【(Preliminary)Perspective】Toward a Typology of Trust under the Generative Relational Being Framework - A Preliminary Discussion Paper

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Toward a Typology of Trust under the Generative Relational Being Framework

A Preliminary Discussion Paper

Wanhong Huang (huangwanhong@serendip.ngo)

Abstract

Governance theory has for the most part treated trust as underwritten, with the court standing behind the contract and the central bank behind the currency. The underwriting covers a small and shrinking fraction of the commitments that actually hold, and this discussion asks what produces trust in the remainder.

Coercion is not a distinct mechanism of trust production. It is a case of symbolic credit in which the guarantee is written in violence, and it is neither sufficient nor necessary for the phenomenon it is thought to explain. The argument is informational: an expectation of sanction produces an estimate of the sanction, and it leaves the partner unobserved.

A typology is then proposed, and its classifying dimension is the mode of closure, being what renders reliance across the interval between a commitment and its keeping warranted. Three modes are derived by partition and the derivation claims exhaustiveness: the warrant lies outside the relation, which is closure by guarantee; or it lies within, and the interval is absent, which is closure by fusion; or it lies within, and the interval is traversed and returns, which is closure by return. The corresponding mechanisms are symbolic credit, relational coupling, and generative circulation, and they are separated in their consequences by a criterion external to their operation, namely whether the arrangement admits audit from a position outside itself. Three cases are examined: the memorandum of understanding, in which sophisticated parties select the unenforceable instrument over the enforceable one; intimate relation, in which coercion destroys the very thing it would secure; and peer-produced software, in which trust survives at a scale coupling cannot reach and collapses when value ceases to return to those who produce it.

The condition of return is taken from Eglash, whose definition of generative justice has three clauses and whose account is more demanding than the single clause on return that is usually quoted from it. A difficulty is nonetheless raised and it concerns a matter the account does not address: the boundary of those who count as generators of value, which a closed order may draw so as to satisfy every clause internally. A refinement is proposed with its falsifiers. Self-legislated commitment is treated separately, having no object, and is offered as the opening condition of relation with its danger stated on the same page.

Keywords: trust; coercion; symbolic order; generative justice; relational governance.

Part I. The Question

§1 Judicial Scarcity as a Structural Condition

The commitments that hold in a society vastly outnumber those that any enforcement apparatus could adjudicate. This is ordinarily treated as a practical embarrassment, to be addressed by expanding the apparatus or by triaging its attention. The premise of this discussion is that it is instead a structural condition, and that treating it as an embarrassment has concealed a theoretical error.

The error is visible in the standard picture. Under that picture, enforcement is the load-bearing member, and the unenforced commitments hold because enforcement, though absent, remains available. The court that never sits nonetheless casts its shadow. Compliance in the shadow is compliance all the same, and the theory is preserved.

Consider what the picture predicts. If the shadow bears the load, then coordination should degrade as the shadow thins. Where enforcement is remote, costly, or effectively unavailable, the commitments that depend on it should weaken in proportion. This is a prediction and it is available for inspection, and it is not obviously borne out. Much of social life has always been conducted at a distance from any enforcement that could reach it, and it has been conducted with a reliability that the standard picture does not lead one to expect.

The observation suggests that enforcement was never the load-bearing member, and that the theory has mistaken a visible instrument for a mechanism.

§2 The Failure of the Guarantee

The condition has an additional aspect, and this discussion treats it as the same condition seen from a different angle. The instruments of symbolic credit are in visible difficulty. Institutional legitimacy, expert authority, the credential, the currency, the certifying body: each is an arrangement in which trust is extended to a particular because a general order is thought to stand behind it, and each is now extended with a hesitancy that would have been unusual a generation ago.

This is ordinarily described as a crisis, and the description carries an assumption worth exposing. A crisis is a loss, and a loss presupposes prior possession. The assumption is that the guarantee was formerly in place and has now failed.

The alternative reading is that no guarantee was ever in place, and that what is now visible was formerly obscured. This reading has a source in Lacan, whose formulation is that the Other does not exist, meaning that the guarantor of the symbolic order is itself barred and cannot underwrite what it appears to underwrite. On this reading, symbolic credit was always a circulation that had forgotten that it was a circulation, and what is called crisis is the moment at which it remembers.

The two readings diverge in what they license. If the guarantee has failed, the task is to restore it. If the guarantee was never there, the task is to describe what has been doing the work all along.

§3 The Question

The scarcity of enforcement is the occasion of this discussion and it is not its premise. A premise of scarcity would license the reply that the apparatus should be enlarged, and the argument of §1 and §2 forecloses that reply. What an expectation of sanction produces is compliance, and compliance carries no information about the disposition that would have obtained without it. An enforcement apparatus of unlimited reach would therefore produce an unlimited quantity of compliance and no trust whatever. The question is accordingly not what to do about a shortfall. It is what has been producing trust in the region that enforcement never reached, which is most of the region, and which would remain most of the region were the apparatus made complete.

The question is structural in a second sense, and §2 has stated it. If the guarantee behind symbolic credit was never in place, then the arrangements now described as failing were never underwritten, and their present visibility is a change in what can be seen rather than a change in what obtains. The question in that case is not what to restore.

The question. What closes a commitment when nothing external is available to close it? The question is prior to the question of design, which is deferred. It is prior in the following sense: an account of how public trust may be built presupposes an account of what trust is produced by, and the two are ordinarily conflated because enforcement is taken to be the answer to both.

The form of the answer. Trust is classified here by the mode of closure, which is the dimension along which the mechanisms differ. The classification is claimed to be exhaustive, and the claim is argued in Part III rather than asserted.

Part II. Coercion

§4 The Insufficiency of Coercion

That coercion does not suffice for trust is not a controversial claim, and it will be treated briefly. Compliance obtained under threat of sanction is compatible with the expectation that the party will defect the moment the sanction is withdrawn, and the expectation is often correct. What is produced by the threat is conduct, and the conduct carries no information about the disposition behind it.

The point admits a sharper statement, and the sharper statement will be needed later. Under threat, the party who must decide whether to rely on another is in the following position. The other’s conduct is determined by the sanction; therefore the conduct is evidence about the sanction; therefore it is not evidence about the other. In the vocabulary of predictive inference, the precision of the estimate rests on the sanction, and the estimate of the partner receives no weight, since nothing observed discriminates between a partner who would have performed and a partner who would not. Enforcement fails to produce trust. It removes the observations from which trust could be produced.

§5 The Non-Necessity of Coercion

That coercion is not necessary is the contested half, and the contest turns on the shadow of enforcement. The objection has been stated above and it must be answered rather than restated.

The answer is that the shadow, if it bears the load, must bear it through some mechanism, and the mechanism must be the one identified in the previous section. The shadow works by supplying an expectation of sanction. But an expectation of sanction, wherever it is efficacious, produces the informational condition just described, in which the partner is not observed. The shadow therefore cannot produce trust; it can produce only compliance at a distance. Where trust is observed in the absence of enforcement, either the shadow is not doing the work, or what is observed is not trust.

This yields the first proposition.

Proposition 1. Coercion is neither sufficient nor necessary for trust. It is further not a distinct mechanism of trust production. It is a special case of symbolic credit, being the case in which the guarantee is written in violence, and the sanction is its visible instrument rather than its mechanism.

Refutation. The proposition fails if coordination degrades in proportion as enforcement thins. It fails if trust and compliance cannot be distinguished behaviorally, since the argument turns on the distinction. It fails if some mechanism can be exhibited by which the expectation of sanction produces an estimate of the partner rather than an estimate of the sanction.

§6 What Coercion Supplies

If enforcement is not the source of trust, the question arises of what it was doing, since it plainly does something. The answer proposed here is that it supplies closure.

A commitment is a proposition about a future that has not occurred. What must be secured is that the loop completes, that the future arrives in the form the commitment describes. Enforcement secures this externally, by making the alternative futures costly. This is a real service and it is not to be dismissed. It is simply not the production of trust, and the two have been conflated because enforcement is the most visible way of achieving closure and has therefore been mistaken for the only one.

The consequence is that trust in the absence of enforcement requires closure to be produced from within. Three routes are available in principle, and they will be developed in Part III. Something may be staked that cannot be recovered, so that the alternative futures are removed by the party rather than by the court. Two parties may be coupled so tightly that the question of the other’s compliance does not arise in the form the enforcement picture presupposes. Or the commitment may circulate through a field and return recognizable, so that the closure is the circulation itself and requires nothing beneath it.

§7 The Substitution Thesis

A consequence follows.

Conjecture (substitution). Enforcement and the production of trust are substitutes. Adding enforcement to a relation does not add trust to it. It displaces the informational conditions under which trust is producible, by reallocating the weight of inference from the partner to the sanction.

Refutation. The conjecture makes a claim about the weight of inference and not about the value of the outcome, and the two are separable in principle, since a party’s estimate of what a course of action is worth and a party’s confidence in that estimate are distinct quantities and are, on current understanding, carried differently. The conjecture therefore predicts a dissociation: the introduction of enforcement should leave the estimate of the value of cooperation intact and should shift the confidence from the partner to the sanction. If enforcement is found to move the two together, or to move the value and leave the confidence where it was, the conjecture is wrong.

The instrument that would run this test does not presently exist in a form the author can specify, and the conjecture is held open until it does. What is claimed is that the conjecture has been given a form in which it could be wrong.

If enforcement crowds out trust, the apparent conclusion is that enforcement should be withdrawn. That conclusion does not follow, and Part VI states why.

Part III. A Typology

§8 The Derivation of the Partition

Part II established that a commitment made in the absence of enforcement requires closure to be produced from within, and it named three routes without arguing that they exhaust the possibilities. The argument is given here. It proceeds by partition rather than by enumeration, and the partition is what carries the claim of exhaustiveness.

Let a commitment be a proposition, advanced by one party, concerning a future state, upon which a second party must act before the state obtains. The interval between the advancing and the obtaining is the gap. Closure is whatever renders the second party’s reliance across the gap warranted.

The question is then what the warrant can rest on, and it admits of a disjunction that is complete.

The first cut

The ground of the warrant lies either outside the relation of the two parties, or within it. There is no third location, since the relation and its exterior exhaust the possibilities by construction.

If the ground lies outside, then some third thing underwrites the first party’s performance, and the second party’s reliance is reliance upon that third thing. This is closure by guarantee. The third thing may be a court, an order of law, a currency, a certifying body, or the anticipated judgment of a community. What these have in common is that the second party’s estimate is an estimate of the underwriter and not of the partner, and §4 has shown why this matters. Coercion falls here, as the sub-case in which the underwriting is violence.

The second cut

If the ground lies within the relation, a second disjunction forces, and it too is complete. Either the gap across which reliance must be extended is absent, or it is present and traversed.

The gap is absent where the two parties do not stand as two. If the predictive model each holds cannot be decomposed into a model of the self and a model of the other without loss, then there is no interval across which one party must rely upon another, since the question of the other’s performance is not separable from the question of what the parties are jointly doing. This is closure by fusion, and it is the mechanism named coupling below.

The gap is present and traversed where the commitment passes outward and returns. What the second party relies upon in this case is neither an underwriter nor the absence of separation. It is that the circuit completes, that what is advanced returns recognizable, and that the value generated returns to those who bear the cost of generating it. This is closure by return, and it requires no third thing beneath it. It is the mechanism named circulation below.

The claim of exhaustiveness

Three leaves are yielded by two complete disjunctions: the warrant is external, or the warrant is internal and the gap is absent, or the warrant is internal and the gap is traversed. No fourth position on the tree exists.

The exhaustiveness claim. Closure is achieved by guarantee, by fusion, or by return, and by nothing else. The claim rests on the two disjunctions, each of which is complete: a warrant is located outside the relation or within it, and a gap within a relation is absent or traversed.

Refutation. The claim fails if a mechanism can be exhibited whose warrant is neither external nor internal, which would require a location the disjunction does not admit. It fails, more plausibly, if a mechanism can be exhibited that is internal and in which the gap is neither absent nor traversed. It fails if the notion of the gap is found to be ill-formed, since the second disjunction is defined over it, and in that case the partition would collapse to the first cut and the account would have two mechanisms and not three.

On the standing of the claim. What is offered is a conceptual partition and not a theorem. The terms of which it is composed, being commitment, warrant, and gap, are not formal objects, and no proof is available over them. The partition is exhaustive relative to the disjunctions, and the disjunctions are open to the objection that they are not the right cuts. That objection is the one worth making.

Symbolic credit. Closure by guarantee. A particular commitment is trusted because an order is taken to underwrite it, and trust in the particular is trust in the consistency of the order. Coercion is the sub-case in which the underwriting is violence, and the sanction is its instrument.

Relational coupling. Closure by fusion. The parties come to share a single predictive model, so that the estimate each forms of the other is not separable from the estimate each forms of the joint course of action. Coupling is present to the degree that a party’s model of the situation cannot be decomposed into a model of the self and a model of the other without loss.

Generative circulation. Closure by return. A commitment passes through a field of parties and returns recognizable, and the value it generates returns to those who bear the cost of generating it. The circulation is the closure, and nothing stands beneath it.

The definition of coupling requires a word, since the term carries the weight of Parts IV and V and would otherwise be a picture rather than a construct.

What is claimed is a degree of non-decomposability, and it admits of gradation. Two parties who have never met model one another as objects: the estimate of the other is formed independently of the estimate of the self, and either may be revised without revising the other. Two parties in sustained joint activity approach a condition in which this independence fails, so that a revision to the estimate of the other is a revision to the estimate of what the parties are doing, and the two cannot be pulled apart. Coupling is the name for the failure of that decomposition, and it is high where the failure is severe.

The construct is thereby distinguished from familiarity, with which it is easily confused. Two parties may know one another in great detail and model one another as separate objects throughout, and this is the ordinary condition of long acquaintance. What distinguishes coupling is the loss of the separation, and not the accumulation of the detail.

The sense of decomposition that is intended may be stated, and stating it converts the construct from a picture into a quantity that could in principle be measured. Let each party hold a model over the joint course of action. The model is decomposable if it factorizes into a component over the self and a component over the other with no loss of predictive content, and it is non-decomposable to the degree that such a factorization discards content. The natural measure of the discarded content is the mutual information between the two components, and coupling is high where the measure is high. The formulation places the construct within the framework of predictive inference in which §4 was stated, and it makes the following consistent: enforcement reallocates the weight of inference toward the sanction, and it thereby reduces the content that the two components share, which is to say that enforcement decouples.

The measure is not applied here and the author does not possess the instrument that would apply it. What is claimed is that the construct has been given a form in which the question of its measurement is well posed.

Refutation. The construct fails if the non-decomposability it names cannot be distinguished from the accuracy of one party’s model of the other, since accuracy alone would return the calculative picture. A test would require exhibiting two relations equal in the accuracy of mutual prediction and unequal in whether the models can be pulled apart, and showing that trust follows the second and not the first. Absent such a distinction the construct is a redescription and should be abandoned.

§9 The Criterion That Separates Them

The three cannot be told apart by their dynamic properties, and this is the observation on which the discussion turns. Coupling and circulation both survive the failure of symbolic credit. Both produce trust on the first encounter, without accumulated history. Both are self-sustaining, and both are experienced from within as strong. On every criterion internal to their operation, they are the same.

They differ on one criterion, and it is external.

	Symbolic credit	Coupling	Circulation
Closure	external guarantee	fusion	the circulation
First encounter	no	yes	yes
Survives symbolic failure	no	yes	yes
Auditable from outside	yes	no	yes
Characteristic failure	legitimacy collapse	the closed body	(none)

The fourth row is the whole of the difference and Part V is devoted to it. Coupling admits no position from which the arrangement can be assessed by one who is inside it, because there is no separable inside. Circulation admits such a position, because a commitment that circulates must be capable of being addressed.

§10 The Danger of the Second Column

The practical importance of the criterion may be stated at once, since the discussion would be dangerous without it.

The failure of symbolic credit does not leave a vacuum into which circulation politely enters. What enters is coupling. The strong leader who is trusted by felt fusion rather than by any record, the community of the initiated, the group whose members are certain of one another and of nothing else: these are Imaginary formations in the technical sense, and their trust is strong, sincere, and unavailable to correction from any position outside. The sociology of the present is largely the sociology of this substitution.

An account which concluded that symbolic credit is failing and that relational trust should therefore be turned to would not have described a solution. It would have described the mechanism of its own worst outcome. The distinction between the second and third columns is what prevents this, and it is not a refinement. It is the load-bearing wall.

Part IV. Three Cases

§11 The Standing of the Cases

The three cases are chosen because each carries a different burden. The memorandum of understanding bears on the substitution thesis. Intimate relation bears on the claim that enforcement is destructive of trust, and its absence is the lesser part of what is claimed. Peer-produced software bears on the condition of return and on scale, since it is the only case in which the mechanism must reach beyond parties who know one another.

Each case is presented with the observation that would refute the reading given of it.

§12 The Memorandum of Understanding

The memorandum of understanding is not legally binding, and this is the first thing said of it and the last thing thought about it. The puzzle is ordinarily posed as follows: given the absence of enforcement, why is the instrument honoured?

The puzzle is posed at the wrong place. What requires explanation is the selection. Sophisticated parties, advised by counsel, in a position to execute an enforceable contract, execute the unenforceable instrument instead. They do not lack the option. They decline it.

The reading proposed here follows from the argument of Part II. Enforceability contaminates the signal. Under a contract, performance is overdetermined, and the party who performs cannot be distinguished from the party who feared the court. The information that would tell the parties what they need to know about one another is destroyed by the very provision that secures their position. The memorandum purchases that information at the price of security. It is a deliberate reallocation of inferential weight away from the sanction and toward the partner, and it is available only to parties who are prepared to be wrong.

On this reading the memorandum is not a crystallization of trust already produced elsewhere. It is a production mechanism, and it operates at the first encounter, which no theory of accumulated reputation can accommodate. What closes the loop is that something has been staked which cannot be recovered, namely the party’s own protection.

Refutation. The reading fails if memoranda are selected only where an enforceable contract was unavailable, where transaction costs made it impractical, or where the relation was already trusting and the instrument therefore incidental. The prediction is that the instrument will be selected in preference to the contract precisely where the parties do not yet know one another and wish to. If the opposite distribution is found, the reading is wrong.

§13 Intimate Relation

The other two cases show enforcement to be absent. This one shows it to be destructive, and it is therefore the sharpest form of the substitution thesis available.

A partner who remains because departure has been made costly is not a partner who trusts, and is not a partner in whom trust has been placed. The introduction of coercion into an intimate relation does not diminish trust by some increment. It removes the conditions under which the question could be asked, since nothing the partner does any longer discriminates between the partner who would have stayed and the partner who would not. The relation may persist. What persists is not the thing that was wanted.

The historical material is illustrative and the study it would take to make it demonstrative has not been conducted. Marriage was for most of its recorded history a coercive institution, secured by property, by the impossibility of exit, and in many jurisdictions by the extinction of the wife’s separate legal personality. Enforcement was at a maximum. Whether trust was at a maximum is a question the record does not obviously answer in the affirmative. The liberalization of exit is available as a natural experiment, and the enforcement picture predicts that trust should have collapsed with it. Whether it did is an empirical question and it is not settled here.

This is the case of maximal coupling, and the joint model is at its most complete. It is therefore also the case in which the danger of the second column appears in its most concrete form, and Part V returns to it.

§14 Peer-Produced Software

The third case is chosen because the first two are dyadic and the question of governance is not.

Contribution to a peer-produced software commons is unremunerated, unenforced, and undertaken by parties who in the great majority of cases will never meet. Coupling in the sense of Part III is not available at this scale, and symbolic credit is not what is being extended. Trust nonetheless obtains, and it obtains at a scale that neither of the first two mechanisms reaches.

The reading proposed is that what sustains it is circulation, and that what is returned is the commons itself: the code that the contributor may use, the tooling, the standing, the capacity to build further. The condition of return is thus visible, and so is its violation. The literature on maintainer exhaustion, the relicensing that converts a commons into an asset, and the corporate fork that consumes without contributing are each descriptions of the same event, which is the severance of the return. What follows the severance is not the persistence of trust under reduced conditions. It is collapse.

Refutation. The reading fails if trust in such communities tracks the accumulated reputation of contributors rather than the return of value to those who bear the cost. The two are separable and the prediction differs. If a project whose returns to contributors are intact loses trust when reputational stocks decline, and retains trust when returns are severed but reputations remain, the reading is wrong and the repeated-game account is right.

Part V. The Condition of Return and Its Boundary

§15 The Condition of Return

The three cases converge on a condition that is not supplied by the mechanisms as stated in Part III. Coupling is not sufficient, since parties who share an experience without staking anything are not thereby brought to trust one another. Generation is not sufficient either, since value may be created jointly and at real cost and produce no trust whatever, and it commonly does.

The condition is Eglash’s, and the debt is stated at the outset. Generative justice is defined there in three clauses: the universal right to generate unalienated value and to participate directly in its benefits; the right of value generators to create their own conditions of production; and the right of communities of value generation to nurture self-sustaining paths for its circulation (Eglash 2016). The condition of return is the first of these and it is the one most often quoted, and the account is more demanding than that clause alone conveys.

Two features of the account bear directly on what follows and both are Eglash’s rather than the present author’s. Unalienated value is defined recursively there, as that which makes possible further just and sustainable generation, so that what must circulate is not a quantity of value alone and includes the capacity by which value is generated. And the second clause requires that generators be positioned to create their own conditions of production, which is a requirement about capacity and not about receipts. The recursion and the requirement on capacity are accordingly not contributions of this discussion, and where the present argument reaches them it is reaching what the source already contains.

§16 The Boundary of the Generators

A difficulty remains, and it concerns a matter the account does not address rather than one it addresses inadequately.

Every clause of the definition quantifies over value generators, over communities of value generation, and over those whose activity produced the value in question. None of the clauses settles who these are. The determination of the set is presupposed, and the presupposition is where a closed order operates.

Consider the arrangements ordinarily offered as counterexamples to relational accounts of trust: the criminal association, the guild that excludes, the caste that reproduces itself, the civic republic whose liberties rested on a colony. In each, value returns to the members, the members create their own conditions of production, and the community nurtures a self-sustaining path for the circulation. Every clause is satisfied with respect to the set the arrangement recognizes. The arrangement is sustained by parties it does not recognize.

Such an arrangement does not violate the condition of return. It draws the boundary of those to whom return is owed so as to exclude those whose cost sustains it.

The central conjecture. The set of value generators is constituted by those who bear the cost of the cycle, and not by those whom the cycle recognizes as its participants. A cycle that satisfies every clause of the definition with respect to its self-certified members may nonetheless be extractive, and no criterion internal to the cycle detects this.

This is why the dynamic condition and the condition of justice are orthogonal. The dynamic condition is computable from within the cycle. The condition of justice is not.

The conjecture is offered as a supplement to the account and not as a correction of it. It is available to a defender of generative justice as readily as to a critic, since the natural reply is that the extorted party is plainly a value generator on any reasonable reading of the definition, and that reply is correct. What it does not supply is a criterion by which the arrangement’s own accounting could be shown to be mistaken, since the arrangement’s accounting is conducted in a grammar from which the extorted party is absent. That is the difficulty, and §17 addresses it.

§17 The Question of Address

A further step is required.

If the uncounted are those who bear the cost and are not recognized, the question arises of what determines whether they can be recognized. The proposal is that the determinant is whether the language of the arrangement admits their address. Those who are excluded are not exhausted by those who receive nothing. They are those for whom no signifier exists within the arrangement by which their cost could be stated. They are not misdescribed. They are unsayable.

If this is right, then extraction is in the first instance a hermeneutic fact and only derivatively a distributive one. Ideology is not a false belief held about the excluded. It is the absence of a grammar in which the claim of the excluded could be made at all.

The consequence for translation is the one the present author has argued elsewhere and it is restated here in the governance register. Translation is not a precondition of trust, and the account which makes it one produces a regress and a worse politics, since it licenses the conclusion that trust is possible only among those who already share a world. Translation is the labour by which the boundary of the counted is enlarged. Its refusal is the mechanism by which extraction becomes invisible to those who benefit from it.

An objection presents itself at once and it must be met. The disenfranchised of a modern democracy possess the full grammar of the arrangement they are excluded from. They can state their claim in the language of rights, they are understood, and they are excluded nonetheless. If address suffices, the conjecture is already refuted.

The reply narrows the claim and the narrowing is a cost. Address is a necessary condition and it is not a sufficient one. What the conjecture asserts is that where address is absent the exclusion cannot be seen from within the arrangement at all, and where address is present the exclusion becomes a matter that the arrangement must answer for, whether or not it answers well. The disenfranchised who can state their claim have made the arrangement accountable and have not thereby been included. Those for whom no grammar exists have not made it accountable, and the arrangement registers no debt.

Refutation. So narrowed, the conjecture fails if arrangements can be exhibited in which the excluded possess no grammar of address and the exclusion is nonetheless registered and answered for from within. It fails if the enlargement of the counted set is found to proceed without any prior enlargement of what can be said.

Part VI. Self-Legislated Commitment

§18 A Structure Without an Object

善者吾善之，不善者吾亦善之，德善。信者吾信之，不信者吾亦信之，德信。

圣人无常心，以百姓心为心。

Laozi 49

The passage is treated separately, and the reason is structural. Trust in each of the three mechanisms is trust in something. It has an object: the Other, the partner, the cycle. What the passage describes has no object. It is a posture the subject adopts toward the possibility of relation as such, prior to any relation that could be its object, and it is therefore not a species of the same thing.

Its place in the argument is nonetheless precise, and it fills a hole the three mechanisms leave. Coupling cannot bootstrap itself. Circulation cannot begin. Symbolic credit is unavailable. Something must open the relation before any of the three can operate, and nothing in the typology supplies it.

The claims of this part are of a different kind from those of Parts II through V, and the difference is recorded here rather than left for the reader to discover. What precedes admits refutation by observation. What follows does not, being an account of a structure and a proposal as to its ethical standing, and the conditions under which it would be abandoned are correspondingly different: it fails if the structure it describes is incoherent, or if the constraint of §20 can be shown not to follow from the structure.

The last two characters of each clause carry the claim. The sage’s goodness is not a response to the other’s goodness and his trust is not a response to the other’s trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is not a property the other possessed antecedently and which the sage detected. It is produced in the field that the sage’s posture opens. This is the belief that constitutes its own object, and it was stated in this form long before the vocabulary in which the present author has restated it.

§19 The Formal Structure

The structure is self-legislation. The subject is at once the legislator and the subject of the law. There is no external authority, no enforcement, and no appeal. This is the architecture the present author has developed elsewhere under a different name, in which self-legislation, self-adjudication, self-observance, and the removal of the paths of exit together constitute a commitment that borrows no guarantee. The memorandum is that structure directed toward a particular partner. What the passage describes is the same structure directed toward the possibility of relation itself.

GRB raises the possibility that self-legislation is not the autonomy of an isolated subject. It may instead disclose the constitution of the subject as relational. What becomes manifest under self-legislation is a mode of being in which the subject exists through relational principles and is sustained by them, without recourse to a guarantee held continuously in place from outside.

The weight falls on the subject existing through relational principles, and it does not fall on a law being internalized. If the subject is itself constituted in relation, no interior exists into which a law could be moved. The guarantee was not transferred from outside to inside. The guarantee may never have been in place.

The term 关系性神性 (relational divinity) has been used by the present author for what appears here, and it is used with reservation, since it carries a theological register that the argument does not require. It marks one thing only, which is a law that stands with nothing beneath it. Whether the term earns its weight or merely borrows one is left open.

§20 The Asymmetry

A constraint follows, and it follows analytically rather than as a caution appended to the recommendation.

If the structure is self-legislation, then to legislate it for another is a contradiction in the terms. A law imposed upon another that they be open is not self-legislation. It is legislation by another, and what it produces is obedience rather than the structure described.

The constraint. Self-legislated commitment may be enacted and may not be required. The passage is in the first person throughout. Read as a prescription addressed to the powerless, it is the oldest instruction ever given to them, and every ideology of forbearance has recruited it. The sage of the passage is not vulnerable. The one who can bear the loss may make the wager. The one who cannot bear it is not thereby obliged to.

§21 The Two Versions

A gap remains and it is not closed here.

The classical formulation is unconditional. It does not update on evidence, and it extends to the one who has given every reason for withholding. A defensible modern formulation would be weaker: begin from relational openness rather than from defensive closure, and revise on what is learned. These are different recommendations and the difference is precisely where the risk resides. The weaker version is easier to defend and it is not what the passage says. This discussion states both, marks the gap, and does not resolve it.

§22 Why Enforcement Survives Proposition 1

The conclusion that would follow from Part II if nothing further were said is that enforcement should be withdrawn. It does not follow, and the reason completes the argument.

A commitment with nothing beneath it is a commitment with nothing to catch its failure. The one who legislates for himself and is betrayed has no appeal. Whether this is bearable is not a question of principle. It is a question of what the person can absorb, and the capacity to absorb betrayal is distributed by material circumstance and is distributed unequally.

Enforcement does not produce trust. Proposition 1 stands. What enforcement does is to bound the loss, and in bounding it, to make the wager affordable to those who could not otherwise make it. It is the residual position from which one who is inside an arrangement may still say that something has been done to them.

The withdrawal of enforcement is therefore not the liberation of trust. It is the reassignment of risk to whoever is weakest within the relation.

This is the answer to the danger identified in Part IV in the intimate case. The relation with the least enforcement is the site of the least-punished violence, and the reason is structural. Within a coupling there is no separable position from which the wronged may speak, and enforcement is what remains when that position has been dissolved.

Part VII. The Standing of This Discussion

§23 What Remains Open

Whether coupling has any sense at a scale beyond parties who can attend to one another, and whether the shared symbolic order is what plays that role at scale, or whether the account simply does not extend. Whether the reallocation of inferential weight described in §4 can be observed, and by what measure, which would require a dissociation between the weight assigned to a variable and the value attached to it. Whether the distinction between the genuine and the forged, which the author has treated elsewhere in the dyadic case, has any application where no witness with standing exists.

§24 Where the Argument Would Fail

Two claims carry the rest. The first is the informational point, that enforcement removes the observations from which trust could be produced. If trust and compliance cannot be distinguished, or if the reallocation of inferential weight does not occur, Part II falls and the rest falls with it. The second is that the boundary of the counted set is not determined from within the cycle. If an internal criterion can be exhibited by which an arrangement detects its own uncounted, Part V falls and the orthogonality of the dynamic and the just is a claim without a ground.

What has been attempted here is prior to any account of how trust may be built: to determine whether the trust upon which governance depends is one phenomenon or several, and whether the mechanisms that produce it can be told apart. Readers who can show that they cannot, or who can exhibit an arrangement that audits its own boundary, would be doing the argument the service it most needs. Correspondence is welcome at huangwanhong@serendip.ngo.

End of the preliminary discussion. The mechanisms have been distinguished and the boundary problem has been posed. How public trust may be built is not established here, and is not attempted.

References

Eglash, R. (2016). An introduction to generative justice. Teknokultura, 13(2): 369–404.

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中文

走向生成性关系存在框架下的一种信任类型学

一篇初步的讨论稿

黄万宏 (huangwanhong@serendip.ngo)

摘要

治理理论在大部分情况下把信任当作被担保的，法庭立于合同之后、而中央银行立于货币之后。那份担保覆盖实际成立之诸承诺的一个小而正在缩减的部分，而本讨论追问在其余部分中什么产生信任。

强制不是一个独特的信任生产机制。它是符号信用的一种情形，其中那份保证被以暴力写就，而对于它被认为解释的那个现象，它既不充分、也不必要。这一论证是信息性的：一个对制裁的期望产生一个对那制裁的估计，而它留伴侣于未被观察。

随后一种类型学被提出，而它的分类维度是闭合的模式，即那使跨越一个承诺与它的信守之间之间隔的倚赖成为有保证者。三种模式由划分被推导，而那推导主张穷尽性：那保证躺在关系之外，这是由担保的闭合；或它躺在其内，而那间隔缺席，这是由融合的闭合；或它躺在其内，而那间隔被穿越并返回，这是由返回的闭合。对应的诸机制是符号信用、关系性耦合、以及生成性循环，而它们在它们的诸后果上被一个外在于它们运作的判准所分开，即那安排是否容许从一个外在于它自己的位置审计。三个案例被审视：谅解备忘录，其中老练的诸方在可执行的工具之外选择那不可执行的工具；亲密关系，其中强制摧毁它本要确保之物本身；以及同侪生产的软件，其中信任在一个耦合无法企及之尺度上存活、并在价值不再返回给那些生产它者时崩溃。

那返回的条件取自埃格拉什，他关于生成性正义的定义有三个条款，而他的说明比那通常从它被引用之关于返回的单一条款更苛求。然而一个困难被提起，而它关切一个那说明所不处理之事项：那些算作价值之生成者的边界，而一个封闭的秩序可以如此绘出它、以便在内部满足每一个条款。一个精细化连同它的诸证伪者被提出。自我立法的承诺被单独处理，因它没有对象，而它作为关系的开启条件、连同它的危险在同一页上被陈述而被提供。

关键词： 信任；强制；符号秩序；生成性正义；关系性治理。

第一部分. 那问题

§1 司法稀缺作为一个结构性条件

在一个社会中成立的诸承诺远远多于任何执行机构所能裁决者。这通常被当作一个实践上的窘境，被以扩大那机构或对它的注意分诊来处置。本讨论的前提是它反而是一个结构性的条件，而把它当作一个窘境已隐藏了一个理论上的错误。

那错误在标准图景中可见。依那图景，执行是那承重的构件，而未被执行的诸承诺成立，因为执行，尽管缺席，仍是可得的。那从不开庭的法庭仍投下它的阴影。在阴影中的遵从同样是遵从，而那理论被保全。

考虑那图景所预测者。若那阴影承担那负荷，那么协调应随那阴影变薄而退化。凡执行是遥远的、昂贵的、或实际上不可得的，依赖它的诸承诺应成比例地削弱。这是一个预测、而它可供检查，而它并不显然地被证实。社会生活的许多部分一向在一个与任何能企及它之执行的距离处被进行，而它被以一种标准图景不引人预期的可靠被进行。

那观察提示执行从来不是那承重的构件，而那理论已把一个可见的工具误当作一个机制。

§2 那担保的失败

这一条件有一个附加的方面，而本讨论把它当作从一个不同角度被看见的同一条件。符号信用的诸工具处于可见的困难之中。制度的正当性、专家的权威、凭证、货币、认证机构：每一个都是一个安排，其中信任被给予一个特殊者，因为一个一般的秩序被认为立于它之后，而每一个如今都以一种在一代之前会是不寻常的犹豫被给予。

这通常被描述为一场危机，而那描述携带一个值得暴露的假定。一场危机是一个损失，而一个损失预设先前的占有。那假定是那份担保先前在位、而如今已失败。

那替代的读法是：从未有任何担保在位，而如今可见者先前是被遮蔽的。这一读法在拉康那里有一个源头，他的表述是大他者并不存在，意思是那符号秩序的担保者本身被划杠、并无法担保它看似担保者。依这一读法，符号信用一向是一个已忘记它是一个循环的循环，而那被称为危机者是它记起的那一刻。

这两种读法在它们所许可者上分岔。若那担保已失败，那任务是恢复它。若那担保从不在那里，那任务是描述一向在做那工作者。

§3 那问题

执行的稀缺是本讨论的契机、而它不是它的前提。一个稀缺的前提会许可那“那机构应被扩大”的回答，而§1与§2的论证预先关闭那回答。一个对制裁的期望所产生者是遵从，而遵从不携带任何关于那没有它便会成立之意向的信息。因此，一个无限触及的执行机构会产生一个无限量的遵从、而绝无任何信任。因此，那问题不是就一个缺口做什么。它是一向在执行从未企及之区域（那是那区域的大部分，而它在那机构被弄完整时仍会是那区域的大部分）中产生信任者是什么。

那问题在第二个意义上是结构性的，而§2已陈述它。若符号信用背后的那份担保从不在位，那么如今被描述为正在失败的诸安排从未被担保，而它们当下的可见性是可被看见者的一个改变、而非所成立者的一个改变。在那种情形中，那问题不是恢复什么。

那问题。 当没有任何外在之物可得以闭合一个承诺时，什么闭合它？这个问题先于设计的问题，而设计被推迟。它在如下意义上在先：一个关于公共信任如何可被建立的说明，预设一个关于信任由什么被生产的说明，而这两者通常被混同，因为执行被取为对两者的答案。

那答案的形式。 信任在此被以闭合的模式分类，那是诸机制沿之有别的维度。这一分类被主张为穷尽的，而那主张在第三部分被论证、而非被断言。

第二部分. 强制

§4 强制的不充分

强制对信任不充分，这不是一个有争议的主张，而它将被简短地处理。在制裁之威胁下所获得的遵从，与“那一方将在那制裁被撤回的那一刻背叛”这一期望相容，而那期望往往是正确的。那威胁所产生者是行为，而那行为不携带任何关于它背后之意向的信息。

这一点容许一个更锐利的陈述，而那更锐利的陈述稍后将被需要。在威胁之下，那必须决定是否倚赖另一者的一方处于如下位置。那另一者的行为被那制裁所决定；因此那行为是关于那制裁的证据；因此它不是关于那另一者的证据。以预测推断的词汇，那估计的精度倚于那制裁，而那对伴侣的估计接受不到任何权重，因为所观察者中没有任何东西区分一个本会履行的伴侣与一个本不会的伴侣。执行未能产生信任。它移除那信任本可从之被产生的诸观察。

§5 强制的非必要

强制不是必要的，这是那被争议的一半，而那争议转轴于执行的阴影。那反对已在上文被陈述、而它必须被回答、而非被重述。

那答案是：那阴影，若它承担那负荷，必须通过某个机制承担它，而那机制必须是前一节所辨认的那个。那阴影通过供给一个对制裁的期望而运作。但一个对制裁的期望，无论它在何处有效，都产生方才所描述的信息性条件，其中那伴侣未被观察。因此那阴影无法产生信任；它只能产生一段距离处的遵从。凡信任在执行的缺席中被观察，要么那阴影不在做那工作，要么所观察者不是信任。

这产出那第一个命题。

命题 1。 强制对信任既不充分、也不必要。它进一步不是一个独特的信任生产机制。它是符号信用的一个特例，即那份保证被以暴力写就的情形，而那制裁是它可见的工具、而非它的机制。

证伪。 这一命题失败，若协调随执行变薄而成比例地退化。它失败，若信任与遵从无法在行为上被区分，因为那论证转轴于那区分。它失败，若某个机制能被展示，那对制裁的期望据以产生一个对伴侣的估计、而非一个对制裁的估计。

§6 强制所供给者

若执行不是信任之源，那么就升起它一向在做什么的问题，因为它显然做某事。此处所提出的答案是它供给闭合。

一个承诺是一个关于一个尚未发生之未来的命题。所必须确保者是那循环完成，即那未来以那承诺所描述的形式到来。执行外在地确保这，通过使那些替代的未来昂贵。这是一个真实的服务、而它不应被摒弃。它只是不是信任的生产，而这两者已被混同，因为执行是达成闭合的最可见之方式、并因此被误当作唯一的方式。

其后果是：在执行的缺席中的信任要求闭合从内部被生产。三条路线在原则上是可得的，而它们将在第三部分被发展。某种无法被收回之物可被押上，因而那些替代的未来被那一方、而非被那法庭所移除。两方可被如此紧密地耦合，以致那另一者之遵从的问题不以那执行图景所预设的形式升起。或者那承诺可以穿过一个场并返回可被辨认者，因而那闭合是那循环本身、而要求它之下没有任何东西。

§7 那替代论旨

一个后果随之而来。

猜想（替代）。 执行与信任的生产是替代品。向一个关系添加执行并不向它添加信任。它置换那信任据以是可被生产之信息性条件，通过把推断的权重从伴侣重新分配到制裁。

证伪。 这一猜想作出一个关于推断之权重、而非关于结果之价值的主张，而这两者在原则上是可分离的，因为一方对一个行动路线值多少的估计与一方对那估计的信心是不同的量，并且，依当前的理解，被以不同方式承载。因此这一猜想预测一次解离：执行的引入应留对合作之价值的估计完好、而应把那信心从伴侣移向制裁。若执行被发现把这两者一同移动、或移动那价值而把那信心留在原处，那么这一猜想是错的。

那会运行这一检验的仪器当前不以一个作者所能指定的形式存在，而这一猜想被持敞直到它存在。所主张者是这一猜想已被给予一个它能被错的形式。

若执行挤出信任，那表面的结论是执行应被撤回。那结论并不随之而来，而第六部分陈述为何。

第三部分. 一种类型学

§8 那划分的推导

第二部分确立了一个在执行缺席中所作的承诺要求闭合从内部被生产，而它命名了三条路线、而不曾论证它们穷尽诸可能。那论证在此被给出。它由划分、而非由枚举进行，而那划分是那承载穷尽性之主张者。

设一个承诺是一个由一方推进的、关于一个未来状态的命题，一个第二方必须在那状态成立之前依它行动。那推进与那成立之间的间隔是那空隙。闭合是无论什么使那第二方跨越那空隙的倚赖成为有保证者。

那问题于是是那保证能倚于什么，而它容许一个完整的析取。

那第一刀

那保证的根据要么躺在这两方的关系之外、要么在它之内。没有任何第三个位置，因为那关系与它的外部依构造穷尽诸可能。

若那根据躺在外面，那么某个第三物担保那第一方的履行，而那第二方的倚赖是对那第三物的倚赖。这是由担保的闭合。那第三物可以是一个法庭、一个法律的秩序、一个货币、一个认证机构、或一个社群的被预期之判断。这些所共有者是那第二方的估计是一个对那担保者、而非对那伴侣的估计，而§4已显示为何这要紧。强制落于此处，作为那份担保是暴力的子情形。

那第二刀

若那根据躺在那关系之内，一个第二析取被迫出，而它也是完整的。要么那倚赖必须被延伸跨越的空隙缺席、要么它在场并被穿越。

那空隙缺席于两方不作为两个而立之处。若每一方所持的预测模型无法被无损地分解为一个关于自我的模型与一个关于他者的模型，那么便没有任何一方必须倚赖另一方所跨越的间隔，因为那另一者之履行的问题不与那两方联合在做什么的问题相分离。这是由融合的闭合，而它是下文所命名的耦合机制。

那空隙在场并被穿越于那承诺向外传递并返回之处。那第二方在这一情形中所倚赖者既非一个担保者、亦非分离的缺席。它是那回路完成、那被推进者返回可被辨认者、而那被生成的价值返回给那些承担生成它之成本者。这是由返回的闭合，而它要求它之下没有任何第三物。它是下文所命名的循环机制。

那穷尽性的主张

三片叶子由两个完整的析取被产出：那保证是外部的，或那保证是内部的且那空隙缺席，或那保证是内部的且那空隙被穿越。那树上没有任何第四个位置存在。

那穷尽性主张。 闭合由担保、由融合、或由返回被达成，而不由任何其他者。这一主张倚于那两个析取，其中每一个都是完整的：一个保证被定位于关系之外或之内，而一个关系之内的空隙缺席或被穿越。

证伪。 这一主张失败，若一个机制能被展示，它的保证既非外部的、亦非内部的，而那会要求一个那析取所不容许的位置。它失败，更为可信地，若一个机制能被展示，它是内部的、并在其中那空隙既非缺席、亦非被穿越。它失败，若那空隙的概念被发现是病构的，因为那第二析取被定义于它之上，而在那种情形中那划分会坍缩到那第一刀，而那说明会有两个机制、而非三个。

关于那主张的地位。 所提供者是一个概念性的划分、而非一个定理。它由之组成的诸术语，即承诺、保证与空隙，不是形式的对象，而在它们之上没有任何证明可得。那划分相对于那些析取是穷尽的，而那些析取对“它们不是正确的诸刀”这一反对敞开。那反对是那值得作出的一个。

符号信用。 由担保的闭合。一个特殊的承诺被信任，因为一个秩序被取为担保它，而对那特殊者的信任是对那秩序之一致性的信任。强制是那份担保是暴力的子情形，而那制裁是它的工具。

关系性耦合。 由融合的闭合。这两方来共享一个单一的预测模型，因而每一方对那另一者所形成的估计不与每一方对那联合行动路线所形成的估计相分离。耦合在场，到一方对那情境的模型无法被无损地分解为一个关于自我的模型与一个关于他者的模型的程度。

生成性循环。 由返回的闭合。一个承诺穿过一个诸方之场并返回可被辨认者，而它所生成的价值返回给那些承担生成它之成本者。那循环是那闭合，而它之下立着没有任何东西。

耦合的定义要求一言，因为这一术语承载第四与第五部分的分量、而否则会是一幅图画、而非一个构念。

所主张者是一个不可分解的程度，而它容许分级。从未相遇的两方把彼此建模为诸对象：对那另一者的估计独立于对那自我的估计被形成，而任一者可被修订而不修订那另一者。处于持续联合活动中的两方趋近一个此独立性失败的条件，因而一个对那另一者之估计的修订是一个对那两方在做什么之估计的修订，而这两者无法被拉开。耦合是那分解之失败的名字，而它在那失败严重之处是高的。

这一构念由此与熟悉相区别，它易与后者被混淆。两方可以极详细地认识彼此、并自始至终把彼此建模为分离的诸对象，而这是长久相识的寻常条件。区分耦合者是那分离的丧失，而不是那细节的积累。

所意图的分解之意义可被陈述，而陈述它把这一构念从一幅图画转换为一个在原则上能被测量的量。设每一方持有一个跨那联合行动路线的模型。那模型是可分解的，若它无预测内容之损失地分解为一个跨自我的分量与一个跨他者的分量，而它是不可分解的，到这样一个分解丢弃内容的程度。那被丢弃之内容的自然量度是那两个分量之间的互信息，而耦合在那量度高之处是高的。这一表述把这一构念置于§4被陈述于其中的预测推断之框架内，而它使如下者一致：执行把推断的权重朝向那制裁重新分配，而它由此减少那两个分量所共享的内容，也就是说，执行去耦合。

那量度在此不被应用，而作者不拥有那会应用它的仪器。所主张者是这一构念已被给予一个它测量之问题被良好提出的形式。

证伪。 这一构念失败，若它所命名的不可分解性无法与一方对那另一者之模型的准确相区分，因为单是准确会返回那算计的图景。一个检验会要求展示两个在相互预测之准确上相等、而在那些模型是否能被拉开上不相等的关系，并显示信任跟随第二个、而非第一个。缺这样一个区分，这一构念是一次重新描述、而应被放弃。

§9 那把它们分开的判准

这三个无法被它们的动力学性质分辨开来，而这是本讨论所转轴的观察。耦合与循环都熬过符号信用的失败。两者都在第一次相遇产生信任，而无积累的历史。两者都是自我维系的，而两者都从内部被经历为强的。在每一个内在于它们运作的判准上，它们是相同的。

它们在一个判准上有别，而它是外部的。

	符号信用	耦合	循环
闭合	外部担保	融合	那循环
第一次相遇	否	是	是
熬过符号失败	否	是	是
可从外部审计	是	否	是
典型失败	正当性崩溃	那封闭的体	（无）

那第四行是那差异的全部，而第五部分致力于它。耦合不容许任何位置，一个在它之内者可从之评估那安排，因为没有任何可分离的内部。循环容许这样一个位置，因为一个循环着的承诺必须能够被致意。

§10 那第二列的危险

那判准的实践重要性可被立即陈述，因为没有它这一讨论会是危险的。

符号信用的失败并不留下一个循环礼貌地进入的真空。所进入者是耦合。那被感到之融合、而非任何记录所信任的强人，那入门者的社群，那其成员对彼此、而对无一其他者确定的群体：这些是技术意义上的想象界形构，而它们的信任是强的、真诚的、并对来自任何外部位置的纠正不可得。当下的社会学在很大程度上是这一替代的社会学。

一个断定“符号信用正在失败、而因此应转向关系性信任”的说明，本不会描述了一个解决方案。它本会描述了它自己最坏结果的机制。那第二列与第三列之间的区分是那阻止这者，而它不是一个精细化。它是那承重的墙。

第四部分. 三个案例

§11 诸案例的地位

这三个案例被选择，因为每一个承担一个不同的负担。谅解备忘录关乎那替代论旨。亲密关系关乎“执行毁灭信任”这一主张，而它的缺席是所主张者的较小部分。同侪生产的软件关乎那返回的条件、并关乎尺度，因为它是那机制必须伸出彼此认识之诸方之外的唯一案例。

每一个案例连同那会反驳对它所给之读法的观察被呈现。

§12 谅解备忘录

谅解备忘录不具法律约束力，而这是关于它所说的第一件事、并是关于它所想的最后一件事。那谜题通常如下被提出：鉴于执行的缺席，为何那工具被恪守？

那谜题在错误之处被提出。所要求解释者是那选择。老练的诸方，被律师建议，处于能执行一份可执行合同的位置，反而执行那不可执行的工具。他们不缺那选项。他们谢绝它。

此处所提出的读法从第二部分的论证随之而来。可执行性污染那信号。在一份合同之下，履行被过度决定，而那履行的一方无法与那畏惧法庭的一方相区分。那会告诉诸方他们需要知道的关于彼此之物的信息，被那确保他们位置的条款本身所摧毁。那备忘录以安全为代价购得那信息。它是一次有意的、把推断权重从制裁移开而朝向伴侣的重新分配，而它只对那些准备好犯错的诸方可得。

依这一读法，那备忘录不是一份别处已被产生之信任的结晶。它是一个生产机制，而它在第一次相遇运作，而这是没有任何积累声誉的理论所能容纳的。那闭合那循环者是某种无法被收回之物已被押上，即那一方自己的保护。

证伪。 这一读法失败，若备忘录只在一份可执行合同不可得之处、在交易成本使它不切实际之处、或在那关系已然是信任的且那工具因此是附带的之处被选择。那预测是那工具将被优先于那合同而被选择，恰恰在诸方尚不认识彼此、而希望认识之处。若那相反的分布被发现，这一读法是错的。

§13 亲密关系

其他两个案例显示执行是缺席的。这一个显示它是毁灭性的，而它因此是那可得的替代论旨的最锐利形式。

一个因离开已被弄得昂贵而留下的伴侣不是一个信任的伴侣，并不是一个信任已被置于其中的伴侣。把强制引入一个亲密关系并不以某个增量减少信任。它移除那问题本可被提出所据的诸条件，因为那伴侣所做的任何东西都不再区分那本会留下的伴侣与那本不会的伴侣。那关系可以持存。所持存者不是那被想要之物。

那历史材料是示例性的，而使它成为示范性所需的研究不曾被进行。婚姻在它有记录的历史的大部分中是一个强制性的制度，被财产、被离开的不可能、并在许多司法辖区被妻子分离之法律人格的消灭所确保。执行处于一个最大值。信任是否处于一个最大值，是一个那记录并不显然地肯定回答的问题。离开的自由化可作为一个自然实验，而那执行图景预测信任本应随它崩溃。它是否崩溃是一个经验问题、而它在此不被了结。

这是最大耦合的案例，而那联合模型处于它最完整之处。因此它也是那第二列的危险以它最具体之形式出现的案例，而第五部分返回于它。

§14 同侪生产的软件

那第三个案例被选择，因为前两个是二元的、而治理的问题不是。

对一个同侪生产的软件公共地的贡献是不被酬偿的、不被执行的、并被那些在绝大多数情形中将从不相遇的诸方所承担。第三部分意义上的耦合在这一尺度上不可得，而符号信用不是所被给予者。信任却成立，而它在一个前两个机制都不企及的尺度上成立。

所提出的读法是：维系它者是循环，而所被返回者是那公共地本身：那贡献者可使用的代码、那工具、那地位、那继续构建的能力。因此那返回的条件是可见的，它的违反也是。关于维护者耗竭的文献、把一个公共地转换为一份资产的重新许可、以及那消耗而不贡献的公司分叉，每一个都是对同一个事件的描述，即那返回的切断。那切断所跟随者不是信任在被减弱之条件下的持存。它是崩溃。

证伪。 这一读法失败，若这样的社群中的信任跟踪诸贡献者的积累声誉、而非价值向那些承担成本者的返回。这两者是可分离的，而那预测有别。若一个其对贡献者之返回完好的项目在声誉存量下降时失去信任、并在返回被切断而声誉留存时保持信任，那么这一读法是错的、而那重复博弈的说明是对的。

第五部分. 那返回的条件及它的边界

§15 那返回的条件

这三个案例汇合于一个不被第三部分所陈述之诸机制所供给的条件。耦合不充分，因为共享一个经验而不押上任何东西的诸方不由此被带到相互信任。生成也不充分，因为价值可被联合地、并以真实的成本被创造、而产生绝无任何信任，而它通常如此。

那条件是埃格拉什的，而那份债在开端被陈述。生成性正义在那里被以三个条款定义：生成未被异化之价值并直接参与它惠益的普遍权利；价值生成者创造他们自己生产条件的权利；以及价值生成之诸社群培育它流通之自我维系路径的权利（埃格拉什，2016）。那返回的条件是这些中的第一个，而它是最常被引用的那一个，而那说明比单那条款所传达者更苛求。

那说明的两个特征直接关乎随后者，而两者都是埃格拉什的、而非当下作者的。未被异化的价值在那里被递归地定义，作为那使进一步的正义而可持续的生成成为可能者，因而所必须流通者不是单一份价值之量，而包括那价值据以被生成的能力。而那第二个条款要求诸生成者被定位以创造他们自己的生产条件，而这是一个关于能力、而非关于收据的要求。因此，那递归与那对能力的要求不是本讨论的贡献，而当下的论证在何处抵达它们，它是在抵达那源头已然含有者。

§16 诸生成者的边界

一个困难仍然存在，而它关切一个那说明所不处理、而非一个它处理得不充分之事项。

那定义的每一个条款都在价值生成者、在价值生成之诸社群、在那些其活动产生所论价值者之上量化。诸条款中没有一个了结这些是谁。那集合的确定被预设，而那预设是一个封闭的秩序运作之处。

考虑那些通常被作为对信任之关系性说明之反例而提供的诸安排：犯罪结社、排斥的行会、再生产它自己的种姓、它的诸自由倚于一个殖民地的公民共和国。在每一个中，价值返回给成员，成员创造他们自己的生产条件，而那社群为那流通培育一条自我维系的路径。每一个条款就那安排所认可的集合被满足。那安排被它所不认可的诸方所维系。

这样一个安排并不违反那返回的条件。它如此绘出那些返回被欠于其的人的边界、以便排除那些其成本维系它者。

那中心猜想。 那价值生成者的集合由那些承担那循环之成本者所构成，而不由那些那循环认可为它参与者者所构成。一个就它自我认证之成员满足那定义每一个条款的循环，仍可能是榨取性的，而没有任何内在于那循环的判准察觉这。

这是为何那动力学的条件与那正义的条件是正交的。那动力学的条件从那循环之内可被计算。那正义的条件不。

这一猜想作为对那说明的一个补充、而非作为对它的一个纠正被提供。它对一个生成性正义的捍卫者如对一个批评者一般现成地可得，因为那自然的回答是那被勒索的一方在那定义的任何合理读法上显然是一个价值生成者，而那回答是正确的。它所不供给者是一个判准，那安排自己的核算据以能被显示为错的，因为那安排的核算是以一种那被勒索的一方从之缺席的语法被进行的。那是那困难，而§17处置它。

§17 那致意的问题

一个进一步的步骤被要求。

若那些未被计数者是那些承担成本而不被认可者，那么就升起什么决定他们能否被认可的问题。那提议是那决定因素是那安排的语言是否容许对他们的致意。那些被排除者不被那些接受无物者所穷尽。他们是那些其成本本可被陈述所据的、在那安排之内不存在任何能指者。他们不被误描述。他们是不可言说的。

若这是对的，那么榨取首先是一个诠释学的事实、而只派生地是一个分配的事实。意识形态不是一个关于被排除者所持有的虚假信念。它是一种语法的缺席，那被排除者的主张据以竟能被作出。

那对翻译的后果是当下作者已在别处论证者，而它在此以治理的层面被重述。翻译不是信任的一个前提条件，而使它成为一个前提条件的说明产生一个回退与一种更坏的政治，因为它许可那“信任只在那些已然共享一个世界者之间是可能的”这一结论。翻译是那被计数者的边界据以被扩大的劳动。它的拒绝是那榨取据以对那些从中获益者变得不可见的机制。

一个反对立即呈现自己、而它必须被应对。一个现代民主的被剥夺公民权者拥有他们被排除于其外之安排的完整语法。他们能以权利的语言陈述他们的主张，他们被理解，而他们仍被排除。若致意足够，这一猜想已被反驳。

那回答窄化这一主张，而那窄化是一个代价。致意是一个必要条件、而它不是一个充分条件。这一猜想所断言者是：在致意缺席之处，那排除根本无法从那安排之内被看见，而在致意在场之处，那排除成为一件那安排必须为之作答之事，无论它是否作答得好。那能陈述他们主张的被剥夺公民权者已使那安排可被问责、而不由此被包括。那些在其上不存在任何语法者不曾使它可被问责，而那安排登录不出任何债。

证伪。 如此被窄化，这一猜想失败，若诸安排能被展示，其中被排除者拥有不了任何致意的语法、而那排除却从内部被登录并被为之作答。它失败，若那被计数集合的扩大被发现进行而没有任何在先的、对可被说者的扩大。

第六部分. 自我立法的承诺

§18 一个没有对象的结构

善者吾善之，不善者吾亦善之，德善。信者吾信之，不信者吾亦信之，德信。

圣人无常心，以百姓心为心。

《老子》第四十九章

这一段落被单独处理，而理由是结构性的。这三个机制中每一个里的信任都是对某物的信任。它有一个对象：大他者、伴侣、那循环。那段落所描述者没有对象。它是主体朝向关系本身之可能所采取的一种姿态，先于任何本可是它对象的关系，而它因此不是同一事物的一个种。

它在论证中的位置却是精确的，而它填补三个机制所留下的一个洞。耦合无法自举它自己。循环无法开始。符号信用不可得。某物必须在这三个中任何一个能运作之前开启那关系，而类型学中没有任何东西供给它。

本部分的诸主张与第二至第五部分的诸主张是不同的一类，而那差异在此被记录、而非被留给读者去发现。在先者容许由观察的反驳。随后者不，因它是一个关于一个结构的说明与一个关于它伦理地位的提议，而它会被放弃所据的诸条件相应地不同：它失败，若它所描述的结构是不融贯的，或若§20的约束能被显示为不从那结构随之而来。

每一个条款的最后两个字承载那主张。那圣人的善不是一个对那另一者之善的回应，而他的信不是一个对那另一者之可信的回应。可信不是那另一者先前拥有、而那圣人所察觉的一个性质。它在那圣人的姿态所开启之场中被生产。这是那构成它自己对象的信念，而它以这一形式被陈述，远早于当下作者以之重述它的那词汇。

§19 那形式结构

那结构是自我立法。主体一时既是立法者、又是那法的主体。没有任何外部权威、没有执行、没有申诉。这是当下作者已在别处以一个不同的名字发展的架构，其中自我立法、自我裁决、自我遵守、以及退出之诸路径的移除，一同构成一个不借用任何担保的承诺。那备忘录是那结构朝向一个特殊的伴侣。那段落所描述者是同一个结构朝向关系本身的可能。

GRB 提起那可能，即自我立法不是一个孤立主体的自主。它反而可能揭示主体作为关系性的构成。在自我立法之下变得显明者是一种存在的方式，其中主体通过关系性的诸原则而存在、并被它们所维系，而不诉诸一个从外面被持续持于原处的担保。

那分量落在主体通过关系性的诸原则而存在，而它不落在一条法被内化。若主体本身是在关系中被构成的，便没有任何内部存在、一条法本可被移入其中。那担保不曾从外面被转移到里面。那担保可能从不在位。

术语 关系性神性 已被当下作者用于此处所出现者，而它被以保留使用，因为它携带一个论证所不要求的神学层面。它只标记一件事，即一条其下立着没有任何东西的法。那术语是挣得它的分量、抑或只是借用了一个，被留敞。

§20 那不对称

一个约束随之而来，而它分析地、而非作为一个附加于那推荐的告诫随之而来。

若那结构是自我立法，那么为另一者立法它是措辞中的一个矛盾。一条被强加于另一者、要他们开放的法不是自我立法。它是由另一者的立法，而它所产生者是服从、而非那被描述的结构。

那约束。 自我立法的承诺可被制定、而不可被要求。那段落自始至终是第一人称的。被读作一个对无权者所致意的处方，它是曾给予他们的最古老的指示，而每一种忍让的意识形态都招募了它。那段落的圣人不是脆弱的。那能承担那损失者可作那投注。那无法承担它者不由此被责成去作。

§21 那两个版本

一个空隙仍然存在，而它在此不被闭合。

那经典的表述是无条件的。它不在证据上更新，而它延展到那已给出每一个理由以扣留者。一个可辩护的现代表述会更弱：从关系性的开放、而非从防御性的封闭开始，并在所学者上修订。这些是不同的推荐，而那差异恰恰是那风险所驻留之处。那更弱的版本更易于被辩护、而它不是那段落所说者。本讨论陈述两者、标记那空隙、而不解决它。

§22 为何执行熬过命题 1

若不再说任何东西，那会从第二部分随之而来的结论是执行应被撤回。它并不随之而来，而那理由完成那论证。

一个其下没有任何东西的承诺是一个没有任何东西可接住它之失败的承诺。那为他自己立法而被背叛者没有任何申诉。这是否可被承受不是一个原则的问题。它是一个那人能吸收什么的问题，而吸收背叛的能力被物质境况所分配、并被不平等地分配。

执行不产生信任。命题 1 立着。执行所做者是限定那损失，而在限定它时，使那投注对那些否则无法作它者可负担。它是那残余的位置，一个在一个安排之内者可从之仍说某事已被对他们做。

因此，执行的撤回不是信任的解放。它是风险向那关系之内无论谁最弱者的重新指派。

这是对第四部分在亲密情形中所辨认之危险的答案。那有最少执行的关系是那最少被惩罚之暴力的场址，而理由是结构性的。在一个耦合之内没有任何可分离的位置，一个被冤者可从之言说，而执行是那位置已被溶解时所留下者。

第七部分. 本讨论的地位

§23 什么仍然敞开

耦合在一个超出能彼此留意之诸方的尺度上是否有任何意义，以及那被共享的符号秩序是否是那在尺度上扮演那角色者，抑或那说明只是不延伸。§4所描述的推断权重之重新分配是否能被观察、并以何种量度，而这会要求一个在被指派给一个变量之权重与被附着于它之价值之间的解离。那真正者与那伪造者之间的区分，作者已在别处于二元情形中处理者，是否在没有任何有地位之见证者存在之处有任何应用。

§24 那论证会在何处失败

两个主张承载其余者。第一个是那信息性的要点，即执行移除那信任本可从之被产生的诸观察。若信任与遵从无法被区分、或若那推断权重的重新分配不发生，第二部分倒下、而其余者随它倒下。第二个是那被计数集合的边界不从那循环之内被确定。若一个内在的判准能被展示，一个安排据以察觉它自己的未被计数者，第五部分倒下、而那动力学的与那正义的之正交性是一个没有根据的主张。

此处所已被尝试者先于任何关于信任如何可被建立的说明：确定那治理所依赖的信任是一个现象还是若干、以及那产生它的诸机制能否被分辨开来。那些能显示它们不能、或那些能展示一个审计它自己边界之安排的读者，会对这一论证做它最需要的服务。欢迎在 huangwanhong@serendip.ngo 通信。

初步讨论终。诸机制已被区分，而那边界问题已被提出。公共信任如何可被建立在此不被确立，并不被尝试。

参考文献

Eglash, R. (2016). An introduction to generative justice. Teknokultura, 13(2): 369–404.