The Extraction of Relational Value in the Cultural Domain - A Lacanian-Psychoanalytic Deconstruction of Political Economy

ENGLISH

The Extraction of Relational Value in the Cultural Domain

A Lacanian-Psychoanalytic Deconstruction of Political Economy

Wanhong Huang · huangwanhong@serendip.ngo

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Abstract

Under the symbolic crisis, as the reproduction of signifiers cheapens the sign, value migrates toward relation, which the sign cannot reproduce. A prior work stated the general theory of this migration and of capital’s capture of relational value. This paper addresses that capture in the cultural domain, and advances six contributions beyond the prior account. It distinguishes the symbolically guaranteed domain, whose value rests on the scarcity of a sign, from the relational domain, whose value is relational at its root and whose sign is an outer shell, and it argues that the cultural domain, as a relational domain, is reached by the crisis through the stripping of the shell and the exposure of the relational core. It develops the guarantee mechanism, and divinity as the site to which what exceeds the individual is attributed, at the level of a general definition distinguished from its Lacanian and other realizations. As its theoretical center it states the alienation of the structure of desire: capital, unable to reach the drive that circles das Ding, seizes the mediation through which drive is structured, which is culture, and reroutes that structuring toward a commodified object, so that drive is demoted to desire, a movement that is at once, in the register drawn from Marx, alienation. It follows the exclusion this works from an economic into an ontological register, draws out the dialectical point that capital profits because the relation is real, and reaches the ontological claim that capital, having arisen from relation, cannot become a relational subject and can only hold relation as an owner. The paper advances no proposal, and leaves to the reader the recognition of where a given cultural circuit stands and to whom its value returns.

Keywords: relational value; cultural domain; alienation of the structure of desire; drive and das Ding; the guarantee mechanism; generative justice; relational divinity; Lacan.

AI usage statement: The ideas, claims, and theoretical framework of this paper originate with the author. AI tools were used as an aid in drafting and revision. Every sentence has been checked by the author line by line, and the origin of each idea verified, so that the author takes full responsibility for the content.

§1 Introduction

The present moment is marked by a crisis in the symbolic order. The signifiers by which meaning and worth were secured have lost the scarcity on which their function rested, and as the reproduction of signs is cheapened, the older labor of producing desire through a scarce mark grows difficult. Value migrates, under this pressure, toward what the reproduction of signifiers cannot dissolve, which is relation. The present author has developed this crisis at length, and has given, in prior work, a general account of relational value and of the way capital captures it once value has migrated toward the bond. That account states the general theory. The present paper stands beside it and addresses questions it left open.

Those questions concern the cultural domain. The prior account established a general theory of the capture of relational value without asking in which domains the migration of value bears most heavily, without a theory of the mediation through which relational value is given a livable form, without reaching beneath desire to the drive that circles the place no commodity can occupy, and without posing the question of the guarantee on which worth is finally secured. The cultural domain is where these questions gather. It is a domain in which value is relational at its root and the sign is an outer shell, and it is for that reason reached by the symbolic crisis in a particular way, its shell stripped and its relational core laid open to capture. This paper takes the cultural domain as the site at which to ask how capture there proceeds, and it does so by way of a psychoanalytic reading joined to the political economy of relational value.

The paper advances six contributions beyond the prior account. It reads a specimen of extraction in the cultural domain, a discourse that presents a relational disposition as a purchasable personal virtue, and gives its anatomy at the level of the structure of desire. It follows the exclusion worked by this capture from an economic exclusion into an ontological one, by which those who cannot pay are held outside the very field in which relation is made to appear possible. It develops the guarantee mechanism, and divinity as the site of the guarantee, at the level of a general definition distinguished from its several realizations. It states, as the theoretical center, the alienation of the structure of desire, the rerouting by capital of the mediation through which drive is structured, and shows the demotion of drive to desire and alienation to be one movement. It draws out the dialectical point that capital profits because the relation is real, and profits more as the relation grows more real. And it reaches an ontological claim, that capital, having arisen from relation, cannot enter relation as a co-generating subject and can only hold it as an owner, so that what capital meets in the age of relational value is a problem in the philosophy of the subject.

The stakes exceed the cultural field taken as one industry among others. If relation is the value that survives the cheapening of the sign, then the terms on which the relational core of a cultural form is mediated, owned, and either circulated or captured become a central question, and this paper is an attempt to state that question at the depth the mechanism requires. The argument proceeds by analytic and conceptual necessity and treats its specimens as illustration rather than proof, for reasons stated where the problem is set out. It advances no proposal, and leaves to the reader the recognition of where, in a given cultural circuit, the relation stands.

§2 The Symbolic Crisis Recalled

The argument of this paper rests on a diagnosis developed at length in prior work, and that diagnosis is recalled here only as far as the present argument requires.

Footnote. The crisis of symbol and subject in modernity is developed by the present author in the foundational work cited below, and the political economy of relational value under that crisis in the work on relational value. This section states what those works establish, without repeating their argument.

The signifiers by which meaning and worth were once secured rested on a scarcity that has collapsed. When a sign can be reproduced without limit, instantly and at negligible cost, it depreciates, and the mark that held its value by being withheld from most can no longer perform that office. This is the crisis of the symbolic.

The crisis has a political-economic face, and it is this face that concerns the present paper. The engine of consumer capital ran, for a long period, through the signifier. It built lack in symbolic form, made a person want a thing by making the thing a mark of identity, and drove desire through the scarcity of that mark. As the reproduction of signifiers is cheapened, creation and labor are cheapened with them, and the older work of producing lack through the signifier grows difficult to carry out, since a mark that anyone can now generate conceals nothing and withholds nothing. Value migrates, under this pressure, toward what the reproduction of signifiers cannot dissolve. That residue is relation, the jointly lived and unrepeatable history of a bond, which cannot be forged while its real coherence is absent.

Two developments follow together, and they are one process seen from two sides. The older circuit that sold the unreachable image grows fatigued, and capital opens new frontiers in the language of connection, community, and belonging. The difficulty of the one circuit and the opening of the other are the same event, the political-economic expression of the symbolic crisis. The prior work established this migration as a general account of relational value and its capture. The present paper takes that account as given and turns to a question it left open, which concerns the domain in which the migration bears most heavily and the mechanism by which capture there proceeds.

§3 Culture and Its Associated Theory

To locate the domain in which the migration of value bears most heavily, the term culture must be given a working sense, and the theory that has thought it must be recalled in outline. The concept has a genealogy, and the movement of that genealogy is itself instructive, since it travels from an inventory of contents toward an account of culture as a field of power.

Tylor took culture as a complex whole, the sum of the knowledge, belief, art, custom, and habit acquired by a person as a member of a society. Culture in this sense is an inventory, a list of the contents a society transmits. Geertz recast it as a system of meaning. Culture became a web of significance that persons themselves have spun, a structure of symbols through which they make their experience intelligible, so that the unit of analysis moved from the contents to the symbolic order that binds them. Turner showed that this symbolic order is not inert. Ritual generates a force, moves those who pass through it, and touches, at its edges, what lies beyond the symbol, so that culture is seen to act upon its participants and not merely to classify them. Williams and Hall drew the consequence for power. Culture is a field in which meanings are produced, contested, and made to prevail, a site where the authority to define the common sense of a society is distributed unevenly, and where the making and reading of signs is bound up with the relations of domination that run through the society at large.

This genealogy yields the distinction the present paper requires. Two things travel under the one word, and they must be held apart. There is the symbolic content of a culture, the web of meaning through which a group makes its experience intelligible, and there is the symbolic economy of a culture industry, the arrangement by which that meaning is produced, circulated, owned, and made to yield a return. The first is culture as a form of life. The second is culture as a field organized for the extraction of value. The two are not separate in fact, since the industry works upon the form of life and the form of life is reshaped by the industry, and the distinction is drawn for analysis rather than in nature. What the following sections examine is the point at which the second bears upon the first, the point at which a symbolic economy organized by capital operates upon the relational core that a cultural form of life generates.

§4 The Phenomenology of Extraction in the Cultural Domain

The claim of this section is that the cultural domain is one of the regions in which the symbolic crisis bears most heavily, and that it bears there in a manner particular to it. The claim is stated with care. It is that the cultural domain is one such region among several, and not the sole site of the crisis, and the argument for its severity proceeds by a distinction between two kinds of domain.

Two Kinds of Domain

Domains differ in what their value rests upon, and this difference decides how the crisis of the signifier reaches them. In one kind of domain the value rests directly upon symbolic scarcity and symbolic guarantee. The luxury good, the art market, the brand, and purely symbolic finance hold their worth by a mark that is withheld, credentialed, or underwritten, so that the foundation of the value is the scarcity and the guarantee of the sign itself. Call these the symbolically guaranteed domains. When signs become reproducible without limit, the crisis strikes the foundation of these domains directly, since the very scarcity on which their worth was built is what has collapsed.

In another kind of domain the value is relational at its root. Education, the cultural and idol field, intimate life, and community hold their worth in a bond, a shared history, a jointly generated experience, and the sign that attends them, the credential, the ticket, the persona, is an outer shell upon a value that is not itself symbolic. Call these the relational domains. The crisis of the signifier does not strike the foundation of a relational domain in the same way, since the foundation was never the scarcity of a sign. It reaches the relational domain by a different route. It strips the outer shell of its credibility, exposes the relational core the shell had covered, and opens that core to a capture that works upon the structure of desire. The target of this paper is the relational domain, and the symbolically guaranteed domain is set beside it as a contrast, the better to show that where the symbolic foundation of the one gives way, capital turns toward the relational foundation of the other.

Education is a clear instance of the relational domain. Its value is the formative relation between teacher and student, and the credential is the shell. When the credential inflates and its scarcity gives way, the value does not vanish, since it was never the credential. What occurs instead is that the relational core is laid bare and made available to an economy that would capture it. The idol and cultural field is a second instance, and it is the one the paper examines in its dialectical case below.

The Specimen Presented

A specimen of extraction in the relational domain may be presented here, its mechanism reserved for the later analysis. A class of magazines devoted to small goods and cosmetics, set against the symbolic background of a luxury shopping district, propounds the claim that amae, the disposition to be received and indulged within a trusting relation, is a personal virtue, one that ought to be acquired and that may be acquired through the right purchase. The disposition it speaks of is real, and it is relational at its root, since one presumes upon and is indulged by another only within a bond of trust. The discourse presents this relational disposition as a personal quality that consumption can confer, and this presentation is offered here as a phenomenon to be recognized. Its anatomy, the account of how a relational movement is rerouted toward a purchasable object, belongs to the analysis of the mechanism below, and is not anticipated here.

The specimen is offered as an illustration and carries no weight of proof. The argument of this paper does not rest on the specimen, and could not, since a single phenomenon settles no general claim. The specimen makes visible, in a recognizable instance, a movement that the later sections establish on other grounds. The distinction between illustration and proof is observed throughout, and its methodological ground is stated in the section on the research problem.

§5 The Prior Mechanism of Capture and Its Epistemic Limit

The prior work gave an account of how capital captures relational value, and that account is recalled here in order to mark where its vision reaches and where it stops. The recalling is brief, since the account stands in the work cited, and the purpose here is to expose its epistemic limit, which the present paper is written to pass.

The Chain Recalled

The prior work described the capture of relational value as a formal chain. A relational property is stripped from the relation in which alone it arises and named an attribute that a person may possess. The constitutive lack is disguised as the lack of that attribute. The attribute is bound to a commodity, and the commodity is offered as the object of desire. Desire is the current that runs through this chain, issuing from a place capital can neither produce nor satisfy, and capital reroutes that current and draws off value at each rerouting. This account holds, and the present paper does not revise it. It captures the operations by which the capture proceeds, and it does so at the level of desire and its object, the level at which desire circles the objet a and capital administers the fantasy that supports it.

The Limit of the Account

The account reaches the operations of capture and stops at the threshold of three questions it was not built to answer. Naming them is the work of this section, since they are the openings the present paper enters.

The first concerns what lies beneath desire. The prior account works at the level of desire, which circles the objet a, the object that may be substituted and that capital supplies. Beneath desire lies drive, which circles das Ding, and drive is more primitive, is not extinguished, and does not admit of substitution. The prior account does not reach drive, and it does not ask what capital does with respect to a movement that circles a place no commodity can occupy. The question of drive is left outside its frame.

The second concerns culture. The prior account treats the capture of relational value without a theory of the mediation through which that value is given a livable form. It does not thematize culture as the process by which a relational movement is structured, and so it does not locate the point at which capital inserts itself, which is precisely that process of mediation. Culture, as the mediating term, falls outside the account.

The third concerns the guarantee. The prior account describes a migration of value and a capture, without asking on what the effect and the authority of value, meaning, and order rest, and where that resting place has moved. The question of the guarantee, the final ground on which worth is secured and the site to which what exceeds the individual is attributed, is not posed. It is the deepest of the three openings, and the methodology of this paper takes it up first.

These three, drive and das Ding, culture as mediation, and the guarantee, are the limits of the prior vision. They are not faults of the prior account, which answered the questions it set itself. They are the questions it did not set, and the present paper is the setting of them. The section that follows states them as the problem to be addressed.

§6 The Research Problem

The prior work and the theory recalled above supply what is known. Against that ground, four openings define the problem this paper addresses. They are stated in order, the last of the four being the target at which the whole analysis is aimed.

The Established Ground

It is established that the reproduction of signifiers has cheapened the sign, that value migrates under this pressure toward relation, which the sign cannot reproduce, and that capital captures relational value through the structure of desire, by a formal chain that strips a relational property, reifies it, and binds it to a commodity. It is established that the justice of a relational circuit is decided at its origin, its field, and within its circulation, and that the reality of a relation settles none of these. This is the account the present paper takes as given and does not revise.

The Openings

The first opening concerns the priority of the cultural domain. It is not yet shown that the cultural domain is one of the regions in which the crisis bears most heavily, nor by what feature a domain is so exposed. The distinction between the symbolically guaranteed domain and the relational domain, and the account of how the crisis reaches each, is required to establish this, and it is owed as an argument rather than assumed.

The second opening concerns the reach of the prior account, which works at the level of desire and its object. It stops at the threshold of drive, does not thematize culture as the mediation through which a relational movement is structured, and does not ask on what the effect and authority of value rest or where that resting place has moved. Drive and das Ding, culture as mediation, and the guarantee lie outside its frame, and bringing them within a frame is the epistemic task the paper sets.

The third opening is the target of the paper. The prior account shows that capital reroutes desire toward a commodified objet a. It does not show what capital does with respect to drive, which circles das Ding and admits of no substitution, nor how the relational core that lies near that unfillable place is reached and drawn upon. The question is how capital, by way of an alienation worked upon the structure of desire, touches and extracts the drive and the relational core that circle das Ding, when drive itself is beyond its direct reach. This is the question the mechanism of this paper answers.

The fourth opening concerns the frameworks. The problem is addressed by several frameworks at once, the theory of the guarantee, the Lacanian account of desire and drive, the framework of generative relational being with dialectical materialism, and the ethics of relational reproduction. It is required that these be brought together without one being made to absorb the others, and that their bringing-together be a synthesis in which the tension among them does the work, rather than a reduction to a single master framework or a loose placing of them side by side.

The Methodological Posture

The argument proceeds by analytic and conceptual necessity, and treats empirical phenomena as illustration and not as proof. The reason is not a preference for abstraction. It is that an inductive demonstration, which would gather instances and infer a tendency, cannot establish a claim of necessity, since past instances do not entail what must follow, and the difficulty is the classical problem of induction. The paper therefore says that a relational domain is structurally susceptible to the capture it describes, and not that it has been demonstrably overtaken, since the claim is about a structure and its liabilities rather than a measured outcome. Specimens are offered to make a structure recognizable in an instance, and the weight of the argument rests on the analysis of the structure.

Footnote. There is a further reason for declining the positivist and inductive route, internal to the diagnosis of this paper. Positivism arises as one of the expressions of the symbolic-divine order, the methodological form taken by a guarantee lodged in the observable sign and the settled measure. To enlist it to demonstrate the failure of that same order would be to judge the order by one of its own products, and the demonstration would move in a circle. The analytic and conceptual route is adopted in part to avoid this circularity. The point is noted here and not developed, since it opens a reflexive question the present paper does not need to settle.

§7 Divinity as the Dialectical-Materialist Development of the Guarantee Mechanism

The deepest of the openings named above concerns the guarantee, the final ground on which the effect and authority of value, meaning, and order are secured. This section develops an account of the guarantee and of its historical movement, and it does so at the level of a general definition, distinguished from its several realizations. The prior work traced a sequence of sites to which the excess beyond the individual has been attributed, and that sequence is presupposed here rather than restated.

Footnote. The materialist sequence of the sites of the guarantee, from a transcendent source, to the sign, to relation, is set out in the prior work on relational value. The present section states the general structure of which that sequence is one realization, and does not repeat the sequence.

What this section adds is the general structure of which that sequence is one realization, and it is this general structure that the present paper requires, since the question of how different domains are reached by the symbolic crisis turns on where their guarantee is lodged.

The General Definition

A guarantee mechanism is the site at which value, meaning, and order acquire their effect, the place where what secures worth is finally lodged. Divinity, in the sense used here, is the place to which what exceeds the individual is attributed. The development of divinity is the historical migration of the site of the guarantee, the movement of that place from one lodging to the next. The account given in the prior work, from a transcendent source to the sign and toward relation, is one such migration, read as a materialist sequence.

The guarantee mechanism, and divinity as its site. A guarantee mechanism is the site at which the effect and authority of value, meaning, and order are finally secured. Divinity is the place to which what exceeds the individual is attributed, and the development of divinity is the migration of the site of the guarantee from one lodging to the next. At the site of the guarantee there is always a void, a place where no positive foundation rests that could secure worth once and for all. While the material conditions of a given lodging hold, the void is covered. When those conditions are exhausted, the void is exposed, and the guarantee is forced to migrate.

The core of this definition is the void at the site of the guarantee. There is no positive foundation, no final bedrock, that could underwrite worth without remainder. A lodging of the guarantee holds while its material conditions hold, and covers the void for that duration. When those conditions are exhausted, the void is exposed, and the guarantee migrates to a new lodging whose conditions have meanwhile matured. This movement is dialectical and without a guaranteed terminus. It is not claimed that a relational divinity is destined to ascend and to hold the site securely at last. It is claimed only that the site of the guarantee migrates as its material conditions are exhausted, that the migration is driven by the exposure of a void rather than by a purpose working toward an end, and that the direction of the present migration can be read from the conditions now exhausted and those now maturing. The account is materialist, non-linear, and without teleology.

The Lacanian Realization

Among the realizations of this structure, the Lacanian one is developed here, since it is the realization through which the mechanism of capture will be stated. In it the site of the guarantee is occupied by the big Other, the symbolic order that underwrites meaning and secures the subject’s address to the world. The void at the site is the lack in the Other, the mark that the Other does not itself possess a final foundation and cannot answer for the whole, and it is written S(Ⱥ), the signifier of the lack in the Other, the point at which the symbolic order registers its own incompleteness. The symbolic divinity of the sign is the lodging of the guarantee in this Other. The crisis of the symbolic is the moment at which the reproduction of signs without limit voids the credibility of this lodging and exposes the lack in the Other, S(Ⱥ), the void the sign had covered. Capital operates upon this exposed void. It suspends the objet a over the void and, with the fantasy that one might fill the void by acquisition, draws value from the subject’s movement toward that promised filling. What operates here upon the exposed void is the same operation the mechanism of capture will describe in the cultural domain.

Other Realizations

The general structure has realizations that are not developed here, and two may be marked so that the account does not present the Lacanian realization as the whole. The teaching of emptiness, that no thing possesses an own-being and that whatever arises does so in dependence, realizes the structure at the point of why the guarantee can come to rest only in relation, since a site with no own-being cannot be a final bedrock and what stands has always the character of the dependent and the relational. The thought of the uncarved and the movement of return in the way, the fecund emptiness from which the ten thousand things proceed, realizes the structure at the point of how a new guarantee comes to be generative rather than merely posited. These realizations do not reduce to one another, and the fuller treatment of the emptiness at the site of the guarantee is left to the foundational work. They are named here to hold the Lacanian realization in its place as one among several.

§8 Desire and Drive

The Lacanian framework supplies the terms in which the mechanism of capture is stated, and the distinction it turns upon is the distinction between desire and drive. Its notation is introduced here, since the mechanism will be stated with it.

Desire has no true object. Its cause is a constitutive lack, the empty place that opens when the subject enters language and loses a supposed original completeness. To face this empty place directly is anxiety, and desire cannot run while facing it. Desire requires an object that veils the empty place and appears to be the very thing the subject lacks, and this object is written a, the objet a, the object-cause of desire. The subject that circles this object is the barred subject, the subject divided by its entry into language and marked by the lack it carries, written $. The relation that binds the barred subject to the object, and lets desire run in a bearable way, is the fantasy, written $ ◇ a, in which the poinçon ◇ names the several relations, of envelopment and of framing, by which the subject is joined to the object that supports its desire. The objet a may be substituted, one object giving way to the next, since it holds its place by veiling the empty place and not by being the thing itself. This substitutability is what capital has learned to work. It supplies the objet a in a manufactured form, binds it to a commodity, and reroutes desire through purchase, and the failure of each object to fill the lack is reworked into the motion that carries desire to the next.

Drive is more primitive than desire, and it circles a different term. Where desire circles the objet a, drive circles das Ding, the Thing at the place of the lack itself, the unsymbolizable core around which the earliest organization of the subject formed. The distinction is the distinction between an object that stands in for the lack and the empty place itself:

desire : circles a      drive : circles das Ding

Drive does not admit of substitution in the way desire does. It does not seek an object that would replace another, and it is not extinguished by any object, since its circuit is the circling of the empty place and not the pursuit of a thing that would fill it. Drive belongs to the Real, to what the symbolic cannot capture, and it is for this reason beyond the direct reach of any operation conducted in the symbolic register. Capital cannot touch drive itself, and this limit follows from where drive lies rather than from any contingent circumstance. The consequence is deferred to the mechanism, where the question becomes what capital can do when the movement it would capture circles a place no commodity can occupy. The answer given there works upon the process through which drive is given a livable form, and leaves drive itself untouched.

§9 Generative Relational Being and Dialectical Materialism

Two further frameworks are required, one for the constitution of the subject and the field in which value is generated, and one for the historical and material character of the forms this generation takes.

The Relational Subject and the Generative Field

The framework of generative relational being takes the subject as the ensemble of its social relations rather than an isolated individual, and takes relation as the field in which what is most the subject’s own is generated rather than held prior to the relation. Value, on this account, arises in relation and belongs to the relational subject that generates it, and it is not a possession that any party holds apart. Culture stands, within this framework, as the mediation through which drive is structured, the process by which the movement that circles das Ding is given a form in which it can run within a relation. This places culture at a definite point, between the drive that belongs to the Real and the relation in which the subject comes to be, and it is at this point that the analysis of the mechanism will locate the intervention of capital.

The Dialectical-Materialist Character of the Forms

The forms this generation takes are historical and material, and they are read here in the terms of dialectical materialism, held to a disciplined version. Material conditions constrain the forms without determining them, and the account preserves contingency and the openness of the process, refusing a teleology that would read history as the working-out of a destined end. The forms of extraction are historically specific and therefore historically alterable, deposited by particular relations of production and liable to change as those relations change.

This yields the ground for a claim developed later, that the extraction capital works upon relational value is a historical escalation over its earlier operation upon the signifier. The earlier operation worked upon a mark and its scarcity. The later operation reaches toward the structure of desire itself, toward the movement that circles the empty place, and in reaching there it touches what lies nearer the constitution of the subject than any mark did. The escalation is a movement of the same logic onto deeper ground, and it meets, on that ground, a weakness that the later sections name, the incapacity of the form of ownership to enter the relation it has reached. That capital reaches so deep and cannot, in its own form, keep from extracting there, is the tension the analysis will draw out. The framework is laid here, and the tension it prepares is carried to the sections on the mechanism and the ontological position of capital.

§10 The Dialectical Synthesis of the Frameworks

Four frameworks have been laid, the theory of the guarantee, the Lacanian account of desire and drive, the framework of generative relational being with dialectical materialism, and the ethics of relational reproduction that will supply the criterion. The problem set above requires that they be brought together in a particular way, and this section states what that way is before the mechanism draws upon all of them at once.

A synthesis is not a reduction. It would be a reduction to take one framework as the true one and to read the others as its incomplete expressions, so that the Lacanian account became a psychology of the economic, or the economic account a sociology of the drive, or every term resolved into the language of the guarantee. Each framework has an epistemic standing of its own, and reaches a face of the object that the others do not reach. The Lacanian account reaches the structure of desire and the place of the drive, and cannot state on its own the historical and material specificity of the forms that work upon them. The dialectical-materialist account reaches that specificity, and cannot state on its own the constitution of the desire that the forms capture. The theory of the guarantee reaches the site at which worth is secured and its migration, and cannot state on its own the ethics by which a circuit is judged. The ethics of relational reproduction reaches that judgment, and rests in turn on the account of the subject that the framework of relational being supplies. No one of them contains the others.

A synthesis is not an eclectic placing side by side. It would be an eclecticism to set the frameworks in a row and to draw from each as convenient, leaving the tensions among them unaddressed, as though they were tools in a drawer rather than accounts that make claims upon one another. The frameworks do make claims upon one another. The Lacanian placing of drive in the Real presses upon the materialist account of what capital can and cannot reach. The materialist insistence on historical specificity presses upon the apparent timelessness of the psychoanalytic structure. These pressures are not to be smoothed away. They are where the work is done.

The synthesis proper is the letting of these tensions sharpen and resolve within an emergent structure, which is itself the new position from which the mechanism is stated. The frameworks illuminate one face of the object each, and the object shows itself in the whole only when the faces are held together under their mutual pressure. The account of the mechanism given below is the emergent structure in which the tensions are worked, the demotion of drive stated in the Lacanian register and alienation stated in the materialist register showing there as one movement, the guarantee and its void supplying the site on which capital operates, and the ethics of reproduction supplying the measure by which the operation is judged. The synthesis is polyphonic in that the frameworks continue to speak in their own registers, and it is dialectical in that their tension is carried into a new structure rather than dissolved. What that structure is, the mechanism states.

§11 Drive, Relation, and Culture as Mediation

The mechanism to be stated in the next section rests on an account of how drive, relation, and culture stand to one another. This section gives that account, and its central move is to place culture as the mediation itself rather than as an outward expression of something already complete.

Drive is a force, and it belongs to the Real. It circles das Ding and does not, of itself, have a form in which it can run within a relation. Relation is a field, the field in which the subject is constituted and in which value is generated. Between the force and the field there must be a process that gives the force a form the field can carry, and culture is that process. Culture is the mediation through which drive is structured into a form in which it can run, the working process by which a movement that circles the empty place is given a shape that a relation can bear.

This must be stated precisely, since a looser statement would misplace what follows. Culture is not the expression of a drive that stands complete behind it, and it is not a code in which an already-formed content is written out. To treat culture as expression or as code is to imagine the drive as finished prior to its mediation, and the mediation as a garment thrown over it. The account here is otherwise. The structuring is the mediation, and the mediation is the process in which the movement of drive comes to have a livable form at all. There is no formed movement lying behind the process, waiting to be expressed. The movement acquires its form in the process, and the process is culture.

A healthy culture structures drive toward generation within a relation. It gives the movement that circles das Ding a form in which the circling runs within a bond, so that what is sought, to be received, to be held, to be witnessed, is sought in the relation where alone it can be generated, and is generated there without the empty place being filled or claimed as a possession. This is the structuring that a healthy culture performs, the giving to drive of a form in which it generates value within relation and leaves the empty place open.

Because culture is the mediation, it is the point at which capital can intervene. Drive itself is beyond reach, lying in the Real, and the relation is the field in which value belongs to those who generate it. What lies between, exposed and workable, is the mediating process, the structuring through which drive is given its form. An operation that would capture the value generated in relation, and cannot reach the drive that feeds it or command the relation that generates it, can seize the process that stands between them. The mediation is where the structuring happens, and for that reason it is where the structuring can be diverted. This is the position from which the mechanism of capture is stated, and the next section states it.

§12 The Alienation of the Structure of Desire

The preceding sections established that culture is the mediating process by which drive is structured into an operative form, and that this mediating position is the point at which capital enters. This section states the mechanism proper. It is the theoretical center of the paper, and it is what the title names.

A difficulty must be met before the mechanism can be stated. Drive circles das Ding, belongs to the Real, and is not reachable as such. Nothing external operates upon drive directly, and capital is no exception. If the account were to claim that capital captures drive, it would claim the impossible, and the mechanism would fail at its first step. The resolution lies in the distinction already drawn. Capital does not operate upon drive. It operates upon the process by which drive is structured into an operative form, which is to say upon culture. Drive remains beyond reach, and the mediating process through which drive is given a livable shape does not. That process is exposed, and what is exposed can be captured.

The alienation of the structure of desire. Capital captures neither drive nor its constitutive lack. It seizes the mediating process through which drive is structured into an operative form, and reroutes that structuration from its course toward relational generation onto a course toward a commodified objet a. Drive is thereby demoted to desire, its non-possessable relational core misrepresented as a purchasable object. The product of a relational generative activity is appropriated by capital and set over against the subject as an alien object that governs and draws upon its desire. This demotion of drive to desire and this appropriation of a relational product as an alien governing power are one process described in two registers.

Two accounts converge on this single process, and neither reduces to the other. The Lacanian account names it the industrialization of the substitution of objet a for das Ding. Drive, in a healthy structuration, circles the empty place and generates value in the circling, without ever filling the place and without needing to. Capital installs, at the site of this circling, a fabricated object that promises to fill the place and is sold. What was a circling around an unfillable emptiness becomes a pursuit of a purchasable thing, and the pursuit is engineered to fail so that it may resume. The substitution is not invented by capital, since the fantasy that veils the empty place is prior to it. What capital adds is the industrial scale, the systematic manufacture of the substitute and its binding to a commodity, so that the structuring of drive is routed, at volume, through purchase.

The account drawn from Marx names the same process alienation. The generative activity is relational, its product is relational value, and that product is appropriated by an owner who stands outside the relation. Once appropriated, the product does not merely leave the subject. It returns as an alien power that governs the subject, presenting itself as the object the subject must acquire in order to be adequate, and drawing value from the subject at each acquisition. The relational core that the subject generates in common is taken, reified, and sold back as the very thing whose lack the subject is made to feel. This is alienation in its general form, the product of one’s own activity confronting one as a hostile and governing force, transposed from the labor of the hand to the structuring of desire.

[Thesis] The demotion of drive to desire, described in the Lacanian register, and alienation, described in the register drawn from Marx, are the same mechanism. The substitution of a commodified objet a for the circling of das Ding is the form in which the relational product is appropriated and set over against the subject. This identity is the theoretical claim of the paper, and it is what the title states.

The chain of capture set out in the prior work described the operations by which this appropriation proceeds, a relational property stripped from its relation, reified into an attribute, bound to a commodity, and offered as the object of desire.

Footnote. See the prior work on relational value under the symbolic crisis for the four operations of the chain of capture. The present account does not restate those operations. It redescribes what they amount to at the level of the structure of desire.

The present account does not repeat those operations. It states what they amount to when read at the level of the structure of desire. The four operations, taken together, are the rerouting of the structuration of drive from relational generation onto a commodified object, and that rerouting is the demotion of drive to desire, which is alienation. Written at the level of desire, with the current of desire supplied through it, the chain reads:

lack (constitutive) → desire → $ ◇ a (fantasy captured) → a (commodified) →[a fails]→ a′ → extraction,

in which desire is the current that runs through the chain rather than a link within it, issuing from a place capital can neither produce nor satisfy, and the failure of the commodified objet a is reworked into the passage to the next. What the formula records at the level of desire, the mechanism reads at the level of drive: the same rerouting is the demotion of drive to desire, the veiling of das Ding by a manufactured and saleable objet a. The prior account gave the operations. This account gives what the operations are.

The Specimen

A class of magazines devoted to small goods and cosmetics, set against the symbolic background of a luxury shopping district, propounds the claim that amae, the movement of seeking to be received and indulged within a trusting relation, is a personal virtue, one that ought to be acquired and that may be acquired through consumption.

Footnote. The term amae names the disposition, healthy in its relational setting, to presume upon and be indulged by another within a bond of trust. Its phenomenology has been described as a marker of a particular culture. It is treated here as one culturally borne form of a general movement, the structuring of drive toward being received and held within a relation, rather than as the property of any single culture.

The specimen is a discourse rather than any particular publication. It exhibits the mechanism with unusual clarity, and its capture may be read in four moves that recover, at the level of desire, the operations of the chain.

Amae, in the first place, is a movement generated only within a relation. One does not presume upon a stranger. The disposition to be received and indulged is the proof and the product of a relational depth, a movement of drive structured, by a healthy culture, toward being held within a bond. It is relational at its root and cannot be held as a private possession.

The discourse strips this movement from its relation and names it an attribute. To be a person who is worthy of indulgence, to possess the quality of one who may be cherished, becomes something one is said to be able to acquire and to display. The movement, severed from the relation in which alone it arises, is recast as a wearable personal trait. The step is decisive, since an attribute can be mediated by a commodity where a relation cannot.

The discourse then misrepresents the non-possessable as purchasable. To be received and held, which is generated only in a relation and possessed by no one, is presented as a qualification that the right purchase confers. The small good and the cosmetic are offered as the means by which one becomes worthy of being cherished. What cannot be bought, because it exists only in the circling of a relation, is counterfeited as a thing that the correct acquisition secures.

The structuring of drive is thereby rerouted. A movement that, within a healthy culture, would be structured toward being held within a bond is redirected toward the acquisition of a commodified object that stands in for the bond. Drive is demoted to desire. Das Ding, the unfillable place around which the movement toward being held would circle, is veiled by an objet a that is manufactured and sold. This is the alienation of the structure of desire in the specimen, the industrialized substitution of a purchasable qualification for a relational movement that no purchase can secure.

From Economic Exclusion to Ontological Exclusion

A consequence follows that reaches past the economic. When the structure of desire is alienated in this way, and the relational core is re-bound to a commodity that must be bought, those who cannot pay are held outside a second time. They are already held outside economic wealth by the market. They are now held outside the relational system that capital has come to mediate, since entry into the counterfeited relation is gated by a purchase they cannot make.

The exclusion is not merely from a good. It is from the mediated field in which relation is made to appear available at all. Where capital has interposed itself as the mediator of the relational movement, and has bound the appearance of that movement to a commodity, the one who cannot pay is excluded from the very field in which the movement is presented as possible. What was in principle available to anyone, since a relational movement depends on no scarce mark, is re-enclosed behind a price. The division of economic wealth is thereby reproduced as a division of relational wealth, and the exclusion deepens from an economic condition into an ontological one, a holding of the subject outside the field in which it might have come to be through relation.

The Locus of the Contradiction

The contradiction lies in the alienation of the structure of desire, and not in a substitution at the level of expression. An earlier formulation would have located the mechanism in a capture at the level of the code, as though the commodity were another expression of a drive that remained otherwise intact, and as though capital merely swapped one sign of the movement for another. That formulation understates the mechanism and misplaces the contradiction. The commodity is not a rival expression of an untouched drive. The structure of desire itself is rerouted, its object displaced onto a fabricated thing that capital has installed, its movement demoted from the circling of an unfillable place to the pursuit of a purchasable one. What is deconstructed here, in the loose sense of the term and not the sense given it in textual theory, is the cultural circuit that capital has built to appear natural and to appear good, the circuit in which a relational movement is made to pass, at volume, through a purchase. The appearance of nature and of good is dismantled by showing the alienation beneath it.

§13 The Good Cultural Cycle and the Ontological Position of Capital

The mechanism stated in the preceding section describes how a cultural circuit is captured. A standard is now required by which a captured circuit may be told from one that is not, and by which the position capital occupies with respect to relation may be named. The standard is the ethics of relational reproduction, developed by the present author in prior work, and its projection onto the circulation of value in the manner of generative justice, which asks who holds the mediating field, to whom the value returns, and who sets the rules of the circuit.

The Criterion

A cultural circuit is good when it satisfies the principles of just relational reproduction and when the value it generates returns to each of those who generate it in common. A circuit that has been captured fails this standard. The principles are stated in the prior work and are recalled here as the criterion of this section.

The principles of just relational reproduction. A just relational reproduction satisfies five conditions. Generativity: it preserves the possibility of the continued becoming of the relational subject. Co-reproduction: the shared experience is reproduced through the participation of the relational subject, and not through the unilateral determination of one party. Non-exploitation: it does not depend on the instrumentalization or the sacrifice of one subject for the benefit of another, and this is the floor. Counter-power: since every reproduction of shared experience generates interpretive power, a just reproduction preserves at the same time the capacity to question, revise, and renegotiate that power. Subject preservation: it does not achieve unity through the elimination of the other as a subject, so that difference is preserved and reproduction remains possible.

Footnote. The principles are stated in the prior work on the theory of relational reproduction. They are taken here as jointly necessary conditions, each bearing on the circulation of value in the cultural field.

Read against this criterion, the capture of a cultural circuit shows its injustice at three of the five conditions at once. Capital defines the rules of the field, the personae, and the narrative on its own authority, so that the shared experience is fixed by one party rather than reproduced through the participation of the relational subject, and co-reproduction is violated. The participants bear the cost, in time, in feeling, and in health, while the surplus is drawn to the owner of the field, so that one side carries the cost and another takes the gain, and non-exploitation, the floor, is violated. The authority to interpret, to set the rules, and to distribute the surplus is fixed in the hands of capital, and the participants have no standing to question or renegotiate it, so that counter-power is violated and the arrangement is frozen against contest.

The Structurally Constrained Co-creator

The participants in a captured cultural circuit occupy a structurally constrained position. A cultural field is not a political community. A political community retains, in principle, the capacity of its members to act in common to remake its rules. A cultural field organized by capital does not extend this capacity to those within it. The participants generate the relational value on which the circuit runs, and are in this sense its co-creators, yet they hold no command over the rules, the surplus, or the ownership of the field. Their options are compressed toward individual exit, which the industry institutionalizes as a regulated departure. The position is named here without a further judgment attached to it. What matters for the argument is its structure: those who generate the value have no share in the command over it, and the sole avenue left open to them is to leave.

The Ontological Position of Capital

The analysis to this point permits a stronger claim, which concerns what capital is with respect to relation. The claim requires care, since it is easily met by the observation that enterprises stand in relations of every kind, to their participants, their audiences, and their markets. The claim is not answered by that observation, and to see why requires a distinction between two senses in which one may be said to stand in a relation.

A relational subject, in the sense given by the framework of generative relational being, is constituted in its relations and generates in them what it could not generate alone. It is a constitutive member of a jointly generated whole, placed within the relation and altered by it. To be a relational subject is to be given over to the relation and reproduced through it. This is the sense that the ethics of relational reproduction governs, and it is the sense in which value comes to belong to a shared whole rather than to any party standing apart.

Capital does not stand in relation in this sense, and the reason lies in how it comes to be and in how it then acts. Value arises in the common generative activity of relational subjects. That value, accumulated and organized, is what capital consists in, so that capital arises from the relational activity it later comes to mediate. It is, in its origin, a product of relation. Yet capital takes the form of ownership, and through that form it turns back upon the very field from which it arose and seeks to hold it. To hold a field as an owner is to stand toward it from without, to possess it as an object rather than to be given over to it as a member. The relation between an owner and the thing owned is external, transferable, and leaves the owner unaltered, where the relation that constitutes a relational subject is internal, non-transferable, and alters the one it constitutes. Capital, having arisen from relation, does not return to it as a co-generating member. It turns upon it as a holder.

Capital cannot be a relational subject. Capital arises within the common generative activity of relational subjects and is in its origin a product of relation. Taking the form of ownership, it turns back upon the field from which it arose and seeks to hold it as an object. It can organize, coordinate, and occasion relation from without, and it cannot enter relation as a co-generating member of the whole, since to hold a field as an owner is to stand toward it externally, and to be a relational subject is to be given over to the relation and altered by it. The inversion by which a product of relation turns to hold relation is the ontological form of the alienation stated in the preceding section.

Three levels are welded in this claim, and they are one structure seen three times. At the ontological level, capital arises from relation and, in the form of ownership, turns to hold it, so that it cannot return to relation as a co-generating member. At the level of mechanism, this is why its operation upon relation can only be the alienation of the structure of desire set out above, a holding and a rerouting from without, and never a joint generation from within. At the ethical level, read in the terms of generative justice, the same inversion is legible as the failure of the value to return to those who generate it in common. A product of relation that turns to hold its own source is precisely a circuit in which the generated value is cut off from its generators and appropriated at the point of origin. The systematic violation of co-reproduction, of non-exploitation, and of counter-power is not a moral charge added from without. It is what this inversion comes to when the criterion of generative justice is read across it, the ontological position of capital showing, on its ethical face, as the interruption of the return of value to its co-creators.

This resolves an apparent objection. Capital is, in the analysis of classical political economy, a social relation, and it might seem that to call it no relational subject is to contradict this. The social relation that capital consists in is a relation of production and of power, whose structure is external and asymmetrical, a holding and a commanding of one pole over another. This is not the constitutive and mutually given relation in which a relational subject is generated. That capital stands within a social relation of this kind is the very manner of its externality to the relational subject, and not a manner of its being one. The two senses of relation must be held apart, and once they are, the objection dissolves.

The consequence may be stated plainly. Capital can organize, coordinate, and occasion relation, and each of these is an operation upon a field held from without. It cannot become a member of the jointly generated whole, the shared subject in whose name the value would belong to those who generate it. When value arises from relation itself, it belongs to the shared subject that generates it, and capital, which arose from relation but holds it as an owner, stands outside that whole as the owner of the field. What capital meets, in an age when value comes to rest in relation, is a problem in the philosophy of the subject rather than a problem in economics, and it is not one that a better arrangement of the same form can resolve, since the obstacle lies in the form of ownership itself.

§14 A Dialectical Case: Capital’s Unwitting Construction of a Relational Divinity

The mechanism and the ontological claim may be brought to bear on a case that shows their working and their limit together. The case is a model of the idol enterprise in which the value is lodged in the connection among members and between members and their supporters, rather than in an unreachable image held at a distance. It is treated here without naming, as a structure rather than a firm, and the reading given to it in the prior work is carried forward and restated from the standpoint of the mechanism of alienation.

Footnote. The same case is read in the prior work on relational value under a criterion of generative justice, where it is the dialectical specimen. The present treatment restates it from the standpoint of the alienation of the structure of desire, and does not repeat the earlier reading.

The case must be held in a double focus, since it is at once two opposite things, and their coincidence is the whole of its interest.

Just at the Origin, Captured in the Circulation

The origin of the model is just. The lack it answers is the native human wish to connect and to be witnessed, and it manufactures no deficiency and gates no entry by a purchase. In this it differs from the specimen of the magazine discourse, which manufactures a lack and binds its repair to a commodity. The model answers a lack that every person carries, and its origin is on that count innocent.

The injustice enters within the circulation. The relation the model generates is real. There is genuine joint authorship, the supporter’s witness and participation truly shaping the member’s course, and a real return from member to supporter, a bond that rises as it runs. And this real bond is made the material of extraction. The relational value the bond generates is drawn off by the owner of the circuit, the connection bound to the ticket and the ballot, so that affection is routed through consumption and the surplus generated within the relation passes to the one who owns the field. By the criterion recalled above, the model is captured within its circulation, the value that the co-creators generate returning to the owner of the field rather than to them.

Capital Profits Because the Relation Is Real

The dialectical point lies here, and it is the point at which the mechanism of alienation shows its full edge. The extraction does not run despite the reality of the relation. It runs by way of it. The sincerity of the members produces a real connection, the real connection accumulates a shared history, a memory, an identity held in common, and this accumulation raises the relational value that the circuit can draw upon. The more real the relation, the greater the relational value generated, and the greater the surplus available to be extracted. Capital profits because the relation is real, and profits more as it grows more real.

The sincerity in question is a native human wish to connect and to be witnessed, and it is not a false need that capital has manufactured. This is what sets the case apart from the manufactured origin, and it is what makes the extraction so efficient. A real circling toward das Ding, the genuine movement of drive toward being witnessed, is occurring in the field. Capital, in the same field, alienates the structured part of that movement, the mediation through which the drive is given its form, and reroutes it toward the commodified object, the ticket and the ballot. The real relation and the alienation are wound together, the one feeding the other, so that the circuit extracts most where the relation is most genuine. This is the mechanism of alienation seen at its sharpest, the demotion of a real relational movement into a commodified desire performed upon the very sincerity that gives the movement its worth.

An Unwitting Construction of a Relational Divinity

Read from the standpoint of the guarantee, the model may be seen to do something it did not set out to do. It turned from the unreachable image, the quasi-transcendent divinity of the idol held at a distance, toward a value lodged in the bond, and in doing so it touched, before the theory of it existed, the relational form of the guarantee. When the model arose the symbolic crisis was not yet manifest, and its turn toward the reachable bond was therefore not a strategy calculated against a visible crisis. It was an intuition ahead of its historical meaning, a reaching toward relation as the site of value before the exhaustion of the symbolic site had come into view. In this sense capital, by way of the cultural form, unwittingly began to construct a relational divinity, a lodging of the excess in the bond rather than in the sign, and it did so as if it had sensed the defect of the symbolic site before that defect was legible. The prescience is real, and it belongs to the structure of the model rather than to any intention read into a person. Its later public statements, that the connection among the members is the thing most precious and most its own, may be taken as the moment the intuition became conscious of itself, and are cited as statements made rather than as evidence of a private motive.

The Weakness of the Capital Form

What the case proves is exact and twofold. It proves that capital can reach relation and generate a real good cycle, and it proves that capital cannot, within its own form, keep from enclosing that cycle and drawing off its surplus. The advance and the limit are two faces of a single act. The way the model breaks the symbolic limit is the way it makes relation a commodity, and the more perfectly it generates a real good cycle the more efficiently it renders that cycle extractable, since the surplus extracted is exactly what the good cycle produces. Its advance is the condition of its exploitation, and its exploitation is the form of its advance.

The limit met here is the weakness named in the section on the ontological position of capital. The model reaches relation, and cannot enter it as a co-generating member, since capital arose from relation and holds it as an owner. It can construct, at the level of the cultural form, the outward shape of a relational divinity, and it cannot occupy the place of the relational subject in whose name the value would belong to those who generate it. Having reached relation, it cannot in its own form refrain from extracting there, and so its unwitting construction of a relational divinity is at the same time the capture of the relation it has built. The advance is real and must be granted in full. The limit is a weakness of the capital form itself rather than a fault of execution, and it deepens the inequality it works within, drawing off from the many who generate the value the surplus that accrues to the one who owns the field.

§15 Conclusion

The argument has moved from a domain to a mechanism to a limit. It began by locating, among the regions in which the symbolic crisis bears most heavily, the relational domain, in which value is lodged in a bond rather than in the scarcity of a sign. The crisis reaches such a domain by a route of its own. It strips the outer shell of the sign, the credential, the ticket, the persona, of its credibility, and exposes the relational core the shell had covered. In the terms of the guarantee, the symbolic site of the excess is voided and the guarantee is pressed toward its relational lodging, so that the relational core of a cultural form comes into view as the value that remains.

Upon that exposed core capital works, and the manner of its working is the alienation of the structure of desire. Capital does not reach drive, which lies in the Real and circles das Ding. It seizes the mediation through which drive is structured into a livable form, which is culture, and reroutes that structuring from its course toward generation within a relation onto a course toward a commodified object. Drive is demoted to desire, the non-possessable relational core misrepresented as a purchasable thing, and the product of a relational generative activity is appropriated and set over against the subject as an alien power that governs and draws upon its desire. The demotion stated in the Lacanian register and the alienation stated in the register drawn from Marx are one movement, and this identity is the claim the title carries.

The mechanism meets a limit that belongs to the form of capital itself. Capital arose from the relational activity it later comes to mediate, and taking the form of ownership it turns back upon that field and holds it as an object. It can organize, coordinate, and occasion relation from without, and it cannot enter relation as a co-generating member of the whole. Read in the terms of generative justice, this inversion of a product of relation into a holder of relation is legible as the interruption of the return of value to those who generate it in common, the systematic failure of the captured circuit at co-reproduction, at non-exploitation, and at the restraint of power. What capital meets, in an age when value comes to rest in relation, is a problem in the philosophy of the subject rather than a problem in economics, and it is not one that a better arrangement of the same form resolves, since the obstacle lies in the form of ownership.

The analysis advances no proposal, and closes on the questions it has made it possible to ask. Who holds the mediation through which a cultural form structures the drive of those who pass through it. Whether the relational core of a cultural form can circulate without being alienated, its surplus kept by those who generate it rather than drawn to an owner of the field. Whether the value a relation generates can return to those who generate it in common, and under what ownership of the field such a return becomes possible. These are posed in the manner of a generative pedagogy, which sets the problem before those who hold the case in view and does not dictate its solution. The paper states the mechanism and the limit, and leaves to the reader the recognition of where, in a given cultural circuit, the relation stands and to whom its value returns.

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中文

文化领域中关系性价值的榨取

一种对政治经济学的拉康式精神分析解构

黄万宏 · huangwanhong@serendip.ngo

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摘要

在象征界的危机之下，随着能指的复制使符号贬值，价值向关系迁移，而关系是符号所不能复制者。一部先前的著作陈述了这一迁移、以及资本对关系性价值之捕获的一般理论。本文在文化领域中处理那一捕获，并在先前的说明之上推进六项贡献。它把象征上被担保的领域（其价值搁于一个符号的稀缺之上）从关系性领域（其价值在其根处即是关系性的、而其符号是一层外壳）区分开来，并论证：文化领域，作为一个关系性领域，是被危机以”外壳之被剥去、关系性内核之被暴露”的方式所触及的。它在一个”与其拉康式实现及其他实现相区分的一般定义”的层面上，展开担保机制，以及作为”逾越个体者被归属于其处之场址”的神性。作为其理论中心，它陈述欲望之结构的异化：资本，无法触及那环绕 das Ding（物）的驱力，遂夺取那”驱力经由其被结构化”的中介，即文化，并把那一结构化改道朝向一个被商品化的对象，于是驱力被降格为欲望，而这一运动，在取自马克思的register里，同时即是异化。它把这一捕获所施行的排除，从一个经济的register追踪进一个本体论的register，抽绎出那一辩证之点，即资本获利是因为关系是真实的；并抵达一个本体论主张：资本，既已从关系中生起，便不能成为一个关系性主体，只能作为一个所有者持有关系。本文不推进任何提案，而把”辨认一个给定的文化回路立于何处、其价值回归于谁”留给读者。

关键词： 关系性价值；文化领域；欲望之结构的异化；驱力与 das Ding；担保机制；生成性正义；关系性神性；拉康。

AI 使用声明： 本文的思想、主张与理论框架源于作者本人。AI 工具被用作起草与修订之辅助。每一句话都已由作者逐行核校，每一想法之来源都已核实，故作者对内容负全责。

§1 导论

当下这一时刻以象征秩序中的一场危机为标记。那些”意义与价值曾由之被保全”的能指，已丧失其功能所搁于其上的稀缺，而随着符号之复制被廉价化，那”经由一个稀缺之标记来生产欲望”的较古老的劳作变得困难。价值，在这一压力之下，向那”能指之复制所不能消解者”迁移，而那便是关系。本文作者已详尽地展开了这一危机，并在先前的著作中，给出了关于关系性价值、以及”一旦价值向结迁移、资本便捕获它”的方式之一般说明。那一说明陈述了一般理论。本文立于它之旁，并处理它所留下未决的诸问题。

那些问题关乎文化领域。先前的说明确立了一个关于关系性价值之捕获的一般理论，却未曾追问价值的迁移在哪些领域里最沉重地压下，未曾有一个关于”关系性价值经由之被给予一个可活之形式”的中介之理论，未曾抵达欲望之下、抵达那”环绕着没有商品能占据之处”的驱力，也未曾提出”价值最终由之被保全”的担保之问题。文化领域正是这些问题聚拢之处。它是一个”价值在其根处即是关系性的、而符号是一层外壳”的领域，也正因此故它被象征界的危机以一种特定的方式触及，其外壳被剥去，其关系性内核被敞开以供捕获。本文把文化领域取作那”追问捕获在其处如何进行”的场址，而它这样做，是经由一种”与关系性价值之政治经济学相接合”的精神分析式读法。

本文在先前的说明之上推进六项贡献。它读一个文化领域中榨取的标本，一种”把一个关系性禀性呈现为一种可购买的个人德性”的话语，并在欲望之结构的层面上给出它的解剖。它把这一捕获所施行的排除，从一个经济的排除追踪进一个本体论的排除，由此，那些付不起者被持于”关系被造成显得可能”的那一场域之外。它在一个”与其若干实现相区分的一般定义”的层面上，展开担保机制，以及作为担保之场址的神性。它陈述，作为理论中心，欲望之结构的异化，即资本对那”驱力经由之被结构化”的中介之改道，并表明驱力之降格为欲望与异化乃是同一个运动。它抽绎出那一辩证之点，即资本获利是因为关系是真实的，并随着关系变得更真实而获利更多。而它抵达一个本体论主张：资本，既已从关系中生起，便不能作为一个共同生成的主体进入关系，只能作为一个所有者持有它，于是资本在关系性价值的时代所遭遇者，是一个主体哲学中的问题。

其攸关者超出被当作诸产业之一的文化领域。倘若关系是那”熬过符号之廉价化”的价值，那么”一个文化形式的关系性内核经由何种条件被中介、被拥有、并或被流通或被捕获”便成为一个中心问题，而本文是一个”在那机制所要求的深度上陈述那问题”的尝试。论证以分析与概念的必然性而行，并把它的诸标本当作例证而非证明，其缘由在问题被铺陈之处陈明。它不推进任何提案，而把”辨认在一个给定的文化回路中关系立于何处”留给读者。

§2 象征危机之重述

本文的论证搁于一个”在先前著作中被详尽展开”的诊断之上，而那诊断在此只被重述到当前论证所要求的程度。

脚注。 现代性中符号与主体的危机，由本文作者在下面所引的奠基性著作中展开，而那一危机之下关系性价值的政治经济学，则在关于关系性价值的著作中展开。本节陈述那些著作所确立者，而不重复它们的论证。

那些”意义与价值曾由之被保全”的能指，搁于一种业已崩塌的稀缺之上。当一个符号能被无限、即刻、并以微不足道之成本复制时，它便贬值，而那”靠对多数人被扣留而持有其价值”的标记，便不再能履行那一职分。这便是象征界的危机。

这一危机有一副政治经济的面孔，而正是这副面孔与本文相关。消费资本的引擎，在很长一段时期里，经由能指而运行。它以象征的形式建造欠缺，靠把一件东西造成一个身份的标记而使一个人想要它，并经由那一标记的稀缺来驱动欲望。随着能指之复制被廉价化，创造与劳动也随之被廉价化，而那”经由能指来生产欠缺”的较古老的工作变得难以施行，因为一个如今任何人都能生成的标记既不隐藏任何东西、也不扣留任何东西。价值，在这一压力之下，向那”能指之复制所不能消解者”迁移。那一残余便是关系，即一个结之被共同活过而不可重复的历史，它在其真实的融贯缺席时无法被伪造。

两种发展一同随出，而它们是同一个过程从两侧被看见。那”出售不可企及之影像”的较古老的回路变得疲惫，而资本以连接、社群、归属的语言开辟新的边疆。一个回路之困难与另一个回路之开辟乃是同一个事件，即象征危机的政治经济表达。先前的著作把这一迁移确立为一个关于关系性价值及其捕获的一般说明。本文把那一说明取为既定，并转向它所留下未决的一个问题，那问题关乎”迁移在其中最沉重地压下的领域”以及”捕获在其处经由之进行的机制”。

§3 文化及其相关理论

为定位那”价值的迁移在其中最沉重地压下”的领域，”文化”一词必须被给予一个可用之义，而那”曾思考过它”的理论必须被在轮廓上重述。这一概念有一部谱系，而那谱系的运动本身即富教益，因为它从一份内容的清册，行向一个”把文化当作一个权力之场”的说明。

泰勒把文化取作一个复杂的整体，即一个人作为一个社会的成员所习得的知识、信仰、艺术、习俗与习惯之总和。文化在这一义上是一份清册，一张社会所传递之内容的清单。格尔茨把它重铸为一个意义的系统。文化成为一张”人们自己所织就”的意义之网，一个”他们经由之使其经验可理解”的符号结构，于是分析的单位从内容移向了那”绑定它们”的象征秩序。特纳表明这一象征秩序并非惰性的。仪式生成一种力，推动那些穿过它者，并在其边缘处触及那”躺在象征之外”者，于是文化被看作作用于它的参与者、而不仅仅对他们分类。威廉斯与霍尔为权力抽绎出后果。文化是一个”意义于其中被生产、被争夺、并被使得胜”的场，一个”界定一个社会之常识的权威被不均地分配”的场址，而在其中，符号之制作与阅读与那”贯穿整个社会”的支配之诸关系相缠。

这一谱系产出本文所要求的区分。有两样东西在这一个词之下行进，而它们必须被持分开。有一个文化的象征内容，即一个群体经由之使其经验可理解的意义之网，也有一个文化产业的象征经济，即那”意义经由之被生产、被流通、被拥有、并被使产出一份回报”的安排。第一个是作为一种生活形式的文化。第二个是作为一个”为价值之榨取而组织”的场的文化。这两者在事实上并不分离，因为产业作用于生活形式、而生活形式被产业所重塑，而这一区分是为分析、而非在自然中划出的。以下诸节所审视者，是第二个压于第一个之上的那一点，即一个”由资本所组织的象征经济”作用于”一个文化的生活形式所生成的关系性内核”的那一点。

§4 文化领域中榨取的现象学

本节的主张是：文化领域是那”象征危机在其中最沉重地压下”的诸区域之一，而它在其处以一种对它特定的方式压下。这一主张被小心地陈述。它是说，文化领域是这样的诸区域之一、而非危机的唯一场址，而关于其严重性的论证经由一个”两类领域之间”的区分而行。

两类领域

诸领域在”其价值搁于其上者”上有别，而这一差别决定了能指的危机如何触及它们。在一类领域里，价值直接搁于象征的稀缺与象征的担保之上。奢侈品、艺术市场、品牌、以及纯粹象征的金融，靠一个”被扣留、被赋予凭证、或被承保”的标记来持有其价值，于是价值的基础是符号本身的稀缺与担保。称这些为象征上被担保的领域。当符号变得可被无限复制，危机便直接击中这些领域的基础，因为其价值所建于其上的那一稀缺本身，正是那已崩塌者。

在另一类领域里，价值在其根处即是关系性的。教育、文化与偶像的领域、亲密生活、以及社群，把它们的价值持有于一个结、一段共享的历史、一个被共同生成的经验之中，而那”随附于它们的符号”，即凭证、门票、人设，是一层”覆于一个本身并非象征之价值之上”的外壳。称这些为关系性领域。能指的危机并不以同一方式击中一个关系性领域的基础，因为那基础从来不是一个符号的稀缺。它以一条不同的路径触及关系性领域。它剥去符号的外壳的可信度，暴露出外壳曾覆盖的关系性内核，并把那内核敞开以供一种”作用于欲望之结构”的捕获。本文的靶是关系性领域，而象征上被担保的领域被置于它之旁作为一个对照，以更好地表明：当一者的象征基础让位，资本便转向另一者的关系性基础。

教育是关系性领域的一个清楚实例。它的价值是教师与学生之间那形塑性的关系，而凭证是外壳。当凭证膨胀、其稀缺让位，价值并不消失，因为它从来不是凭证。反倒发生的是：关系性内核被暴露，并被交付给一个”意欲捕获它”的经济。偶像与文化的领域是第二个实例，而它正是本文在下面的辩证案例中所审视者。

标本之呈现

关系性领域中一个榨取的标本可在此被呈现，其机制留待稍后的分析。一类”献给小商品与化妆品、置于一个奢侈购物区之象征背景之下”的杂志，鼓吹这一主张：amae（即”在一段信任的关系之内被接纳、被纵容”的禀性）是一种个人德性，一种应当被习得、并可经由正确的购买而被习得的德性。它所说的那一禀性是真实的，而它在其根处即是关系性的，因为一个人只在一个信任的结之内才向另一个人撒娇并被其纵容。这一话语把这一关系性禀性呈现为一种”消费所能授予的个人品质”，而这一呈现在此被作为一个”有待被辨认的现象”而提供。它的解剖，即”一个关系性运动如何被改道朝向一个可购买之对象”的说明，属于下面对机制的分析，在此不被预先展开。

这一标本被作为一个例证而提供，不承载任何证明之分量。本文的论证并不搁于这一标本之上，也不可能，因为一个单一的现象裁定不了任何一般的主张。这一标本在一个可辨认的实例中，使一个”后面诸节在别的地基上确立”的运动变得可见。例证与证明之间的区分被通篇遵守，而其方法论的地基在关于研究问题的一节中被陈明。

§5 先前的捕获机制及其认识论界限

先前的著作给出了一个关于”资本如何捕获关系性价值”的说明，而那说明在此被重述，是为了标出它的视野够及何处、又在何处止步。这一重述是简短的，因为那说明立于所引的著作之中，而此处的目的是暴露它的认识论界限，本文正是为了越过它而写。

那条链的重述

先前的著作把关系性价值的捕获描述为一条形式的链。一个关系性属性被从”它唯一由之生起”的关系中剥去，并被命名为一个”一个人可以拥有的”属性。那构成性的欠缺被伪装为那一属性的欠缺。那属性被绑定于一件商品，而那商品被作为欲望的对象而提供。欲望是那”贯穿这条链而运行”的电流，从一个”资本既不能生产、也不能满足”之处发出，而资本给那电流改道、并在每一次改道处抽取价值。这一说明成立，而本文不修订它。它捕获了”捕获经由之进行”的诸操作，而它这样做，是在欲望及其对象的层面上，即那”欲望环绕 objet a、而资本管理那支持它的幻想”的层面。

那说明的界限

那说明够及捕获的诸操作，并在它”未被建来回答”的三个问题的门槛处止步。命名它们乃是本节的工作，因为它们正是本文所进入的诸开口。

第一个关乎躺在欲望之下者。先前的说明在欲望的层面上做工，欲望环绕 objet a，即那”可被替换、由资本所供给”的对象。在欲望之下躺着驱力，它环绕 das Ding，而驱力更为原始，不被熄灭，也不容替换。先前的说明够不到驱力，也不追问：面对一个”环绕着没有商品能占据之处”的运动，资本能做什么。驱力的问题被留在它的框架之外。

第二个关乎文化。先前的说明处理关系性价值的捕获，却没有一个关于”那价值经由之被给予一个可活之形式”的中介之理论。它不把文化主题化为那”一个关系性运动经由之被结构化”的过程，因而它不定位那”资本把自己插入其中”的点，而那点正是那中介的过程。文化，作为中介的项，落在那说明之外。

第三个关乎担保。先前的说明描述了一个价值的迁移与一个捕获，却不追问价值、意义与秩序的效力与权威搁于何物之上、以及那安歇之处已移向何方。担保的问题，即”价值由之被保全的最终地基、以及逾越个体者被归属于其处的场址”，未被提出。它是三个开口中最深的一个，而本文的方法论首先取用它。

这三者，即驱力与 das Ding、作为中介的文化、以及担保，是先前视野的诸界限。它们不是先前说明的过失，那说明回答了它为自己所设的诸问题。它们是它未曾设立的诸问题，而本文正是对它们的设立。随后一节把它们陈述为有待处理的问题。

§6 研究问题

先前的著作与上面所重述的理论供给了已知者。以那为地基，四个开口界定本文所处理的问题。它们按次序被陈述，四者中的最后一个是整个分析所瞄准的靶。

已确立的地基

已确立者是：能指之复制已使符号廉价化；价值在这一压力之下向关系迁移，而关系是符号所不能复制者；而资本经由欲望之结构、以一条”剥去一个关系性属性、把它物化、并把它绑定于一件商品”的形式的链，来捕获关系性价值。已确立者是：一个关系性回路的正义在其起源、其场域、以及其流通之内被裁定，而一个关系的真实性对这些一概不裁定。这便是本文取为既定而不修订的说明。

诸开口

第一个开口关乎文化领域的优先性。尚未被表明的是：文化领域是那”危机在其中最沉重地压下”的诸区域之一，以及一个领域凭何种特征而如此暴露。象征上被担保的领域与关系性领域之间的区分，以及”危机如何触及各者”的说明，是确立这一点所必需的，而它作为一个论证被欠下、而非被假定。

第二个开口关乎先前说明的够及，它在欲望及其对象的层面上做工。它在驱力的门槛处止步，不把文化主题化为那”一个关系性运动经由之被结构化”的中介，也不追问价值的效力与权威搁于何物之上、或那安歇之处已移向何方。驱力与 das Ding、作为中介的文化、以及担保躺在它的框架之外，而把它们带入一个框架乃是本文所设的认识论任务。

第三个开口是本文的靶。先前的说明表明资本把欲望改道朝向一个被商品化的 objet a。它不表明面对驱力资本做什么（驱力环绕 das Ding 而不容任何替换），也不表明那”躺在那不可填满之处近旁”的关系性内核如何被够及并被汲取。问题是：资本如何经由一种”施于欲望之结构之上的异化”，触及并榨取那”环绕 das Ding“的驱力与关系性内核，而驱力本身却在其直接的够及之外。这正是本文的机制所回答的问题。

第四个开口关乎诸框架。这一问题由若干框架同时处理，即担保的理论、拉康式关于欲望与驱力的说明、生成性关系性存在连同辩证唯物主义的框架、以及关系性再生产的伦理学。所要求的是：把这些带到一起而不使其中一者吸收其余，并使它们的被带到一起成为一种”其间的张力做工”的综合，而非一种向一个单一主框架的化约、或一种把它们松散地并排放置。

方法论的姿态

论证以分析与概念的必然性而行，并把经验现象当作例证而非证明。其缘由不是一种对抽象的偏好。而是：一个归纳的证明，它会聚集诸实例并推断一个趋势，无法确立一个必然性的主张，因为过去的诸实例并不蕴含那必定随出者，而这一困难是归纳的经典问题。因此本文说：一个关系性领域在结构上易受它所描述的捕获之害，而非说它已被可证地占据，因为那主张关乎一个结构及其诸易感，而非一个被测量的结果。诸标本被提供，以在一个实例中使一个结构变得可辨认，而论证的分量搁于对那结构的分析之上。

脚注。 还有一个”谢绝实证主义与归纳路径”的进一步缘由，内在于本文的诊断。实证主义作为象征神性之秩序的诸表达之一而生起，是那”寄居于可观察的符号与已定的度量之中的担保”所采取的方法论形式。征用它去证明那同一秩序的失败，便会是以那秩序自己的一件产物来审判那秩序，而那证明便会走一个圈。分析与概念的路径之被采用，部分正是为避免这一循环性。此点在此被记下而不被展开，因为它开启一个”本文无需裁定”的反身性问题。

§7 作为担保机制之辩证唯物主义发展的神性

上面所命名的诸开口中最深的一个关乎担保，即”价值、意义与秩序的效力与权威由之被保全”的最终地基。本节展开一个关于担保及其历史运动的说明，而它这样做，是在一个”与其若干实现相区分的一般定义”的层面上。先前的著作追踪了一个”逾越个体的过剩曾被归属于其处的诸场址”的序列，而那序列在此被预设、而非被重述。

脚注。 担保之诸场址的唯物主义序列，从一个超越的源头、到符号、再到关系，在先前关于关系性价值的著作中被铺陈。本节陈述那”那序列是其一个实现”的一般结构，而不重复那序列。

本节所添加者，是那”那序列是其一个实现”的一般结构，而正是这一一般结构为本文所要求，因为”不同领域如何被象征危机触及”的问题，端赖于它们的担保寄居于何处。

一般定义

一个担保机制是那”价值、意义与秩序获得其效力”的场址，即”保全价值者最终被寄居于其中”的地方。神性，在此处所用之义上，是”逾越个体者被归属于其处”的地方。神性的发展是担保之场址的历史迁移，即那地方从一个寄居处向下一个的运动。先前著作所给出的说明，从一个超越的源头到符号、再朝向关系，便是一个这样的迁移，被读作一个唯物主义的序列。

担保机制，以及作为其场址的神性。 一个担保机制是那”价值、意义与秩序的效力与权威最终被保全”的场址。神性是”逾越个体者被归属于其处”的地方，而神性的发展是担保之场址从一个寄居处向下一个的迁移。在担保的场址处，总有一个空，一个”没有任何’能一劳永逸地保全价值’的正向基础安歇于其上”的地方。当一个给定寄居处的物质条件持存时，那空被覆盖。当那些条件被耗尽时，那空被暴露，而担保被迫迁移。

这一定义的核心是担保之场址处的那个空。没有任何正向的基础、没有任何最终的基岩，能无余地承保价值。担保的一个寄居处在它的物质条件持存时持存，并在那段时间里覆盖那空。当那些条件被耗尽，那空被暴露，而担保迁移到一个”其条件同时已然成熟”的新寄居处。这一运动是辩证的、且没有一个被担保的终点。这里并不主张一个关系性的神性注定要上升、并终于牢固地持守那场址。这里只主张：担保之场址随着其物质条件被耗尽而迁移；那迁移是由一个空之暴露、而非由一个”朝一个目的做工”的意图所驱动；而当前迁移的方向可从”如今被耗尽的条件与如今正在成熟的条件”读出。这一说明是唯物主义的、非线性的、并且没有目的论。

拉康式的实现

在这一结构的诸实现之中，此处所展开的是拉康式的那一个，因为它正是”捕获的机制将经由之被陈述”的实现。在它之中，担保的场址被大他者所占据，即那”承保意义、并保全主体对世界之称谓”的象征秩序。场址处的空是大他者中的欠缺，即那”大他者自身并不拥有一个最终基础、不能为整体负责”的标记，而它被写作 S(Ⱥ)，即大他者中欠缺的能指，即”象征秩序登记它自己的不完整”的那一点。符号的象征性神性便是担保在这一大他者中的寄居。象征界的危机正是那”符号之无限复制作废这一寄居的可信度、并暴露出大他者中的欠缺 S(Ⱥ)、即符号曾覆盖的那个空”的时刻。资本作用于这一被暴露的空。它把 objet a 悬于那空之上，并以”人或可经由获取来填满那空”的幻想，从主体”朝那被允诺的填满”之运动中抽取价值。此处作用于被暴露之空者，正是捕获的机制将在文化领域中描述的同一个操作。

其他实现

这一一般结构有一些”在此不被展开”的实现，而其中两个可被标出，以使这一说明不把拉康式的实现呈现为整体。空性之教（即”无一物拥有一个自性、而凡所生起者皆依待而起”）在”担保为何只能安歇于关系之中”这一点上实现了这一结构，因为一个”无自性”的场址不能是一个最终的基岩，而所立者总带着依待的、关系的性格。那”朴”之思与”道”中”返”之运动（即”万物由之而出”的丰产之虚），在”一个新的担保如何成为生成性的、而非仅仅被设定的”这一点上实现了这一结构。这些实现并不彼此化约，而对”担保之场址处的空性”之更充分的处理，被留给那奠基性的著作。它们在此被命名，是为了把拉康式的实现持守在它作为诸者之一的位置上。

§8 欲望与驱力

拉康式的框架供给”捕获的机制由之被陈述”的诸术语，而它所转于其上的区分，是欲望与驱力之间的区分。它的记法在此被引入，因为机制将以它被陈述。

欲望没有真正的对象。它的成因是一个构成性的欠缺，即那”当主体进入语言、并丧失一个被假定的原初完整时所开启”的空之处。直接面对这一空之处便是焦虑，而欲望在面对它时无法运行。欲望需要一个”遮蔽那空之处、并显得就是主体所欠缺之物”的对象，而这一对象被写作 a，即 objet a，欲望的对象成因（object-cause）。那”环绕这一对象”的主体是被划杠的主体，即”因进入语言而被分裂、并被它所携带的欠缺所标记”的主体，被写作 $。那”把被划杠的主体绑定于对象、并让欲望以一种可承受的方式运行”的关系是幻想，被写作 $ ◇ a，其中那菱形 ◇（poinçon，穿孔）命名了”主体经由之被接合于那支持其欲望之对象”的若干关系，即包封的关系与框定的关系。objet a 可被替换，一个对象让位于下一个，因为它靠遮蔽那空之处、而非靠”是那物本身”来持守其位置。这一可替换性正是资本已学会去做工者。它以一种被制造的形式供给 objet a，把它绑定于一件商品，并经由购买给欲望改道，而每一个对象”未能填满那欠缺”之失败，被重新做工为那”把欲望载向下一个”的运动。

驱力比欲望更为原始，而它环绕一个不同的项。欲望环绕 objet a，驱力则环绕 das Ding，即那处于欠缺之处本身的物，那”主体最早的组织围绕之而形成”的不可符号化的内核。这一区分是”一个替代欠缺的对象”与”那空之处本身”之间的区分：

欲望：环绕 a      驱力：环绕 das Ding

驱力不以欲望所容的方式容许替换。它不寻求一个”会替换另一个”的对象，也不被任何对象所熄灭，因为它的回路是对那空之处的环绕、而非对一个”会填满它之物”的追逐。驱力属于实在界，属于那”象征界所不能捕获者”，也正因此故它在”任何在象征register里施行的操作”之直接够及之外。资本不能触及驱力本身，而这一界限随于”驱力躺于何处”、而非随于任何偶然的情形。其后果被推迟到机制处，在那里问题成为：当”资本意欲捕获的运动”环绕着一个”没有商品能占据之处”时，资本能做什么。在那里所给出的答案作用于”驱力经由之被给予一个可活之形式”的过程，而把驱力本身留而不触。

§9 生成性关系性存在与辩证唯物主义

还需要两个进一步的框架，一个用于主体之构成与”价值于其中被生成”的场域，一个用于”这一生成所取的诸形式”之历史与物质的性格。

关系性主体与生成性场域

生成性关系性存在的框架把主体取作它诸社会关系的总合、而非一个孤立的个体，并把关系取作那”‘最属主体自己者’于其中被生成、而非先于关系被持有”的场域。价值，在这一说明上，在关系中生起、并归属于那”生成它”的关系性主体，而它不是任何一方分立地持有的一份占有。文化立于，在这一框架之内，作为那”驱力经由之被结构化”的中介，即那”环绕 das Ding 的运动经由之被给予一个’能在一段关系之内运行’的形式”的过程。这把文化置于一个确定的点上，即在”属于实在界的驱力”与”主体于其中得以生成的关系”之间，而正是在这一点上，对机制的分析将定位资本的介入。

诸形式的辩证唯物主义性格

这一生成所取的诸形式是历史的与物质的，而它们在此以辩证唯物主义的术语被读，被持守于一个受约束的版本。物质条件约束诸形式而不决定它们，而这一说明保存偶然性与过程的开放性，谢绝一个”会把历史读作一个被注定之目的的做工而出”的目的论。榨取的诸形式是历史地特定的、因而是历史地可变的，由特定的生产关系所沉积，并随着那些关系改变而易于改变。

这产出一个”稍后被展开”之主张的地基，即：资本施于关系性价值之上的榨取，是对它较早”施于能指之上”的操作的一次历史升级。较早的操作作用于一个标记及其稀缺。较晚的操作朝向欲望之结构本身、朝向那”环绕空之处的运动”而够去，而在够到那里时，它触及那”比任何标记都更靠近主体之构成”者。这一升级是同一逻辑向更深地基的一个运动，而它在那地基上遭遇一个”后面诸节所命名”的弱点，即所有权的形式”进入它已够及之关系”之无能。资本够得如此之深、却不能在它自己的形式里克制不在那里榨取，正是分析将抽绎出的张力。框架在此被铺陈，而它所准备的张力被带到关于机制与关于资本之本体论位置的诸节。

§10 诸框架的辩证综合

四个框架已被铺陈，即担保的理论、拉康式关于欲望与驱力的说明、生成性关系性存在连同辩证唯物主义的框架、以及那”将供给判准”的关系性再生产的伦理学。上面所设的问题要求它们以一种特定的方式被带到一起，而本节陈述那方式为何，在机制同时取用它们全体之前。

一个综合不是一次化约。把一个框架取作那真的、并把其余读作它不完整的表达，会是一次化约，于是拉康式的说明成了经济者的一种心理学，或经济的说明成了驱力的一种社会学，或每一个术语都被消解进担保的语言。每一个框架有它自己的一种认识论地位，并够及那对象的一副”其余者所够不到”的面孔。拉康式的说明够及欲望之结构与驱力之处，而不能独自陈述那”作用于它们之上”的诸形式的历史与物质的特定性。辩证唯物主义的说明够及那特定性，而不能独自陈述那”诸形式所捕获”的欲望之构成。担保的理论够及那”价值由之被保全”的场址及其迁移，而不能独自陈述那”一个回路由之被审判”的伦理学。关系性再生产的伦理学够及那审判，而它转而搁于关系性存在的框架所供给的那个关于主体的说明之上。它们中无一者包含其余。

一个综合不是一次折中的并排放置。把诸框架排成一列、并随便利从各者取用、而把它们之间的诸张力置之不理，仿佛它们是抽屉里的工具、而非”彼此提出主张”的诸说明，会是一次折中主义。诸框架确实彼此提出主张。拉康式”把驱力置于实在界”压于唯物主义”关于资本能与不能够及者”的说明之上。唯物主义对历史特定性的坚持压于精神分析结构的表面上的无时间性之上。这些压力不应被抚平。它们正是工作被做之处。

综合本身是这些张力”在一个涌现的结构之内被使锐化并化解”的过程，而那涌现的结构本身就是”机制由之被陈述”的新位置。诸框架各照亮那对象的一副面孔，而那对象只在诸面孔被在其相互的压力之下持守到一起时，才在整体中显示自身。下面所给出的关于机制的说明，就是那”诸张力于其中被做工”的涌现结构，即在拉康register里被陈述的驱力之降格、与在唯物主义register里被陈述的异化，在那里显示为同一个运动；担保及其空供给资本作用于其上的场址；而再生产的伦理学供给那操作由之被审判的尺度。这一综合是复调的，在于诸框架继续以它们自己的register说话；而它是辩证的，在于它们的张力被带入一个新的结构、而非被消解。那结构是什么，机制陈述之。

§11 驱力、关系、以及作为中介的文化

下一节将陈述的机制搁于一个”关于驱力、关系、文化如何彼此而立”的说明之上。本节给出那说明，而它的中心一着是把文化置为中介本身、而非某个已然完整之物的一种向外的表达。

驱力是一种力，而它属于实在界。它环绕 das Ding，而它就自身而言，并不拥有一个”能在一段关系之内运行”的形式。关系是一个场域，即主体于其中被构成、价值于其中被生成的场域。在那力与那场域之间，必须有一个”给那力一个’那场域能承载’的形式”的过程，而文化便是那过程。文化是那”驱力经由之被结构化为一个’能运行’的形式”的中介，即那”一个’环绕空之处’的运动经由之被给予一个’一段关系能承受’的形状”的做工的过程。

这必须被精确地陈述，因为一个更松散的陈述会错置随后者。文化不是一个”完整地立于它背后”的驱力的表达，也不是一个”一个已成形的内容被写出于其中”的代码。把文化当作表达或当作代码，便是把驱力想象为在其中介之前已然完成、而把中介想象为一件抛于它之上的衣裳。此处的说明另异。那结构化就是那中介，而那中介是”驱力的运动根本得以拥有一个可活之形式”的过程。没有一个”躺在那过程背后、等待被表达”的已成形的运动。那运动在那过程中获得它的形式，而那过程就是文化。

一个健康的文化把驱力结构化朝向”在一段关系之内的生成”。它给那”环绕 das Ding 的运动”一个”那环绕于一个结之内运行”的形式，于是所寻求者（被接纳、被持守、被见证）是在那”它唯一能被生成于其中”的关系里被寻求的，并在那里被生成，而空之处既不被填满、也不被作为一份占有而声索。这便是一个健康的文化所施行的结构化，即给驱力一个”它在其中于关系之内生成价值、并把空之处留而敞开”的形式。

因为文化是那中介，它便是资本能介入的那一点。驱力本身在够及之外，躺于实在界；而关系是那”价值归属于生成它者”的场域。躺在两者之间、被暴露且可做工者，是那中介的过程，即”驱力经由之被给予其形式”的结构化。一个”意欲捕获在关系中生成之价值、却够不到那喂养它的驱力、也命令不了那生成它的关系”的操作，能够夺取那”立于它们之间”的过程。中介正是结构化发生之处，也正因此故它是结构化能被改道之处。这便是”捕获的机制由之被陈述”的位置，而下一节陈述它。

§12 欲望之结构的异化

前面诸节确立了：文化是那”驱力经由之被结构化为一个可运作之形式”的中介的过程，而这一中介的位置正是资本进入的那一点。本节陈述机制本身。它是本文的理论中心，也正是标题所命名者。

在机制能被陈述之前，一个困难必须被迎击。驱力环绕 das Ding，属于实在界，并不能作为其自身被够及。没有任何外部之物直接作用于驱力，而资本不是例外。倘若这一说明要主张资本捕获驱力，它便会主张那不可能者，而机制会在其第一步失败。化解躺于那已划出的区分之中。资本不作用于驱力。它作用于那”驱力经由之被结构化为一个可运作之形式”的过程，也就是说作用于文化。驱力保持在够及之外，而那”驱力经由之被给予一个可活之形状”的中介的过程则不然。那过程被暴露，而被暴露者能被捕获。

欲望之结构的异化。 资本既不捕获驱力、也不捕获它构成性的欠缺。它夺取那”驱力经由之被结构化为一个可运作之形式”的中介的过程，并把那结构化从它”朝向关系性生成”的航道，改道到一个”朝向一个被商品化的 objet a“的航道。驱力由此被降格为欲望，其不可占有的关系性内核被谎称为一个可购买的对象。一个关系性的生成活动之产物被资本所占据，并被树立于主体对面、作为一个”统辖并汲取其欲望”的异己对象。这一驱力之降格为欲望、与这一”把一个关系性产物占据为一个异己的统辖之力”，乃是被以两个register描述的同一个过程。

两个说明汇聚于这一单一的过程，而无一者化约为另一者。拉康式的说明把它命名为”以 objet a 替代 das Ding 的工业化”。驱力，在一个健康的结构化里，环绕那空之处、并在环绕中生成价值，而从不填满那处、也无需填满。资本在这一环绕的场址处，安装一个”允诺填满那处、并被出售”的被捏造之对象。曾是一个”环绕一个不可填满之虚空”者，成了一个”对一个可购买之物的追逐”，而那追逐被工程化为失败，以便它可以重启。这一替代不是资本所发明的，因为那”遮蔽空之处”的幻想先于它。资本所添加者是那工业的规模，即对替代物的系统制造、及其对一件商品的绑定，于是驱力的结构化被大批量地经由购买而改道。

取自马克思的说明把同一个过程命名为异化。那生成的活动是关系性的，它的产物是关系性价值，而那产物被一个”立于关系之外”的所有者所占据。一旦被占据，那产物不仅仅离开主体。它作为一个”统辖主体”的异己之力而返回，把自己呈现为”主体为使自己适格而必须获取”的对象，并在每一次获取处从主体抽取价值。主体在共同中所生成的关系性内核被拿走、被物化、并被作为”主体被使去感到其欠缺”的那件东西本身回售。这便是异化在其一般形式里，即”一个人自己活动之产物作为一个敌对而统辖之力与他对峙”，从手的劳动被移置到欲望之结构化。

[论题] 在拉康register里被描述的驱力之降格为欲望，与在取自马克思的register里被描述的异化，是同一个机制。以一个被商品化的 objet a 替代对 das Ding 的环绕，正是那”关系性产物被占据、并被树立于主体对面”的形式。这一同一性是本文的理论主张，也正是标题所陈述者。

先前著作所铺陈的捕获之链，描述了这一占据经由之进行的诸操作，即一个关系性属性被从它的关系中剥去、被物化为一个属性、被绑定于一件商品、并被作为欲望的对象而提供。

脚注。 关于捕获之链的四个操作，见先前”象征危机之下关系性价值”的著作。本说明不重述那些操作。它重新描述它们在欲望之结构的层面上归结为何。

本说明不重复那些操作。它陈述它们”当在欲望之结构的层面上被读时归结为何”。那四个操作，合起来，就是”把驱力的结构化从关系性生成改道到一个被商品化的对象”，而那改道就是驱力之降格为欲望，即异化。在欲望的层面上、以贯穿其中的欲望之电流被供给来写，那条链读作：

欠缺（构成性）→ 欲望 → $ ◇ a（幻想被捕获）→ a（被商品化）→[a 失败]→ a′ → 榨取，

其中欲望是那”贯穿这条链而运行”的电流、而非其中的一环，从一个”资本既不能生产、也不能满足”之处发出，而那被商品化的 objet a 之失败被重新做工为向下一个的通道。那公式在欲望的层面上所记录者，机制在驱力的层面上读之：同一个改道就是驱力之降格为欲望，即以一个被制造并可出售的 objet a 来遮蔽 das Ding。先前的说明给出了诸操作。本说明给出那些操作是什么。

标本

一类”献给小商品与化妆品、置于一个奢侈购物区之象征背景之下”的杂志，鼓吹这一主张：amae（即”寻求在一段信任的关系之内被接纳、被纵容”的运动）是一种个人德性，一种应当被习得、并可经由消费而被习得的德性。

脚注。 amae 一词命名那”在其关系性的背景里是健康的、在一个信任的结之内向另一个人撒娇并被其纵容”的禀性。它的现象学曾被描述为一种特定文化的标记。它在此被当作一个一般运动（即”驱力朝向’在一段关系之内被接纳、被持守’的结构化”）的一种由文化所承载的形式，而非当作任何单一文化的属性。

这一标本是一种话语、而非任何特定的出版物。它以不寻常的清晰展示那机制，而它的捕获可被以四步来读，那四步在欲望的层面上恢复那条链的诸操作。

amae，首先，是一个只在一段关系之内被生成的运动。人不向一个陌生人撒娇。那”被接纳、被纵容”的禀性是一种关系性深度的证明与产物，是一个”被一个健康的文化结构化朝向’在一个结之内被持守’”的驱力之运动。它在其根处即是关系性的，不能被作为一份私人的占有而持有。

那话语把这一运动从它的关系中剥去，并把它命名为一个属性。”是一个配得纵容的人”、”拥有一个可被珍爱者的品质”，成了某个”据说人能够习得并展示”的东西。那运动，从它”唯一由之生起”的关系中被割断，被重铸为一个可穿戴的个人特质。这一步是决定性的，因为一个属性能被一件商品所中介，而一段关系不能。

那话语随后把不可占有者谎称为可购买者。”被接纳、被持守”，它只在一段关系中被生成、由无人所占有，却被呈现为一个”正确的购买所授予”的资格。小商品与化妆品被作为”人经由之变得配得被珍爱”的手段而提供。那”因为只存在于一段关系的环绕之中而不能被购买”者，被伪造为一个”正确的获取所保全”之物。

驱力的结构化由此被改道。一个”在一个健康的文化之内会被结构化朝向’在一个结之内被持守’”的运动，被重定向朝向对一个”替代那结”的被商品化之对象的获取。驱力被降格为欲望。Das Ding，即那”‘朝向被持守之运动’会环绕之的不可填满之处”，被一个”被制造并被出售”的 objet a 所遮蔽。这便是这一标本中欲望之结构的异化，即以一个可购买的资格，工业化地替代一个”没有购买能保全”的关系性运动。

从经济排除到本体论排除

一个”够及经济者之外”的后果随出。当欲望之结构以这种方式被异化、关系性内核被重新绑定于一件”必须被购买”的商品时，那些付不起者被第二次持于外部。他们已经被市场持于经济财富之外。他们如今被持于”资本已来中介”的关系系统之外，因为进入那被伪造的关系被一个”他们无法作出”的购买所设卡。

这一排除不仅仅是从一件善之中排除。它是从那”关系根本被造成显得可得”的被中介之场域之中排除。凡资本已把自己插入作为关系性运动的中介者、并已把那运动之显现绑定于一件商品之处，那付不起者便被从”那运动被呈现为可能”的那一场域中排除。那”在原则上对任何人都可得者”（因为一个关系性运动不依赖任何稀缺的标记）被重新圈禁于一个价格之后。经济财富的划分由此被再生产为关系财富的划分，而那排除从一个经济的状况加深为一个本体论的状况，即把主体持于”它本可经由关系而得以生成”的那一场域之外。

矛盾的所在

矛盾躺于欲望之结构的异化之中，而非躺于一个表达层面上的替代之中。一个较早的表述会把机制定位于一个代码层面上的捕获，仿佛那商品是一个”其余方面保持完好”的驱力的另一种表达，仿佛资本只是把那运动的一个符号换成另一个。那一表述低估了机制、并错置了矛盾。那商品不是一个未被触及之驱力的一个对手表达。欲望之结构本身被改道，它的对象被移置到一个”资本已安装”的被捏造之物上，它的运动从”对一个不可填满之处的环绕”被降格为”对一个可购买之处的追逐”。此处被解构者，在这一术语的松散之义上、而非在文本理论所给予它之义上，是那”资本已建来使其显得自然、并显得善”的文化回路，即那”一个关系性运动被使去大批量地经由一个购买而穿过”的回路。自然之显现与善之显现，被靠”表明躺于其下的异化”而拆解。

§13 好的文化循环与资本的本体论位置

前一节所陈述的机制描述一个文化回路如何被捕获。如今需要一个标准，被捕获的回路可由之与未被捕获者相区别，而资本相对于关系所占据的位置可由之被命名。那标准是关系性再生产的伦理学，由本文作者在先前的著作中展开，以及它以生成性正义的方式向价值之流通的投射，那投射追问：谁持有那中介的场域、价值回归于谁、谁设定那回路的规则。

判准

一个文化回路是好的，当它满足公正的关系性再生产的诸原则、并当它所生成的价值回归于”在共同中生成它”的每一个人时。一个已被捕获的回路不合乎这一标准。诸原则在先前的著作中被陈述，而在此被重述为本节的判准。

公正的关系性再生产的诸原则。 一个公正的关系性再生产满足五个条件。生成性：它保存关系性主体之持续成为的可能。共同再生产：那共享的经验经由关系性主体的参与而被再生产，而非经由一方的单边决定。非剥削：它不依赖于对一个主体的工具化、或为另一个主体之利益而对其牺牲，而这是底线。反权力：既然共享经验的每一次再生产都生成解释之权力，一个公正的再生产同时保存那”质疑、修订、并重新协商那权力”的能力。主体保存：它不经由把他者作为一个主体加以消除而达成统一，于是差异被保存、再生产保持可能。

脚注。 诸原则在先前关于关系性再生产之理论的著作中被陈述。它们在此被取作共同必要的条件，各自关涉文化场域中价值的流通。

以这一判准来读，一个文化回路的捕获在五个条件中的三个上同时显示它的不义。资本以它自己的权威界定那场域的规则、诸人设、以及叙事，于是那共享的经验被一方所固定、而非经由关系性主体的参与而被再生产，而共同再生产被违反。参与者承担代价，在时间上、在情感上、在健康上，而剩余被抽向那场域的所有者，于是一侧承担代价、另一侧取走所得，而作为底线的非剥削被违反。解释的权威、设定规则的权威、以及分配剩余的权威，被固定于资本之手，而参与者没有立场去质疑或重新协商它，于是反权力被违反，而那安排被冻结以抗拒争议。

结构上受约束的共同创造者

一个被捕获的文化回路中的参与者占据一个结构上受约束的位置。一个文化场域不是一个政治共同体。一个政治共同体在原则上保留它的成员”共同行动以重造它的规则”的能力。一个由资本组织的文化场域不把这一能力延及那些身处其中者。参与者生成那”回路运行于其上”的关系性价值，并在这一义上是它的共同创造者，然而他们不持有对规则、剩余、或场域之所有权的任何号令。他们的选项被压缩朝向个体的退出，而产业把它制度化为一个被规制的离场。这一位置在此被命名，而不附加一个进一步的判断于它。对论证要紧者是它的结构：那些生成价值者对它的号令没有份额，而留给他们敞开的唯一途径是离开。

资本的本体论位置

至此的分析容许一个更强的主张，它关乎资本相对于关系是什么。这一主张要求小心，因为它易于被这一观察所应对：诸企业立于各种各样的关系之中，对它们的参与者、它们的受众、它们的市场。那观察并不应对这一主张，而要看清何以，需要一个”人可被说成立于一段关系之中”的两种意义之间的区分。

一个关系性主体，在生成性关系性存在的框架所给之义上，在它的诸关系中被构成，并在它们之中生成它独自不能生成者。它是一个”被共同生成的整体”的构成性成员，被置于关系之内、并被它所改变。作为一个关系性主体，便是被交付给关系、并经由它而被再生产。这便是关系性再生产的伦理学所统辖之义，也是那”价值来归属于一个共享的整体、而非归属于任何一个分立而立之方”之义。

资本不在这一义上立于关系之中，而其缘由躺于它如何生成、以及它随后如何行动。价值在关系性主体的共同生成活动中生起。那价值，被积累并被组织，正是资本之所构成者，于是资本从它稍后来中介的关系性活动中生起。它，在其起源，是关系的一个产物。然而资本采取所有权的形式，并经由那形式转身回向那”它由之生起”的场域本身，并意欲持有它。作为一个所有者持有一个场域，便是从外部朝它而立，把它作为一个对象来占有、而非作为一个成员被交付给它。一个所有者与被拥有之物之间的关系是外在的、可转让的，并使所有者不被改变；而那”构成一个关系性主体”的关系是内在的、不可转让的，并改变它所构成的那一个。资本，既已从关系中生起，便不作为一个共同生成的成员返回它。它作为一个持有者转向它。

资本不能是一个关系性主体。 资本在关系性主体的共同生成活动之内生起，并在其起源是关系的一个产物。采取所有权的形式，它转身回向那”它由之生起”的场域，并意欲把它作为一个对象来持有。它能从外部组织、协调、并促成关系，而它不能作为整体的一个共同生成的成员进入关系，因为作为一个所有者持有一个场域便是外在地朝它而立，而作为一个关系性主体便是被交付给关系、并被它所改变。那”一个关系的产物转身去持有关系”的倒置，正是前一节所陈述的异化的本体论形式。

三个层面在这一主张里被焊合，而它们是同一个结构被看见三次。在本体论的层面，资本从关系中生起，并以所有权的形式转身去持有它，于是它不能作为一个共同生成的成员返回关系。在机制的层面，这正是为何它对关系的操作只能是上面所铺陈的欲望之结构的异化，即一种从外部的持有与改道，而绝非一种从内部的共同生成。在伦理的层面，以生成性正义的术语来读，同一个倒置可被读作”价值未能回归于在共同中生成它者”。一个”转身去持有它自己之源头”的关系之产物，恰恰是一个”被生成的价值被从它的诸生成者切断、并在起源之点被占据”的回路。对共同再生产、对非剥削、对反权力的系统违反，不是一个从外部附加的道德指控。它是”当生成性正义的判准被横读于这一倒置之上时那倒置所归结为者”，即资本的本体论位置在它伦理的面孔上显示为”价值向它的共同创造者之回归被打断”。

这化解一个表面的反驳。资本，在古典政治经济学的分析里，是一种社会关系，而似乎”称它不是一个关系性主体”便是与此相矛盾。资本所构成的那种社会关系是一种生产与权力的关系，其结构是外在而不对称的，即一极对另一极的一种持有与一种命令。这不是那”一个关系性主体于其中被生成”的构成性而相互给予的关系。资本立于这种社会关系之中，正是它对关系性主体之外在性的方式、而非它”是一个关系性主体”的方式。关系的这两种意义必须被持分开，而一旦如此，那反驳便消解。

后果可被平白地陈述。资本能组织、协调、并促成关系，而这些各自是对一个”从外部被持有”之场域的操作。它不能成为那”被共同生成的整体”的一个成员，即那”价值会以其名义而归属于生成它者”的共享主体。当价值从关系本身生起，它归属于那”生成它”的共享主体，而资本，它从关系中生起却作为一个所有者持有它，作为那场域的所有者立于那整体之外。资本所遭遇者，在一个”价值来安歇于关系之中”的时代，是一个主体哲学中的问题、而非一个经济学中的问题，而它不是一个”同一形式的一个更好的安排所能化解”者，因为那障碍躺于所有权的形式本身之中。

§14 一个辩证案例：资本对一个关系性神性的不自知的建造

机制与本体论主张可被带来施于一个”一同显示它们的做工与它们的界限”的案例之上。那案例是偶像企业的一个模型，其中价值被寄居于成员之间、以及成员与其支持者之间的连接之中，而非被寄居于一个”被隔着距离持守”的不可企及之影像之中。它在此被无名地对待，作为一个结构、而非一家公司，而它在先前著作中被给予的那个读法被承续下来，并从异化之机制的立足点被重述。

脚注。 同一个案例在先前”象征危机之下关系性价值”的著作中、以一个生成性正义的判准被读，在那里它是那辩证的标本。当前的处理从欲望之结构的异化的立足点重述它，而不重复较早的读法。

这一案例必须被持于一个双重的焦点之中，因为它同时是两样相反之物，而它们的重合正是它全部的旨趣所在。

在起源处公正，在流通之内被捕获

那模型的起源是公正的。它所回答的欠缺是那”去连接、去被见证”的人之本有的愿望，而它不制造任何缺陷、也不以一个购买设卡任何进入。在这一点上它有别于那杂志话语的标本，后者制造一个欠缺、并把它的修复绑定于一件商品。那模型回答一个”每一个人都携带”的欠缺，而它的起源在这一点上是无辜的。

不义进入于流通之内。那模型所生成的关系是真实的。有真正的共同著作，即支持者的见证与参与真正地形塑着成员的进程，也有一个从成员到支持者的真实回返，一个”随其运行而上升”的结。而这一真实的结被造成榨取的材料。那结所生成的关系性价值被那回路的所有者抽走，那连接被绑定于门票与选票，于是情感被经由消费而改道，而在关系之内被生成的剩余转到那”拥有那场域”者。以上面所重述的判准衡量，那模型在它的流通之内被捕获，那”共同创造者所生成”的价值回归于那场域的所有者、而非回归于他们。

资本获利是因为关系是真实的

辩证之点躺于此处，而它正是异化之机制显示其全部锋刃的那一点。那榨取不是”不顾关系之真实性”而运行。它是”经由”它而运行。成员的真诚生产一个真实的连接，那真实的连接积累一段共享的历史、一份记忆、一个被共同持有的身份，而这一积累抬升那”回路能汲取之上”的关系性价值。关系越真实，被生成的关系性价值越大，而可供被榨取的剩余越大。资本获利是因为关系是真实的，并随着它变得更真实而获利更多。

所论的真诚是那”去连接、去被见证”的人之本有的愿望，而它不是一个”资本已制造”的虚假需要。这正是那”把这一案例与那被制造的起源区分开”者，也正是那”使那榨取如此高效”者。一个真实的朝向 das Ding 的环绕，即”驱力朝向被见证”的真正运动，正在那场域中发生。资本，在同一个场域里，异化那运动被结构化的部分，即”驱力经由之被给予其形式”的中介，并把它改道朝向那被商品化的对象，即门票与选票。那真实的关系与那异化被缠绕到一起，一个喂养另一个，于是那回路在关系最真诚之处榨取得最多。这便是异化之机制被在其最锐处看见，即把一个真实的关系性运动降格为一个被商品化的欲望，施行于那”给予那运动以其价值”的真诚本身之上。

一个对关系性神性的不自知的建造

从担保的立足点来读，那模型可被看作做了某个它未曾着手去做之事。它从那不可企及之影像，即那”被隔着距离持守”的偶像的准超越之神性，转向一个被寄居于结之中的价值，而在这样做时它触及了，在关于它的理论存在之前，担保的关系性形式。当那模型生起时，象征危机尚未显明，而它朝向那可企及之结的转向，因此不是一个”针对一个可见的危机而算计”的策略。它是一个先于它历史意义的直觉，一个”在象征场址之耗竭进入视野之前，朝向关系作为价值之场址”的够去。在这一义上，资本，经由那文化形式，不自知地开始建造一个关系性神性，即一个”把过剩寄居于结、而非寄居于符号”的寄居，而它这样做，仿佛它在那”象征场址之缺陷”变得可读之前便已感到了它。那先见是真实的，而它属于那模型的结构、而非属于任何被读入一个人的意图。它稍后的公开陈述，即成员之间的连接是那最珍贵、最属它自己之物，可被取作那直觉变得对自己有意识的时刻，并被作为”被作出的陈述”、而非作为”一个私人动机的证据”而征引。

资本形式的弱点

那案例所证明者是确切而双重的。它证明资本能够及关系并生成一个真实的好循环，而它证明资本不能，在它自己的形式之内，克制不去圈禁那循环并抽走它的剩余。那进展与那界限是同一个行动的两副面孔。那模型打破象征界限的方式，正是它把关系造成一件商品的方式，而它越是完美地生成一个真实的好循环，它就越高效地使那循环变得可榨取，因为被榨取的剩余恰恰是那好循环所生产者。它的进展是它的剥削的条件，而它的剥削是它的进展的形式。

此处所遭遇的界限是关于资本之本体论位置的一节里所命名的那个弱点。那模型够及关系，而不能作为一个共同生成的成员进入它，因为资本从关系中生起、并作为一个所有者持有它。它能，在文化形式的层面，建造一个关系性神性的向外的形状，而它不能占据那”价值会以其名义而归属于生成它者”的关系性主体的位置。既已够及关系，它便不能在它自己的形式里克制不在那里榨取，于是它对一个关系性神性的不自知的建造同时就是对它所建之关系的捕获。那进展是真实的、并必须被完全承认。那界限是资本形式本身的一个弱点、而非一个执行上的过失，而它加深它所做工于其内的不平等，从那”生成价值”的众多者抽走那”累积于’拥有那场域’的一个者”之上的剩余。

§15 结论

论证已从一个领域移到一个机制、再移到一个界限。它以定位关系性领域而开始，在那”象征危机在其中最沉重地压下”的诸区域之中，即那”价值被寄居于一个结、而非寄居于一个符号的稀缺之中”的领域。危机以一条它自己的路径触及这样一个领域。它剥去符号的外壳（凭证、门票、人设）的可信度，并暴露出外壳曾覆盖的关系性内核。以担保的术语说，过剩的象征场址被作废，而担保被压向它的关系性寄居，于是一个文化形式的关系性内核作为那”余留下”的价值而进入视野。

资本作用于那被暴露的内核之上，而它做工的方式是欲望之结构的异化。资本够不到驱力，驱力躺于实在界并环绕 das Ding。它夺取那”驱力经由之被结构化为一个可活之形式”的中介，即文化，并把那结构化从它”朝向关系之内的生成”的航道，改道到一个”朝向一个被商品化的对象”的航道。驱力被降格为欲望，那不可占有的关系性内核被谎称为一个可购买之物，而一个关系性的生成活动之产物被占据、并被树立于主体对面、作为一个”统辖并汲取其欲望”的异己之力。在拉康register里被陈述的降格、与在取自马克思的register里被陈述的异化，是同一个运动，而这一同一性正是标题所承载的主张。

那机制遭遇一个属于资本形式本身的界限。资本从它稍后来中介的关系性活动中生起，而采取所有权的形式，它转身回向那场域并把它作为一个对象来持有。它能从外部组织、协调、并促成关系，而它不能作为整体的一个共同生成的成员进入关系。以生成性正义的术语来读，这一”一个关系的产物倒置为一个关系的持有者”，可被读作”价值向在共同中生成它者之回归被打断”，即那被捕获的回路在共同再生产上、在非剥削上、在权力之克制上的系统失败。资本所遭遇者，在一个”价值来安歇于关系之中”的时代，是一个主体哲学中的问题、而非一个经济学中的问题，而它不是一个”同一形式的一个更好的安排所化解”者，因为那障碍躺于所有权的形式之中。

这一分析不推进任何提案，而在它已使之成为可问的诸问题上收束。谁持有那”一个文化形式经由之结构化那些穿过它者之驱力”的中介。一个文化形式的关系性内核是否能被流通而不被异化，其剩余被”生成它者”所保留、而非被抽向一个场域的所有者。一个关系所生成的价值是否能回归于”在共同中生成它者”，以及在那场域的何种所有权之下这样一个回归变得可能。这些是以一种生成性教学法的方式被提出的，那教学法把问题置于那些”把案例持于视野中”者之前，而不口授它的解答。本文陈述那机制与那界限，而把”辨认在一个给定的文化回路中关系立于何处、其价值回归于谁”留给读者。

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