predominance, breaking the everyday’s symbolic frame and exposing the subject to what exceeds it. Travel affords the sublime as much as the beautiful, the overwhelming as much as the reconciled, and the two together, the beautiful as three-register accord and the sublime as the Real’s excess, are the full aesthetic range of the field. The sublime is where the aesthetics of this section rejoins the existential phenomenology of the paper’s beginning: the Real that overwhelms is the same Real whose irruption, in contingency, returns the subject to its existence.
§9.7 The beauty of suffering
The sublime has already broken one comfortable assumption, that beauty is a matter of pleasure, by locating, at the heart of one whole class of aesthetic experience, a delight inseparable from dread. It is necessary now to break the assumption more thoroughly, for it bears directly on the ethics of the relation and on the failures the paper must still reckon with. The assumption is that beauty and suffering are opposed, that the beautiful is the pleasant and the painful is the unbeautiful. This is false, and its falsity is among the deepest facts about beauty. Suffering can be beautiful, not in spite of being suffering, but in and through it; and the recognition of this is not a morbid paradox but a central truth of the aesthetic that the philosophy of beauty has long known and the consumerist aesthetic of the merely pleasant has forgotten.
The evidence is overwhelming once one looks. The greatest art is very largely an art of suffering: the tragedy, the elegy, the lament, the requiem, the poem wrung from grief. The sorrowful poem is not a lesser beauty than the joyful one; it is often the higher, and it is beautiful precisely as the articulation of sorrow, its beauty inseparable from the pain it shapes. Nietzsche made this the centre of his first work: tragedy, he argued, is the supreme art because it looks into the abyss of existence, the suffering, the destruction, the terror at the heart of things, and through the transfiguring power of form, makes it not merely bearable but beautiful, affirmable, even joyous; the Dionysian truth of suffering is redeemed by the Apollonian power of beautiful form, and the result is the highest aesthetic achievement, the transfiguration of pain into beauty that does not deny the pain but transmutes it. The beauty of tragedy is the transfiguration of suffering rather than its absence; the suffering remains, fully, and is made beautiful. The East Asian tradition knows this even more intimately, and its central categories are categories of beautiful sorrow: mono no aware (§9.11) is the beauty of transience felt as gentle grief, the falling blossom beautiful because it falls, the poignancy of loss as itself a form of beauty; sabi is the beauty of what is weathered, decayed, passing, the loveliness of the marks of time and mortality. These are beauties of suffering rather than beauties that exclude it; they are beauties of suffering, of transience, of loss, refined into whole aesthetic sensibilities. And psychoanalysis locates the structure: the work of mourning is itself a labour of transfiguration, the slow conversion of raw loss into something that can be held, integrated, given form; and sublimation, in which the painful drive is raised into the created object, is the very mechanism by which suffering becomes art.
The three-register analysis explains how this is possible. Suffering, in its rawness, is an excess of the Real, the overwhelming, the unsymbolisable, the unbearable pressing past all form, akin to the sublime. To make suffering beautiful is to bring this Real excess into a reconciliation with the Symbolic and the Imaginary without denying or diminishing it: to give the unbearable a form (Symbolic) that holds it without falsifying it, to invest it with a transfiguring image (Imaginary) that does not prettify but transmutes, so that the suffering is neither repressed nor merely endured but shaped into a beauty that contains it whole. The beauty of suffering is the achieved reconciliation, across the three registers, of an experience whose Real component is pain, and this is harder than the reconciliation of pleasant beauty, which is why the art of suffering is the higher art and the sorrowful poem the deeper beauty. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά is nowhere truer than here: the beauty of suffering is the most difficult beauty, because it must reconcile, without falsifying, a Real that resists reconciliation with every fibre. That it can be done, that grief can become elegy, loss can become mono no aware, terror can become tragedy, is among the most important things about beauty, and it will prove, when the paper returns to the conflicts and failures of shared travel (§5.5, §9.8), to be the key that transforms the darkest material of a relation into a possible source of its deepest wealth.
§9.8 Conflict as relational wealth
If suffering can be beautiful, then a conclusion follows that overturns the assumption with which the paper’s ethics of travel began, and the overturning is important enough to be drawn out here, in the theoretical chapter, before its consequences are taken up in the ethics. The assumption, natural, and not wholly wrong, was that conflict in shared travel is a negative thing: the holiday quarrel as the exposure of a hollow relation, the friction of forced co-presence as a stressor, contingency overwhelming rather than nourishing (§3.1, §5.5). All of this can be true. But it is not the whole truth, and the part it omits is exactly the part the beauty of suffering reveals. Conflict can be relational wealth: under the right conditions, a positive and even peculiarly precious form of the wealth a relation generates, in place of merely a danger to be survived.
The argument runs through everything the paper has built. A conflict undergone together is a shared experience of unusual intensity, a passage of difficulty, friction, even pain, that the two undergo as a “we.” Like any shared experience, it is generated in the living and then either reproduced or left to dissipate (§4). And here the beauty of suffering becomes decisive. If the conflict is reproduced well, if, in the shared retelling, the two return to it together and, through the labour of reproduction, transfigure it, giving the remembered pain a form that holds it, investing it with a significance that does not deny the difficulty but transmutes it, then the conflict becomes beautiful in exactly the way suffering becomes beautiful in art: a raw Real of pain reconciled, in the retelling, into a shaped and shared meaning. And a conflict so transfigured is not a wound the relation carries but a treasure it holds: the storm weathered together, the hard passage survived as a “we,” becomes, years later, among the most precious of the relation’s shared possessions, do you remember that terrible night we fought in the rain spoken not as a reopening of the wound but as the recollection of a thing they came through together, unique, theirs, beautiful precisely because it was hard. The conflict has become wealth, and a peculiarly durable wealth, because it is unrepeatable and wholly their own.
There is more, and it is the deepest point, the one that joins this to the paper’s theory of aesthetic judgement. A conflict is, among other things, a collision of two differing perceptions, two divergent takes on what is happening, two aesthetic judgements that do not agree, one finds the detour an adventure, the other a disaster; one is moved where the other is irritated. The conflict is the friction of two aesthetic judgements failing, in the moment, to accord. And the labour of reproducing it well is precisely the labour of bringing those two divergent judgements into a shared accord, of the two perceptions, through the mutual translation of retelling (§4.6), moving toward each other until a common aesthetic judgement is generated that neither held alone, a shared way of seeing the difficult thing that both can now hold. Conflict, reproduced well, is therefore one of the primary occasions on which two people’s aesthetic judgements are reconciled, on which the divergent perceptions of two relational subjects are brought, through difficulty, into a genuinely shared accord. And the accord so generated is uniquely valuable exactly because it was won through conflict: a shared aesthetic judgement forged in difficulty is deeper, more tested, more wholly common than one that never met resistance, as a reconciliation that has survived a quarrel is sounder than a harmony that was never strained. This is why conflict can be not merely tolerable but generative: it creates the occasion for the deepest kind of aesthetic reconciliation between two people, the bringing-into-accord of judgements that genuinely diverged, and the unique shared beauty that only a transfigured difficulty can yield.
The conclusion is a thesis about beauty and conflict that the ethics will inherit: beauty does not exclude conflict, but can make conflict a part of the relation’s common generation. The relation whose conflicts are well reproduced does not merely survive them; it is enriched by them, in a way it could not be enriched by unbroken harmony, because the transfigured conflict yields a wealth, the unique shared experience, the hard-won common accord, the beauty of a difficulty come through together, that harmony alone cannot generate. This does not make conflict good in itself, and the paper is not counselling the manufacture of quarrels; the raw conflict is real difficulty, and badly reproduced it is pure depletion (§5.5). What makes the difference is the reproduction: the same conflict that, extracted and weaponised, is the bad cycle’s fuel is, transfigured and shared, the good cycle’s treasure. The decisive variable, here as throughout the paper, is what is done with it rather than the material, and the beauty of suffering is the proof that even the hardest material, the pain and friction of a shared life, can be transfigured, in the labour of loving reproduction, into the deepest beauty a relation holds. It is on this recognition that the ethics of conflict (§5.6) will be built.
§9.9 The just reproduction of suffering - four criteria, and an opened question
The previous subsection established that conflict, well reproduced, can become a relation’s wealth, and rested the whole claim on the distinction between reproducing a conflict well and reproducing it badly. But it did not say what distinguishes them, beyond the metaphors of transfiguration and weaponisation; and the question it left open, how suffering is reproduced well, justly, generatively rather than destructively, is among the hardest the paper raises, hard enough that this paper cannot pretend to resolve it. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful is difficult, and the good reproduction of suffering is difficult in exactly the same way and for exactly the same reason, for it too is a making-beautiful of a recalcitrant Real, and it too resists every procedure. The honest course is to give not a method, there is none, but a set of criteria: necessary conditions that any good reproduction of suffering must meet, which mark the direction of the good without supplying the route to it. Four such criteria can be stated, and they are not arbitrary; each corresponds to one of the theoretical pillars the series has built, and each closes off one of the four directions in which the reproduction of suffering characteristically degenerates.
The teleological criterion - the possibility of the continuation of generativity. A reproduction of suffering is good only if it preserves the possibility that the relation continue to generate, only if, having reproduced the painful experience, the relation can still generate further from it, rather than being terminated, frozen, or foreclosed by it. The criterion rests on the metaphysical ground this series established at its foundation: that generativity aims at its own continuation (Paper IX). The wording is deliberately minimal: the criterion is not that the reproduction guarantee continuation, nor that it make the suffering “positive,” but only that it preserve the possibility of continued generation, that it not close the door. A bad reproduction closes the door: it reproduces the painful experience as a fixed verdict, a settled debt, a permanent indictment, a wound sealed into a grievance, a dead end (§10.3). A good reproduction keeps the door open. The criterion closes off the first degeneration: the reproduction of suffering into a generative dead end.
The ontological criterion - the reproduction must be relational. A reproduction of shared suffering is good only if it is itself relational, conducted jointly, by the two together, rather than unilaterally by one. What is to be reproduced is the experience of the relational subject, the “we,” and the experience of a relational subject can be reproduced only relationally. When one partner unilaterally reproduces a shared suffering, decides, alone, what the painful experience meant, how it is to be remembered, the reproduction has already failed the ontological criterion, however benevolent the intent, because it has converted a relational experience into one party’s account of it. This is so even when the unilateral reproducer is the one who suffered more, and even generously: a suffering reproduced for the relation by one member is not a suffering reproduced by the relation. The criterion demands co-production. It closes off the second degeneration: the reproduction of shared suffering into one party’s private narrative.
The political-economic criterion - the reproduction must not be exploitative. A reproduction of suffering is good only if it is non-exploitative, only if neither party’s suffering is reproduced as material for the other’s gain. Even a jointly conducted reproduction can be exploitative: the two may reproduce the suffering together, yet the reproduction may systematically convert one party’s pain into the other’s benefit, into the other’s moral credit, the other’s victim-standing, the other’s leverage. Suffering is peculiarly liable to this, because suffering carries moral weight, and whoever’s version of the shared suffering prevails acquires a moral advantage. The good reproduction admits both parties’ suffering, refuses to convert either’s pain into the other’s moral capital. It closes off the third degeneration: the reproduction of suffering into the extraction of moral surplus.
The power criterion - the generation of power must be accompanied by the generation of its restraint. It must be granted, unflinchingly, that the reproduction of shared suffering generates a structure of power. A relation that has weathered serious suffering together is left with asymmetries: who was hurt more, who needs more care, who owes whom, who has the standing to invoke the painful episode. These asymmetries are real and, like all relational power, ineliminable. The criterion does not demand the impossible abolition of the power that suffering’s reproduction generates. It demands that the generation of power be accompanied by the generation of power’s restraint, that the same reproduction which generates a structure of power also generate a force that checks the abuse of that power. The distinction is the series’ distinction between power-to and power-over (Paper XVII): a reproduction generates power-over when the asymmetry becomes a standing instrument of domination, the wound reproduced as a permanent debt, “after all I suffered” become the bad cycle’s most effective weapon; it generates power-to, accompanied by restraint, when the asymmetry is held within a force that prevents its abuse. The good reproduction makes the wounded one cared-for without making them a tyrant of their wound. It closes off the fourth and most insidious degeneration: the reproduction of suffering into a standing instrument of domination, the wound become a weapon.
The criteria as direction, not method; and the opened question. These four criteria, teleological, ontological, political-economic, and power-dialectical, together specify what a good reproduction of suffering must be: it must preserve the possibility of continued generation, be conducted relationally, refuse exploitation, and accompany the power it generates with the restraint of that power. (These four, first stated here for the hard case of suffering, are in fact the general criteria of relational production as such, governed by the principle of subject-preservation; the general theory is set out separately, §6, where suffering’s reproduction is treated as its first application.) Together they mark the direction of the good with some precision. But they do not supply the method, and the paper is careful not to pretend otherwise. To know that a good reproduction of suffering must meet these four conditions is not yet to know how to meet them. That how is not a procedure; it is an art, as difficult as any in this paper, and it cannot be reduced to a rule any more than the perception of beauty can. The criteria are the direction; the route is not given. And so the paper, having opened the question of the just reproduction of suffering and given it the structure of these four criteria, must hand on the larger task as a problem it has framed but not solved, a fissure that points beyond it (§16.3). The good reproduction of suffering is difficult, as the beautiful is difficult; this paper has done what it can, which is to say in which direction the good lies, and to confess that the way there remains to be found.
§9.10 The metaphysics of beauty - from Plato to Hegel
Behind the questions of definition and of taste stands a third, the metaphysical question: what is the standing of beauty in the order of being? The Western tradition gave a sequence of answers that, though the paper does not adopt any wholesale, illuminate what is at stake and supply terms the argument will use. The sequence runs from Plato through Plotinus and Aquinas to Hegel, and it traces a gradual descent of beauty from a transcendent Form to the sensuous appearing of spirit.
For Plato, beauty is a Form, the auto to kalon that the Hippias Major sought and the Symposium approached by another route: in Diotima’s ascent, the lover rises from the beauty of a single body, to the beauty of all bodies, to the beauty of souls, of laws and institutions, of the sciences, and finally to Beauty itself, eternal, uncompounded, neither coming to be nor passing away, the Form in which all beautiful things participate and from which they derive whatever beauty they have. Beauty, for Plato, is thus a transcendent reality, and the experience of beautiful things is valuable chiefly as the first rung of an ascent beyond them to the Form. Crucially, in the Platonic vision the beautiful and the good are near allied, the ascent to Beauty is also an ascent toward the Good, and the kalon shades into the agathon, a proximity of beauty and goodness that the paper’s own thesis of their continuity (§13) will inherit and transform.
Plotinus deepened the Platonic account by locating beauty in the soul’s recognition of form imposed on matter, and ultimately in the radiance of the One: the beautiful is that in which the formative principle, the logos, shines through matter, and the experience of beauty is the soul’s recognition of its kindred, the trace of the intelligible in the sensible, drawing the soul back toward its source. Beauty is here a radiance, an emanation, the appearing of the higher in the lower, and its perception is a homecoming. Aquinas, synthesising the classical inheritance with Christian metaphysics, gave the most analytically influential formula: beauty requires three things, integritas (wholeness or completeness), proportio or consonantia (due proportion or harmony), and claritas (radiance or clarity, the splendour of the form shining through), and the beautiful is that which, being seen, pleases, id quod visum placet. The Thomistic claritas, the form’s radiance, its shining-forth, is a precise name for what the three-register analysis called the Real surplus made manifest: the splendour by which the thing’s form announces itself beyond what concepts capture.
Hegel completed the descent by bringing beauty fully into the sensuous and the historical. Beauty, for Hegel, is das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee, the sensuous appearing of the Idea, the shining of spirit through sensuous form. Beauty is no longer a transcendent Form above the sensible (Plato) nor a radiance emanating from above (Plotinus), but the Idea’s own appearing in the sensuous, spirit made manifest to sense; and art is the medium in which spirit gives itself sensuous appearance, in a historical development through which spirit progressively frees itself from the sensuous toward the conceptual. Hegel’s formula brings beauty down into history and into the appearing itself, and in doing so it prepares the modern recognition, which the paper shares, that beauty is a structure of appearing rather than a property behind experience, an event in which something comes to presence. The paper does not adopt Hegel’s idealist metaphysics, but it inherits his decisive move: that beauty is a matter of appearing, of coming-to-presence, rather than of a property residing in objects or a Form residing beyond them. This is consonant with the paper’s own category of presence (§1.3): beauty, like the relation’s dynamics, is something that comes to presence, an event of appearing, not a thing that simply is.
§9.11 East Asian aesthetics - an independent pillar
The philosophy of beauty surveyed so far is Western, and to leave the matter there would be a provincialism the paper’s whole orientation forbids, and would moreover omit the tradition that has most precisely cultivated exactly the perceptual capacities the paper is concerned with. East Asian aesthetics is an independent and in some respects deeper pillar rather than an exotic supplement to the Western account, and it is the more apposite here because its central categories are, to an extraordinary degree, categories of the perception of contingency, transience, emptiness, and the unsymbolisable, the very objects of the aesthetic perception this paper makes central. The principal categories are surveyed in the table below; four deserve discussion in the text.
The Chinese category of yijing (意境), variously rendered “world of meaning,” “aesthetic realm,” or “conceived realm”, names the fused totality of scene and feeling that a work opens, the interpenetration of the objective landscape (jing, scene) and the subjective feeling (yi, mind or intent) into a single resonant whole that exceeds both. Yijing is not a property of the depicted scene nor a feeling in the perceiver but the resonant world that arises in their fusion, which is, in the paper’s terms, a name for the three-register reconciliation itself, the accord in which the Real of the scene, the Imaginary of feeling, and the Symbolic of the rendered work fuse into a realm that is neither objective nor subjective but their reconciliation. The Chinese tradition named, in yijing, exactly the structure the paper reached through Lacan: beauty as the fused realm beyond the subject-object split. And the highest yijing, in the critical tradition, is achieved through emptiness, through what is left unsaid, unpainted, the void that opens the resonant space, so that yijing is inseparable from the aesthetics of spaciousness the paper has carried throughout (§2.8).
The category of qiyun shengdong (气韵生动), “spirit-resonance, life-motion,” the first of Xie He’s six principles of painting, names the vital resonance, the living movement of qi (breath, energy, spirit) that animates a great work and makes it not a dead representation but a living presence. Qiyun is the aesthetic of the living, the dynamic, the animate, and it is, in the paper’s terms, close to the aesthetic of the self-presence of dynamics: the valuing of the felt movement, the living current, over static form. A work has qiyun when its dynamism comes to presence; and this is the aesthetic correlate of the paper’s central phenomenological concept, the coming-to-presence of a living dynamics.
The Japanese categories carry the aesthetics of transience and depth to their height. Mono no aware (物の哀れ), “the pathos of things,” the gentle sorrow-tinged sensitivity to the transience of all things, the poignancy felt in the falling cherry blossom precisely because it falls, is the aesthetic perception of contingency in its purest form: the trained sensitivity to the passing, the contingent, the impermanent, felt as beautiful in and through its very transience. This is the cultivated xing (§11.2) raised to a whole aesthetic sensibility. Yūgen (幽玄), “mysterious depth,” the profound, dim, half-glimpsed beauty of what is not fully revealed, the suggestion of an unfathomable depth behind the surface, is the aesthetics of the unsymbolisable, the Real that beauty intimates without capturing: yūgen is precisely the beauty of what exceeds the symbolic, glimpsed at the edge of the unsayable. And sabi (寂), the beauty of the weathered, the aged, the solitary, the marks of time and use, the patina of transience, together with wabi, the beauty of the simple, the imperfect, the austere, completes the Japanese aesthetics of impermanence and emptiness, finding beauty exactly in what the consumerist aesthetic of the new and the perfect cannot see. These categories are, collectively, the most refined vocabulary any tradition has developed for the perception of contingent, transient, spacious, and unsymbolisable beauty, which is to say, for precisely the perception this paper makes central. The paper draws on them not as ornament but as the tradition that most fully cultivated its own central capacity, and it takes their existence as evidence that the aesthetic perception of contingency is a deep and ancient cultivable art rather than a private notion.
| Category | Tradition | Meaning and bearing on the paper |
|---|---|---|
| yijing 意境 | Chinese | The fused realm of scene and feeling beyond the subject-object split; a name for three-register reconciliation; achieved through emptiness. |
| qiyun 气韵 | Chinese | Spirit-resonance, life-motion; the aesthetic of living dynamism; correlate of the self-presence of dynamics. |
| mono no aware 物の哀れ | Japanese | The pathos of transient things; the aesthetic perception of contingency in pure form; cultivated xing. |
| yūgen 幽玄 | Japanese | Mysterious depth; the beauty of the half-glimpsed unsymbolisable; the Real intimated, not captured. |
| sabi / wabi 寂 / 侘 | Japanese | The beauty of the weathered, simple, imperfect, austere; beauty in transience and emptiness. |
| shen / shenyun 神韵 | Chinese | Spirit-resonance, the numinous quality beyond technique; the Real surplus that exceeds the made. |
The convergence of the Eastern categories with the paper’s Lacanian-relational resolution is itself significant. Yijing names the reconciliation beyond subject and object that the three-register analysis reconstructed; yūgen names the Real surplus that the analysis located at the heart of beauty; mono no aware names the perception of contingency the paper makes central; qiyun names the living dynamism whose coming-to-presence is the paper’s phenomenological core. That a tradition entirely independent of the Western antinomy should have developed, as its central categories, precisely the structures the paper reaches by dissolving that antinomy is evidence that those structures are features of the matter itself rather than artefacts of one philosophical vocabulary. The East Asian tradition did not face Kant’s antinomy because it did not begin from the isolated subject whose taste must somehow claim universality; it began, in its Daoist and Buddhist and Confucian roots, from a self already continuous with world and others, and so arrived directly at categories of fusion, resonance, and shared perception that the Western tradition could reach only by undoing its individualist premise. In this the Eastern tradition is the paper’s natural ally, and its categories will recur, alongside the Western, throughout the aesthetics that follows.
§10 The Evolution of Aesthetic Judgement - A Dynamics in the Reproduction Cycle
The philosophy of beauty just developed treated aesthetic judgement as though it were a single event, a reconciliation achieved at a moment, an accord struck once. This is an abstraction, and it must now be corrected, for aesthetic judgement is not a point but a process: it evolves in time, and its evolution is governed by exactly the reproduction cycle the paper analysed in its political economy. To read the same poem today and a year ago is to make two different aesthetic judgements of it; the beauty one finds in a place, a person, an experience, shifts rather than fixed, deepens, sometimes fades, across the repeated returns of a life. This temporal evolution of aesthetic judgement is the missing dynamical dimension of the paper’s aesthetics, and supplying it joins the third movement (the aesthetic) to the second (the political-economic) at their root, showing them to be two aspects of one process. The section is brief but structurally pivotal: it is the hinge on which the paper’s aesthetics and its political economy turn out to be the same theory seen twice.
§10.1 Aesthetic judgement is not a point but a trajectory
Consider the simplest case. One reads a poem, and finds it beautiful, or does not, or finds in it a particular beauty. One returns to it a year later, and the judgement has changed: the poem one found slight now seems profound, or the poem that dazzled now seems hollow, or, most commonly, the same poem yields a different beauty, inflected by all that has happened in the intervening time, the lines that meant little now heavy with a significance that one’s own life has since supplied. The aesthetic judgement of the poem is not a fixed fact about the poem-and-reader; it is a state that evolves, a point on a trajectory that the repeated returns trace out. And what is true of the poem is true of every object of aesthetic judgement: the place revisited, the music reheard, the person re-beheld, the shared experience re-membered. Aesthetic judgement is temporal through and through, a thing that develops across its returns, and to treat it as a single timeless accord is to freeze a moving thing.
This is not a defect in aesthetic judgement to be corrected toward some stable “true” judgement that further acquaintance approaches. The evolution is not convergence toward a fixed correct answer, as the accumulation of evidence converges toward a fact; it is genuine development, the judgement becoming other as the judging subject and its history become other, with no terminus at which the “real” beauty of the thing would finally be fixed. This follows directly from the resolution of the antinomy (§9.4): if beauty is the three-register reconciliation achieved by a relational subject rather than an objective property of the thing, then as the subject evolves, as its symbolic world deepens, its imaginary investments shift, its encounters with the Real accumulate, the reconciliation it achieves with the same object evolves too. The beauty is not in the object waiting to be correctly read; it is in the accord, and the accord is struck by a subject that is itself in motion. Aesthetic judgement evolves because the relational subject that judges is itself continually being generated and re-generated rather than static, which is to say, reproduced.
§10.2 The reproduction cycle as the engine of evolution
What drives the evolution? The answer joins this section to the paper’s political economy: aesthetic judgement evolves through the reproduction cycle (§4). Recall that the reproduction of experience is the labour of shared retelling by which a generated experience is returned to the relation’s present, re-felt, and re-woven into its living fabric (§4.2). Each such return is a re-generation rather than a neutral replay, in which the experience is inflected by all that has happened since and added to in the re-feeling. And the aesthetic judgement of the experience is among the things so re-generated. When two people return, in retelling, to a shared journey, they do not merely recall its beauty; they re-judge it, and the re-judging is shaped by everything the intervening time has brought, so that the beauty they find in the remembered experience evolves with each return. The reproduction cycle is therefore the engine of the evolution of aesthetic judgement: each turn of the cycle re-generates the judgement, moves it, deepens or alters it, traces another point on its trajectory.
This is why the example with which this paper’s political economy was concerned, do you remember that time we got lost, is at once a reproduction of experience and an evolution of aesthetic judgement. The getting-lost, judged in the moment as a frustration, is re-judged in the retelling, and across repeated retellings its aesthetic value evolves: what was experienced as an irritation becomes, through the reproductive returns, perceived as a charm, then as a treasured oddity, then as one of the most beautiful moments of the whole journey. The aesthetic judgement of the experience has traversed a trajectory, frustration to charm to treasure, and the reproduction cycle is what carried it along that path. This is the precise mechanism by which the conflict analysed in the previous section (§9.8) can become wealth: the reproduction cycle evolves the aesthetic judgement of the conflict from the negative value it had in the moment to the positive value it acquires in the transfigured retelling. The evolution of aesthetic judgement and the reproduction of experience are not two processes but one: to reproduce an experience is to evolve its aesthetic judgement, and the trajectory of the judgement is the track the reproduction cycle traces.
§10.3 The dynamics - good and bad evolution
If aesthetic judgement evolves through the reproduction cycle, then it has a dynamics, and the dynamics can run well or badly, which connects this section to the good and bad cycles the series has analysed throughout, and to the dynamical layer of its formal companion (Paper IX). The evolution of aesthetic judgement is the dynamical state of a system, and like any such system it can move toward enrichment or toward collapse.
The good evolution is the deepening one. Here each turn of the reproduction cycle adds to the aesthetic judgement, so that the beauty found in the experience grows richer with each return, accumulating significance, gathering the resonances of all the intervening life, becoming over years an ever-deeper well of meaning. This is the good cycle in the register of aesthetic judgement: a circulation that returns more than it took, the holonomy of the judgement accumulating positive value along the path of its re-generation (§4.3). The poem returned to over a lifetime that deepens with each reading, the shared journey whose beauty grows richer with each retelling, these are the good evolution. The bad evolution is the degrading one, and it takes two forms corresponding to the two failures of the cycle. The first is fixation: the judgement frozen, the reproduction become rote, the same beauty found in the same way each time with no re-generation, the living judgement hardened into a fixed verdict, the solidification of the aesthetic judgement, its circulation fallen to zero. The poem reduced to a fixed “great poem” one no longer actually reads, the journey hardened into a set anecdote no longer re-felt: the aesthetic judgement has stopped evolving, frozen into a dead possession. The second is depletion: the judgement worn away by a reproduction that extracts rather than enriches, the beauty consumed until nothing is left, the over-told story whose charm is exhausted. Both are the bad cycle in the aesthetic register: the judgement either frozen or consumed, its living evolution arrested or its value extracted.
This gives the paper’s aesthetics its dynamical completion, and it gives the cultivation of aesthetic judgement (§12) its temporal object. To cultivate aesthetic judgement is to tend its evolution over time rather than only to refine it at a moment, to keep its reproduction generative rather than rote or extractive. The mutual aesthetic education of two (§12.7) is, seen now, the joint tending of the evolution of their shared aesthetic judgements: the labour by which two people, returning together to the beauties they have shared, keep the evolution of their common aesthetic judgement on the deepening path rather than letting it freeze or deplete. The aesthetic and the political-economic, the judgement and its reproduction, the perception of beauty and the dynamics of the relation, are here seen to be one moving system, and the beauty of a long shared life is, in the end, the good evolution of a shared aesthetic judgement, deepened across a lifetime of generative reproduction. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful is difficult, and now its difficulty is seen to be also temporal, the difficulty not only of striking the accord but of tending its evolution, over a whole life, on the deepening path.
§10.4 The dialectic of the general and the particular
The account of the evolution of aesthetic judgement toward an “ever more deeply shared accord” has been stated, so far, as though the goal were the convergence of two judgements into one, as though the ideal terminus were two people who judge beauty identically. This is wrong, and the correction is not a minor qualification but the introduction of the dialectic that governs the whole matter: the dialectic of the general and the particular, which is the form the materialist dialectic takes in the domain of aesthetic judgement, and which this section must now make explicit, for without it the paper’s aesthetics would collapse into exactly the homogenisation its relational ontology forbids.
The problem is this. Two relational subjects cannot be required to have identical aesthetic judgements, to do so would be to annul their distinctness, to demand the fusion that this series has refused from its foundation, the merging of two into one that destroys the resonance it pretends to perfect (§3.2). A “we” whose two members judged all beauty identically would not be a relation of two but a single judging subject wearing two faces; the particularity of each, the irreducible difference of their perception, is a condition of there being two to relate rather than an obstacle to the relation. And yet a shared aesthetic judgement, a general accord, a common way of finding things beautiful, is genuinely needed, for without it there is no “we” that judges, no shared sensibility, no common aesthetic life, only two strangers who happen to perceive in parallel. The relation requires both: a generality (the shared accord) and a particularity (the irreducible difference of each judgement). And these two requirements pull against each other, the generality toward convergence, the particularity toward divergence, so that the matter is a dialectical tension to be held rather than a simple good to be maximised.
The resolution is the materialist dialectic’s resolution of the general and the particular, and it is precisely the concept of the concrete universal that this paper invoked at the outset as its method (§1.4). The genuine general is not the abstract universal that is reached by stripping away all particularity, the empty common residue, the homogenised judgement that all must share by having surrendered what is their own. The genuine general is the concrete universal: the commonality that exists in and through the particulars, generated by their relation, real only as the shared life of distinct perceivers who remain distinct. The shared aesthetic judgement of a “we” is general in this concrete sense: not an identity imposed upon two by the erasure of their difference, but a commonality generated between two who remain different, a shared accord that lives through their particular judgements rather than in place of them. This is the materialist insight against the idealist abstraction: the universal is not above the particulars, subsuming them; it is among them, generated by their relation, and has no existence apart from the particulars whose commonality it is. Applied here: the shared aesthetic judgement is not a third judgement above the two, to which both must conform, but the living commonality that the two particular judgements generate between them while remaining two. And the tension between the general and the particular, between the pull toward shared accord and the pull toward irreducible difference, is not a defect to be resolved by the victory of one side but the very motor of the relation’s aesthetic development, the contradiction whose ongoing motion is the relation’s aesthetic life. The materialist dialectic holds that contradiction is the source of development; here the contradiction of the general and the particular is the source of the development of the shared aesthetic judgement, which advances not by resolving the tension but by its perpetual working.
This forbids two opposite errors, and naming them shows why the dialectic is necessary. The first error is homogenisation: the collapse of the particular into the general, the two judgements converging into identity, the difference erased, which is the fusion the relational ontology forbids, and which, as the next subsection will show, is also a dynamical catastrophe. The second error is atomisation: the collapse of the general into the particular, the two judgements with no commonality, no shared accord, no “we” that judges, which is the dissolution of the relation into two strangers. The good aesthetic life of a “we” lies in neither, but in the held tension of both: a shared accord (general) genuinely generated, through and not against the irreducible difference (particular) of two perceivers who remain two. It is to a light formal rendering of this dialectic, which shows, with a precision the prose alone cannot, why both the general and the particular are required rather than merely permitted, and required for the sake of generativity itself, that the section finally turns.
§10.5 A light formal rendering - two coupled fields
The dialectic of the general and the particular can be given a formal rendering, and the rendering earns its place by showing something the prose can assert but not demonstrate: that the particularity of the two judgements is necessary for the survival of generativity itself rather than merely tolerable. The rendering is offered in the spirit the whole paper has maintained toward the formal, lightly, as a dialectical suggestion and not a formal assertion. What follows is a gesture toward a structure, not a theory of it; its value is heuristic, the lending of a precise image to a dialectical thought, and it is to be read as such.
Picture the two subjects’ aesthetic judgements as two fields, $\phi_1$ and $\phi_2$, each a configuration evolving in time through the space of possible judgements, each the trajectory of one subject’s sensibility. Picture their evolution as governed by an action, or equivalently a dynamics, with two kinds of term. There is a coupling term, write it schematically as a cost that penalises the divergence of the two fields, something of the form $\kappa,V(\phi_1 - \phi_2)$, which pulls the two judgements toward agreement and is minimised when they accord. And there is, for each subject, a self term, a proper dynamics $f_i(\phi_i)$ of each field on its own, the irreducible individual tendency of each subject’s sensibility, which owes nothing to the other and follows its own form. The coupling term is the general: it is what draws the two judgements toward a shared accord, and it is what makes possible their joint, gradual evolution toward a common attractor, a shared aesthetic sensibility, a basin of agreement into which the two can settle together. The self term is the particular: it is what keeps each judgement its own, what preserves the dynamical diversity of the two fields, what prevents their collapse into a single configuration.
The dialectic is now legible in the dynamics, and it yields exactly the two errors the previous subsection named, plus the deep reason the particular is required. A system of pure coupling, the self terms suppressed, only the divergence-penalising term left, collapses: the two fields are driven to identity, settling into a single shared configuration, all difference annihilated. This is homogenisation, and in the dynamics it is a positive danger rather than merely a loss of richness, for a system collapsed to a single homogeneous configuration has lost all dynamical diversity, and a system without diversity cannot escape a degenerating attractor. Should the shared attractor into which the two judgements have collapsed begin to degenerate, to become a “bad” attractor, a fixed and frozen configuration, the solidification analysed above (§10.3), the homogenised system has no resource by which to leave it: both fields are at the same dead point, and there is no perturbation, no divergent tendency, no alternative trajectory to carry the system out. The generativity of the system is extinguished, frozen at a dead attractor with no path away. This is the dynamical meaning of the fusion the relational ontology forbids: not merely the loss of two-ness, but the loss of the diversity that is the condition of continued evolution, and so the extinction of generativity.
And here is the deep role of the particular, the self term, the irreducible individuality of each judgement: it is the possibility of escape from the extinction of generativity. Because the two fields retain their own proper dynamics, their own divergent tendencies, the system retains diversity, and diversity is precisely what allows a system to leave a degenerating attractor. When the shared attractor begins to die, the self term of one or the other field can carry it off the dead point, perturb the system, open a divergence that provides a direction of escape, and so migrate the system toward a new attractor where generativity can resume. The particularity of the two judgements is, in this light, not a romantic concession to individuality but a structural necessity for the survival of the relation’s generativity: it is the diversity reserve, the evolutionary variance, the source of the perturbations by which a relation escapes the death of its shared accords. A relation whose two members have become aesthetically identical has spent this reserve and is, for that reason, fragile, unable to renew a sensibility that has gone stale, trapped in whatever shared judgement it has frozen into. A relation whose two members remain aesthetically distinct, while genuinely sharing, retains the reserve, and can therefore keep escaping the deaths of its accords, keep migrating to new and living attractors, keep its generativity from extinction. The particular is required for the sake of generativity, which is the relation’s own ultimate end (Paper IX); and so the dialectic of the general and the particular is a unity in which each serves the relation’s generativity rather than a standoff between two goods, the general by giving the two a shared aesthetic life, the particular by keeping that life able to renew itself.
This is the materialist dialectic in its proper form: not the triumph of the general over the particular (homogenisation, the dead shared attractor) nor of the particular over the general (atomisation, no shared life at all), but their contradictory unity, whose perpetual motion is the relation’s living aesthetic development, and whose two poles are each necessary, the general for the shared accord, the particular for the escape from the accord’s death. The coupling builds the “we”‘s common sensibility; the self terms keep it alive; and the good evolution of a shared aesthetic judgement is the dialectical motion of the two, a coupled system that settles toward shared accords generative enough to be worth sharing and diverse enough to be escaped when they die. The model is, as promised, only a gesture, a lending of dynamical precision to a dialectical thought, not a closing of the matter into a formalism, for the matter does not close. But it shows, with a clarity the prose alone could not reach, why the paper’s relational aesthetics requires both the general and the particular, and why their tension is the very life of a shared aesthetic existence rather than a problem to be solved. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful is difficult, and its difficulty is, here, the difficulty of holding a contradiction in living motion, of being, with another, neither identical nor separate, but two who share a beauty that remains, in each, their own.
§11 The Aesthetic Perception of Contingency
The construction of the field is an aesthetic problem; so, it turns out, is the perception of what arises within it. This section turns from the making of the field to the catching of what the field lets in, and argues that the capacity to catch it is itself an aesthetic capacity, the second of the paper’s named concepts: the aesthetic perception of contingency. The argument also lightens, in an important way, the apparent burden of the previous section. For if constructing fields were the only path to the good this paper describes, that good would be effortful and rare, available chiefly to those with the leisure and means to build elaborate frames. This section shows that the deeper capacity is lighter and more portable than the construction of fields: it is a perceptual skill, exercisable anywhere, that catches the contingent beauty the world is always offering and turns it toward the beloved. A wildflower at the roadside is enough.
§11.1 Contingency is everywhere; the problem is catching it
The previous sections may have given the impression that contingency must be manufactured, that the everyday is a desert of pure repetition into which openness has to be deliberately imported by the construction of fields. This impression is false, and correcting it is the starting point of the present section. The everyday is not, in fact, pure repetition; its repetitions are shot through with contingency at every moment, with small undetermined irruptions that the routine does not fully suppress. A wildflower has come up at the edge of the path. The light has fallen, just now, in a particular way across a wall. A stranger’s face, in passing, has worn an expression that means something. A phrase overheard, a sound, a sudden smell, the everyday leaks contingency continuously, through the seams of its repetition, in a steady stream of small undetermined events. The problem is not that the everyday lacks contingency. The problem is that almost all of this contingency goes uncaught, arrives and departs unnoticed, unregistered, unturned-toward, because the purposive perception of the everyday, fixed on its functions and its destinations, is blind to it.
This reframes the whole question of practice. The deepest practical capacity is not, after all, the construction of fields, demanding as that is; it is the capacity to catch the contingency that is already arriving, to notice and receive what the everyday is already offering through its seams. And the minimal event in which this capacity is exercised is very small and entirely free: one catches the wildflower at the roadside, sees it, is touched by it, and turns it toward the one beside one: look. In that small act, a contingency that would have passed unnoticed is caught, and in being turned-toward it is shared, and in being shared it enters the structure of the “we” and becomes a deposit, however tiny, in the relation’s wealth. The flower, caught and shared, is a contingency that has intervened in the relational structure, the smallest possible instance of everything this paper has described, requiring no constructed field, no journey, no leisure, nothing but the capacity to catch what is already there and turn it toward the beloved. The chain runs: contingency → perception → sharing → wealth, and it can run anywhere, at any moment, for free.
§11.2 The three moments of the perception
The capacity so described is not simple; it has three distinct moments, each a distinct ability that can be present or absent, developed or atrophied, and it is worth separating them because the cultivation of the capacity (§12) is the cultivation of each.
The first moment is recognition: actually seeing the contingent thing when it arrives. This is harder than it sounds, and most contingency fails at exactly this first step. The purposive perception of the everyday, the perception that sees the road but not the flower, because it is fixed on getting somewhere, is structurally blind to the contingent, since the contingent is by definition what is not on the way to the purpose. To see the flower is to perceive in a different mode: a mode in which purpose is suspended and the perception is open to what is there for its own sake rather than for its use. This is the mode classically called aesthetic perception, the disinterested attention that beholds a thing for what it is rather than for what it is for, that sees the flower as a flower and not as an irrelevance beside the path to the destination. The first moment of catching contingency is thus an aesthetic suspension of the purposive gaze, the opening of perception to the gratuitous, the un-useful, the merely there.
The second moment is being moved: not merely seeing the contingent thing but being touched by it, letting it stir something. Seeing is not enough; one can register a flower coldly, as a fact, and be unmoved. The second moment is the receptivity in which the seen thing is allowed to matter, to provoke a small movement of feeling, to be received as significant rather than merely noted. This is a poetic receptivity, and the Chinese tradition has a precise name for it: xing (兴), the stirring of feeling by a thing, the rising of emotion or significance in response to a perceived object, which the classical poetics placed at the very root of poetry, “the poem begins in xing,” in the affective stirring that a thing provokes. To be moved by the roadside flower is to undergo xing: to let the small contingent thing stir something, to be affectively reached by it rather than merely registering its presence. This receptivity, too, can be developed or dulled; a life of purely purposive perception dulls it, and the practiced sensibility of the poet keeps it alive.
The third moment is turning-to-share: taking what one has seen and been moved by, and turning it toward the other. Look. This small act is the one that makes the whole chain relational, and it is the decisive moment for the purposes of this paper, because it is what converts a private aesthetic experience into a relational event. One could see the flower and be moved by it and keep it, a complete solitary aesthetic experience, of the kind the lone traveller has. The turning-toward is what makes it a deposit in the “we”: by sharing the caught contingency, one lets it intervene in the relational structure, makes it a moment of the “we” rather than of the “I.” The turning-to-share is the relational moment of the aesthetic perception of contingency, and it is what distinguishes the capacity this paper describes from the solitary aesthetic sensibility the tradition has long praised. The full capacity is the chain of all three: to see the contingent (recognition), to be moved by it (xing), and to turn it toward the beloved (sharing), and these three, as the philosophy of beauty will show (§9.2), are the three registers brought into accord: the real kernel of the contingent thing encountered in recognition, the imaginary investment of being-moved, and the symbolic articulation of the turning-toward. On that account the look is not the aftermath of a completed aesthetic judgement but its very completion, the moment at which the relational subject’s judgement achieves the shared symbolic accord its relational constitution demands, and a relationship rich in this capacity, in which both partners habitually catch and share the contingent beauty the world leaks, is rich in a continuous stream of small generative deposits that require no journey and no constructed field, only the cultivated perception that catches what is already there.
§11.3 A skill, not an engineering - the portable container
This resolves, at last, the tension that the construction of fields had introduced, the worry that the good of this paper is effortful, elaborate, and available only to those who can build grand frames. The aesthetic perception of contingency is not an engineering but a skill: not a structure one builds in the world but a capacity one carries in oneself, exercisable anywhere, requiring no external apparatus. And a skill, unlike a constructed field, is portable. The constructed field is a scaffolding, an external structure, built at some cost in time and means, that holds open a space for the relation to come to presence. The aesthetic perception of contingency is the internalisation of what the scaffolding was for: once one has the skill, one no longer needs the scaffolding, because one carries within oneself the capacity that the scaffolding was constructed to supply. The skilled perceiver opens the field wherever they are, catches the contingent beauty the everyday leaks, turns it toward the beloved, and so generates, in the midst of the most ordinary day, the small relational events that the constructed field was built to produce.
This is the movement from scaffolding to skill, and it is the deep logic of the paper’s eventual generalisation of travel (§15). The literal journey is a scaffolding: a powerful, expensive, external frame that opens the field all at once, and whose chief value, beyond the field it opens, is that it teaches, it lets one experience the field vividly enough to recognise it, to learn what it is and what it feels like to catch and share the contingent within it. But the mature form of the practice is not the perpetual construction of scaffoldings, which would indeed be effortful and elite; it is the skill that the scaffolding taught, carried back into the everyday, exercisable without the scaffolding. The journey shows what the field is; the skill lets one open it anywhere. And spaciousness is what makes the catching possible at every point: the skilled perceiver is one who keeps, within themselves and within their day, enough emptiness, enough freedom from the total occupation of purpose, that the contingent has room to be noticed when it arrives. Without that interior spaciousness the contingency leaks past uncaught, the perception too full of purpose to register the flower. The skill, then, is inseparable from the cultivation of an interior emptiness: the aesthetic perception of contingency is, among other things, the capacity to keep oneself empty enough to catch what comes.
The skill connects, finally, to two things the series has already established. It is the positive, capacitated form of what the previous paper marked as the un-programmability of the good (Paper XX): there it was shown that the good cannot be reduced to a procedure and must be judged afresh in each case; here that un-programmable judgement is given its positive name as a cultivated perceptual skill, the thing one develops where a procedure cannot be supplied. And it is the everyday exercise of what the series called witnessing (Paper XIX): to catch the flower and say look is the smallest act of shared witnessing, the turning of two gazes toward one thing, the constitution of a shared seeing that is a moment of the “we.” The aesthetic perception of contingency is witnessing made into a daily skill, and its cultivation, to which the paper turns next, is the cultivation of the capacity to witness the world together, beautifully, at the scale of a roadside flower.
§11.4 Eastern resources - the poetics of the wayfarer and the landscape
The capacity this section describes is not without its masters, and the richest tradition of them is the East Asian poetics of the wayfarer and the landscape, which developed the aesthetic perception of contingency to a height the Western literature of travel rarely reached, and which the paper draws on both for its phenomenological precision and as a counterweight to the otherwise Western cast of its aesthetics. Three strands are especially apposite.
The first is the travel poetics of Bashō, whose Oku no Hosomichi, the narrow road to the deep north, is the supreme record of the aesthetic perception of contingency exercised on a journey. Bashō’s practice is exactly the chain this section has described: the catching of small contingent things (a particular silence, the cry of a cicada, the look of a ruined gate), the being-moved by them (the haiku is the deposit of a xing, the stirring crystallised), and in the form of the travel diary itself, the turning of them toward another, the sharing of the caught moment with a reader and, within the journey, with the companion Sora who travelled beside him. Bashō’s aesthetic of sabi and the lightness he called karumi are, among other things, disciplines of the perception of contingent beauty, trained capacities to catch and be moved by the small, the passing, the un-grand, exactly the contingencies the purposive gaze misses.
The second is the Chinese tradition of the landscape travel-record and the landscape poem, the youji of writers from Liu Zongyuan to Xu Xiake, and the landscape poetry of Xie Lingyun, Wang Wei, and their lineage, in which the journey into mountains and waters is at once a literal travel and a discipline of perception, the cultivation of an eye and a heart attuned to the beauty of the contingent and the spacious. The Chinese landscape aesthetic is, in a deep sense, an aesthetic of spaciousness: the valuing of emptiness in the painting and the poem, the significance of what is not depicted, the use of the void, the unbrushed silk, the unsaid word, the empty distance, as the very medium of beauty. This is the aesthetic correlate of the eleventh chapter’s metaphysics of emptiness (§2.8): a whole tradition of perception trained to find the use of the vessel in its emptiness, the beauty of the landscape in its spacious void.
The third is the broader figure, common to the tradition, of travel as a discipline of perception and not merely a movement through space, the wayfarer whose journey is an education of the eye and the heart, who travels in order to learn to perceive. This figure gives the paper’s eventual generalisation an ancient precedent: the point of the journey was never the destinations but the trained perception the journey cultivated, the eye for contingent and spacious beauty that, once trained, could be exercised anywhere. The masters of this tradition are, in the paper’s terms, those who completed the movement from scaffolding to skill, who used the journey to cultivate a perception that they then carried into all of life, so that for them the whole world became a landscape to be perceived with the wayfarer’s trained and open eye. They are the proof that the capacity this section describes can be cultivated to mastery, and the bridge to the question of how such cultivation is done, the question of aesthetic education, to which the paper now turns.
§12 Aesthetic Education - Cultivating the Judgement of the Good
If the construction of the field is an aesthetic problem (§7.6), and the perception of what arises within it is an aesthetic skill (§11), then the cultivation of the capacity for both is an aesthetic education. This is the philosophical summit of the paper, and also its most exposed wager, for it will argue that aesthetic education is not a refinement added to ethical life but, at the limit, the most fundamental form of ethical education there is. The section advances three theses of increasing radicality. The first, already stated, is that the construction of the field is aesthetic. The second distinguishes two kinds of beauty, the received and the enacted, and locates the second at the root of the long-noted kinship between practical ethics and the aesthetic. The third, the most radical, is that ethical judgement, at the point where rules give out, operates aesthetically, so that the good cannot finally be separated from the beautiful, and the deepest ethical education is aesthetic. The section defends the third thesis in a guarded form, confronts it with its strongest objectors, surveys the classical and modern theories of aesthetic education, descends to the question of how the relevant capacities are actually cultivated between two people, and closes on the difficulty that the whole edifice rests upon: that beautiful things are difficult.
§12.1 Why aesthetic education, and not simply ethical education
The claim that the cultivation of the good is an aesthetic rather than a narrowly ethical education depends on a result established in the previous paper and reactivated here: that the good is not programmable (Paper XX). If the good of an intimate relation could be reduced to a set of rules, do this, refrain from that, follow the procedure, then its cultivation would be a matter of teaching the rules, and ethical education would be the transmission of a code. But the good of a relation cannot be so reduced; it requires, in each concrete case, a judgement of what is fitting here, now, with this person, that no rule determines, because the concrete case always exceeds the rule’s generality. This was the lesson of the previous paper’s closing recognition that the good must be judged afresh in the flesh of each particular relation, and it has a direct consequence for education: if the good is not a code, its cultivation cannot be the transmission of a code, and must instead be the cultivation of the judgement that operates where the code gives out.
What is the structure of that judgement? It is the judgement of what is fitting in a concrete case that no rule subsumes, a holistic, situated grasp of the right proportion, the apt response, the fitting measure, exercised on a particular that no universal exhausts. And this, the section will argue, is the structure of aesthetic judgement. The judgement that catches the right measure in a concrete case, where no rule can supply it, is the same judgement in the construction of a field, the perception of a contingency, and the response to an ethical situation; it is, in each, a felt grasp of the fitting that is irreducible to procedure. If that is so, then the cultivation of the good is the cultivation of this judgement, and the cultivation of this judgement is aesthetic education, the education of the capacity to perceive and respond to the fitting where no rule can be followed. This is why the education the good requires is aesthetic and not merely ethical in the narrow, rule-transmitting sense: because the good itself, at its un-programmable core, requires a judgement whose structure is aesthetic.
§12.2 Thesis Two - receptive beauty and enactive beauty
Before the most radical thesis, a distinction must be drawn that the discussion has so far left implicit, and that proves to be the hinge between the aesthetic and the ethical. Beauty, as it figures in this paper, is of two kinds.
Thesis Two. Beauty divides into the receptive and the enactive. Receptive beauty is beauty as received, the beauty of the wildflower, the landscape, the work of art, met in the aesthetic perception that beholds it. Enactive beauty is beauty as done, the beauty of an action, a response, a way of treating another, made beautiful in the doing. The first is perceived; the second is enacted. And it is enactive beauty that grounds the long-observed kinship between practical ethics and the aesthetic, for to act so that one’s treatment of another is itself beautiful is to enact the good as beauty.
Receptive beauty is the beauty the previous section was concerned with: the contingent beauty caught in perception, the flower seen and the landscape beheld, beauty as something that arrives and is received. It is the object of the aesthetic perception of contingency, and its cultivation is the cultivation of the receptive capacities, the trained eye, the awakened xing, the openness to what the world offers. But there is a second beauty that is not received but made: the beauty of a gesture, a response, a way of meeting another person, that is beautiful in the way it is done. A response to a partner’s distress can be beautiful, apt, proportioned, generous in exactly the right measure, neither too much nor too little, fitting the moment as a perfect line fits a poem. A way of treating another can have grace, the way a movement or a phrase can have grace. This is enactive beauty: not beauty beheld but beauty enacted, the beauty of the deed.
The distinction matters because enactive beauty is where the aesthetic and the ethical meet, and meet not by analogy but in substance. To act well toward another, to respond to their need with exactly the right measure, to meet their vulnerability with exactly the fitting grace, to treat them with the aptness that the situation calls for and no rule prescribes, is at once an ethical achievement and an aesthetic one, and the two are one rather than two descriptions of the achievement. The rightness of the response is its fittingness, and its fittingness is its beauty; the well-met moment is the beautifully-met moment, and there is no separating, in it, the ethical aptness from the aesthetic grace. This is why practical ethics has so often been felt to have an aesthetic dimension, why we speak of a response as graceful, of a life as beautiful, of conduct as fitting; the kinship is a recognition that enacted goodness is enacted beauty rather than a metaphor borrowed from art, that to do the fitting thing is to make a small beautiful thing of one’s action. Enactive beauty is the practical beauty of the well-done deed, and its cultivation is the cultivation of the capacity to act beautifully, which is, the next thesis will argue, indistinguishable at its root from the capacity to act well.
§12.3 Thesis Three - ethical judgement is, at its limit, aesthetic
The third thesis is the paper’s most radical, and it is advanced with the care its radicality demands. It is stated first in a guarded form, which the paper defends; then in an extreme form, which the paper entertains as a genuine temptation and holds open rather than asserts.
Thesis Three (guarded form). At the point where rules are exhausted by the concrete, which is every point at which a genuinely particular ethical situation must be met, ethical judgement operates aesthetically. Practical wisdom, at its summit, coincides with aesthetic judgement: both are the holistic, non-conceptual grasp of what is fitting in a concrete case that no rule subsumes. The cultivation of the good is therefore, at its core, the cultivation of aesthetic judgement, and the deepest ethical education is an aesthetic education.
The argument for the guarded form proceeds in two steps, the first structural and the second concerning purity. The structural step is this. Ethical life cannot be exhaustively governed by rules, because rules are general and situations are particular, and the particular always in principle exceeds the general; there is always a gap between the rule and the case, which judgement must cross. What crosses it? Not another rule, for that would only reproduce the gap; but a capacity to grasp, in the concrete situation, what is fitting, a capacity Aristotle named phronesis, practical wisdom, the perception of the right thing to do in the particular case, which he was careful to say could not be reduced to rules and belonged to perception rather than to demonstration. Now consider the structure of aesthetic judgement as Kant analysed it: the judgement of beauty is, for Kant, a reflective judgement, one that finds the universal in the particular rather than subsuming the particular under a given universal; it is non-conceptual, it does not apply a determinate concept, yet it claims a kind of universality; it is the free play of the faculties grasping a purposiveness without a determinate purpose, a fittingness with no rule that the fittingness instances. The two structures, phronesis and aesthetic judgement, are, the thesis claims, the same structure: both are the non-conceptual grasp of a fitting particular that no rule subsumes, the finding of the right measure in the concrete where no determinate universal can be applied. Phronesis at its summit and aesthetic judgement coincide: the perception of the fitting in the ethical case and the perception of the fitting in the aesthetic case are one capacity, exercised on different materials. This is the bridge Kant’s third Critique was written to build, the judgement that mediates between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom, and the thesis takes it at its word: the faculty that judges beauty is the faculty that, at its limit, judges the good.
The second step concerns purity, and it is the heart of the matter and the author’s own deepest reason for the thesis. Consider the difference between two ways of doing the right thing. In the first, one does the right thing because a rule, an obligation, an internalised norm, requires it: one has been formed to act so, and one acts so because one is so formed. In the second, one does the right thing because one perceives, freshly and for oneself, that it is the fitting thing to do, because one sees its fittingness, is moved by it, and enacts it out of that perception, as one might be moved to complete a line of verse in the only way that fits. The two may issue in the same outward act; but they differ in their source, and the difference is the difference between a structured second nature and a free response. The rule-governed good is structured humanity: a humanity formed by the internalisation of external norms, acting rightly because it has been built to, its rightness the operation of an installed structure rather than a free perception. Such goodness is reliable, and it is not nothing, a world of people reliably formed to act well is far better than its opposite, but it is not pure, for it is heteronomous in the deepest sense: the source of the action is the installed structure, the internalised rule, the formed disposition, and not the free perceiving subject. The aesthetically-grounded good is different. To act rightly because one perceives, oneself and freshly, the fittingness of the act, to be moved by the beauty of the fitting response and to enact it out of that being-moved, is to act from a source that is one’s own free perception rather than an installed structure; and only such action, the thesis holds, has purely ethical character, because only in it is the subject the genuine origin of the good it does, rather than the executor of a structure built into it. The rule-governed good is safe, reliable, and structured; the aesthetically-grounded good is dangerous, unreliable, and free, and only the free is pure. This is why, on the deepest version of the thesis, the truly ethical can only be the aesthetic: because only a goodness that springs from the free perception of the fitting, rather than from the operation of an internalised rule, is the goodness of a free subject rather than the functioning of a structured one.
Thesis Three (extreme form, entertained not asserted). Every ethical question is, at bottom, an aesthetic question. There is, finally, no good that is not the beautiful enacted, and no ethical judgement that is not, at its root, a perception of the fitting, so that ethics is a province of aesthetics, and the good a name for the beautiful in the realm of action.
The extreme form is a genuine temptation, and the paper neither asserts nor dismisses it. It is the thought that the whole distinction between ethics and aesthetics is, at the limit, unsustainable, that what we call the good just is the beautiful as it appears in conduct, and that the apparent difference between them is an artefact of treating ethics as a matter of rules and aesthetics as a matter of taste, a difference that dissolves once one sees that ethics at its core is also a matter of the perception of the fitting. The paper marks this as the radical horizon of its argument and declines to assert it, for reasons the next subsection makes clear: the extreme form, unguarded, courts a danger severe enough that responsibility requires holding it at the level of a temptation rather than a thesis. But it records it, because the guarded form points toward it, and an honest account does not conceal the precipice to which its own argument leads.
§12.4 The strongest objections, and the reply
A thesis this radical must face its strongest objectors at full strength, and there are two whose force is sufficient to require, not refutation, but the guarding that the thesis has already built into itself. The series’ practice has been to let the hardest objection stand at full force (Paper XX); the practice is kept here.
The Kantian objection - the heteronomy of inclination. The first objection comes from Kant’s own ethics, and it is sharp precisely because the thesis leaned on Kant’s aesthetics. For Kant the moral worth of an action lies in its being done from duty, from respect for the moral law, and not from inclination, however amiable; an action done because one is moved to it, because one feels its fittingness or is drawn by its beauty, is for Kant exactly not a moral action in the full sense, but at best a fortunate pathological one, done from feeling rather than from the rational recognition of duty. On this view the thesis has it exactly backwards: to ground the good in the aesthetic perception of the fitting, in being-moved by the beauty of the response, is to ground it in inclination, and inclination is precisely what Kant excludes from the purely moral. The aesthetically-grounded good, far from being the pure good, would be on Kantian grounds the impure one, the good done from feeling rather than from law.
The reply does not deny the Kantian point but relocates the disagreement. The objection assumes that the alternative to acting-from-feeling is acting-from-the-rational-law, and that purity lies with the latter. But the thesis’s purity argument was directed at exactly this: the rational law, internalised and operative as the source of one’s action, is itself a structure, the structure of duty installed in the subject, and action from it is, in the sense the thesis specified, the operation of an installed structure rather than the free response of the perceiving subject. The thesis and Kant agree that inclination as mere pathological impulse is no ground for the good; they disagree about whether the free perception of the fitting is “inclination” in that sense. The thesis holds that it is not, that the perception of the fitting, the being-moved by the beauty of the right response, is a judgement rather than a blind pathological pull, the reflective grasp of a fittingness, which has more in common with Kant’s own aesthetic judgement (universal, disinterested, reflective) than with the inclinations he excluded. The disagreement, then, is whether the faculty of reflective judgement, which Kant himself placed between nature and freedom, can be the source of moral action; Kant says the source must be pure practical reason, the thesis says the source can be the reflective perception of the fitting. This is a real and unresolved disagreement, and the paper does not pretend to settle it against Kant; it claims only that the thesis is not refuted by the charge of grounding the good in mere inclination, because the perception of the fitting is a judgement rather than mere inclination, and that whether such judgement can be a pure ground of the good is exactly the open question the thesis raises against the Kantian orthodoxy, not a confusion the orthodoxy disposes of.
The objection from the aestheticisation of ethics - the fascist spectre. The second objection is graver, because it is historical and not merely conceptual, and because the previous paper already conceded its force in another form (Paper XX). To make the good a matter of the beautiful, to aestheticise ethics, is to invite the most dangerous confusion of the last century: the aestheticisation of politics that Benjamin diagnosed at the heart of fascism, the treatment of the political as a work of art to be composed, the people as material to be shaped into a beautiful whole, the leader as artist and the nation as artwork. If the good is the beautiful enacted, what prevents the beautiful-but-monstrous, the magnificently staged rally, the aesthetically perfect and morally abominable order, the cruelty committed with style? The previous paper conceded exactly this point in its own register, granting that a relation could be formally beautiful, could have the geometry of the good cycle, and yet be unjust, so that aesthetic form alone does not secure goodness (Paper XX). The objection here is the same at a higher pitch: the aestheticisation of ethics threatens to license the beautiful atrocity, to make style a sufficient credential for the good, and history shows where that leads.
This is the objection that forces the thesis into its guarded form and keeps the extreme form a temptation rather than an assertion. The reply has three parts, and none of them fully dissolves the danger, which is as it should be. First, the thesis distinguishes receptive and enactive beauty, and the fascist aestheticisation is an aestheticisation of the spectacle, of receptive beauty, the beauty beheld by the masses in the staged rally, not of the enactive beauty of how persons are treated; and enactive beauty, the beauty of the fitting treatment of this person, is precisely what the beautiful atrocity lacks, since the atrocity treats persons as material for a spectacle rather than meeting them in the aptness their particularity demands. The fascist spectacle is receptively magnificent and enactively monstrous; the distinction the thesis draws is exactly the one that the beautiful atrocity violates. Second, the enactive beauty the thesis prizes is inseparable, by the analysis of the whole series, from the non-extractive, non-dominative treatment of the other, the fitting response is the one that meets the other as an end and returns rather than retains (Paper XX, Paper XVII), so that a “beautiful” treatment that reduced the other to material would, on the thesis’s own account of enactive beauty, not be beautiful but its counterfeit, the meretricious mistaken for the beautiful. Third, and most honestly, the danger is real and the guarding is necessary precisely because the extreme form, unguarded, could not make these distinctions stick: if every ethical question simply were an aesthetic one, with no further criterion, then the magnificent and the monstrous could not be told apart by anything but taste, and taste can be trained to monstrosity. It is exactly to keep the criterion of enactive beauty, the fitting, non-extractive meeting of the particular other, from collapsing into mere spectacular magnificence that the thesis must be held in its guarded form, in which the aesthetic judgement that grounds the good is the judgement of enactive fittingness and not of receptive splendour. The fascist spectre is the standing proof that the extreme form is too dangerous to assert; it is the reason the paper entertains that form as a precipice rather than standing on it. The beautiful that grounds the good is the beauty of the fitting deed, not the beauty of the magnificent show, and the whole weight of the thesis rests on a distinction that history shows to be perpetually under threat of erasure.
§12.5 The classical theories of aesthetic education
The thought that the cultivation of the human being passes essentially through the beautiful is old and deep, and the thesis of this paper is its inheritor rather than its inventor. The classical theories are surveyed in the table below; the text draws out the four that bear most directly on the argument.
The foundational modern text is Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, and it is foundational precisely because it makes the claim this paper makes: that the way to a free and whole humanity runs through the aesthetic. Schiller’s problem was the one this paper has met in another form, how a being divided between sensuous inclination and rational law might become free and whole rather than either the slave of impulse or the executor of an installed law. His answer was the play-drive (Spieltrieb), the faculty that arises in the free play between the sensuous and the rational and that is exercised paradigmatically in the experience of beauty; in aesthetic play the human being is, Schiller said, most fully human, because there alone the two halves of its nature are reconciled in freedom rather than one subordinated to the other. This is, in a different vocabulary, exactly the thesis’s contrast between the structured humanity of the installed rule and the free humanity of the aesthetic response: Schiller’s aesthetic education is the cultivation of the freedom that lies beyond both impulse and law, in the play where the human being is whole. The paper’s purity argument is Schiller’s insight in the register of ethics, that only the aesthetically free response is the response of a whole and free human being, rather than of one half of a divided one obeying the other.
The decisive analysis of the faculty is Kant’s, already invoked: the Critique of Judgment supplies the structure of the reflective aesthetic judgement on which the whole thesis turns, and it is Kant who frames that faculty as the bridge between nature and freedom, the very mediation the thesis exploits. Aristotle supplies the ethical half of the bridge, the phronesis whose structure the thesis identifies with aesthetic judgement. And the Confucian tradition supplies what the Western sources lack: an explicit, institutionalised programme of aesthetic education as the core of ethical formation. The Analects states it with a concision the West never matched: 兴于诗，立于礼，成于乐, one is aroused by poetry, established by ritual, and completed by music. Here the cultivation of the person begins in the affective stirring of poetry (the xing of §11.2) and culminates in music, the ethical formation of the human being completed in an aesthetic accomplishment, the harmony of the well-formed character figured as, and achieved through, the harmony of music. This is the classical locus of the paper’s two beauties: xing, the arousal by poetry, is receptive beauty at the root of formation; cheng yu yue, completion in music, is enactive beauty as the summit of the formed character, the life made harmonious as a piece of music is made harmonious. The Confucian sequence is the thesis of this section stated two and a half millennia early: ethical cultivation begins and ends in the aesthetic.
| Source | Core concept | Bearing on the thesis |
|---|---|---|
| Schiller | The play-drive (Spieltrieb); beauty as the reconciliation of sense and reason | The freedom beyond both impulse and law is reached through the aesthetic — the paper’s purity argument in its original form. |
| Kant | Reflective aesthetic judgement; judgement as the bridge of nature and freedom | Supplies the structure of the faculty the thesis identifies with phronesis; the mediation the thesis exploits. |
| Aristotle | Phronesis: perception of the fitting in the particular, irreducible to rule | The ethical half of the bridge; practical wisdom as non-conceptual grasp of the fitting. |
| Confucius | 兴于诗，立于礼，成于乐: aroused by poetry, completed in music | Ethical formation begins (xing, receptive) and culminates (music, enactive) in the aesthetic. |
| Plato | The difficulty of the beautiful; beauty and the good ascending together | χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful resists definition — the un-programmability at the section’s close. |
| Daoist | 虚; the use of emptiness; the uncarved | The aesthetic education of the perception of spaciousness and the un-forced. |
§12.6 The modern theories of aesthetic education
The modern theories, surveyed in the table below, develop the classical inheritance in three directions that matter to the paper: the democratisation of aesthetic experience, its critical and emancipatory edge, and its concrete pedagogy.
Dewey’s Art as Experience performs the decisive democratising move, and it is the modern source closest to the paper’s own argument. Against the confinement of the aesthetic to museums and masterpieces, Dewey located aesthetic experience in the consummation of ordinary experience, in any stretch of lived experience that achieves a certain wholeness, completion, and felt unity, which he called “an experience.” The roadside flower, caught and consummated into a complete small experience, is aesthetic in exactly Dewey’s sense; the aesthetic perception of contingency is the Deweyan finding of the aesthetic in the texture of ordinary life, and the paper’s insistence that the good of the everyday is available without grand apparatus is Dewey’s democratisation carried into the ethics of intimacy. Cai Yuanpei’s programme of “replacing religion with aesthetic education” carries the democratising impulse into a whole national pedagogy, proposing aesthetic cultivation as the universal, secular path to the formation of a free and elevated humanity, the institutional dream of exactly the thesis this paper argues.
The critical edge is supplied by the Frankfurt tradition. Adorno’s aesthetics locates in the genuine aesthetic experience a resistance to instrumental reason, the aesthetic as the comportment that refuses to reduce its object to a use, that beholds rather than exploits, and so stands against the total administration of the world by the logic of means and ends. This gives the paper’s aesthetic perception its critical-political dimension, taken up in the next section: to perceive aesthetically, to behold the contingent for its own sake rather than for its use, is already a small refusal of the instrumentalisation that the administered world imposes. Rancière sharpens this into an explicit politics: the aesthetic is the “distribution of the sensible,” the prior partition of what can be perceived, by whom, as significant, so that to alter what is perceptible, to make the overlooked perceptible, is a political act, and aesthetic education, the cultivation of new capacities of perception, is the redistribution of the sensible. The cultivation of the aesthetic perception of contingency is, in Rancière’s terms, the acquisition of a capacity to perceive what the dominant distribution renders imperceptible, a politics of perception, whose stakes the following section will make concrete.
| Source | Contribution | Bearing on the paper |
|---|---|---|
| Dewey | “An experience”; the aesthetic in the consummation of ordinary life | Democratises the aesthetic; the roadside flower is aesthetic in Dewey’s exact sense. |
| Cai Yuanpei | Aesthetic education in place of religion; universal secular formation | The institutional dream of the thesis; aesthetic cultivation as the path to a free humanity. |
| Adorno | The aesthetic as resistance to instrumental reason | Beholding-not-using as a refusal of administration; the critical edge of perception. |
| Rancière | The distribution of the sensible; aesthetics as politics | Cultivating perception redistributes the perceptible — a politics of perception. |
| Murdoch | Attention; the just and loving gaze | The moral work of attention is aesthetic in structure — seeing truly is loving rightly. |
| Scarry | Beauty as prompting justice; the decentred, fair regard | Receptive beauty trains the fair attention that the just response requires. |
| Modern pedagogy (Montessori, Steiner, Greene, Eisner) | Sensory education; artistic formation; aesthetic education as practice | Concrete methods for cultivating perception — how the capacities are actually trained. |
Two further modern sources deserve note for joining the aesthetic to the ethical in exactly the paper’s way. Iris Murdoch made attention, the just and loving gaze, the patient regard that sees the other truly, the centre of the moral life, and her attention is aesthetic in structure: it is the disinterested, careful beholding that the aesthetic perception of a thing requires, turned upon a person, so that to see the other justly is to behold them with the regard one gives a thing of beauty. Elaine Scarry argued that the experience of beauty trains the fair, decentred attention that justice requires, that to be stopped and decentred by a beautiful thing is to practice the very unselfing that just regard for others demands. Both are, in the paper’s terms, theorists of how receptive beauty schools enactive beauty: how the trained perception of the beautiful becomes the capacity for the fitting, attentive, just response. And the concrete pedagogies, Montessori’s education of the senses, Steiner’s artistic formation of the whole child, the aesthetic-education programmes of Greene and Eisner, supply what a paper on cultivation must not omit: actual methods by which the capacities of aesthetic perception are trained, evidence that the aesthetic education the thesis requires is a practiced art with a literature of its own rather than a pious wish.
§12.7 How it is cultivated - the mutual aesthetic education of two
The theories describe the cultivation of a person; this paper’s concern is the cultivation of a “we,” and the distinctive claim of this subsection is that between two people aesthetic education is mutual, that each is the other’s teacher, and the relation itself a school. This is not a metaphor. The capacities at issue, the perception of contingent beauty, the receptivity of xing, the judgement of the enactively fitting, are cultivated, between two people, largely by each other, in three concrete ways.
The first is the pedagogy of look. When one partner catches a contingent beauty and turns it toward the other, look, they do not merely share a moment; they teach a way of seeing. The turning-toward is a demonstration: it shows the other what is worth catching, trains the other’s eye toward the kind of thing one has learned to see, awakens in the other a xing they might not have had. Over time, two people who habitually turn contingent beauties toward each other educate each other’s perception, each becoming more able to catch what the other catches, until they come to share a trained sensibility, a common eye for the beautiful, built up from a thousand acts of mutual showing. The relation becomes a school of perception in which each is continually teaching the other to see, and the curriculum is the contingent beauty of the shared world.
The second is the pedagogy of shared retelling, which is also the reproduction of experience (§4.2) seen from the side of aesthetic education. To retell a shared journey, to return together to the beauty once caught, is to re-cultivate the perception of it, to deepen, in the retelling, the capacity to perceive what the experience held, and to refine together the sensibility that first caught it. Shared retelling is mutual aesthetic education exercised upon the past: the joint re-perceiving of what was lived, by which the two refine together their common capacity to perceive. This connects the paper’s political economy to its aesthetics: the reproduction of experience is, at the same time, the mutual cultivation of the sensibility that perceives experience, so that the labour that conserves the relation’s wealth is the same labour that educates its perception.
The third is the pedagogy of enacted beauty: each partner teaches the other the enactively fitting by enacting it. When one meets the other’s vulnerability with exactly the right measure, responds to their distress with exactly the fitting grace, the other learns, not by precept but by undergoing, what the fitting response is, and is formed toward the capacity to give it in turn. To be treated beautifully is to be educated in the enactment of beauty; the well-met partner learns, from being well met, how to meet. The relation is thus a reciprocal school of enactive beauty, each forming the other’s capacity for the fitting response by the gift of fitting responses received. And this is the deepest sense in which the relation is the mutual cultivation of the good: by treating each other beautifully, two people educate each other in the enactment of the good, so that the relation becomes, over a lifetime, a mutual aesthetic education in the most consequential of all the arts, the art of meeting another person fittingly, which is the same, by the argument of this section, as the art of treating them well.
§12.8 χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά - that the beautiful is difficult
It remains to name the difficulty on which the whole edifice rests, and it is fitting to name it with the oldest words for it. In Plato’s Hippias Major, Socrates and the sophist Hippias attempt to say what the beautiful is, and fail; Hippias, who can speak fluently and at length on every other subject, is reduced, on this one, to a succession of definitions that Socrates dismantles one by one, until the dialogue ends not in an answer but in the proverb Socrates offers in place of one: χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά, beautiful things are difficult. It is a remarkable ending. The man who could define anything could not define the beautiful; the dialogue that sought the essence of beauty found only its difficulty. And the difficulty is not accidental but essential: the beautiful resists definition because it is not the kind of thing a definition can capture, not a property specifiable by a rule, but exactly the un-ruled fittingness that the whole of this section has been concerned with. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά is the most ancient name for the un-programmability of the beautiful, and by the thesis of this section, of the good.
This difficulty is its confirmation rather than a defect of the account, and it explains the section’s central claim about education. Because the beautiful cannot be reduced to a rule, it cannot be taught, not in the sense in which a rule is taught, by transmission of a content to be applied. It can only be cultivated, developed, in oneself and in another, through long exposure, practice, attention, and the slow refinement of a perception, the way taste is cultivated rather than taught, the way an eye is trained rather than instructed. This is exactly why the cultivation of the good must be an aesthetic education in the deep sense and not a moral instruction: because the good, like the beautiful and for the same reason, cannot be transmitted as a rule but can only be cultivated as a sensibility. And it is why the cultivation is so difficult, so slow, so resistant to method, so dependent on the long mutual schooling of two people who teach each other to see and to meet over a whole shared life. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful is difficult, the good is difficult, and they are difficult in the same way and for the same reason, because neither is a rule to be followed but a fitting to be perceived, and the perception of the fitting is the most difficult and the most uninstructable of all the human capacities, the one that can only be grown. That it is difficult is not a reason to doubt that it is the heart of the matter; it is the sign that one has reached the heart of the matter, the place where Socrates himself was reduced to a proverb, and where this paper, having followed the good to its root in the beautiful, can do no more than name the difficulty and turn to the cultivation that is the only response to it.
§13 The Continuity of Ethics and Aesthetics - A History of the Debate
The third thesis, that ethical judgement, at its limit, is aesthetic, was advanced in the previous section as though it were a bold novelty to be defended against objections. It is not a novelty. It is the latest entry in one of the longest and most consequential debates in the history of philosophy: the debate over whether ethics and aesthetics are continuous or discontinuous, whether the good and the beautiful are at bottom one or are irreducibly distinct. This section sets the thesis in that debate, and the placement is not a scholarly formality but a strengthening: a thesis that stands within a long lineage of serious thought, and that can locate itself precisely against the strongest statements of the opposing view, is a different and sturdier thing than a bold claim defended in isolation. The section surveys the affirmative lineage, the tradition that has held the good and the beautiful to be continuous, then confronts the debate’s most powerful negative pole, Kierkegaard’s insistence on their rupture, which is the true strongest opponent of the paper’s thesis. It closes by locating Thesis Three within the debate and stating how it answers the rupture.
§13.1 The affirmative lineage - the good and the beautiful as one
The thought that the good and the beautiful are continuous, that to be good is, at the deepest level, to be beautiful in one’s being and one’s action, and that the perception of the good is akin to the perception of the beautiful, is ancient and recurrent, and it forms a lineage the paper’s thesis joins. The lineage is surveyed in the table below; its principal moments deserve discussion.
The Greek root is the word itself: kalokagathia (kalos kai agathos), the ideal of the beautiful-and-good as a single excellence, the noble person whose goodness and beauty are one, which expressed in a single hyphenated virtue the Greek sense that the admirable in conduct and the beautiful in form were aspects of one human excellence rather than separate achievements. Plato gave this metaphysical depth: in the ascent of the Symposium, the lover rises toward a Beauty that is also the Good, the two Forms allied at the summit, so that the love of beauty rightly pursued becomes the love of the good, and the perception of beauty is the beginning of the soul’s turn toward the good. The proximity of kalon and agathon in Plato is the metaphysical charter of the affirmative lineage: beauty and goodness ascend together, and at the height they are scarcely to be distinguished.
The British moral-sense tradition gave the continuity an epistemological form. Shaftesbury, its founder, held that we perceive moral good and evil by a moral sense that is explicitly modelled on, and continuous with, the sense of beauty: just as we perceive the harmony and proportion of a beautiful form by an immediate sense rather than by reasoning, so we perceive the harmony and proportion of a virtuous character by an analogous immediate sense, and virtue is, on this view, a kind of beauty, the beauty of a well-proportioned soul, perceived by a taste for the moral as the connoisseur perceives the beauty of a work by a taste for the beautiful. For Shaftesbury the good and the beautiful are perceived by the same kind of faculty, a sense or taste, and moral excellence simply is a species of beauty, the beauty of character. This is the affirmative thesis in its clearest early-modern form, and it is the direct ancestor of the paper’s claim that the perception of the good is structurally aesthetic.
Schiller carried the continuity to its highest point in the concept of the beautiful soul (die schöne Seele). For Schiller, the merely dutiful person, who does the right thing against inclination by force of moral will, has not yet achieved the highest moral condition; that condition is reached only when duty and inclination are reconciled, when one does the good gladly, when virtue has become a second nature so thoroughly that the right action flows from the whole person without inner conflict, and this reconciled condition, in which morality has become grace, Schiller called the beautiful soul. The beautiful soul does not struggle to be good against itself; it is good as a beautiful thing is beautiful, effortlessly, gracefully, as an expression of its whole reconciled nature. Here the continuity of ethics and aesthetics reaches its summit: moral perfection is figured as beauty, the perfected character as a beautiful soul, the highest good as the achievement of moral grace. The paper’s purity argument (§12.3) is a near descendant of Schiller’s beautiful soul: the freely-perceived fitting response, issuing from the whole person rather than from the operation of an installed rule, is the action of a beautiful soul, and its superiority to the merely dutiful is Schiller’s superiority of grace to struggle.
The twentieth century gave the continuity its most compressed statement and several of its most careful defences. Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, wrote the lapidary sentence that stands almost as the paper’s motto: Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins, ethics and aesthetics are one. The remark is enigmatic and the Tractatus does not unfold it, but in its context, among the propositions on the mystical, on the inexpressible, on what shows itself but cannot be said, it locates ethics and aesthetics together as concerned with the same thing: not facts within the world but the meaning or value of the world as a whole, the dimension that cannot be stated in propositions but shows itself, and that ethics (the value of action) and aesthetics (the value of the beautiful) approach as one. Later in the century, and in a quite different key, Iris Murdoch made attention the centre of the moral life and made attention aesthetic in structure: the moral task is to see truly, to attend to reality justly and lovingly, to overcome the self’s distorting fantasy and perceive the other as they are, and this just and loving attention is the very attention the perception of beauty requires, so that the experience of beauty, which decentres the self and fixes it on something other, is a training-ground for the unselfing that moral attention demands. Martha Nussbaum argued that literature is itself a form of moral philosophy, that the fine-grained perception of particulars which the novel cultivates is exactly the perception that practical wisdom requires, and that the moral life depends on a capacity for perception, the seeing of the morally salient features of a concrete situation, that is cultivated by art and is irreducible to the application of principles. And Bernard Williams, with the broader anti-theory current, mounted a sustained attack on the pretension of ethical theory to reduce the moral life to a system of principles, insisting on the ineliminable role of judgement, character, and the perception of the particular, a critique that, while not itself a continuity thesis, clears the ground for one by denying that ethics is the application of a code and affirming that it rests on capacities of perception and judgement that the code cannot replace. The affirmative lineage thus runs unbroken from kalokagathia to the contemporary priority of perception over principle, and the paper’s Thesis Three is its inheritor.
| Source | Form of the continuity | Bearing on Thesis Three |
|---|---|---|
| Greek kalokagathia | The beautiful-and-good as one human excellence | The ideal in which goodness and beauty are aspects of one excellence. |
| Plato | Kalon and agathon allied at the summit of the ascent | Beauty and goodness ascend together; perceiving beauty begins the turn to the good. |
| Shaftesbury | The moral sense modelled on the sense of beauty | Virtue is a species of beauty, perceived by a taste; direct ancestor of the thesis. |
| Schiller | The beautiful soul: virtue become grace | Moral perfection as beauty; the purity argument’s near ancestor. |
| Wittgenstein | “Ethics and aesthetics are one” (Tractatus 6.421) | Both concern the value of the world that shows but cannot be said. |
| Murdoch | Attention: the just and loving gaze, aesthetic in structure | Moral seeing is aesthetic seeing; beauty trains moral attention. |
| Nussbaum | Literature as moral philosophy; perception over principle | Practical wisdom is fine-grained perception, cultivated by art. |
| Williams | Anti-theory: judgement and character over system | Clears the ground: ethics is not the application of a code. |
§13.2 The temptation and the danger - Nietzsche
Before the strongest opponent, a figure must be named who is neither simply for nor against the continuity but who marks both its temptation and its danger: Nietzsche. For Nietzsche gave the continuity of ethics and aesthetics its most intoxicating and most perilous formulation: that existence is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon, that the value of life is finally aesthetic rather than moral, that the moral interpretation of existence is to be overcome and replaced by an aesthetic one in which life is affirmed as one affirms a work of art, beyond good and evil. This is the continuity thesis pushed past the point the paper will follow it: not the claim that ethical judgement is aesthetic in structure, but the claim that the ethical is to be replaced by the aesthetic, that morality is a falsification to be overcome in favour of the aesthetic justification of life. Nietzsche is the temptation of the extreme form of Thesis Three (§12.3) made into a philosophy: the abolition of the ethical into the aesthetic, the aesthetic justification of existence that leaves good and evil behind.
And he is, in the same gesture, its danger. For the aesthetic justification of existence, unmoored from any ethical constraint, is precisely the thought that the previous section identified as the precipice, the licence for the beautiful-but-monstrous, the aestheticisation that can find existence “justified” as a spectacle regardless of its cruelty (§12.4). Nietzsche marks the point at which the continuity thesis, pushed to the replacement of ethics by aesthetics, becomes dangerous; and his presence in the debate is the standing reminder of why the paper holds Thesis Three in its guarded form and entertains the extreme form only as a temptation. The paper inherits the affirmative lineage’s claim that ethics and aesthetics are continuous, that ethical judgement is aesthetic in structure, but it refuses Nietzsche’s further claim that ethics is therefore to be replaced by aesthetics, that the good is to be abolished into the beautiful. Continuity is not replacement. That ethical judgement is aesthetic in structure does not entail that anything aesthetically affirmable is thereby good; it entails that the perception of the good has the structure of aesthetic perception, which is a claim about the faculty, not a licence to abolish the distinction between good and evil into a matter of taste. Nietzsche is the figure who shows what it would mean to cross that line, and why the paper does not cross it.
§13.3 The strongest opponent - Kierkegaard’s rupture
The affirmative lineage has a great opponent, and the paper’s thesis must face it at full strength, for it is the most powerful statement of the discontinuity of ethics and aesthetics ever made, and it comes from a thinker who understood the aesthetic life from within better than its celebrants. Kierkegaard’s Either/Or is built upon the thesis that the aesthetic and the ethical are discontinuous rather than continuous, separated by a qualitative leap, related not as lower and higher on one scale but as two mutually exclusive modes of existence between which one must choose. The very title states it: either the aesthetic or the ethical, not both, not a continuity from one to the other, but an exclusive disjunction demanding a decision. This is the antithesis of everything the affirmative lineage holds, and it is argued by a man who gave the aesthetic life its most seductive and most searching portrayal.
The first volume of Either/Or presents the aesthetic life from the inside: the life organised around the immediate, the interesting, the pleasurable, the beautiful, the life of the aesthete who lives for the cultivation of mood and the avoidance of boredom, who treats existence as material for interesting experience, who is exquisitely sensitive to beauty and incapable of commitment. Kierkegaard portrays this life with such power because he knew it; and his critique is the more devastating for its sympathy. The aesthetic life, he shows, however refined, is finally despair, a despair often unconscious of itself, but despair nonetheless, because the aesthetic existence has no continuity, no self that persists through time, no commitment that binds the moments into a life. The aesthete, living for the interesting moment, is dispersed among moments; he has no self, only a succession of moods and experiences, and beneath his cultivation lies an emptiness, a melancholy, a despair that the relentless pursuit of the interesting is designed not to cure but to outrun. The aesthetic life consumes the world, including other people, as material for its own experience; it cannot love, because love requires a commitment the aesthete cannot make; it cannot become a self, because selfhood requires the continuity the aesthetic existence lacks.
The ethical, in the second volume, is the leap out of this despair, and crucially, it is a leap, not a continuous development. One does not refine the aesthetic life until it becomes ethical; one chooses, by a qualitative decision, to exist ethically rather than aesthetically, and the choice is a discontinuity, a break, a conversion from one mode of existence to another. The ethical life is the life of commitment, continuity, the self that binds itself through time by its choices, marriage rather than seduction, the keeping of vows rather than the cultivation of moods, the becoming of a self through commitment rather than the dispersal of the self among experiences. And the ethical is reached not by perfecting the aesthetic but by renouncing it, by the either/or in which one chooses the ethical against the aesthetic. This is the rupture: the aesthetic and the ethical are not one, not continuous, not aspects of a single excellence; they are opposed modes of existence, and the moral life begins precisely where the aesthetic life is renounced. Against kalokagathia, against the beautiful soul, against “ethics and aesthetics are one,” Kierkegaard sets the either/or: ethics and aesthetics are two, and you must choose.
This is the strongest opponent, and its strength must be granted fully. Kierkegaard is not denying that the aesthetic has value; he is denying that ethical existence is continuous with it, insisting that the move from the aesthetic to the ethical is a break rather than a development, and grounding this on a profound analysis of the aesthetic life’s incapacity for commitment, continuity, and genuine love. If he is right, the paper’s Thesis Three is not merely overstated but fundamentally mistaken: ethical judgement would not be aesthetic at its limit but precisely what one reaches by leaving the aesthetic behind, and to ground the good in aesthetic perception would be to remain in the aesthetic despair the ethical must renounce. The objection is grave, and it cannot be met by the replies the previous section gave to Kant and to the fascist spectre, for it operates at a deeper level: it concerns not whether aesthetic judgement can ground the good, but whether the aesthetic mode of existence is not precisely what the ethical must break with.
§13.4 The reply - the consumptive aesthetic and the enactive aesthetic
The reply to Kierkegaard is the hinge on which the paper’s whole aesthetics turns, and it is made not by denying his analysis but by drawing a distinction within the aesthetic that his account, for all its power, does not draw. Kierkegaard’s aesthete is a particular figure: the consumer of experience, the one who lives for the interesting moment, who treats the world and others as material for his own moods, who cannot commit because commitment would end the pursuit of the next interesting thing. The aesthetic life Kierkegaard anatomises and condemns is the consumptive aesthetic: the aesthetic as the consumption of experience for the self’s own sake, the aesthetic in the register the paper has called, in Lacanian terms, the Imaginary, the captivation, the pleasurable investment, the absorption of the world as material for the self’s experience. And Kierkegaard is entirely right about this aesthetic: it is despair, it cannot love, it cannot found a self, and the ethical must indeed break with it. The consumptive aesthetic and the ethical are discontinuous; on this Kierkegaard and the paper agree completely.
But the consumptive aesthetic is not the whole of the aesthetic, and the distinction the paper drew between receptive and enactive beauty (§12.2) is precisely the distinction Kierkegaard’s account omits. Kierkegaard’s aesthete lives in receptive beauty turned consumptive, beauty received as experience to be consumed for the self. But there is the enactive aesthetic: beauty not consumed but done, the beauty of the fitting response, the grace of the well-met moment, the beauty enacted in how one treats another. And the enactive aesthetic is not consumptive at all; it is the very opposite of the aesthete’s consumption of the world. To respond to the beloved’s vulnerability with exactly the fitting grace is to give oneself rightly to another rather than to consume an experience for oneself; it is an act of commitment, of attention to the other, of the very love the consumptive aesthete cannot manage. The enactive aesthetic is committed, continuous, other-directed, everything the consumptive aesthetic is not, and everything Kierkegaard rightly demanded of the ethical. Indeed, the enactive aesthetic is exactly the beautiful soul of Schiller: the person whose ethical commitment has become grace, whose right action flows beautifully from a reconciled character, whose goodness is enacted as beauty. The enactive aesthetic is not the despair the ethical must renounce; it is the ethical itself, perceived in its beauty.
So the reply to Kierkegaard is this. What ruptures with the ethical is the consumptive aesthetic, the Imaginary captivation, the consumption of experience, the aesthete’s dispersal among moods, and on this rupture the paper agrees: Thesis Three does not ground the good in the consumptive aesthetic, and would join Kierkegaard in renouncing it. What is continuous with the ethical, what is, indeed, the ethical at its highest, is the enactive aesthetic: the beauty of the fitting, committed, other-directed response, the grace of the beautiful soul, the perception of what is fitting in the concrete case that is at once aesthetic and ethical. Kierkegaard’s either/or is real, but it falls within the aesthetic, between its consumptive and enactive forms, not between the aesthetic as such and the ethical. The choice he rightly demands, between the dispersed consumption of experience and the committed becoming of a self, is the choice between the consumptive and the enactive aesthetic, and the enactive side of that choice is continuous with, is indeed identical to, the ethical life he championed. Thesis Three is thus not refuted by Kierkegaard but refined by him: it must specify that the aesthetic with which the ethical is continuous is the enactive and not the consumptive, the giving and not the consuming, the beauty done and not the beauty merely fed upon. With that specification, which the paper’s prior distinction already supplied, the rupture Kierkegaard insisted upon is preserved exactly where it belongs, between two aesthetics, and the continuity the affirmative lineage insisted upon is preserved exactly where it belongs, between the enactive aesthetic and the good. The strongest opponent, fully granted, turns out to deepen rather than defeat the thesis, by forcing the distinction that locates the continuity precisely.
§13.5 The location of Thesis Three in the debate
Thesis Three can now be located exactly in the debate it joins. It stands within the affirmative lineage, with kalokagathia, Shaftesbury’s moral sense, Schiller’s beautiful soul, Wittgenstein’s “ethics and aesthetics are one,” Murdoch’s attention, Nussbaum’s perception, in holding that ethical judgement is continuous with aesthetic judgement, that the perception of the good is structurally the perception of the fitting, that the good is enacted as beauty. It refuses, with the paper’s guarding, Nietzsche’s further step from continuity to replacement, holding that the structural continuity of ethical and aesthetic judgement does not license the abolition of the ethical into the aesthetic. And it answers the strongest opponent, Kierkegaard, not by denying his rupture but by relocating it: the rupture is real, but it falls between the consumptive and the enactive aesthetic, so that the consumptive aesthetic is indeed discontinuous with the ethical (as Kierkegaard held) while the enactive aesthetic is continuous with it (as the affirmative lineage held). The paper’s contribution to this ancient debate is precisely this relocation: the recognition that the dispute between the continuity theorists and Kierkegaard is resolved by distinguishing two aesthetics, and that once they are distinguished, both sides are seen to be right about different things, Kierkegaard about the consumptive aesthetic, the affirmative lineage about the enactive.
This is why the paper can hold Thesis Three in its guarded form with confidence while entertaining the extreme form only as a temptation. The guarded form, that ethical judgement at its limit operates aesthetically, that the cultivation of the good is the cultivation of aesthetic judgement in its enactive form, is the affirmative lineage’s thesis, refined by Kierkegaard’s distinction and defended against Kant’s and Benjamin’s objections. The extreme form, that all ethics is aesthetics, that the good is simply the beautiful, is Nietzsche’s step, the abolition of the distinction, and it is too dangerous to assert because, unguarded, it cannot keep the consumptive aesthetic from passing as the good, cannot keep the beautiful spectacle from licensing the monstrous deed. The whole weight of the paper’s aesthetics rests on the distinction between the two aesthetics, receptive and enactive, consumptive and giving, and on the location of the continuity of ethics and beauty in the enactive alone. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful is difficult, and its difficulty here is the difficulty of holding the continuity precisely where it belongs and the rupture precisely where it belongs, against both the temptation to collapse them entirely and the temptation to rupture them entirely. The good is the beautiful enacted; but only the beautiful enacted, and not the beautiful consumed, is the good, and the whole of the paper’s ethics of intimacy, of travel, of the fitting response and the shared aesthetic accord, lives in that distinction.
§14 The Political Economy of Beauty - The Contested Remainder
The aesthetic perception of contingency and the spaciousness it requires have been presented, so far, as goods of the intimate relation, private capacities for a private flourishing. This section shows that they are nothing so contained. The capacity to perceive the beautiful, and the emptiness that perception requires, have a political-economic weight: they are forces in the world of capital, sought and fought over, and the contest over them is one of the quiet fronts of the struggle between the administered world and what resists it. The argument proceeds through a concrete case, the costly emptiness of a luxury department store, read first as the capture of the aesthetic by capital, then as the site of a remainder capital cannot seize, and finally as one point on a spectrum of such contests. The section closes by drawing from the case an emancipatory thesis: that the cultivation of aesthetic perception is a micro-politics of de-alienation, the building of a capacity that capital may use but cannot confiscate.
§14.1 The costly emptiness of Ginza Six
Consider a fact that ought, on a narrowly economic logic, to be impossible. Ginza Six is among the most expensive retail real estate in Tokyo, and Tokyo’s is among the most expensive in the world; every square metre of its floor space commands a rent that makes its use a matter of the most careful calculation. And yet, on its sixth floor, in the heart of this most costly of spaces, Ginza Six gives over a large expanse to emptiness: a broad, open, uncrowded hall in which, periodically renewed, stands a major work of contemporary art, a vast installation, a hanging sculpture, a piece by an artist of the first rank, and the space is free, open to anyone, selling nothing. On the logic of maximal rent-extraction this is madness; the same floor area, partitioned into boutiques, would yield a fortune in rent that the empty hall forgoes. The store deliberately, expensively, leaves a great space empty and fills it with free beauty. The fact is not unique to Ginza Six, the costly atrium, the foundation gallery, the corporate plaza given to public art, are familiar features of the high-capital landscape, but Ginza Six states it with peculiar clarity, because the contrast between the price of the space and the gratuity of its use is so stark. Why does capital, which wastes nothing, pay so dearly for emptiness and beauty?
§14.2 The first reading - capital’s capture of the aesthetic
The first answer is that this is the most refined calculation rather than madness, and that the apparent gift is in truth the most sophisticated form of extraction. The empty hall and its free beauty are an instrument of it rather than a forgoing of profit, working by a logic more advanced than the rent it appears to waste. The beauty draws people in, it is a lure, an attraction that brings footfall the boutiques alone could not. It lengthens their stay, and lengthened stay is increased spending. It confers upon the whole establishment an aura of culture, refinement, and generosity that raises the brand and justifies the prices throughout. And in the age of the photograph, it manufactures spectacle: the free artwork is endlessly photographed and circulated, a vast unpaid advertisement performed by the visitors themselves, the empty hall converted into the most efficient marketing the money could buy. On this reading the emptiness is the most expensive advertising space in the building, and the free beauty is bait; the gift is a transaction in which the visitor, drawn by beauty and moved to share it, performs unpaid promotional labour and is induced to spend. This is the culture industry in its perfected form, the moment Adorno foresaw when the aesthetic, which ought to resist instrumental reason, is itself wholly instrumentalised, when even beauty, even the contemplative emptiness that seems the very opposite of commerce, is captured and made to serve the logic of the market. The spectacle, in Debord’s sense, has annexed the aesthetic; the beholding of beauty has become a moment in the circulation of capital. On this reading the paper’s own prized capacities are revealed as already colonised: the aesthetic perception of contingency, the love of spacious beauty, are exactly the susceptibilities that capital has learned to farm.
§14.3 The second reading - the irreducible remainder
The first reading is true, and it is not the whole truth, and the dialectical task is to see what it leaves out without denying what it captures. For consider what actually happens to a particular person who, coming to the store for some errand of consumption, rounds a corner on the sixth floor and is met, unexpectedly, by the great open space and the work of art standing in it. Something happens in them. They stop; they are, for a moment, taken, the purposive errand suspended, the gaze caught, a small genuine experience of beauty undergone. And this experience is real, whatever the motive of the space that occasioned it. The store’s calculation does not reach into the experience and hollow it; the person is genuinely stopped, genuinely moved, genuinely, for that moment, released from the purposive consumption that brought them, into the disinterested beholding of something beautiful for its own sake. Here is the remainder the first reading cannot capture: the aesthetic experience, once it occurs, has a reality and a value that exceed and escape the instrumental frame that produced it. This remainder is, in the precise vocabulary of the philosophy of beauty developed earlier (§9.2), the moment of the Real in the aesthetic experience, the kernel that resists symbolisation, and therefore resists the symbolic capture by which capital would convert the experience wholly into a commodity. Capital built the container for its own ends; but what happens in the container, in the person who is genuinely stopped by genuine beauty, is not exhausted by those ends, and cannot be, because the experience of beauty is a genuine suspension of the purposive, and a genuine suspension of the purposive is precisely what serves no purpose, what stands outside the means-end logic even when that logic arranged for it to occur.
This is the deep point, and it is the paper’s whole argument returning in the register of political economy. The aesthetic experience is, by its nature, the beholding of something for its own sake rather than for its use; it is the moment in which the purposive is suspended and something is met as gratuitously there. Such a moment cannot be fully instrumentalised from within, because the moment it is genuinely undergone it is, by its very structure, a stepping-outside of instrumentality, a small piece of non-alienated experience occurring in the very heart of the apparatus of alienation. Capital can build the container, can arrange the occasion, can profit from the footfall and the photographs; but it cannot make the person’s actual experience of the beauty be itself an instrumental experience, for then it would not be an experience of beauty at all but merely another transaction, and the lure would fail. Capital needs the experience to be genuine in order to profit from it, a fake beauty would draw no one, and the genuineness it needs is exactly the remainder that escapes it. The store requires that the visitor really be stopped, really be moved; and in really being stopped and moved, the visitor has a moment of genuine non-instrumental experience that the store’s instrumentality cannot reach into and convert. The remainder is structural, not accidental: capital’s capture of the aesthetic depends on leaving intact precisely the non-instrumental core that defeats capture.
§14.4 The dialectic - beauty as a contested field
The two readings do not cancel; they compose a dialectic, and the dialectic is the truth of the matter. Beauty, in the world of capital, is neither simply liberating nor simply captured; it is a contested field, a site of struggle in which capture and remainder are locked together, each requiring and resisting the other. The first reading establishes that the aesthetic is real political-economic force, that beauty and spacious emptiness do genuine economic work, draw real footfall, command real rent, justify real premiums; capital’s willingness to pay dearly for them is the hardest possible proof that they are powers in the world rather than private trivialities. The second reading establishes that this force, even as capital wields it, carries a remainder capital cannot confiscate, a non-instrumental core that, being the very thing that gives beauty its drawing power, cannot be converted into pure instrument without destroying the power it was meant to serve. Beauty is thus simultaneously the most capturable and the least confiscatable of goods: capturable because its force is real and capital can harness it, unconfiscatable because the force depends on a non-instrumental core that resists conversion. The contest between these is permanent and unresolvable, and it is fought, micro-cosmically, in every person who is genuinely stopped by beauty in a space designed to profit from their being stopped.
This connects the case directly to the dialectic of controlled contingency (§7.4). Ginza Six is a container built by capital: its boundary is rigidly controlled for commercial ends, the space is a retail environment, arranged to sell, while its interior, the actual aesthetic experience it occasions, remains genuinely open, uncontrolled, the visitor’s own. The structure is exactly that of the field: a controlled boundary enclosing an open interior. What the case adds is that the boundary’s control and the interior’s openness can serve different masters, the boundary serving capital’s commercial purpose, the interior serving the visitor’s non-instrumental experience, and that this divergence is the very form of the contest. Capital controls the container; the remainder lives in the contents; and the political economy of beauty is the struggle over a field whose boundary one party holds and whose interior escapes them.
§14.5 无之以为用 - emptiness confirmed by capital
There is a further and deeper point in the case, and it concerns emptiness specifically. What Ginza Six pays for, most strikingly, is emptiness rather than only beauty, the open, uncrowded, spacious hall, the deliberate non-filling of the most fillable space. And in paying so dearly for emptiness, capital confirms, against its own filling logic, the ancient thesis of the eleventh chapter: that the use of the vessel is in its emptiness, that what is not there gives use. The most calculating filler of space, the logic that would partition every square metre into rentable use, is driven, by the discovery that emptiness draws, that spaciousness has a power density of filling lacks, to leave a great space empty, and thereby to confirm 无之以为用 in the one register that cannot be accused of mysticism: the register of rent. Capital has discovered, and paid to confirm, that emptiness is of use. The Daoist metaphysics of the void, which the paper has carried throughout as the deepest ground of the field, receives here its most unlikely and most decisive proof: that even the logic of maximal filling is forced, by the nature of value, to acknowledge that the empty is of use, and to pay the highest price for it.
But the same case shows that emptiness, too, is contested. The spaciousness capital pays for is spaciousness instrumentalised, emptiness deployed as a lure, the void made to work for the filling it appears to refuse. The atmospheric emptiness of the luxury hall is not the same as the spaciousness of the field, even though it borrows its form; it is emptiness in the service of consumption, the void as ambience, designed to dispose the visitor to spend. And yet, the remainder again, the emptiness, even instrumentalised, still opens a real space in which a real suspension of the purposive can occur; capital’s instrumental emptiness still, despite itself, affords moments of the genuine spaciousness it was built to exploit. Emptiness, like beauty, is a contested field: paid for by capital, deployed as ambience, and yet harbouring a remainder that escapes the deployment, a genuine openness within the instrumentalised one. The struggle over beauty is, at its root, a struggle over emptiness, over whether the space that is opened will be a space for genuine non-instrumental experience or merely an ambience engineered for consumption, and the two are perpetually entangled, the genuine void haunting the engineered one it is made to wear.
§14.6 The spectrum of cases
Ginza Six is one point on a spectrum, and placing it among others clarifies what is and is not specific to it. Consider three cases, ordered by the degree to which the aesthetic is captured by capital.
At one end stands the unownable aesthetic: the beauty of the mountain and the water, the landscape that the wayfaring tradition perceived (§11.4), the contingent beauty of the wildflower at the roadside. This beauty is, in its nature, resistant to capture, because it is not produced by capital, not enclosed, not sold; the mountain’s beauty is free in a sense the gallery’s is not, available to anyone with the trained perception to catch it, owned by no one and rentable by no one. Capital can sell access to the mountain, the ticket, the lodge, the guided tour, but it cannot own the beauty itself, which remains available to the unmonied wayfarer with the seeing eye, and which the poorest perceiver with the richest perception possesses more fully than the wealthiest tourist who photographs it without seeing. This is the aesthetic at its most unalienated: a beauty no one made and no one can confiscate, requiring for its enjoyment nothing but the cultivated perception this paper has described.
In the middle stands the contested aesthetic of Ginza Six: beauty produced and enclosed by capital, deployed for profit, and yet harbouring the irreducible remainder. Here the capture is real and the resistance is real, and the case is dialectical through and through, the gallery is neither the free mountain nor the pure trap, but the contested field in which both forces operate at once.
At the other end stands the extracted aesthetic, the case in which capture is most nearly complete: the photogenic site engineered for the image, the “Instagrammable” location whose entire reality is its capacity to generate shareable photographs, the destination that exists to be photographed and has no other being. Here the aesthetic has been most thoroughly instrumentalised: the place is beautiful to be captured rather than beautiful to be beheld, designed backward from the photograph, its every feature calculated for the image it will yield. And here the remainder is most nearly extinguished, not because the structure differs from the gallery’s, but because the perception the place cultivates is the perception that does not behold but only captures, the gaze that does not undergo beauty but only records it for circulation. The extracted aesthetic is the triumph of dead material over living perception (§4.4): a place built for the photograph, undergone by no one, the beauty wholly converted into the image and the experience wholly evacuated. Yet even here the remainder is not quite zero, for a visitor with the cultivated perception might still, against the grain of the place’s design, actually behold rather than capture, and have a genuine moment the engineered site did not intend. The spectrum has no endpoint of total capture, because the remainder, however reduced, is structural; but the extracted case shows how nearly it can be approached, and how the difference between the captured and the free turns, in the end, not on the place but on the perception brought to it.
§14.7 How beauty creates a value cycle - the mechanism
The analysis so far has established that beauty is a real political-economic force, that it draws footfall, commands rent, justifies premiums, but it has treated this force statically, as a power beauty possesses, without showing the mechanism by which beauty exercises it: how, dynamically, beauty creates and sustains a cycle of value. This mechanism must now be set out, for it is the link between the paper’s phenomenology of aesthetic perception and its political economy, and it shows the political economy of beauty to be not a static fact but a dynamic cycle with the same structure as the relational reproduction the paper analysed at its centre.
The cycle has a definite point of ignition, and the point is the act of perception. Beauty is not a passive property awaiting valuation; it is an active power that seizes perception, stops the passer-by, catches the gaze, draws the subject out of the purposive errand that brought them into the non-purposive beholding of something for its own sake (§11.2, §11). This seizure is the ignition of the value cycle. Before it, the subject is a purposive agent moving through means toward ends; in it, the subject is arrested, captured, released for a moment into the aesthetic experience, and it is exactly this arrest, the conversion of a purposive passage into a non-purposive beholding, that beauty performs and that nothing else performs so well. The person stopped on the sixth floor of Ginza Six by the great space and the work standing in it (§14.5) is the value cycle igniting: a purposive consumer seized, against the grain of their errand, into a genuine aesthetic experience. Beauty makes the subject perceive; the making-perceive is the first moment of the cycle.
The second moment is the generation of value in the perception itself, and here the three-register analysis specifies what the value is (§9.3). The seized perception is a genuine experience, the Real surplus of the beautiful thing met, invested with Imaginary captivation, raised toward the Symbolic of the shareable, and this experience is itself a value: not yet an economic magnitude, but a lived good, the non-instrumental experience that the subject undergoes and that has worth in the undergoing. This is the value beauty generates at the source: the aesthetic experience as a lived good. And it is, crucially, a value with the double character the dialectic established (§14.4): it can be captured economically, converted into footfall, dwell-time, the premium the subject will pay to be where such experiences occur, and yet it carries the irreducible remainder, the non-instrumental core that the economic capture depends upon and cannot itself produce. The value beauty generates is at once capturable (it can be turned to economic account) and unconfiscatable (its economic capture requires the genuineness that escapes capture).
The third moment is the one that makes this a cycle rather than a single event: the reproduction of the value, by which the aesthetic experience generates further perception and so renews the source. The aesthetic experience, once undergone, is reproduced, recounted, returned to, shared, made into a reason to come back and a reason others come (§4). And this reproduction feeds the source: the recounted experience draws new perceivers, the return visit renews the experience, the shared beauty propagates the seizure of perception to others, so that the value generated at the source flows back to generate more perception, more experience, more value. This is the value cycle proper: beauty seizes perception, perception generates value, value is reproduced, and the reproduction renews and amplifies the seizure of perception, a self-sustaining circulation in which beauty, by being perceived and the perception reproduced, generates a flow of value that returns to its source and augments it. The political economy of beauty is this cycle: not a static force but a dynamic circulation, ignited by aesthetic perception and sustained by its reproduction.
§14.8 The good and the bad value cycle
That beauty creates a value cycle does not yet say whether the cycle is good or bad, and the distinction, which the paper has drawn for every other cycle it has analysed (§4.3, §10.3), applies here with full force and full discriminating power. The value cycle that beauty ignites can run as a good cycle, accumulating value and preserving the remainder, or as a bad cycle, extracting value and consuming the remainder until beauty itself is hollowed out.
The good value cycle is the one in which the reproduction of the aesthetic experience is nourishing, in which each turn of the cycle deepens the experience, enriches the perception, and conserves the non-instrumental remainder that is beauty’s living core. Here beauty is perceived, the perception generates genuine experience, the experience is reproduced in ways that renew rather than exhaust it, and the cycle accumulates value while keeping beauty alive: the place returned to that grows richer with each visit, the beauty whose reproduction deepens it, the cultivated perception that finds more in it each time. The value accumulates, in the deepening of experience, in the reputation that draws others, in the relational wealth of those who share it, and the remainder is preserved, because the reproduction is the kind that nourishes rather than extracts. This is the good cycle in the register of the political economy of beauty: a circulation that returns more than it takes, the holonomy of value accumulating along the path of nourishing reproduction (§4.3), beauty growing rather than diminishing as it is perceived and reproduced.
The bad value cycle is the one in which the reproduction is extractive, in which each turn consumes the experience, depletes the perception, and hollows out the remainder until beauty is reduced to a spent commodity. Here beauty is perceived, but the perception is reproduced in ways that exhaust it: the experience consumed for its extractable value, the beauty photographed without being beheld, the place worn smooth by an extraction that takes the value and gives nothing back, until the remainder, the genuine non-instrumental core that drew perception in the first place, is consumed away, and beauty, hollowed, loses the very power by which it ignited the cycle. This is the Instagram extreme of the spectrum (§14.6): the beauty extracted so thoroughly that nothing is left to behold, the experience consumed until the place that drew millions for its beauty no longer holds any, the remainder spent, the cycle collapsing as the beauty it fed upon is exhausted. The bad value cycle is self-undermining, for it consumes its own source: extracting the remainder that was the condition of beauty’s drawing-power, it kills the goose, and the cycle that hollowed out its beauty finds, at last, that it has nothing left to circulate. The decisive variable, here as everywhere in the paper, is the manner of its reproduction rather than beauty itself, nourishing or extractive, conserving the remainder or consuming it, and the same beauty that, well reproduced, founds a good cycle of accumulating value is, badly reproduced, fed into a bad cycle that consumes it to nothing.
§14.9 The value cycle as relational production
The deepest truth about the value cycle of beauty is that it is, at its root, a cycle of relational production, and this returns the political economy of beauty to the paper’s unified core (§8). For the value that beauty generates is not, fundamentally, a value residing in objects or accruing to capital; it is the value generated when a subject is drawn, through beauty, into a relation, with the beautiful thing, with the place, with those who behold it together, with the world the beauty opens, and undergoes, in that relation, the generation of a value that belongs to the relation. The aesthetic experience that ignites the cycle is the coming-to-presence of a relation between the perceiver and what is perceived; the value it generates is relational value; and the reproduction that sustains the cycle is the reproduction of that relation, the relational production analysed at the paper’s centre (§6). Beauty creates a value cycle because beauty draws subjects into relations, and relations, reproduced, generate and circulate value: the value cycle of beauty is relational production seen in the register of political economy, the same bringing-forth of value by a relational subject that the paper has tracked under the names of creation, reproduction, and the good cycle, now seen as the engine that beauty ignites and sustains.
This is why the good value cycle and the bad correspond so exactly to the good and bad cycles of relational production (§6.3). The good value cycle nourishes the relation that beauty opens, preserves its generativity, conserves the remainder that is the relation’s living core, it satisfies, in the economic register, the criteria of good relational production. The bad value cycle extracts from the relation beauty opens, consumes its generativity, hollows out the remainder, it is the bad relational production, the extractive cycle, in the economic register. And the remainder that capital cannot confiscate (§14.3) is, seen now, precisely the relational core of the aesthetic experience: the non-instrumental relation between perceiver and perceived that is the genuine source of beauty’s value, which capital can build a container around and profit from but cannot itself produce, because it is generated only in the genuine relation that beauty opens and that no instrumental arrangement can manufacture. The political economy of beauty is, in its depths, the political economy of relational production: beauty creates value by drawing subjects into relations that generate value, and the cycle it ignites is good or bad according to whether that relational production is nourished or extracted, the same distinction, the same criteria, the same keystone, now seen to govern the circulation of value that beauty sets in motion.
§14.10 The emancipatory upshot - aesthetic education as micro-politics
The spectrum yields the section’s emancipatory thesis, and with it the political stakes of the whole aesthetic argument. What distinguishes the three cases, in the end, is less the place than the perception brought to it, for the cultivated perception can find the unalienated remainder even in the contested gallery and the extracted site, while the uncultivated perception misses the free beauty even of the mountain, photographing the landscape without ever beholding it. The decisive variable is the perception, and the perception is cultivable. This is where the paper’s aesthetics becomes a politics. To cultivate the aesthetic perception of contingency, the capacity to behold rather than capture, to be genuinely stopped by genuine beauty, to undergo the non-instrumental experience for its own sake, is to cultivate a capacity that capital can use but cannot confiscate: a capacity for non-alienated experience that, once possessed, can be exercised even within the apparatus of alienation, finding the remainder that escapes capture wherever beauty occurs, in the gallery built to profit from it and the site built to extract it and the mountain that no one built at all.
This is a micro-politics of de-alienation. Alienation, in the classical analysis, is the condition in which one’s activity and experience are appropriated rather than one’s own, instrumentalised, turned into means for ends not one’s own; and the administered world extends this condition across ever more of life, until even leisure, even beauty, even the contemplative suspension of purpose is captured and made to work. Against this, the cultivation of aesthetic perception builds a capacity for genuine non-instrumental experience that capital cannot fully appropriate, because its value lies precisely in the non-instrumentality that capture would destroy. Each genuine beholding of beauty, each real suspension of the purposive, is a small piece of de-alienated experience reclaimed, a moment in which one’s experience is genuinely one’s own, undergone for its own sake, escaping the means-end logic even when occurring in its midst. And this reclamation is available to anyone, requiring no wealth, no leisure, no apparatus, only the cultivated perception that this paper has argued can be developed, and developed, between two people, mutually, as the relation’s own aesthetic education (§12.7). The politics of perception that Rancière named (§12.6) is here given its intimate and practical form: two people cultivating in each other the capacity to perceive the unalienated remainder, and so building between them a small commons of de-alienated experience that the administered world cannot enclose. The cultivation of beauty’s perception is not a retreat from politics into private aesthetics; it is a micro-politics, the building of a capacity for freedom at the scale of a perception, exercised in the catching of a wildflower and the beholding of a remainder, available to all and confiscatable by none. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful is difficult, and its difficulty is now seen to be also its political promise, for what cannot be reduced to a rule cannot be wholly captured by a system, and the un-programmable perception of the beautiful is, for that very reason, the seed of a freedom the administered world cannot finally administer.
§15 The Generalized Field of Travel
The paper has spoken throughout of travel in its literal sense, the journey to an unfamiliar place. It is time to generalise. “Travel,” it will be argued, names not essentially a movement through geographical space but a function: the construction of the special field, the opening of the spacious, contingent, suspended condition within which a relation comes to presence. The literal journey is the most efficient and powerful instance of this function, but it is an instance, not the essence; and once the function is distinguished from its most familiar instance, it becomes possible to perform it without the journey, to construct the field within the everyday, with neither distance nor expense. This generalisation is the practical culmination of the paper, and it is offered not as a conclusion that closes the argument but as an opening that hands it on. It is also the resolution of a worry that has shadowed the paper from the start: that its goods are the privileges of those who can afford to travel.
§15.1 Travel as a functional concept
What, in the end, did the literal journey do? It opened the special field: it exchanged the fixed background, suspended the roles, restored contingency, framed a bounded continuous time, threw two people into symmetric unfamiliarity and forced co-presence, and beneath all these, opened the spaciousness in which a relation could come to presence. These are the functions; the journey is their vehicle. And once the functions are named in their own right, it becomes clear that they are not necessarily tied to geographical movement. The exchange of background, the suspension of roles, the restoration of contingency, the opening of spaciousness, each of these can, in principle, be effected without going anywhere, by other means than the journey. The journey effects them all at once, powerfully and reliably, which is its great advantage; but it holds no monopoly on them. To generalise travel is to recognise that “travel,” in the sense that has mattered to this paper, is the performance of these functions, the construction of the special field, and that the literal journey is one way, the most efficient way, but not the only way, of performing it.
This recognition reorganises the whole paper retrospectively. Every feature of the field analysed in §2 is, seen now, a function that can be sought in the everyday: one can exchange the background by altering the familiar setting; one can suspend roles by deliberately and jointly bracketing the everyday’s demands for a protected span; one can restore contingency by introducing the undetermined into the over-determined day; one can open spaciousness by refusing, for a while, the everyday’s total assignment of function. The generalised field of travel is the everyday deliberately opened into a field, the construction, without the journey, of the spacious contingent condition the journey opens with such ease. And the deepest of the functions, the one that underlies all the others and is the most portable of all, is the one the aesthetic chapters identified: the perception that catches the contingent and the spaciousness that lets it be caught. For if the contingent is always already leaking through the seams of the everyday (§11.1), then the field is, in a sense, always already half-open, awaiting only the perception that would catch what it offers. To generalise travel is, at its root, to carry the perception home.
§15.2 From scaffolding to skill
The relation between the literal journey and the generalised field is the relation, introduced earlier, between scaffolding and skill (§11.3). The literal journey is a scaffolding: a powerful external structure, erected at some cost, that opens the field reliably and completely, holding it open by main force of distance, expense, and the wholesale suspension a journey effects. Its value is double. It opens the field, here and now, for the two who travel; and, the deeper value, it teaches the field, lets two people experience the special field vividly enough to learn what it is, to recognise its character, to know from the inside what it is to be in it and to catch and share within it. The journey is the demonstration class in which one learns, by undergoing it, what the field is and what one does within it.
But the mature form of the practice is not the perpetual erection of scaffoldings. To require a literal journey every time one wished to open the field would be to remain forever dependent on an expensive external structure, and it is exactly this dependence that would make the paper’s goods the privilege of the moneyed and the free. The mature form is the skill that the scaffolding taught: the internalised capacity to open the field, or to catch what the half-open everyday already offers, without the external structure. Once two people have learned the field, learned it, perhaps, through literal journeys that showed them what it is, they can begin to open it at home, in the ordinary day, by the cultivated capacities the journeys taught them: the perception that catches the contingent, the taste that constructs the frame, the restraint that keeps the vessel empty, the mutual attention that turns the caught beauty toward the other. The scaffolding comes down; the skill remains; and the skill opens, in the midst of the everyday, the field the scaffolding was erected to open. This is the movement the whole paper has been tending toward: from the journey that opens the field by force, to the skill that opens it anywhere; from travel as a thing one does occasionally and expensively, to travel as a capacity one carries always and exercises freely. The literal journey is the demonstration; the generalised field is the daily practice; and the bridge between them is the cultivation, through the one, of the skill that performs the other.
§15.3 The de-alienation of the everyday, and the answer to elitism
This resolves the worry of elitism, and the resolution is also the paper’s deepest political claim. The worry is obvious and serious: if the good this paper describes required literal travel, it would be the privilege of those with the money and the leisure to travel, and a philosophy of intimacy resting on it would be a philosophy for the comfortable, complicit in the very inequality the series has elsewhere opposed (Paper XV, Paper XVII). The generalisation dissolves the worry. The generalised field does not require distance or expense; it requires the cultivated capacities, perception, taste, restraint, attention, which depend on no wealth and are, as the previous section argued, exactly the capacities that capital can use but cannot confiscate and that the poorest perceiver may possess more fully than the richest tourist (§14.6). The good of the field is therefore, in its generalised form, universally available: open to any two people willing to cultivate the perception and do the relational labour, regardless of their means. The literal journey is a privilege; the generalised field is not, and the movement from the one to the other is the movement from a good available to the few to a good available to all.
This is, in the terms the previous section established, the de-alienation of the everyday. The alienated everyday is the everyday wholly assigned to function, every hour given to labour or its reproduction, every space to use, the whole of life instrumentalised under the administered order, with no opening for the non-instrumental, the gratuitous, the spacious. To open a field within this everyday, to clear a protected span in which roles are suspended and the purposive lifted, to catch the contingent beauty leaking through the seams, to undergo a moment of genuine non-instrumental experience with the beloved, is to reclaim a piece of the everyday from its alienation, to make, within the administered order, a small space that is genuinely one’s own. And because this reclamation requires no wealth, it is available where wealth is not: the de-alienation of the everyday is a freedom the poor can practice as fully as the rich, perhaps more fully, since the cultivated perception that is its only requirement is no respecter of means. Here the paper’s politics reaches its conclusion. The cultivation of the field’s skill is the building, by two people, of a capacity to de-alienate their everyday, to open, within the administered world and without its permission, recurring small fields of genuine, spacious, non-instrumental, shared experience. This is not a retreat from the political into the domestic; it is a politics conducted at the scale of the everyday, the construction of a commons of de-alienated experience that the administered order cannot enclose because it requires nothing the order controls. The generalised field of travel is the everyday reclaimed, and the reclaiming is available to all.
§15.4 Generative openness - a principle, and a limit
The generalisation of travel permits one further abstraction, which the paper states as a principle and then, characteristically, marks as opening beyond itself. Throughout, the condition underlying the field has been spaciousness (§2.8), the emptiness in the sense of the Daodejing‘s eleventh chapter, the room left unfilled in which the contingent can arrive and be caught. The generalisation now lets this be seen not as a feature peculiar to travel but as a general resource, the openness that any field requires if relational generativity is to occur within it, and the resource can be named: generative openness, the condition of not being so wholly filled by function that nothing unplanned can enter. A field, of whatever kind, is generative to the degree that it preserves this openness; and the principle may be stated generally: a field is made generative by preserving the openness in which unplanned, meaningful events may emerge, rather than by adding activity to it. The political economy of beauty already confirmed this from the side of value (§14.5): the costly emptiness that capital pays dearly to preserve is generative openness recognised, even by capital, as a resource rather than a waste.
Two qualifications keep the principle from being misunderstood, and the second of them marks the paper’s limit. The first: generative openness is not emptiness as a style. It must not be confused with minimalism, or with an aesthetic of bareness, for the point is that room must be left for the unplanned rather than that less is better, and that room may be held open as well by a thing that invites lingering (a window, a bench, a painting, a piano, a table wide enough to gather around) as by literal vacancy. Generative openness is the condition of not being wholly closed by function, whatever holds that condition open; it is a structural property of a field, not a decorative quantity of empty space. The second qualification is the limit. The principle of generative openness plainly reaches beyond the intimate relation that is this paper’s subject, it bears on the design of rooms and houses, of schools and libraries and cities, of institutions and their allocation of time and budget and attention, wherever the question arises whether a space or a structure preserves the openness in which generative events can occur or forecloses it by total functionalisation. But the full development of generative openness as a principle of design, spatial, temporal, institutional, is not the work of this paper, and would, if pursued here, carry the argument away from the relational field it is meant to illuminate into a general theory of generative design the paper cannot contain. The paper therefore states the principle, notes that the field of travel and the costly emptiness of the gallery and the unfilled room are instances of it, and marks its general development as a directed opening (§16.3), a principle this paper discovers at the limit of its own subject and hands on to a theory of generative design it borders but does not enter. That generative openness is a real and general resource, the paper affirms; what a full theory of its cultivation across spaces, times, and institutions would be, it leaves, deliberately, to other work.
§15.5 An opening, not a conclusion
It would be false to the matter to present the generalised field as a solution achieved, a technique mastered, a conclusion reached. The generalisation opens a practice; it does not complete one. To open a field within the everyday is difficult, and to do it repeatedly, sustainably, against the everyday’s constant pressure to close back down, is more difficult still, a labour without end, a practice that must be perpetually renewed because the everyday perpetually re-alienates, the opened field perpetually re-closing into routine. The paper does not pretend to have mastered this practice or to be able to hand the reader a method for it; χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά, and the generalised field, being an aesthetic accomplishment, cannot be reduced to a method any more than the good or the beautiful can. What the paper offers is the recognition that the practice exists, that its direction is the movement from scaffolding to skill, and that its goal is the daily, mutual, un-programmable cultivation of the capacity to open fields of de-alienated shared experience in the midst of an everyday that is forever closing them. How to sustain this practice, how to keep the field open against the everyday’s pressure, how not to let the skill decay back into the routine it was meant to interrupt, these are real and open questions, and the paper hands them on rather than answering them. The generalised field is not the paper’s conclusion but its opening: the point at which the understanding it has built passes into a practice that exceeds it, and the reader is left not with a doctrine but with a direction and a difficulty. To which the only fitting response is the one the whole paper has been arguing for: not a method, but the cultivation, slow and mutual and lifelong, of the perception and the taste and the love that open the field, and the difficult, unending, beautiful labour of keeping it open, together.
§16 The Closure of the Temporal Arch, and Directed Fissures
The paper closes by completing the figure with which its phenomenology began, the temporal arch of the journey, and then, in the manner this series has adopted for its mid-sequence papers, by opening rather than sealing: marking the places where the argument, pressed further, runs out of what this paper can say and points toward papers still to come. The field of travel is a source, not a terminus, and its closing is an opening.
§16.1 The closure of the temporal arch
The phenomenology began with a temporal arch: co-creation before the journey, the lived field during it, and the reproduction in retelling after (§2.1, §4.2). The arch can now be seen whole, and seen to be a complete circuit of generation and reproduction. In co-creation, two people jointly intend a world that does not yet exist, beginning to build the “we” in imagination before the journey opens. In the lived field, the world is entered and the “we” is generated vividly, brought to the self-presence of its own dynamics in the spacious, contingent, suspended condition the journey opens. In reproduction, the generated experience is carried across the threshold of return and woven, in shared retelling, into the relation’s lasting wealth, establishing the good cycle by which a single journey becomes an ever-deepening common possession. The three phases are not a sequence of separate episodes but the moments of one circuit: the co-created anticipation rehearses the field, the lived field generates the wealth, the reproduction conserves and augments it, and the conserved wealth becomes, in turn, part of what the next co-creation draws upon, so that the arch is a spiral rather than a line from beginning to end, each journey’s reproduced wealth feeding the imagination of the next. The “we” is forged across the whole arch and the whole spiral: not in the journey alone but in the imagining before, the living during, and the retelling after, and in the way each completed circuit enriches the ground from which the next begins. This is the complete shape of what a shared journey is, not an episode with a start and a finish, but a turn of a spiral by which two people, over a life of journeys imagined, lived, and retold, build and rebuild the “we” they are.
And the spiral does not, in the end, require the journeys to be literal. The generalisation of the previous section completes the figure: the same arch, anticipation, living, retelling, structures the generalised field as much as the literal one, and the spiral of generation and reproduction turns as truly in a life of small everyday fields, opened by skill and woven by retelling, as in a life of great journeys. The temporal arch is the shape of the field’s life, literal or generalised; and its closure here is the recognition that the field, in either form, is a circuit rather than a moment, not an event but a practice that spirals through a whole shared life.
§16.2 A note on the paper’s length and difficulty
A word is owed about this paper itself, for it is among the longest and most difficult in the series, and the fact is a consequence of its subject rather than incidental. The paper set out to follow a shared journey through phenomenology, political economy, ethics, and aesthetics, and found, at its centre, that the deepest of these is the aesthetic, and that the aesthetic resists exactly the kind of completion a paper is supposed to achieve. This was a discovery about the object rather than a failure of organisation. The beautiful, as the whole of the paper’s aesthetics argued, does not lie wholly within the empirical, the demonstrable, the formalisable; it is not, like an object of natural science, governed by statable laws that further inquiry converges upon, nor, like an object of engineering, reducible to a procedure that can be specified and completed. It has a remainder, the Real that resists symbolisation, the un-programmable fitting, the accord that must be struck afresh and tended in its evolution, that no system captures and no treatise closes. And a paper faithful to such an object must, in some measure, share its character: it cannot be cleanly completed, cannot be reduced to a system, cannot reach the kind of closure that a paper on a formalisable subject can reach, because its object does not permit it.
The length and the resistance to closure are therefore not defects to be apologised for but the form’s fidelity to its content. A short, systematic, cleanly concluded paper on the beautiful would, by its very neatness, have betrayed the difficulty it claimed to describe, would have implied, against its own thesis, that the beautiful is after all a formalisable thing that a system can contain. That this paper is long, ramifying, and finally unconcludable, that it opens more than it closes, that its last word is a set of fissures rather than a conclusion, is the formal enactment of its central claim. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful is difficult, and a true account of the beautiful must be difficult in the same way and for the same reason, must itself resist the completion its object resists. This is the series’ long practice, that the form of a paper should enact its content; here the practice reaches the case where the content is the resistance of the beautiful to formal completion, and the form, accordingly, is a paper that cannot be completed, only opened. The difficulty of the paper is the difficulty of the beautiful, undergone in the writing as the beautiful is undergone in the perceiving, and the only honest response to it is the one the paper has counselled throughout: not a method that would dissolve the difficulty, but the patient, lifelong, mutual cultivation of a perception equal to it.
§16.3 Directed fissures
In the manner of this series’ mid-sequence papers, the close opens rather than concludes. Eight fissures are marked, places where the argument, pressed past the edge of what this paper establishes, points toward a paper that might carry it further.
The first fissure is the return and the everyday’s re-closing. The paper has argued that the generated field must be carried across the threshold of return (§4.5) and that the generalised field must be sustained against the everyday’s pressure to re-close (§15.5). But how the field, once opened, is kept open in time, how the relation’s good condition is sustained against the constant entropy of routine, what the temporal dynamics of opening and re-closing are, how attunement is maintained and re-tuned across the long time of a shared life, is a question this paper opens and does not answer. It points toward a paper on the temporal sustenance of the relation’s good condition: the dynamics, left open in the formal companion’s own dynamical layer, of how a good cycle is kept turning against the tendency of every cycle to wind down.
The second fissure is the solitary and the shared. The paper distinguished the solitary journey’s revelation of the self from the shared journey’s generation of the “we” (§3.4), but it treated the solitary chiefly as a foil. The relation between the two, how the self that the solitary journey reveals is related to the “we” that the shared journey generates, whether and how one must be able to be alone in order to be genuinely together, what the solitary and the shared owe each other in a life, is a deep question this paper only touches. It points toward a paper on the subject of the relation: who the one must be who can enter the “we” without dissolving into it, the question the previous paper also marked as open (Paper XX).
The third fissure is the third-party other and the ethics of the many. The paper opened, in the ethics of facing the third party (§5.4), the question of how the dyad treats those beyond it, and marked this as the first step from the ethics of intimacy toward the ethics of the many. But the full ethics of the relational commons, how the “we” of two extends to the “we” of many, how the goods and dangers of the dyadic field scale to the family, the community, the basin, is the horizon beyond this paper, the watershed the previous paper also marked (Paper XX, Paper XV). It points toward a paper on the scaling of the relational field beyond the dyad.
The fourth fissure is the politics of perception. The paper argued that aesthetic education is a micro-politics of de-alienation (§14.10), the cultivation of a capacity for non-alienated experience that capital cannot confiscate. But the full political theory implicit in this, the redistribution of the sensible as a programme, the relation between the cultivation of perception and the transformation of the administered order, whether a politics of perception can be more than micro, is a horizon this paper only indicates. It points toward a paper on the politics of aesthetic education: the question whether the de-alienation practiced at the scale of a perception can be raised to the scale of a society.
The fifth fissure is the formal phenomenology of the field. The paper invoked the formal companion lightly, the self-presence of relational dynamics as the foregrounding of the fusion-space operator (§3.3), the good cycle of reproduction as holonomy accumulated along the retelling path (§4.3). But a full formal treatment of the field, of how the exchange of background, the opening of spaciousness, and the foregrounding of the dynamics appear in the formalism of the companion, of whether the phenomenological features have exact formal correlates, is left undone. It points toward a formal companion to this paper, as “From Fluid to Braid” is the formal companion to the previous one: a formal phenomenology of the field of travel.
The sixth fissure is the deepest of all, and the paper has marked it explicitly within its own body: the just and generative reproduction of suffering. The paper established that conflict and pain, well reproduced, can become a relation’s wealth (§9.8), and gave the good reproduction of suffering the structure of four criteria, teleological, ontological, political-economic, and power-dialectical (§9.9). But it gave only the criteria, the direction of the good, and not the method, the route to it; and the full theory of how two people justly and generatively reproduce a shared suffering, how, concretely, a pain is returned to and transfigured so that it stays generative, joint, non-exploitative, and free of domination, is the largest task the paper opens and cannot complete. It points toward a paper of its own: a theory of the just reproduction of suffering, which this paper has framed in its four criteria but whose method remains, like the beautiful it so closely resembles, difficult, un-programmable, and yet to be found.
The seventh fissure is the life of a created work in the public sphere. The paper established that creation is co-creation and co-creation is relational production (§8), and that the ethics of relational production governs the creation and destruction of co-created works, but it found, at the edge of this, a case that exceeds the relational frame: the work that enters public culture, belonging no longer to any determinate “we” but to an anonymous, non-reciprocal, institutional public including the unborn (§8.5). The paper marked, there, the limit of the theory of relational production, refusing to dissolve the public sphere into a magnified relation, and naming the overlap of the relational-productive and the public, the way a created thing is at once the product of a relational subject and a member of a public world, as a problem governed by two different logics. The full theory of this overlap, of the ethics of public creations and the claims of the anonymous and the unborn, is opened here and not closed; it points toward a theory of the public sphere that the theory of relational production borders but does not contain.
The eighth fissure is generative openness as a principle of design. The paper found, at the limit of its generalisation, that the spaciousness underlying the field of travel is an instance of a general resource, generative openness, the unfilled room in which unplanned and meaningful events may emerge, and that this resource bears far beyond the intimate relation, on the design of spaces, times, and institutions wherever the question arises whether a structure preserves the openness in which generative events can occur (§15.4). But the paper marked, there, its own limit, declining to develop generative openness into a general theory of design lest the argument be carried away from its relational subject. The full theory, of generative openness across the spatial, the temporal, and the institutional, of how spaces and schedules and institutions may be designed to preserve rather than foreclose the room for generative events, is opened here and not pursued; it points toward a theory of generative design that this paper borders but does not enter.
These eight are directed openings rather than loose ends, each a place where the field of travel, fully entered, shows more than this paper can contain. The field is a source. What it generates exceeds what any single paper can hold, and the fissures mark where the excess points. χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: the beautiful is difficult, and the difficulty is inexhaustible, which is the very sign of a source rather than a reason for despair, that one can return to it again and again and never find it spent.
And here, at the last, the generalisation that has run through the whole paper completes itself in a single recognition. The field of travel was never, finally, about travel. The deepest purpose of faring into the unfamiliar is not to leave the everyday behind, but to learn, and to bring home, how to recreate, within the everyday, the field in which relational subjects can continue to come into being. The journey teaches the field; the skill carries it home; and the highest accomplishment the paper has described is the cultivated capacity to open, in the midst of an ordinary shared life, the spacious and contingent field in which two people go on generating the “we” they are, rather than the great journey itself. To learn how to travel, even where one remains; to keep, within the everyday, the openness in which the relation can continue to come to presence, this is what the field of travel, generalised, finally asks. The field of travel is such a source, and this paper has done no more, and no less, than open it.
Acknowledgements
This paper, more than any in the series, was written before its occasion: it imagines a journey not yet taken, with one person who loves to travel and who has already taught me, without ever meaning to teach, most of what these pages try to say. The wildflower at the roadside is not only an example chosen for the argument; it is the kind of thing she notices and turns toward the world, and the turning is the whole of what I have tried to understand. If anything here is true, it was learned from her, in the ordinary days before any journey; if anything here is false, it is where I have not yet learned to see what she sees. The field this paper describes is one I hope we will build, journey by journey, in the life ahead; and the cultivation it calls aesthetic education is the one I have already begun to receive from her, simply by knowing her. To the girl who belongs to the forest, with whom I long to fare into the unfamiliar: this is yours, written before our first journey, in anticipation of every world we will build together, and the giving keeps nothing back.
中文
亲密关系的哲学与正义理论 · 第二十一篇
“旅行”的场域
宽阔、偶然，与关系性主体的生成
【 工作草稿 】
当其无，有器之用。
万泓
工作草稿——不供引用或传播
凿户牖以为室，当其无，有室之用。
故有之以为利，无之以为用。
凿出门窗以造一间屋；
屋之用，正在它的空处。
故而”有”给出便利，”无”给出用。—— 老子，《道德经》第十一章
χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά.
美的事物是困难的。—— 柏拉图，《大希庇阿斯篇》304e
致伟晶——
For Weijing——
那个属于森林的女孩，
她爱旅行——
我盼望有一天与她同行，
那将是我们一起建造的一个世界。
摘要
本文发展出一套共同旅行的哲学，并用它确立一套关系性生产（relational production）的一般理论。其方法是把单一个充分展开的情形——一段共同承担的旅程——当作一个具体的普遍者来处理，所赌的是：一个结构，是通过深入一个特殊者、而非通过从众多者中抽象，才变得可见。旅行之被选择，是因为它以异乎寻常的效率，聚集起一段关系的结构得以到场的诸条件。
论证分四个乐章推进。现象学的乐章把旅行分析为一个由宽阔（虚，在《道德经》第十一章的意义上）所构成的特殊场域，并把它最深的效果指认为关系性动态的自我到场（the self-presence of relational dynamics）——关系自身的运动作为某种关系性主体作为一个整体所感到之物而涌入被感受的经验。政治经济学的乐章论证：一段旅程所生成的经验是关系性财富，共同的复述再生产着它，而美——被一个主体所知觉、并经由复述而被再生产——维持着一个具有关系性生产之结构的价值循环。美学的乐章经由三个拉康的维度与判断主体的关系性构成而消解了趣味的二律背反，把创造指认为共同创造、把共同创造指认为关系性生产，并论证伦理判断在其极限处以美学方式运作，以致对善的培育圆成于美育。伦理的乐章确立关系性生产理论本身：它的拱顶石，即主体保全原则（the principle of subject-preservation），主张没有任何好的关系可以以消灭对方为代价来购买它的统一；四条操作性判准与”求同存异”的方法支配着它的进行；而苦难的公正再生产、审美分歧的伦理，以及对所继承之传统的辩证扬弃，作为它的应用而随之而来。
本文以把旅行一般化为一个功能性概念收尾，把生成性的敞开（generative openness）指认为一种一般资源，并把旅行最深的目的定位于一种能力的培育：在日常生活之内，重新创造那个关系性主体得以继续来到存在的场域。一组定向的开口，标出本文所框定却未予解决的诸问题，作为结尾。
关键词： 关系性生产；关系性主体；宽阔；审美判断；经验的再生产。
§1 引言 —— 旅行作为一个特殊场域
有一种幸福，是两个人唯有靠离开才找得到的。他们离开的不是彼此，而是他们的生活通常被安置于其中的那些房间与例程，走进一个两人都不属于的地方。本系列的前一篇以一种从水那里习得的德、以及一个”待人如水”的人收尾（第二十篇）；这一篇则始于水自然会去的地方，那就是别处。水，依其禀性，是旅程、过渡、不滞于任何单一之地者的意象。追问两个人一同好好地行入陌生意味着什么，是顺着本系列的指导意象走到它所引向之处。
本文关切的是一同承担的旅行。它的主题是共同的旅程——两个人作为一对走进陌生、并作为一对被这一走所改变——而不是哲学家-漫游者那种孤独的旅程（那有它自己漫长而高贵的文献）。它所辩护的主张是宏大的，而在开篇就把它平白说出，能让读者掂量这一赌注的分量。一段共同的旅程是一个特殊场域：一种被结构的、被刻意进入的境况，其中两个人之间的关系同时被暴露与被生成，其中关系本身的运动——否则是潜伏的——升入被感受的经验。本文从这一场域依次引出：一套”关系性主体如何来到存在”的现象学，一套”共享经验如何被再生产或被挥霍”的政治经济学，一套”这样一个场域如何被建造与被知觉”的美学，以及一套”这一切如何能被好好地或糟糕地做”的伦理。旅程是入口；目的地是一个关于善与美之关系的主张——在它最激进的形式里，主张这两者终究无法被分开。
§1.1 从固定的背景到对它的刻意交换
出发点是本系列已经确立的一个结论。曾论证过：共享的幸福在于两个意义-世界对照一个共同背景的共振，而非两个人融合为一：两个相异的意义中心，被耦合进一个不可还原为任一者、却也不融合任一者的共享状态，被维持在一个供给那”双方的耦合据以被定义的共同地基”的背景流形之上（第十九篇）。在一种共同生活的寻常进行里，那个背景是固定的。它是同一套公寓、同一段通勤、把一周划分为劳作与休息的同一种划分、同一圈义务与角色。这固定性做着它的工作，因为它正是使一种共享生活可过下去者，因为一个必须被不断重建的背景会使任何别的东西都无注意力之余裕可用。然而固定性带着一份代价，而这代价正是本文的主题。一个从不改变的背景，久而久之，变得不可见；而一段全然对照一个不可见背景而进行的关系，可以靠诸习惯的纯粹咬合运行许多年，其两方在例程的层面被耦合着，而”他们是否在任何更深的层面上仍共振”这一问题，悄然无人发问。固定的背景对某种掏空是好客的：两套配合良好的习惯，可以在很长时间里冒充一段活的关系。
旅行是对那个背景的刻意交换。一同旅行，是把两个人从他们的共振一向在其中被定义的意义-世界里带出来，把他们放进一个对两人都陌生的意义-世界里。这是对一段共同旅程所做之事最简单可能的描述，而本文其余的一切都展开它的诸后果。这一交换同时做两件相反的事，而这双重性是任何诚实的论说首先必须解释者。在一侧，被剥去了熟悉的脚手架，一段关系可以在它的贫乏中被暴露：那对一旦电视关掉就无话可说的伴侣，在一座异乡城市、面对面前的整个夜晚时，发现他们所共享的究竟有多么少，而那本意在使他们更新的旅程，却反而把例程一向仁慈地遮掩着的一片空洞暴露出来。”伴侣在假期里争吵”这一老生常谈,绝非关于后勤与疲惫的琐事；它是一项头等重要的现象学所予之实情，而一套解释不了它的共同旅行理论会是毫无价值的。在另一侧，凭同一次交换、而非另一次，脚手架的被剥去能够逼出一种比例程所曾允许的更纯粹的共振：没有任何熟悉之物可倚，两人便只有彼此可依靠，而在那相互的依靠中，可以抵达一种被布置好的、被排定日程的、被角色所束缚的居家生活在结构上所封闭的深度。同一个行为既暴露又生成。为何同一个行为该持有这些相反的力量，以及什么决定它行使哪一个，正是本文由之生长的那个问题。
§1.2 何种场域 —— 宽阔，而非新奇
诱惑是把旅行的力量定位于新奇：新的景观、新鲜的刺激、旅游手册所许诺的心智之拓宽。那种读法恰是真相的颠倒，而指认其所以然，会固定全文的命题。新奇是一种填充：它把新内容、新的可供消费之物、行程单与相册上的新条目装进诸感官。但两个人之间的关系不由任何共享刺激的装载所生成，正如一只器皿不由把它填到满溢而被造得有用。旅行所提供的，当它提供任何有价值之物时，是一种清空：把日常铺在每一小时、每一空间之上的那张由功能、角色、义务与预定用途所织成的密网清扫开来，留出一间屋子，让某种拥挤的日常不曾为之留出余地之事得以发生。一段旅程所提供之物最深的名字是宽阔：虚，在《道德经》第十一章给它的意义上——埏埴以为器，而器之用在其中之空；凿户牖以为室，而室之用在那空处；故有之以为利，无之以为用。一段旅程，在它最好的时候，是一种被加工过的空，一只其价值在于它所开启的余地、而非它所携带的内容的器皿。
这就是为何一座陌生咖啡馆里安静的一小时——日程上空无一事、除了一同在那里别无可做——能比一整天塞满纪念碑的日子持有更多本文所追求的善；以及为何那山间的远景、那空寂的庙宇、那长长的车窗，是通过它们所开启的宽阔、而非通过它们所展示之物来做它们的工作的——是日常那”每一刻都须为着某事”之要求的暂时被抬起。那把旅程填得和被留下的生活一样密的旅行者——每一小时被订满、每一处景点被打勾、每一餐被拍照——是把固定的背景一并带上了、只换了它的布景；那场域从未开启，因为它从未被清空。宽阔是特殊场域的介质，而本文现象学（§2）的中心论证是：使旅行有力量的那些特征，无一例外，都是开启或依赖那一空的方式。
§1.3 到场、存在，与它们所预设的场域
在论证能够推进之前，必须固定一个区分，因为整套论说系于它。说旅行把关系自身的运动带入经验，所主张的不同于说旅行把关系带入存在。关系已然存在；两个共享过一段生活的人有一种关系性动态，无论他们是否曾感到它——正如一个人总已经在存在着，无论他是否曾注意到自己在存在。日常的重复所遮掩的是到场而非存在，因为存在不能被不留意所取消：到场是某物涌入被感受的、被照亮的经验、从背景中走出、作为当下而被经历的方式。这一差别是”一物之成立”与”一物之对某人到场“之间的差别。重复是一种麻醉剂；它让关系继续存在着，同时把它的存在弄得不可知觉，把”我们”这一事实溶解进两套互锁例程的自动运作。旅行所能做、而日常通常不能做的，是使关系到场而非使它存在：把它的动态从那潜伏的自动状态中带向前来，成为两人能真正感到自己在活着的某种东西。当本文稍后讲到关系性动态的自我到场（§3）时，它所指的正是这一意义上的到场，而非存在。
如此理解的到场，预设一个场域。没有任何东西抽象地到场；它在某处到场，在某个使显现成为可能的、被开启的区域之内。这是一个全文所依赖的结构性要点，也是论证的两根支柱——场域，与在它之内到场之物——之所以处于根据与被根据的关系、而非作为两个平行的主张并立的原因。旅程的宽阔是那场域；关系动态的自我到场是那场域使之可能的事件。没有为之而开启的场域，便没有到场，正如没有器中之空，便没有器之用。这就是为何同一种到场，一般而言，在家里的客厅里得不到：客厅是一个封闭的场域，一个其每一坐标都已被指派了一种功能的空间，没有留下任何”未排定者得以显现”的被开启区域，而障碍是那封闭、而非任何新奇之匮乏。到场要求敞开；敞开来自空；空来自日常那”功能之总指派”的被抬起，而那一抬起，正是一段旅程在它最好的时候所执行者。
§1.4 关于方法的一则说明 —— 旅程作为具体普遍者
在论证开始之前，它的方法必须被弄诚实，因为读者有权追问：一篇论文凭什么权利从特定之人的共同旅程，走向关于关系性主体、经验的再生产、以及伦理与美之关系的诸主张。这一忧虑是真实的，应得一个真实的回答而非一种心照不宣的回避。本文不提供任何经验研究；它不搁置于任何对旅行者的调查之上，而一项调查也不会驳倒它。它也不是一篇把旅行用作单纯例证、一个对独立确立之诸命题的装饰性例子的论著。它的方法是本系列通篇所用、并由其形式上的姊妹作以它自己的语域明白说出的那一种：它取单一个、充分展开的特殊者并读它的结构，所赌的——古老而对辩证传统居于核心的赌注——是：一个结构是通过深入一个特殊者、而非通过剥去一切具体之物的抽象，才最清楚地展示自身。这是具体普遍者的方法：普遍者不是一切特殊性被煮干之后所剩的稀薄残余，而是一个足够深的特殊者恰恰在它的具体性中所使之显明的结构。一段共同的旅程，被足够贴近地关注，便拓宽为对”一个关系性主体之生成是什么”的一次展示，而非窄化为私人轶事，因为旅程是那一生成发生得足够缓慢、足够可见以致可被描述的一个场所。
由此推出两个后果，而本文接受它们。第一，它的证据是现象学的：它诉诸读者被邀请从自己生活内部去辨认的共享经验之结构，而非从外部一锤定音的数据。它诸主张的检验，是它们一旦被说出是否照亮——那曾与所爱之人一同旅行过的读者，是否在它们之中发现自己的经验变得新近可读——而非它们是否已被测量。这是对一门现象学而言恰当的检验，而本文不佯称别的。第二，那特殊性是这一展示的器官本身，而非一桩须被致歉的尴尬。本文背后的诸旅程是特定的旅程、与一个特定的人，这正是普遍者据以变得根本可见的具体性，而非通往普遍者途中须被滤掉的噪声；而本文将论证——当它抵达所爱者之不可替代性这一问题时——这标示的是关于事情本身的一个真相、而非方法的一桩偶然：亲密之生成性的普遍结构，永远只能在一个没有任何普遍者能穷尽的特殊性中得到例示。方法与主题在此说着同一件事：人唯有靠一路深入一个，才抵达一切爱所共有者。旅程是那具体；普遍者是那旅程被充分进入时所展示者。
§1.5 本文的布局
本文分四个乐章与一次一般化推进，由一个单一的方法论承诺——从理论下降到实践——所约束。第一个乐章是现象学的。它把旅行这一特殊场域分析为它的诸构成性特征，即共同创造、被重塑的时间、悬置、偶然、阈限、对称的陌生，与被迫的共同在场，连同那支撑它们全部的宽阔（§2）；并论证那场域既揭示关系又生成”我们”，把关系的动态带至自我到场（§3）。第二个乐章是政治经济学的：它表明一段旅程所生成的经验是关系性财富的一种形态，它的复述是那财富的再生产，而这一再生产有一种健康的形态——活的共同复述——与一种退化的形态——把经验物化为一个被消费、被陈列的对象（§4）。第三个乐章先是伦理的、然后是美学的。它从场域引出一套共同旅行的伦理，包括它的诸失败及它与第三方他者的关系（§5），发展出这些问题所共享的关系性生产理论（§6），继而论证这样一个场域的建造是一个美学问题而非工程问题（§7）；创造即共同创造、共同创造即关系性生产（§8）；美的诸古典问题由三个维度与关系性主体所消解（§9）；审美判断经由再生产循环而演化（§10）；偶然之美的知觉是一种可培育的能力（§11）；并且，在本文最暴露的一章里，伦理判断在其极限处是美学的，以致最深的伦理教育是一种美育（§12）——一个被置于”伦理与美学之连续性”这一漫长争论之内的命题（§13）。一章关于美的政治经济学（§14）拿这些主张对照来自资本世界的一个具体情形来检验。收尾的乐章把”旅行”一般化为一个功能性概念，即便在被异化的日常之内对特殊场域的建造，并把它作为一个开口、而非一个结论奉上（§15、§16）。凡需要本系列姊妹作的形式装置处，它都被轻轻地、以服务的角色援引，绝不重建。通篇的支配精神是实践的：本文意在不仅理解旅行的场域，而且说出两个人实际上如何可能建造一个，并在一个永远在把它重新关闭的日常之中，持续地建造它。
§2 旅行的场域及其诸构成性特征
如果旅行创造一个特殊场域，那么这个场域就可以被分析。本节如此做，把场域分解为构成它的诸特征，并为每一个论证它在现象学上是什么、以及它如何关涉两个人之间的关系。诸特征分为三组。第一组关乎场域的时间之拱，旅程在时间中的结构，它始于出发之前、续于归来之后。第二组关乎场域的敞开，那抬起日常之封闭、使场域根本成其为场域者。第三组关乎在一起的诸条件，那使场域的敞开具体地成为共享的、而非两个孤独旅行者各自可享的敞开者。支撑这三组的，是一个本节最后单独处理的条件，因为它是它们之可能性的根据、而非它们之中的一个特征：宽阔。本节以考察诸特征如何相互作用、相互强化、并且——关键地——相互冲突来收尾，以致场域被理解为一个动态系统、其内部诸张力本身就是旅行对一段关系所做之事的一个来源，而非一张静态的属性清单。
§2.1 时间之拱（一）—— 共同创造
一段旅程不始于机场。它始于两个人最初一同想象它之时，始于念头被提出、地图被打开、诸种可能被争论、诸种期待被对齐、共享的期盼被构筑之时。这一共同创造的阶段已然就是场域本身，而且在一个方面是它最纯粹的一段，而非先于旅程本身的预备性劳作——消费主义的理解把规划当作仅仅是”为一个稍后被消费的产品作安排”这种前置的工作。在共同创造中，两个人一同建造一个尚不存在的共享世界，而一个共享世界的建造正是”我们”据以被构成的那个奠基性行为。
这一点值得停留，因为它把旅行的生成性定位得比通常的论说所置之处更早。一同规划一段旅程，是去协商一个共享的意向：去哪里、为什么、寻什么、拒什么、如何把一方想去看的愿望与另一方想去歇的愿望相权衡。一个共享的意向是由两个人所承载的单一个意向性、而非两个私人意向之和，而它的建构是关系性主体在它最可读的形式之一里的锻造。日常出人意料地很少提供这种纯粹的共同建构之机缘，因为例程在很大程度上在于对已经被给定之诸意向（诸角色、诸职责、诸既立安排）的履行、而非对新意向的一同建造。旅行规划逼出它。两个人想象一个他们尚未到过的地方、对齐他们各自盼望在那里找到之物，是在微缩中做着”成为一个’我们’”恰恰是什么之事：他们在一同意向一个世界。而因为他们所一同意向者是一个未来的背景——那个几周后他们的共振将据以被重新定义的流形——共同创造，相当精确地，是对旅程将要施行的那个背景-交换的、预演性而合谋性的预排。在那流形事实上被交换之前，两人已经在想象中开始一同建造它了。共同创造是场域的第一次开启，而因为它复现——在途中每一天的重新规划里、并且，如本文将论证的，在事后的共同复述里（§4）——它构成那整个时间之拱被串起所沿的那条轴，而不只是一个单一的阶段。
§2.2 时间之拱（二）—— 被重塑的时间
旅行重塑时间。日常的时间，在严格的意义上，被分派成被指派给诸功能的单位：通勤的那一小时、开会的那一小时、被诸义务所瓜分的那个傍晚——一种其每一区间都已被预订的时间性。一段旅程的时间有一种不同的质地，而这差别不止于它是闲暇而非劳作。它，首先，是被框起的：一段旅程有一个开端与一个结尾，一段被从寻常时间的无定流动中抬出、作为一个整体被界定的确定跨度。这一框起给旅行的时间某种例外的品质，一年之流里的一个括号，而那例外的、被界定的性格促成它的价值。恰恰因为旅程将要结束，因为它的时间是有限而被数着的，其内的每一刻都被更紧地把持；那”自己正处在一段不会持续的跨度里”之知，把人压入一种比日常那看似无尽的、因为未被框起的时间所曾强使的更充分的、在其内的到场。
它，其次，是连续而共享的。日常把两个人的时间分配进大体分离、只在一天的边缘相交的诸渠道——早餐、傍晚、周末被协商的重叠——以致一种共享生活的大部分其实是被并行地、而非一同地过着的。一段旅程的时间是不被打断的共同时间：一小时接一小时并肩，没有分离的办公室可散入、没有独立的圈子可吸走那一天。这一连续性是使场域的其他效果成为可能的诸条件之一，因为它们之中许多——共同在场的被迫、深度的抵达——要求一种持续的、不被打断的在一起，而那是日常那被分渠的时间在结构上所阻止的。被重塑的时间，被框起而连续，是场域其余部分得以做工所凭的时间介质；而它连同共同创造一道，完成场域的时间结构，那从最初的想象、经旅程本身那被界定的连续跨度、到那将在记忆中重开此跨度的复述的拱。
§2.3 敞开（一）—— 悬置
日常的封闭，首先被悬置所抬起：在旅程的期间，把那通常定义着每个人的、由角色与义务织成的密网搁置起来。在家里，人是那个必须去上班的人、那个欠着房贷的人、那个必须打理亲戚的人、那个在这套既立安排中被指派了这个位置的人；而这些指派，在很大程度上，构成着人日复一日如何现身，而不止是对一个没有它们也会是同一个自我的外在装饰。旅行是把它们搁置，悬置它们的运作而非废除它们（因为它们在家里等着），以致在一段跨度里，人更近乎只是他自己、只是与对方在一起，而非那些功能的履行者。这一结构接近现象学所称的悬搁（epoché）：对自然态度的有方法的搁置，以便那被它的自动运作所遮掩者得以被看见。这里的搁置由一张机票、而非一位哲学家的决意来执行，而它所使之可见者，是诸角色之下的那两个人——当功能的脚手架被搁在一边时，他们是谁、他们彼此是谁。
这是旅行同时是一块试金石与一个危险的诸原因之一。悬置所搁置的诸角色，对许多伴侣而言，是一向把关系维持在运转秩序中的好大一部分；把它们搁置，关系便必须在一段时间里、立于其下任何之物之上。如果诸角色之下有一种活的相互性，悬置便解放它，而那对伴侣发现一种”在一起”的自由，是被角色所束缚的日常曾经压抑的。如果诸角色之下所剩无几，悬置便暴露那所剩，而那对伴侣发现——有时带着一阵他们宁愿不曾有过的眩晕——他们的”在一起”有多少是诸功能的咬合、而别的有多么少。悬置移去那遮掩着它所揭示之物者，而非创造它。这正是场域是一块试金石的确切意义：它通过拿走支撑、看什么立得住，来检验关系。
§2.4 敞开（二）—— 偶然
场域之敞开的第二个来源是偶然：日常那预先决定的被抬起，每一刻”真正悬而未决”这一品质的被恢复。日常，在它的本质里，是重复，而重复是被预先决定者：在一天的寻常进行里，人或多或少地知道每一小时将持有什么，因为每一小时此前已被持有过千遍。这一预先决定，正是存在主义传统教我们认作自我的那大麻醉剂者。在海德格尔的分析里，日常是常人（das Man）的统治，那匿名的”人们”——存在被吸收进其平均化、被拉平的领会之中：人做人之所做，如”人们”所做地做，而在这一吸收中，”自己的存在作为一个须被活出的问题”这一事实被遮盖，跌入熟悉之物那平滑的自动状态。旅行打破那重复，而这打破首要地是对悬而未决者的一种恢复、而非一桩新鲜刺激之事。在一个陌生的地方，没有什么是预先被settle的：人不知道火车会不会来、那条巷子通向哪里、自己会不会被听懂、食物会不会好。每一刻重又成为一个真正的当下，悬而未决、敞开、待被经历而非待被履行。
而在这被恢复的偶然中，主体被压回到显现。当熟悉的脚手架被移去，”我在这里、在经历这个、不得不选择“这一事实重又变得可见，不再被溶解进被预先决定者的自动状态。这是旅行的存在论核心，而它有一条漫长而严肃的哲学谱系，是场域的偶然所重新激活、而非发明者。这谱系被概括于下表。其诸成员所共有的要点，无论他们如何相异，是：被预先决定者之破裂，通过剥去日常的遮掩，把主体归还于它自己、它的存在、它的自由、它的有限。本文向这谱系所添加的，是从孤独到共享的move，在下一节展开；在此只需确立：偶然是场域的两大开启者之一，而它的开启首先是存在论的，存在向到场的归还。
| 思想家 | 概念 | 对场域之偶然的关涉 |
|---|---|---|
| 海德格尔 | 常人、沉沦、本真；畏（Angst）作为开显 | 日常的重复是沉浸于”人们”；偶然抬起那遮掩，一种可忍受的畏、其中存在被开显。本文的主桅。 |
| 萨特 | 偶然性；面对存在之无端性的恶心；自由 | 旅行恢复诸物被感到的无端性、它们必然理由之缺乏，并随之恢复自由的暴露：在悬而未决的一刻，人必须选择。 |
| 克尔凯郭尔 | 重复对照回忆；真正的”重复”作为更新的领受 | 磨锐本文自己的措辞：目标是从偶然中对存在的更新的赢得，而非机械的重演。 |
| 雅斯贝尔斯 | 临界境况（Grenzsituationen） | 旅程的诸不顺——迷路、被困、卡住——是诸微小的临界境况，其中寻常的自我领会失效，主体遇到它的有限与可能。 |
| 梅洛-庞蒂 | 活的身体；知觉作为身体对一个世界的介入 | 陌生的地方首先在身体里被遇到——迷向、警觉、重新学习它的周遭——以致偶然在被理解之前先被知觉地经历。 |
§2.5 在一起的诸条件（一）—— 阈限
至此的诸特征,每一个都会对一个孤独的旅行者也可得。接下来的三个，是使场域的敞开具体地成为共享者。第一个是阈限。这一概念是人类学的：在范热内普对过渡仪式的分析、以及特纳对它的发展里，仪式有一个门槛阶段，阈限（limen），其中受礼者已离开旧身份、却尚未进入新身份，在一段时间里居于”之间与中途”，在诸角色与诸位阶的寻常结构之外。两样东西刻画这一阈限阶段。第一是结构的暂时消解：在门槛中，寻常的诸等级与诸分类被悬置，受礼者们立于通常安置他们的格栅之外。第二是特纳所称的交融（communitas）：在那些一同穿过阈限者之间所兴起的强烈、拉平、直接的纽带，一种被剥去了身份之诸中介的”在一起”，一种唯在门槛中才可能的无差别的相互性。
旅行是一种阈限境况，而共同旅行生成一种”二人的交融”。在一段旅程上，是居于”之间与中途”，是已离开家的结构而未抵达任何新结构，悬于两个安顿状态之间的一次过渡里。而两个一同进入这一门槛的人，在它的期间，被从那通常中介着他们的结构——家务劳动的划分、诸既立角色、一段共享生活所累积的诸位置——中释放出来，进入一种更直接而拉平的相互性。在路上的那对伴侣，在一段时间里，不是那”管财务的”与那”打理亲戚的”；他们是两个一同在门槛里的人，更近乎作为这样的人而相遇。这种二元的交融是共同旅行最深的诸善之一，而它也是为何归来能如此使人泄气：交融，依其本性，是一种门槛现象，而归家所要求的重新进入结构（§4.5）会把它消解，除非刻意的劳作保全它所生成者。
§2.6 在一起的诸条件（二）—— 对称的陌生
共享之敞开的第二个条件是对称的陌生，而尽管它易被忽视，它或许是三者中最重要的，因为它是真正的共享见证得以成为可能所凭的条件。在日常里，熟悉几乎从不对称。家首先是某人的家；城市是一方的本土、是另一方的所收养之地；朋友圈起源于一方、被另一方习得；诸能力领域被划分，以致在每一个里都有一个主人与一个客人，一个知道者与一个被领看者。这一不对称不是恶的，但它是无处不在的，而它意味着在一种共享生活的寻常进行里，两人很少、如果有过的话，是在平等的条件上被置于同一个未知之前的。去一个对两人都陌生的地方旅行，移去这一不对称。那异乡城市对他们两人同等地陌生；无人是主人，无人持有主场之利，无人识路。这一回，他们作为平等者立于同一个未知之前。
这一点的意义在于，它是共同见证的条件，相对于主客的不对称见证而言。当一方把对方领看自己的家乡城市时，对方见证那城市，也见证那作为主人的一方，并作为客人被见证；这一结构有一个陌生之物的给予者与一个领受者。当两人同等地是陌生人时，无人作主、无人被款待；他们一同经历那未知，并肩，各自新鲜地看它、各自看着对方新鲜地看它，并且——那决定性的添加——各自知道对方处在同一境况里。这一对称的共同经历是场域最深之生成性的根据，因为它是关系的动态得以一次性地对两人到场、作为某种他们同等地身处其内之物、而非某种一方在展示而另一方在领受之物所凭的条件。下一节的中心概念，关系性动态的自我到场，依赖于这一对称：当两人之一是这一场合的主人时，很难把”我们”作为一个整体感到；当两人同等地在门槛里、同等地在同一陌生之前、同等地无脚本时，它便成为可能。
§2.7 在一起的诸条件（三）—— 被迫的共同在场
第三个条件是最平淡也最双刃的：被迫的共同在场。旅行把两个人连续地放在一起，日常的诸逃逸阀被移去。在家里总有诸出口——分离的工作、独立的友谊、可退入的房间、把人带出去的差事——而这些出口，尽管看起来像单纯的后勤，执行着一个真实的功能：它们释放连续的邻近所生成的压力，并让一段关系运行而无须曾经检验它能承受多少未被稀释的”在一起”。旅行移去诸出口。在旅程的跨度里，两人被抛在一起而无喘息，而这被强加的、不得缓解的邻近，同时是场域的首要压力源与它深度的诸主引擎之一。
作为压力源，它放大。那些日常的诸出口本会驱散的小摩擦——相异的节律、分歧的所欲、累积的恼怒——在路上无处可去；它们不能被走散进一个正常日子的诸分离渠道，于是它们浓缩,这构成对”为何伴侣在假期里争吵”的、超出悬置与偶然之外的第二部分解释。然而那同一个放大摩擦的”出口之移去”，也封闭了一段关系据以回避它自己之诸深度的诸轻易逃避，从而逼出一种真正的共同在场,是那富于出口的日常允许人永久地推迟者。无处可逃，两人便必须真正地与彼此在一起，迎接他们之间的一切而非打理它，而在那被迫的相遇中，一种深度变得可抵达，是家的回避性安逸永远把它保持在一臂之外者。被迫的共同在场，一如悬置，是一个其价值与其危险不可分离的特征：它是那既使一段脆的关系裂开、又使一段健全的关系得到淬炼的同一种压力。
§2.8 那支撑的条件 —— 宽阔
然而至此的七个特征，并不作为一张清单上的七个并列条目而坐。一个条件支撑它们全部，而它是使其余成为可能的那个根据、而非它们之中的一个特征：宽阔，§1.2 所引入的那被加工过的空。七者中的每一个，被贴近考察，都被证明为了运作而要求一间被开启的、未被填满的屋子。偶然不能进入一个被填满的场域：一段其每一小时被订满、其每一空间被计划好的内容挤满的旅程，留不下任何”未被决定者得以到达”的缝隙，而路边的野花，当眼睛盯着行程单时，看不见。悬置本身就是一种清空，因为角色的搁置正是对那些填满日常之诸功能的清扫。阈限的门槛在结构上就是一种空，两个结构之间被清出的区间。被迫的共同在场只在有未被填满的时间供两人真正一同占据处才做它生成性的工作；把旅程塞得够密，共同在场便成为单纯的共同后勤，两个人并肩处理一份行程单。甚至共同创造与被重塑的时间，归根到底，都是开启并界定一个”将被留得部分为空”的空间的方式，一只其用在其中之屋的器皿。
这就是为何宽阔被命名为场域那支撑的条件、而非它的第八个特征。它是器中之空；其余是塑造并把持它的诸壁。《道德经》第十一章精确地陈述了这一结构：那”有”——诸壁、诸特征、被界定的跨度——给出便利，而那”无”——它们所围出的空——给出用。场域的便利在于它被建造的诸特征；它的用——到场与”我们”的实际生成——在于那些特征所围出并保护的空。而这是为何旅行的力量被误解为新奇的最深原因。新奇填充；宽阔清空；而那清空，而非那填充，开启那间关系得以来到自身的屋子。前一篇用于这一形态之最高者的那个措辞——什么也不做的丰盈，两个人在窗前，伴着雨（第十九篇）——已经是对宽阔的一个描述，在此被给予它的名字与它作为整个场域之条件的位置。好好地旅行，是在一切具体特征之前，懂得如何把器皿保持得空得足以为用。
§2.9 诸特征处于张力 —— 场域作为一个动态系统
把场域的诸特征留作一份静态的清单会歪曲场域，因为它们并不并肩坐在安详的共存里；它们相互拉扯、相互强化，并且——关键地——相互冲突，而场域在任一给定旅程里的实际性格，是这些张力的合力、而非诸特征单独取来之和。三个张力值得抽出来讲，既因为它们在现象学上真实，也因为它们对随后而来的伦理与实践要紧。
第一个是共同创造与偶然之间的张力，它构成一桩熟悉的争吵的深层结构。共同创造，被推到过度，是偶然的敌人：一段旅程被规划得越完全——每一小时被指派、每一处景点被预订、每一餐预先被选定——留给未被决定者进入的余地就越少，直到旅程成为一个运动中的固定背景，日常那预先决定被以旅行的戏服带到了外地。然而没有任何共同创造的偶然是一种漂流、而且是焦虑的一种，而非一段旅程；某种共享的意向是”根本有一个旅行着的’我们’”的条件。那过度规划者与那不足规划者——那个会把旅程订到分钟的人与那个会干脆出发的人——是在拉扯场域的两个真正构成性的特征、而非仅仅在脾性上不合，其每一个，单独而过度，都会摧毁它。本文最终将提供的解决（§7）是：规划的正确对象是框架而非内容——共同创造应建造并保护一个被界定的、被清空的空间，然后把内部留得对偶然敞开，意向被施于器皿的诸壁，其中之空被留给将要来者。
第二个是被迫的共同在场与宽阔之间的张力。被迫的共同在场供给场域所要求的连续的共同占据；但宽阔要求那共同时间保持不被完全填满，包括不被完全用彼此填满。一种没有内部之空、没有任一方在共享场域内安静独处之余地、没有未被填满之沉默的”在一起”，成为一种窒息，而那淬炼一段健全关系的不懈邻近，能够、在没有宽阔时、闷死它。场域既需要诸出口的移去，也需要一间内部的屋子；没有宽阔的共同在场是禁闭，而没有共同在场的宽阔是两个仅仅彼此靠近的人。
第三个是阈限与时间之拱之间的张力，它是归来之问题的结构性种子。门槛的交融，依其本性，是反结构的、无常的；时间之拱，依其本性，结束，把两人存回日常的结构里。那使场域的相互性如此强烈的特征本身——它从结构中的阈限式释放——正是那保证它在归来时消解的特征，因为人不能永远停留在门槛里。这一张力是使再生产之劳作成为必要的那个条件、而非一桩须被移除的缺陷（§4）：因为阈限不能被延长，它所生成者必须被再生产成一种能挺过向结构之归来的形态，否则它就丧失了。如此，场域是一种动态而自我瓦解的境况、而非一份稳定的占有，强烈而无常，其诸善必须被主动地携过归来的门槛、否则便在门槛处被交出。正是向那一携带、向它所守护或挥霍的财富，本文现在转去——在首先关注了场域、当它持续时、所带至到场之物之后。
§3 从揭示到生成 —— 关系性动态的自我到场
旅行的场域做两件事，而它们必须被仔细区分，因为把它们混为一谈遮掩了共同旅程中最具特色者。场域揭示，而场域生成。揭示是把某种已然在那里之物带入视野；生成是把某种不曾在那里之物带入存在。前一节的诸特征曾被描述为执行这两个功能——悬置揭示诸角色之下所卧者，但被迫的共同在场与阈限的门槛生成一种此前不存在的交融——而那双重性被留着。本节把这两个功能分开，论证那生成性的功能是更深、更具特色的，并给它的产物一个名字：关系性动态的自我到场，本文现象学的中心概念。然后它通过把这一概念分别对照两个可能与它相混的误解来保全它：它仅仅是孤独旅行者之存在论自我发现的加倍，以及它就是黑格尔已经描述过的相互承认。
§3.1 场域作为试金石 —— 揭示
那揭示性的功能是试金石这一隐喻所命名者，而它是两者中较易描述的，因为它不带来任何新东西。当场域的诸特征剥去熟悉的脚手架——被悬置所搁置的诸角色、被偶然所抬起的预先决定、被被迫共同在场所移去的诸出口——脚手架之下者便被暴露。如果其下有一种活的相互性，这暴露是一次解放；如果其下有一片空洞，这暴露是一次清算。无论哪一种，场域都没有添加任何东西；它减去了遮掩，留两人面对那已然是其所是者。这是那解释假期争吵的功能，而它以一种公道于其严肃性的方式解释它。那争吵，归根到底，不是关于误掉的火车或关于餐厅的分歧；这些是机缘、而非原因。原因是场域移去了日常的诸遮掩、把两人之关系的真相呈给了他们，而那里那真相比例程曾允许他们相信的更稀薄，与它的遭遇是痛苦的，而那痛苦把自己倾泻在最近的任何机缘上。称旅行为试金石，是说它检验关系，通过拿走支撑、看什么无支撑地立着，来检验它由什么造成。这一检验之所以宝贵恰恰因为它在家里难以执行——在家里支撑总在那里可倚——而它危险也出于同一原因，因为一段关系可能被检验而被发现不足，而这一发现不能被取消。
然而揭示把两人留作两人。在试金石的论说上，有两个分离的主体，其每一个都可能在被清出的场域里看见关系的真相与对方的真相；而即便每一个都看见对方看见、并且他们向彼此确认场域所展示者，那结构仍是两个见证者比对笔记的结构。某种真实而重要之事发生了，但它发生于两个人。场域所能做的更深之事，是从两人中生成一个既非此又非彼的第三者，而非向两个分离的见证者揭示一段关系。
§3.2 场域作为催化剂 —— “我们”的生成
那生成性的功能把某种东西带入存在。在对场域的共享经历中——对同一个未知的对称的并立、门槛的交融、连续的被迫共同在场、共同创造中对一个共享世界的一同建造——涌现出一个既非两人之一又非他们之和的主体：一个本身就是关系性主体的”我们”，有它自己的运动与它自己的生命。这不是一个隐喻、也不是一种说法。它是本系列在其根基处确立的那个核心存在论承诺：关系先于它们所关联的实体，而我们所称的主体是关系性活动的一个次级凝结、而非一个先于它而立的前提。在那一承诺上，”我们”不是两个邻近的”我”的一个方便名字；它是一个真正的关系性主体，由关系性活动所生成，与它所关联的两者一样真实——在那承诺最深的版本上，比它们更根本。
旅行的场域所做、而日常通常不做之事，是生动而可见地生成这个”我们”。前一篇把共享的幸福描述为两个意义-世界的共振，被耦合进一个不可还原为任一者、却也不融合任一者的共同状态（第十九篇）；旅行的场域是那一耦合被强化到成为一个被感受的事件、而非仅仅被达成所凭的条件。两滴水不仅仅共振；那共振变得足够强、诸条件足够清，以致它所构成的”我们”作为某种被经历之物走向前来。那生成在日常里也真实——任何活的关系都在不断生成它的”我们”——但在日常里那生成是潜伏的，被溶解进例程的自动运作，进行着而从不升入经验。旅行的场域抬起它。而那被生成的”我们”之被抬入经验，正是本节现在所命名的现象。
§3.3 关系性动态的自我到场
在旅行的场域里，在某些时刻，两个人不仅仅感到彼此，也不仅仅各自感到自己；他们感到关系本身，它的运动、它的水流、那”我们”流动、移转、生成的方式，作为某种他们两人一同地、作为一个整体地感到之物。这就是关系性动态的自我到场：关系自身的动态作为一个关系性主体对它自己所经历的现象，涌入被感受的经验。它须被小心地定义，而三个要点固定它。（将会表明——当美的哲学被发展时——关系性主体与它自己的运动之间这一被感到的协和，在结构上是三个维度——实在界、符号界、想象界——的一种协和，是一同地、而非在一个主体之内被达成的；见 §9.2。）
第一，那到场者是那动态，不是任一关系项、也不是作为一个静态事实的关系。人能觉知到自己的伴侣（对他者的觉知）；人能觉知到自己（个体的自我觉知）；这里所命名的现象是两者皆非。它是对之间的运动的觉知，对关系如何进行的觉知，对那”我们”作为它流动、推进、收紧、舒缓、转弯时的活水流的觉知。在场域里，关系的动态——通常是一道运作于一切注意之下的潜伏暗流——升到经验的表面、被作为一个运动着的整体所感到。两个在陌生地方的人可能突然以极大的清晰感到，这，此刻，就是我们的关系正在成为的东西，而那感到——对关系自身的运动作为一个被感受之当下的感到——就是它的动态的自我到场。
第二，那到场者是那动态的到场，不是它的存在，恰恰在引言（§1.3）所固定的意义上。关系的动态不始于场域；它们连续地运行，在日常里和在旅程上一样。场域所供给者是它们的到场而非它们的存在，它们从潜伏的自动状态向被感受经验的涌现。日常的重复是那把动态保持在感受之阈下的麻醉剂；场域的宽阔是它们得以升入感受的那片空地。讲自我-到场而非自我-存在因而是精确的：场域不使关系的动态存在；它使它们到场。
第三，这一现象是一种自我-到场，因为它是那关系性主体、那”我们”，它自己的动态对之到场者。这是它最奇异、最重要的特征。不是两人各自分别地观察关系、把它作为一个被持于他们之间的外部对象；而是那”我们”，作为一个单一的关系性主体，把它自己的运动作为被感受的经验所经历。关系对它自己到场。这是一种关系性的自我觉知，在种类上有别于个体的自我觉知：不是”我觉知到我存在”，而是”我们觉知到我们自己是一个运动中的动态整体”。而它要求，作为它的条件，前一节所确立的对称共同经历（§2.6）：唯当两人之一都不是这一场合的主人、当两人同等地身处同一展开之内时，关系的动态才能作为一个整体对那”我们”到场、而非对一个观察的伴侣与一个被观察的伴侣到场。
一个轻的形式之锚。 本系列的形式姊妹作给这一现象一个结构性的定位，在此被轻轻地、以服务的角色记下、不重建。在那里，两个被耦合主体的共同状态是一个融合空间（fusion space）中的一个向量，而关系的演化是辫化（braiding）施于那状态的作用，一种在寻常情形里是一个隐式算子、一个支配着共同状态如何改变而自身却不成为系统经验之对象的背景结构的动态。关系性动态的自我到场，在这些术语里，是融合空间动态的成为-现象学地-到场：那通常在背景里运行的算子升入前景、被经历的那一刻。否则仅仅是”共同状态如何演化”之数学者，在场域里成为一个被感受的事件，那”我们”感到它自己的辫化。形式装置对这一现象学主张并非必需，那主张立于它自己的描述之上；它被记下只为标示这一现象在本系列别处所建之结构中有一个精确的位置，以及那被感受者与那形式者之间的连续性，在此如在这整部作品中，是刻意的。
§3.4 两个对照 —— 孤独的旅行者与黑格尔式的承认
这一概念最好通过把它对照两个它可能与之相混的邻居来保全，因为在每一情形里那差别都标示出它之中独特者。
孤独的旅行者。 几乎整个旅行的哲学文献都是一种孤独旅程的文献。那个靠失去熟悉而找到自己的漫游者、那个其道路是一条通向自己深处之道路的朝圣者、那个浪漫主义与存在主义想象中的孤独旅人——从哲学传统中的孤独漫步者到日本的独り旅（hitori tabi，独自所行的旅程）——全都描述一个真实而宝贵的现象：自我在陌生这一被清出的场域里向它自己的归还。这是偶然的存在论功能（§2.4），而它对一个人可得。但它是揭示、不是生成，而它是一个单一主体对它自己的揭示。孤独的旅行者所不能拥有者，依孤独这一条件本身，是关系性动态的自我到场，因为没有在场的关系性主体、其动态可以到场。孤独的旅程能把我带至到场；唯有共享的旅程能把我们作为一个运动着的整体带至到场。这正是当下这一论说不是存在主义旅行哲学之加倍或求和的确切意义。两个孤独的自我到场，即便并肩、即便同时，也不构成一个关系性动态的自我到场；那要求一个”我们”的生成、其自己的运动是那到场者，而”我们”的生成正是孤独的旅程、无论多么深刻、在结构上所缺者。这一主张的原创性在此：不在于给旅行添加存在论的深度（传统已经做了那个），而在于定位一个现象——关系性的、不是个体的——是传统那孤独的取景所使之不可见者。
黑格尔式的承认。 一种关系性自我觉知最近的哲学邻居是黑格尔关于相互承认的论说：那个自我意识唯有通过被另一个自我意识所承认才达至它自己、以致自我性从一开始就被对方所中介的辩证法。这相似是真实的，而此处所提供的论说欠承认传统一份债。但那差别是精确的，而它正是这一概念所系于其上的差别。黑格尔式的承认，在它的古典形式里，是两个自我意识之间的一种关系：每一个通过对方达至它自己，但那被达至者，归根到底，是每一个的自我意识，那个靠穿过对方的承认而赢得了自己的”我”。终点是两个被承认的”我”。关系性动态的自我到场不是两个”我”通过彼此的相互承认，而是那*”我们”*向它自己的到场：是那关系性主体达至对它自己的动态作为一个整体的觉知，而非每个伴侣经由对方达至个体的自我意识。这一现象的单位是关系、不是关系项；那到场者是”我们”的运动，不是任一”我”被确保的自我性。承认归于两个通过彼此赢得了自己的自我之处，自我到场归于一段对它自己到场了的关系，一个不同的终点，要求那个先在的存在论承诺：关系本身就是一个主体、而非仅仅一个两个主体借以构成自己的介质。承认传统，缺乏那一承诺，能看见那两个-通过-彼此、却看不见那既非此又非彼的第三者；这一论说，搁置于本系列根基的关系性本体论之上，把那第三者——作为一个其动态能对它到场之主体的”我们”——取作待描述的现象。正是向那”我们”在旅程结束之后的命运、向它所生成或挥霍的财富，论证现在转去。
§4 经验的政治经济学 —— 再生产与关系性财富的流通
旅行的场域生成某种东西；前一节描述了那是什么。但生成只是任何完整论说的一半，而单凭它自己，它是那会消散的一半。一份被生成而未被再生产的价值是一份被挥霍的价值，到场一次然后消失，不留任何沉积。本节从关系性经验的生成转向它的再生产：那”使场域所生成者得以持存、流通、累积、而非随旅程之结束而消失”的过程。这一转向也是从现象学到政治经济学的转向，因为再生产在成为任何别的东西之前先是一个政治经济学的范畴，而本节的主张是：一段共同旅程的来世，最好通过它被理解。本节论证：一段旅程所生成的经验是关系性财富的一种形态；它的复述是再生产那财富的劳作；再生产是一个好循环的确立；这一活的劳作有别于、且不可与那仅仅是它原料的死物质（照片、纪念品）相混；归来的时刻是再生产或始或败的临界关头；而再生产，一如一切再生产，在它的分配里能是公正或不公正的。
§4.1 旅程的经验是关系性财富
本系列已经确立了生成性关系性财富这一范畴：一段关系所生成并持有的、不作为分于两方之间的存量、而作为一份真正共同的盈余的价值，那”我们”的财富、而非两个”我”被加总的所有物（第十五篇）。一段共同旅程所生成的经验正是这一种财富，而这一点无须详加论证，因为它直接推出：关系性动态的自我到场、门槛的交融、在被清出的场域里所抵达的深度——这些不是任一伴侣私下拥有、可独自带走的善，而是关系的善，由”我们”所生成、属于”我们”。两人从一段进行得好的旅程带回家者，是对他们关系之财富的一份共同沉积、而非两份愉快记忆的私人储存。这就是为何它的丧失，当它丧失时，被感到为对关系的丧失、而不仅仅是对两个个体的丧失；而这就是为何它的守护是关系之政治经济学的一桩事，即”我们”如何打理它所生成之财富这一问题。
但关系性财富，一如任何财富，受制于一个基本的政治经济学事实：它不被自动地守护。被生成，它可能被再生产，那样它便持存并累积；或它可能被留作未被再生产，那样它便消散。旅程的经验不靠仅仅已经发生过，就把自己永久地沉积进关系的财富。它必须被再生产进关系持续的生活，否则它褪色，而那从一段真正生成了某种东西的旅程归来、然后什么也不做来再生产它的伴侣，会在数月之内发现它已变薄成几张他们不再看的照片、与一个他们能陈述却不再感到的事实。没有再生产的生成是一次性的花费。那财富是真实的，但它是易腐的，而它的守护是一桩劳作。
§4.2 复述作为主观经验的再生产
那劳作是什么？它首要地是复述：对旅程的共享的、口头的、相互的重新叙述，两人借之回到他们所生成者、并把它一遍又一遍地织进”我们”的织体。你还记得我们那次迷路吗——这个小小的短语是一大堆东西的开端，因为在共享的复述中，那被生成的经验不仅仅被回想、而是被再-生产：被带回关系活的当下、被重新感受、被重新编织，并由此被保住、不致消散。这是主观经验的再生产，而这名字是带着它全部的政治经济学分量被选定的。在劳动的政治经济学里，再生产是那”使生产所生成者得以持存、流通、并充当下一轮生产之前提”的过程；它是生产之”不止是一个单一的、消散的事件”的条件、而非生产的一个附庸。再生产，在此，是同一范畴被应用于一个不同的对象：不是劳动力的再生产，而是关系性主体之经验的再生产，那”使一份被生成的经验保持在流通中、并由此作为财富被守护”的劳作。
这一应用在它的每一部分都是精确的。生产——场域中经验的生成——单凭它自己是一个一次性的事件；旅程结束、场域关闭，而那被生成者若不被再生产便会消散。再生产——共享的复述——是那保住它者：通过把经验归还给关系的当下，复述使它持存于它的那一刻之外、流通过关系持续的生活、并成为可供进一步生成所用者，关系可汲取的那被沉积的财富。而再生产，一如一切再生产，是劳作，活的活动，由两人所耗费，没有它那守护便不发生。这最后一点是最易被错过、也最重要的，而下一小节专门讲它；因为这个时代的大诱惑是想象经验的再生产已经被自动化、被外包给一台设备，而真相是它不能由任何别的东西、而只能由分享了那经验的两人之活的劳作来执行。
§4.3 再生产是一个好循环的确立
复述不仅仅保存；它流通，而在流通中它能做一件单纯的保存所不能做之事——它能确立一个好循环，在本系列给这一术语的确切意义上。一个好循环，如在可持续亲密的奠基性论说中所发展的，是一个归还得比它所取的更多的流通：一条沿之正盈余累积的回路，以致关系回到它自己时不是被耗竭、而是被丰富，那流通在生成而非仅仅在守护（第九篇）。共享的复述，当它活着时，正是这样一个循环。在复述中每一次回到旅程都不是对一份固定内容的静态重放、而是一次再-生成：经验被重新感受，而在那重新感受中它被增添，被自那以来发生的一切所inflect，被复述这一行为本身所丰富，以致那常常回到一段共同旅程的伴侣不把它用旧、而是加深它，故事在每一次被讲述时在意义上生长。复述是一条归还得比它所取的更多的回路，关系的和乐沿重新叙述之路径累积正相位——以本系列形式姊妹作的术语说，一段关系的盈余正是一个闭合流通在它的诸输入之上所生成者。再生产，于是，是一个流通的确立、而非对一份存量的单纯维持，而且是一个流通——当它健康时——是生成性的：那”使一段旅程的财富不仅持存而且生长”的好循环。
这是经验的再生产为何与它的生成一样要紧、也许更要紧的深层原因。生成给关系一份财富；再生产确立那”使那财富成为自我增益”的流通，那”使单一一段旅程、被复述并重新感受多年、成为一份不断加深的共同所有、而非一份褪色的记忆”的流通。一段富于这样诸流通的关系——许多共享的经验，每一个被保持在活的复述里——是以最持久的方式富有的，因为它的财富是一组好循环、每一个都归还得比它所取的更多、而非一份只能被花光的固定储存。关系的政治经济学，在很大程度上，是对这些循环的打理：它们的确立、它们的维持，以及下一小节的主题、它们的两种特征性失败——物化与不公正的分配。
§4.4 死物质与活劳作 —— 照片
经验的再生产是活的劳作，而它不能由任何别的东西来执行。这必须被坚持，因为现代旅行进行中最普遍的错误是这一信念：那再生产已经被那记录完成了，已经拍了旅程的照片就是已经保存了它。照片、视频、纪念品、被地理标记的日志：这些不是经验的再生产。它们至多是它的物质，那”一份再生产或可稍后由之被造出、但本身不是一份再生产、单凭它自己什么也成就不了”的死物。这一区分恰恰是马克思关于死劳动与活劳动的区分。死劳动是凝结在一物中的劳动，过去的活动被凝固成一个对象；活劳动是当下的活动，而唯有活劳动能把死劳动重新置于运动、使它产出。照片是死劳动：一次过去之看的被凝结的残余，一个一份经验已被沉积并冻结于其中之物。它能成为再生产的物质，一个提示、一个道具、活的复述的一个触发，但唯当活劳作拿起它并加工它时。一张从不在共享复述中被回到的照片再生产不出任何东西；它是停留为死的死劳动，一份在硬盘上累积的、被凝结之看的存量，未被那唯一能使它产出的活动所触及。
把物质与再生产相混的诸后果是严重的，而它们在当代旅行的进行中处处可见。那把一切都拍照、什么都不复述的伴侣，把死物质的累积误认作财富的守护，而他们会发现他们的财富在一堆不断增长的未被观看的图像之下消散，那”活劳动从不被执行、而死劳动累积着”的完美徽记。更糟的是，记录的劳作能主动地取代再生产的劳作：投入到为以后捕捉那一刻的精力，是没有花在此刻经历那一刻或事后复述它上的精力，而被插在两人与他们的经验之间的相机能阻止它本意要保存的那生成本身。那透过一个镜头被过的旅程，被拍照而非被经历，可能生成不出多少可供再生产者；而那其来世是一个从不被重开的图像文件夹的旅程，再生产出它所生成者的很少。记录不是再生产。唯有共享复述的活劳作再生产那经验，而那死物质所值的恰恰等于那回来加工它的活劳作、一分不多。
§4.5 归来 —— 那临界关头
有一个再生产或始或败的时刻，而它在每一个把旅程当作”在归家处结束”来对待的旅行论说里都被低估了。那个时刻是归来本身，从场域回降到日常，在朝家方向上对门槛的穿越。归来不是旅程的结论；它是旅程最微妙的阶段，那”场域所生成的一切必须被携过、进入一个对它怀有敌意的结构、否则便在门槛处被留下”的关头。那敌意是结构性的，已在对场域诸张力的分析中被确立（§2.9）：旅程的交融是一种阈限现象，依本性反结构，而人所归入的日常恰恰是结构，悬置曾搁置的诸角色之被重新强加、偶然曾抬起的预先决定、被重塑的时间曾开启的被分渠的时间。归来是从门槛迈回格栅，而格栅不保存门槛所生成者；任它自己，它消解它。这是那旅行者最常见的哀叹背后的结构性真相，在那里那么好，而回家不到一周我们就回到了我们一向的样子。那哀叹不是感受的失败、而是再生产在临界关头的失败：场域的财富被生成了、然后在门槛处被交出了，因为没有做任何事来携它过去。
因此归来是那劳作的开端、而非结尾。把场域的财富携过门槛，是立即而刻意地开始那”将让它在被结构的日常里存活”的再生产：趁经验新鲜时复述、在格栅能消解它之前把它沉积进关系活的当下、趁财富仍温热时开始好循环。而且——这是本文最后乐章将转于其上的枢纽——把场域的财富携过门槛进入日常的劳作，与在日常之内建造场域的劳作是连续的。在家里再生产一段旅程的财富，已经是开始在日常里建造一个对生成了它的场域的小小延续；归来是那字面的旅程开始成为那一般化的旅程之处（§15）。那再生产得好的伴侣不仅仅记得他们的旅程；他们让它播下日常里诸场域之建造的种子，以致归家是把场域的能力带回家、而非从场域的一次坠落。归来是这或发生或不发生的关头，是旅程或沉积它的财富、播下它自己延续的种子，或在门槛处被交出、被哀悼之处。
§4.6 再生产的公正
再生产，最后，有一种政治，因为那再生产经验的复述从不是中立的，而谁的版本成为那被再生产的经验这一问题是一个公正的问题。两个人不以同一方式经历同一段旅程：一方感到为迷路这一浪漫冒险者，另一方可能感到为头一方之粗心的可怕后果；一方记得为一顿光辉之餐者，另一方记得为他们被冷落的那个夜晚。共享的复述把这些分歧的经历编织进一个单一的共享叙事，而那编织有一种权力的分配。如果一个伴侣的版本系统地支配着复述，如果”我们”的官方记忆一贯地是一方而非另一方的经验，那么那被再生产的经验便是一种不平等再生产的产物，一种叙事的占有，其中一方的主观经验被取作关系的记忆、而另一方的被覆写或被噤声。这，在记忆的语域里，是本系列通篇所分析的坏循环的一个确切实例：一方被沦为一个流通的单纯物质、其盈余归于另一方，一份不被共同持有之财富的燃料（第九篇、第十七篇）。那被不公正地再生产的旅程在名义上丰富”我们”、而事实上以另一方为代价丰富两人之一，那被噤声的伴侣的经验被消费以喂养一份并非真正共同的共同记忆。
再生产的公正形式，相应地，是本系列在相互翻译这一名下所描述者：那复述，其中两种经历都被接纳、其中两个版本朝彼此移动并生成一个任一者单独都不曾拥有的共享叙事，”我们”的记忆从两者被建起、而非由一方强加（第十三篇）。公正的再生产比不公正的更难，正如相互翻译比强加更难；它要求每个伴侣的经验在共同记忆中被给予地位、诸分歧被承认而非被支配版本抹平、复述生成一个真正共享的叙事而非批准一方的。但唯有公正的再生产把那财富作为关系性财富、那”我们”的财富守护住；不公正的再生产把它转化为一方的私人财富，穿着第一人称复数的衣裳。再生产的公正因而不是叠加在一个政治经济学过程之上的一个分离的伦理涂层、而是内在于那过程本身：唯有公正的复述把关系的财富作为关系的来再生产，而不公正的复述，无论它保存什么，都已经开始消解那”它声称要守护其财富”的”我们”。正是向这一及场域之其他诸运作所隐含的伦理，论证现在转去。
§5 共同旅行的伦理
场域生成，复述再生产；两者都能被好好地或糟糕地做，而那差别是伦理的。本节抽出旅行场域所隐含的伦理。它不从前一篇的水之德推出那伦理，尽管两者协和；旅行的场域提出它自己的诸伦理问题，而它们最好是从它自己的结构内部、从本系列所建之诸资源——好循环、相互翻译、生成性财富、意义-世界的共振——而非从别处引入来回答。四个问题组织本节。两个人如何一同面对场域所恢复的偶然？是什么使他们经验的再生产公正？在何种条件下一段旅程所确立的好循环存续而非崩塌？以及，本系列此前没有哪一篇不得不面对的问题（因为二元体是它的地平线）：两个人如何一同对待旅程必然涉及的第三方——他们所经之地的居民与文化？第五个小节，一套诚实的伦理不能省略者，问一段共同旅程之失败是什么。
§5.1 一同面对偶然
场域恢复偶然，而偶然，被一同经历，是场域的第一个伦理境况。因为偶然不舒适。那悬而未决的一刻、那误掉的接驳、那转错的弯、那令人失望的一餐、那不如所盼的一天，是一桩小逆境，而小逆境，被两人迎接，立即提出场域的伦理问题：那偶然会被一同承担，还是会被转化为一方责怪另一方的机缘？这是共同旅行精确的伦理岔口，而它一天被遇到许多次。当火车被误掉时，有一个误掉了火车的”我们”，被一同抛入一个待被一同迎接的未定境况，而有一种可能——总是可得、总是诱人——把那”我们”消解为一个无可责怪的”我”与一个有过失的”你”。一同面对偶然的伦理是把那”我们”守住、抵御那消解的伦理：把那未定者作为一个待被一同导航的共同境况来迎接，而非把它攫取为分派责任的物质。
责怪的诱惑之所以强，恰恰因为偶然是焦虑的。那未定的一刻暴露主体（§2.4），而那暴露能令人不适；责怪是一种通过把它的原因定位在对方身上来卸下那不适的方式，把自己面对未定者的焦虑转化为对一个人的怨。但责怪，无论它有何宽解，恰在那”我们”最被需要的一刻消解那”我们”，而它把一个场域曾作为”共同导航之机缘、从而作为那场域为之存在的交融与自我到场本身之生成之机缘”提供的境况，转化为关系之耗竭的机缘。因此共同旅行在伦理上核心的能力，是把偶然作为一份共同的礼物、而非一桩私人的怨来领受的能力：把那误掉的火车作为我们的待解者、那转错的弯作为我们的待笑或待担者来迎接，以致那未定者成为那”我们”之生成性的物质、而非它断裂的机缘。那能做到这个的伴侣在场域的诸偶然中发现无尽供给的生成性机缘；那不能的伴侣在它们中发现无尽供给的争吵，而差别在于那偶然是被作为一个”我们”迎接、还是被攫取为一个”我”。
§5.2 再生产的伦理
再生产的公正，在前一节已被确立（§4.6），是场域的第二个伦理境况，而它在此可被陈述为一个伦理要求、而非一个政治经济学描述。那要求是：那再生产旅程的复述须是公正的，须接纳两种经历、在共同记忆中给每个伴侣的经验以地位、并从两者生成一个共享叙事而非强加一个。那伦理工作是相互翻译的工作（第十三篇）：那更难的劳作，对照那”让更善表达的、更坚持的、或更自信的伴侣的版本默认地成为’我们’的记忆”之更易之路。那不公正之路的容易,正是使这一要求成为一个真正的伦理要求、而非一个单纯描述者；不公正的再生产不要求恶意、只要求”不去做接纳对方经验之更难工作”，而它靠不过是那”一个稍响些或稍确些的声音成为记录”的惯性来成就自己。公正地再生产，是抵抗那惯性：去问、并真心地问，对你来说是怎样的，并让那答案改动共同记忆，即便自己的版本更讨好或更方便。再生产的伦理，在这一意义上，是一种记忆的伦理，对”‘我们’渐渐记住什么”之公正的一种警觉，在复述这一寻常行为中被行使，那里关系的历史在被不断书写，而”那历史记录谁的经验”这一问题在被不断决定。
§5.3 维持好循环
第三个伦理境况关乎存续：在何种条件下一段旅程所确立的好循环继续生成而非崩塌？这一问题是可持续亲密这一一般问题的场域版本，而本系列的奠基性回答适用（第九篇）。一个好循环存续，只要它继续归还得比它所取的更多、只要每一次在复述中回到旅程都再-生成而非仅仅重放、只要那流通保持敞开而不闭合成一种固定的、重复的、被耗尽的形态。它的崩塌是那敞开的崩塌：那复述不再再-生成、成为单纯的死记重复、同一个故事以同一方式被讲到再无效果的那一刻，那循环便已闭合成一份存量，那财富不再流通生长、而被冻结成一份固定而萎缩的所有。因此维持好循环的伦理是一种反对过早闭合的伦理：反对让那共享的旅程硬化成一则固定的轶事、一段被表演而非被重新感受的定场戏、一份被持有而非被保持敞开的流通的所有。它是，以前一篇的语汇说，不盈的伦理被应用于记忆（第二十篇）：不把旅程的意义填到完成、不把它安顿成一个最终而固定的陈述，而是把它留得对再-生成敞开，以致它能继续归还得比它所取的更多。一段如此被保持敞开的旅程能滋养一段关系一辈子；一段被闭合成固定轶事的旅程在几次讲述中被花光、此后仅仅被重复。差别，又一次，是伦理的：它在于两人是把循环保持敞开还是任它闭合。
§5.4 面对第三方他者
第四个伦理境况对本系列是新的，而它是那开始把亲密的二元伦理带向更广之”多的伦理”者。此前每一篇都能把二元体取作它的地平线，因为亲密首先是一种二人的关系。但旅行打破那地平线，因为旅行必然涉及一个第三方：所经之地的居民、所遇到的文化、那些不是这对伴侣、而其家是这对伴侣在访问的人。而这提出一个二元体单独从不必面对的问题：两人，一同，如何对待那第三方他者？这一问题真正是一个为那”我们”、而不仅仅是为每个”我”的问题，因为那对伴侣一同面对那他者，而他们对所访之人与所访之地的共同立场本身是他们关系的一个特征，一桩”我们”所做之事，做得好或坏，一桩塑造着”我们”成为什么之事。
这里特征性的伦理失败是众所周知的，而旅行与旅游的文献已命名它：把被居住之地化约为供访客消费的景观，把他者的家与生活转化为布景、把居民转化为一片为旅游者的凝视而安排的风景中如画的特征。这是前一节所分析的物化的旅游者版本：一地及其人民活的实在被化约为一个可消费的对象，被拍照而非被遭遇，被凝视而非被会面。而它对那对伴侣有一个具体地关系性的危险，超出对那他者的不公之外：一个通过把他者作为景观来共同消费而构成自己的”我们”，是一个建立在一种共享榨取之上的”我们”，而它对第三方所实践的坏循环，往往是它将在内部所实践的坏循环。那一同把每一处地方化约为他们自己经验之背景、把被居住的世界作为”我们”的布景来消费的伴侣，在实践一种关联的样式——榨取、物化、把活者化约为可消费者——是一种不留在二元体之外的样式。一个人如何对待第三方,与他如何对待第二方是连续的。
那生成性的替代方案是对本系列所称的认识论好客的共同实践，在此朝外指向（第十三篇）：把所访之地及其人民作为一个待被遭遇的真正他者、而非一个待被消费的景观来会面，带着那让他者的实在改动自己的实在、而非仅仅充实它的敞开。在伦理上好好地旅行，是两人一同作客人而非消费者、以”主人接受一份礼物”的方式接受那地方、带着那”知道自己在别人的家里”的谦逊，而非把它作为”我们”的布景来榨取。而这对第三方他者的共同伦理实践，本文提议，是为本系列最终将需要的更广伦理所设的一所学校：多的伦理、关系性共有体的伦理、那大于二的”我们”的伦理。那学会在生成性地面对第三方他者、把非榨取关系之圆周拓宽到二元体之外的伴侣，是在迈出从亲密的伦理走向流域、分水岭、共有体之伦理的第一步——前一篇曾把后者标为二元体之外的地平线（第二十篇、第十五篇）。旅行的第三方他者是二元伦理第一次遇到它自己之扩大之处，而那遇到的方式是一个为”我们”而设的真正伦理问题。
§5.5 共同旅行的失败与崩塌
一套只能描述共同旅行之成功的伦理会是毫无价值的，一篇罗曼司而非一套伦理，而旅行失败得够频繁、以致它的诸失败要求一个充分而不退缩的论说。旅行不总是生成；它频繁地耗竭。有些旅程把一段关系留得比它们所发现的更糟，而一套诚实的理论必须能说它们是什么、而不仅仅承认它们发生。
第一个、也最基本的失败是无可揭示之物的揭示的失败：场域剥去脚手架、却在其下什么也找不到。这是那一段旅程，其上悬置搁置了诸角色、却开显那诸角色就是一切之所有，那两人，无功能地相遇，彼此无话可说；那例程曾让他们假定的共振是诸习惯的纯粹咬合。这里场域做着它在成功情形里所做之事——它移去遮掩、呈现真相——但它所呈现的真相是一片空洞。这一失败不是场域的故障；它是场域正确地作用于一段空心的关系，而它所产生的痛苦是一次真检验得到差结果的痛苦。它确实是旅程之生成的一次失败，但它的原因卧于旅程之前，在一段”其诸例程之下所有者比诸例程所遮掩者更少”的关系里。
第二个失败是再生产退化为榨取的失败：那本应公正地再生产财富的复述,反而成为一个伴侣占有共同记忆的工具，前一节那不公正的再生产被造成一种安顿的实践（§4.6）。这里某种东西被生成了，但它的来世是腐败的：旅程的财富，不作为关系的来流通，而被一方捕获、另一方被噤声，而叙事榨取的坏循环便安顿下来。这一失败比第一个更阴险，因为它能与一段丰富共享历史的表象共存——那对常常而温暖地讲述一个其实是一方之故事的共享故事的伴侣，另一方的经验早已被覆写并遗忘，包括被那”其经验是它”的人遗忘。
第三个失败是偶然压垮而非滋养的失败：场域被恢复的偶然，不提供”作为一个’我们’被迎接”的生成性机缘，而成为一股关系无法代谢的压力源之洪流，每一未定的一刻被转化为责怪，旅程退化成一场跑动的争吵、其中每一偶然都是那”我们”消解为指控的”我”与被指控的”你”之机缘。这是当那假期争吵成为旅程安顿下来的样式、而非一次孤立的卸放时它所成为的失败，当被迫的共同在场放大摩擦比关系能驱散它更快时，而那被清出的场域——它曾把自己作为”我们”之生成的场所提供——成为它断裂的竞技场。
那统一这三个失败者有教益，而它把伦理带回它单一的原则。在每一个里，场域都做了它的工作——移去遮掩、恢复偶然、为再生产开启空间——而关系未能迎接场域所提供者：或无可揭示之物、或榨取而非再生产、或断裂而非导航。场域是中立的；它开启诸条件，而关系在它们之内生成善或恶。这就是为何同一段旅程、同一组偶然、同一个被清出的场域，能对一对伴侣是一辈子的加深、对另一对是一个结束的开端。场域不决定结果；它呈现机缘，而那”我们”拿那机缘做什么是共同旅行的伦理实质。诸失败是被带至它者与在它之内所做者的失败、而非场域的失败，这恰恰是为何它们是伦理失败，是关于两人如何迎接场域所提供者的事、而非仅仅是降临于他们的不幸。而正因为场域永远只提供机缘、从不提供结果，”如何好好地迎接它”这一问题——正确地建造并居住场域这一问题——便成为本文现在转去的那个中心实践问题。
§5.6 冲突作为正面的财富 —— 嬗变的伦理
刚才给出的失败论说是真的，但单独取来，它是片面的，而那片面性现在必须被纠正，因为它会留下”共同旅行中的冲突仅仅是一个危险、一件至多须被挺过、最坏会摧毁之事”的印象。美的哲学已表明这不是全部真相：苦难能是美的，而冲突，在再生产的劳作中被嬗变，能成为不是一段关系之财富的耗竭、而是它最丰之诸沉积之一（§9.7、§9.8）。因此冲突的伦理不被回避或挺过它的伦理所穷尽；它包括、并圆成于嬗变它的伦理，于做那”把一桩共享的困难转化为一份共享的美与一份共同的财富”的再生产劳作。
这整个地重构了冲突的伦理境况。早先关于一同面对偶然（§5.1）的讨论把那伦理岔口呈现为”把偶然作为一个’我们’迎接”与”把它攫取为责怪之物质”之间、导航与断裂之间者。那岔口是真实的，但它关乎当下那一刻里的冲突。有第二个伦理时刻，是再生产的分析现在所使之可见者：那之后的时刻，其中那冲突，已经发生，或在共享复述中被嬗变成关系历史里被珍视的一部分、或被留作一道生的伤口、或被武器化为一桩待重开的怨。冲突的伦理横跨两个时刻。在那一刻里，要求是把那困难作为一个”我们”迎接、而非消解为责怪。在那一刻之后，要求是好好地再生产那冲突，以一种嬗变它的方式一同回到它，给那共享的困难一个形式与一个意义，让两人在那艰难者之中找到一种困难本身使之成为可能的美与亲近。那能两者皆做的伴侣——在那一刻里一同迎接冲突，并在事后一同嬗变它——不仅仅挺过他们的冲突；他们把它们转化为财富，而且转化为一种独特地持久而珍贵的财富，因为它是一桩”被一同走过并被造得美”的困难的财富。
这就是为何一段曾经受并嬗变过真实冲突的关系，往往比一段从未被认真检验过的关系更深。被嬗变的冲突产出不破的和谐所不能者：那”‘我们’能挺过困难并以它造美”的、被持于共享记忆中的证明；那真正分歧并被和解的两种知觉之来之不易的共同协和；那”一同经受一场风暴”的独特而不可重复的共享经验。最深的诸亲密很常常是那些嬗变了最多困难者，而原因现在清楚了：困难，被好好地再生产，是比安逸更丰的关系性财富之物质，因为它的嬗变生成一种安逸从不要求、因而从不产出的美与纽带。那伦理劝谕当然不是去寻求冲突——那生的困难是真实的，而被糟糕地迎接或糟糕地再生产它是纯粹的损失。那劝谕是：冲突，当它来时，不只是待被挺过、而是待被嬗变：在那一刻里作为一个”我们”被迎接、并在事后被再生产成美，以致一段共享生活最艰难的诸段落，通过它们之再生产的爱的劳作，成为不是关系所携的伤口、而是它所持的珍宝。那”使成功的嬗变区别于失败的嬗变”者不被留给隐喻：苦难的好再生产必须满足四条判准——它必须保全关系继续生成之可能、必须被关系地而非单方面地进行、必须拒绝对任一方之痛的剥削、并必须以那”它不可避免地生成”的权力之克制伴随那权力（§9.9）。这四条标出善的方向，尽管，如那讨论所承认的，它们不供给方法，那方法仍是诸艺中最难者之一。共同旅行的伦理在它包括这个之前是不完整的——这一认识：那困难者、甚至那痛苦者，不是关系之繁荣的敌人、而是，被正确地嬗变，它最深的诸来源之一。美不排除冲突；亲密的伦理，在它最成熟时，使冲突成为关系之共同生成的一部分。
§5.7 共同的善 —— 一同面对世界的能力
共同旅行的伦理已分析了须被回避的诸失败与须被嬗变的诸冲突，但它若以诸禁令与诸修补、以”不可做什么”与”须补什么”收尾，便会落在一个太低的音上。因为共同旅行的伦理实质终究不是否定的而是肯定的：那些被好好迎接的旅程、被一同面对的偶然、被嬗变的冲突，累积成某种是关系最深的伦理成就之物，而本文应在离开伦理乐章之前命名它。那成就是一种能力——那在两个人之间、经一生共同行旅而生长起来的、一同面对世界的能力。
考虑跨许多被好好经历的旅程所建起者。每一次两人作为一个”我们”迎接一个陌生地方、一同导航它的诸偶然、不消解为责怪地经受它的诸困难、并把经验再生产成共享的财富，他们就不仅在生成一个特定的善；他们在培育一个一般的善——一种被检验、被加深、日益可靠的”把无论什么来者作为一个’我们’、而非作为两个孤立的’我’来迎接”的能力。那旅行得久而好的伴侣不仅仅在共享记忆上更富有；他们一同地，更善于面对那陌生者、那偶然者、那困难者，更能进入未知而不断裂、迎接未计划者而不慌乱、在那”驱散较少历练之关系”的strain下守在一起。这一生长的能力是关系最确切意义上的共同善：不是一个由一方拥有并与另一方分享的善、也不是一个外在于两人的善，而是一个就是那被强化的”我们”本身的善，那关系性主体被发展的”作为一者面对世界”之力。它是整个实践的伦理果实，那一切被好好迎接的旅程、无人意图之下、一直在建造之物。
这一共同善是本文所分析之一切的伦理对应物，被聚拢进一个单一的能力。它是关系性动态的自我到场（§3）成为持久的，一个”足够好地认识自己以致能在压力下作为一者行动”的”我们”。它是被再生产之经验的关系性财富（§4）成为能力，那被累积的共享历史沉淀成一种面对来者的当下之力。它是关系性生产的好循环（§6）见于它的果实，一段”既已生成并再生产得好、如今更能生成并再生产”的关系，它的生成性复利成一种被检验的共享生活之能力。而它是对”共同旅行为何在伦理上要紧”这一问题最深的回答：不因为它提供愉快的经验、甚至不因为它生成财富，而因为，被好好地经历，它建造两个人一同面对世界的能力，而那，归根到底，正是一段亲密关系所为者、它的伦理繁荣之所在。那能一同面对任何事的伴侣，因为他们已一同好好地面对了如此之多，已成就了那整个共同旅行的伦理、在它一切具体关切之下、所关于者的共同善。这是伦理乐章归于安息之处：不在失败的回避、而在一种一同面对世界之共享能力的肯定成就，一个经一生共同行旅而生长得能作为一者面对无论什么来者的”我们”的共同善。
§6 关系性生产及其伦理原则
本文已经，经数条路径，抵达同一种问题。一段共享经验的再生产能是公正或不公正的（§4.6）；苦难的再生产能保全或摧毁一段关系（§9.9）；跨两种相异感受力的审美判断之实践能维持或消灭那相异的两者（§10.4）。这些一向被当作分离的问题、各有其自己的分析。它们不是分离的。它们是一个底层活动的诸实例，本节首次命名并理论化它：关系性生产，那”一个关系性主体生成并再生产那对它本有之价值”的活动。本节把关系性生产确立为一个范畴、构想支配它的诸伦理原则、并表明那些此前分离的问题是它的诸应用、共享一组单一的原则。它，在本文乃至可以说本系列的架构里，是一个理论事件：关系性生产作为一个有它自己之构成性伦理的领域的首次陈述。
§6.1 关系性生产这一范畴
本文所谓关系性生产，意指任何”一个关系性主体、一个’我们’、生成或再生产那对一段关系本有之价值”的活动：共享经验、共同记忆、共同意义、”我们”的审美判断、所一同经历者的意义。这一范畴在设计上是宽的，因为它的要点是把一向被分开对待、却共享一个结构的诸活动聚于一个概念之下。旅行场域中经验的生成（§2）、它在共享复述中的再生产（§4）、苦难的再生产（§9.9）、一个共享审美判断的生产与演化（§10），全都是关系性生产：在每一个里，一个关系性主体在做工，生成或再生产一个属于关系、而非属于它任一成员的价值。
那统一这些活动、使关系性生产成为一个单一范畴而非一份清单者，是它们全都共享的一个结构性特征：每一个都是一个由必须保持为二的两者所进行、生成一个不属任一者单独之价值的生产。这是那把关系性生产与单纯的生产区分开来者。在寻常的生产里，一个主体生产一个价值；那主体是被给定的，而问题只是那价值。在关系性生产里，那生产着的主体本身是一段关系，一个由保持相异的两者所构成的”我们”，而这改变一切，因为那活动能以损害或摧毁那进行它的关系性主体本身的方式被进行。一段关系能以一种把”我们”消解进一方之叙事的方式生产它的共享记忆；能以一种把关系转化为支配之工具的方式再生产它的苦难；能以一种消灭两者之差异的方式生产它的审美判断。关系性生产是能消费它自己之生产者的生产，能在生产之中损害那”它生产其价值”的关系性主体，而正是这一可能性使关系性生产成为一个要求它自己之伦理的领域。关系性生产的伦理是那”使活动生成关系的价值而不损害那生成它的关系性主体“所凭的一组原则。
§6.2 那拱顶石 —— 主体保全原则
在关系性生产之伦理的首位立着一个单一的原则，它支配其余一切、并在一种意义上从它展开它们。它处理关系性生产最深的危险——关系之统一的生产可能被以它所联合的诸主体之一的摧毁来购买——而它恰恰禁止这个。
主体保全原则。 没有任何好的关系可以以消灭对方为代价来购买它的统一。 任何”通过消除、噤声、消解或压倒它所关联的诸主体之任一者来达成’我们’的统一、协和或共享价值”的关系性生产，恰恰在那一达成中，失败了，因为一段关系的统一是保持为二的两者的统一，而一个由它们之一的摧毁所买来的统一是它的废除、而非关系的圆成。那”挺过一个’我’之消灭”的”我们”是一个穿着关系之戏服的单一主体、而非一个关系性主体。
这一原则直接搁置于本系列的关系性本体论与”共振有别于融合”的论说（§3.2）之上。一段关系是保持为二的两者的耦合；它的统一是相异意义-世界的共振、不是它们的融合。以统一之名消灭两者之一，因而不是完善关系、而是摧毁它的条件，把那共振的二坍缩成那孤独的一。主体保全原则是这一存在论真相的伦理陈述：因为关系就是两个相异主体的共振，任何消除一个主体的生产都摧毁关系，无论它显得达成了多少”统一”。而它是普遍与特殊之辩证法那一动力学结果（§10.5）的伦理对应物：那里曾表明特殊之被压制、两者之同质化为一，是一场动力学灾难，熄灭关系之继续生成性所依赖的多样性；这里同一真相显现为一条伦理禁令，即关系即便为了统一也不可消灭那特殊的主体，否则便熄灭它自己。那动力学的”特殊者为生成性所必需”与那伦理的”对方不可为统一而被消灭”是同一真相的两个语域。
这一原则的力量在于，它一举诊断出每一形态的关系性生产之特征性腐败。每一形态都有一种”通过消灭一个主体来购买统一”的方式，而那原则禁止每一种：那”通过噤声一方之经验来达成一个共享故事”的记忆之再生产；那”通过把一方从属于另一方之伤口来达成关系之延续”的苦难之再生产；那”通过把一方之判断消解进另一方的来达成一致”的审美协和之生产。在每一情形里那腐败都有同一形式——统一被一个主体的消灭所购买——而主体保全原则是那命名它的单一禁令。这就是为何它是拱顶石：不是诸原则中的一个，而是那”诸具体判准从之取得它们之力”的原则，它们每一个都是”在关系性生产的一个特定维度里禁止主体之消灭”的一种确定方式。
§6.3 四条操作性判准
在拱顶石之下立着四条操作性判准，它们在对应于本系列诸理论支柱的四个维度里，指明主体之保全在关系性生产的进行中要求什么。它们最初是为苦难这一特定情形被陈述的（§9.9）；现在它们被看出不特定于苦难、而一般于关系性生产本身，并在此以它们的一般形式被陈述。
目的论判准：关系性生产必须保全关系之继续生成性的可能（第九篇）。它必须不在生产关系之价值时封闭关系的生成性未来，必须不生产一个死胡同、一个被冻结的裁决、一个无可从之进一步生成的终点。这一判准禁止在时间这一维度里对主体的消灭：一个终结关系”继续生成”之能力的生产，已经把关系作为一个活的主体消灭了，只留下一个死的结构。
存在论判准：关系性生产必须被关系地、共同地、由两者一同地、而非由一方单方面地进行。那被生产者是关系性主体的价值，而一个关系性主体的价值只能由那关系性主体来生产、而非由一个以它之名行动的成员。这一判准禁止在能动这一维度里对主体的消灭：一个由一个成员单独进行的生产，已经把另一方作为一个共同生产者消灭了，把那”我们”的生产转化为一个”我”的。
政治经济学判准：关系性生产必须不剥削，必须不把一方的贡献、经验或苦难转化为另一方所得之物质（第十五篇、第十七篇）。这一判准禁止在价值这一维度里对主体的消灭：一个把一方的贡献作为另一方之盈余榨取的生产，已经把头一方作为一个平等的参与者消灭了，把他们沦为另一方致富的单纯燃料。
权力判准：关系性生产不可避免地生成一个权力的结构，而它必须在生成它时也生成那约束其滥用之力（第十七篇）。它必须不让它所造的不对称成为一个支配的持立工具，而必须以那”制衡它”的权力伴随它所生成的权力。这一判准禁止在权力这一维度里对主体的消灭：一个其被生成的不对称成为不受制衡之支配的生产，已经把那被从属的一方作为一个自由主体消灭了，把他们沦为另一个之权力的对象。
每一条判准，于是，是拱顶石的一种确定形式：每一条在一个维度——时间、能动、价值、权力——里禁止主体之消灭，而它们一同指明主体之保全在关系性生产的整个范围里要求什么。拱顶石禁止对方的消灭；四条判准说出消灭在每一维度里是什么、从而它的回避要求什么。
§6.4 那方法 —— 求同存异
诸原则陈述好的关系性生产必须达成与回避什么；它们不陈述它如何进行。它的方法、它进行的实践形式，由一句唯物辩证法与援引它的外交传统精确地命名了的箴言所给出：求同存异（qiu tong cun yi）。这箴言是普遍与特殊之辩证法（§10.4）的操作形式，而它是那”主体保全原则在关系性生产的进行中据以被尊崇”的实践方法。
这箴言有两个时刻，被合在一起把持。求同是对那一般者的追求，那共享的协和、那共同的价值、那”我们”的统一，是关系性生产必须真正寻求者，因为没有它便没有关系、只有两个并行的陌生人。存异是对那特殊者的保全，两者那不可还原的相异、他们分歧的经验、判断与视角，是关系性生产必须真正保全者，因为没有它便没有二者可关联，而所寻求的统一便会是拱顶石所禁止的那种消灭性的统一。这箴言把两者合在一起：它通过差异之保全、而非以它为代价来寻求统一，因而它正是那尊崇主体保全的方法，达成关系性生产所需的共同地基而不消灭关系性生产必须保持的差异。那里一种对统一的天真追求会驱向那消灭主体的同质化，而一种对差异的天真坚持会驱向那消解关系的原子化，求同存异把持那辩证的中道：那保全两者的统一、那保全差异的共同地基。它是唯物辩证法自己对普遍与特殊的解决（§10.4），被提升为一条行止的箴言：不是统一对差异或差异对统一的胜利，而是它们被把持的张力，那共同地基永远通过、绝不逆着两者被保全的差异而被寻求。
这一箴言，取自辩证的与外交的传统，是关系性生产之伦理的实践之心。主体保全原则禁止那消灭性的统一；四条判准指明保全的诸维度；而求同存异是那”在实践中，一段关系生产它的共同价值、同时保全那’其价值是其价值’的两者”所凭的方法。它们一同构成关系性生产的伦理，本文现在在转向它的诸应用之前以概要陈述它。
§6.5 重述 —— 关系性生产的伦理
关系性生产理论 —— 概要。
关系性生产是任何”一个关系性主体（一个’我们’）生成或再生产那对一段关系本有之价值——共享经验、共同记忆、共同意义、’我们’的审美判断、所一同经历者的意义”的活动。它与单纯的生产相区别，凭这一事实：它生产着的主体本身是一段由必须保持为二的两者构成的关系，以致那活动能损害或摧毁那进行它的关系性主体本身。它因而要求它自己的伦理。
拱顶石 —— 主体保全原则。 没有任何好的关系可以以消灭对方为代价来购买它的统一。被一个主体之消除所买来的统一是它的废除、而非关系的圆成。
四条操作性判准（每一条在一个维度里禁止主体的消灭）：
- 目的论的（时间）：保全继续生成性的可能；不生产一个死胡同。
- 存在论的（能动）：关系地、共同地、而非单方面地生产。
- 政治经济学的（价值）：不剥削；不把一方的贡献转化为另一方的盈余。
- 权力：以那”生产所造之权力”，生成那”约束其滥用”之力。
方法 —— 求同存异。 普遍与特殊之辩证法的操作形式：永远通过两者差异之保全、绝不以它为代价，来寻求”我们”的统一。
诸应用。 苦难的公正再生产（§9.9）；审美分歧的伦理（§6.7）；历史结构之内的关系性生产，即对社会、文化与传统在共享praxis中的辩证扬弃（Aufhebung）（§6.8）；以及，原则上，每一个”一个’我们’生产其共同价值”的活动。
§6.6 第一个应用 —— 苦难的公正再生产
苦难的再生产（§9.9）现在被看作一般理论的第一个应用，而它的四条判准被看作关系性生产的四条操作性判准被特定化于痛之情形。目的论判准要求苦难被再生产得保全关系的生成性未来、而非把它冻结成一道封死的伤口；存在论判准要求苦难被共同地、而非由一方单方面的叙事再生产；政治经济学判准要求任一方之痛不被转化为另一方的道德盈余；权力判准要求苦难之再生产所生成的不对称以其滥用之克制伴随。而高于这四者立着拱顶石：苦难的再生产必须不通过消灭两者之一——无论是噤声那个其痛不方便的人、或把一方全然从属于另一方的伤口、或把一方对那苦难的经验消解进另一方的——来达成关系的统一、它的延续、它的痊愈、它的共享故事。苦难的公正再生产是那”医治关系、同时保全那被医治的两者”的再生产；而求同存异是它的方法，对那苦难的一个共享陈述的建造、是保全那受苦的两者之差异的。早先一节作为四条特定于苦难之判准所陈述者，由此被揭示为关系性生产的一般伦理、被应用于它最难的情形。
§6.7 第二个应用 —— 审美分歧的伦理
第二个应用是新的，而它是最尖锐地检验主体保全原则者，因为它关乎一个情形——其中那”待被生产之价值”本身，一个共享的审美判断，似乎要求一个差异的消灭。这一情形是普遍而日常的：对方觉得美者，我觉不出美。她在那幅画前被感动到静止；我感到很少。他在那音乐里落泪；我无动于衷。她说看，多美，而我看不出来。普遍与特殊之辩证法保证了这会发生，两种相异的感受力会在它们的审美判断里分歧（§10.4），而审美判断的关系性结构（§9.4）使它成为一个问题，因为如果一个关系性主体的审美判断圆成于被分享、于那相互的看，那么一个对方不能分享的判断是一个其圆成被堵住的判断：那看被提供而不能被回应。善在这里如何被实践？
两种回应呈现出来，而两者，主体保全原则揭示，都是腐败，而且是恰恰拱顶石所禁止之形式的腐败，以一个主体的消灭来购买统一。第一是假共融：我假装觉得我不觉得美者美、佯装那共享的判断、逆着我实际的知觉说是，美。这通过消灭我的真相、通过消除我真实的审美判断以求一个佯装的一致，来购买那”我们”的统一。它是对自我的主体消灭，而它是双重腐败的：它违反主体保全原则（统一被一个主体、这里是我自己、的消除所购买），而它是一个虚假，一个被掏空了它实在根据的符号肯定，正是本系列分析过的那”保留被掏空了实在耦合之符号形式”的不真之结构（第十三篇）。假共融通过消灭那”真正的协和本会须保全”的差异，生产一个赝品协和。
第二种回应更微妙、更诱人、也更阴险，恰恰因为它披着美德的面孔：全然共情。这里我不假装；我真诚地努力把我自己的判断消解进对方的、使我自己觉得他们觉得美者美、克服我分歧的知觉仿佛它是一个待被纠正的错误、靠对我自己审美判断的真实交出来达成真实的共融。这看起来像爱的极致，我的知觉对所爱者的完全交出。但它，也，通过消灭一个主体来购买统一，而这一次那消灭因其真诚而更彻底：我把我自己的审美判断作为一个有效的立场消除、把我的”我不觉得这美”当作一个待被克服的缺陷而非一个待被尊崇的知觉，从而对我自己犯下一桩认识论不义，那对一个人在其作为认知者之能力中所犯之错，这里是拒绝给自己的审美知觉以一个有效判断之地位的错。而它，以辩证法的术语，是那动力学分析表明为灾难性的同质化（§10.5）：特殊向一般的消解，它消灭关系之继续生成性所依赖的多样性，从而，依目的论判准，失败。全然共情是被伪装成奉献的主体消灭：它摧毁关系所需要的差异、对自我犯下认识论不义、并因为它移去了那”其张力是关系审美生命”的两个分歧判断之一，而熄灭它本意要服务的那生成性本身。它被越真诚地追求，便越彻底地消灭；而主体保全原则禁止它，正如它禁止那假共融，因为两者都用一个主体的生命购买统一。
那好的实践居于两者之间，而它经由求同存异被抵达，后者在此取一个精确而美的形式。那共同地基不在对象的层面被寻求——在那里它无法被诚实地得到：我不假装、也不强迫自己觉得那幅画美。它在一个更高的层面被寻求，在那里它能被得到而不消灭任一主体：我觉得对方之被感动美，不是那幅画、而是她在它前的全神贯注；不是那音乐、而是他的泪；不是她审美判断的对象、而是她审美生命活的在场，她特殊感受力在它的被感动中的显现。我不觉得那幅画美，但我爱看你看它。 这不是一个安慰奖或一个回避；它是那真正的解决，而它一举尊崇每一条原则。它保全差异（我保有我自己对那对象的判断；我不假装也不消解），尊崇主体保全、对我自己不犯认识论不义。它把对方的判断保全为他们的（我不要求她为她的知觉辩护或把它带向与我的一致），对她不犯认识论不义。而它真正地达成那共同地基，一个真实的共享协和、那看的一个真实的回应，但在元层面上：那关系性主体达至它的审美协和，不在一个对对象的共享判断里、而在各自对对方审美生命的欣赏里，对那”分隔他们对象层面判断”的差异本身的一个共享的珍视。她所提供、我在对象的层面不能回应的那看，我在关系的层面回应：我看见你在看它，而那我觉得美。那审美判断终究被圆成了，不是靠我来分享她对那幅画的判断、而是靠我对她之判断的判断，她感受力在它的行使中的那enactive之美（§12.2），那是我能觉得美而丝毫不假装觉得那幅画美者。
这是审美分歧的伦理，而它是关系性生产理论的第二个应用：一个情形，其中主体保全原则禁止那”佯装一致”之假统一与那”全然共情”之消灭性统一两者，而其中求同存异在相互欣赏的元层面找到那真正的协和，保全两个主体及他们的差异、同时达成一个真实而回应的统一。它，而且，是本系列对认识论好客的分析所预告的实践（第十三篇）：为对方的审美实在、包括其中自己不分享的部分腾出空间，既不假装分享它们、也不要求对方交出它们。最深的爱，在美的事情上，不是相同趣味的达成；它是把对方不同的趣味作为他们不可替代之特殊性的显现来珍爱，对那”自己的趣味所不能架桥”的差异本身的觉美。爱另一个人觉世界为美的方式，恰恰在它不是自己的之处，是在关系性生产最亲密的维度里尊崇主体保全原则，并在关系的层面圆成那”在对象的层面不能被圆成”的审美判断。
§6.8 历史结构之内的关系性生产 —— 共享praxis中的辩证扬弃
头两个应用关乎二元体之内的关系性生产，在构成那”我们”的两者之间，在他们关系的共时当下里。第三个开启头两个所未触及的一个维度，而它在种类上不同得足以被标为不是又一个应用、而是该理论的一个独立子主题：那历时的维度，关系性生产，当它发生在一个被继承的历史结构之内时。因为那”我们”不是一个孤立的系统，而它不是一个无过去的系统；它被嵌在一个更大的系统里，而那更大的先于它、超出它、并以历史累积的重量压在它身上。每一段关系周围立着社会、文化与传统，每一个都带着它自己的普遍判断——关于什么是合宜、得体、美、所亏欠者——而这些普遍判断是历史的沉积、而非当代的发明，由诸代所沉积，以一种常常是强制的力压在那”我们”身上，由习俗的重量、家庭的压力、长久确立者的权威所backed。二元体的关系性生产因而从不发生在真空里；它发生在一个非它自己的、被继承之普遍判断的场域之内，一个历史结构、它同时是它生产的条件（供给语言、诸形式、价值的物质本身）与对它的约束（用被继承的诸规范及它们的强制之力束缚它）。这是马克思以它的一般形式所命名的境况：人创造他们自己的历史，但他们不随心所欲地创造它，不在他们自己选择的境况下、而在直接遭遇到的、被给定的、从过去继承来的境况下。关系性生产是创造一个人自己的关系、但在被继承的诸条件下；而”我们”与它被抛入其中的历史结构之和解，是这一子主题的主题，历史中的关系性生产，一如一切关系性生产、被主体保全原则所支配，但面对那”如何在一个非自己所选的结构之内自由地生产”的独特问题。
两个例子使这一境况具体，而本文轻轻地对待它们、作为一个结构的例示、而非实践劝告的机缘。考虑彩礼或聘礼这一制度，许多传统给它注入一种审美与道德的光环，使它成为认真、尊重、一桩婚姻之应有分量的一个标志，以致拒绝或减少它能被弄得显得不是一个选择、而是感情的一种失败。考虑孝道，被一个伟大传统跨越地审美化并道德化为人际关系的一种美、诸代之间的一种和谐，以致偏离它所传承的诸形式能被弄得显得不是一个判断的差异、而是一种丑、一种不孝。这些是社会秩序的普遍判断，而它们，关键地，是被审美化的，被弄得承载合宜与美之力，以致社会秩序不仅作为规则、而且作为美与得体之知觉来强制它们，恰恰在本文所分析的伦理与美学之连续性里（§13），在此作为一种社会调控的工具运作。那判断不同的”我们”——它不觉得那被规定的彩礼是它的爱的一个合宜表达、它不觉得孝道所传承的诸形式是它的关怀的真正形状——面对那普遍判断作为一种顺从的压力，一种敦促它把它自己的关系性判断交给那社会的之审美-道德之力。
那决定性的move是认识到：社会的普遍判断本身是关系性生产的一个产物，是无数关系、跨许多代、在历史与集体的尺度上生产并再生产一个共享价值的被沉积之结果。传统不是一个外在于关系性生产的异己之力；它是关系性生产在集体与历史尺度上的，一个延伸于时间中的庞大”我们”对价值的被累积之再生产。这一认识把二元体与社会判断的遭遇带入理论：它是两个处于不同尺度的关系性生产的相遇，二元体的微观生产与历史集体的宏观生产，而它，一如一切关系性生产，被主体保全原则及它的诸判准所支配。
那原则现在揭示两个相反的错误，恰与第二个应用的诸错误平行、但在更大的尺度上。第一是屈服：那”我们”把它自己的关系性判断全然交给那社会的、逆着它自己的知觉采纳被规定的诸形式、把它的特殊判断消解进那普遍者、因为传统强大而顺从更易。这是那较大系统对二元主体的消灭，§10.5 所表明为灾难性的同质化、在宏观尺度上：那”我们”坍缩进传统这一大吸引子、交出那”是它生成性之条件”的特殊性、并作为一个相异的关系性主体、以与社会秩序统一之名被消灭。主体保全原则禁止它：那”我们”不可以消灭它自己为代价购买它与社会的统一。第二个错误是全然对立：那”我们”整批拒绝那社会判断、把自己从传统中孤立出来、宣称它除了它自己什么也不向之负责。这显得尊崇主体保全、而事实上在另一个方向上违反它，因为它犯下 §10.4 所指认的原子化、切断那”与较大系统的耦合”——后者本身是一个真正的善，因为传统携带真实的被沉积之智慧、而文化是人类生活的一个构成性维度——而更严重地，它倾向于以传统之承载者的形式消灭对方：父母、长者、社群，他们的审美与道德世界是全然对立必须当作单纯压迫来打发者。整批拒绝传统常常是拒绝给传统的承载者以本文对第三方所要求的认识论好客（§5.4），以二元体之自主之名消灭他们的世界。两个错误都买一个统一——与社会秩序的、或那叛逆二元体的——靠消灭一个主体，而主体保全原则禁止两者。
那好的实践居于，再一次，求同存异（§6.4），而在这一历史尺度上它取它本有的辩证之名：传统的扬弃（Aufhebung），在共享praxis中。这一术语是精确的、且比”批判的再生产”更精确，因为Aufhebung恰恰命名那境况所要求的三重运动——去否定、去保存、去提升——而那是屈服（单纯保存、不加批判的肯定）与全然对立（单纯否定、抽象拒绝）都不能执行、唯有那辩证实践能执行者。那”我们”否定传统的异化形式：它取消那死的字句、拒绝那被规定的彩礼作为爱的尺度、不接受孝道所传承的诸形式作为关怀的真正形状。它保存传统的活的实质：它守护那形式曾承载的真正价值、一桩婚姻的真实分量、诸代之间所亏欠的真实的爱与责任，而非把它与那形式一并丢弃。而它把那被保存的实质提升进它自己生产的一个新形式：它把那实质再生产成一个”我们”真正觉得合宜的形状，把那被继承的价值提升进二元体自己对它的活的再生产，那里它在一个两人能诚实地肯定的形式中重新活着。形式的否定、实质的保存、提升进一个新的再生产——这是扬弃的三重运动，而它恰恰是那对待传统的好实践。传统的形式（那死的、被凝结的字句、被规定的彩礼、所传承的诸礼）与它的实质（那活的价值、那分量、那爱、那责任）之间的区分，是那扬弃所转于其上的区分：形式被否定、实质被保存并提升，以本系列所分析的死物质与活劳作之差别的方式（§4.4），传统的死形式被二元体自己之再生产的活劳作重新赋予生命。
而那扬弃不在思想中、而在共享praxis中被成就——这是它本有之名的第二部分，而它是本质性的。二元体不靠私下理解它的传统、在反思中批判它、智识上抵达对它的正确看法来扬弃它；它靠实际地在它之内不同地生活、靠”婚姻实际上如何被缔结、父母实际上如何被照顾、所传承的诸形式实际上如何在一种共享生活的进行中被修订”的具体实践来扬弃它。要点是去改变它、而非去解释那传统，而以传统被改变的唯一方式去改变它——靠被那些继承它的人、在实践中、不同地生活。这就是为何那扬弃是关系性生产、而非关系性认知的一桩事：它被生产、被造、被在两人的共享praxis中enacted，而它正因此也必然是共同的（存在论判准，§6.3），由那”我们”在它的共同生活中、而非由任一成员对传统的私人判断所成就。传统的扬弃是关系性主体的一桩praxis，而正是在这一被生活的、共同的、辩证的实践中——否定那死形式、保存并提升那活实质、在一种共享生活的实际进行中——那”我们”与它历史结构之好和解之所在。它既非屈服（实质被在二元体自己的判断与praxis中再生产、而非交给社会形式），亦非对立（传统的真实价值被保存并提升、它的承载者被以好客相迎、那耦合被保持），而是那保全每一个主体的辩证扬弃：二元体、传统的承载者、与传统自己的活价值，无一被牺牲于其他者的统一。
这一辩证扬弃在宏观尺度上尊崇关系性生产的诸判准，而它以一个目的论要点收尾，那要点把二元体的繁荣接到传统自己的繁荣、并最终接到历史本身的动态。目的论判准（§6.3）要求关系性生产保全继续生成性的可能，而扬弃双重地保全它，因为它不仅维持二元体的生成性（屈服会以同质化熄灭它）、而且维持传统自己的生成性。一个只被服从、被在它的死形式中不加扬弃地再生产的传统，僵化并死去，冻结在它所传承的吸引子处，丧失那诸形式曾承载的活实质，恰恰是 §10.3 所分析的固化。一个被扬弃的传统——它的实质被保存并提升、它的诸形式被那些继承它的二元体之活praxis所否定并修订——保持活着，继续生成，演化而非石化。那扬弃它传统的二元体因而，一如那”其分歧拯救被耦合系统脱离它死吸引子”的特殊场（§10.5），是那”传统借以脱离它自己之僵化、继续活着”的微观机制：二元体之扬弃praxis的特殊性，正是那允许宏观传统演化而非冻结者。
这最后一点开向一个关于历史的主张，那是这一子主题能陈述却不能展开、并标示它与历史唯物主义之联系者。如果一个传统的扬弃由那些继承它的二元体之被生活的praxis所成就，且如果这一被生活的praxis是那”一个传统借以演化而非僵化”的机制，那么诸传统的历史演化本身部分地被微观尺度上的关系性生产所驱动，被那无数二元体——他们在他们共享生活的praxis中扬弃他们所继承的诸形式、渐进地修订他们所传递的宏观传统。传统的大沉积不只从上面被改变，靠法令或剧变；它也、并不断地、从下面被改变，靠无数关系不同地生活它们的继承之被累积的扬弃。关系性生产，在这一光下，不仅仅是在历史之内被进行、而是历史自己的引擎之一：那”被继承的结构、一代又一代、一个二元体又一个二元体、在它的死形式中被否定、在它的活实质中被更新、从而被作为一份活的而非死的继承携向前”所凭的微观praxis。这是亲密尺度上的历史唯物主义，那一认识：那条件着关系性生产的历史结构本身，反过来，被那生产所再生产并转化，在那”第十一条提纲所要求、《雾月十八日》所描述”的被继承之条件与被生活之praxis的辩证法里。而它是文化与历史尺度上的生成性正义：一个传统的价值回流于并被那”再生产它的活关系”所更新、而非作为对一个死形式的单纯顺从被从它们榨取，而那传统活着恰恰在那些继承它的关系自由地扬弃它的限度内。那好的实践一举服务于”我们”的生成性、传统的生成性、与历史的活演化，而在如此做时，它尊崇关系性生产最深的要求——价值的生产保全、而非消灭、那”其价值是其价值”的每一个主体：这里是二元体、传统的承载者、与那活的传统本身，无一被牺牲于其他者的统一。
§7 场域的建造 —— 一个美学问题，而非工程问题
场域提供机缘；两人拿它做什么是他们的。但场域本身能被造，而”如何造它”——如何建造并居住一个关系得以来到到场的场域——这一问题是本文中心的实践问题。正是在这里，工作从理论下降到实践，忠实于那框定本系列的辩证-唯物主义承诺：要点是懂得如何建造一个、而非只是解释旅行的场域，并在一生中持续地建造一个。本节提出这一实践问题，并经一场辩证法、抵达一个出人意料的答案：场域的建造，归根到底，根本不是一个工程问题、而是一个美学问题。这一答案重构随后的一切，因为它使那些美学的章节（§11、§12）不是实践的一个附录、而是它的根基。
§7.1 Praxis —— 理论下降到实践
那支配本节的承诺应被明白说出，因为它决定本节的必要性。在辩证与历史唯物主义的传统里，理论不是自身完备然后被选择性地应用；实践是理论被实现并被检验的时刻，而一套不下降到实践的理论会正因此而作为理论有缺陷。关于费尔巴哈的诸提纲之第十一条以它最尖锐的形式陈述这一原则：要点是去改变它、而非只是去解释世界。应用于此，这一原则要求：一套停于理解的旅行场域论说——它描述了场域、它的诸特征、它的现象学、它的政治经济学、它的伦理，却从不追问两个人实际上如何可能建造并维持这样一个场域——会在它自己的术语上是不完整的。前面诸节解释了；这一节及随后的诸节必须转向那改变、转向那”理解借以在一生中被实现”的实践。而实践，当它试图刻意地建造一个场域时所发现的第一件事，是一个几乎击败它的悖论。
§7.2 刻意之自发的悖论
那些构成场域的诸特征——首先是偶然，但也有悬置及其余——有一种抵抗刻意生产的性格。偶然是未被决定者的品质；但我决定去生产偶然的那一刻，我已经决定了它，而我所生产者不再是那未被决定者、而是它的一个被决定的仿制品，一种被排了日程因而不自发的自发。决意”今天做点没计划的事”已经是把它计划了；着手”要自发”是把自己占进一个自觉的项目、其自觉本身封闭它所追求的那自发。同样的自败折磨悬置与一般之敞开的刻意生产：靠一个意志行为搁置自己角色的努力本身是一个人在表演的一个角色，而要敞开的费力尝试是一种封闭，一种以努力填满它本意要清空之空间的焦虑的自我监视。
这是刻意之自发的悖论，而它是一种天真实践触礁于其上的礁石。一对伴侣，既已理解偶然是生成性的，便着手制造偶然——把没计划的冒险插进日程、使自己按指令自发——所生产的不是场域、而是它的一个紧张的表演，而那表演，若有什么，是比寻常例程离场域更远，因为它是例程加上自觉努力这一额外负担。人越是努力直接地生产那敞开，便越是坚决地用那努力填满它。如果场域根本要被建造，那不能靠对它诸特征的直接生产，因为它的诸特征是那种”直接生产摧毁之”者。那建造必须以别的方式运作。
§7.3 意向施于边界，而非内容
那解决是认识到：意向能在两个不同的层面上作用，而它在一个层面上是生成性的、在另一个层面上是自败的。意向被指向场域的内容、被指向其内发生之事、被指向这一偶然或那一敞开之生产，是自败的，出于刚才所给的诸原因：它决定那必须保持未被决定者。但意向被指向场域的边界、被指向那”未被决定者随后能在其内发生”的被界定、被清空之空间的建造与保护，根本不是自败的，而事实上恰恰是一个场域的建造所要求者。人不生产偶然；人建造并守护一个框架、其内偶然自由地兴起，然后人克制自己去填那框架。意向建造器皿的诸壁并保护它的空；那空中发生之事恰恰是意向所不决定者。
这是那解锁整个实践的钥匙，而它可被陈述为一条原则：在场域的建造里，意向作用于容器、不作用于内容。造一个场域，是清出并界定一个空间、框出一段时间、悬置一组角色、保护一片空免于日常”它须被填满”之要求，然后把内部留得敞开、拒绝去决定其内将发生什么。那字面的旅程完美地例示这一结构：在买票与请假中，人一举建造一个有力的框架（一段被界定的时间、一次角色的悬置、一次向别处的移去），而在那框架之内人无须、也不应去决定内容，因为那框架本身开启那”偶然、悬置及其余自行兴起”的空间。那过度规划者的错误恰恰是把意向带过边界、带进内容，不仅订下框架、而且订下其内的每一小时，直到那框架所开启的空被重新填回、而场域被关闭。场域的建造是一片被保护之空的建造，意向被慷慨地施于诸壁、被从那屋子里扣住。
§7.4 受控的偶然 —— 那辩证法
这产出一个值得被精确陈述的辩证结构，因为它不仅支配场域的建造、而且如后面诸节将表明的、支配本文所追踪的自由与形式之整个关系。那结构是受控的偶然的结构，而它的两个时刻是一个辩证的统一、其中每一个使另一个成为可能、而非控制与敞开之间的一个折中。
命题 —— 受控的偶然。 生成性的场域要求它的边界被控制、它的内容不被控制。边界之控制不是内容之敞开的敌人、而是它的条件：恰恰因为那框架被牢牢把持——被界定、安全、被保护——那内部才能被释放进一种真正而不焦虑的敞开。一个有敞开内部的受控边界是生成性场域的结构；而两个时刻是辩证地统一的，一个之控制正是那解放另一个者。
那统一不是在两个相反的量之间达成的一个平衡，仿佛人想要”一些”控制与”一些”敞开、并寻一个中点。它是一种相互构成的关系。一个被牢牢控制的边界、一段真正被界定的时间、一个真正被保护的空间、一个人在其内真正安全的框架，正是那”允许内部被无焦虑地释放进未被决定者”者；人能放开内容，恰恰因为那容器把持着。反过来，一个真正敞开、被留得未被决定、不被意向填满的内部，正是那给那受控边界以它要点者，因为一个围着一份被完全决定之内容的边界会根本围不住场域、只围住一个更小的日常。控制与敞开不在为场域之一个固定的量而竞争；它们是一个结构的两个时刻，一只器皿的诸壁与它的空，其每一个唯在与另一个的关系中才是其所是。这是前一篇经由器皿与水之意象（第二十篇）所趋近者、以及本系列对那”束缚而不被强制之誓”经由那”把持而不约束之形式”（第十三篇）所趋近者的深层形式：一个其控制服务于一种内部自由的受控形式，那”靠界定而解放”的框架。
§7.5 两个失败极
受控偶然的辩证法有，一如每一个真正的辩证法，两种特征性的崩塌方式，而命名它们给那实践以它的区分之力、并使它免于沦为一个单纯的口号。场域能因边界之控制太少、或因控制太多被带进内容而失败；而两种失败在形式上相反、同等地具摧毁性。
第一个失败是边界太弱、内容不被控制到混乱的地步。这里有敞开而无一个把持的框架：偶然不被任何被保护之空间所界定，一次放开而无物把那放开守得安全。这是它危险的拙劣模仿、而非生成性的场域，把自己、或把关系、抛入真正的失控，把生成性的未被决定者与单纯的鲁莽相混。一对把场域误认作一切结构之放弃的伴侣，无一个被保护之框架地猛扎进一个无界的偶然，不生成场域；他们生成危险，而危险所带的焦虑封闭他们所寻求的那敞开本身。没有一个被把持之边界的敞开是暴露、而非自由。
第二个失败是边界太强、控制被延伸进内容直到那敞开被封闭。这是那过度规划者的失败，而它在焦虑者与控制者中更常见：框架被建起然后被填满，意向被带过边界直到其内每一小时被决定、而那框架所开启的空被塞回。这里结果是那伪场域，一种全然被排了日程的自发，一种全然被决定的敞开，场域的表演而无它的任何实质。那把每一分钟都规划、不能留一小时未被决定、必须不仅控制框架而且控制其内一切的伴侣，已经建了一只器皿并把它填实；没有空剩下来可为用。这是那产生”刻意之自发的悖论最初所指认的不自然的、费力的品质”之失败：场域被作为内容制造、而非被作为框架开启。
在两极之间居着那生成性的场域：边界被控制得足以使那放开安全、内容被敞开得足以使那未被决定者真实。受控的偶然居于这一狭窄的带里，而建造一个场域的实践就是找到并把持它的实践，这把本节带至它中心而重构性的主张。
§7.6 命题一 —— 建造是美学的、而非工程的
那找到并把持受控偶然之狭窄带的能力是何种能力？把它想成一种工程能力是诱人的，一桩”把设计弄对、计算正确的控制程度、把场域建到规格”之事。本节那重构性的主张是它绝非如此。那”界定多少与留多少敞开、何时把持框架与何时让内容跑、把器皿保持多空与塑造它多少”的判断，是不可计算的、不可还原为一条规则或一份规格的、根本不是一桩工程之事。它是一桩比例、分寸之事，一种对那”正确的量、正确的克制、正确的空”的被感到之感，而一种不可被还原为一条规则的”对正确比例的被感到之感”，正是我们以一种美学之感所意指者。
命题一。 生成性场域的建造是一个美学问题、而非一个工程问题。那”决定一个场域是被造得好还是坏”者是一种比例之感、而非一个设计之正确，是分寸与克制——界定多少与留多少敞开、塑造多少与清空多少——之感，它不可被还原为任何规则、而在它的结构里是一个审美判断。把一个场域造得好，更近于把一首诗或一幅画作得好、而非解一个工程问题：它是趣味、分寸、一种无程序能供给之被感到的正确的行使。
这一主张不是隐喻的。一个被造得好的场域之”善”与一首被作得好的诗之”善”是同一种类的诸善：两者都在于一种比例之正确——什么被纳入与什么被留出、什么被决定与什么被留敞开、多满与多空——它被一个反思的、整体的判断所把握、而非从一条规则推出，恰恰在审美判断的分析稍后将使之精确的那一结构里（§12.3）。一首被过度决定的诗，每一空间被填满、无物被留给读者，是一首坏诗，以一段被过度规划的旅程、每一小时被填满、无物被留给偶然、是一个被造得坏的场域的同一方式；而那”感到那诗需要更多空气、那旅程需要更多空”的能力，是一个能力，一个美学能力，在两种情形里。这就是为何随后的美学章节不是实践的一个装饰、而是它的根基：如果场域的建造是一桩美学之事，那么学习建造诸场域，归根到底，是一种美育，而那”懂得把器皿保持多空”的知觉是一种审美知觉。建造”一段关系得以来到到场之诸条件”的实践，被证明要求，在任何技术之前，趣味的培育。
最后，有一个特定于这一美学实践的德，而它是一切之中最难的：一旦边界被把持，放开内容的德。既已建造并保护那框架，人必须释放那内部，必须克制那”去控制其内发生之事、去使旅程’有意义’、去确保那夜晚’进行得好’、去把那空引向一个被决定之目的”的焦虑冲动。这一释放之所以难，因为控制内容的冲动是强的，尤其在那些最在乎的人身上；那最焦虑于旅程进行得好的爱人最被诱去把它规划实、从而封闭那”他们所想要的善本可在其中兴起”的敞开本身。放开的德是那”信任那空、建造器皿然后把它留得空得足以为用、拒绝去填那间自己费了如此周折去清出的屋子”的美学德。它，在空间与时间的语域里，是那审美之感通篇所行使的同一种克制：那”懂得何时停、何时留敞开、何时那不在那里者将比人所能放进者给出更多用”。而它是通往下一问题的桥，那问题不再是如何建造场域、而是如何知觉其内所兴起者，如何，在那间自己有趣味去保持空的屋子里，接住那来者。
§8 创造与共同创造 —— 美学与生产的统一
前一节论证场域的建造是一个美学问题、而非工程问题，而在如此做时它用了一个词，”建造”，那词现在必须被检审并替换，因为它携带一种论证一向在抵抗的工程残余。去建、去建造，暗示一种从一个计划而来的造：那先在的设计、那被执行的组装、那依一张蓝图而带出的poiesis。但场域的造者所做者不是这个。它更近于一个艺术家所做、而非一个建造者所做者，而它本有的词是创造、而非建造，那”把某种不曾存在、不曾预先被指定之物带入存在、开启一个世界而非组装一个结构”者。而一旦那词被纠正，一个概念进来，是本文——既已把旅行化约为一个场域、把场域化约为一桩美学之事——不再能回避者：因为美学的核心行为是创造，而一种把美学立为它中心的哲学必须给出一个”创造是什么”的论说。本节给出那论说，而那论说有一个重组整篇论文的后果：在关系性本体论之下，创造是共同创造，而共同创造是本文在它的政治经济学里所称的同一活动——关系性生产。那美学概念（创造）与那政治经济学概念（生产）被揭示为一，而它们的统一是那接合本文两大主线的拱顶石。
§8.1 从建造到创造
偏好”创造”而非”建造”的诸理由不仅仅是术语的；它们追踪所涉行为之种类里的一个真实差别。建造，在它本有的意义上，是一个设计的实现：人知道什么要被建，并建它；目的先于那造、一如一个计划先于它的执行，而造者的技艺是那计划向那物的忠实翻译。这恰恰是前一节所拒绝的工程模型（§7.2）：如果场域被建造，它会被预先指定并被组装到规格，而场域所要求的偶然、自发与敞开会被设计出去。创造是另一回事。去创造，是带出那不曾预先被指定者、开启一个”某种真正新之物能显现”的空间，某种创造者不曾、也不能完全预见者，因为如果它被完全预见它便会被执行而非被创造。艺术家不从对那诗的一个完整先在指定来执行那诗；那诗在那造中来到存在，它的最终形式被发现而非被实施，那创造恰恰是那超出任何先在计划者的带出。这就是为何场域的建造更好被称为它的创造：场域的造者所做者，是开启一个”一种真正新的关系性实在——旅程那被生活的’我们’，连同它一切不曾预见的偶然——能来到存在”的空间，而这”为那不曾预见者开启空间”是创造、不是建造。
这一纠正要紧，因为它把场域的造带入那美学传统最深地理论化了的概念之下。美的造是创造：艺术作品被创造、不被建造；而如果场域的建造是一桩美学之事，那么它是一桩创造之事，而场域的造者是，在相关的意义上，一个艺术家，一个为美创造一个空间的人、而非一个把一个结构建到规格的人。本文关于场域之造是美学的所说的一切（§7），因而被聚拢进那单一主张：场域被创造；而美的哲学，下面诸节所发展者，因而也，在它的根处，是一种创造的哲学，因为那美者就是那被创造者，而美的问题与”那美者如何来到存在”的问题不可分离。
§8.2 在关系性本体论之下，创造是共同创造
创造这一概念进入本文时已经被那理论化了它的传统所inflect，而那传统的默认必须被对峙，因为它与本文所确立的一切相悖。西方的创造理论，特征性地，是一种单一创造者的理论。范式是那孤独的艺术家：那天才，在康德的论说里，是那”自然通过其向艺术给出规则”者，那”其原创性是新者之来源”的单一个体；那浪漫主义的创造性想象，那”作品由之发出”的孤独作者。创造，在这一范式上，是一个主体的行为——他，面对那物质，从内部（或从缪斯、或从无意识）带出一个不曾存在的对象。它是孤独的：创造者对峙世界并生产作品，而那作品是创造者的。
但在关系性本体论之下这一范式是，若非干脆错误、则是派生的，某种其完整形式是关系性之物的一个特殊而贫乏的情形。因为如果主体本身是关系性的、是在关系中并由关系所构成的（§9.4），那么创造，作为主体的一个行为，便不比判断或知觉更原初地孤独。正如本文表明审美判断原初地是关系性的、圆成于那共享的”看”、而仅仅在那孤独的审美者身上被截短（§9.4），创造原初地是共同创造，由一个关系性主体的共同带出，而仅仅在那孤独的创造者身上被截短。那孤独的艺术家不是”共同创造由之是一个派生复杂化”的创造之范式；那孤独的艺术家是那有缺的情形，创造被阻于一段关系的一极，而创造的完整形式是那”两个（或更多）一同带出任一者单独都不能带出之物”的共同创造。这不是对协作的浪漫夸大、而是关系性本体论的一个后果：如果那创造着的主体是关系性的，那么创造是一个关系性主体的行为，也就是说它是共同创造，而那孤独的天才是那”创造的关系性结构已被窄化到一个单极”的极限情形。
旅行的场域使这生动，因为那场域无疑是被共同创造的（§2.1）：它不由一个旅行者为另一个所创造、一如一个艺术家为一群观众作一件作品，而由两人一同带出，每一个为那”成为’我们’的、而非任一者单独的”空间之开启作贡献。出发前被共同想象的旅程、在旅行中被共同开启的场域、在生活中被共同生成的经验，全都是共同创造，由那”其实在是其实在”的关系性主体对一个关系性实在的共同带出。而那在旅行中生动者，本文主张，是创造本身的真相：创造是共同创造，由一个关系性主体对新者的带出，孤独的艺术家之造是它的那被窄化的、单极的情形。最深的创造，一如最深的审美判断、最深的爱，是那被一同进行者。
§8.3 共同创造是关系性生产 —— 两条主线的统一
那”创造是共同创造”的认识产出本节中心的结果，是本文最重要者之一：共同创造（那美学概念）与关系性生产（那政治经济学概念）是两个名字下的同一活动。本文一向沿两条平行的主线运行。一条是美学的：场域的创造、美的知觉、美者的造。另一条是政治经济学的：经验的生产、关系性财富的再生产、”我们”对价值的生成（§4、§6）。这些似乎是关于诸相异方面的诸相异语汇。它们不是。共同创造与关系性生产命名一个活动，一个关系性主体对新者的带出，从两侧来看。
从美学的一侧来看，那活动是共同创造：两个关系性主体一同带出某种不曾存在之物，一个场域、一段经验、一个意义、一种美。从政治经济学的一侧来看，那同一活动是关系性生产：一个关系性主体生成并再生产那对关系本有之价值。那美学的着重落在那新奇、那”不曾存在者之带出”、那创造性的开启上；那政治经济学的着重落在那被生成的价值、它的再生产与流通、它的公正上。但那活动是一：在两者里，一个关系性主体一同带出任一成员都不能单独带出之物，而它所带出者同时是一个新的东西（那美学的重音）与一个价值（那政治经济学的重音）。这就是为何本文的两条主线一次又一次地会合，为何经验的再生产被证明是审美判断的演化（§10）、为何价值的好循环与美的好循环是同一个循环：因为那美学的与那政治经济学的从来不是两个活动、而是一，共同创造与关系性生产是”一个关系性主体对新者与有价值者之带出”的两个名字。
这一统一被锚在唯物主义传统最深的地层里，本文在此使它明白。对马克思，生产从来不仅仅是经济的：在它的根义上它是人在一个它所创造的世界里对它自己的对象化，那”人，作为一个’类存在’，生产一个对象的世界、并在生产它中生产它自己、通过对物质世界的创造性转化创造它自己的生活与它自己的本性”的活动。生产，在这一奠基性意义上，是创造，人在一个它自己所造之世界里的创造性对象化，而那后来的、较窄的、经济的生产之义是这一创造性之根的一个特定化。所以创造与生产的会合不是两个异己概念的被强行凑合；它是它们原初统一的复原，是唯物主义传统在它的根基处所把握者：生产是创造的唯物主义与社会的名字，而创造是生产的美学的名字，而两者都命名那”一个主体借以在一个世界里对象化它自己”的带出。在关系性本体论之下，那里主体是关系性的，这一带出是共同创造即关系性生产：那关系性主体在它一同带出的世界里对象化它自己，在创造它的共享世界中，创造它自己作为一个”我们”。本文的两条主线是一条主线，而创造是它们之统一的名字。
一个细微之处在肯定那统一的同时保全那两个重音。创造与生产是同一活动，但那两个词携带值得保留的不同重音：”创造”前置那”真正新者、不曾预见者、不曾存在者之开启”的带出；”生产”前置那价值之生成与再生产、它的流通与公正。一个关系性主体的同一行为，在头一个重音下是创造、在第二个重音下是生产，而本文将用那个前置着所视方面的词，但读者应把持它们命名一个活动，那关系性主体的共同带出，它同时是创造性的（它造新者）与生产性的（它生成价值）、美学的（它造美）与政治经济学的（它造财富）。正是在这一被统一的概念——共同创造作为关系性生产、一个关系性主体对新者与有价值者之带出——之上，创造的伦理现在建起。
§8.4 创造的伦理 —— 被共同创造之作品与毁灭之问题
如果创造是共同创造、共同创造是关系性生产，那么创造的伦理落在已被确立的关系性生产之伦理（§6）之下，但它添加早先的对待所未明言者：关系性生产有一个否定的以及一个肯定的时刻。那肯定的时刻是创造、新者的带出；那否定的时刻是毁灭、对那被带出者的拆解。关系性生产的伦理必须支配两者，而毁灭之问题——一个被创造之物何时、由谁、可正当地被毁灭——是整个框架的尖锐检验，因为它是主体保全原则最具体地受危处。
这一问题在创造的孤独范式之下有一个熟悉的答案，而那答案在此是错的、出于一个有教益的原因。在孤独范式之下，创造者拥有那创造、并可毁灭它：卡夫卡可遗命焚烧他的手稿；画家可割破画布；那造者，既已造，可拆解，因为那作品是造者的、且唯独是造者的。这把创造按生产-即-占有的模型来对待：我造了它，故而我拥有它，故而我可毁灭它。而对真正孤独的创造，这一直觉有些力量。但关系性生产的诸作品不是孤独的创造；它们是被共同创造的，而对一个被共同创造之物，那毁灭权消解。考虑那尖锐而寻常的情形：在一段关系里，在一阵愤怒中，一个伴侣删掉那些共享的照片，一种共享生活的图像，被共同创造的，正是那”我们”的财富（§4）。那行为是一桩错，而那框架精确地说出为什么。那些照片是关系性主体被共同创造的财富、而非一个伴侣的所有；单方面地毁灭它们是单枪匹马地消灭一个”我们”的创造、而非处置一个人自己的创造。它一举违反关系性生产的每一条判准：那存在论的（它是单方面的，而那属于”我们”者唯可由”我们”被拆解，毁灭，作为再生产的否定，必须一如再生产是共同的）；那目的论的（它封闭那”那共享经验本可被再生产、加深、嬗变”的未来，砰地关上关系之继续生成性的一条路径）；那政治经济学的与那权力判准一道（在愤怒中，那毁灭被作为一件武器挥舞，那共享财富被转化为一件伤害与支配的工具）。而高于这一切立着拱顶石（§6.2）：对一个被共同创造之物的单方面毁灭消灭对方在它里的那一份——对方的记忆、投入、在那共享创造里的在场——从而以消灭对方在那”我们”里的那一份为代价、购买一个伴侣对他们之暴怒的一刹那统一。那框架的结论是，没有单方面地毁灭一个被共同创造之物的权利；毁灭，一如创造，必须是关系的、由那”其创造是其创造”的”我们”来进行，否则便违反主体保全原则。
三个张力必须被处理，因为这事不像一条平直的禁令那么简单。第一：如果诸伴侣贡献不等，如果那些照片大多是一个伴侣所造、被一方珍视而被另一方忽视，会如何？这不授予单方面的毁灭权，而其原因开显关于关系性生产的某种深刻之事：一个被共同创造之物的价值不分别地、按各自贡献的比例属于诸伴侣，而属于那”我们”本身，因为按个体贡献分摊关系的财富已经是把那关系性主体消解进两个计较的个体，而那本身就是该理论所禁止的腐败（§6.1）。不等的贡献不把被共同创造的财富转化为私有财产；它仍是”我们”的，且唯可由”我们”被拆解。第二个张力：那卡夫卡情形，关于真正孤独的创造。这里那框架给一个有等级的、而非一个绝对的答案。即便”一个人自己的”创造，在关系性本体论之下，也很少是纯粹孤独的，因为它立于与他人——读者、继承者、它所进入的文化（§6.8）——的关系中，而一旦它已进入那些关系，它便不再是纯粹私下可毁灭的。但这一对一个孤独创造的关系性claim，弱于一个被共同创造之物所携的claim：一个纯粹个人之创造的毁灭是一个真实（若非绝对）的个人处置权与一份对那创造所进入之诸关系的责任之间的一个张力，而一个被共同创造之物的毁灭是一条清楚的禁令，根本不存在任何单方面的权利。那框架产出一个梯度：一个创造越是被共同创造、或越是已进入诸关系，任何单方面毁灭它的权利就越弱；它越是纯粹孤独而未进入，那个人处置权就越强，但因为纯粹孤独、未进入的创造是一个关系性本体论使之近乎空的极限情形，一个绝对的单方面毁灭权几乎从不被确立。第三个张力：毁灭不总是一桩错，因为毁灭本身能是创造性的——那”涂掉一张失败的画布以释放下一张”的艺术家、那道家的”为道日损”、那”为新生长腾出空间”的清扫、甚至在一段关系里那”为重新开始而须被释放者之放手”。那框架靠同一组判准区分好的与坏的毁灭：好的毁灭保全继续生成性之可能（它拆解以使某种新之物可被造）、在那被毁之物是被共同创造处是共同的、且既非剥削性的、亦非被作为支配挥舞；坏的毁灭封闭生成性（它终结而非更新）、对一个被共同创造之物是单方面的、且被作为一件武器挥舞。毁灭本身不是那错；那错是对一个被共同创造之物的单方面的、封闭生成性的、被武器化的毁灭。那愤怒中的删除在每一项上都是错的；那”让某件痛苦的遗物去、为新创造释放关系”的相互决定，可能是全然好的。诸判准区分，一如通篇，不靠行为的表面、而靠它是保全还是消灭那关系性主体及它的生成性。
创造的伦理因而是对称的，支配一个肯定的时刻（共同创造、新者的带出）与一个否定的时刻（毁灭、对那被带出者的拆解），而主体保全原则统治两者：一如关系不可以消灭一个主体来创造它的统一，它也不可以一方的单方面行为毁灭一个共同创造，因为那”我们”所造者的拆解，一如它的造，属于那”我们”。毁灭，一如创造，是关系的；而那”拆解那共享作品”的孤手已经，在那拆解中，消灭了对方在它里的那一份。
§8.5 创造、公共领域，与理论的限度
有一个进一步的情形压过那关系性框架，而它必须被迎接、不靠扩展理论去涵盖它、而靠诚实地标出理论终于何处。一个被创造的作品不仅进入诸特定的关系；它可能进入公共领域、可能成为公共文化，而一旦它如此，它便不再仅属于它的作者、也不再，本文必须承认，属于任何确定的”我们”。卡夫卡的手稿，一旦它们已成为《城堡》、一旦它们是世界文学，便不再是他的、可无剩余地焚烧者，因为一个公众对它们有一个claim；但那有此claim的公众不是一段关系、不是一个可命名之他者的特定”我们”，而是一个匿名的、无定的、开放的领域，包括尚未出生的读者，一个恰恰不是一个关系性主体的”公众”。这一情形以一种尖锐的形式提出一个关于关系性生产理论之触及范围的问题，而那问题必须被直接面对，因为有一个理论必须不屈服于的诱惑。
那诱惑是把公共领域解释为一个关系性领域，说那公众只是一个更大的”我们”、说公共文化是一个庞大的共同创造，从而把公共领域整批带入关系性生产理论之下。这会是一个错误，而命名它是重要的，因为它是一个成功理论之特征性的过度伸张：那”一个照亮一个领域的概念声称照亮一切”的帝国主义。公共领域不是一个被放大的关系，而把它解释为一个会减损、而非扩展那分析，因为它会抹去恰恰那些把公共领域构成为公共者的特征。公共领域是匿名的、那里关系是特定的：它被向无定的、不可命名的他者、包括尚未出生者发出，而非向一段关系的那个特定他者。它是非互惠的、那里关系是相互的：人可能欠后代某种东西，但后代不能回应，而那关系性主体的互惠结构（§9.4）、那相互的”看”，对一个不能回看的公众无从着力。它是制度性而持久的、那里关系是亲密的：公共领域有它自己的显现、永久、与共同世界之逻辑，它自己的法律、遗产与公开性之诸制度，那不是亲密关系之逻辑被放大。而它是政治经济学（§14）那被争夺的场域，被权力与资本以不可还原为关系性主体之好坏循环的方式所穿越。把公共领域当作一个大关系会废除这一切，会把公共缩成亲密、把匿名缩成特定、把非互惠缩成相互，从而不会扩大理论的解释触及、而会收缩它的对象，把公共领域自己的实在消解进一个错过它本质者的关系性图像。
那正确的进路因而是去标出一个限度，而在标出它时去精确地说出关系性生产理论关于一个已进入公共之作品所确实解释与不解释者。它所解释者是那作品持存的关系-生产维度：即便在公共领域里，那作品仍是一个被创造之物，一个共同创造或孤独创造的产物，承载关系性价值，而它的毁灭仍触及主体保全之问题，只要它仍是任何人的创造。这一维度那理论照亮，而它不在作品走向公共时消失；一个进入公共文化的被共同创造之作品仍携带那”它不被它的共同创造者之一单方面毁灭”的禁令，如今被那公众的claim所加强。但那公共领域作为公共——它的匿名、它的非互惠、它的制度性、它独特的政治、它向尚未出生者归属的方式——不被关系性生产理论所解释，且必须不被佯称为如此。它属于别的理论：属于公共领域与显现之空间的理论、属于文化遗产与共有体的理论、属于一种代际正义的理论、属于本文只触及了的政治经济学（§14）。一个作品的关系-生产维度与它的公共维度之间的关系，一个被创造之物如何同时是一个关系性主体的产物与一个公共世界的成员，居于两个被不同逻辑所支配之领域的重叠处，是一个真实而重要的问题，但它是一个关系性生产理论开启、而非关闭者。
这一对限度的诚实标出是它之严谨的一个条件、而非理论的一个弱点，而它值得被陈述为一条方法原则。一套不知限度的理论，声称以关系性生产的单一逻辑解释公共领域与亲密关系及其间的一切，会正因此而把它们一个也解释不好，因为它会消解那”使每一个成其为其所是”的诸差别。关系性生产理论在它自己领域里——特定关系的领域、可命名之他者的”我们”、共享价值的共同创造与再生产——之力量，依赖于它不被拉伸到一个有不同逻辑的领域。那理论照亮那关系性者、与那进入公共者之关系性维度；它达至它的限度于公共领域自己的、非关系性的特征开始之处，而它在那里指向它自己之外。一个作品在公共领域里之生活的完整伦理、那关系-生产者与那公共者之重叠与差别、公共创造的毁灭与保全、匿名者与尚未出生者的诸claim，相应地在此被命名为不是一个结果、而是一个定向的开口（§16.3），一个关系性生产理论框定并交付给一个它自己不包含之公共理论的问题。懂得这一限度，就是懂得关系性生产是什么、不是什么，而那是好好使用它的开端。
§9 古典美的哲学的诸核心问题
论证已抵达美学，而在它能建于美之上之前，它必须清算哲学关于美所发现者——不是把美学的诸结论作为方便的支撑来借用（前文至此一向如此做的），而是进入这门学科自己的诸构成性问题、并在它们之内取一个立场。因为本文将搁置于美之上的诸主张——场域的建造是美学的、偶然的知觉是美学的、伦理判断在其极限处是美学的——预设对一些问题的诸答案，是美的哲学已争论了两千五百年而无共识者：美是什么、它是客观的还是主观的、它如何关涉崇高、它的形而上学地位是什么。本节直接对峙这些问题。它的重心是其中第二个，审美判断之主观性与客观性的二律背反，本文对它提供一个两阶段的解决——取自拉康理论的诸维度、与本系列的关系性本体论——是不仅本节、而且本文整个美学的拱顶石。本节然后处理崇高、美的形而上学、与那平行而同等深刻的东亚美学传统，它把后者取作不是西方讨论的一个附录、而是一根独立的支柱。
§9.1 定义之问题 —— 《大希庇阿斯篇》
美的哲学，在西方，始于一次失败，而那失败有教益得足以值得被完整重构。在柏拉图的《大希庇阿斯篇》里，苏格拉底逼智者希庇阿斯说出不是什么是美的、而是美本身是什么，那auto to kalon，那”一切美的事物据以为美者”。希庇阿斯，自信而流利，提供一连串答案，而对话是对每一个的有方法的拆毁。他第一个答案是一个被装扮成答案的范畴错误：美是一位美的少女。苏格拉底纠正那问题的形式——他问的不是一个实例、而是那eidos，那”少女与琴与罐与公正的法律据以全都同样为美”的形式——而希庇阿斯，抓住那对某种共同之物的要求，提供黄金：美是那”被加到任何东西上、使它显得美”者。但黄金不会美化那”比一只金勺更好地搅锅”的合宜的无花果木勺，于是那答案让位于一个更深、似乎抓住了黄金所伸向者的答案：美是那合宜者、to prepon、那”对它的物合适者”。这是那最接近的答案，而它的失败是对话最具启发性的一刻。因为苏格拉底问那合宜者是那”使诸物美”者、还是只是那”使它们显得美”者，而那问题分裂那答案：如果那合宜者是那使诸物美者，那么因为那合适者与那真正美者有时分歧、它便不能是美本身；如果它只是那使它们显得美者，那么它是美的显现之原则、不是美之原则。那合宜者抓住某种本质之物——本文将回到它，因为to prepon、那合适者，恰恰是那”审美与实践判断之后来的等同将利用”的结构（§12.3）——但它不能，苏格拉底表明，是美的定义，因为它不可决定地悬于”是”与”显得”之间。
两个进一步的答案依次倒下。美是那有用者、to chrēsimon，但那有用者是那”为某个目的”有用者，而那”为一个坏目的有用”者用来产生恶，以致美会是恶之原因，那是荒谬的；那有用者坍缩进那有益者，而那有益者，作为善之原因，会使美成为善之原因、从而与善相区别如因之于果，那冒犯了那”美与善并非如此干净地可分离”的深层直觉。最后、也最现代的答案是：美是那”通过视与听之诸感官令人愉悦”者，那狭义的审美，美作为快乐的一个种。但这也触礁：为何是这两种感官、而非味或触之诸快乐，它们也是快乐？而那”视之诸快乐与听之诸快乐据以都是美的快乐”的共同性格是什么，当视与听在知觉上毫无共同之处时，一个会是那被寻求者本身——美本身、如今被预设而非被定义——的共同性格？对话以每一个答案被摧毁、无一个可替代它而结束，而苏格拉底提供，代替一个定义，那本文取作它诸题词之一的箴言：χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά，美的事物是困难的。
那aporia是一个关于对象的发现、而非诸对话者的一次失败，而那发现是随后一切的起点。美抵抗定义、抵抗被一个指定的公式、一条规则、一份属性清单所捕获，而它以一种特定的方式抵抗：每一个被提议的定义或是太窄（黄金、视与听之诸感官）、或坍缩进一个相邻的概念（那有用者进善、那合宜者进单纯的显得）、或预设它本要定义的那美本身（诸美的快乐之共同性格）。这一三重的失败模式是某种”根本不是一个可被一个概念所指定之属性”之物的签名。《大希庇阿斯篇》是那”美不是一个定义所能捕获之种类之物”的首次、且仍是最清楚的证明，那恰恰是本文那不可程序化命题所要求的主张（§12.8），在此不靠断言、而靠那尝试的穷尽性失败被确立。那美者之所以困难因为它不是一个概念；而”它不是一个概念”是美的哲学所学到的第一件事。
§9.2 趣味的二律背反 —— 主观的与客观的
如果美不是一个可定义的属性，它栖居于何处？这里美的哲学遇到它最深、最持久的问题，那个本文必须取一个立场者、因为它的整个美学依赖于那答案。那问题是趣味的二律背反，而它可被陈述为两个同等地令人信服之直觉的碰撞。
第一个直觉是美是客观的，它在对象里、是那美的事物的一个真实特征，以致那”觉不出那日落或那交响曲美”者错过了某种在那里之物。这一直觉是为何我们就美争论、为何我们说某人趣味差、为何我们持守”有些美的判断比别的更好”；如果美仅仅是一个私人反应，这一切便都无意义，因为对一个单纯的反应没有争论可争、也没有改进可改。第二个直觉是美是主观的，它只存在于知觉者的反应里、那物之美在它所occasion的快乐之外什么也不是，以致称一物为美是报告它对我的一个效果，而de gustibus non est disputandum，趣味无可争。这一直觉是为何美不能被证明、为何无证明强制审美的赞同、为何人不能把一个人争辩进觉得”使他冷淡者”美；美活在那反应里，而诸反应不能被命令。
每一个直觉都令人信服而每一个都驳倒另一个，而美学的历史在很大程度上是把持两者之诸尝试的历史。休谟，压那主观的一角，把美定位于情感，”美不是诸物本身里的任何性质；它仅仅存在于那沉思它们的心灵里”，却不能歇于此，因为他看见有些批评家比别的更好，于是被驱去在合格判断者的共同裁决里、在那”其被精炼并被实践的情感设立规范”的真批评家里寻一个趣味的标准。但这是不稳的：如果美是单纯的情感，为何一个情感该比另一个更权威？休谟的标准偷偷带回一个他的前提所否认的客观性。康德给了这二律背反它经典而最深刻的构想。趣味的判断，他看见，作一个奇特而看似不可能的主张：它奠基于一种快乐之感、因而是主观的，它断言对象的无属性、应用无概念、证明无物，却又主张普遍有效性，要求所有人的赞同，以一个”普遍的声音”说话，仿佛它所感到的美对每个人都有约束力。这是那二律背反的确切形式：趣味的判断是主观的（它搁置于感受、非概念之上）却主张普遍性（它要求一致），而这些似乎平直地矛盾。康德的解决是论证趣味的判断，虽不基于任何确定的概念，却搁置于诸认知能力——想象与知性在自由游戏中——的自由协和之上，那协和，因在一切理性者中相同，奠基一种主观普遍性：那判断是普遍的因为它表达、而非因为它追踪一个客观属性、一种所有人都共享的诸能力的自由协和，经由一种sensus communis、一种被预设为趣味之可传达性之条件的共通感或共享感受力来传达。这是那主体中心传统所产出的最深刻的答案，而它也是那传统达至它限度之处，因为那sensus communis恰恰是康德不能推导、而只能预设者，一种被设立为趣味之普遍性之条件、却被留作一个公设的共享感受力，一种被假定的共通感，因为没有它趣味的普遍声音便不可解释。那二律背反与其说被解决、不如说被重新定位进一个预设：给定一个sensus communis，主观普遍性是可能的；但那sensus communis本身，那”会奠基那对一致之要求”的共享性，仍是一个那主体中心框架不能奠基的设定。
这是本文所继承的僵局、与它自己的诸资源允许它move之处。那二律背反与康德的近乎解决，都在一个深得罕被注意的假定之内运作：审美判断是一个主体关于一个对象的判断，以致美必定或在对象里（客观主义）、或在主体里（主观主义）、或在那”所有主体碰巧共享”的单一主体之某种能力结构里（康德的主观普遍性，要求那被设立的sensus communis去从那一者架桥到那所有者）。本文的解决通过在两个层面上质疑这一假定来进行——先是审美经验的结构、然后是判断主体的结构——而正是向这两个阶段论证现在转去。它们是本文美学的拱顶石。
§9.3 解决的第一阶段 —— 横跨三个维度的审美判断
第一阶段通过表明主观与客观之赤裸对立太粗、表明”主观”与”客观”这两词各自混合了一个更细的分析所分开的审美经验之诸相异时刻，来消解那对立。本文所采用的更细分析是拉康对三个维度——实在界、符号界、想象界——的区分，本系列通篇所用者，而它在此被证明恰恰是那二律背反所要求的工具。那主张是：一个完整的审美判断与其说是一个主体极与一个对象极之间的关系、不如说是一个横跨全部三个维度的和解，而那主观与客观之表面二律背反兴起于把这一三重结构坍缩成一个二重结构。
考虑一个完整的美之经验里所在场者，那路边被接住的野花、那使旅行者驻足的远景。有，首先，一个抵抗一切捕获的时刻：那物纯然的”在那里”、它单一的在场、它里那”无描述穷尽、无概念subsume”的盈余，那”当一切可说者都已被说之后所剩”者。这是实在界的维度：那美的事物不可还原的、不可符号化的核，那”在一切可说之物之前、之下在那里”的”它”。那客观主义直觉——美在物里、那错过它者错过了某种真实之物——是这一维度的真相：那里确有某种在对象里之物，但它是无可指定的属性（《大希庇阿斯篇》驳倒了那个）；它是那实在界的盈余、那不可符号化的”在那里”，那恰恰是为何客观主义既对（那里有某种在物里之物）又不能说它是什么（实在界不能被符号化）。客观主义者感到那美的对象的实在界、并把它误认作一个客观属性。
有，其次，一个称呼与要求的时刻：美之经验伸出它自己之外、求被传达、主张一种会约束他人的有效性、以康德的措辞说、以一个普遍的声音说话。这是符号界的维度：那”美者被取入可共享、可传达、主体间有效之秩序”的维度，那”要求’你也必须看见这个’”的维度。康德的”主观普遍性”、那对普遍赞同的主张，是符号界维度在审美里的运作：那”经验被在共享意义之秩序里批准、它不止是私人的、它有约束力”的要求。符号界是那sensus communis的维度；如第二阶段将表明的，它是那可共享者本身的维度，代替一个神秘的设定。
有，第三，一个被迷住与快乐的时刻：被接住、被吸引、被把持的经验；美所提供的快乐；那”知觉者被束于对象一种吸引之关系中”的被全神贯注的迷恋。这是想象界的维度：那迷人之像、那镜像的迷恋、那”知觉者被把持其中”的快乐投入的维度。那主观主义直觉——美是一种快乐、知觉者里的一个效果——是这一维度的真相：那里确有快乐、确有被迷住，美确实部分地活在知觉者的投入里；但这一想象界的被迷住是经验的一个时刻、不是它的全部，而主观主义者错在把那部分当作那全部、把那想象界的快乐当作美的全体。
第一阶段的解决现在可见。那主观与客观的二律背反是一个三维结构向两极的坍缩：那”客观”极把那物的实在界盈余（它真正在那里）与那”一个可指定属性”之假观念（它不在那里）挤在一起；那”主观”极把那想象界的被迷住（它真正在知觉者里）与美之全体（它不是）挤在一起。一个完整的审美经验既非简单地主观、亦非简单地客观；它是全部三个维度的一举和解——那物的实在界盈余、被取入那对共享有效性的符号界要求、经由那被迷住之知觉者的想象界投入。美是当这三者被和解时所发生者：当那物不可符号化的”在那里”（实在界）被投以被迷住的快乐（想象界）、并被提升进那”被共享”之主张（符号界）时。那二律背反消解因为它的两个项从来不是正确的两个项；一向有三个维度，而”主观”与”客观”是各自把一个真正的维度与一个虚假的添加熔在一起的粗名。而这是为何美是困难的、χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά，在一个如今被弄精确的意义上：它要求三个维度——它们依本性处于张力、永不完美地可和解——的和解，以致那被达成的美永远是诸”相互拉开的维度”之间的一个脆而短暂的协和。美之困难是三维和解之困难。
§9.4 解决的第二阶段 —— 关系性主体与二律背反的消解
第一阶段精炼了审美经验的结构；第二阶段精炼那判断主体的结构，而正是在这里那二律背反被表明从来根本不是一个真正的问题、而非仅仅被消解，是一个关于”谁判断”之虚假前提的人造物。因为那三维分析，尽管有力，仍可能被误读为发生在一个单一孤立的主体之内：一个其中实在界、符号界、想象界被和解的主体。那最深的困难、康德的，便会仍然存在：一个奠基于我的和解的判断如何能要求你的赞同？为何我里诸维度的协和该约束你？那sensus communis便会仍被需要、作为那”从我的和解到它之普遍有效性”被设立的桥，而仍未被奠基。
第二阶段通过移去那困难的前提来移去它。那前提是那判断主体是一个单一的、自立的、先于他人的个体，它然后必须以某种方式伸出它自己之外去主张普遍性。但这一前提恰恰是本系列的关系性本体论所否认者。主体不是一个先于关系的自立个体；它是一个关系性主体，是在关系中并由关系所构成的，被它朝向他人的取向内在地构成。而对这样一个主体，那”如此困扰康德”的对共享有效性的要求、那”普遍的声音”、那”你也必须看见”的主张，不是一个”从一个私人判断到一个普遍主张”的神秘飞跃、要求一个被设立的共通感去架桥它。它是主体之判断本身的本有结构。一个关系性主体，因被它朝向他人的取向所构成，不先私下判断、然后面对”如何要求一致”的问题；它的判断，从一开始，就朝向他者、内在地被称呼、已经是一个”与他者一同判断”。那康德唯靠设立一个sensus communis才能确立的”主观普遍性”，对一个关系性主体，只是主观判断所是者：一个内在地是关系性之主体的判断内在地是对他者的一个主张，因为那判断着的主体内在地朝向他者。没有缝隙可架桥，因为那主体从来不是那”对一致之要求须越过其边界飞跃”的孤立单子。那sensus communis不是一个被添加到主体上的设定；它是主体自己的关系性构成、从趣味这一侧来看。康德的二律背反是一个个体主义前提的人造物；在一个关系性本体论上，审美判断的普遍性是那判断主体所是者的一个推论、而非一个谜。
这是那拱顶石，而它的诸后果贯穿整篇论文。它意味着审美判断在它的结构本身里是关系性而共享的，不是一个然后面对传达之问题的私人反应、而是一个内在地被称呼的、内在地与他者一同的判断，它对共享有效性的要求是那判断者之关系性构成的表达。它意味着趣味的”主观普遍性”是真实的、且无二律背反：那判断是主观的（它是一个关系性主体的）且普遍的（因为那主体内在地是关系性的、它的判断内在地是对他人的一个主张），而这两者是相同的、而非处于张力，一个关系性主体的主观性已经是一个朝向那共享者的伸向。而它意味着——那把本节接到本文诸被命名概念的要点——一个审美判断的圆成是它的被共享。因为如果那判断主体是关系性的，那么一个私人的审美判断、一个从不朝向他者者，是一个被截短的、而非一个完整的审美判断，被阻于它自己结构所要求的那”朝向他者的伸向”之前。一个关系性主体的审美判断唯当它被朝向他者、当那美的事物的实在界盈余、被投以想象界的被迷住、被提升进符号界作为一个向所爱者发出的主张：看，才被圆成。”看”不是一个对一个已私下完整之知觉的可选附加；它是那审美判断的圆成，那”关系性主体内在地被称呼的判断抵达它一向已朝向的那他者”的一刻。这就是为何偶然的审美知觉圆成于那朝向他者的转向（§11.2）：不因为分享是对私人审美经验的一个愉快添加、而因为一个关系性主体的审美判断在结构上不完整、直到它被共享。那孤独审美者的经验不再是”分享由之是一个派生”的审美判断之范式；它是一个有缺的情形，一个被阻于它圆成之前的审美判断。审美判断的完整形式是那共享的，而这是本文经由两个旅行的人、而非一个沉思的审美者抵达美的哲学的最深原因。
§9.5 旅行作为共享审美协和的场域
这两个阶段一道产出本节那圆成性的主张，把那抽象的解决带回本文的具体对象。如果一个完整的审美判断是一个关系性主体所达成、并圆成于被共享的三维和解，那么必有诸条件、在其下这一完整结构被最充分地实现，诸”被加强的实在界、被悬置并被重新协商的符号界、被强化的共享想象界投入”之条件，而这些条件恰恰是旅行场域的条件。
考虑旅行（字面的或一般化的）如何关涉每一维度。旅行最大化那实在界：那陌生的地方，密布着未被符号化者，呈现一个未被捕获者之盈余，那”无熟悉的概念已驯服”的陌生之物、那”被过度符号化的日常已遮盖”的生的”在那里”。那里日常是一个被如此彻底符号化、以致实在界罕浮出表面的世界——一切已被命名、被分类、被指派——那陌生者恢复实在界的压力，与那超出自己符号之网者的遭遇。旅行悬置并重新协商那符号界：它搁置那既立的符号秩序（诸角色、诸分类、家的诸安顿之义），以致审美判断必须被新鲜地作出、新鲜地共享、而非被那被继承的符号格栅预先决定，两者之间的符号协和被重新创造、而非被假定。而旅行强化那共享的想象界：两个一同被同一陌生之美迷住的人，各自投入于它、各自看着对方投入，形成一个共享的想象界纽带，一个被迷住的交融，是那分散的日常罕允许者。旅行因而是那”审美判断的三维和解在每一维度上一举被加强”的场域，而其中，因为两个人一同经历它，在那”使任一者都不作主”的对称的陌生里（§2.6），那和解被作为一个共享的协和达成，那关系性主体内在地被称呼的审美判断在那相互的”看”里抵达它的圆成。
这是旅行的场域是审美之场域的最深意义：不仅仅是旅行提供美的景观，而是旅行是那”审美判断的完整结构——三维和解、由一个关系性主体所达成、圆成于分享——被最充分地实现”所凭的条件。两个被同一偶然之美接住的旅行者的相互”看”，不是审美判断一个较小的、被应用的实例；它是审美判断在它完整的形式里，那孤独传统永不能抵达的形式、因为它从错误的主体开始。旅行横跨三个维度、横跨那关系地和解审美判断，而在如此做时它表明审美判断最充分地是什么。趣味的二律背反，那主体中心传统只能把它重新定位进一个设定者，在此被在关系性本体论与三个维度里消解，而它的消解被具体地enacted，每一次两个人在某种美的事物之前转向彼此说：看。正是在这一被解决的根基——审美判断作为诸关系性主体的、共享的、三维的协和——之上，本文其余的美学被建起。
§9.6 崇高 —— 当实在界占主导
美有一个伟大的邻居、是至此的分析所搁置、而现在必须接纳者，因为它对旅行的经验、对本文上半部的存在主义诸主题居于核心：崇高。美与崇高之间的区分是美学中最深者之一，而那三维分析精确地照亮它。柏克以诸感受的术语划那区分：美奠基于快乐、于那小的、滑的、精致的、形构良好者，而它松弛并吸引；崇高奠基于一种令人愉悦的恐怖、于那巨大的、有力的、晦暗的、无形者，而它压垮并使人惊骇，一种与畏相混的快乐、当我们从一个安全的位置对峙那”能摧毁我们者”时所兴起者。康德加深那区分：美关乎形式、那被界定者，而occasion一种休憩的沉思；崇高关乎那无形者与那无界者，那”超出想象之comprehend它之力”的量或力，而它occasion不是休憩、而是心灵的一个运动，一个对我们生命之力的momentary check、随之一个更强的涌出，当理性，面对那压垮感官者，在它自己里发现一个那”压垮的对象不能匹敌”的无限之观念。崇高，对康德，是理性之超感性使命之感，被感官在那无界者前的失败所唤醒；它是，悖论地，恰恰在我们知觉之力的被压垮中我们感到我们超感性的提升。
在本文所发展的三维术语里，崇高是那实在界占主导的经验，其中那不可符号化者、那”超出一切符号捕获”的无形盈余，以它的全力走向前来、压垮符号界与想象界、而非与它们被和解。那里美是三个维度被达成的和解，崇高是与那”超出和解之溢出中”的实在界的遭遇：那巨大者、那无界者、那压垮者，不能被取入形式（符号界）或被捕获于一个悦人之像（想象界），而作为那破框之纯然不可符号化的量压在主体身上。利奥塔恰恰把这立为他解读的中心：崇高是对”那不可呈现者存在”这一事实的呈现，那”被超出一切呈现者”所occasion的感受，实在界越过形式之界限的irruption。而这把崇高直接接到本文存在主义的上半部。那旅行场域所恢复的偶然（§2.4）、那”把主体归还于它的存在”的与未定者的遭遇，与崇高切近相亲：那压垮的山间远景、那广袤冷漠的风景、那无界的海、那全然陌生地方的奇异，这些是崇高的遭遇，实在界的诸irruption超出旅行者的符号之网、并通过那压垮把他们归还于他们存在的赤裸事实。本文定位于偶然里的那存在论开显，以审美的术语，是崇高：实在界的占主导，破那日常的符号框架、把主体暴露于那超出它者。旅行提供崇高一如提供美、那压垮者一如那被和解者，而两者一道——作为三维协和的美与作为实在界之溢出的崇高——是场域的完整审美幅度。崇高是本节的美学重新接上本文开端之存在主义现象学之处：那压垮的实在界，是那”它在偶然里的irruption把主体归还于它的存在”的同一实在界。
§9.7 苦难之美
崇高已经打破了一个舒适的假定——美是一桩快乐之事——靠在一整类审美经验的核心定位一种与畏不可分离的愉悦。现在有必要更彻底地打破那假定，因为它直接关涉关系的伦理与本文仍须清算的诸失败。那假定是美与苦难相对立、那美者是那愉快者、那痛苦者是那不美者。这是错的，而它的错误是关于美最深的诸事实之一。苦难能是美的，不是尽管它是苦难、而是在它之中并通过它；而对这一点的认识不是一个病态的悖论、而是审美的一个中心真相，是美的哲学早已知道、而那”仅仅愉快者”之消费主义美学所遗忘者。
证据一旦人去看便压倒一切。最伟大的艺术在很大程度上是一种苦难的艺术：那悲剧、那挽歌、那哀歌、那安魂曲、那从悲恸拧出的诗。那悲伤的诗不是一种比那欢乐的诗更小的美；它常常是那更高的，而它之美恰恰作为悲伤的articulation，它之美与它所塑造的痛不可分离。尼采把这立为他第一部作品的中心：悲剧，他论证，是至高的艺术，因为它向存在的深渊里看——那苦难、那毁灭、那诸物核心的恐怖——并通过形式之嬗变之力，使它不仅可忍受、而且美、可肯定、甚至欢乐；那苦难之狄俄尼索斯的真相被那美的形式之阿波罗之力所救赎，而结果是那至高的审美成就，痛向美之嬗变、它不否认那痛、而是transmute它。悲剧之美是苦难之嬗变、而非它的缺席；那苦难全然保留着、并被造得美。东亚传统更亲密地知道这个，而它的诸中心范畴是美的悲伤之诸范畴：物哀（§9.11）是被作为温柔之悲恸所感的无常之美，那落下的花因为它落下而美，丧失之凄美本身作为美的一种形式；寂是那被风化的、衰朽的、流逝者之美，时间与终有一死之痕的可爱。这些是苦难之美、而非排除它的诸美；它们是苦难、无常、丧失之诸美，被精炼成整套审美感受力。而精神分析定位那结构：哀悼的工作本身是一桩嬗变的劳作，生的丧失向某种”能被持有、被整合、被给予形式”之物的缓慢转化；而升华，其中那痛苦的驱力被提升进那被创造的对象，正是那”苦难借以成为艺术”的机制。
那三维分析解释这如何可能。苦难，在它的生中，是实在界的一个溢出，那压垮者、那不可符号化者、那”压过一切形式”的不可忍受者，与崇高相亲。使苦难美，是把这实在界溢出带入与符号界和想象界的一个和解、而不否认或减损它：给那不可忍受者一个不falsify它而把持它的形式（符号界）、投以一个不美化而transmute的嬗变之像（想象界），以致那苦难既不被压抑、也不仅仅被忍受、而被塑造成一种把它整个含住的美。苦难之美是那”其实在界成分是痛”的一个经验、横跨三个维度的被达成的和解，而这比愉快之美的和解更难，这是为何苦难的艺术是那更高的艺术、那悲伤的诗是那更深的美。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά 在此处比在任何地方都更真：苦难之美是那最困难的美，因为它必须和解、而不falsify、一个以每一根纤维抵抗和解的实在界。它能被做到——悲恸能成为挽歌、丧失能成为物哀、恐怖能成为悲剧——是关于美最重要的事情之一，而它将被证明，当本文回到共同旅行的诸冲突与诸失败时（§5.5、§9.8），是那”把一段关系最黑暗的物质转化为它最深财富之一个可能来源”的钥匙。
§9.8 冲突作为关系性财富
如果苦难能是美的，那么一个结论随之而来、是它推翻本文旅行之伦理由之开始的那个假定，而这一推翻重要得足以在此、在这一理论的章节里、在它的诸后果被在伦理里接手之前、被抽出来。那假定，自然的、且非全然错误的，是共同旅行中的冲突是一个否定之物：那假期争吵作为一段空心关系的暴露、那被迫共同在场的摩擦作为一个压力源、偶然压垮而非滋养（§3.1、§5.5）。这一切都能为真。但它不是全部真相，而它所略去的部分恰恰是那苦难之美所揭示的部分。冲突能是关系性财富：在正确的条件下，是关系所生成之财富的一种正面的、甚至独特地珍贵的形态，代替仅仅是一个待被挺过的危险。
那论证贯穿本文所建的一切。一个被一同经历的冲突是一段异乎寻常强度的共享经验，一段困难、摩擦、甚至痛的段落，两人作为一个”我们”经历它。一如任何共享经验，它在生活中被生成、然后或被再生产、或被留作消散（§4）。而这里那苦难之美成为决定性的。如果那冲突被好好地再生产——如果，在共享复述中，两人一同回到它、并通过再生产的劳作嬗变它，给那被记得的痛一个把持它的形式、投以一个不否认那困难而transmute它的意义——那么那冲突变得美，恰恰以苦难在艺术里变得美的方式：一个痛的生实在界，在复述中，被和解进一个被塑造而被共享的意义。而一个如此被嬗变的冲突不是关系所携的一道伤口、而是它所持的一件珍宝：那被一同经受的风暴、那作为一个”我们”被挺过的艰难段落，成为，多年后，关系诸共享所有中最珍贵者之一，你还记得我们在雨里吵的那个可怕的夜晚吗——被说出不作为伤口的重开、而作为对一件他们一同走过之事的追忆，独特、他们的、恰恰因为它艰难而美。那冲突已成为财富，而且是一种独特地持久的财富，因为它不可重复、全然是他们自己的。
还有更多，而它是最深的要点，那把这接到本文审美判断理论者。一个冲突是，除别的之外，两种相异知觉的碰撞，对发生之事的两种分歧的看法，两个不一致的审美判断——一方觉得那绕路是一场冒险，另一方觉得是一场灾难；一方被感动处，另一方被惹恼。那冲突是两个审美判断、在那一刻、未能协和之摩擦。而好好地再生产它的劳作恰恰是把那两个分歧的判断带入一个共享协和的劳作，两种知觉、通过复述的相互翻译（§4.6）、朝彼此移动直到一个任一者单独都不曾持有的共同审美判断被生成，一种看那困难之物的共享方式、是两人现在都能持有者。冲突，被好好地再生产，因而是两个人的审美判断被和解的诸首要机缘之一，是两个关系性主体的分歧知觉、通过困难、被带入一个真正共享的协和的机缘。而那如此被生成的协和独特地宝贵恰恰因为它是通过冲突赢得的：一个在困难中被锻造的共享审美判断比一个从未遇到阻力者更深、更被检验、更全然共同，一如一个挺过一场争吵的和解比一个从未被strain的和谐更健全。这是为何冲突能不仅可忍受、而且生成性：它创造两个人之间最深种类之审美和解的机缘，那”真正分歧之判断的被带入协和”，以及那唯一个被嬗变的困难所能产出的独特共享之美。
那结论是一个关于美与冲突的命题、是伦理将继承者：美不排除冲突，而能使冲突成为关系之共同生成的一部分。 那”其诸冲突被好好再生产”的关系不仅仅挺过它们；它被它们丰富，以一种它不可能被不破的和谐所丰富的方式，因为那被嬗变的冲突产出一种财富——那独特的共享经验、那来之不易的共同协和、那”一同走过一个困难”之美——是和谐单独所不能生成者。这不使冲突本身为善，而本文不在劝告制造争吵；那生的冲突是真实的困难，而被糟糕地再生产它是纯粹的耗竭（§5.5）。那作出差别者是那再生产：那”被榨取并被武器化时是坏循环之燃料”的同一冲突，被嬗变并被共享时是好循环之珍宝。那决定性的变量，在此如通篇，是拿它做什么、而非那物质，而苦难之美是那”即便最艰难的物质——一种共享生活的痛与摩擦——也能被嬗变、在爱的再生产之劳作中、成为一段关系所持的最深之美”的证明。正是在这一认识之上，冲突的伦理（§5.6）将被建起。
§9.9 苦难的公正再生产 —— 四条判准，与一个被开启的问题
前一小节确立了冲突，被好好地再生产，能成为一段关系的财富，而把整个主张搁置于”好好地”再生产一个冲突与”糟糕地”再生产它之区分上。但它没说什么区分它们，除嬗变与武器化的诸隐喻之外；而它所留下的开放问题——苦难如何被好好地、公正地、生成性而非毁灭性地再生产——是本文所提出最难者之一，难得足以使本文不能佯称解决它。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：那美者是困难的，而苦难的好再生产以恰恰同一方式、出于恰恰同一原因困难，因为它也是一个顽固之实在界的使成美，而它也抵抗每一程序。那诚实的进路是给出不是一个方法（没有方法）、而是一组判准：任何苦难的好再生产必须满足的诸必要条件，它们标出善的方向而不供给通往它的路。四条这样的判准可被陈述，而它们不是任意的；每一条对应于本系列所建之诸理论支柱之一，而每一条封闭苦难之再生产特征性地退化的四个方向之一。
目的论判准 —— 生成性之延续的可能。 苦难的一个再生产唯当它保全关系继续生成的可能时才好，唯当，既已再生产那痛苦的经验、关系仍能从它进一步生成、而非被它终结、冻结或封闭时。那判准搁置于本系列在它根基处所确立的形而上学根据：生成性以它自己的延续为旨（第九篇）。那措辞是刻意地最小的：那判准不是那再生产保证延续、也不是它使那苦难”正面”，而只是它保全继续生成的可能、它不关上那门。一个坏的再生产关上那门：它把那痛苦的经验作为一个固定的裁决、一笔安顿的债、一份永久的控诉、一道被封进一桩怨的伤口、一个死胡同来再生产（§10.3）。一个好的再生产把那门保持敞开。那判准封闭第一个退化：苦难向一个生成性死胡同的再生产。
存在论判准 —— 再生产必须是关系的。 一个共享苦难的再生产唯当它本身是关系的、被共同地、由两者一同地、而非由一方单方面地进行时才好。那被再生产者是那关系性主体、那”我们”的经验，而一个关系性主体的经验只能被关系地再生产。当一个伴侣单方面地再生产一个共享的苦难、独自决定那痛苦的经验意味什么、它如何被记得，那再生产已经未通过存在论判准，无论意图多么仁慈，因为它把一个关系性经验转化为了一方对它的陈述。这即便在那单方面的再生产者是那受苦更多的人时、即便慷慨地，也如此：一个由一个成员为关系所再生产的苦难不是一个由关系所再生产的苦难。那判准要求共同生产。它封闭第二个退化：共享苦难向一方私人叙事的再生产。
政治经济学判准 —— 再生产必须不剥削。 苦难的一个再生产唯当它是非剥削的、唯当任一方的苦难不被作为另一方所得之物质来再生产时才好。即便一个被共同进行的再生产也能是剥削的：两人可能一同再生产那苦难，而那再生产可能系统地把一方的痛转化为另一方的益处、另一方的道德信用、另一方的受害者地位、另一方的筹码。苦难特别易于此，因为苦难承载道德分量，而谁的共享苦难版本胜出便获得一个道德优势。那好的再生产接纳两方的苦难、拒绝把任一方的痛转化为另一方的道德资本。它封闭第三个退化：苦难向道德盈余之榨取的再生产。
权力判准 —— 权力之生成必须以它之克制的生成伴随。 必须被承认、不退缩地：共享苦难的再生产生成一个权力的结构。一段曾一同经受严重苦难的关系被留下诸不对称：谁受伤更多、谁更需要关怀、谁欠谁、谁有地位去援引那痛苦的episode。这些不对称是真实的、且一如一切关系性权力、不可消除的。那判准不要求那”苦难之再生产所生成之权力”的不可能的废除。它要求那权力之生成被它之克制的生成所伴随，那同一个生成一个权力结构的再生产也生成一个制衡那权力之滥用之力。那区分是本系列”权力去”与”权力凌”的区分（第十七篇）：一个再生产生成权力凌、当那不对称成为一个支配的持立工具，那伤口被作为一笔永久的债来再生产，”我受了那么多苦”成为坏循环最有效的武器；它生成权力去、以克制伴随、当那不对称被把持在一个防止其滥用之力之内。那好的再生产使那受伤者被照顾、而不使他们成为他们伤口的暴君。它封闭第四个、也最阴险的退化：苦难向一个支配的持立工具、那伤口成为一件武器的再生产。
诸判准作为方向、而非方法；与那被开启的问题。 这四条判准——目的论的、存在论的、政治经济学的、权力-辩证的——一同指明一个苦难的好再生产必须是什么：它必须保全继续生成的可能、被关系地进行、拒绝剥削、并以它所生成的权力之克制伴随那权力。（这四条，最初在此为苦难这一难情形被陈述，事实上是关系性生产本身的一般判准、被主体保全原则所支配；那一般理论被单独陈述，§6，那里苦难之再生产被作为它的第一个应用对待。）它们一同以一些精确标出善的方向。但它们不供给方法，而本文小心不佯称相反。懂得一个苦难的好再生产必须满足这四个条件，还不是懂得如何满足它们。那”如何”不是一个程序；它是一门艺术，与本文中任何一门一样难，而它不能被还原为一条规则、不比美的知觉更能。诸判准是那方向；那路不被给出。于是本文，既已开启苦难之公正再生产的问题、并给它这四条判准的结构，必须把那更大的任务作为一个它已框定却未解决的问题、一道指向它之外的裂隙交付（§16.3）。苦难的好再生产是困难的，一如那美者是困难的；本文已做了它所能做者，那就是说出善卧于哪个方向、并承认通往那里的路仍待被找到。
§9.10 美的形而上学 —— 从柏拉图到黑格尔
在定义之问题与趣味之问题的背后立着第三个，那形而上学问题：美在存在之秩序里的地位是什么？西方传统给了一连串答案，它们虽然本文不整批采纳任何一个、却照亮所系于其上者、并供给论证将用的诸术语。那序列从柏拉图经普罗提诺与阿奎那到黑格尔，而它追踪美从一个超越的形式到精神之感性显现的一个渐进的下降。
对柏拉图，美是一个形式，那《大希庇阿斯篇》所寻、《会饮篇》以另一路径所趋近的auto to kalon：在第俄提玛的攀升里，爱者从一个单一身体之美，升到一切身体之美，到诸灵魂、诸法律与诸制度、诸科学之美，最后到美本身——永恒、不复合、不生不灭，那”一切美的事物分有、并从之derive它们所有任何美”的形式。美，对柏拉图，因而是一个超越的实在，而美的事物之经验之宝贵主要作为一次”越过它们到那形式”之攀升的第一级。关键地，在柏拉图的视野里那美者与那善者切近相盟，那向美的攀升也是一次向善的攀升，而那kalonshades into那agathon，一种本文自己那”它们之连续性”命题（§13）将继承并转化的美与善的切近。
普罗提诺通过把美定位于灵魂对”被施于物质之形式”的认出、并最终于那”太一”的辉光，加深那柏拉图式的论说：那美者是那”其中那形构原则、那logos、透过物质照耀”者，而美之经验是灵魂对它的同类的认出，那感性中可知者之痕迹，把灵魂拉回向它的来源。美在此是一种辉光、一种emanation、那更高者在更低者中的显现，而它的知觉是一次归家。阿奎那，把那古典遗产与基督教形而上学相综合，给了那最具分析影响力的公式：美要求三样东西，integritas（完整或完备）、proportio或consonantia（应有的比例或和谐）、与claritas（辉光或清晰、那形式透过照耀的光彩），而那美者是那”被看见时令人愉悦”者、id quod visum placet。那托马斯式的claritas、那形式的辉光、它的照耀-而出，是那三维分析所称的”被使显明之实在界盈余”的一个精确名字：那”物之形式据以在概念所捕获之外宣告自身”的光彩。
黑格尔通过把美完全带入那感性者与那历史者，完成那下降。美，对黑格尔，是das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee、理念的感性显现、精神透过感性形式的照耀。美不再是一个高于可感者的超越形式（柏拉图）、也不是一种从上面emanate的辉光（普罗提诺），而是理念自己在那感性者之中的显现、精神被使对感官显明；而艺术是那”精神给自己以感性显现”的介质，在一个历史的发展里、精神通过它渐进地把自己从那感性者解放向那概念者。黑格尔的公式把美带下进历史、进那显现本身，而在如此做时它准备了那现代的认识、本文所共享者：美是一个显现的结构、而非一个在经验背后的属性，一个其中某物来到到场的事件。本文不采纳黑格尔的唯心主义形而上学，但它继承他那决定性的move：美是一桩显现之事、来到-到场之事，而非一个”residing于诸对象里的属性或residing于它们之外的一个形式”之事。这与本文自己那到场之范畴（§1.3）协和：美，一如关系的动态，是某种来到到场之物，一个显现的事件、而非一个仅仅是的物。
§9.11 东亚美学 —— 一根独立的支柱
至此所考察的美的哲学是西方的，而把这事留在那里会是一种本文整个取向所禁止的省略主义、而且会略去那”最精确地培育了恰恰本文所关切之诸知觉能力”的传统。东亚美学是一根独立的、在某些方面更深的支柱、而非西方论说的一个异国补充，而它在此更切题，因为它的诸中心范畴，到一个非凡的程度，是对偶然、无常、空、与那不可符号化者之知觉的诸范畴，正是本文立为中心之审美知觉的诸对象。诸主要范畴被考察于下表；四个值得在正文中讨论。
中国的意境范畴，被各样地译为”意义之世界””审美境界””被构想之境”，命名一件作品所开启的景与情之融合的整体，那客观的风景（景）与那主观的情（意，心或意图）interpenetrate into一个超出两者的单一共鸣整体。意境不是那被描绘之景的一个属性、也不是知觉者里的一个情、而是那在它们之融合中兴起的共鸣世界，那是，以本文的术语，三维和解本身的一个名字，那”景之实在界、情之想象界、与被render之作品之符号界融合进一个既非客观亦非主观、而是它们之和解的境”的协和。中国传统在意境里命名了恰恰本文经由拉康所抵达的结构：美作为那超出主-客之分的融合之境。而那最高的意境，在批评传统里，是通过空、通过那被留白者、未画者、那”开启那共鸣空间”的虚来达成的，以致意境与本文通篇所携之宽阔的美学不可分离（§2.8）。
气韵生动（谢赫六法之首）这一范畴命名那生命的共鸣，那”animate一件伟大作品、使它不是一个死的表象而是一个活的在场”的气（呼吸、能量、精神）之活的运动。气韵是那活者、动者、有生气者的美学，而它是，以本文的术语，切近于那动态之自我到场的美学：对那被感到的运动、那活水流、而非静态形式的珍视。一件作品有气韵当它的动态来到到场；而这是本文中心现象学概念——一个活动态之来到-到场——的审美对应物。
日本的诸范畴把无常与深度的美学带到它们的高处。物哀（物の哀れ），”诸物之凄美”，那对一切诸物之无常的、被带悲伤之色的敏感，那”恰恰因为它落下而在落下的樱花里被感到”的凄美，是偶然之审美知觉在它最纯的形式里：那对那流逝者、那偶然者、那无常者、被作为美在并通过它的无常本身所感的、被训练的敏感。这是那被培育的兴（§11.2）被提升为一整套审美感受力。幽玄（幽玄），”神秘的深度”，那”不被完全揭示者”之深远、幽暗、半瞥见之美，那对表面之后一个不可测之深度的暗示，是那不可符号化者的美学，那”美所intimate而不捕获”的实在界：幽玄恰恰是那超出符号界者之美，在那不可说者的边缘被瞥见。而寂（寂），那被风化的、老的、孤独的、时间与使用之痕者之美，那无常之patina，连同侘、那简的、不完美的、朴素者之美，完成那日本的无常与空的美学，恰恰在那”新者与完美者之消费主义美学所不能看见者”里找到美。这些范畴，集体地，是任何传统所发展的、对偶然的、无常的、宽阔的、与不可符号化之美之知觉——也就是说，对恰恰本文立为中心之知觉——的最精炼语汇。本文汲取它们不作为装饰、而作为那”最充分地培育了它自己之中心能力”的传统，而它把它们的存在取作”偶然之审美知觉是一门深而古老的可培育之艺、而非一个私人观念”的证据。
| 范畴 | 传统 | 含义与对本文的关涉 |
|---|---|---|
| 意境 意境 | 中国 | 景与情之超出主-客之分的融合之境；三维和解的一个名字；通过空达成。 |
| 气韵 气韵 | 中国 | 气韵生动；活动态之美学；动态之自我到场的对应物。 |
| 物哀 物の哀れ | 日本 | 无常诸物之凄美；偶然之审美知觉的纯形式；被培育的兴。 |
| 幽玄 幽玄 | 日本 | 神秘的深度；那半瞥见之不可符号化者之美；被intimate、不被捕获的实在界。 |
| 寂／侘 寂 / 侘 | 日本 | 那被风化的、简的、不完美的、朴素者之美；无常与空中之美。 |
| 神／神韵 神韵 | 中国 | 神韵，那超出技术的神妙品质；那超出被造者之实在界盈余。 |
那东方诸范畴与本文拉康-关系性解决的会合本身是意味深长的。意境命名那三维分析所重构的”超出主与客”的和解；幽玄命名那分析所定位于美之核心的实在界盈余；物哀命名本文立为中心的偶然之知觉；气韵命名那”其来到-到场是本文现象学核心”的活动态。一个完全独立于那西方二律背反的传统，竟发展出、作为它的诸中心范畴、恰恰本文靠消解那二律背反所抵达的诸结构，是”那些结构是事情本身的诸特征、而非一套哲学语汇的诸人造物”的证据。东亚传统不面对康德的二律背反因为它不从那”其趣味必须以某种方式主张普遍性”的孤立主体开始；它从，在它道家、佛教、儒家的诸根里，一个已经与世界与他人连续的自我开始，从而直接抵达那融合、共鸣、与共享知觉之诸范畴、是西方传统唯靠拆解它的个体主义前提才能抵达者。在这一点上东亚传统是本文的天然盟友，而它的诸范畴将，与西方的并列，贯穿随后的美学复现。
§10 审美判断的演化 —— 再生产循环里的一种动态
刚才所发展的美的哲学把审美判断当作仿佛它是一个单一的事件、一个在一刻被达成的和解、一个被一次性击成的协和。这是一个抽象，而它现在必须被纠正，因为审美判断不是一个点、而是一个过程：它在时间中演化，而它的演化被恰恰本文在它政治经济学里所分析的那再生产循环所支配。今天读同一首诗与一年前读它，是对它作两个不同的审美判断；一个人在一地、一个人、一段经验里所找到的美，是移转的、而非固定的，加深，有时褪色，跨一生的诸反复返回。审美判断的这一时间演化是本文美学所缺的动态维度，而供给它把那第三乐章（美学的）接到那第二乐章（政治经济学的）于它们的根处，表明它们是一个过程的两个方面。本节是简短的、但在结构上是枢纽性的：它是那”本文的美学与它的政治经济学被证明是同一理论被看了两次”所转于其上的枢纽。
§10.1 审美判断不是一个点、而是一条轨迹
考虑最简单的情形。一个人读一首诗，并觉得它美、或不、或在它里找到一种特定的美。一个人一年后返回它，而那判断已改变：那一个人曾觉得轻的诗如今似乎深刻、或那曾使人目眩的诗如今似乎空洞、或，最常见地，那同一首诗产出一种不同的美，被那中间发生的一切所inflect，那曾意味很少的诗行如今沉重于一个一个人自己的生活自那以来供给了的意义。那诗的审美判断不是一个关于诗-与-读者的固定事实；它是一个演化的状态、一个那诸反复返回所勾出之轨迹上的点。而对那诗为真者对每一个审美判断的对象为真：那被重访的地方、那被重听的音乐、那被重新看的人、那被重新-记得的共享经验。审美判断通体是时间的、一个跨它诸返回而发展之物，而把它当作一个单一的、无时间的协和来对待是冻结一个运动之物。
这不是审美判断里一个待被朝某个”更进一步的熟悉所趋近”之稳定的”真”判断纠正的缺陷。那演化不是向一个固定的正确答案的收敛、一如证据的累积向一个事实收敛；它是真正的发展，那判断随那判断主体及它的历史变得别样而变得别样，没有一个终点、在其处那物的”真”美会最终被固定。这直接从那二律背反的解决推出（§9.4）：如果美是一个关系性主体所达成的三维和解、而非那物的一个客观属性，那么随那主体演化——随它的符号世界加深、它的想象界投入移转、它与实在界的诸遭遇累积——它与同一对象所达成的和解也演化。那美不在那对象里等着被正确地读；它在那协和里，而那协和被一个本身在运动中的主体所击成。审美判断演化因为那判断的关系性主体本身在被不断地生成与再-生成、而非静态，也就是说，被再生产。
§10.2 再生产循环作为演化的引擎
什么驱动那演化？那答案把本节接到本文的政治经济学：审美判断通过那再生产循环演化（§4）。回想经验的再生产是那”一份被生成的经验借以被归还给关系的当下、被重新感受、被重新织进它活的织体”的共享复述之劳作（§4.2）。每一这样的返回都是一次再-生成、而非一次中立的重放，其中那经验被自那以来发生的一切所inflect、并在那重新感受中被增添。而那经验的审美判断在那被如此再-生成者之列。当两个人在复述中返回一段共享旅程，他们不仅仅回想它的美；他们重新-判断它，而那重新-判断被那中间时间所带来的一切所塑造，以致他们在那被记得的经验里所找到的美随每一次返回而演化。再生产循环因而是审美判断之演化的引擎：那循环的每一转再-生成那判断、移动它、加深或改变它、勾出它轨迹上的另一个点。
这是为何本文政治经济学所关切的那个例子——你还记得我们那次迷路吗——同时是一次经验的再生产与一次审美判断的演化。那迷路，在那一刻被判断为一桩挫折，在复述中被重新-判断，而跨诸反复复述它的审美价值演化：那被作为一桩恼怒所经历者，通过那诸再生产性的返回，被知觉为一种魅力、然后一桩被珍视的奇趣、然后整段旅程最美的诸时刻之一。那经验的审美判断已横过一条轨迹——挫折到魅力到珍宝——而那再生产循环是那沿那条路携它者。这是那”前一节所分析的冲突（§9.8）能成为财富”所凭的精确机制：那再生产循环把那冲突的审美判断从它在那一刻所有的负面价值、演化到它在那被嬗变的复述里所获的正面价值。审美判断的演化与经验的再生产不是两个过程、而是一：再生产一段经验就是演化它的审美判断，而那判断的轨迹是那再生产循环所勾的轨。
§10.3 那动态 —— 好的与坏的演化
如果审美判断通过那再生产循环演化，那么它有一种动态，而那动态能好好地或糟糕地运行，那把本节接到本系列通篇所分析的好与坏循环、与它形式姊妹作的动态层（第九篇）。审美判断的演化是一个系统的动态状态，而一如任何这样的系统它能朝丰富或朝崩塌移动。
那好的演化是那加深的。这里再生产循环的每一转向那审美判断增添，以致在那经验里所找到的美随每一次返回而更丰，累积意义、聚集那一切中间生活的诸共鸣、经年成为一口越来越深的意义之井。这是好循环在审美判断之语域里：一个归还得比它所取的更多的流通，那判断的和乐沿它再-生成之路径累积正价值（§4.3）。那经一生被返回、随每一次阅读而加深的诗、那随每一次复述而美更丰的共享旅程，这些是那好的演化。那坏的演化是那退化的，而它取对应于那循环之两个失败的两种形态。第一是固着：那判断被冻结、那再生产成为死记、同一种美每次以同一方式被找到而无再-生成、那活的判断硬化成一个固定的裁决，那审美判断的固化、它的流通降到零。那被化约成一首”伟大的诗”、一个人不再实际读的诗、那硬化成一则不再被重新感受之定场轶事的旅程：那审美判断已停止演化、被冻结成一份死的所有。第二是耗竭：那判断被一种榨取而非丰富的再生产磨损、那美被消费到什么也不剩、那被讲过头之故事的魅力被耗尽。两者都是坏循环在审美的语域里：那判断或被冻结或被消费、它活的演化被阻或它的价值被榨取。
这给本文的美学它动态的完成，而它给审美判断的培育（§12）它的时间对象。培育审美判断是照料它跨时间的演化、而非只是在一刻精炼它，是把它的再生产保持得生成性、而非死记或榨取。两人的相互美育（§12.7）是，如今所见，对他们共享审美判断之演化的共同照料：那”两个人，一同返回他们曾共享的诸美，把他们共同审美判断的演化保持在那加深之路上、而非任它冻结或耗竭”的劳作。那美学的与那政治经济学的、那判断与它的再生产、那美之知觉与那关系之动态，在此被看出是一个运动着的系统，而一段漫长共享生活之美，归根到底，是一个共享审美判断的好演化、跨一生的生成性再生产被加深。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：那美者是困难的，而如今它的困难被看出也是时间的，那困难不仅是击成那协和、而是照料它的演化、经一整个生命、在那加深之路上。
§10.4 普遍与特殊之辩证法
那”审美判断朝一个’越来越深地被共享之协和’演化”的论说，至此一向被陈述得仿佛那目标是两个判断收敛成一，仿佛那理想的终点是两个相同地判断美的人。这是错的，而那纠正不是一个小的限定、而是那”支配整个事情”之辩证法的引入：普遍与特殊之辩证法，是那唯物辩证法在审美判断之领域里所取之形式，而本节现在必须使它明白，因为没有它本文的美学会坍缩进恰恰它的关系性本体论所禁止的那同质化。
那问题是这个。两个关系性主体不能被要求有相同的审美判断，那样做会annul他们的相异、会要求那本系列自它根基起所拒绝的融合，那”两个合并为一、摧毁它佯称要完善之共振”（§3.2）。一个其两个成员相同地判断一切美的”我们”不会是一个二人的关系、而是一个穿着两副面孔的单一判断主体；每一个的特殊性、他们知觉那不可还原的差异，是”有二者可关联”的条件、而非关系的一个障碍。而一个共享的审美判断、一个一般的协和、一个觉得诸物美的共同方式，是真正被需要的，因为没有它便没有判断着的”我们”、没有共享的感受力、没有共同的审美生命、只有两个碰巧并行地知觉的陌生人。关系要求两者：一个一般性（那共享的协和）与一个特殊性（每一判断那不可还原的差异）。而这两个要求相互拉扯，那一般性朝收敛、那特殊性朝分歧，以致这事是一个辩证的张力、待被把持、而非一个简单的善、待被最大化。
那解决是唯物辩证法对普遍与特殊的解决，而它恰恰是本文在开篇作为它方法所援引的具体普遍者这一概念（§1.4）。那真正的一般者不是那靠剥去一切特殊性所抵达的抽象普遍者、那空的共同残余、那”所有人都须靠交出他们自己者而共享”的同质化判断。那真正的一般者是那具体普遍者：那”在并通过诸特殊者而存在、由它们的关系所生成、唯作为保持相异之诸相异知觉者的共享生命而真实”的共同性。一个”我们”的共享审美判断在这一具体意义上是一般的：不是一个靠他们差异之抹去而被强加于两人的同一、而是一个在保持不同的两者之间被生成的共同性，一个通过他们的诸特殊判断、而非代替它们而活的共享协和。这是那”反对唯心主义抽象”的唯物主义洞见：那普遍者不在诸特殊者之上、subsume它们；它在它们之间、由它们的关系所生成、在那”其共同性是其共同性”的诸特殊者之外无存在。应用于此：那共享审美判断不是一个高于两者、两者都须conform of的第三个判断、而是那”两个特殊判断在它们之间、同时保持为二、所生成”的活的共同性。而那普遍与特殊之间的张力、那朝共享协和之拉扯与朝不可还原之差异之拉扯之间的张力，不是一个待被一方之胜利所解决的缺陷、而是那关系审美发展的马达本身，那”其持续运动是关系审美生命”的矛盾。唯物辩证法持守矛盾是发展之源；这里普遍与特殊之矛盾是那共享审美判断之发展之源，那发展不靠解决那张力、而靠它的永久working而推进。
这禁止两个相反的错误，而命名它们表明为何那辩证法是必要的。第一个错误是同质化：特殊向一般的坍缩、两个判断收敛成同一、那差异被抹去，那是那关系性本体论所禁止的融合，而它，如下一小节将表明的，也是一场动态灾难。第二个错误是原子化：一般向特殊的坍缩、两个判断而无共同性、无共享协和、无判断着的”我们”，那是关系向两个陌生人的消解。一个”我们”的好审美生命既不在一者、也不在另一者，而在两者被把持的张力里：一个共享的协和（一般），真正被生成、通过、而非逆着两个保持为二之知觉者那不可还原的差异（特殊）。正是向这一辩证法的一个轻的形式render——它以一种单凭散文所不能的精确表明，为何那一般者与那特殊者两者都是被要求的、而非仅仅被允许的、且为了生成性本身之故被要求——本节最后转去。
§10.5 一个轻的形式render —— 两个被耦合的场
普遍与特殊之辩证法能被给一个形式的render，而那render挣得它的位置，靠表明某种散文能断言而不能证明之事：两个判断的特殊性是为生成性本身之存活所必需的、而非仅仅可容忍的。那render以本文通篇对那形式者所维持的精神被提供——轻轻地、作为一个辩证的暗示、而非一个形式的断言。随后者是一个朝向一个结构的姿态、而非一个关于它的理论；它的价值是启发性的，对一个辩证思想借出一个精确之像，而它须被如此读。
把两个主体的审美判断想象为两个场，$\phi_1$ 与 $\phi_2$，每一个是一个在可能判断之空间中在时间里演化的configuration，每一个是一个主体感受力的轨迹。把它们的演化想象为被一个作用、或等价地一个动态、以两种项所支配。有一个耦合项，schematically写作一个惩罚两个场之分歧的cost、形如 $\kappa,V(\phi_1 - \phi_2)$ 之物，它把两个判断拉向一致、并在它们协和时被最小化。而有，为每一个主体，一个自身项，每一个场单独的一个本有动态 $f_i(\phi_i)$、每一个主体感受力那不可还原的个体倾向，它不欠对方任何东西、遵循它自己的形式。那耦合项是那一般者：它是那把两个判断拉向一个共享协和者，而它是那”使它们的共同的、渐进的、朝一个共同吸引子——一个共享的审美感受力、一个它们能一同安顿进去的一致之basin——的演化成为可能”者。那自身项是那特殊者：它是那把每一判断保持为它自己者、那保全两个场之动态多样性者、那防止它们坍缩进一个单一configuration者。
那辩证法现在在那动态里可读，而它产出恰恰前一小节所命名的两个错误、加上那”特殊者为何被要求”的深层原因。一个纯耦合的系统——自身项被压制、只剩那惩罚分歧之项——坍缩：两个场被驱向同一、安顿进一个单一的共享configuration、一切差异被消灭。这是同质化，而在那动态里它是一个正面的危险、而非仅仅是丰富之丧失，因为一个坍缩到一个单一同质configuration的系统已丧失一切动态多样性，而一个无多样性的系统不能脱离一个退化的吸引子。如果那两个判断坍缩进的共享吸引子开始退化、成为一个”坏”吸引子、一个固定而冻结的configuration、那上面所分析的固化（§10.3），那同质化的系统便无资源凭以离开它：两个场都在那同一个死点、而没有perturbation、没有分歧倾向、没有替代轨迹去把那系统带出。那系统的生成性被熄灭、被冻结在一个无离开之路的死吸引子处。这是那关系性本体论所禁止之融合的动态含义：不仅仅是二之丧失、而是那”继续演化之条件”的多样性之丧失、从而生成性之熄灭。
而这里是那特殊者、那自身项、每一判断那不可还原的个体性的深层角色：它是脱离生成性之熄灭的可能。因为两个场保留它们自己的本有动态、它们自己的分歧倾向，那系统保留多样性，而多样性恰恰是那”允许一个系统离开一个退化吸引子”者。当那共享吸引子开始死去，一个或另一个场的自身项能把它带离那死点、perturb那系统、开启一个提供逃逸方向的分歧，从而把那系统migrate向一个新吸引子、那里生成性能重续。两个判断的特殊性，在这一光下，不是一个对个体性的浪漫让步、而是关系生成性之存活的一个结构必需：它是那多样性储备、那演化方差、那”一段关系借以脱离它诸共享协和之死”的perturbation之源。一段其两个成员已在审美上变得相同的关系已花光这一储备、并因此而脆，不能更新一个已变陈的感受力、被困在它所冻结进的任何共享判断里。一段其两个成员保持审美上相异、同时真正共享的关系保留那储备，因而能继续脱离它诸协和之死、继续migrate向新而活的诸吸引子、把它的生成性保持得不被熄灭。那特殊者为生成性之故被要求，那是关系自己的终极目的（第九篇）；而所以普遍与特殊之辩证法是一个统一、其中每一个服务于关系的生成性、而非两个善之间的一场对峙，那一般者靠给两者一个共享的审美生命，那特殊者靠把那生命保持得能更新它自己。
这是唯物辩证法在它本有的形式里：不是一般对特殊的胜利（同质化、那死的共享吸引子）、亦非特殊对一般的胜利（原子化、根本无共享生命）、而是它们矛盾的统一，其永久的运动是关系活的审美发展、而其两极每一个都必需，那一般者为那共享协和、那特殊者为那脱离那协和之死。那耦合建造那”我们”的共同感受力；那诸自身项把它保持活着；而一个共享审美判断的好演化是那两者的辩证运动，一个朝”生成性得足以值得共享、又多样得能在它们死时被脱离”的诸共享协和安顿的被耦合系统。那模型是，如所许诺的，只是一个姿态，对一个辩证思想借出动态的精确、而非把那事情闭合进一个形式体系，因为那事情不闭合。但它表明，以一种单凭散文所不能抵达的清晰，为何本文的关系性美学要求那一般者与那特殊者两者、以及为何它们的张力是一个共享审美存在之生命本身、而非一个待被解决的问题。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：那美者是困难的，而它的困难是，在此，把持一个矛盾于活的运动中之困难，与另一个一同地、既非相同亦非分离、而是两个共享一种”在每一个里仍是其自己”之美者之困难。
§11 偶然的审美知觉
场域的建造是一个美学问题；那，结果，对”知觉其内所兴起者”也如此。本节从场域的造转向对”场域所放进者”的接住，并论证那接住它的能力本身是一个美学能力，本文诸被命名概念的第二个：偶然的审美知觉。那论证也，以一种重要的方式，减轻前一节的表面负担。因为如果建造诸场域是通往本文所描述之善的唯一路径，那善会是费力而稀有的、主要对那些有闲暇与财力去建造精巧框架者可得。本节表明那更深的能力比诸场域之建造更轻、更可携：它是一种知觉的技能、可在任何地方行使、接住那世界总在提供的偶然之美、并把它朝向所爱者。路边的一朵野花就足够。
§11.1 偶然无处不在；问题是接住它
前面诸节可能给了一个印象——偶然必须被制造、日常是一片纯粹重复的沙漠、敞开须被靠诸场域之建造刻意地输入其中。这一印象是错的，而纠正它是本节的起点。日常事实上不是纯粹的重复；它的诸重复在每一刻都被偶然所贯穿、被诸”例程不完全压制”的小的未被决定之irruption所贯穿。一朵野花在路边冒了出来。光，恰刚才，以一种特定的方式落在一面墙上。一个陌生人的脸，路过时，带着一个意味某事的表情。一句听到的话、一个声音、一阵突然的气味——日常连续地、通过它重复的诸缝、以一股小的未被决定之事件的稳定流，泄漏偶然。问题不是日常缺乏偶然。问题是这一偶然几乎全都未被接住地去、到达又离开而不被注意、不被登记、不被转向，因为日常那目的性的知觉、盯着它的诸功能与它的诸目的地，对它视而不见。
这重构整个实践之问题。那最深的实践能力，毕竟，不是诸场域之建造（那么费力的），而是那接住那已经在到达之偶然、注意并领受日常已经通过它诸缝在提供者的能力。而那”这一能力在其中被行使”的最小事件是很小而全然免费的：一个人接住那路边的野花、看它、被它触动、并把它朝向身边的那一个：看。在那小小的行为里，一个本会未被注意地路过的偶然被接住了，而在被转向中它被共享，而在被共享中它进入”我们”的结构、成为一份沉积，无论多么微小，在关系的财富里。那花，被接住并被共享，是一个已介入关系性结构的偶然，本文所描述之一切最小可能的实例，不要求被建造的场域、无旅程、无闲暇、无物、只要那”接住那已经在那里者并把它朝向所爱者”的能力。那链条跑：偶然 → 知觉 → 共享 → 财富，而它能在任何地方、任何一刻、免费地跑。
§11.2 那知觉的三个时刻
那如此被描述的能力不是简单的；它有三个相异的时刻，每一个是一个相异的能力、能在场或不在、被发展或被萎缩，而把它们分开是值得的，因为那能力的培育（§12）是对每一个的培育。
第一个时刻是认出：当那偶然之物到达时实际地看见它。这比听起来更难，而大多数偶然恰恰在这第一步失败。日常那目的性的知觉、那”看见那路而非那花、因为它盯着到某处去”的知觉，对那偶然者在结构上视而不见，因为那偶然者依定义是那”不在通往那目的之路上”者。看见那花是以一种不同的样式知觉：一种样式，其中目的被悬置、那知觉对那”为它自己之故在那里、而非为它的用”者敞开。这是那古典地被称为审美知觉的样式，那”为一物之所是、而非为它所为来beholding它，看见那花作为一朵花、而非作为通往那目的地之路旁的一个无关之物”的无利害的注意。接住偶然的第一个时刻因而是那目的性凝视的一个审美悬置，知觉向那无端者、那无用者、那仅仅在那里者的开启。
第二个时刻是被感动：不仅仅看见那偶然之物、而是被它触动、让它stir某物。看见还不够；一个人能冷冷地、作为一个事实、登记一朵花而无动于衷。第二个时刻是那”那被看见之物被允许要紧、被allowed去provoke一个小的感受之运动、被作为意味深长而非仅仅被记下来领受”的接受性。这是一种诗的接受性，而中国传统有一个精确的名字给它：兴（兴），那物对感受的stir、那情或意义在回应一个被知觉之对象时的rising，那古典诗学把它置于诗的根处，”诗起于兴”、起于一物所provoke的那情感之stir。被那路边的花感动是经历兴：让那小的偶然之物stir某物、被它情感地reach、而非仅仅登记它的在场。这一接受性，也，能被发展或被钝化；一种纯然目的性知觉的生活钝化它，而那诗人被实践的感受力把它保持活着。
第三个时刻是转向-共享：取一个人所看见并被感动者、并把它朝向那他者。看。 这一小小的行为是那”使整个链条关系性”者，而它是为本文之目的的那决定性时刻，因为它是那”把一个私人审美经验转化为一个关系性事件”者。一个人能看见那花、被它感动、并保有它，一个完整的孤独审美经验、那孤独旅行者所有的那种。那转向是那”使它成为’我们’里一份沉积”者：靠共享那被接住的偶然，一个人让它介入那关系性结构、使它成为”我们”、而非”我”的一刻。那转向-共享是偶然之审美知觉的关系性时刻，而它是那”把本文所描述的能力与传统久已赞颂的孤独审美感受力区分开来”者。那完整的能力是全部三者的链条：看见那偶然者（认出）、被它感动（兴）、并把它朝向所爱者（共享），而这三者，如美的哲学将表明的（§9.2），是那三个维度被带入协和：那偶然之物的实在界核在认出中被遭遇、那被感动的想象界投入、与那转向的符号界articulation。在那论说上那看不是一个被圆成之审美判断的余波、而是它的圆成本身，那”关系性主体的判断达成它的关系性构成所要求的共享符号协和”的一刻，而一段富于这一能力的关系——其中两个伴侣习惯性地接住并共享那世界所泄漏的偶然之美——富于一股小的生成性沉积之连续流、它们不要求旅程也不要求被建造的场域、只要那”接住那已经在那里者”的被培育之知觉。
§11.3 一种技能、而非一种工程 —— 那可携的容器
这最终解决了诸场域之建造曾引入的那张力，那”本文之善是费力的、精巧的、只对那能建造宏大框架者可得”的忧虑。偶然的审美知觉不是一种工程、而是一种技能：不是一个人在世界里建造的一个结构、而是一个人在自己里携带的一个能力、可在任何地方行使、不要求外部装置。而一种技能，不像一个被建造的场域，是可携的。那被建造的场域是一个脚手架、一个外部结构、以一些时间与财力之代价被建起、把一个空间为关系之来到到场而保持敞开。偶然的审美知觉是对”那脚手架为之而设者”的内化：一旦一个人有了那技能，他便不再需要那脚手架，因为他在自己里携带那”那脚手架被建造以供给”的能力。那有技能的知觉者无论在哪里都开启那场域、接住日常所泄漏的偶然之美、把它朝向所爱者，从而在最寻常一天的当中，生成那”被建造的场域被建以产生”的小的关系性事件。
这是从脚手架到技能的运动，而它是本文最终对旅行之一般化（§15）的深层逻辑。那字面的旅程是一个脚手架：一个有力的、昂贵的、外部的框架、一举开启那场域，而它的主要价值，在它所开启的场域之外，是它教——它让一个人足够生动地经历那场域以致认出它、学到它是什么、知道在它里、并在它内接住并共享那偶然者是什么感觉。但那实践的成熟形式不是诸脚手架的永久建造（那确实会费力而精英），它是那脚手架所教的技能，被携回日常、可无那脚手架地行使。那旅程表明那场域是什么；那技能让一个人在任何地方开启它。而宽阔是那”使那接住在每一点可能”者：那有技能的知觉者是那”在自己里、并在他的一天里、保持足够的空、足够的免于目的之总占据之自由、以致那偶然者在它到达时有余地被注意”者。没有那内部的宽阔，那偶然便未被接住地泄漏过去，那知觉太满于目的以致登记不了那花。那技能，于是，与一种内部之空的培育不可分离：偶然的审美知觉是，除别的之外，那”把自己保持得空得足以接住那来者”的能力。
那技能最终接到本系列已经确立的两样东西。它是前一篇所标的善之不可程序化（第二十篇）的那正面的、被赋能的形式：那里曾表明善不能被还原为一个程序、而必须在每一情形里被新鲜地判断；这里那不可程序化的判断被给它的正面之名、作为一种被培育的知觉技能、一个人在一个程序不能被供给处所发展者。而它是本系列所称见证（第十九篇）的日常行使：接住那花并说看是共享见证最小的行为，两道凝视向一物的转向、一个”是’我们’一刻”的共享之看的构成。偶然的审美知觉是见证被造成一门日常技能，而它的培育——本文接下来转向者——是那”一同地、美地、在一朵路边野花的尺度上、见证世界”之能力的培育。
§11.4 东方资源 —— 行旅者与风景的诗学
本节所描述的能力并非没有它的诸大师，而它们最丰的传统是行旅者与风景的东亚诗学，它把偶然的审美知觉发展到一个西方旅行文献罕抵达的高度，而本文汲取它，既为它现象学的精确、也作为对它否则西方化之美学的一个counterweight。三股尤其切题。
第一是芭蕉的旅行诗学，他的《奥之细道》是”偶然之审美知觉在一段旅程上被行使”的至高记录。芭蕉的实践恰恰是本节所描述的链条：小偶然之物的接住（一种特定的寂静、一只蝉的鸣、一座荒废之门的样子）、被它们感动（那俳句是一个兴的沉积、那stir被结晶）、并以那旅行日记本身之形式、把它们朝向另一个的转向、与一个读者、并在旅程之内与那并肩而行的同伴曾良、对那被接住之一刻的共享。芭蕉那寂的美学与他所称karumi（轻）是，除别的之外，对偶然之美之知觉的诸纪律，被训练的”接住并被那小者、流逝者、不宏大者感动”之能力，恰恰是那目的性凝视所错过的诸偶然。
第二是中国的风景游记与风景诗传统，从柳宗元到徐霞客之诸作者的游记、与谢灵运、王维及其谱系的风景诗，其中那入山水的旅程同时是一段字面的旅行与一门知觉的纪律，一只眼与一颗心向那偶然者与那宽阔者之美的调谐之培育。中国风景美学在一个深的意义上是一种宽阔的美学：对那画与诗里之空的珍视、对那未被描绘者之意义、对那虚、那未着墨之绢、那未说之词、那空远、作为美之介质本身的运用。这是那第十一章之空的形而上学（§2.8）的审美对应物：一整套被训练去”在器皿之空里找到它的用、在风景之宽阔之虚里找到它的美”的知觉传统。
第三是那更广的、为传统所共有的figure：旅行作为一门知觉的纪律、而非仅仅一次穿空间的移动，那行旅者、其旅程是一次眼与心的教育，他旅行以学会知觉。这一figure给本文最终的一般化一个古老的先例：旅程的要点从来不是诸目的地、而是那旅程所培育的被训练之知觉，那”对偶然与宽阔之美的眼”、一旦被训练、便能在任何地方被行使。这一传统的诸大师是，以本文的术语，那些完成了从脚手架到技能之运动者，那些用那旅程去培育一个他们然后携入全部生活之知觉者，以致对他们整个世界成为一片”以行旅者被训练而敞开之眼来知觉”的风景。他们是”本节所描述的能力能被培育到精通”的证明，与通往”那种培育如何被做”之问题的桥，那美育之问题，本文现在转向它。
§12 美育 —— 培育对善的判断
如果场域的建造是一个美学问题（§7.6）、而对其内所兴起者的知觉是一个美学技能（§11），那么对这两者之能力的培育是一种美育。这是本文哲学的顶峰，也是它最暴露的赌注，因为它将论证美育不是添加到伦理生活上的一个精炼、而是、在极限处、那里有的最根本的伦理教育形式。本节推进三个递增激进的命题。第一个，已被陈述，是场域的建造是美学的。第二个区分两种美——那被领受的与那被enact的——并把第二个定位于”实践伦理与美学之间久被注意的亲缘”之根处。第三个、最激进的，是伦理判断，在那”规则给出”之点，以美学方式运作，以致那善终究不能与那美分开，而那最深的伦理教育是美学的。本节以一个被守护的形式辩护第三个命题、以它最强的诸反对者对峙它、考察美育的诸古典与现代理论、下降到”那相关诸能力实际上如何在两人之间被培育”的问题、并以那整座大厦所搁置于其上的困难收尾：美的事物是困难的。
§12.1 为何美育、而非只是伦理教育
那”对善的培育是一种美学的、而非一种狭义伦理的教育”的主张依赖于前一篇所确立、在此被重新激活的一个结论：善不是可程序化的（第二十篇）。如果一段亲密关系的善能被还原为一组规则——做这个、戒那个、遵循那程序——那么它的培育会是一桩教那些规则之事，而伦理教育会是一套code的传递。但一段关系的善不能被如此还原；它要求，在每一具体情形里，一个”什么在这里、现在、与这个人是合宜的”的判断、是无规则所决定者，因为那具体情形总超出那规则的一般性。这是前一篇收尾时的认识——善必须在每一段特定关系的血肉里被新鲜地判断——的教训，而它对教育有一个直接的后果：如果善不是一套code，它的培育便不能是一套code的传递、而必须转而是对那”在那code给出处运作”之判断的培育。
那判断的结构是什么？它是对一个具体情形里、无规则subsume者、何为合宜的判断，一个整体的、被处境化的、对那正确比例、那合适回应、那合宜分寸的把握，被在一个无普遍者穷尽之特殊者上行使。而这，本节将论证，是审美判断的结构。那”在一个具体情形里、那里无规则能供给它、接住那正确分寸”的判断，是同一个判断、在一个场域的建造里、一个偶然的知觉里、对一个伦理境况的回应里；它是，在每一个里，一个对那合适者的被感到之把握、不可还原为程序。如果如此，那么对善的培育是对这一判断的培育，而对这一判断的培育是美育，那”知觉并回应那合适者、在那里无规则能被遵循”之能力的教育。这是为何那善所要求的教育是美学的、而非仅仅是狭义的、传递规则之伦理的：因为那善本身，在它不可程序化的核心，要求一个其结构是美学的判断。
§12.2 命题二 —— 领受之美与enact之美
在那最激进的命题之前，必须划一个讨论至此一向留作隐含、而被证明是那美学与伦理之间的枢纽之区分。美，如它在本文里所现，是两种。
命题二。 美分为领受的与enact的。领受之美是作为被领受者之美，那野花、那风景、那艺术作品之美，在那beholding它的审美知觉中被遇到。Enact之美是作为被做者之美，一个行动、一个回应、一种对待另一人之方式之美，在那做中被造得美。第一个被知觉；第二个被enact。而正是那enact之美奠基那”实践伦理与美学之间久被观察的亲缘”，因为如此行动以致一个人对另一人的对待本身是美的，是把善作为美来enact。
领受之美是前一节所关切之美：那偶然之美在知觉中被接住、那花被看见与那风景被beholding，作为某种”到达并被领受”之物的美。它是偶然之审美知觉的对象，而它的培育是对那领受诸能力——那被训练的眼、那被唤醒的兴、那向世界所提供者的敞开——的培育。但有第二种美、不被领受而被造：一个姿态、一个回应、一种会面另一人之方式之美，是在它被做的方式里美的。一个对一个伴侣之苦恼的回应能是美的、合适的、被比例化的、慷慨于恰恰正确的分寸、不太多也不太少、合那一刻如一条完美的诗行合一首诗。一种对待另一人的方式能有grace，如一个运动或一个短语能有grace。这是enact之美：不是被beholding之美、而是被enact之美，那deed之美。
那区分要紧，因为enact之美是那美学与伦理相遇处，而相遇不靠类比、而在实质里。向另一人好好地行动、以恰恰正确的分寸回应他们的需要、以恰恰合适的grace会面他们的脆弱、以那情境所召唤而无规则所规定的合适来对待他们，同时是一个伦理成就与一个美学成就，而这两者是一、而非那成就的两个描述。那回应之正确是它的合适，而它的合适是它的美；那被好好会面的一刻是那被美地会面的一刻，而在它里，没有把那伦理的合适与那美学的grace分开。这是为何实践伦理如此常被感到有一个美学维度、为何我们讲一个回应为graceful、一种生活为美、行止为合适；那亲缘是一个认识——被enact的善是被enact的美、而非一个从艺术借来的隐喻，做那合宜之事是把一个人的行动造成一个小小的美的东西。Enact之美是那被好好做之deed的实践之美，而它的培育是对那”美地行动”之能力的培育，那是，下一命题将论证，在它的根处与那”好好地行动”之能力无法区分。
§12.3 命题三 —— 伦理判断在它的极限处是美学的
第三个命题是本文最激进的，而它以它的激进所要求的小心被推进。它先以一个被守护的形式被陈述，本文辩护它；然后以一个极端的形式，本文把它作为一个真正的诱惑来entertain、并把它保持敞开而非断言它。
命题三（被守护的形式）。 在那”规则被那具体者所穷尽”之点——那是每一个一个真正特殊的伦理境况必须被会面之点——伦理判断以美学方式运作。实践智慧，在它的顶峰，与审美判断相合：两者都是对一个具体情形里、无规则subsume者、何为合宜的整体的、非概念的把握。对善的培育因而，在它的核心，是对审美判断的培育，而那最深的伦理教育是一种美育。
那被守护形式的论证分两步推进，第一步是结构的、第二步关乎纯粹。那结构的一步是这个。伦理生活不能被规则穷尽地支配，因为规则是一般的而情境是特殊的，而那特殊者总在原则上超出那一般者；规则与情形之间总有一个缝隙，判断必须越过它。什么越过它？不是另一条规则，因为那只会再生产那缝隙；而是一个”在那具体情境里把握何为合宜”的能力，一个亚里士多德所命名的phronesis、实践智慧、对那特定情形里”何为正确该做之事”的知觉，他小心地说它不能被还原为规则、而属于知觉而非证明。现在考虑康德所分析的审美判断之结构：美的判断，对康德，是一个反思的判断，一个在那特殊者里找到那普遍者、而非把那特殊者subsume于一个被给定之普遍者之下者；它是非概念的，它不应用一个确定的概念，却主张一种普遍性；它是诸能力把握一个无确定目的之合目的性、一个无规则、那合适所instance者的自由游戏。那两个结构，phronesis与审美判断，是，那命题主张，同一个结构：两者都是对一个无规则subsume之合适特殊者的非概念把握，对那正确分寸在那”无确定普遍者能被应用”的具体者里的找到。Phronesis在它的顶峰与审美判断相合：对那合适者在伦理情形里的知觉与对那合适者在审美情形里的知觉，是一个能力、被在不同的物质上行使。这是康德的第三《批判》被写来建造的桥，那”在自然之域与自由之域之间作中介”的判断，而那命题取它于它的话：那判断美的能力是那、在它的极限处、判断善的能力。
第二步关乎纯粹，而它是事情的核心与作者自己对那命题最深的理由。考虑”做正确之事”的两种方式之间的差别。在第一种里，一个人做正确之事因为一条规则、一个义务、一个被内化的规范要求它：一个人已被形成如此行动，而一个人如此行动因为一个人被如此形成。在第二种里，一个人做正确之事因为一个人知觉到、新鲜地、为他自己、那是合宜之事该做、因为他看见它的合适、被它感动、并出于那知觉enact它，如一个人会被感动去以那唯一合适的方式完成一行诗。这两者可能issue in同一个外在行为；但它们在它们的来源上不同，而那差别是一个被结构的第二天性与一个自由的回应之间的差别。那规则支配的善是被结构的人性：一个被外在规范之内化所形成的人性，正确地行动因为它已被建以如此、它的正确是一个被安装之结构的运作、而非一个自由的知觉。这样的善是可靠的，而它不是无物——一个由可靠地被形成以好好行动之人所组成的世界远好于它的反面——但它不是纯粹的，因为它在最深的意义上是他律的：那行动的来源是那被安装的结构、那被内化的规则、那被形成的禀性、而非那自由地知觉着的主体。那美学地被奠基的善是不同的。出于”一个人知觉到、自己并新鲜地、那行为的合适”而正确地行动、被那合适回应之美所感动并出于那被感动enact它，是出于一个”是一个人自己的自由知觉、而非一个被安装的结构”之来源而行动；而唯有这样的行动，那命题持守，有纯粹伦理的性格，因为唯在它里那主体是它所做之善的真正起源、而非一个被建进它之结构的执行者。那规则支配的善是安全的、可靠的、被结构的；那美学地被奠基的善是危险的、不可靠的、自由的，而唯有那自由的是纯粹的。这是为何，在那命题最深的版本上，那真正伦理者只能是那美学者：因为唯有一种”从那合适者之自由知觉、而非从一条被内化规则之运作而springs”的善，是一个自由主体之善、而非一个被结构者之运作。
命题三（极端形式，被entertain而非被断言）。 每一个伦理问题，归根到底，是一个美学问题。终究，没有不是那美者被enact之善，也没有不是、在它的根处、一个对那合适者之知觉之伦理判断，以致伦理是美学的一个province，而善是那美者在行动之域里的一个名字。
那极端形式是一个真正的诱惑，而本文既不断言也不打发它。它是那”伦理与美学之间的整个区分、在极限处、不可维持，我们所称的善就是那美者如它在行止里显现、而它们之间的表面差别是把伦理当作一桩规则之事、把美学当作一桩趣味之事的一个人造物，一个一旦人看出伦理在它的核心也是一桩对合适者之知觉之事便消解的差别”的思想。本文把这标为它论证的激进地平线、并拒绝断言它，出于下一小节使之清楚的诸理由：那极端形式，未被守护，招引一个严重得足以使责任要求把它保持在一个诱惑、而非一个命题之层面的危险。但它记下它，因为那被守护的形式指向它，而一套诚实的论说不隐藏它自己之论证所引向的悬崖。
§12.4 那最强的诸反对，与回应
一个这么激进的命题必须以全力面对它最强的诸反对者，而有两个，其力足以要求、不是反驳、而是那命题已建进它自己里的守护。本系列的实践一向是让那最难的反对以全力立着（第二十篇）；那实践在此被保持。
那康德式的反对 —— 倾向之他律。 第一个反对来自康德自己的伦理学，而它尖锐恰恰因为那命题倚靠了康德的美学。对康德，一个行动的道德价值在于它被出于义务、出于对道德法则的敬重、而非出于倾向（无论多么可亲）而做；一个”因为一个人被感动去做它、因为他感到它的合适或被它的美吸引”而做的行动，对康德，恰恰不是一个完整意义上的道德行动、而至多是一个幸运的病理的行动，出于感受而非出于对义务的理性认识而做。在这一看法上那命题把它完全弄反了：把善奠基于那合适者之审美知觉、于被那回应之美所感动，是把它奠基于倾向，而倾向恰恰是康德从纯粹道德者中排除者。那美学地被奠基的善，远非那纯粹的善，会在康德的根据上是那不纯的善，那出于感受而非出于法则而做的善。
那回应不否认那康德的要点、而是重新定位那分歧。那反对假定那”出于感受而行动”的替代方案是”出于那理性法则而行动”、而纯粹在于后者。但那命题的纯粹论证恰恰针对这个：那理性法则，被内化并作为一个人行动之来源而运作，本身是一个结构，那被安装进主体的义务之结构，而出于它的行动是，在那命题所指定的意义上，一个被安装之结构的运作、而非那知觉着主体的自由回应。那命题与康德同意倾向作为单纯病理冲动不是善的根据；他们分歧于那合适者之自由知觉是否是那意义上的”倾向”。那命题持守它不是，那合适者之知觉、被那正确回应之美所感动，是一个判断、而非一个盲目的病理之拉，对一个合适的反思把握，那与康德自己的审美判断（普遍的、无利害的、反思的）比与他所排除的诸倾向有更多共同之处。那分歧，于是，是那反思判断之能力——康德自己把它置于自然与自由之间者——能否是道德行动之来源；康德说那来源必须是纯粹实践理性，那命题说那来源能是那合适者之反思知觉。这是一个真实而未解决的分歧，而本文不佯称对着康德解决它；它只主张那命题不被”把善奠基于单纯倾向”之控所反驳，因为那合适者之知觉是一个判断、而非单纯倾向，并且这样一个判断能否是善的一个纯粹根据恰恰是那命题对着康德正统所提出的开放问题、而非那正统所打发的一个混淆。
那来自伦理之审美化的反对 —— 那法西斯幽灵。 第二个反对更严重，因为它是历史的而非仅仅概念的，并且因为前一篇已以另一形式承认了它的力（第二十篇）。把善弄成一桩美之事、审美化伦理，是招引上个世纪最危险的混淆：本雅明在法西斯主义之核心所诊断的政治之审美化，把那政治者当作一件待被composed之艺术作品、把人民当作待被塑成一个美的整体之物质、把领袖当作艺术家而把民族当作artwork。如果善是那美者被enact，什么防止那美-而-monstrous者、那被宏大地搬演的集会、那美学上完美而道德上可憎的秩序、那带着style所犯的残忍？前一篇以它自己的语域恰恰承认了这一要点，granting一段关系能在形式上美、能有好循环的几何、而仍不公正，以致审美形式单独不确保善（第二十篇）。这里的反对是同一个、在一个更高的音上：伦理之审美化威胁去许可那美的暴行、去使style成为善的一个充分凭证，而历史表明那引向何处。
这是那”逼那命题进它的被守护形式、并把那极端形式保持在一个诱惑而非一个断言”的反对。那回应有三部分，而它们无一完全消解那危险，那是应当的。第一，那命题区分领受之美与enact之美，而那法西斯审美化是一个景观之审美化、一个领受之美之审美化，那被群众在被搬演之集会里beholding之美、而非那”人如何被对待”之enact之美；而enact之美、那对这个人之合适对待之美，恰恰是那美的暴行所缺者，因为那暴行把人当作一个景观之物质、而非在他们特殊性所要求的合适里会面他们。那法西斯景观是领受上宏大而enact上monstrous的；那命题所划的区分恰恰是那美的暴行所违反者。第二，那命题所珍视的enact之美，依整个系列的分析，与那对他者的非榨取、非支配之对待不可分离——那合适的回应是那”把他者作为一个目的来会面、归还而非保留”者（第二十篇、第十七篇）——以致一种”把他者化约为物质”的”美的”对待会，在那命题自己关于enact之美的论说上，不是美的、而是它的赝品，那被误认作美者的meretricious者。第三，也最诚实地，那危险是真实的、而那守护是必要的恰恰因为那极端形式、未被守护，不能使这些区分stick：如果每一个伦理问题简单地就是一个美学的、无进一步的判准，那么那宏大者与那monstrous者便不能被趣味之外的任何东西区分开来，而趣味能被训练到monstrosity。正是为了把那enact之美的判准——对那特殊他者的合适、非榨取之会面——保持得不坍缩进单纯的景观宏大，那命题必须被保持在它的被守护形式里，其中那奠基善的审美判断是对enact之合适、而非对领受之splendour的判断。那法西斯幽灵是那”那极端形式太危险以致不可断言”的常立证明；它是那”本文把那形式作为一个悬崖来entertain、而非立于它之上”的原因。那奠基善之美是那合宜deed之美、而非那宏大show之美，而那命题的整个分量搁置于一个历史表明永久地处于被抹去之威胁下的区分上。
§12.5 美育的诸古典理论
那”人之培育本质上通过那美者”的思想是古老而深的，而本文的命题是它的继承者、而非它的发明者。诸古典理论被考察于下表；正文抽出那最直接关涉论证的四个。
那奠基性的现代文本是席勒的《审美教育书简》，而它是奠基性的恰恰因为它作那本文所作的主张：那通往一个自由而完整人性之路通过那美学者。席勒的问题是本文以另一形式所遇者，一个分裂于感性倾向与理性法则之间的存在如何可能成为自由而完整、而非或冲动之奴或一个被安装法则之执行者。他的答案是那游戏冲动（Spieltrieb），那”在感性者与理性者之间的自由游戏中兴起、并在美之经验里被典范地行使”的能力；在审美游戏里那人，席勒说，最充分地是人，因为唯在那里它本性的两半在自由中被和解、而非一半从属于另一半。这是，以一个不同的语汇，恰恰那命题在”被安装规则之被结构人性”与”审美回应之自由人性”之间的对比：席勒的美育是那”超出冲动与法则两者之自由”的培育，在那”人是完整的”游戏里。本文的纯粹论证是席勒的洞见、在伦理的语域里，那”唯有那美学地自由的回应是一个完整而自由之人的回应、而非一个被分裂者之一半服从另一半的回应”。
那对那能力之决定性的分析是康德的，已被援引：《判断力批判》供给那”整个命题转于其上”的反思审美判断之结构，而正是康德把那能力framing为自然与自由之间的桥、那命题所利用的中介本身。亚里士多德供给那桥的伦理一半，那”命题把它的结构与审美判断相等同”的phronesis。而儒家传统供给西方诸源所缺者：一个明确的、被制度化的、作为伦理形成之核心的美育纲领。《论语》以一个西方从未匹敌的简洁陈述它：兴于诗，立于礼，成于乐。这里人之培育始于诗之情感stir（§11.2 的兴）并圆成于乐，人之伦理形成圆成于一个美学成就，那被形成良好之品格的和谐被figure为、并通过、音乐之和谐而被达成。这是本文两种美的古典locus：兴，被诗之唤起，是形成之根处的领受之美；成于乐，圆成于音乐，是enact之美作为那被形成之品格的顶峰，那被造得和谐如一首乐曲被造得和谐的生命。那儒家序列是本节之命题、被早两千五百年陈述：伦理培育始于并终于那美学者。
| 来源 | 核心概念 | 对那命题的关涉 |
|---|---|---|
| 席勒 | 游戏冲动（Spieltrieb）；美作为感与理之和解 | 那超出冲动与法则两者之自由经由美学者被抵达——本文纯粹论证在它原初形式里。 |
| 康德 | 反思审美判断；判断作为自然与自由之桥 | 供给那命题与phronesis相等同之能力的结构；那命题所利用的中介。 |
| 亚里士多德 | Phronesis：对特殊者里合适者之知觉，不可还原为规则 | 那桥的伦理一半；实践智慧作为对合适者的非概念把握。 |
| 孔子 | 兴于诗，立于礼，成于乐：兴于诗、圆成于乐 | 伦理形成始于（兴，领受）并圆成于（音乐，enact）那美学者。 |
| 柏拉图 | 美之困难；美与善一同攀升 | χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：美抵抗定义——本节末尾的不可程序化。 |
| 道家 | 虚；空之用；那未雕琢者 | 对宽阔与那未被强迫者之知觉的美育。 |
§12.6 美育的诸现代理论
诸现代理论，被考察于下表，把那古典遗产发展向三个对本文要紧的方向：审美经验的民主化、它的批判与解放之edge、与它的具体教学法。
杜威的《艺术即经验》执行那决定性的民主化move，而它是最接近本文自己论证的现代源。针对审美之被限于博物馆与杰作，杜威把审美经验定位于寻常经验之圆成、于任何”达成某种整全、完成、与被感到之统一”的被生活之经验段落，他称之为”一个经验”。那路边的花，被接住并被圆成成一个完整的小经验，恰恰在杜威的意义上是审美的；偶然的审美知觉是那”在寻常生活之肌理里找到那审美者”的杜威式做法，而本文那”日常之善无须宏大装置便可得”的坚持是杜威的民主化被带入亲密的伦理。蔡元培”以美育代宗教”的纲领把那民主化冲动带入一整套国家教学法，提议审美培育作为通往一个自由而被提升之人性之形成的普遍的、世俗的路，恰恰本文所论证之命题的制度之梦。
那批判的edge由法兰克福传统供给。阿多诺的美学在那真正的审美经验里定位一种对工具理性的抵抗，那审美作为那”拒绝把它的对象化约为一个用、beholding而非剥削、从而立于那被手段-目的逻辑对世界之总管理之对立面”的comportment。这给本文的审美知觉它批判-政治的维度，在下一节被接手：审美地知觉、为它自己之故而非为它的用beholding那偶然者，已经是对那”被管理之世界所强加之工具化”的一个小小拒绝。朗西埃把这磨锐成一个明确的政治：那审美者是那”可感者之分配”、那对”什么能被知觉、被谁、作为意味深长”的先在分割，以致改变那可知觉者、使那被忽视者可知觉，是一个政治行为，而美育、诸新知觉能力的培育，是可感者的再分配。偶然之审美知觉的培育是，以朗西埃的术语，对那”知觉那被支配分配所render为不可知觉者”之能力的获得，一种知觉的政治，其stakes下一节将使之具体。
| 来源 | 贡献 | 对本文的关涉 |
|---|---|---|
| 杜威 | “一个经验”；审美者在寻常生活之圆成里 | 民主化那审美者；那路边的花在杜威确切的意义上是审美的。 |
| 蔡元培 | 以美育代宗教；普遍的世俗形成 | 那命题的制度之梦；审美培育作为通往一个自由人性之路。 |
| 阿多诺 | 那审美者作为对工具理性的抵抗 | Beholding-而非-使用作为对管理的一个拒绝；知觉的批判edge。 |
| 朗西埃 | 可感者的分配；美学作为政治 | 培育知觉再分配那可知觉者——一种知觉的政治。 |
| 默多克 | 注意；那公正而充满爱的凝视 | 注意的道德工作在结构上是美学的——真地看见就是正确地爱。 |
| 斯卡里 | 美作为prompting正义；那被去中心的、公平的regard | 领受之美训练那”公正回应所要求”的公平注意。 |
| 现代教学法（蒙台梭利、施泰纳、格林、艾斯纳） | 感官教育；艺术形成；美育作为实践 | 培育知觉的实际方法——诸能力实际上如何被训练。 |
两个进一步的现代源值得note、因为它们以恰恰本文的方式把那美学者接到那伦理者。艾里斯·默多克把注意、那公正而充满爱的凝视、那”真地看见那他者”的耐心regard、立为道德生活的中心，而她的注意在结构上是美学的：它是那”一物之审美知觉所要求”的无利害的、细心的beholding、被转向一个人，以致公正地看见那他者是以”一个人给一件美的东西”的regard来beholding他们。伊莱恩·斯卡里论证美之经验训练那”正义所要求”的公平的、被去中心的注意，被一件美的东西所驻足并去中心是实践那”对他人之公正regard所要求”的去我本身。两者都是，以本文的术语，”领受之美如何schools enact之美”的理论家：那”对美者之被训练知觉”如何成为那合适的、专注的、公正的回应之能力。而那具体的诸教学法——蒙台梭利的感官教育、施泰纳对整个孩子的艺术形成、格林与艾斯纳的美育纲领——供给一篇关于培育的论文必须不省略者：审美知觉之诸能力借以被训练的实际方法，是”那命题所要求的美育是一门有它自己之文献的被实践之艺、而非一个虔诚的愿望”的证据。
§12.7 它如何被培育 —— 两人的相互美育
诸理论描述一个人的培育；本文的关切是一个”我们”的培育，而这一小节独特的主张是：在两个人之间美育是相互的，每一个是另一个的老师，而那关系本身是一所学校。这不是一个隐喻。所涉的诸能力——偶然之美的知觉、兴的接受性、对那enact地合适者的判断——在两个人之间，在很大程度上被彼此培育，以三种具体的方式。
第一是看的教学法。当一个伴侣接住一个偶然之美并把它朝向另一个、看，他们不仅仅共享一刻；他们教一种看的方式。那转向是一个展示：它向另一个表明什么值得接住、把另一个的眼训练向”一个人已学会看见”之物的那种、在另一个里唤醒一个他们可能不曾有过的兴。久而久之，两个习惯性地把偶然之美朝向彼此的人教育彼此的知觉，每一个变得更能接住另一个所接住者，直到他们来到共享一个被训练的感受力、一只对美者的共同之眼，从一千个相互展示的行为构筑起来。那关系成为一所知觉的学校，其中每一个不断地教另一个看，而那课程是那共享世界的偶然之美。
第二是共享复述的教学法，它也是经验的再生产（§4.2）从美育这一侧来看。复述一段共享旅程、一同返回那曾被接住的美，是重新-培育对它的知觉，是在那复述中加深那”知觉那经验所持者”的能力、并一同精炼那最初接住它的感受力。共享复述是被在过去上行使的相互美育：对那被生活者的共同重新-知觉，两人借之一同精炼他们知觉的共同能力。这把本文的政治经济学接到它的美学：经验的再生产同时是那”知觉经验的感受力”的相互培育，以致那守护关系之财富的劳作是那教育它知觉的同一劳作。
第三是被enact之美的教学法：每一个伴侣靠enact它来教另一个那enact地合适者。当一个以恰恰正确的分寸会面另一个的脆弱、以恰恰合适的grace回应他们的苦恼，另一个学会，不靠训诫而靠经历，那合适的回应是什么，并被形成向那”轮到他时给出它”之能力。被美地对待是被在美之enact里教育；那被好好会面的伴侣学会，从被好好会面，如何会面。那关系因而是一所enact之美的互惠学校，每一个靠所领受之合适回应的礼物形成另一个对那合适回应之能力。而这是那”关系是善之相互培育”的最深意义：靠美地对待彼此，两个人在善之enact里教育彼此，以致那关系成为，经一生，一桩在一切艺中最有后果者——会面另一人合宜地之艺——里的相互美育，那是，依本节的论证，与好好地对待他们之艺相同。
§12.8 χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά —— 美的事物是困难的
剩下要命名那整座大厦所搁置于其上的困难，而以那最古老的词为它命名是合宜的。在柏拉图的《大希庇阿斯篇》里，苏格拉底与智者希庇阿斯试图说出那美者是什么、而失败；希庇阿斯，那能在每一别的主题上流利而长篇地说者，在这一个上，被还原为一连串苏格拉底一个接一个拆解的定义，直到对话不以一个答案、而以苏格拉底代替一个所提供的箴言结束：χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά，美的事物是困难的。这是一个非凡的结束。那能定义任何东西的人不能定义那美者；那寻求美之本质的对话只找到它的困难。而那困难不是偶然的而是本质的：那美者抵抗定义因为它不是一个定义所能捕获之种类之物、不是一个可被一条规则指定的属性、而恰恰是那整节一向所关切的无规则之合适。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά 是那美者之不可程序化、并依本节的命题、那善者之不可程序化的最古老之名。
这一困难是它的确证、而非那论说的一个缺陷，而它解释本节关于教育的中心主张。因为那美者不能被还原为一条规则，它不能被教，不在一条规则被教的意义上、靠一个待被应用之内容的传递。它只能被培育、被发展、在一个人自己里与在另一个里、通过长久的暴露、实践、注意、与一个知觉之缓慢的精炼，以趣味被培育而非被教的方式、以一只眼被训练而非被instruct的方式。这恰恰是为何对善的培育必须是一种深意义上的美育、而非一种道德instruction：因为那善，一如那美者、出于同一原因，不能作为一条规则被传递、而只能作为一种感受力被培育。而这是为何那培育是如此困难、如此缓慢、如此抵抗方法、如此依赖于两个人长久的相互schooling、他们经一整个共享生命教彼此看与会面。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：美者是困难的、善者是困难的，而它们以同一方式、出于同一原因困难，因为两者都不是一条待被遵循的规则、而是一个待被知觉的合适，而那合适者之知觉是一切人之诸能力中最困难、最不可instruct者，那唯一能被生长的。它困难不是怀疑它是事情之核心的理由；它是一个人已抵达事情之核心的标志，那”苏格拉底自己被还原为一个箴言”之处，与那”本文，既已把善追踪到它在美者里的根，所能做的不过是命名那困难、并转向那作为对它之唯一回应的培育”之处。
§13 伦理与美学的连续性 —— 一段争论的历史
第三个命题——伦理判断，在它的极限处，是美学的——在前一节被推进得仿佛它是一个待被对着诸反对辩护的大胆新奇。它不是一个新奇。它是哲学史上最长、最有后果之争论之一里的最新条目：那”伦理与美学是连续的还是不连续的、那善者与那美者归根到底是一还是不可还原地相异”之争论。本节把那命题置于那争论中，而那置放不是一个学术形式、而是一次强化：一个立于一条漫长的严肃思想谱系之内、并能精确地对着那相反看法之最强陈述定位自己的命题，是一个不同而更结实之物、比起一个被孤立地辩护的大胆主张。本节考察那肯定的谱系——那持守善者与美者为连续之传统——然后对峙那争论最有力的否定一极，克尔凯郭尔对它们之断裂的坚持，那是本文命题真正最强的对手。它以把第三命题定位于那争论之内、并陈述它如何回答那断裂收尾。
§13.1 那肯定的谱系 —— 善者与美者为一
那”善者与美者是连续的、为善在最深的层面是在一个人的存在与他的行动里为美、而对善之知觉与对美之知觉相亲”的思想，是古老而复现的，而它构成一条本文命题所加入的谱系。那谱系被考察于下表；它的诸主要时刻值得讨论。
那希腊之根是那词本身：kalokagathia（kalos kai agathos），那”美-而-善作为一个单一卓越”之理想，那”其善与美为一”的高贵之人，它在一个单一的连字符之德里表达了那希腊之感——行止里那令人钦佩者与形式里那美者是一个人之卓越的诸方面、而非分离的诸成就。柏拉图给了这形而上学的深度：在《会饮篇》的攀升里，爱者升向一个也是那善的美，那两个形式在顶峰相盟，以致对美之爱、被正确地追求，成为对善之爱，而对美之知觉是灵魂转向善之开端。柏拉图里kalon与agathon之切近是那肯定谱系的形而上学charter：美与善一同攀升，而在那高处它们几乎不可区分。
那英国道德感传统给了那连续性一个认识论的形式。沙夫茨伯里，它的奠基者，持守我们靠一种道德感知觉道德的善与恶，那道德感被明确地以、并连续于、那美感为模型：正如我们靠一个直接的感、而非靠推理，知觉一个美的形式之和谐与比例，我们也靠一个类比的直接之感知觉一个有德之品格之和谐与比例，而德，在这一看法上，是一种美、那一个被比例化良好之灵魂之美，被一种对道德者的趣味所知觉、如鉴赏家靠一种对美者的趣味知觉一件作品之美。对沙夫茨伯里那善者与那美者被同一种类的能力——一个感或趣味——所知觉，而道德卓越简单地是美的一个种、那品格之美。这是那肯定命题在它最清楚的早期现代形式里，而它是本文那”对善之知觉在结构上是审美的”主张的直接祖先。
席勒把那连续性带到它最高之点、在美的灵魂（die schöne Seele）这一概念里。对席勒，那仅仅尽责之人，那”靠道德意志之力、逆着倾向、做正确之事”者，尚未达成那最高的道德境况；那境况唯当义务与倾向被和解、当一个人乐意地做那善、当德已如此彻底地成为一个第二天性、以致那正确行动从那整个人无内部冲突地流出时才被达成，而这一被和解的境况、其中道德已成为grace，席勒称为美的灵魂。那美的灵魂不逆着它自己挣扎着去为善；它为善如一个美的东西为美，毫不费力地、优雅地、作为它整个被和解之本性的一个表达。这里伦理与美学之连续性抵达它的顶峰：道德完美被figure为美，那被完善的品格作为一个美的灵魂，那最高的善作为道德grace的成就。本文的纯粹论证（§12.3）是席勒美的灵魂的一个近后裔：那被自由地知觉之合适回应，从那整个人、而非从一个被安装规则之运作而issue，是一个美的灵魂的行动，而它对那仅仅尽责者的优越是席勒grace对挣扎的优越。
二十世纪给了那连续性它最被压缩的陈述与它几个最细心的辩护。维特根斯坦，在《逻辑哲学论》里，写下那几乎作为本文格言而立的lapidary之句：Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins，伦理与美学是一。那remark是enigmatic的而《逻辑哲学论》不展开它，但在它的语境里——在那些关于神秘者、关于不可表达者、关于那”自身显示而不能被说”者的命题之中——它把伦理与美学一同定位为关切同一件事者：不是世界之内的诸事实、而是那作为整体的世界之意义或价值，那”不能被陈述于诸命题中、而自身显示”的维度，而那伦理（行动之价值）与美学（美者之价值）作为一来趋近它。世纪稍晚，并在一个相当不同的key里，艾里斯·默多克把注意立为道德生活的中心、并使注意在结构上是美学的：那道德任务是真地看见、公正而充满爱地注意实在、克服那自我之扭曲的fantasy并知觉那他者如他们之所是，而这一公正而充满爱的注意正是那美之知觉所要求的注意，以致那”去中心那自我并把它fix于某种他者之上”的美之经验，是那”道德注意所要求之去我”的一个训练场。玛莎·努斯鲍姆论证文学本身是一种道德哲学之形式，那”小说所培育”的对诸特殊者之细粒度知觉正是那”实践智慧所要求”的知觉，而道德生活依赖于一种知觉之能力、对一个具体情境之道德上突出之诸特征的看见、是被艺术所培育、不可还原为原则之应用者。而伯纳德·威廉斯，与那更广的反理论潮流一道，对”伦理理论把道德生活还原为一套原则之系统”的pretension发动一场持续的攻击，坚持判断、品格、与对特殊者之知觉那不可消除的角色，一个批判，它虽本身不是一个连续性命题、却为一个连续性命题清出地基，靠否认伦理是一套code之应用、并肯定它搁置于那code不能替代的诸知觉与判断之能力上。那肯定的谱系因而从kalokagathia到当代”知觉先于原则”之优先不破地跑，而本文的第三命题是它的继承者。
| 来源 | 那连续性之形式 | 对第三命题的关涉 |
|---|---|---|
| 希腊 kalokagathia | 那美-而-善作为一个人之卓越 | 那”善与美是一个卓越之诸方面”的理想。 |
| 柏拉图 | Kalon 与 agathon 在攀升之顶峰相盟 | 美与善一同攀升；知觉美开始那向善的转向。 |
| 沙夫茨伯里 | 那以美感为模型的道德感 | 德是美的一个种、被一种趣味所知觉；命题的直接祖先。 |
| 席勒 | 那美的灵魂：德成为grace | 道德完美作为美；纯粹论证的近祖先。 |
| 维特根斯坦 | “伦理与美学是一”（《逻辑哲学论》6.421） | 两者都关切那”自身显示而不能被说”的世界之价值。 |
| 默多克 | 注意：那公正而充满爱的凝视，在结构上美学的 | 道德之看见是审美之看见；美训练道德注意。 |
| 努斯鲍姆 | 文学作为道德哲学；知觉先于原则 | 实践智慧是细粒度知觉、被艺术所培育。 |
| 威廉斯 | 反理论：判断与品格先于系统 | 清出地基：伦理不是一套code之应用。 |
§13.2 那诱惑与那危险 —— 尼采
在那最强的对手之前，必须命名一个既非简单地为、亦非简单地反那连续性、而标示它的诱惑与它的危险两者之figure：尼采。因为尼采给了伦理与美学之连续性它最令人陶醉、最危险的构想：存在唯作为一个美学现象才被辩护，生命之价值终究是美学的而非道德的，那对存在之道德解释要被克服并被一个美学的所替换、其中生命被肯定如一个人肯定一件艺术作品、超出善恶之外。这是那连续性命题被推过本文将跟随它之点：不是”伦理判断在结构上是美学的”之主张、而是”那伦理者要被那美学者所替换、道德是一个待被克服以favor生命之美学辩护之falsification”之主张。尼采是那第三命题之极端形式（§12.3）被造成一种哲学的诱惑：那伦理者向那美学者的废除、那”留善恶于身后”的存在之美学辩护。
而他是，在同一姿态里，它的危险。因为那存在之美学辩护、不锚于任何伦理约束，恰恰是前一节所指认为那悬崖的思想，那对美-而-monstrous者的许可，那”能找到存在被作为一个景观’辩护’、无论它的残忍”之审美化（§12.4）。尼采标示那点、在其处那连续性命题、被推到伦理被美学替换、成为危险；而他在那争论里的在场是那”为何本文把第三命题保持在它的被守护形式、并把那极端形式只作为一个诱惑来entertain”的常立提醒。本文继承那肯定谱系的主张——伦理与美学是连续的、伦理判断在结构上是美学的——但它拒绝尼采那进一步的主张——伦理因而要被美学替换、那善者要被废除进那美者。连续性不是替换。”伦理判断在结构上是美学的”不蕴含任何美学上可肯定者由此为善；它蕴含对善之知觉有审美知觉之结构，那是一个关于那能力的主张、而非一个把善恶之区分废除进一桩趣味之事的许可。尼采是那”表明越过那条线会意味什么、以及为何本文不越过它”的figure。
§13.3 那最强的对手 —— 克尔凯郭尔的断裂
那肯定的谱系有一个伟大的对手，而本文的命题必须以全力面对它，因为它是有史以来对伦理与美学之不连续性最有力的陈述，而它来自一个比它的颂扬者更从内部理解那审美生活的思想家。克尔凯郭尔的《非此即彼》建于那”审美者与伦理者是不连续的、而非连续的、被一个qualitative的飞跃所分开、不作为一个标度上的更低与更高、而作为两个相互排斥的存在样式、人必须在它们之间选择“的命题之上。那标题本身陈述它：要么那审美者要么那伦理者，不是两者、不是一个从一者到另一者的连续性、而是一个要求一个决定的排斥的析取。这是那肯定谱系所持守之一切的反题，而它由一个给了那审美生活它最诱人、最searching之描绘的人所论证。
《非此即彼》的第一卷从内部呈现那审美生活：那”围绕那直接者、那有趣者、那愉快者、那美者组织”的生活，那”为心境之培育与无聊之回避而活、把存在当作有趣经验之物质、对美exquisitely敏感而不能承诺”之审美者的生活。克尔凯郭尔以那么大的力描绘这一生活因为他知道它；而他的批判因它的同情而更devastating。那审美生活，他表明，无论多么精炼，终究是绝望，一个常对它自己无意识的绝望、但仍是绝望，因为那审美存在没有连续性、没有持存于时间中的自我、没有把诸时刻绑进一个生命的承诺。那审美者，为那有趣的时刻而活，被分散于诸时刻之中；他没有自我、只有一连串心境与经验，而在他的培育之下卧着一个空、一个忧郁、一个绝望，那对有趣者之不懈追求被设计来不去治愈而去outrun。那审美生活消费那世界、包括他人、作为它自己经验之物质；它不能爱，因为爱要求一个那审美者不能作的承诺；它不能成为一个自我，因为自我性要求那审美存在所缺的连续性。
那伦理者，在第二卷里，是那”出离这一绝望”的飞跃，而关键地，它是一个飞跃、而非一个连续的发展。一个人不精炼那审美生活直到它成为伦理的；一个人选择，靠一个qualitative的决定，伦理地而非审美地存在，而那选择是一个不连续、一个断裂、一个从一个存在样式到另一个的转变。那伦理生活是承诺、连续、那”靠它的诸选择把自己绑于时间中”之自我的生活——婚姻而非诱惑、誓的守持而非心境之培育、靠承诺成为一个自我而非自我之被分散于诸经验之中。而那伦理者不靠完善那审美者、而靠放弃它、靠那”一个人在其中对着那审美者选择那伦理者”的非此即彼被抵达。这是那断裂：那审美者与那伦理者不是一、不是连续的、不是一个单一卓越的诸方面；它们是相对立的存在样式，而道德生活恰恰始于那审美生活被放弃之处。对着kalokagathia、对着那美的灵魂、对着”伦理与美学是一”，克尔凯郭尔立起那非此即彼：伦理与美学是二，而你必须选择。
这是那最强的对手，而它的力必须被充分承认。克尔凯郭尔不否认那审美者有价值；他否认伦理存在与它连续，坚持从审美者到伦理者的move是一个断裂而非一个发展，并把这奠基于一个对”那审美生活之不能承诺、连续、与真正的爱”的深刻分析之上。如果他对，本文的第三命题不仅是被夸大、而是根本错误的：伦理判断不会在它的极限处是美学的、而恰恰是那”靠离开那审美者所抵达”者，而把善奠基于审美知觉会是停留在那”伦理者必须放弃”的审美绝望里。那反对是严重的，而它不能被前一节给康德与给那法西斯幽灵的诸回应所应付，因为它在一个更深的层面运作：它关切的不是审美判断能否奠基善、而是那审美的存在样式是否恰恰是那”伦理者必须与之断裂”者。
§13.4 那回应 —— 那消费的审美与那enact的审美
对克尔凯郭尔的回应是本文整个美学所转于其上的枢纽，而它被作出、不靠否认他的分析、而靠在那审美者之内划一个他的论说、尽管有它一切的力、所不划的区分。克尔凯郭尔的审美者是一个特定的figure：那经验的消费者、那”为有趣的时刻而活、把那世界与他人当作他自己心境之物质、不能承诺因为承诺会终结对下一个有趣之物的追求”者。克尔凯郭尔所anatomise并谴责的审美生活是那消费的审美：那审美作为为自我自己之故对经验的消费，那审美在本文以拉康术语所称的想象界的语域里、那被迷住、那愉快的投入、那”把世界作为自我经验之物质来吸收”。而克尔凯郭尔关于这一审美完全是对的：它是绝望、它不能爱、它不能奠基一个自我，而那伦理者确实必须与它断裂。那消费的审美与那伦理者是不连续的；在这一点上克尔凯郭尔与本文完全同意。
但那消费的审美不是那审美者之全部，而本文在领受之美与enact之美之间所划的区分（§12.2）恰恰是克尔凯郭尔的论说所略去的区分。克尔凯郭尔的审美者活在被转为消费的领受之美里，美被作为待为自我消费之经验来领受。但有那enact的审美：美不被消费而被做，那合适回应之美、那被好好会面之一刻之grace、那在一个人如何对待另一人里被enact之美。而那enact的审美根本不是消费的；它是那审美者对世界之消费的反面本身。以恰恰合适的grace回应所爱者的脆弱，是把一个人自己正确地给予另一人、而非为自己消费一个经验；它是一个承诺之行为、一个对他者之注意之行为、那消费审美者不能管理的那爱本身之行为。那enact的审美是被承诺的、连续的、他者-指向的，那消费的审美所不是之一切、与克尔凯郭尔正确地向那伦理者所要求之一切。确实，那enact的审美恰恰是席勒那美的灵魂：那”其伦理承诺已成为grace、其正确行动从一个被和解之品格美地流出、其善被作为美来enact”之人。那enact的审美不是那”伦理者必须放弃”的绝望；它是那伦理者本身、在它的美里被知觉。
所以对克尔凯郭尔的回应是这个。那与伦理者断裂者是那消费的审美——那想象界的被迷住、那经验之消费、那审美者之被分散于诸心境——而在这一断裂上本文同意：第三命题不把善奠基于那消费的审美、并会与克尔凯郭尔一道放弃它。那与伦理者连续者、那是、确实、那伦理者在它最高处者，是那enact的审美：那合适的、被承诺的、他者-指向的回应之美、那美的灵魂之grace、那”在那具体情形里何为合宜”之知觉——它同时是审美的与伦理的。克尔凯郭尔的非此即彼是真实的，但它落在那审美者之内、在它的消费形式与enact形式之间、而非在那作为如此之审美者与那伦理者之间。他正确地要求的选择，在那经验之被分散消费与一个自我之被承诺成为之间，是那消费审美与那enact审美之间的选择，而那选择的enact一侧与他所championship的伦理生活连续、确实与之相同。第三命题因而不被克尔凯郭尔所反驳、而被他所精炼：它必须指定那”伦理者与之连续”的审美是那enact的、而非那消费的、那给予而非那消费、那被做之美而非那仅仅被fed upon之美。有了那指定——本文先在的区分已供给者——克尔凯郭尔所坚持的断裂被精确地保全于它所属之处、在两个审美之间，而那肯定谱系所坚持的连续性被精确地保全于它所属之处、在那enact审美与那善之间。那最强的对手，被充分承认，结果是加深、而非击败那命题，靠逼出那精确地定位那连续性的区分。
§13.5 第三命题在那争论中的定位
第三命题现在能被精确地定位于它所加入的争论里。它立于那肯定的谱系之内、与kalokagathia、沙夫茨伯里的道德感、席勒的美的灵魂、维特根斯坦的”伦理与美学是一”、默多克的注意、努斯鲍姆的知觉一道，在持守”伦理判断与审美判断连续、对善之知觉在结构上是对合适者之知觉、善被作为美来enact”。它拒绝、以本文的守护、尼采那”从连续性到替换”的进一步之步，持守”伦理与审美判断之结构连续性不许可那伦理者向那美学者之废除”。而它回答那最强的对手、克尔凯郭尔，不靠否认他的断裂、而靠重新定位它：那断裂是真实的，但它落在那消费审美与那enact审美之间，以致那消费审美确实与那伦理者不连续（如克尔凯郭尔所持）、而那enact审美与它连续（如那肯定谱系所持）。本文对这一古老争论的贡献恰恰是这一重新定位：那认识，那连续性理论家与克尔凯郭尔之间的争执靠区分两个审美而被解决，而一旦它们被区分，两侧都被看出关于不同之事是对的——克尔凯郭尔关于那消费审美、那肯定谱系关于那enact审美。
这是为何本文能有信心地把第三命题保持在它的被守护形式、同时只把那极端形式作为一个诱惑来entertain。那被守护形式——伦理判断在它的极限处以美学方式运作、对善的培育是对审美判断在它enact形式里的培育——是那肯定谱系的命题，被克尔凯郭尔的区分所精炼、并被对着康德的与本雅明的诸反对所辩护。那极端形式——一切伦理是美学、那善简单地是那美者——是尼采那一步，那区分之废除，而它太危险以致不可断言，因为，未被守护，它不能把那消费审美保持得不冒充那善、不能把那美的景观保持得不许可那monstrous的deed。本文美学的整个分量搁置于那两个审美之间的区分上——领受的与enact的、消费的与给予的——并搁置于那”伦理与美之连续性在那enact者单独里”的定位上。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：美者是困难的，而它的困难在此是把那连续性精确地保持于它所属之处、并把那断裂精确地保持于它所属之处的困难，对着那”完全坍缩它们”之诱惑与那”完全断裂它们”之诱惑两者。那善是那美者被enact；但唯有那美者被enact、而非那美者被消费，是那善，而本文那亲密、旅行、合适回应与共享审美协和之伦理的全部，活在那区分里。
§14 美的政治经济学 —— 那被争夺的剩余
偶然的审美知觉与它所要求的宽阔，至此一向被呈现为亲密关系的诸善、一种私人繁荣的诸私人能力。本节表明它们绝非如此被收容。那知觉美的能力、与那知觉所要求的空，有一个政治经济学的分量：它们是资本世界里的诸力、被求被争，而对它们的争夺是那”被管理之世界与那抵抗它者之间斗争”的诸安静前线之一。论证通过一个具体情形推进——一家奢侈百货店那昂贵的空——先被读作资本对审美者的捕获、然后被读作一个资本不能攫取之剩余的场所、最后被读作这样诸争夺之一谱系上的一个点。本节以从那情形引出一个解放的命题收尾：审美知觉的培育是一种去异化的微观政治，那”资本可用而不能没收”之能力的构筑。
§14.1 GINZA SIX 那昂贵的空
考虑一个本该、在一个狭义经济的逻辑上、不可能之事。GINZA SIX 是东京最昂贵的零售地产之一，而东京的是世界最昂贵者之一；它楼面空间的每一平方米都command一个使它的用成为一桩最仔细计算之事的租金。而然而，在它的六楼，在这最昂贵之空间的核心，GINZA SIX 把一大片让给空：一个宽阔的、敞开的、不拥挤的厅，其中，被周期性地更新，立着一件当代艺术的大作，一个庞大的装置、一件悬挂的雕塑、一位第一流艺术家的作品，而那空间是免费的、向任何人敞开、不卖任何东西。在最大租金-榨取的逻辑上这是疯狂；那同一片楼面面积，被分隔成精品店，会产出一笔那空厅所forgo的财富之租金。那店刻意地、昂贵地、把一大片空间留空、并以免费的美填它。这一事实不独于 GINZA SIX——那昂贵的中庭、那基金会画廊、那让给公共艺术的公司广场，是高资本景观熟悉的诸特征——但 GINZA SIX 以一种特别的清晰陈述它，因为那空间之价与它的用之gratuity之间的对比是如此stark。为何资本，那不浪费任何东西者，为空与美付得如此昂贵？
§14.2 第一种读法 —— 资本对审美者的捕获
第一个答案是这是最精炼的计算、而非疯狂，而那表面的礼物其实是榨取最sophisticated的形式。那空厅与它免费的美是它的一个工具、而非利润的一个forgo，以一个比它表面所浪费之租金更先进的逻辑运作。那美把人引进来——它是一个诱饵、一个带来精品店单独所不能带的客流量的吸引。它延长他们的停留，而被延长的停留是被增加的花费。它给整个establishment一种文化、精炼、与慷慨的aura、那提升那品牌并justify通篇的价格。而在照片的时代，它制造景观：那免费的artwork被无尽地拍照与流通，一个由访客们自己执行的庞大的无偿广告，那空厅被转化为那钱所能买到的最高效的营销。在这一读法上那空是那楼里最昂贵的广告空间，而那免费的美是bait；那礼物是一桩交易，其中那访客、被美所引、被感动去分享它、执行无偿的推广劳动、并被诱去花费。这是那文化工业在它被完善之形式里，那阿多诺所foresaw的时刻、当那审美者、那本该抵抗工具理性者，本身被完全工具化，当甚至美、甚至那似乎是商业之反面本身的沉思之空，被捕获并被造得服务于市场的逻辑。那景观，在德波的意义上，已annex那审美者；那美之beholding已成为资本流通里的一刻。在这一读法上本文自己所珍视的诸能力被揭示为已被殖民：偶然的审美知觉、对宽阔之美的爱，恰恰是那资本已学会去farm的诸susceptibility。
§14.3 第二种读法 —— 那不可还原的剩余
第一种读法是真的，而它不是全部真相，而那辩证的任务是看出它所留下者、而不否认它所捕获者。因为考虑那实际发生于一个特定之人者——他，为某桩消费的差事来到那店、在六楼拐过一个角、被那大的敞开空间与立于其中的艺术作品意外地遇到。某事在他们里发生。他们驻足；他们，在一刻里，被taken，那目的性的差事被悬置、那凝视被接住、一个小的真正的美之经验被经历。而这一经验是真实的，无论那occasion它之空间的动机。那店的计算不reach into那经验并hollow它；那人真正地被驻足、真正地被感动、真正地、为那一刻、被从那把他们带来的目的性消费中释放、进入对某种”为它自己之故美”之物的无利害beholding。这里是那第一种读法不能捕获的剩余：那审美经验、一旦它发生，有一个超出并逃逸那产生它之工具性框架的实在与价值。这一剩余是，以早先所发展之美的哲学的精确语汇（§9.2），那审美经验里那实在界的时刻，那抵抗符号化的核，因而抵抗那”资本本要靠它把那经验完全转化为一件商品”的符号捕获。资本为它自己的诸目的建造那容器；但那在那容器里发生者，在那”被真正的美真正地驻足”之人里，不被那些目的所穷尽、且不能被，因为美之经验是那目的性者的一个真正悬置，而那目的性者的一个真正悬置恰恰是那”服务于无目的”者、那”立于手段-目的逻辑之外、即便那逻辑安排了它的发生”者。
这是那深的要点，而它是本文的整个论证、在政治经济学的语域里回返。那审美经验是，依它的本性，对某种”为它自己之故、而非为它的用”之物的beholding；它是那”目的性者被悬置、某物被作为gratuitously在那里所会面”的一刻。这样一个时刻不能被从内部完全工具化，因为它被真正地经历的那一刻它是，依它的结构本身，一个对工具性的踏出，一小片在那异化装置的核心本身发生的非异化经验。资本能建造那容器、能安排那机缘、能从那客流量与那些照片获利；但它不能使那人对那美的实际经验本身是一个工具性的经验，因为那样它便根本不会是一个美之经验、而仅仅是另一桩交易，而那诱饵会失败。资本需要那经验是真正的以便从它获利——一种假的美会引不来任何人——而它所需要的那真正性恰恰是那逃逸它的剩余。那店要求那访客真正地被驻足、真正地被感动；而在真正地被驻足并被感动中，那访客有一个真正的非工具性经验之一刻、是那店的工具性不能reach into并转化者。那剩余是结构性的、非偶然的：资本对审美者的捕获依赖于留下完好、恰恰那”击败捕获”的非工具性之核。
§14.4 那辩证法 —— 美作为一个被争夺的场域
那两种读法不相消；它们composé一个辩证法，而那辩证法是事情的真相。美，在资本世界里，既非简单地解放、亦非简单地被捕获；它是一个被争夺的场域，一个斗争的场所、其中捕获与剩余被锁在一起、每一个要求并抵抗另一个。第一种读法确立那审美者是真实的政治经济学之力，美与宽阔之空做真正的经济工作、引真实的客流量、command真实的租金、justify真实的premium；资本为它们付得昂贵的willingness是它们是世界里的诸力、而非私人琐事的最硬可能之证明。第二种读法确立这一力，即便资本挥舞它，携带一个资本不能没收的剩余，一个非工具性的核、它，作为那”给美它吸引力”者本身，不能被转化为纯工具而不摧毁它本要服务之力。美因而同时是诸善中最可捕获与最不可没收者：可捕获因为它的力是真实的、资本能harness它，不可没收因为那力依赖于一个抵抗转化的非工具性之核。这两者之间的争夺是永久而不可解决的，而它被争，微观-宇宙地，在每一个”被美在一个设计来从他们之被驻足获利之空间里真正地驻足”之人里。
这把那情形直接接到受控偶然的辩证法（§7.4）。GINZA SIX 是一个被资本建造的容器：它的边界为商业目的被rigidly控制，那空间是一个零售环境、被安排来卖，而它的内部、那它所occasion的实际审美经验、保持真正地敞开、不被控制、那访客自己的。那结构恰恰是那场域的：一个围着一个敞开内部的受控边界。那情形所添加者是那边界之控制与那内部之敞开能服务不同的主人——那边界服务资本的商业目的、那内部服务访客的非工具性经验——而这一分歧是那争夺的形式本身。资本控制那容器；那剩余活在那内容里；而美的政治经济学是那”一个其边界由一方把持、其内部逃逸他们之场域”的斗争。
§14.5 无之以为用 —— 空被资本所确证
那情形里有一个进一步而更深的要点，而它具体地关乎空。GINZA SIX 所付的，最striking地，是空、而非只是美——那敞开的、不拥挤的、宽阔的厅、那对最可填之空间的刻意非填。而在为空付得如此昂贵中，资本确证，对着它自己的填充逻辑，那第十一章的古老命题：那器皿之用在它的空、那不在那里者给出用。那最计较的空间填充者、那”本会把每一平方米分隔成可租之用”的逻辑，被那”空引人、宽阔有一种填充所缺之力之密度”的发现所驱，去把一大片空间留空、并由此在那”不能被指控为神秘主义”的唯一语域——租金的语域——里确证无之以为用。资本已发现、并付费去确证，空是有用的。那虚的道家形而上学、本文通篇作为场域之最深根据所携者，在此领受它最不可能、最决定性的证明：即便那最大填充的逻辑也被、由价值的本性、强迫去承认那空是有用的、并为它付最高的价。
但那同一情形表明空，也，是被争夺的。资本所付的宽阔是被工具化的宽阔，空被部署为一个诱饵，那虚被造得为它表面所拒绝的填充而工作。那奢侈厅那氛围之空与那场域之宽阔不同，即便它借它的形式；它是为消费服务的空，那作为氛围的虚、被设计来dispose那访客去花费。而然而，那剩余又一次，那空，即便被工具化，仍开启一个真实的空间、其中目的性者的一个真实悬置能发生；资本的工具性之空仍，尽管它自己，提供它被建以剥削之真正宽阔的诸时刻。空，一如美，是一个被争夺的场域：被资本所付、被部署为氛围，而然而harbouring一个逃逸那部署的剩余，一个在那被工具化者之内的真正敞开。对美的斗争，在它的根处，是对空的斗争，是对”那被开启的空间会是一个为真正非工具性经验之空间、还是仅仅一个为消费engineered之氛围”的斗争，而这两者是永久地纠缠的，那真正的虚haunting那”它被造来wear”的被engineered者。
§14.6 诸情形之谱系
GINZA SIX 是一个谱系上的一个点，而把它置于诸他者之间澄清什么对它是特定的、什么不是。考虑三个情形，按那审美者被资本捕获之程度排序。
在一端立着那不可拥有的审美者：那山与水之美、那行旅传统所知觉的风景（§11.4）、那路边野花的偶然之美。这一美是，依它的本性，抵抗捕获的，因为它不由资本所产生、不被enclosed、不被卖；那山之美是免费的、在一个那画廊的不是之意义上，对任何有被训练之知觉去接住它者可得、被无人所拥有、被无人所可租。资本能卖通往那山的access——那票、那lodge、那导游团——但它不能拥有那美本身，那美仍对那”有看见之眼”的无钱行旅者可得，而那”以最富之知觉的最穷之知觉者”比那”无看见地拍照它的最富之旅游者”更充分地拥有它。这是那审美者在它最非异化处：一种无人所造、无人能没收之美，为它的享受要求无物、只要本文所描述的被培育之知觉。
在中间立着 GINZA SIX 那被争夺的审美者：被资本所产生并enclosed、为利润被部署、而然而harbouring那不可还原的剩余之美。这里那捕获是真实的而那抵抗是真实的，而那情形通体是辩证的——那画廊既非那免费的山、亦非那纯粹的陷阱、而是那”两个力一举运作”的被争夺场域。
在另一端立着那被榨取的审美者，那”捕获最近乎完全”的情形：那为像而engineered的上镜场所、那”其整个实在是它产生可分享照片之能力”的”可Instagram”location、那”存在以被拍照、无别的存在”的目的地。这里那审美者被最彻底地工具化：那地方是美的以被捕获、而非美的以被beholding，被从那照片倒着设计，它的每一特征为它将产出之像而被计算。而这里那剩余最近乎被熄灭，不因为那结构不同于那画廊的、而因为那地方所培育的知觉是那”不beholding而只捕获”的知觉、那”不经历美而只为流通记录它”的凝视。那被榨取的审美者是死物质对活知觉的triumph（§4.4）：一个为那照片所建、被无人所经历之地方，那美被完全转化进那像而那经验被完全evacuated。然而即便这里那剩余也不全为零，因为一个有被培育之知觉的访客可能仍、逆着那地方的设计、实际地beholding而非捕获、并有一个那被engineered之场所不曾意图的真正之刻。那谱系没有一个总捕获的终点，因为那剩余、无论多么被减少、是结构性的；但那被榨取的情形表明它能被多么近乎地趋近，以及那被捕获者与那免费者之间的差别终究如何不在那地方、而在被带向它的知觉。
§14.7 美如何创造一个价值循环 —— 那机制
至此的分析已确立美是一个真实的政治经济学之力——它引客流量、command租金、justify premium——但它静态地对待这一力、作为美所拥有的一个力、而不表明那”美借以行使它”的机制：美如何，动态地，创造并维持一个价值的循环。这一机制现在必须被陈列，因为它是本文审美知觉之现象学与它政治经济学之间的link，而它表明美的政治经济学不是一个静态事实、而是一个有与本文在它中心所分析之关系性再生产相同结构的动态循环。
那循环有一个确定的点燃之点，而那点是知觉的行为。美不是一个等着被估值的被动属性；它是一个抓住知觉的主动之力，驻足那路人、接住那凝视、把那主体从那”把他们带来的目的性差事”中拉进对某种”为它自己之故”之物的非目的性beholding（§11.2、§11）。这一抓住是那价值循环的点燃。在它之前，那主体是一个穿过手段朝目的移动的目的性agent；在它里，那主体被arrested、被捕获、被释放一刻进那审美经验，而恰恰是这一arrest——一个目的性passage向一个非目的性beholding的转化——是美所执行、而无别的东西如此好地执行者。那”被六楼的那大空间与立于其中的作品所驻足”之人（§14.5）是那价值循环点燃：一个目的性消费者被抓住、逆着他们的差事、进一个真正的审美经验。美使那主体知觉；那使-知觉是那循环的第一个时刻。
第二个时刻是价值在那知觉本身里的生成，而这里那三维分析指明那价值是什么（§9.3）。那被抓住的知觉是一个真正的经验，那美的事物的实在界盈余被会面、被投以想象界的被迷住、被提升向那可共享者的符号界，而这一经验本身是一个价值：尚不是一个经济的量、而是一个被生活的善，那主体所经历、且在那经历中有价值之非工具性经验。这是美在源头所生成的价值：那审美经验作为一个被生活的善。而它是，关键地，一个有那辩证法所确立之双重性格的价值（§14.4）：它能被经济地捕获、被转化为客流量、停留时间、那”主体将为’身处这样诸经验所发生之处’而付”的premium，而然而它携带那不可还原的剩余，那”那经济捕获依赖于、而不能自己产生”的非工具性之核。美所生成的价值同时是可捕获的（它能被turned to经济account）与不可没收的（它的经济捕获要求那逃逸捕获的真正性）。
第三个时刻是那”使这成为一个循环、而非一个单一事件”者：那价值的再生产，那审美经验借以生成进一步的知觉、从而更新那源头。那审美经验，一旦被经历，被再生产、被recount、被返回、被共享、被造成一个回来的理由与一个他人来的理由（§4）。而这一再生产feed那源头：那被recount的经验引新的知觉者、那回访更新那经验、那被共享的美propagate那知觉之抓住给他人，以致那在源头被生成的价值flow back去生成更多知觉、更多经验、更多价值。这是那价值循环本身：美抓住知觉、知觉生成价值、价值被再生产、而那再生产更新并放大那知觉之抓住，一个自我维持的流通、其中美，靠被知觉、那知觉被再生产，生成一个回到它源头并增益它之价值的flow。美的政治经济学是这一循环：不是一个静态的力、而是一个动态的流通，被审美知觉所点燃、被它的再生产所维持。
§14.8 那好的与坏的价值循环
那”美创造一个价值循环”尚不说那循环是好是坏，而那区分，本文为它所分析的每一个别的循环所划者（§4.3、§10.3），在此以全力与全部区分之力适用。那美所点燃的价值循环能作为一个好循环运行、累积价值并保全那剩余，或作为一个坏循环、榨取价值并消费那剩余直到美本身被hollowed out。
那好的价值循环是那”审美经验的再生产是滋养的“者、其中那循环的每一转加深那经验、丰富那知觉、并守护那”是美之活核”的非工具性剩余。这里美被知觉、那知觉生成真正的经验、那经验被以”更新而非耗尽它”的方式再生产，而那循环累积价值同时把美保持活着：那被返回、随每一次访问而更丰之地方、那”其再生产加深它”之美、那”每次在它里找到更多”的被培育之知觉。那价值累积——在经验之加深里、在那引他人之声誉里、在那分享它者之关系性财富里——而那剩余被保全，因为那再生产是那”滋养而非榨取”的种类。这是好循环在美之政治经济学的语域里：一个归还得比它所取的更多的流通，那价值的和乐沿滋养之再生产之路径累积（§4.3），美随它被知觉并被再生产而生长而非diminish。
那坏的价值循环是那”再生产是榨取的“者、其中那循环的每一转消费那经验、耗竭那知觉、并hollow out那剩余直到美被化约为一件被花光的商品。这里美被知觉，但那知觉被以”耗尽它”的方式再生产：那经验为它可榨取的价值被消费、那美被拍照而不被beholding、那地方被一个”取那价值而什么也不给回”的榨取磨smooth，直到那剩余、那”最初引知觉”的真正非工具性之核、被消费掉，而美，被hollowed，丧失那”它借以点燃那循环”之力本身。这是那谱系的Instagram极端（§14.6）：那被如此彻底榨取以致什么也不剩可beholding之美、那被消费到”那曾为它的美引来百万之地方不再持有任何美”之经验、那剩余被花光、那循环崩塌当它所fed upon之美被耗尽。那坏的价值循环是自我瓦解的，因为它消费它自己的源头：榨取那”是美之吸引力之条件”的剩余，它kill那goose，而那hollow out了它的美之循环发现，最后，它什么也不剩可流通。那决定性的变量，在此如本文处处，是它再生产的方式、而非美本身——滋养的或榨取的、守护那剩余或消费它——而那同一美、被好好地再生产，奠基一个累积价值的好循环、被糟糕地再生产，被fed进一个把它消费到无的坏循环。
§14.9 那价值循环作为关系性生产
关于美之价值循环最深的真相是它，在它的根处，是一个关系性生产的循环，而这把美的政治经济学带回本文被统一的核心（§8）。因为美所生成的价值，根本地，不是一个residing于诸对象里或accruing于资本的价值；它是那”当一个主体、通过美、被拉进一段关系——与那美的事物、与那地方、与那一同beholding它者、与那美所开启之世界——并经历、在那关系里、一个属于那关系之价值之生成”时所生成的价值。那点燃那循环的审美经验是那知觉者与那被知觉者之间一段关系的来到-到场；它所生成的价值是关系性价值；而那维持那循环的再生产是那关系的再生产，那在本文中心所分析的关系性生产（§6）。美创造一个价值循环因为美把诸主体拉进诸关系，而诸关系，被再生产，生成并流通价值：美的价值循环是关系性生产在政治经济学的语域里被看见，那”一个关系性主体对价值之带出”——本文在创造、再生产、与好循环之名下所追踪者——如今被看作那美所点燃并维持的引擎。
这是为何那好的价值循环与那坏的如此精确地对应于关系性生产的好与坏循环（§6.3）。那好的价值循环滋养那美所开启的关系、保全它的生成性、守护那”是关系之活核”的剩余——它满足，在经济的语域里，好关系性生产的诸判准。那坏的价值循环从那美所开启的关系榨取、消费它的生成性、hollow out那剩余——它是那坏的关系性生产、那榨取的循环、在经济的语域里。而那资本不能没收的剩余（§14.3）是，如今所见，恰恰那审美经验的关系性之核：那知觉者与那被知觉者之间那”是美之价值真正来源”的非工具性关系，那”资本能围着它建造一个容器并从它获利、而不能自己产生”者，因为它唯在那”美所开启、而无工具性安排能制造”的真正关系里被生成。美的政治经济学是，在它的深处，关系性生产的政治经济学：美靠把诸主体拉进生成价值之诸关系来创造价值，而它所点燃的循环是好是坏依那关系性生产是被滋养还是被榨取——那同一区分、那同一诸判准、那同一拱顶石、如今被看作支配那美所set in motion之价值流通者。
§14.10 那解放的upshot —— 美育作为微观政治
那谱系产出本节那解放的命题，并随之那整个审美论证的政治stakes。那区分这三个情形者，终究，与其说是那地方、不如说是被带向它的知觉，因为那被培育之知觉甚至在那被争夺的画廊与那被榨取的场所里也能找到那非异化的剩余，而那未被培育的知觉甚至错过那山的免费之美、拍照那风景而从不beholding它。那决定性的变量是那知觉，而那知觉是可培育的。这是本文的美学成为一种政治之处。培育偶然的审美知觉、那”beholding而非捕获、被真正的美真正地驻足、为它自己之故经历那非工具性经验”之能力，是培育一个”资本能用而不能没收”之能力：一个为非异化经验之能力，它，一旦被拥有，能甚至在那异化装置之内被行使、无论美在哪里发生都找到那逃逸捕获的剩余——在那为从它获利所建之画廊、在那为榨取所建之场所、与那无人所建之山里。
这是一种去异化的微观政治。异化，在那古典分析里，是那”一个人的活动与经验被占有而非他自己的、被工具化、被turned into为非他自己之目的的手段”之境况；而那被管理之世界把这一境况延伸到越来越多的生活、直到甚至闲暇、甚至美、甚至目的之沉思的悬置都被捕获并被造得工作。对着这个，审美知觉的培育构筑一个”资本不能完全占有”之”为真正非工具性经验”的能力，因为它的价值恰恰在那”捕获会摧毁之”的非工具性里。每一次对美的真正beholding、每一次对目的性者的真正悬置，是一小片被reclaim的去异化经验，一个其中一个人的经验真正地是他自己的、为它自己之故被经历、逃逸那手段-目的逻辑、即便在它的当中发生之刻。而这一reclamation对任何人可得、要求无财富、无闲暇、无装置、只要本文已论证能被发展、并在两个人之间、相互地、作为那关系自己之美育（§12.7）被发展的被培育之知觉。那朗西埃所命名的知觉之政治（§12.6）在此被给它亲密而实践的形式：两个人在彼此里培育那”知觉那非异化剩余”之能力，从而在他们之间构筑一小片”那被管理之世界不能enclose”的去异化经验之共有体。美之知觉的培育不是从政治退入私人美学；它是一种微观政治，在一个知觉的尺度上对一个自由之能力的构筑，被在一朵野花之接住与一个剩余之beholding里行使、对所有人可得、被无人所可没收。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：美者是困难的，而它的困难如今被看出也是它的政治许诺，因为那”不能被还原为一条规则”者不能被一个系统完全捕获，而那美者之不可程序化的知觉是，正出于那原因，一个”那被管理之世界不能最终管理”之自由的种子。
§15 旅行的一般化场域
本文通篇以旅行的字面意义讲它，那去一个陌生地方的旅程。是时候一般化了。”旅行”，将被论证，本质上命名的不是一次穿地理空间的移动、而是一个功能：特殊场域的建造、那”关系在其内来到到场之宽阔的、偶然的、被悬置之境况”的开启。那字面的旅程是这一功能最高效、最有力的实例，但它是一个实例、不是那本质；而一旦那功能被与它最熟悉的实例区分开来，便有可能无那旅程地执行它、在日常之内建造那场域、既无距离也无花费。这一一般化是本文的实践圆成，而它被提供为不是一个关闭那论证的结论、而是一个把它交付出去的开口。它也是对一个自始就shadow本文之忧虑的解决：它的诸善是那些负担得起旅行者的特权。
§15.1 旅行作为一个功能性概念
归根到底，那字面的旅程做了什么？它开启那特殊场域：它交换那固定的背景、悬置诸角色、恢复偶然、框出一段被界定的连续时间、把两个人抛入对称的陌生与被迫的共同在场，而在这一切之下，开启那”关系能来到到场”的宽阔。这些是诸功能；那旅程是它们的载具。而一旦诸功能以它们自己的权利被命名，便清楚它们不必然地系于地理的移动。背景的交换、角色的悬置、偶然的恢复、宽阔的开启，这每一个都能，原则上，无须去任何地方、靠那旅程之外的别的手段被effected。那旅程一举地、有力而可靠地effect它们全部，那是它的大优势；但它对它们不持有垄断。一般化旅行是认识到”旅行”，在那对本文要紧的意义上，是这些功能的执行、那特殊场域的建造，而那字面的旅程是一种方式、那最高效的方式、但不是执行它的唯一方式。
这一认识回溯地重组整篇论文。§2 所分析的场域之每一特征是，如今所见，一个能在日常里被寻求的功能：人能靠改变那熟悉的setting交换那背景；人能靠刻意地、共同地、为一段被保护之跨度搁置日常之诸要求来悬置诸角色；人能靠把那未被决定者引入那被过度决定之一天来恢复偶然；人能靠拒绝、为一段时间、日常那功能之总指派来开启宽阔。那旅行的一般化场域是那日常被刻意地开启成一个场域，那无旅程地、对”那旅程以如此之易所开启之宽阔偶然境况”的建造。而诸功能中最深的那个、那支撑一切别的、最可携的那个，是那美学诸章所指认者：那”接住那偶然者”之知觉与那”让它被接住”之宽阔。因为如果那偶然者总已经在通过那日常之诸缝泄漏（§11.1），那么那场域是，在一个意义上，总已经半开、只等那”会接住它所提供者”之知觉。一般化旅行是，在它的根处，把那知觉携回家。
§15.2 从脚手架到技能
那字面旅程与那一般化场域之间的关系是那早先所引入的、脚手架与技能之间的关系（§11.3）。那字面的旅程是一个脚手架：一个有力的外部结构、以一些代价被erect、可靠而完全地开启那场域，靠距离、花费、与一段旅程所effect之wholesale悬置之主力把它保持敞开。它的价值是双重的。它开启那场域、在此与现在、为那两个旅行者；而，那更深的价值，它教那场域，让两个人足够生动地经历那特殊场域以致学到它是什么、认出它的性格、从内部知道在它里、并在它内接住并共享是什么。那旅程是那”一个人靠经历它学到那场域是什么、并在其内做什么”的演示课。
但那实践的成熟形式不是诸脚手架的永久erect。要求一段字面的旅程每一次一个人愿开启那场域时，会是永远依赖于一个昂贵的外部结构，而正是这一依赖会使本文的诸善成为那有钱者与那有闲者的特权。那成熟的形式是那脚手架所教的技能：那”无那外部结构地开启那场域、或接住那半开的日常已提供者”的被内化之能力。一旦两个人已学到那场域——也许，通过那”向他们表明它是什么”的字面旅程学到它——他们便能开始在家里、在那寻常的一天里、靠那旅程教他们的被培育之诸能力开启它：那接住那偶然者之知觉、那建造那框架之趣味、那把那器皿保持空之克制、那把那被接住之美朝向他者之相互注意。那脚手架被拆下；那技能保留；而那技能开启，在那日常的当中，那脚手架被erect以开启之场域。这是那整篇论文一向所趋向的运动：从那靠主力开启场域的旅程、到那在任何地方开启它的技能；从作为一桩偶尔而昂贵地所做之事的旅行、到作为一个一个人总携带并自由地行使之能力的旅行。那字面的旅程是那演示；那一般化场域是那日常实践；而它们之间的桥是那”通过那一者、对那执行另一者之技能”的培育。
§15.3 日常的去异化，与对精英主义的回答
这解决那精英主义之忧虑，而那解决也是本文最深的政治主张。那忧虑是明显而严重的：如果本文所描述之善要求字面的旅行，它会是那些有钱与有闲去旅行者的特权，而一套搁置于它之上的亲密哲学会是一套为那舒适者的哲学，complicit于本系列别处所反对之不平等本身（第十五篇、第十七篇）。那一般化消解那忧虑。那一般化场域不要求距离或花费；它要求那被培育之诸能力——知觉、趣味、克制、注意——它们不依赖于任何财富、且是，如前一节所论证的，恰恰那”资本能用而不能没收”的、那”以最富之知觉的最穷之知觉者可能比那最富之旅游者更充分地拥有”的诸能力（§14.6）。那场域之善因而，在它的一般化形式里，是普遍可得的：对任何”愿培育那知觉并做那关系性劳作”的两个人敞开，无论他们的财力。那字面的旅程是一个特权；那一般化场域不是，而从一者到另一者的运动是从一个对少数人可得之善到一个对所有人可得之善的运动。
这是，以前一节所确立的术语，那日常的去异化。那被异化的日常是那”被完全指派给功能”的日常——每一小时被给予劳作或它的再生产、每一空间被给予用、整个生活在那被管理之秩序下被工具化、无一个为那非工具性者、那无端者、那宽阔者的开口。在这一日常之内开启一个场域、清出一段”诸角色被悬置而那目的性者被抬起”的被保护跨度、接住那通过诸缝泄漏的偶然之美、与所爱者经历一个真正非工具性经验之一刻，是从它的异化reclaim一片日常、在那被管理之秩序之内造一个真正是一个人自己的小空间。而因为这一reclamation要求无财富，它在那”财富所不在”处可得：日常的去异化是一个那穷人能与那富人一样充分地、也许更充分地实践之自由，因为那”是它的唯一要求”的被培育之知觉不respecter of手段。这里本文的政治抵达它的结论。那场域之技能的培育是两个人对一个”去异化他们日常”之能力的构筑，是在那被管理之世界之内、无它的许可、开启反复的、真正的、宽阔的、非工具性的、共享经验之小场域。这不是从那政治者退入那家庭者；它是一种在日常的尺度上被进行的政治，一片”那被管理之秩序不能enclose”的去异化经验之共有体的构筑、因为它要求无那秩序所控制者。那旅行的一般化场域是那日常被reclaim，而那reclaim对所有人可得。
§15.4 生成性的敞开 —— 一个原则，与一个限度
旅行的一般化允许一个进一步的抽象，本文把它陈述为一个原则、然后，特征性地，把它标为向它自己之外开启。通篇，那支撑场域的条件一向是宽阔（§2.8），那《道德经》第十一章之意义上的空，那”偶然者能在其中到达并被接住”的被留得未填之屋。那一般化如今让这被看作不是一个特定于旅行的特征、而是一个一般的资源，那”任何场域所要求、如果关系性生成性要在它之内发生”的敞开，而那资源可被命名：生成性的敞开，那”不被功能填得如此完全、以致无未计划之物能进入”的条件。一个场域，无论何种，生成性到它保全这一敞开之程度；而那原则可被一般地陈述：一个场域被造得生成性、靠保全那”未计划的、意味深长之事件可涌现”的敞开、而非靠向它添加活动。美的政治经济学已从价值这一侧确证这个（§14.5）：那”资本付得昂贵以保全”的昂贵之空是生成性的敞开、被甚至资本所认作一个资源、而非一个浪费。
两个限定使那原则免于被误解，而它们的第二个标示本文的限度。第一：生成性的敞开不是作为一种style的空。它必须不被与minimalism、或与一种bareness的美学相混，因为那要点是余地必须被留给那未计划者、而非”更少更好”，而那余地可被一个”邀请lingering之物”（一扇窗、一条长凳、一幅画、一架钢琴、一张宽得足以gather around之桌）一如被字面的vacancy同样好地保持敞开。生成性的敞开是那”不被功能完全关闭”的条件，无论什么把那条件保持敞开；它是一个场域的一个结构属性、而非一个装饰性的空之量。第二个限定是那限度。生成性的敞开之原则明显reach beyond那”是本文之主题”的亲密关系——它关涉房间与房屋、学校与图书馆与城市、诸制度及它们对时间、预算、注意之分配的设计，凡那”一个空间或一个结构是保全那’生成性事件能发生之敞开’、还是靠总功能化封闭它”之问题兴起处。但生成性敞开作为一个设计原则——空间的、时间的、制度的——的完整发展不是本文的工作，而会，如果在此被追求，把那论证从它本要照亮的关系性场域带走、进一个本文不能包含的生成性设计之一般理论。本文因而陈述那原则、note那旅行的场域与那画廊的昂贵之空与那未填之屋是它的诸实例、并把它的一般发展标为一个定向的开口（§16.3），一个本文在它自己主题之限度处所发现、并交付给一个它border而不进入之生成性设计理论的原则。生成性的敞开是一个真实而一般的资源，本文肯定；那”一个关于它跨空间、时间、与诸制度之培育的完整理论会是什么”，它，刻意地，留给别的工作。
§15.5 一个开口、而非一个结论
把那一般化场域呈现为一个被达成的解决、一项被精通的技术、一个被抵达的结论，会是对事情不忠的。那一般化开启一个实践；它不完成一个。在日常之内开启一个场域是困难的，而反复地、可持续地、对着日常那”重新关闭”之恒压做它，更困难，一桩无终的劳作、一个必须被永久更新的实践、因为那日常永久地重新-异化，那被开启的场域永久地重新-关闭进例程。本文不佯称已精通这一实践、或能向读者递交一个为它之方法；χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά，而那一般化场域，作为一个美学成就，不能被还原为一个方法、不比那善或那美者更能。本文所提供者是那认识——那实践存在、它的方向是那从脚手架到技能的运动、它的目标是那”在一个永远在关闭它们之日常的当中、开启去异化共享经验之诸场域”之能力的日常的、相互的、不可程序化的培育。如何维持这一实践、如何对着那日常之压把那场域保持敞开、如何不让那技能decay back into它本意要打断之例程，这些是真实而开放的问题，而本文交付它们、而非回答它们。那一般化场域不是本文的结论、而是它的开口：那”它所建之理解passes into一个超出它之实践”之点，而那读者被留下、不带一个学说、而带一个方向与一个困难。对它那唯一合宜的回应是那整篇论文一向所论证者：不是一个方法、而是那”开启那场域之知觉与趣味与爱”的、缓慢的、相互的、终生的培育，与那”把它保持敞开、一同地”的困难的、无终的、美的劳作。
§16 时间之拱的闭合，与诸定向裂隙
本文以完成那”它现象学由之开始”的figure——旅程的时间之拱——收尾，然后，以本系列为它中段诸论文所采用的方式，靠开启而非封口：标出那些”论证、被进一步逼压、用尽了本文所能说者、并指向仍将到来之诸论文”之处。旅行的场域是一个源头、不是一个终点，而它的收尾是一个开口。
§16.1 时间之拱的闭合
那现象学以一个时间之拱开始：旅程之前的共同创造、其间被生活的场域、与其后复述中的再生产（§2.1、§4.2）。那拱如今能被整个看见、并被看出是一个生成与再生产的完整circuit。在共同创造里，两个人一同意向一个尚不存在的世界、在旅程开启之前在想象中开始建造那”我们”。在那被生活的场域里，那世界被进入而那”我们”被生动地生成、被在那旅程所开启之宽阔的、偶然的、被悬置之境况里带至它自己动态的自我到场。在再生产里，那被生成的经验被携过归来的门槛、并被在共享复述中织进关系持久的财富，确立那”一段单一旅程成为一份不断加深之共同所有”的好循环。那三个阶段不是一连串分离的episode、而是一个circuit的诸时刻：那被共同创造的期盼预排那场域、那被生活的场域生成那财富、那再生产守护并增益它，而那被守护的财富成为，转而，那下一次共同创造所汲取者的一部分，以致那拱是一个螺旋、而非一条从始到终的线，每一段旅程被再生产的财富喂养下一段的想象。那”我们”被跨整个拱与整个螺旋锻造：不在那旅程单独里、而在那之前的想象、其间的生活、与其后的复述里，以及在那”每一个被完成的circuit丰富那下一个由之开始之地基”的方式里。这是一段共同旅程之是什么的完整形状，不是一个有始有终的episode、而是一个螺旋的一转，两个人借之、经一生被想象、被生活、被复述的旅程、建造并重建他们所是的那”我们”。
而那螺旋终究不要求那些旅程是字面的。前一节的一般化完成那figure：那同一个拱——期盼、生活、复述——结构那一般化场域一如那字面的场域，而那生成与再生产的螺旋在一个”被技能开启、被复述编织的小日常场域”之生命里转得如在一个大旅程之生命里一样真。那时间之拱是那场域之生命的形状，字面的或一般化的；而它在此的闭合是那认识——那场域，以任一形式，是一个circuit、而非一个时刻，不是一个事件、而是一个螺旋穿一整个共享生命的实践。
§16.2 关于本文之长度与困难的一则说明
关于本文本身欠一句话，因为它在本系列中是最长、最困难者之一，而这一事实是它主题的一个后果、而非偶然的。本文着手跟随一段共同旅程穿现象学、政治经济学、伦理、与美学，并发现，在它的中心，这些中最深的是那美学者，而那美学者恰恰抵抗那种”一篇论文本该达成”的完成。这是一个关于对象的发现、而非一个组织的失败。那美者，如本文整个美学所论证的，不全然卧于那经验者、那可证明者、那可形式化者之内；它不是，像一个自然科学的对象，被”进一步探究所趋近”的可陈述之诸法则所支配，也不是，像一个工程的对象，可还原为一个”能被指定并被完成”的程序。它有一个剩余——那抵抗符号化的实在界、那不可程序化的合适、那”必须被新鲜地击成并在它的演化中被照料”的协和——是无系统捕获、无论著闭合者。而一篇忠于这样一个对象的论文必须，在某种程度上，分有它的性格：它不能被干净地完成、不能被还原为一个系统、不能抵达那种”一篇关于一个可形式化主题之论文所能抵达”的闭合，因为它的对象不允许它。
那长度与那对闭合的抵抗因而不是待被致歉的诸缺陷、而是那形式对它内容的忠实。一篇关于那美者的、短的、系统的、被干净地总结之论文会，靠它的整洁本身，背叛它声称要描述的困难，会暗示，对着它自己的命题，那美者毕竟是一个系统能包含的可形式化之物。这篇论文是长的、ramifying的、最终不可总结的，它开启得比它闭合得多，它最后一词是一组裂隙而非一个结论，这是它中心主张的形式enactment。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：那美者是困难的，而一个关于那美者的真论说必须以同一方式、出于同一原因困难，必须自己抵抗它对象所抵抗的那完成。这是本系列长久的实践——一篇论文的形式应enact它的内容；这里那实践抵达那”内容是美者对形式完成之抵抗”的情形，而那形式，相应地，是一篇不能被完成、只能被开启的论文。那论文的困难是那美者的困难，在那写作中被经历如那美者在那知觉中被经历，而对它唯一诚实的回应是那论文通篇所劝告者：不是一个会消解那困难的方法、而是对一个equal于它之知觉的耐心的、终生的、相互的培育。
§16.3 诸定向裂隙
以本系列中段诸论文的方式，那收尾开启而非作结。八道裂隙被标出，那些”论证、被逼过本文所确立者之边缘、指向一篇或能携它更远之论文”之处。
第一道裂隙是归来与日常的重新-关闭。本文已论证那被生成的场域必须被携过归来的门槛（§4.5）、而那一般化场域必须被对着日常那”重新-关闭”之压维持（§15.5）。但那场域、一旦被开启、如何在时间中被保持敞开、那关系的好境况如何被对着例程之恒熵维持、那开启与重新-关闭的时间动态是什么、那调谐如何跨一段共享生命的漫长时间被维持并被重新调谐，是一个本文开启而不回答的问题。它指向一篇关于关系之好境况之时间维系的论文：那”一个好循环如何被对着’每一循环winding down之倾向’保持转动”的动态，是那形式姊妹作自己的动态层所留作开放者。
第二道裂隙是那孤独者与那共享者。本文区分了那孤独旅程对自我之揭示与那共享旅程对”我们”之生成（§3.4），但它主要把那孤独者当作一个foil来对待。那两者之间的关系、那”孤独旅程所揭示之自我”如何关涉那”共享旅程所生成之’我们’”、一个人是否及如何必须能独处以便真正地在一起、那孤独者与那共享者在一个生命里彼此亏欠什么，是一个本文只触及的深问题。它指向一篇关于那关系之主体的论文：那”能进入那’我们’而不消解进它”者必须是谁，那前一篇也标为开放的问题（第二十篇）。
第三道裂隙是第三方他者与多的伦理。本文开启了，在面对第三方的伦理里（§5.4），那”二元体如何对待那超出它者”之问题，并把这标为那”从亲密的伦理走向多的伦理”的第一步。但那关系性共有体的完整伦理、那”二人之’我们’如何延伸到多人之’我们’”、那”二元场域之诸善与诸危险如何scale到家庭、社群、流域”，是那本文之外的地平线、那前一篇也标出的分水岭（第二十篇、第十五篇）。它指向一篇关于关系性场域之超出二元体之scaling的论文。
第四道裂隙是知觉的政治。本文论证美育是一种去异化的微观政治（§14.10）、那”资本不能没收”之”为非异化经验”之能力的培育。但那”这所隐含”的完整政治理论、那作为一个纲领的可感者之再分配、那”知觉之培育与那被管理之秩序之转化”之间的关系、一种知觉的政治能否不止于微观，是一个本文只indicate的地平线。它指向一篇关于美育之政治的论文：那”在一个知觉之尺度上被实践的去异化能否被提升到一个社会之尺度”的问题。
第五道裂隙是场域的形式现象学。本文轻轻地援引了那形式姊妹作——关系性动态的自我到场作为融合空间算子之前景化（§3.3）、再生产的好循环作为沿复述路径累积之和乐（§4.3）。但一个对那场域的完整形式对待、那”背景之交换、宽阔之开启、与动态之前景化如何在那姊妹作的形式体系里显现、那诸现象学特征是否有确切的形式对应物”，被留作未做。它指向一篇对本文的形式姊妹作，一如”从流体到辫”是对前一篇的形式姊妹作：一套旅行场域的形式现象学。
第六道裂隙是一切中最深的，而本文已在它自己的body之内明白地标出它：苦难的公正而生成性的再生产。本文确立了冲突与痛，被好好地再生产，能成为一段关系的财富（§9.8），并给了苦难的好再生产以四条判准——目的论的、存在论的、政治经济学的、与权力-辩证的——之结构（§9.9）。但它只给了诸判准、善的方向、而非那方法、通往它的路；而那”两个人如何公正而生成性地再生产一个共享的苦难、如何，具体地，一个痛被返回并被嬗变得它保持生成性、共同、非剥削、与免于支配”的完整理论，是本文所开启而不能完成的最大任务。它指向一篇它自己的论文：一套苦难之公正再生产的理论，本文已在它的四条判准里框定它、但它的方法仍是，一如那”它如此切近地resemble”之美者，困难的、不可程序化的、且仍待被找到。
第七道裂隙是一个被创造之作品在公共领域里的生命。本文确立了创造是共同创造而共同创造是关系性生产（§8）、并确立了关系性生产的伦理支配被共同创造之作品的创造与毁灭，但它发现，在这之edge，一个超出关系性框架之情形：那进入公共文化、不再属于任何确定之”我们”、而属于一个匿名的、非互惠的、制度性的、包括尚未出生者之公众的作品（§8.5）。本文标出，在那里，关系性生产理论的限度，拒绝把公共领域消解进一个被放大的关系，并把那关系-生产者与那公共者之重叠、那”一个被创造之物如何同时是一个关系性主体的产物与一个公共世界的成员”，命名为一个被两个不同逻辑所支配的问题。这一重叠的完整理论、那公共创造之伦理与匿名者与尚未出生者之诸claim，在此被开启而不被关闭；它指向一套关系性生产理论border而不包含之公共领域理论。
第八道裂隙是生成性的敞开作为一个设计原则。本文发现，在它一般化之限度处，那支撑旅行场域之宽阔是一个一般资源——生成性的敞开、那”未计划而意味深长之事件可涌现”的未填之屋——的一个实例，而这一资源reach far beyond那亲密关系、关涉空间、时间、与诸制度之设计、凡那”一个结构是保全那’生成性事件能发生之敞开’”之问题兴起处（§15.4）。但本文标出，在那里，它自己的限度，拒绝把生成性的敞开发展成一个设计的一般理论、以免那论证被从它的关系性主题带走。那完整理论、关于生成性敞开跨那空间的、那时间的、那制度的、关于空间与日程与诸制度如何可被设计得保全而非封闭那”为生成性事件之余地”，在此被开启而不被追求；它指向一套本文border而不进入之生成性设计理论。
这八个是诸定向的开口、而非诸松散的线头，每一个是一个”旅行的场域、被充分进入、表明比本文所能包含者更多”之处。那场域是一个源头。它所生成者超出任何单一论文所能持有者，而那诸裂隙标出那超出所指之处。χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά：那美者是困难的，而那困难是不可穷尽的，那正是一个源头之标志、而非一个绝望之理由，那”一个人能一次又一次地返回它、而从不发现它被花光”。
而这里，在那最后，那贯穿整篇论文之一般化在一个单一的认识里完成它自己。旅行的场域从来，终究，不是关于旅行。那行入陌生最深的目的不是把那日常留在身后、而是去学到、并携回家，如何在那日常之内、重新创造那”关系性主体能继续来到存在”之场域。那旅程教那场域；那技能携它回家；而本文所描述最高的成就是那”在一个寻常共享生命的当中、开启那’两个人继续生成他们所是之’我们’’之宽阔而偶然之场域”的被培育之能力、而非那大旅程本身。学会如何旅行、即便在一个人留处；在那日常之内、保持那”关系能继续来到到场”之敞开——这是那旅行的场域、被一般化、最终所要求者。旅行的场域是这样一个源头，而本文所做的不多不少：开启它。
致谢
本文，比本系列中任何一篇都更，是在它的occasion之前被写的：它想象一段尚未承担的旅程，与一个爱旅行、并已经教了我——从不意图去教——这些篇页所试图说之大部分者。那路边的野花不只是为论证所选的一个例子；它是她所注意并朝世界转向之物的那种，而那转向是我所试图理解者的全部。如果这里有任何东西为真，它是从她、在任何旅程之前的寻常日子里、学到的；如果这里有任何东西为假，它是我尚未学会看她所看者之处。本文所描述的场域是我盼望我们将建造者，一段旅程又一段旅程，在前方的生命里；而它所称美育之培育是我已开始从她领受者，只靠认识她。致那个属于森林的女孩，与她我渴望行入陌生：这是你的，在我们第一段旅程之前被写，期盼着我们将一起建造的每一个世界，而那给予什么也不留下。