Interpretive Justice in Heteromorphic Value Conversion - Toward a Generative Relational Theory of Legitimate Value Conversion Nomos 【（Preliminary）Draft】

ENGLISH

Abstract

A polity that recognizes several official languages must maintain an apparatus of translation, and the apparatus is an institution with a politics of its own. This paper takes that arrangement as a model for a wider condition. Where the values held within a polity are generated in different relational settings, they acquire different semantics, different conditions of production, and different histories, so that collective decision requires their conversion into terms admitting of comparison. The framework performing that conversion is treated here as a translation regime for values, and the paper asks what makes such a regime legitimate. The survey concedes that the descriptive half of this subject is occupied: the sociology of commensuration has established that conversion frameworks are interpretive, institutionalized, and productive of power, and the sociology of worth has mapped the plural orders across which conversion must operate. What appears to remain open is a normative account of the legitimacy of a conversion framework considered as an institution. The paper proposes such an account in three parts: a distinction between the justice of a framework’s formation and the justice of the framework itself; six meta-principles by which a framework may be assessed, five of them inherited from existing traditions and attributed accordingly; and a criterion under which a framework is assessed by whether it preserves the capacity of the relations it orders to generate a further determination of the equivalences it fixes. The account supplies no procedure for measuring that capacity, it does not resolve the trade-off between the cost of translation and the reach of a polity, and its central propositions are entered as hypotheses. The closing questions are held to be the more valuable half of what is offered.

Keywords: multilingual democracy; commensuration; value conversion; legitimacy; translation; counterpower; relational plurality; governance.

A note on the standing of this paper. This is a discussion paper. It identifies a structure, surveys what existing scholarship has made of it, marks where each account appears to run out, and proposes a direction for work. It does not complete a theory. The survey is conducted in a conceding register, because the central descriptive claims of this subject were established some decades ago in a literature the political-theory treatments of value pluralism do not always cite, and a paper that failed to say so would be worth less than one that says so first. Where a claim entered here as open is in fact occupied, or where a source has been read wrongly, correction is welcome at huangwanhong@serendip.ngo.

§1 Introduction

A polity that recognizes several official languages faces a problem its monolingual neighbours can leave implicit. Its laws must exist in several versions, and the versions must be held to say the same thing. When they diverge, some institution must determine which reading governs, and that determination is made by an apparatus of translation, interpretation, and authorization that the polity has built and maintains at considerable expense. The European Union adopts its legislation in all official languages with each version equally authentic; Switzerland, Canada, India, Belgium, and South Africa each maintain arrangements of comparable ambition. Such arrangements are costly, they are contested, and they are the visible institutional form of a question that monolingual polities answer without noticing that they have answered it.

The question is what a polity does when the terms in which its members articulate what matters to them fail to coincide. This paper takes the multilingual case as a model for a wider condition, and the extension is the paper’s organizing hypothesis. Where the values held within a polity are generated in different settings, through different practices, and under different histories, they acquire what may be called heteromorphy: differences in semantics, in the mechanisms by which they are produced, in the relational structures that sustain them, and in the meanings they carry for those who hold them. The ecological integrity of a watershed, the security of a livelihood, the continuity of a language community, the return on invested capital, and the dignity of a person subjected to an administrative decision are values of this kind. They are not versions of one thing, and a collective decision bearing on all of them requires that they be brought into some relation admitting of comparison. The framework by which that is done may be understood as a translation regime, and a polity operating under heteromorphic values may be understood as multilingual in an extended sense.

Three difficulties motivate what follows. The first concerns visibility. The apparatus performing value conversion in contemporary governance is largely technical in appearance: a discount rate, a valuation methodology, an impact assessment protocol, a scoring rubric, a schedule of weights. Because the apparatus presents as method, the settlements it embodies are seldom examined as settlements, and the choice among them is seldom recognized as a choice about what will count. The second difficulty concerns the standing of such settlements. A conversion framework, once established, determines what may subsequently be said in the polity’s collective deliberations, since a value with no place in the framework has no way of entering a decision that the framework governs. This gives the framework a constitutional character that its technical presentation conceals. The third difficulty concerns the absence of a criterion. Governance cannot proceed without conversion, and the impossibility of a fully adequate conversion is well established, so a polity must operate a framework it knows to be imperfect. What distinguishes a defensible framework from an indefensible one, given that neither will be adequate, is a question the available literatures address obliquely.

Five bodies of work bear on these difficulties, and each is treated at length below. The sociology of commensuration has established that the making of heterogeneous things comparable is a social and interpretive process, that it is institutionalized, and that it operates as a mode of power (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 2008; Porter 1995; Desrosières 1998). The sociology of worth has mapped the plural orders of justification within which claims are made and has examined the compromises by which disputes across orders are provisionally settled (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Philosophical work on incommensurability and on contested commodification has established when and why particular values resist conversion (Raz 1986; Chang 1997; Sunstein 1994; Anderson 1993; Radin 1996; Satz 2010; Sandel 2012). Political theory has treated the multilingual polity directly, under the heading of linguistic justice, and has examined what a polity owes to speakers of its several languages (Van Parijs 2011; Kymlicka and Patten 2003). The critical literature on cost-benefit analysis, finally, has examined the most consequential conversion framework now in operation (Ackerman and Heinzerling 2004). These literatures settle a considerable proportion of the subject, and one purpose of this paper is to record how much; the survey below accordingly proceeds by conceding first and locating what remains afterwards.

The account offered here is developed within a framework the author has set out elsewhere, and which may be stated in a sentence:

Generative Relational Being. A theory of how subject, meaning, value, creation, and normativity co-emerge through generative relational processes.

Three features of the framework bear on the present subject. Values are treated as generated within relations, so that heteromorphy follows from relational plurality and requires no further explanation: values differ in kind because the relations that produce them differ in kind. Relations are treated as generative, in that a relation in working order produces further determinations of meaning, of value, and of what the relation itself requires. The framework carries, third, a methodological commitment governing how its claims are advanced, its keynote being historical dialectics, so that propositions are entered as revisable within a historical frame, the finitude of knowledge and of practice is acknowledged as a standing condition, and philosophical argument is joined to operable formulation where the subject admits of it. A paper written under that commitment states its claims so that they may be given up.

Applied here, these features suggest a reformulation. A conversion framework may be understood as an institution that fixes, for the purposes of collective decision, the relations obtaining among values that were generated separately. Such a framework has consequences for the relations it orders, since a fixed equivalence enters those relations and shapes what they subsequently produce. The proposal advanced below is that a framework may be assessed by what it does to the generative capacity of the relations it orders, and the proposal is entered as a hypothesis.

This is a discussion paper, and its role is correspondingly limited. It identifies a structure, surveys what existing scholarship has made of it, marks where each account appears to run out, and proposes a direction for work; it does not complete a theory, and several of its central propositions are entered as hypotheses awaiting examination. Three matters lie outside the undertaking. The paper offers no valuation methodology, and §16 explains why none follows from the account. It does not adjudicate the philosophical dispute over whether incommensurability is a real feature of values or an artifact of description, taking from that dispute what bears on institutions and leaving the metaphysics where it stands. It leaves aside, third, the empirical performance of particular conversion instruments, which would require methods the paper does not employ.

Four contributions are offered, claimed with differing degrees of confidence. The first is a mapping: the survey locates which questions in this area appear to be settled and which appear to remain open, and that mapping retains its value independently of whether the proposals below are accepted. The second is an extension of the multilingual model to heteromorphic values, advanced in §4 as a hypothesis with its licence and its limits stated. The third is a distinction between the justice of a framework’s formation and the justice of the framework itself, developed in §10, together with an account of how that distinction may be drawn without reinstating a question a companion paper has argued to be misposed. The fourth is a proposed criterion, advanced in §13 with its costs stated, under which a conversion framework is assessed by whether it preserves the capacity of the relations it orders to generate a further determination of the equivalences it fixes. The questions set down in §17 are held to be the more valuable half of what is offered.

§2 Scope and Method

2.1 The Containment Device

Three questions organize the discussion, and material earns its place by discharging one of them:

(i) The regime. What is the framework by which heteromorphic values are brought into relations admitting of comparison, and what kind of institution is it.

(ii) Its formation. Who holds standing to contribute to the construction of such a framework, and on what ground.

(iii) Its legitimacy. What distinguishes a defensible framework from an indefensible one, given that no framework will be adequate.

The second question is treated at length in a companion paper on participation justice and is taken up here only where the present subject alters it. The third is the question this paper is principally concerned with.

2.2 The Conceding Register

A theory whose components are individually unoriginal may still contribute through the manner in which it joins them, and the joining becomes visible only where the components are correctly attributed. The argument of this paper is architectural, and an architectural argument is weakened by any claim to have quarried its own stone. Where a claim that might have been advanced here appears to be occupied, the relevant section says so and names the occupant.

2.3 The Standing of the Multilingual Model

The multilingual polity is used here in two senses, kept distinct throughout, since the paper’s title turns on the difference.

It is used, first, as a literal case. Multilingual polities exist, their translation regimes are documented, and what those regimes cost and what they secure is a matter of record. §3 treats this material as evidence about institutions.

It is used, second, as a model for the wider condition of heteromorphic values. That extension is a hypothesis, it is defended in §4, and the defence includes a statement of what the model fails to capture. A model that were treated as an identity would mislead, since values differ from languages in ways §4 sets out.

2.4 A Note on Sources

The survey draws on economic sociology, science and technology studies, political theory, moral philosophy, and law. These fields cite one another unevenly, and one incidental finding of the survey is that the same structural point has been reached independently within several of them. Where that has occurred it is recorded, since convergence from unconnected directions is evidence of a kind.

§3 Translation Regimes in Multilingual Polities

The literal case is treated first, since it supplies the institutional vocabulary the rest of the paper borrows.

3.1 Equal Authenticity and Its Apparatus

The European Union adopts its legislation in each of its official languages, with every version equally authentic. No version is the original and none is a translation of the others in the legal sense, so that where versions diverge the Court of Justice compares them and resolves the divergence by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the measure. The arrangement is maintained by a translation service of considerable size, by drafting conventions designed to reduce divergence, and by a body of interpretive doctrine developed for the purpose.

Comparable arrangements operate elsewhere with variations that are instructive. Switzerland maintains federal law in three languages with a fourth holding partial status, and allocates linguistic competence largely to cantons. Canada requires federal statutes in English and French, each authoritative, and has developed a doctrine of shared meaning for reconciling divergences. India designates official languages at union level while conducting much administration in state languages, producing a layered arrangement in which the language of governance varies with the level of government. South Africa recognizes a larger number of official languages with differentiated practical obligations.

3.2 Findings from the Literal Case

Three findings bear on the extension proposed below.

A polity can operate without a single privileged language. The arrangements above are workable, they have persisted, and they demonstrate that the coordination a polity requires does not entail a single medium of expression. The demonstration matters because the contrary assumption is frequently made about values, where the impossibility of a common metric is treated as an argument that collective decision would be impossible without one.

The cost is real and it falls unevenly. Translation is expensive, it introduces delay, and it produces divergences requiring adjudication. Van Parijs (2011) examines the distributive consequences of linguistic arrangements and argues that the spread of a lingua franca confers unequal burdens and benefits, since those who must learn the common language bear a cost that native speakers avoid. The literature on language rights (Kymlicka and Patten 2003) examines what a polity owes to its linguistic communities and records that the choice among arrangements distributes advantage.

The regime is an institution, whatever its technical presentation. Which languages hold official status, what equal authenticity requires in practice, how divergence is resolved, and who decides, are settled by constitutional provision, statute, and doctrine. They are contested politically, they are revised, and they are recognizably objects of governance.

3.3 The Demonstration Carried Forward

A companion paper on organizational rule-interpretation records an observation about the European arrangement that bears directly on the present subject. Where a single authoritative text exists, the claim that the text underdetermines its own application can be resisted by asserting that a competent reader simply sees what the words require. Where several texts are equally authentic and they diverge, the insufficiency of any single text lies on the face of the record, and the system is compelled to adopt an interpretive ordering that places purpose and scheme above the wording of any one version. Multilingualism converts a contested philosophical thesis into an operational necessity.

The same structure will be claimed below for values. Where one framework of valuation is in place and unchallenged, the claim that it constructs equivalence can be resisted by asserting that it measures something already there. Where two frameworks are in operation and they disagree, the constructive character of both is exhibited.

§4 The Extension from Languages to Values

The extension proposed here is a hypothesis, and this section states it, gives the grounds for it, and states what it fails to capture.

4.1 The Hypothesis

Working hypothesis on the extension. Values generated within different relational settings stand to one another approximately as natural languages stand to one another: they carry semantics that do not map term for term, they are produced and sustained by different practices, they encode histories that their vocabularies presuppose, and rendering one in the terms of another is an operation of translation with the losses that translation entails. A polity holding values so related may accordingly be described as multilingual in an extended sense, and the framework by which it renders values comparable may be described as its translation regime.

4.2 Grounds for the Extension

Four features of heteromorphic values support the analogy.

Values differ in semantics. The vocabulary in which ecological integrity is articulated contains terms with no counterpart in the vocabulary of financial return, and the substitutions available are approximations whose adequacy is contested.

Values differ in their conditions of production. A value sustained by a practice of intergenerational transmission is produced differently from one sustained by market exchange, and the difference bears on what would count as respecting it.

Values carry histories. A claim about ancestral land presupposes a history that the claim does not restate, and a rendering of that claim in terms of land value discards the presupposition while preserving the reference.

Values resist, finally, term-for-term rendering. The philosophical literature treated in §7 establishes that some pairs of values admit no common measure that preserves what matters about each, which is the condition translators describe as untranslatability.

4.3 The Disanalogies and Their Weight

Three disanalogies attend the extension, of which the third is the most serious.

Languages have identifiable communities of speakers with recognized competence, and the boundaries of a language are settled with reasonable determinacy by linguistic practice. The boundaries of a value-language are not settled in that way, and who counts as competent in a given value vocabulary is contested in a manner that competence in Finnish is not.

Translation between natural languages has an evaluative standard internal to the practice: a translation may be assessed as accurate or inaccurate by those competent in both languages. Conversion between values has no comparable internal standard, since the parties competent in each value vocabulary characteristically disagree about what an adequate rendering would preserve. The absence of that standard is what makes value conversion a governance problem where translation remains a craft problem.

A natural language does not, third, make claims in the ordinary case upon the speakers of another. Values do. A claim that a river holds standing is a claim upon those who do not hold it, in a way that a sentence of Finnish makes no claim upon a speaker of Tamil. The model therefore understates the adversarial character of the situation, and any argument drawn from the multilingual case must be checked against that understatement before it is relied upon.

4.4 Findings and Residue

The extension rests on four grounds and carries three disanalogies, of which the absence of an internal standard of adequacy is the most serious. Its use below is confined to institutional vocabulary and heuristic guidance, with no conclusion derived from it as a premise. The risk that it may nonetheless be doing more work than the disanalogies permit is entered in §16.

§5 Commensuration as an Established Object of Study

5.1 The Established Position

The making of heterogeneous things comparable has been studied as a general social process for some decades. Espeland and Stevens (1998) define commensuration as the comparison of different entities according to a common metric, treat it as a social process with a long history as an instrument of social thought, analyse it as a mode of power, and examine the stakes involved in declaring something incommensurable. Their programme was to establish commensuration as a general phenomenon deserving investigation in its own right, and the subsequent literature has followed it.

Espeland and Stevens (2008) extend the treatment to quantification generally, examining the production and circulation of numbers and identifying the effects that measures produce upon what they measure. Porter (1995) argues that quantitative objectivity arises from political and institutional pressures and functions as a strategy of impersonality adopted where trust is scarce. Desrosières (1998) treats statistical categories as conventions that must be constructed and sustained. Bowker and Star (1999) examine classification systems as infrastructures that recede from view while carrying moral and political consequences. Fourcade (2011) shows that monetary valuations of nature reproduce the conceptions of nature that motivated their construction. The field of valuation studies has developed around the proposition that value is enacted through devices and practices (Vatin 2013).

5.2 The Concession Stated

Two claims that a relational account might wish to advance are occupied by this literature, and the occupation is substantial.

The claim that conversion frameworks are interpretive in character, and that equivalence is constructed in the course of conversion, is the founding commitment of the field. The claim that such frameworks are institutionalized, contested, and productive of power is stated in the same founding article. A paper presenting either as a discovery would be mistaken, and a reviewer in economic sociology would say so.

5.3 The Residue

Three things appear to remain.

The literature is descriptive and critical. It examines how commensuration is accomplished, what it does to what it measures, and whose interests it serves. It does not offer a normative account of what would make a commensurative framework legitimate, and the question of how a polity ought to construct and maintain such a framework is largely outside its remit.

The field acknowledges its own condition. Berman and Hirschman (2018) observe that the sociology of quantification resembles a genre more than a subfield, lacking general claims and a common theoretical language. That observation identifies an opening for theoretical work while confirming that the descriptive terrain is occupied.

The relation, third, between a conversion framework and the relations it orders has not, so far as this survey has found, been made the object of a criterion. §13 proposes one.

5.4 Findings and Residue

The interpretive and institutional character of conversion frameworks is established, and the works establishing it are named above. The residue lies in the absence of a normative account of what makes such a framework legitimate.

§6 Orders of Worth and the Settlement of Cross-Order Disputes

The nearest structural rival to the account proposed here belongs to a different tradition.

6.1 The Plural Orders

Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) hold that justification in ordinary disputes proceeds within a limited number of orders of worth, each organized around a higher common principle by which persons and things are ranked. The orders they identify include the market, the industrial, the civic, the domestic, the inspired, and that of fame. A claim advanced within one order is intelligible as a justification within it, and the same claim may carry no weight within another.

The framework bears on the present subject because disputes characteristically cross orders. A proposal defended by industrial efficiency may be resisted by civic solidarity or by domestic attachment, and the parties are then arguing in different registers about the same object.

6.2 Compromise Across Orders

Their treatment of such disputes is the material closest to a theory of value conversion. Cross-order disagreement may be settled by arrangements that hold together persons and objects belonging to different worlds, and such compromises establish local and workable accommodations. They stress that compromises remain precarious, since a party may at any point revive the critique proper to their own order and the accommodation then requires renegotiation.

6.3 The Distance from the Present Account

Three differences may be recorded, of which the third leaves the most room.

The framework is pragmatic and descriptive. It examines how competent actors argue, what they appeal to, and how disputes are resolved in practice. It offers no criterion by which a settlement may be judged legitimate.

The unit is the dispute. Compromises are local accommodations reached in particular episodes, and the framework does not treat the standing institutional arrangements within which many such disputes are settled in advance by a common instrument.

The framework has been criticized, third, for dissolving structural power. Honneth (2010) argues that an account organized around the justificatory competence of actors loses the asymmetries within which justification occurs. The criticism bears on the present paper’s concerns directly, since §11 treats the power produced by a conversion framework as central.

6.4 Findings and Residue

Plural orders of worth and the compromises settling disputes across them are established. The treatment is pragmatic and dispute-centred, and it neither supplies a criterion of legitimacy nor addresses the standing institutions within which many disputes are settled in advance. The residue is accordingly normative and institutional.

§7 The Resistance of Values to Conversion

A third literature establishes when and why particular values resist rendering in one another’s terms.

7.1 Incommensurability

Raz (1986) argues that some options stand in no relation of better, worse, or equal, so that the failure to rank them reflects the values themselves, with fuller information leaving the failure in place. Chang (1997) collects the subsequent debate and develops the possibility that options may be on a par without being equal. Sunstein (1994) carries the argument into law, holding that human goods are assessed along diverse kinds of valuation and that legal institutions both recognize and suppress this diversity. Anderson (1993) grounds the pluralism in an account of modes of valuation, on which goods differ in kind according to the attitudes appropriate to them.

7.2 Contested Commodification

A related literature examines the specific case of rendering goods in monetary terms. Radin (1996) argues against the picture on which everything is in principle exchangeable, and develops the notion of incomplete commodification, on which a good may be simultaneously subject to market and non-market understandings. Satz (2010) examines markets that are objectionable on grounds including the vulnerability of participants, weakness of agency, and the severity of outcomes for individuals and for society, and emphasizes that markets are constituted by laws and institutions and are accordingly matters of public concern. Sandel (2012) distinguishes an objection from coercion, concerning the fairness of exchanges made under inequality, from an objection from corruption, concerning the degradation of a good’s constitutive norms when it is priced.

Zelizer (1994) supplies the empirical counterpart, showing that money is continually differentiated in use, earmarked for particular purposes, and invested with meanings that resist its formal fungibility. The finding supports the general position of §5 from a different direction: equivalence is negotiated in practice and does not obtain by the nature of the medium.

7.3 The Residue

This literature establishes when conversion is objectionable and what is lost when it proceeds. It stops short of the question this paper is concerned with. A polity that accepted every finding above would still have to decide how to structure the framework it must nonetheless operate, since the decisions requiring conversion do not cease upon the demonstration that conversion is imperfect. What follows from these findings for the design of a standing conversion institution is largely unstated.

7.4 Findings and Residue

The resistance of values to conversion is established, and its principal treatments are named above. The residue lies in the passage from a critique of conversion to the design of a framework that must operate despite the critique.

§8 Cost-Benefit Analysis as the Working Instance

The most consequential conversion framework now operating supplies the paper’s running case.

8.1 The Instrument

Regulatory decisions in many jurisdictions are assessed by comparing the monetized costs of a measure with its monetized benefits. The comparison requires that mortality risk, morbidity, ecological condition, time, and amenity be rendered in a common unit, and a body of technique has developed for the purpose, including the valuation of statistical life, contingent valuation surveys eliciting willingness to pay for non-marketed goods, and discounting procedures relating present and future.

8.2 The Critique

Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004) argue that no meaningful monetary price attaches to life or to nature, that the techniques by which such prices are produced embed contestable assumptions, and that decisions of this kind should reflect values chosen on moral grounds through democratic processes. The critique is normative and it is directed at the conversion framework as such.

The defence holds that decisions bearing on these matters are taken in any event, that implicit valuations are embedded in whatever is decided, and that making the valuations explicit improves deliberation by exposing them. Sunstein (1994) occupies a considered position, acknowledging the diversity of kinds of valuation while resisting the conclusion that quantitative comparison should be abandoned.

8.3 The Instance Read Structurally

Three features of the instance bear on the argument below.

The framework is constitutional in effect and technical in presentation. A discount rate settles the standing of future persons within every decision the framework governs, and it is set by a procedure that few of those affected could identify.

The framework produces the terms of its own contestation. A party objecting to a regulatory decision assessed in this way is ordinarily obliged to argue within the framework, by contesting a parameter, since an objection expressed outside it has no place in the assessment.

The framework has been revised, third, in response to sustained criticism, which establishes that arrangements of this kind admit of revision and that the revisions are political events.

8.4 Findings and Residue

The working instance is in place and its normative critique is developed. That critique proceeds largely by argument against monetization, and the design of an alternative standing framework remains unspecified.

§9 The Value Conversion Nomos

The survey to this point has conceded the descriptive terrain and located a normative residue. The object addressed by the remaining sections may now be named.

9.1 The Object Named

Working definition. A value conversion nomos is the institutionalized interpretive framework by which a polity establishes, for the purposes of collective decision, the relations obtaining among values generated in different relational settings.

Four features of the definition require comment.

The framework is institutionalized. It is carried by rules, methodologies, offices, and precedents, and it persists across the particular decisions it governs. A single act of comparison performed by an individual falls outside the definition.

The framework is interpretive. What it fixes are relations that the values themselves leave undetermined, and the fixing draws on judgement about what matters in each value and what a defensible rendering preserves. This restates the position of §5 and claims no originality for it.

The framework is oriented to collective decision. Frameworks operating for other purposes, including private deliberation and scholarly comparison, fall outside the definition, which is confined to arrangements bearing on what a polity does.

The framework establishes, fourth, relations of several kinds. Equivalence is the limiting case. A nomos may also fix relations of priority, of threshold, of admissibility, and of exclusion, and an arrangement declaring a value inadmissible in a class of decisions is performing an act of the same family as one declaring a rate of exchange.

9.2 The Term and Its Provenance

The term nomos is borrowed and carries two prior meanings that require distinguishing.

Cover (1983) uses nomos for the normative universe a community inhabits, generated through the narratives by which a community gives its precepts meaning, and diminished when institutions with authority to determine meaning suppress the alternatives that communities have generated. That usage is the one intended here, and the present paper extends it: where Cover addresses the generation of normative meaning, this paper addresses a particular institutional product within it, namely the framework fixing relations among values.

Schmitt (2003) uses nomos differently, tying it to the appropriation and division of territory as the constitutive act from which an order proceeds. That usage is not intended here, and the distinction is entered because the term carries the association and because the political provenance of that account is contested.

9.3 Findings and Residue

The object is named, four of its features are stated, and the intended sense of the borrowed term is distinguished from an available alternative. The questions of formation and of legitimacy remain for the sections following.

§10 Two Justices Distinguished

The second and third questions of §2 are distinct, and this section separates them and resolves a difficulty that the separation raises.

10.1 The Distinction

Proposed distinction. The justice of the formation of a nomos concerns who holds standing to contribute to its construction and revision, and by what arrangements they do so. The justice of the nomos concerns the properties of the framework itself, assessed independently of the history by which it came to be.

The distinction has practical force in two directions. A framework constructed through an impeccable process may fix relations that render a value systematically invisible, and the impeccability of the process supplies no answer to a party so affected. A framework constructed by an unrepresentative body may fix relations that survive examination, and the defect in its formation is a reason for scrutiny without being a demonstration of defect in the product.

10.2 A Difficulty Arising from a Companion Paper

The distinction meets an objection drawn from the author’s own prior work, and the objection is serious enough to state fully.

A companion paper on value conversion argues that standing to write a conversion rule is generated by the act of crossing categories, so that whoever performs a conversion acquires the vocabulary in which the matter is subsequently discussed, and concludes that the question of who owns the right of interpretation is misposed (Huang, in preparation, b). The second question of §2 asks precisely that question. If the companion paper is right, the question should be withdrawn.

The resolution proposed here follows a distinction developed in a second companion paper on organizational rule-interpretation (Huang, in preparation, a). Conferral of interpretive standing fixes the holder without fixing the reach. At the core of a conferral the holder is settled and no interpretive act is needed to see it; at the edge, what the holder may determine is itself settled by an interpretive act, ordinarily performed by the holder. Standing accordingly has an open texture of its own, and the two positions are compatible once core and edge are distinguished.

Applied here, the resolution reads as follows. A polity may confer upon a body the authority to construct a conversion framework, and the conferral is real. What the body may bring within the framework, which values it treats as admitting of conversion at all, and what it treats as falling outside its remit, are settled by the body in the course of constructing the framework, and to that extent the companion paper’s thesis holds. The question of who constructs the nomos is therefore askable and its answer is partial: conferral settles the centre and the act of construction settles the edge.

10.3 The Consequence for the Two Justices

The resolution bears on the distinction in a way that should be recorded. Because the reach of a conversion framework is settled in the course of constructing it, the formation of a nomos and the content of a nomos are connected more tightly than the distinction suggests. A body constructing a framework determines, by the same acts, both what the framework says and what the framework is about. The distinction between the two justices is accordingly analytical and does not describe two separable institutional moments.

10.4 Findings and Residue

The distinction stands, and the difficulty a companion paper raises for it is answered by the distinction between the core and the edge of a conferral. The two justices are connected more tightly than the analytical separation implies, since a body constructing a framework settles by the same acts what it says and what it is about. The treatment of formation remains with the companion paper on participation justice.

§11 Power Produced by Conversion, and the Case for Counterpower

A conversion framework appears to produce power, and the production appears to be systematic. The mechanism is set out below, together with what is established about it and a remedy proposed in response.

11.1 The Loop Described

The mechanism may be stated as a sequence. Values generated in different settings require rendering in common terms before a collective decision bearing on them can be taken. The rendering is performed by a framework. Decisions taken under the framework allocate resources, authority, and standing. Those allocations strengthen the position of parties whose values the framework renders favourably, and the strengthened parties are better placed to influence the framework’s maintenance and revision. Subsequent renderings accordingly proceed under conditions the previous renderings helped to establish.

Figure 1. The loop described in §11, drawn as a schematic. Values generated in separate settings are rendered comparable by a conversion framework; decisions taken under the framework allocate resources and standing; the allocation strengthens parties favourably rendered; and those parties are better placed to shape the framework’s maintenance. The dashed path is the contestation channel proposed in §11, drawn as a branch that reaches the framework without passing through the parties the framework has strengthened. The figure carries no claim about the magnitude or the rate of any of these effects, and the arrangement of the boxes carries no claim about temporal order.

11.2 The Concession

The descriptive content of this loop is established. Espeland and Stevens (1998) analyse commensuration as a mode of power in the article that founded the field. Foucault (1980) supplies the general thesis that regimes of truth are sustained by and sustain relations of power, of which the present loop is a specialization. Fourcade (2011) documents the return path, showing that monetary valuations of nature feed back into the practices and representations from which they were drawn. Espeland and Sauder (2016) document reactivity in the case of rankings, showing that measures alter the conduct of those measured in ways that confirm the measures.

The descriptive content of the loop is accordingly inherited. The pairing of that content with a normative requirement, set out in the subsection following, is itself drawn substantially from existing traditions.

11.3 Counterpower and Its Provenance

The remedy proposed is that a conversion framework should be constructed so as to generate, alongside the power it confers, a capacity to contest the framework itself. The proposal requires attribution in two directions.

Galbraith (1952) advances the concept of countervailing power, holding that the effective answer to concentrated economic power is the development of organized power on the other side, and that in the absence of such development the strong determine outcomes unchecked. The structural logic is the one relied upon here.

Pettit (1997, 2012) supplies the more exact analogue. On the republican account, freedom consists in the absence of domination, and a power capable of arbitrary interference is compatible with freedom only where those subject to it hold an institutionalized capacity to contest its exercise. Pettit distinguishes the authorial dimension of democracy, by which decisions are made, from the editorial dimension, by which they are challenged, and holds that the second must be institutionally distinct from the first.

The proposal advanced here is the application of that structure to conversion frameworks:

Proposed requirement. A conversion framework confers power upon the parties it renders favourably. A framework that confers such power without instituting a capacity to contest the framework itself tends toward a condition in which the terms of contestation are set by the parties the framework has strengthened. The requirement proposed is that the institution of contestation be established alongside the framework and be structurally distinct from the body maintaining it.

The requirement is a proposal and its empirical premise is a conjecture. Whether frameworks lacking such an institution in fact tend toward the condition described is an empirical question, and §16 records that the paper does not establish it.

11.4 Findings and Residue

The loop is stated and its descriptive content is conceded to the traditions that established it. The counterpower remedy is likewise inherited, and its application to conversion frameworks stands as a proposal resting on a conjecture that this paper does not establish.

§12 Meta-Principles for the Assessment of a Nomos

Six principles are proposed. Five are substantially inherited and are attributed; the sixth is drawn from a companion paper. They are offered as a set for examination, with their standing as a list left open.

12.1 The Principle of Generativity

A nomos should preserve the capacity of the relations it orders to continue producing determinations of what those relations require. The principle is the framework’s own and it is developed as a criterion in §13. Its nearest antecedent is Cover’s account of the generation of normative meaning within communities and of the institutional acts by which such generation is suppressed (Cover 1983).

12.2 The Principle of Counterpower

A nomos should generate, alongside the power it confers, an institutionalized capacity to contest the nomos itself. The principle is inherited from Galbraith (1952) and, in the form relied upon here, from Pettit (1997, 2012), and §11 states the application.

12.3 The Principle of Co-Creation

A nomos should be constructed through arrangements admitting contribution from those whose values it orders. The principle is inherited. Habermas (1996) grounds legitimacy in the discursive conditions under which norms are adopted, and Ostrom (1990) associates enduring self-governance with arrangements under which those affected by rules may participate in modifying them.

12.4 The Principle of Non-Erasure

A nomos should not render any affected value systematically inarticulable within the decisions it governs. The principle is inherited from two directions. Fricker (2007) identifies hermeneutical injustice, arising where a gap in collective interpretive resources places a party at an unfair disadvantage in making sense of their experience, and traces it to unequal participation in the practices by which social meanings are generated. Fraser (2008) identifies misframing, in which the constitution of the frame excludes parties from consideration as subjects of justice. The commensuration literature reaches a parallel finding, recording that commensuration renders some aspects of a situation invisible (Espeland and Stevens 1998).

12.5 The Principle of Revisability

A nomos should remain open to revision by those it orders. The principle is inherited from the same sources as co-creation, and it is distinguished here from co-creation because a framework may admit contribution at its founding and foreclose alteration afterwards.

12.6 The Principle of Admissible Refusal

A nomos should admit the move by which a party declines conversion altogether. The principle is drawn from the companion paper on value conversion, which argues that a party asserting that no rate obtains between two categories is advancing a claim about the categories, which differs in kind from a dispute about the rate, and that a framework unable to receive such a claim collapses into the position that everything is convertible and only terms remain (Huang, in preparation, b).

The principle is distinct from revisability. Revisability concerns whether a fixed relation may be altered. Refusal concerns whether the pairing may be denied. A framework may permit continual adjustment of a rate while treating the existence of some rate as beyond question, and the principle proposed here holds that such a framework is defective in a respect that adjustment cannot repair.

The literature of §7 supports the principle from outside the framework. Incomplete commodification (Radin 1996), the objection from corruption (Sandel 2012), and the constraints on objectionable markets (Satz 2010) are each, on the present reading, articulations of a refusal that a conversion framework should be able to receive.

12.7 The Set Considered as a Whole

Two observations attach to the set.

The principles are not independent. Refusal without revisability is precarious, since a framework may receive a refusal and decline to act on it. Counterpower without co-creation tends to a contestation conducted by parties who had no part in what they contest. The set is offered as a whole whose members support one another.

The principles may conflict. A framework maximally open to refusal and revision may be unable to settle anything, which is a defect for a polity that must decide. The set supplies no ordering for such conflicts, and §16 records the omission.

12.8 Findings and Residue

Six principles are proposed, five of them attributed to existing traditions and the sixth distinguished from its nearest neighbour within the set. The set is neither independent nor ordered, and the consequences of that are entered in §16.

§13 The Criterion of Generative Preservation

The principles of §12 state desiderata without supplying a test. One is proposed below, and the paper’s substantive contribution rests upon it.

13.1 The Criterion Stated

Proposed criterion. A value conversion nomos is defensible in respect of a given pairing when it preserves the capacity of the relations it orders to generate a further determination of the relation it has fixed between them. It is indefensible when it extinguishes that capacity, whether or not the relation it fixed was accurate, and whether or not any party was excluded from its construction.

13.2 The Ground of the Criterion

The criterion derives from the framework and its ground lies there. If values are generated within relations, and if the relations that generate them also generate determinations of what they require, then a framework that fixes a relation between two values has entered the relational field it orders. Where the fixing leaves the field able to produce a further determination, the framework has settled a question provisionally, which is what a framework for collective decision is required to do. Where the fixing removes the field’s capacity to produce any further determination of that question, the framework has replaced a generative relation with a settled quantity, and the loss falls on the relation itself.

13.3 The Distance from Accuracy

The criterion is deliberately silent about whether a conversion is correct, and the silence requires defence.

The literature of §7 establishes that many conversions admit of no correct answer, so a criterion of accuracy would be inapplicable in exactly the cases that matter. A criterion of capacity applies in those cases, since a relation may retain or lose the ability to produce a further determination whether or not any determination is uniquely correct.

The criterion accordingly ranks two failures differently. A framework that fixes an indefensible rate while leaving the question open has committed an error that the relation it orders may correct. A framework that fixes a defensible rate and closes the question has removed the means by which errors of the first kind are found. On the present account the second is the graver institutional failure, and this ranking is the criterion’s principal claim.

13.4 Relation to the Family of Criteria

The criterion has two siblings. In a companion paper on organizational rule-interpretation, an interpretation is held unjust when it extinguishes the capacity of the relation between interpreter and interpreted party to generate a further interpretation of the same question (Huang, in preparation, a). In a companion paper on participation, an arrangement is held sufficient when it preserves the capacity of the affected relations to generate a further determination of the moment at issue (Huang, in preparation, c). In the companion paper on value conversion, a conversion is held unjust when the party against whom an equivalence is asserted can no longer contest that the equivalence holds (Huang, in preparation, b).

The four share a form: an act or an institution is assessed by what it does to the capacity of a relation to produce a further determination of the matter the act settled. The recurrence is offered as weak evidence for the form, on the ground that a criterion reached in four domains is more likely to be tracking something than one constructed for a single case. The evidence is weak because the four were developed by one author within one framework, and a common origin is an alternative explanation of the convergence that this paper is unable to exclude.

13.5 Application to the Working Instance

Applied to the framework of §8, the criterion yields an assessment that differs from the standard critique.

The standard critique holds that monetized valuations of life and of ecological condition are inaccurate and that the inaccuracy is not remediable. On the present criterion the question is different: whether the framework leaves the relations it orders able to generate a further determination of the valuations it fixes. A framework that publishes its parameters, that receives objections to them, that admits claims that a given pairing should not be made at all, and that revises in response, satisfies the criterion whether or not its current parameters are defensible. A framework whose parameters may be contested only by argument conducted in its own terms, and which has no channel by which the pairing itself may be denied, fails the criterion whether or not its parameters are well chosen.

The assessment is offered as an illustration of the criterion’s operation. Whether any particular jurisdiction’s arrangements satisfy it is an empirical question this paper does not address.

13.6 Findings and Residue

The criterion is proposed, grounded in the framework, and distinguished from accuracy. Its siblings are recorded together with the alternative explanation of their convergence, and its application to the working instance is illustrated. The assessment of generative capacity remains without a procedure, which §16 enters as the principal weakness.

§14 Relation to Existing Theories of Justice and Governance

Five positions require comparison, and one of them requires care, since a natural contrast would misdescribe the position it is drawn against.

14.1 Justice under an Assumed Index

Rawls (1971) constructs an account of justice in which the primary goods furnish the currency of distributive comparison. The construction requires that the several primary goods be weighted into a single index, and the difficulty of specifying that weighting is acknowledged within the theory and has been pressed by commentators since. The relation to the present subject is that the index performs the work this paper attributes to a conversion framework, and that the theory proceeds after such comparability has been secured. The present paper takes as its object what that construction takes as given.

14.2 Legitimacy through Discourse

Habermas (1996) grounds the legitimacy of norms in the discursive conditions of their adoption. The relation to the present subject requires care, since discourse theory addresses the constitution of validity and is therefore closer to the present account than a flat contrast would suggest. The difference proposed is one of object: discourse theory specifies conditions on the procedure by which norms are adopted, and the present paper asks after properties of a standing framework assessed independently of the procedure that produced it, which is the distinction of §10.

14.3 Evaluation under Incomplete Comparability

The relation to Sen (1970, 1992) requires care, and stating it accurately improves the paper’s position.

Sen has argued since 1970 that completeness ought not to be imposed upon evaluative orderings, and the capability approach proceeds with partial orderings, dominance rankings, and intersection methods precisely because a full weighting across heterogeneous capabilities is unavailable and, on his account, unnecessary for many judgements. Any suggestion that this body of work assumes heterogeneous capabilities to be mutually convertible would be mistaken.

The relation is accordingly complementary. Sen establishes that reasoned evaluation can proceed under incomplete comparability, which is a result about what an evaluator may conclude. The present paper concerns institutions that must nonetheless produce determinate outcomes for binding collective decisions, where partial orderings leave a residue that some procedure will settle. What settles the residue, and on what terms, is the object here.

14.4 Governance of Rules and Governance of Measures

Ostrom (1990, 2005) distinguishes operational, collective-choice, and constitutional levels of rules and examines the arrangements under which self-governing communities sustain them. Constitutional-level choice, concerning which actors hold standing and which institutional forms are available, approaches the present subject closely. The difference proposed is that the framework treats rules governing conduct and the standing to make them, and treats the evaluative terms in which the merits of rules are assessed as largely given. The commentary on that framework has noted its limited treatment of power, which §11 takes as central.

14.5 Power and the Production of Equivalence

Foucault (1980) holds that regimes of truth are constituted within relations of power. The specialization proposed here, that power institutionalizes equivalence relations, is not original to this paper: it is substantially the position of Espeland and Stevens (1998), who analyse commensuration as a mode of power. What the present paper adds to that specialization is the normative requirement of §11 and the criterion of §13.

14.6 Findings and Residue

The account has been set beside five positions. One relation proves complementary where a natural contrast would have misdescribed it, and the specialization of the power thesis to equivalence is owed to the commensuration literature.

§15 The Place of the Account within a Wider Programme

15.1 The Circuit

The account completes a circuit that companion papers enter at other points. Relations generate values, and the plurality of relations accounts for the heteromorphy of what they generate. The arrangements by which parties contribute to reproducing those relations are the subject of the companion paper on participation. The framework by which heteromorphic values are rendered comparable is the subject of this paper. The application of that framework to particular cases is the subject of the companion paper on interpretation. What is determined issues in collective action, and action remakes the relations from which the circuit began.

Figure 2. The circuit within which the account sits, with the companion papers marked. The figure records relations among the papers and asserts no temporal sequence, since the moments recur and overlap and a polity is ordinarily engaged in several at once.

15.2 The Priority Question Declined

A conclusion suggests itself from the circuit, that the conversion framework is foundational and that other questions of justice presuppose it. That conclusion is declined in its strong form for the reason given in the companion paper on participation. The claim that the constitution of the frame is prior to questions of what is owed within it has been advanced and defended (Fraser 2008), and a relational restatement of it would inherit the objections it has attracted.

The weaker claim asserted here concerns propagation. A defect in a conversion framework appears downstream as a decision that a party cannot contest, since the terms in which the objection would be expressed have no place in the assessment. An injustice presenting at the point of decision may accordingly have originated at the point where the framework was constructed, and the tracing of such defects to their origin is a use to which the account may be put.

15.3 Findings and Residue

The circuit is set out and the companion papers are marked upon it. The strong priority claim is declined, and a weaker claim about the propagation of defects is advanced in its place.

§16 The Limits of the Account

The account is now complete enough to be priced.

No procedure for the criterion. The criterion of §13 turns on the capacity of a relation to generate a further determination, and no procedure is offered by which that capacity may be assessed in a given case. What would count as evidence that a question remains open, who would assess it, and against what baseline, are unsettled. This is the principal weakness of the account.

No valuation methodology. A polity persuaded of everything argued here would still require a means of comparing values in order to decide, and the account supplies none. It states conditions upon a framework and does not supply a framework.

The set of principles is unordered. §12 records that the six principles may conflict, and the account offers no ordering. A framework maximally open to refusal and revision may be unable to settle anything, which is a defect for an institution whose purpose is to permit decision.

The empirical premise of counterpower is a conjecture. The requirement advanced in §11 rests on the proposition that frameworks lacking an institution of contestation tend toward a condition in which the terms of contestation are set by the parties the framework has strengthened. That proposition is plausible and it is not established here.

The model may be doing unlicensed work. §4 records three disanalogies between languages and values, of which the absence of an internal standard of adequate rendering is serious. Arguments drawn from the multilingual case may carry an assumption of translatability that the value case does not support, and a reader should treat each such argument with that risk in view.

The descriptive terrain is borrowed. As §5 concedes, the interpretive and power-laden character of conversion frameworks is established elsewhere. What is offered here is a normative superstructure, and a reader who judges the superstructure thin will find little else.

Two claims are entered against this list. The criterion of §13 states a condition on conversion frameworks that the surveyed literatures appear not to state, and it does so in a form applicable in the cases where accuracy is unavailable, which are the cases of interest. The survey, second, locates with some precision where the residue appears to lie, which retains its value independently of whether the criterion is accepted.

§17 Open Questions

This paper identifies a neglected structure. It does not complete a theory of it, and the questions below are held to be the more valuable part of what is offered.

If the structure is real, the following questions arise immediately.

The first group concerns the model.

Q1. How far does the multilingual model extend before the disanalogies of §4 defeat it? The absence of an internal standard of adequate rendering is the disanalogy most likely to mislead, and locating the point at which arguments from translation cease to carry would improve the account.

Q2. Do value-languages admit of identification independently of the framework that renders them? The account speaks of values generated in different settings, and whether such settings individuate value-languages determinately, or whether the individuation is itself an act of the framework, is unsettled.

The second group concerns the institution.

Q3. What institutional forms can carry the contestation requirement of §11? The requirement specifies a structural relation between a framework and a body able to contest it, and which existing institutions satisfy the specification, and at what cost, is unexamined.

Q4. How may a refusal be distinguished from a rate dispute in practice? The principle of §12 turns on the distinction, and a framework receiving a claim must classify it before responding, which is an interpretive act performed by the framework upon a claim directed against it.

Q5. Can the six principles be ordered? A polity facing a conflict among them requires guidance the account does not supply, and whether a principled ordering exists, or whether the conflicts are to be settled case by case, is open.

The third group concerns the criterion, and the questions are sharpest here because the claims are strongest.

Q6. What evidence bears on whether a question remains open? The criterion applies with confidence in retrospect, once a pairing has visibly failed to be reopened across a long period. Applying it at the time a framework is designed is what would be useful, and it remains unsupplied.

Q7. Does generative capacity admit of degrees, and if so what threshold does the criterion require? Preserving the capacity to generate a further determination is compatible with preserving it barely, and whether the criterion demands more than bare preservation, and on what ground, is unsettled.

Q8. Can a framework satisfy the criterion for one pairing and fail it for another? The criterion is stated pairwise, and whether an assessment of a framework as a whole may be assembled from pairwise assessments, or requires something further, is open.

The last question is the one the account is directed toward, and it is placed last because everything above bears on it.

Q9. Under what institutional and relational conditions does a conversion framework retain its generative capacity across time? Frameworks settle into usage, parameters acquire the authority of precedent, the parties strengthened by a framework accumulate influence over its maintenance, and the ordinary pressure toward finality operates continuously. A framework satisfying the criterion when established may fail it a generation later with no act of foreclosure by anyone. What sustains generative capacity across such drift is the question on which the practical value of the account depends, and it is entirely open.

A closing observation about the shape of the list. The questions of the first two groups could be pursued within existing disciplines, and several are being pursued there under other descriptions. The questions of the third group could not, since they concern a criterion advanced here. A reader who finds the survey useful and the criterion unpersuasive may take the first and leave the second, since the survey’s findings about where the residue lies do not depend on the criterion being correct. The reverse is unavailable: the criterion is a proposal about what a conversion framework is for, and it requires the reformulation of §9 to say what it is a criterion about.

---

A note on method. No formal apparatus has been used. The loop of §11 could be written in the notation of dynamical systems, with a framework answering to a parameter and the accumulation of influence to a slow variable, and a companion work on historical dynamics does something of this kind. Written out here, such a model would derive nothing the prose does not state and would supply an appearance of precision the argument has not earned. The conditions under which the notation would become honest are set out in Q6 through Q9.

A note on the survey. The literatures drawn on here cite one another unevenly, and several of the convergences recorded above were located in the course of the survey. The descriptive claims attributed to the sociology of commensuration and to the sociology of worth carry the weight of the paper’s concessions, and they have been stated conservatively for that reason. Where a source has been read at second hand, the claims resting on it have been kept correspondingly weak.

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中文

摘要

一个承认若干官方语言的政体必须维持一个翻译的装置，而那个装置是一个带它自己一套政治的制度。本文取那个安排为一个更广状况的模型。在一个政体之内所持有的诸价值被在不同关系设定中生成之处，它们获得不同的语义、不同的生产条件与不同的历史，以致集体决定要求它们被转换为容许比较的诸术语。施行那个转换的框架在此被当作一个价值的翻译体制，而本文问什么使这样一个体制正当。那次综述让步这个主题的描述性一半被占据：通约的社会学已确立诸转换框架是解释性的、被制度化的，并生产权力，而价值秩序的社会学已绘制转换必须运作于其间的诸复数秩序。显得保持开放之物是一个关于一个被当作制度考量之转换框架之正当性的规范说明。本文以三个部分提议这样一个说明：一个框架之形成的正义与那个框架本身的正义之间的一个区分；一个框架可由之被评估的六个元原则，其中五个从既存诸传统继承并相应地被归属；以及一个判据，在其之下一个框架由它是否保全它所排序之诸关系产生一个对它所固定之诸等值之进一步裁定的能力被评估。那个说明供出没有测量那个能力的程序、它不解决翻译代价与一个政体触及范围之间的权衡，而它的诸中心命题作为假说被引入。那些收尾的问题被持为所供出之物中更有价值的一半。

关键词： 多语言民主；通约；价值转换；正当性；翻译；对抗权力；关系复数性；治理。

关于本文站位的一则附记。 这是一篇讨论文。它辨认一个结构、概览既存学术对它所作之物、标记每一个说明显得用尽之处，并提议一个工作的方向。它不完成一个理论。那次综述以一个让步的语域被进行，因为这个主题的中心描述性诸主张在数十年前就在一个价值多元论的政治理论处理并不总是援引的文献中被确立，而一篇未能如此说的论文会比一篇率先如此说的论文更少价值。在一个此处作为开放被引入的主张事实上已被占据之处，或在一个来源被读错之处，改正被欢迎至 huangwanhong@serendip.ngo。

§1 引论

一个承认若干官方语言的政体面对一个它的单语言邻居能留下隐含的问题。它的诸法律必须以若干版本存在，而那些版本必须被持为说同一件事。当它们分歧时，某个制度必须判定哪个读法支配，而那个判定被一个翻译、解释与授权的装置作出，那个政体已建造它并以可观的开支维持它。欧洲联盟以它所有官方语言采纳它的立法，每一版本同等作准；瑞士、加拿大、印度、比利时与南非各维持可比雄心的诸安排。这样的诸安排是昂贵的、它们是被争议的，而它们是一个单语言政体在没有注意到它们已回答它的情况下回答之问题的可见制度形式。

那个问题是一个政体在它成员表述对它们要紧之物所用的诸术语未能重合时做什么。本文取那个多语言情形为一个更广状况的模型，而那个延伸是本文的组织性假说。在一个政体之内所持有的诸价值被在不同设定中、通过不同实践，并在不同历史之下生成之处，它们获得一个可被称为异形性之物：语义上的、它们被生产所凭之机制上的、维系它们之关系结构上的，以及它们为持有它们者所携带之意义上的诸差异。一个流域的生态整全、一份生计的安全、一个语言共同体的延续、被投资本的回报，以及一个受制于一个行政决定之人的尊严，是这一种类的诸价值。它们不是一个东西的诸版本，而一个关系着它们全部的集体决定要求它们被带入某个容许比较的关系。那个做那件事所凭的框架可被理解为一个翻译体制，而一个在异形价值之下运作的政体可被在一个延伸的意义上理解为多语言的。

三个困难推动随之而来之物。第一个关乎可见性。当代治理中施行价值转换的装置在外观上大体是技术性的：一个贴现率、一个估值方法论、一个影响评估协议、一个评分准则、一个权重表。因为那个装置呈现为方法，它所体现的诸安定鲜少作为诸安定被审查，而它们之间的选择鲜少被承认为一个关于什么将算数的选择。第二个困难关乎这样诸安定的站位。一个转换框架，一旦被确立，判定什么可随后在那个政体的集体审议中被说，因为一个在那个框架中没有位置的价值没有办法进入一个那个框架支配的决定。这给那个框架一个它的技术呈现所隐藏的宪制性质。第三个困难关乎一个判据的缺席。治理无法在没有转换的情况下进行，而一个完全恰当之转换的不可能是被充分确立的，故一个政体必须运作一个它知道不完美的框架。什么把一个可辩护的框架同一个不可辩护的区分开来，鉴于两者都不会是恰当的，是一个那些可得文献间接致意的问题。

五个工作之体关乎这些困难，而每一个在下面被长篇处理。通约的社会学已确立使异质诸物可比较是一个社会与解释的过程、它被制度化，而它作为一个权力模式运作（埃斯佩兰与史蒂文斯 1998, 2008；波特 1995；德罗齐耶 1998）。价值秩序的社会学已绘制诸主张被作出于其内的诸复数辩护秩序，并已审查跨诸秩序之争议被临时安定所凭的诸妥协（博尔坦斯基与泰弗诺 2006）。关于不可通约性与关于有争议之商品化的哲学工作已确立特定诸价值何时以及为何抵抗转换（拉兹 1986；张 1997；桑斯坦 1994；安德森 1993；雷丁 1996；萨茨 2010；桑德尔 2012）。政治理论已直接处理那个多语言政体，在语言正义这个标题之下，并已审查一个政体欠它若干语言之说者什么（范·帕里斯 2011；金里卡与帕滕 2003）。关于成本效益分析的批评文献最终已审查如今运作中最有后果的转换框架（阿克曼与海因策林 2004）。这些文献安定这个主题的一个可观比例，而本文的一个目的是记录多少；下面的综述相应地通过先让步、而后定位剩下之物来进行。

此处所供出的说明在一个作者已在别处铺陈的框架之内被发展，而它可被以一句话陈述：

生成性关系存在。 一个关于主体、意义、价值、创造与规范性如何通过生成性关系过程共同涌现的理论。

那个框架的三个特征关乎当下主题。诸价值被当作在诸关系之内被生成，以致异形性从关系复数性随之而来并要求没有进一步的解释：诸价值在种类上不同，因为生产它们的诸关系在种类上不同。诸关系被当作生成性的，即一个处于运作秩序中的关系产生意义的、价值的，以及那个关系本身所要求之物的诸进一步裁定。那个框架第三携带一个支配它诸主张如何被推进的方法论承诺，它的基调是历史辩证法，以致诸命题作为在一个历史框架内可修订的被引入、知识与实践的有限被承认为一个常在状况，而哲学论证在那个主题容许它之处被连到可操作的表述。一篇在那个承诺之下被书写的论文陈述它的诸主张以致它们可被放弃。

被应用于此处，这些特征暗示一个重述。一个转换框架可被理解为一个制度，它为集体决定的目的固定在被分开生成之诸价值之间成立的诸关系。这样一个框架对它所排序的诸关系有诸后果，因为一个被固定的等值进入那些关系并塑造它们随后所生产之物。下面所推进的提议是，一个框架可由它对它所排序之诸关系的生成能力所做之物被评估，而那个提议作为一个假说被引入。

这是一篇讨论文，而它的角色相应地有限。它辨认一个结构、概览既存学术对它所作之物、标记每一个说明显得用尽之处，并提议一个工作的方向；它不完成一个理论，而它的若干中心命题作为等待审查的假说被引入。三个事项躺在这项承担之外。本文供出没有估值方法论，而§16解释为什么无一从那个说明随之而来。它不裁断关于不可通约性是诸价值的一个真实特征还是描述的一个人为产物的哲学争议，从那场争议取关乎诸制度之物并把那个形而上学留在它所立之处。它第三把特定转换工具的经验表现搁置一旁，那会要求本文不采用的诸方法。

四个贡献被供出，以不同程度的信心被主张。第一个是一次绘图：那次综述定位这个领域中哪些问题显得被安定、哪些显得保持开放，而那次绘图保有它的价值，独立于下面诸提议是否被接受。第二个是那个多语言模型向异形价值的一个延伸，在§4作为一个假说带它的许可与它的诸界限被陈述而被推进。第三个是一个框架之形成的正义与那个框架本身的正义之间的一个区分，在§10被发展，连同一个关于那个区分如何可被划出而不重新设立一个姊妹论文已论证为被误置之问题的说明。第四个是一个被提议的判据，在§13带它的诸代价被陈述而被推进，在其之下一个转换框架由它是否保全它所排序之诸关系产生一个对它所固定之诸等值之进一步裁定的能力被评估。在§17所记下的诸问题被持为所供出之物中更有价值的一半。

§2 范围与方法

2.1 那个容纳手法

三个问题组织那次讨论，而材料通过履行它们之一赢得它的位置：

（i）那个体制。 异形价值被带入容许比较之诸关系所凭的框架是什么，而它是什么种类的制度。

（ii）它的形成。 谁持有站位去对这样一个框架的建构作出贡献，而在什么根据上。

（iii）它的正当性。 什么把一个可辩护的框架同一个不可辩护的区分开来，鉴于没有框架会是恰当的。

那第二个问题在一篇关于参与正义的姊妹论文中被长篇处理，而在此处仅在当下主题改变它之处被接手。那第三个是本文主要关切的问题。

2.2 那个让步的语域

一个其诸组件在个别上不具原创性的理论仍可通过它连接它们的方式作出贡献，而那个连接仅在那些组件被正确地归属之处变得可见。本文的论证是建筑性的，而一个建筑性的论证被任何采过它自己石料的主张所削弱。在一个可能已在此处被推进的主张显得被占据之处，相关的节如此说并命名那个占据者。

2.3 那个多语言模型的站位

那个多语言政体在此以两个意义被使用，自始至终保持区分，因为本文的标题转在那个差别上。

它首先作为一个字面情形被使用。多语言政体存在、它们的翻译体制被记录，而那些体制耗费什么以及它们确保什么是一个记录在案的事项。§3把这个材料当作关于诸制度的证据。

它其次作为那个异形价值之更广状况的一个模型被使用。那个延伸是一个假说、它在§4被辩护，而那个辩护包括一个关于那个模型未能捕捉之物的陈述。一个被当作一个同一的模型会误导，因为诸价值以§4所铺陈的诸方式不同于诸语言。

2.4 关于来源的一则附记

那次综述汲取经济社会学、科学与技术研究、政治理论、道德哲学与法律。这些场域不均地相互援引，而那次综述的一个偶然发现是同一个结构点已在它们中的若干内被独立地抵达。在那已发生之处它被记录，因为来自不相连方向的趋同是一种证据。

§3 多语言政体中的翻译体制

那个字面情形被首先处理，因为它供出本文其余部分借用的制度语汇。

3.1 同等作准及其装置

欧洲联盟以它每一种官方语言采纳它的立法，每一版本同等作准。没有版本是那个原件而无一在法律意义上是其他的一个翻译，以致在诸版本分歧之处法院比较它们并参照那项措施的目的与总体方案解决那个分歧。那个安排被一个可观规模的翻译服务、被诸旨在减少分歧的起草惯例，以及被一个为此目的发展的解释学说之体所维持。

可比的诸安排在别处以有教益的诸变体运作。瑞士以三种语言维持联邦法，第四种持有部分地位，并把语言权限大体分配给诸州。加拿大要求联邦制定法以英语和法语，各自权威，并已发展一个共享意义的学说以协调诸分歧。印度在联盟层级指定诸官方语言，同时以邦语言进行甚多行政，产生一个分层的安排，其中治理的语言随政府的层级变化。南非以差异化的实践义务承认更大数目的官方语言。

3.2 来自那个字面情形的诸发现

三个发现关乎下面所提议的延伸。

一个政体能在没有一个单一特权语言的情况下运作。上面的诸安排是可行的、它们已持续，而它们示范一个政体所要求的协调不蕴含一个单一的表达媒介。那个示范要紧，因为那个相反的假定被频繁地就诸价值作出，在那里一个共同度量的不可能被当作一个论证，即集体决定在没有一个共同度量的情况下会是不可能的。

那个代价是真实的而它不均地落下。翻译是昂贵的、它引入延迟，而它产生要求裁决的诸分歧。范·帕里斯（2011）审查语言诸安排的分配后果并论证一门通用语的传播授予不平等的负担与利益，因为那些必须学习那个共同语言者承担一个母语说者避免的代价。关于语言权利的文献（金里卡与帕滕 2003）审查一个政体欠它诸语言共同体什么并记录诸安排之间的选择分配优势。

那个体制是一个制度，无论它的技术呈现。哪些语言持有官方地位、同等作准在实践中要求什么、分歧如何被解决，以及谁裁定，由宪法条款、制定法与学说所安定。它们在政治上被争议、它们被修订，而它们是可辨认的治理对象。

3.3 那个示范被向前承载

一篇关于组织规则解释的姊妹论文记录一个关于那个欧洲安排的观察，它直接关乎当下主题。在一个单一权威文本存在之处，那个文本欠决定它自己应用的主张可被通过断言一个有能力的读者只是看见那些词语所要求之物而抵抗。在若干文本同等作准而它们分歧之处，任何单一文本的不足在记录的表面，而那个系统被逼采纳一个把目的与方案置于任何一个版本之措辞之上的解释排序。多语言主义把一个被争议的哲学论题转换为一个操作上的必然。

同一个结构将在下面被就诸价值主张。在一个估值框架到位且未受挑战之处，它建构等值的主张可被通过断言它测量某样已经在那里之物而抵抗。在两个框架运作中而它们不一致之处，两者的建构性性质被展示。

§4 从语言到价值的延伸

此处所提议的延伸是一个假说，而本节陈述它、给出它的诸根据，并陈述它未能捕捉之物。

4.1 那个假说

关于那个延伸的工作假说。 在不同关系设定之内被生成的诸价值相互立于彼此，近似于诸自然语言相互立于彼此：它们携带不逐项映射的语义、它们被不同的实践生产与维系、它们编码它们的诸词汇所预设的诸历史，而以一个的诸术语渲染另一个是一个带翻译所蕴含之诸损失的翻译操作。一个持有如此关联之诸价值的政体可相应地被在一个延伸的意义上描述为多语言的，而它渲染诸价值可比较所凭的框架可被描述为它的翻译体制。

4.2 那个延伸的诸根据

异形价值的四个特征支持那个类比。

诸价值在语义上不同。生态整全被表述所用的词汇含有在财务回报的词汇中没有对应物的诸术语，而可得的诸替代是其恰当性被争议的诸近似。

诸价值在它们的生产条件上不同。一个被一个代际传递之实践所维系的价值被生产得不同于一个被市场交换所维系的，而那个差别关乎什么会算作尊重它。

诸价值携带诸历史。一个关于祖传土地的主张预设一个那个主张不重述的历史，而那个主张以土地价值之诸术语的一个渲染丢弃那个预设，同时保全那个指称。

诸价值最终抵抗逐项渲染。§7所处理的哲学文献确立某些价值对不容许保全对每一个要紧之物的共同度量，那是译者描述为不可翻译性的那个状况。

4.3 那些不类比及其分量

三个不类比贴附那个延伸，其中第三个是最严重的。

诸语言有带被承认能力的可辨认说者共同体，而一个语言的诸边界被语言实践以合理的确定性安定。一个价值语言的诸边界不以那种方式被安定，而谁算作在一个给定价值词汇中胜任被以一种芬兰语中的胜任所不是的方式争议。

诸自然语言之间的翻译有一个内在于那个实践的评价标准：一个翻译可被那些在两种语言中胜任者评估为准确或不准确。诸价值之间的转换没有可比的内在标准，因为在每一个价值词汇中胜任的诸方特征性地在一个恰当的渲染会保全什么上不一致。那个标准的缺席是那个使价值转换成为一个治理问题、而翻译保持一个手艺问题之物。

一门自然语言第三在寻常情形中不对另一门的诸说者作出诸主张。诸价值作出。一个一条河持有站位的主张是一个对着那些不持有它者的主张，以一种一个芬兰语句子不对一个泰米尔语说者作出主张的方式。那个模型因而低估那个情境的对抗性性质，而任何从那个多语言情形汲取的论证必须在它被依赖之前对着那个低估被核查。

4.4 诸发现与残余

那个延伸停靠于四个根据并携带三个不类比，其中一个恰当性内在标准的缺席是最严重的。它在下面的使用被限于制度语汇与启发式指引，没有结论从它作为一个前提被推导。它可能尽管如此在做多于那些不类比所许可之工作的风险被引入§16。

§5 通约作为一个既定研究对象

5.1 那个既定立场

使异质诸物可比较已作为一个一般社会过程被研究了数十年。埃斯佩兰与史蒂文斯（1998）把通约界定为按一个共同度量对不同实体的比较、把它当作一个带一段作为社会思想工具之悠久历史的社会过程、把它分析为一个权力模式，并审查宣告某物不可通约所涉的诸利害。它们的纲领是把通约确立为一个配得上在它自己权利中被研究的一般现象，而随后的文献已追随它。

埃斯佩兰与史蒂文斯（2008）把那个处理延伸到量化一般，审查诸数字的生产与流通并辨认诸度量对它们所测量之物所产生的诸效果。波特（1995）论证定量客观性从政治与制度压力生起并作为一个在信任稀缺之处被采纳的非人格策略而运作。德罗齐耶（1998）把统计诸范畴当作必须被建构与维系的诸惯例。鲍克与斯塔（1999）把分类系统审查为从视野退去、同时携带道德与政治后果的诸基础设施。富尔卡德（2011）显示自然的货币估值再生产激发它们建构的自然设想。估值研究这个场域已围绕价值通过诸装置与诸实践被施行这个命题发展（瓦坦 2013）。

5.2 那个让步被陈述

一个关系说明可能希望推进的两个主张被这个文献占据，而那个占据是实质的。

诸转换框架在性质上是解释性的、而等值在转换的过程中被建构这个主张，是那个场域的奠基承诺。这样诸框架被制度化、被争议，并生产权力这个主张被陈述在同一篇奠基文章中。一篇把两者之一呈现为一个发现的论文会是错的，而一个经济社会学中的评审者会如此说。

5.3 那个残余

三样东西显得剩下。

那个文献是描述性与批评性的。它审查通约如何被完成、它对它所测量之物做什么，以及它服务谁的利益。它不供出一个关于什么会使一个通约框架正当的规范说明，而一个政体应当如何建构与维持这样一个框架的问题大体在它的职责之外。

那个场域承认它自己的状况。伯曼与赫希曼（2018）观察量化的社会学更像一个体裁而非一个子领域，缺乏一般诸主张与一个共同的理论语言。那个观察辨认一个通往理论工作的开口，同时确认那个描述性地形被占据。

那第三，一个转换框架与它所排序之诸关系之间的关系，就这次综述所发现而言，未曾被作成一个判据的对象。§13提议一个。

5.4 诸发现与残余

诸转换框架的解释性与制度性性质是被确立的，而确立它的诸作品在上面被命名。那个残余在于一个关于什么使这样一个框架正当之规范说明的缺席。

§6 价值秩序与跨秩序争议的解决

对着此处所提议的说明的最近结构对手属于一个不同的传统。

6.1 那些复数秩序

博尔坦斯基与泰弗诺（2006）主张寻常争议中的辩护在一个有限数目的价值秩序之内进行，每一个围绕一个更高的共同原则被组织，诸人与诸物由之被排名。它们所辨认的诸秩序包括市场的、工业的、公民的、家庭的、受启发的，以及声名的。一个在一个秩序之内被推进的主张作为它之内的一个辩护是可理解的，而同一个主张可能在另一个之内不承载分量。

那个框架关乎当下主题，因为诸争议特征性地跨越诸秩序。一个被工业效率辩护的提议可能被公民团结或被家庭依恋所抵抗，而那些方于是在关于同一个对象的不同语域中论证。

6.2 跨秩序的妥协

它们对这样诸争议的处理是最接近一个价值转换理论的材料。跨秩序的不一致可被把属于不同世界的诸人与诸物持在一起的诸安排所安定，而这样的诸妥协确立局部且可行的诸调停。它们强调诸妥协保持不稳固，因为一方可在任何点复活属于它自己秩序的那个批评，而那个调停于是要求重新协商。

6.3 同当下说明的距离

三个差别可被记录，其中第三个留下最多空间。

那个框架是实用主义与描述性的。它审查有能力的诸行动者如何论证、它们诉诸什么，以及诸争议在实践中如何被解决。它供出没有一个安定可被判为正当所凭的判据。

那个单位是那个争议。诸妥协是在特定诸插曲中抵达的局部调停，而那个框架不处理许多这样的争议被一个共同工具事先安定于其内的那些常在制度安排。

那个框架第三被批评为消解结构权力。霍耐特（2010）论证一个围绕诸行动者之辩护能力被组织的说明失去辩护发生于其内的诸不对称。那个批评直接关乎当下这篇论文的诸关切，因为§11把一个转换框架所生产的权力当作中心。

6.4 诸发现与残余

诸复数价值秩序与安定跨它们之争议的诸妥协是被确立的。那个处理是实用主义与以争议为中心的，而它既不供出一个正当性判据，也不致意许多争议被事先安定于其内的那些常在制度。那个残余相应地是规范性与制度性的。

§7 价值对转换的抵抗

一个第三文献确立特定诸价值何时以及为何抵抗以彼此的诸术语被渲染。

7.1 不可通约性

拉兹（1986）论证某些选项立于没有更好、更糟，或相等的关系，以致未能为它们排名反映那些价值本身，而更充分的信息把那个未能留在原处。张（1997）汇集随后的辩论并发展选项可能相当而不相等的可能性。桑斯坦（1994）把那个论证带入法律，主张人类诸善沿多样种类的估值被评估，而诸法律制度既承认又压制这个多样。安德森（1993）把那个多元论奠基于一个估值诸模式的说明，在其之上诸善按对它们恰当的诸态度在种类上不同。

7.2 有争议的商品化

一个相关的文献审查以货币术语渲染诸善的特定情形。雷丁（1996）对着那个每样东西原则上可交换的图景论证，并发展不完全商品化的概念，在其之上一个善可同时受制于市场与非市场的诸理解。萨茨（2010）审查在包括参与者的易受伤害性、能动性的弱、对个体与对社会之诸结果的严重性等根据上可反对的诸市场，并强调诸市场被诸法律与诸制度所构成并相应地是公共关切的诸事项。桑德尔（2012）把一个来自胁迫的反对，关乎在不平等之下所作交换的公平，同一个来自腐蚀的反对，关乎一个善被定价时它的诸构成性规范的降格，区分开来。

泽利泽（1994）供出那个经验对应物，显示货币在使用中持续地被差异化、被指定用于特定诸目的，并被投以抵抗它形式上之可替代性的诸意义。那个发现从一个不同方向支持§5的一般立场：等值在实践中被协商而不凭那个媒介的性质成立。

7.3 那个残余

这个文献确立转换何时可反对以及当它进行时什么被失去。它在本文所关切的问题之前止步。一个接受上面每一个发现的政体仍会不得不裁定如何构造它尽管如此必须运作的框架，因为要求转换的诸决定不在转换不完美的示范时停止。从这些发现为一个常在转换制度之设计随之而来之物大体未被陈述。

7.4 诸发现与残余

诸价值对转换的抵抗是被确立的，而它的诸主要处理在上面被命名。那个残余在于从一个对转换的批评到一个必须尽管那个批评而运作之框架的设计的过渡。

§8 成本效益分析作为工作实例

如今运作中最有后果的转换框架供出本文的运行情形。

8.1 那个工具

许多法域中的监管决定被通过比较一项措施的货币化成本与它的货币化收益而评估。那个比较要求死亡风险、发病率、生态状况、时间与舒适度被以一个共同单位渲染，而一个技术之体已为此目的发展，包括统计生命的估值、引出对非市场化诸善之支付意愿的条件估值调查，以及关联现在与未来的贴现程序。

8.2 那个批评

阿克曼与海因策林（2004）论证没有有意义的货币价格附着于生命或自然、这样诸价格被生产所凭的诸技术嵌入可争议的诸假定，而这一种类的诸决定应通过民主过程反映在道德根据上被选择的诸价值。那个批评是规范性的，而它被针对那个转换框架本身。

那个辩护主张关系着这些事项的诸决定无论如何被作出、隐含的诸估值被嵌入无论什么被裁定之物，而使那些估值明确通过暴露它们改善审议。桑斯坦（1994）占据一个深思熟虑的立场，承认估值种类的多样，同时抵抗定量比较应被放弃的结论。

8.3 那个实例被结构性地读

那个实例的三个特征关乎下面的论证。

那个框架在效果上是宪制性的而在呈现上是技术性的。一个贴现率安定未来诸人在那个框架支配之每一个决定之内的站位，而它被一个那些受影响者中很少能辨认的程序所设定。

那个框架生产它自己竞争的诸术语。一个反对一个以这种方式被评估之监管决定的一方通常被迫在那个框架之内论证，凭争议一个参数，因为一个在它之外表达的反对在那个评估中没有位置。

那个框架第三已被修订，回应持续的批评，那确立这一种类的诸安排容许修订，而那些修订是政治事件。

8.4 诸发现与残余

那个工作实例到位而它的规范批评被发展。那个批评大体通过对着货币化的论证进行，而一个替代常在框架的设计保持未被规定。

§9 价值转换的诺谟斯

到这一点的综述已让步那个描述性地形并定位一个规范残余。被剩余诸节致意的对象现在可被命名。

9.1 那个对象被命名

工作定义。 一个价值转换诺谟斯是那个被制度化的解释框架，一个政体借之为集体决定的目的确立在不同关系设定中被生成之诸价值之间成立的诸关系。

那个定义的四个特征要求评论。

那个框架是被制度化的。它被诸规则、诸方法论、诸机关与诸先例所携带，而它跨它所支配的特定诸决定持续。一个被一个个体施行的单一比较行为落于那个定义之外。

那个框架是解释性的。它所固定之物是那些价值本身留下未定的诸关系，而那个固定汲取关于每一个价值中什么要紧以及一个可辩护的渲染保全什么的判断。这重述§5的立场并为它主张没有原创性。

那个框架被朝向集体决定。为其他目的运作的诸框架，包括私人审议与学术比较，落于那个定义之外，那被限于关系着一个政体所做之物的诸安排。

那个框架第四确立若干种类的诸关系。等值是那个极限情形。一个诺谟斯也可固定优先的、门槛的、可容许性的与排除的诸关系，而一个宣告一个价值在一类决定中不可容许的安排正施行一个同一个宣告一个交换率者相同家族的行为。

9.2 那个术语及其出处

诺谟斯这个术语是借来的并携带两个要求区分的在先意义。

科弗（1983）以诺谟斯指一个共同体栖居的规范宇宙，它通过一个共同体给它诸训诫意义所凭的诸叙事被生成，而在带判定意义之权威的诸制度压制诸共同体已生成的诸替代时被削减。那个用法是此处所意指的一个，而当下这篇论文延伸它：在科弗致意规范意义之生成之处，本文致意它之内的一个特定制度产物，即固定诸价值之间关系的那个框架。

施米特（2003）不同地使用诺谟斯，把它系于领土的占取与划分作为一个秩序从中进行的构成性行为。那个用法在此不被意指，而那个区分被引入，因为那个术语携带那个联想，而因为那个说明的政治出处是被争议的。

9.3 诸发现与残余

那个对象被命名、它的四个特征被陈述，而那个借来术语的被意指意义同一个可得的替代被区分开来。形成与正当性的诸问题为随之诸节而剩下。

§10 两种正义的区分

§2的第二与第三个问题是不同的，而本节把它们分开并解决那个分开所提起的一个困难。

10.1 那个区分

被提议的区分。 一个诺谟斯之形成的正义关乎谁持有站位去对它的建构与修订作出贡献，而凭什么安排他们如此做。那个诺谟斯的正义关乎那个框架本身的诸性质，独立于它前来成为它所经由的历史被评估。

那个区分在两个方向上有实践力量。一个通过一个无可指摘之过程被建构的框架可能固定使一个价值系统性地不可见的诸关系，而那个过程的无可指摘对一个如此受影响的一方供出没有答案。一个被一个不具代表性之机体建构的框架可能固定经受住审查的诸关系，而它形成中的那个缺陷是一个审查的理由，而不是产物中一个缺陷的示范。

10.2 一个从一篇姊妹论文生起的困难

那个区分遇到一个从作者自己先前工作汲取的反对，而那个反对严重到足以完整地陈述。

一篇关于价值转换的姊妹论文论证书写一条转换规则的站位被跨越诸范畴的行为所生成，以致无论谁施行一个转换获得那个事项随后被讨论所用的词汇，并断定谁拥有解释权的问题是被误置的（黄，编写中，b）。§2的第二个问题恰恰问那个问题。倘若那篇姊妹论文是对的，那个问题应被撤回。

此处所提议的解决追随一个在一篇第二姊妹论文关于组织规则解释中发展的区分（黄，编写中，a）。解释站位的授予固定那个持有者而不固定那个触及范围。在一个授予的核心那个持有者被安定而不需要解释行为去看见它；在那个边缘，那个持有者可判定什么本身被一个解释行为安定，通常被那个持有者施行。站位相应地有一个它自己的开放织理，而那两个立场一旦核心与边缘被区分就相容。

被应用于此处，那个解决读如下。一个政体可把建构一个转换框架的权威授予一个机体，而那个授予是真实的。那个机体可把什么带入那个框架、它把哪些价值当作根本容许转换，以及它把什么当作落于它职责之外，被那个机体在建构那个框架的过程中安定，而到那个程度那篇姊妹论文的论题成立。谁建构那个诺谟斯的问题因而是可问的，而它的答案是部分的：授予安定那个中心而建构的行为安定那个边缘。

10.3 那个对两种正义的后果

那个解决以一种应被记录的方式关乎那个区分。因为一个转换框架的触及范围在建构它的过程中被安定，一个诺谟斯的形成与一个诺谟斯的内容被比那个区分所暗示的更紧地连接。一个建构一个框架的机体凭同样的诸行为判定那个框架说什么与那个框架关于什么两者。那两种正义之间的区分相应地是分析性的，而不描述两个可分开的制度环节。

10.4 诸发现与残余

那个区分成立，而一篇姊妹论文为它提起的困难被一个授予之核心与边缘之间的区分回答。那两种正义被比那个分析性分开所蕴含的更紧地连接，因为一个建构一个框架的机体凭同样的诸行为安定它说什么与它关于什么。形成的处理停留于那篇关于参与正义的姊妹论文。

§11 由转换所生产的权力，与对抗权力的理据

一个转换框架显得生产权力，而那个生产显得是系统性的。那个机制在下面被铺陈，连同关于它被确立之物与一个作为回应被提议的补救。

11.1 那个环路被描述

那个机制可被陈述为一个序列。在不同设定中被生成的诸价值要求以共同术语渲染，一个关系着它们的集体决定才能被作出。那个渲染被一个框架施行。在那个框架之下所作的诸决定分配资源、权威与站位。那些分配加强其价值被那个框架有利地渲染之诸方的位置，而那些被加强的诸方被更好地定位去影响那个框架的维持与修订。随后的诸渲染相应地在先前诸渲染帮助确立的诸条件下进行。

图1。 §11中所描述的那个环路，作为一个示意图被绘制。在分开设定中被生成的诸价值被一个转换框架渲染为可比较；在那个框架之下所作的诸决定分配资源与站位；那个分配加强被有利地渲染的诸方；而那些方被更好地定位去塑造那个框架的维持。那条虚线路径是§11中所提议的那个竞争渠道，作为一个够到那个框架而不穿过那个框架已加强之诸方的分支被绘制。那个图不携带关于这些效果任何一个之量级或比率的主张，而那些框的排列不携带关于时间序的主张。

11.2 那个让步

这个环路的描述性内容是被确立的。埃斯佩兰与史蒂文斯（1998）在那篇奠基那个场域的文章中把通约分析为一个权力模式。福柯（1980）供出那个一般论题，即诸真理体制被诸权力关系维系并维系它们，当下的环路是它的一个专门化。富尔卡德（2011）记录那条返回路径，显示自然的货币估值反馈进它们从中被汲取的诸实践与诸表征。埃斯佩兰与绍德（2016）在诸排名的情形中记录反应性，显示诸度量以确认那些度量的诸方式改变那些被测量者的行为。

那个环路的描述性内容相应地是被继承的。那个内容同一个规范要求的配对，在随之的小节中被铺陈，本身实质上从既存诸传统汲取。

11.3 对抗权力及其出处

被提议的补救是，一个转换框架应被建构以致生成，同它所授予的权力并列，一个竞争那个框架本身的能力。那个提议要求在两个方向上归属。

加尔布雷思（1952）推进抗衡权力的概念，主张对集中经济权力的有效回答是有组织权力在另一侧的发展，而在这样一个发展缺席之处强者不受制约地判定诸结果。那个结构逻辑是此处所依赖的一个。

佩迪特（1997, 2012）供出那个更精确的类比。在那个共和主义说明上，自由在于支配的缺席，而一个能够任意干预的权力仅在那些受制于它者持有一个竞争它行使的被制度化能力之处与自由相容。佩迪特把民主的作者维度，凭之诸决定被作出，同那个编辑维度，凭之它们被质疑，区分开来，并主张那第二个必须在制度上区别于那第一个。

此处所推进的提议是那个结构对诸转换框架的应用：

被提议的要求。 一个转换框架把权力授予它有利地渲染的诸方。一个授予这样的权力而不设立一个竞争那个框架本身之能力的框架，倾向于一个其中竞争的诸术语被那个框架已加强的诸方所设定的状况。被提议的要求是那个竞争的制度被同那个框架并列地确立，并在结构上区别于维持它的那个机体。

那个要求是一个提议而它的经验前提是一个猜想。缺乏这样一个制度的诸框架是否事实上倾向于所描述的那个状况是一个经验问题，而§16记录本文不确立它。

11.4 诸发现与残余

那个环路被陈述而它的描述性内容被让步给确立它的那些传统。那个对抗权力补救同样被继承，而它对诸转换框架的应用作为一个停靠于一个本文不确立之猜想的提议而成立。

§12 评估一个诺谟斯的诸元原则

六个原则被提议。五个实质上被继承并被归属；那第六个从一篇姊妹论文汲取。它们作为一组供审查被供出，带它们作为一个清单的站位被留下开放。

12.1 生成性的原则

一个诺谟斯应保全它所排序之诸关系继续产生对那些关系所要求之物之裁定的能力。那个原则是那个框架自己的，而它在§13作为一个判据被发展。它最近的先行者是科弗关于诸共同体之内规范意义之生成以及这样的生成被压制所凭之诸制度行为的说明（科弗 1983）。

12.2 对抗权力的原则

一个诺谟斯应生成，同它所授予的权力并列，一个竞争那个诺谟斯本身的被制度化能力。那个原则从加尔布雷思（1952）继承，而在此处所依赖的形式中，从佩迪特（1997, 2012）继承，而§11陈述那个应用。

12.3 共同创造的原则

一个诺谟斯应通过接纳来自那些其价值它排序者之贡献的诸安排被建构。那个原则是被继承的。哈贝马斯（1996）把正当性奠基于诸规范被采纳所处的话语条件，而奥斯特罗姆（1990）把持久的自治同那些受规则影响者可参与修改它们的诸安排相关联。

12.4 非抹除的原则

一个诺谟斯不应使任何受影响的价值在它支配的诸决定之内系统性地不可表述。那个原则从两个方向被继承。弗里克（2007）辨认诠释学不义，它生起于集体解释资源中的一个空缺把一方置于一个在弄懂他们经验时不公平的劣势，并把它追溯到在社会意义被生成所凭之诸实践中的不平等参与。弗雷泽（2008）辨认错误定框，其中那个框架的构成把诸方从作为正义主体的考量中排除。通约文献抵达一个平行的发现，记录通约使一个情境的某些方面不可见（埃斯佩兰与史蒂文斯 1998）。

12.5 可修订性的原则

一个诺谟斯应对被它所排序者的修订保持开放。那个原则从同共同创造一样的诸来源被继承，而它在此处同共同创造被区分，因为一个框架可在它的奠基接纳贡献而此后封锁改变。

12.6 可容许之拒绝的原则

一个诺谟斯应接纳一方彻底谢绝转换所凭的那个举动。那个原则从关于价值转换的姊妹论文汲取，它论证一个断言在两个范畴之间没有比率成立的一方正推进一个关于那些范畴的主张，那在种类上不同于一个关于那个比率的争议，而一个无法接收这样一个主张的框架坍缩进一切都可转换、而仅诸术语剩下这个立场（黄，编写中，b）。

那个原则区别于可修订性。可修订性关乎一个被固定的关系是否可被改变。拒绝关乎那个配对是否可被否认。一个框架可许可一个比率的持续调整，同时把某个比率的存在当作超出质疑，而此处所提议的原则主张这样一个框架在一个调整无法修复的方面有缺陷。

§7的文献从那个框架之外支持那个原则。不完全商品化（雷丁 1996）、来自腐蚀的反对（桑德尔 2012），以及对可反对之诸市场的约束（萨茨 2010）各是，在当下的读法上，一个转换框架应能够接收之拒绝的诸表述。

12.7 那组作为一个整体被考量

两个观察贴附那组。

那些原则不是独立的。没有可修订性的拒绝是不稳固的，因为一个框架可接收一个拒绝并谢绝对它行动。没有共同创造的对抗权力倾向于一个被那些在它们所竞争之物中没有份的诸方所进行的竞争。那组作为一个其诸成员相互支持的整体被供出。

那些原则可能冲突。一个对拒绝与修订最大限度开放的框架可能无法安定任何东西，那对一个必须裁定的政体是一个缺陷。那组供出没有为这样诸冲突的排序，而§16记录那个省略。

12.8 诸发现与残余

六个原则被提议，其中五个被归属于既存诸传统而那第六个同它在那组之内最近的邻居被区分。那组既非独立也非被排序，而那个的诸后果被引入§16。

§13 生成性保全的判据

§12的诸原则陈述诸所欲之物而不供出一个检验。一个在下面被提议，而本文的实质贡献停靠于它。

13.1 那个判据被陈述

被提议的判据。 一个价值转换诺谟斯就一个给定的配对而言是可辩护的，当它保全它所排序之诸关系产生一个对它已在它们之间固定之关系之进一步裁定的能力时。它是不可辩护的，当它熄灭那个能力时，无论它所固定的关系是否准确，而无论任何一方是否被排除于它的建构之外。

13.2 那个判据的根据

那个判据从那个框架推导而它的根据在那里。倘若诸价值在诸关系之内被生成，而倘若生成它们的诸关系也生成对它们所要求之物的诸裁定，那么一个固定两个价值之间一个关系的框架已进入它所排序的那个关系场域。在那个固定把那个场域留得能够产生一个进一步裁定之处，那个框架已临时地安定一个问题，那是一个为集体决定之框架被要求做之物。在那个固定移除那个场域产生那个问题任何进一步裁定之能力之处，那个框架已以一个被安定的数量替换一个生成性关系，而那个损失落于那个关系本身。

13.3 同准确性的距离

那个判据刻意地就一个转换是否正确沉默，而那个沉默要求辩护。

§7的文献确立许多转换不容许正确答案，故一个准确性判据会恰恰在那些要紧的情形中不可适用。一个能力判据在那些情形中适用，因为一个关系可保有或失去产生一个进一步裁定的能力，无论任何裁定是否独一地正确。

那个判据相应地不同地为两个失败排序。一个固定一个不可辩护之比率、同时把那个问题留下开放的框架已犯一个它所排序之关系可改正的错误。一个固定一个可辩护之比率并闭合那个问题的框架已移除第一种类之诸错误被发现所凭的手段。在当下的说明上那第二个是更严重的制度失败，而这个排序是那个判据的首要主张。

13.4 同那个判据家族的关系

那个判据有两个同胞。在一篇关于组织规则解释的姊妹论文中，一个解释在它熄灭解释者与被解释一方之间关系产生同一问题之一个进一步解释的能力时被持为不义（黄，编写中，a）。在一篇关于参与的姊妹论文中，一个安排在它保全受影响诸关系产生成问题之环节之一个进一步裁定的能力时被持为充分（黄，编写中，c）。在关于价值转换的姊妹论文中，一个转换在那个对着其一个等值被断言的一方不再能质疑那个等值成立时被持为不义（黄，编写中，b）。

那四个共享一个形式：一个行为或一个制度被由它对一个关系产生那个行为所安定之事项的一个进一步裁定之能力所做之物评估。那个复现作为那个形式的弱证据被供出，以那个根据，即一个在四个领域中被抵达的判据比一个为一个单一情形被建构的更可能正追踪某样东西。那个证据是弱的，因为那四个被一个作者在一个框架之内发展，而一个共同的起源是那个趋同的一个替代解释，本文无法排除它。

13.5 对那个工作实例的应用

被应用于§8的框架，那个判据产出一个不同于那个标准批评的评估。

那个标准批评主张生命与生态状况的货币化诸估值是不准确的，而那个不准确不可救济。在当下的判据上那个问题是不同的：那个框架是否把它所排序的诸关系留得能够产生一个对它所固定之诸估值的进一步裁定。一个发布它诸参数、接收对它们的诸反对、接纳一个给定配对根本不应被作出的诸主张，并回应地修订的框架，满足那个判据，无论它当前的诸参数是否可辩护。一个其诸参数仅可被以它自己诸术语进行的论证竞争、而没有一个那个配对本身可被否认所凭之渠道的框架，失败于那个判据，无论它的诸参数是否被好好选择。

那个评估作为那个判据之运作的一个示例被供出。任何特定法域的诸安排是否满足它是一个本文不致意的经验问题。

13.6 诸发现与残余

那个判据被提议、被奠基于那个框架，并同准确性被区分开来。它的诸同胞连同它们趋同的替代解释被记录，而它对那个工作实例的应用被示例。生成能力的评估保持没有一个程序，§16把这个作为那个首要弱点引入。

§14 同既存正义与治理理论的关系

五个立场要求比较，而它们之一要求谨慎，因为一个自然的对照会误描它被对着划出的那个立场。

14.1 一个被假定指数之下的正义

罗尔斯（1971）建构一个正义的说明，在其中那些基本善供出分配比较的通货。那个建构要求那若干基本善被加权为一个单一指数，而规定那个加权的困难在那个理论之内被承认并自那以后被诸评论者施压。同当下主题的关系是那个指数施行本文归于一个转换框架的工作，而那个理论在这样的可比较性已被确保之后进行。当下这篇论文取那个建构当作被给定之物为它的对象。

14.2 通过话语的正当性

哈贝马斯（1996）把诸规范的正当性奠基于它们采纳的话语条件。同当下主题的关系要求谨慎，因为话语理论致意有效性的构成并因而比一个平的对照会暗示的更接近当下的说明。被提议的差别是一个对象的：话语理论规定诸规范被采纳所凭之程序上的诸条件，而当下这篇论文探问一个独立于产生它之程序被评估的常在框架之诸性质，那是§10的区分。

14.3 不完全可比较性之下的评价

同森（1970, 1992）的关系要求谨慎，而准确地陈述它改善本文的位置。

森自1970年以来已论证完整性不应被强加于评价性诸排序，而那个能力进路以偏序、支配排名与交集方法进行，恰恰因为一个跨异质诸能力的完整加权是不可得的，并在他的说明上对许多判断是不必要的。任何这个工作之体假定异质诸能力可相互转换的暗示会是错的。

那个关系相应地是互补的。森确立被说理的评价能在不完全可比较性之下进行，那是一个关于一个评价者可断定什么的结果。当下这篇论文关乎那些尽管如此必须为有约束力之集体决定产生确定诸结果的制度，在那里偏序留下一个某个程序会安定的残余。什么安定那个残余，而在什么术语上，是此处的对象。

14.4 规则的治理与度量的治理

奥斯特罗姆（1990, 2005）区分操作、集体选择与宪制的诸规则层级，并审查自治诸共同体维系它们所处的诸安排。宪制层级的选择，关乎哪些行动者持有站位以及哪些制度形式可得，接近于当下主题。被提议的差别是那个框架处理支配行为的诸规则与作成它们的站位，而把诸规则的功过被评估所用的评价性诸术语当作大体被给定。对那个框架的评论已注意到它对权力的有限处理，而§11把那个当作中心。

14.5 权力与等值的生产

福柯（1980）主张诸真理体制被在诸权力关系之内构成。此处所提议的专门化，即权力制度化诸等值关系，对本文不是原创的：它实质上是埃斯佩兰与史蒂文斯（1998）的立场，它们把通约分析为一个权力模式。当下这篇论文向那个专门化所添加之物是§11的规范要求与§13的判据。

14.6 诸发现与残余

那个说明已被安置在五个立场旁边。一个关系被证明是互补的，在一个自然的对照本会误描它之处，而那个权力论题向等值的专门化欠通约文献。

§15 该说明在一个更广纲领中的位置

15.1 那个回路

那个说明完成一个诸姊妹论文在其他点进入的回路。诸关系生成诸价值，而诸关系的复数性说明它们所生成之物的异形性。诸方对再生产那些关系作出贡献所凭的诸安排是那篇关于参与之姊妹论文的主题。异形价值被渲染为可比较所凭的框架是本文的主题。那个框架对特定诸案件的应用是那篇关于解释之姊妹论文的主题。被裁定之物发端于集体行动，而行动重制那个回路从中开始的诸关系。

图2。 那个说明坐落于其内的那个回路，带诸姊妹论文被标记。那个图记录诸论文之间的诸关系并不断言时间序列，因为那些环节复现并交叠而一个政体通常一次从事若干。

15.2 那个优先问题被谢绝

一个结论从那个回路暗示自己，即那个转换框架是根基性的，而其他正义诸问题预设它。那个结论在它的强形式中被谢绝，出于那篇关于参与之姊妹论文中所给的缘由。那个框架的构成先于在它之内什么被亏欠之诸问题这个主张已被推进并被辩护（弗雷泽 2008），而它的一个关系重述会继承它所招致的诸反对。

此处所断言的更弱主张关乎传播。一个转换框架中的一个缺陷在下游作为一个一方无法竞争的决定出现，因为那个反对会被表达所用的诸术语在那个评估中没有位置。一个在决定之点呈现的不义相应地可能起源于那个框架被建构之点，而把这样的诸缺陷追溯到它们的起源是那个说明可被派上的一个用途。

15.3 诸发现与残余

那个回路被铺陈而诸姊妹论文被标记于它之上。那个强优先主张被谢绝，而一个关于诸缺陷之传播的更弱主张在它的位置被推进。

§16 该说明的界限

那个说明现在完整到足以被定价。

没有那个判据的程序。 §13的判据转在一个关系产生一个进一步裁定的能力上，而没有程序被供出，那个能力可借之在一个给定案件中被评估。什么会算作一个问题保持开放的证据、谁会评估它，以及对着什么基线，是未安定的。这是那个说明的首要弱点。

没有估值方法论。 一个被此处所论证的一切说服的政体仍会要求一个比较诸价值以裁定的手段，而那个说明供出无一。它陈述一个框架上的诸条件而不供出一个框架。

那组原则是未被排序的。 §12记录那六个原则可能冲突，而那个说明供出没有排序。一个对拒绝与修订最大限度开放的框架可能无法安定任何东西，那对一个其目的是许可裁定的制度是一个缺陷。

对抗权力的经验前提是一个猜想。 §11中所推进的要求停靠于那个命题，即缺乏一个竞争制度的诸框架倾向于一个其中竞争的诸术语被那个框架已加强之诸方所设定的状况。那个命题是可信的而它在此不被确立。

那个模型可能在做未被许可的工作。 §4记录诸语言与诸价值之间的三个不类比，其中一个恰当渲染之内在标准的缺席是严重的。从那个多语言情形汲取的诸论证可能携带一个那个价值情形不支持的可翻译性假定，而一个读者应带那个风险在视野中处理每一个这样的论证。

那个描述性地形是借来的。 如§5所让步，诸转换框架的解释性与充满权力之性质在别处被确立。此处所供出之物是一个规范上层建筑，而一个判断那个上层建筑单薄的读者会发现别的甚少。

两个主张被对着这个清单引入。§13的判据陈述一个转换框架上的条件，那些被概览的文献显得不陈述，而它以一个在准确性不可得之诸情形中可适用的形式如此做，那些是有旨趣的诸情形。那次综述其次以某种精确定位那个残余显得躺在何处，那保有它的价值，独立于那个判据是否被接受。

§17 开放的问题

本文辨认一个被忽视的结构。它不完成一个关于它的理论，而下面的诸问题被持为所供出之物中更有价值的部分。

倘若那个结构是真实的，下列诸问题立即生起。

那第一组关乎那个模型。

Q1。 那个多语言模型延伸多远，在§4的诸不类比击败它之前？一个恰当渲染之内在标准的缺席是最可能误导的不类比，而定位那些来自翻译的论证停止承载之点会改善那个说明。

Q2。 诸价值语言容许独立于渲染它们之框架的辨认吗？那个说明谈论在不同设定中被生成的诸价值，而这样的诸设定是否确定地个体化诸价值语言，还是那个个体化本身是那个框架的一个行为，是未安定的。

那第二组关乎那个制度。

Q3。 什么制度形式能承载§11的竞争要求？那个要求规定一个框架与一个能够竞争它之机体之间的结构关系，而哪些既存制度满足那个规定，以及以什么代价，是未被审查的。

Q4。 一个拒绝在实践中如何可同一个比率争议被区分？§12的原则转在那个区分上，而一个接收一个主张的框架必须在回应之前分类它，那是一个被那个框架施行于一个针对它的主张之上的解释行为。

Q5。 那六个原则能被排序吗？一个面对它们之间一个冲突的政体要求那个说明不供出的指引，而一个有原则的排序是否存在，还是那些冲突要逐案被安定，是开放的。

那第三组关乎那个判据，而诸问题在此是最尖锐的，因为那些主张是最强的。

Q6。 什么证据关乎一个问题是否保持开放？那个判据在回溯中被以信心应用，一旦一个配对在一个长时期内可见地未能被重开。在一个框架被设计之时应用它是那个会有用之物，而它保持未被供出。

Q7。 生成能力容许诸程度吗，而倘若如此那个判据要求什么门槛？保全产生一个进一步裁定的能力与勉强保全它相容，而那个判据是否要求多于勉强的保全，而在什么根据上，是未安定的。

Q8。 一个框架能就一个配对满足那个判据而就另一个失败于它吗？那个判据被成对地陈述，而一个对一个框架作为一个整体的评估是否可从成对的诸评估被组装，还是要求某样进一步之物，是开放的。

那最后一个问题是那个说明被导向的一个，而它被置于最后，因为上面一切关乎它。

Q9。 在什么制度与关系条件下一个转换框架跨时间保有它的生成能力？诸框架安定入用法、诸参数获得先例的权威、被一个框架加强的诸方积累对它维持的影响，而朝向终局性的寻常压力持续地运作。一个在被确立时满足那个判据的框架可能在一代之后失败于它，而没有任何人的任何封锁行为。什么跨这样的漂移维系生成能力是那个说明之实践价值所依赖的问题，而它完全是开放的。

一个关于那个清单形状的收尾观察。前两组的诸问题能在既存学科之内被追寻，而若干正在那里以其他描述被追寻。第三组的诸问题不能，因为它们关乎一个在此处被推进的判据。一个发现那次综述有用而那个判据不能说服的读者，可取那第一个而留那第二个，因为那次综述关于那个残余躺在何处的诸发现不取决于那个判据是正确的。那个反面不可得：那个判据是一个关于一个转换框架是为了什么的提议，而它要求§9的重述去说它是关于什么的一个判据。

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关于方法的一则附记。 没有形式装置被使用。§11的环路能被以动态系统的记号书写，带一个框架对应一个参数而影响的积累对应一个慢变量，而一篇关于历史动态的伴随作品做某样这类之物。在此处被写出，这样一个模型会推导没有那个散文不陈述之物，并会供出一个那个论证不曾赢得的精确表象。那个记号会变得诚实所处的诸条件被在 Q6 到 Q9 中铺陈。

关于本次综述的一则附记。 此处所汲取的诸文献不均地相互援引，而上面所记录的若干趋同是在那次综述的过程中被定位的。归于通约社会学与价值秩序社会学的诸描述性主张承载本文诸让步的分量，而它们出于那个缘由被保守地陈述。在一个来源被二手地读之处，停靠于它的诸主张被相应地保持弱。

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